

YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY

ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Shutdown Project

Ecumenical Coalition Experience

O.H. 216

FATHER EDWARD STANTON

Interviewed

by

Philip Bracy

on

April 5, 1981

## FATHER EDWARD STANTON

Father Edward Stanton was born in Hubbard, Ohio, February 22, 1930. He graduated from Hubbard High School and went to Athenaeum of Ohio where he graduated in 1957 with a Bachelor's in Philosophy.

Since that time Father Stanton has been in the employment of the Youngstown Catholic Diocese. His father, the chief executive of the city of Hubbard and formally Director of Human Development and Social Action for the Diocese, was possibly of great help to Father Stanton's role as the Diocese community outreach person because the teenage Stanton was brought up around how things are done.

Father Stanton also served as head of the Federation of Priest Councils for a few years and is one of a core of priests who fought the conservative wing of the church in the 1950's. This effort brought together many of the liberal circles of the church which served as the basis of such national Catholic organizations as the Catholic Committee on Urban Ministry headquartered in Notre Dame. This blend of politics and awareness of social justice helped create the philosophical foundation for Father Stanton. One other event seems also to have been added to this, and that is the fact that he worked several summers in the mills helping him relate especially well during the Ecumenical Coalition's opening effort. Father Stanton presently is in residence at St. Patrick's Church in Youngstown.

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INTERVIEWEE: FATHER EDWARD STANTON

INTERVIEWER: Philip Bracy

SUBJECT: Founding of Ecumenical Coalition, Involvement in Coalition, Internal structure of Coalition, Mahoning Valley Economic Development Committee, Save Our Valley, Meetings concerning the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Shutdown.

DATE: April 5, 1981

B: This is an interview with Father Edward Stanton for the Youngstown State University Oral History Project concerning the shutdown of the Youngstown Sheet & Tube by Philip Bracy at Geneva, Ohio, on Sunday, April 5, 1981, at 2:00 p.m.

S: My name is Father Ed Stanton. I'm a priest of the Diocese of Youngstown. I was ordained in 1957 after studying philosophy and theology at Mount St. Mary's of the West in Cincinnati, Ohio, and two years previous to that at St. Charles College in Catonsville, Maryland. I was born and raised in Hubbard, Ohio, attended St. Patrick's Grade School and the Hubbard High School, and am, therefore, a native of the valley.

In my priesthood I served in the North Side of Youngstown, the City of Warren, Austintown, and the East Side of Youngstown before going full-time into social action work as Director of Human Development and Social Action for the Diocese of Youngstown. That began in 1972. Prior to that I served on the board of the National Federation of Priest Councils for the maximum term of four years. My first assignment on that board was National Social Action Chairman. It was there that I became first deeply interested and involved in social action.

From that I came back to work for the Diocese and got involved so that when the position was established for Human Development and Social Action Director, I applied for the job and was assigned to that position by Bishop Malone.

It was in that capacity that I was working when the fateful closing of the Youngstown Sheet & Tube came about. Also, during that time in the early 1970's, I had become affiliated with Bill Sullivan and the Council of Governments and an offspring when the Council of Governments was broken up into the Eastgate Development and Transportation Agency and the Western Reserve Economic Development Agency. I came on the board as treasurer of the Western Reserve Economic Development Agency and had been very involved as an active board member with that group in trying to retain steel in the Mahoning Valley.

One of the first things we did was to challenge the EPA regulations for steel. We won that even though it was reversed by a federal court later on, but at least the bureaucrats saw the wisdom of our stance, that when you talk about the impact on a community you don't just look at the environmental impact, you also look very closely at the impact that is going to take place on the economy if a number of industries are forced to close. It was with that background, when I was called by Bishop Malone to work and see what the possibilities of the formation of an Ecumenical Coalition were and what might be done about the situation in the valley, that I felt I was as prepared as anyone could be given the suddenness of the decision even though many of us might have seen something like this coming. It was with this background that I began work on the proposed reopening.

B: Where were you and how did you find out about the shutdown of the Sheet and Tube or the announcement?

S: Sullivan, myself, and others from the Western Reserve Economic Development Agency had been in New York the previous week meeting with engineers, both from this country and from Japan, looking at the possibility of strengthening the industry in the valley by the installation of giant, multi-ton blast furnaces to replace some of the smaller capacity ones we had here. That had grown out of a transportation study that we had done showing that we could pretty well dissolve the transportation disadvantage by the use of unitrains and central dumping facilities or unloading facilities.

We were proceeding along that line and for that reason we were in New York to meet with these various groups and see what technology was available and where we might proceed from there.

My brother lives in Connecticut and it was that time of the year when the bluefish were running in Long Island Sound, so I decided as long as I was that close I just might as well duck up there and get a couple days of fishing in. I was coming back to the office on Monday. My car was at the airport in Cleveland so I picked it up, drove down to Warren, and was going to have lunch with a friend there before going on into Youngstown. He was tied up for a few minutes so I called the office and they told me that Sullivan was looking for me, that something had happened, and that I should call him. I called and it was right around noon when Bill told me that the announcement had come that morning at ten o'clock. I was in the air, I suppose, when the announcement was made, literally and figuratively, and really found out about it at noon when I got back and called up the office.

B: After that how were you drawn into the Ecumenical Coalition once you got back?

S: Once I got back--I never did get to the office till about Wednesday--I went immediately to the WREDA office and we started making plans there. I had called Washington to see what, if anything, might be done by way of either reopening the plant or getting something else in, and what kind of monies were going to be available to work with from the Economic Development Agency.

As a result of that Bill and I along with Frank Leseganich went to Washington on Wednesday to a series of meetings. It was in these series of meetings that I was engaged when Bishop Burt from the Episcopal Diocese of Ohio called my boss Bishop Malone and suggested that maybe there was some role that the churches ought to play. Neither one of them had any concrete idea about what eventually came. I'm sure it was the furthest from both their minds. I got back late Friday night and there were messages both in the office and at the rectory from Bishop Malone telling me that he had cancelled all of my appointments for Monday morning, that there was this breakfast meeting at, I believe, eight o'clock in the morning at the Cathedral rectory at which we wanted to talk about the possibilities, and that I was to attend. So I attended that meeting.

That was the first of a number of meetings out of which it grew. I would be less than honest to say that I went to that meeting with any enthusiasm because I didn't have any idea of what we were going to get into either. I figured I didn't want to spend what I considered very crucial and valuable time right while the iron was hot to strike sitting around writing sermon outlines and letters to the editor and that sort of thing. I thought it was time for some concrete action. I was somewhat pleasantly surprised by the meeting itself and the tone the meeting took. As things developed, of course, I felt it was the way to go.

B: Who was present at that first meeting?

S: At the first meeting there was, of course, Bishop Malone and Bishop Burt, Chuck Rawlings from Bishop Burt's staff, myself, and Rabbi Burkowitz. I think Dave Stone was there. John Sharick, Ed Weisheimer, Bishop Hughes, and Lonnie Simons were there. I don't remember whether Burt Campbell was there or not. I'm sure there were a couple of others, but I really can't remember. Mark Burnett from Washington was there.

B: The Policy Institute?

S: Yes, the Institute for Policy Studies. He was a friend of Chuck Rawlings, of Bishop Burt, and he was there just as the think-tank type to go over some possibilities with us. Nothing really came out of that meeting, except that we were going to hold another meeting and see what could be done.

There were some definite things given. Don Walton was also at that meeting. There were four of us giving the charge, at that time, to start working to set up some other possibilities of some other things. The four that became the steering committee then were Don Walton, the Methodist Superintendent, Burt Campbell representing the Presbyterian faith, John Sharick, Chuck Rawlings representing the Episcopalian group, Bishop Burt, myself for the Diocese, and Bishop Malone. There were others working with us at that time, but that was the basic group that got the next meeting together.

B: The follow-up meetings took place a couple of days later?

S: No, there were a series of planning meetings that took place from then on. We went to, I think it was about ten days or two weeks later, Washington where we met at

Mr. Alpervitz's place, the Center for Economic Alternatives. Some of the guys from the Institute for Policy Studies and some other think-tank types were there. John Sharick, Ed Weishiemer, Chuck Rawlings, and I were there. I took along with me one of the staffers from the Western Reserve Economic Development Agency, who had a ton of papers to back up anything they wanted to know. At the meeting we pretty well decided we were going to hold a one or two-day seminar, conference-type thing and bring a lot more people in. We started to outline, pretty well, the format we were going to take. It was in October, then, that we held this two-day meeting on a Friday and Saturday, and it was really out of that meeting that the Ecumenical Coalition sprang.

B: Do you remember approximately how many planning meetings were held?

S: I would guess four or five. There was a lot of telephone calling in between and that sort of thing, but basically there were four or five meetings where we all sat down together.

B: Who actually put together the October 28th and 29th program, the Steering Committee?

S: The Steering Committee did pretty much. A lot of it grew out of that meeting in Washington, but it was actually the Steering Committee with probably some additions. Weisheimer probably sat in on some of it and others at various times, but the basic core group was the Steering Committee.

B: Was there any particular reason that the politicians weren't invited?

S: It was just that we didn't see any place for them. We were trying to see what we could do to become a coalition. We were not sure whether there was anything we could do except to say a prayer. They were not excluded because we said we didn't want them. It's just that there was no reason to bring them in so we didn't invite them. The ones at the meeting were either Economic Development types such as Sullivan, think-tank types from Washington and New York, national staff people from the various churches in Washington and New York, local clergy, and that was about it.

B: The main point that would have come out of the Steel Crises Conference, aside from the formation of the Ecumenical Coalition, would be what in your opinion?

S: There were about four things that we decided to do. The life of the crisis in Washington D.C. was about 48 hours, so we decided we weren't going to get into that bag. We were going to make them know that Youngstown was here and we were going to be here for awhile, we were going to stick around, and we were going to keep it under their noses. I think we did that extremely well.

We also decided that there were moral and ethical questions that we, as a religious community, should speak about, and this we did. We said we would put out a pastoral letter over Thanksgiving, which we did. That, of course, is a matter history. It has gotten rather wide acceptance around the world, let alone around the country.

We also said that we were going to maybe look at the possibility of perhaps, and it was that day, doing something either to reopen the mill or use the facilities that were there to get jobs back in the valley. That was basically the three things we decided we might do something about.

B: I believe on October 29th, it was a Saturday, on the Bishop's request you were asked to bring together the bishops and judiciaries, could you relate how that came about?

S: As the Friday thing developed there was a natural progression that was started. If you were astute at all, you could see it coming. Bishop Malone being a practical man knew it was going to cost bucks. He said, "Now, before we make any big commitments we better find out what kinds of bucks we have." He got me at the end of the day and asked me to go ahead and put together a breakfast meeting, just a coffee and doughnuts type thing, the next morning bringing in the major judicatories that would be represented to try and come up with some sort of an idea about how much we were going to spend. If we needed \$25,000, could we raise it? If we needed \$50,000, could we raise \$50,000? If we need \$50,000 and we can only raise \$25,000, where do we cut back?

We had that breakfast meeting. I forget the exact numbers, but everybody there committed to their fair share as we saw it at that time with a proviso that if we took the next step we were going to need an awful lot more, but this was sort of a preliminary.



The other thing that came out of that very shortly thereafter, cosponsored by the Western Reserve Economic Development Agency and the Coalition, was the Beetle Study, a quick, down and dirty study, which cost approximately \$30,000 and was split half and half between the Coalition and WREDA. In that study we found out that given a certain set of circumstances, in the opinion of Beetle and the group that studied it with him, something could be done. Then, of course, the Coalition made the next commitment to go the rest of the way.

B: First of all there are a couple of questions that follow-up on that Saturday meeting. Approximately how many persons attended that meeting?

S: Roughly fifty.

B: Could you tell me what hours it ran?

S: It was pretty much all day Friday from midmorning till supertime and the Saturday breakfast meeting broke up in midafternoon. There was a good chunk of hours in there.

B: You mentioned the formation of the Coalition. What structure was a result of that?

S: It was very loose at first, there was no structure to amount to anything. There was a lot of talk and a consensus grew that Bishop Malone being the resident Bishop of the largest constituency involved should chair it. We never got much beyond a chairman because it was not going to be that formal a structure. I don't even remember whether it was at that time or later that John Sharick became vice-chairman.

B: Then you had basically two committees, the executive committee that set policy and the steering committee that developed how to achieve that policy?

S: That's right. Not too long after that, in November, at a joint meeting of the executive committee and the steering committee--the steering committee was almost a staff to the executive committee--a couple of us, well, all of us really, brought up the fact that if we were going to run something like this, there had better be an executive director or staff director or something because you couldn't run something like this with a committee. The more we got into it and started describing the person that was needed, the background that was needed, et cetera, and the time elements the more we realized that we couldn't bring

somebody in from the outside even though he was an expert and take 90 to 180 days to let him find where Federal Street was and where Campbell was and things like that. We needed somebody from on the scene. As that developed, if I remember correctly, it was Bishop Thomas, the Methodist Bishop from Canton, who finally turned to Bishop Malone and said, "Well, I think there's only one question here; are you going to release Ed to do this?" Bishop Malone turned to me and he said, "Do you want to be released." I said, "Sure," so that was that.

B: Could you elaborate on the Beetle Report, what it's main focus was?

S: On the October 28th and 29th meeting when we decided in a very nebulous way that perhaps part of the role we could perform was looking into the feasibility of reopening the mill, the steering committee, working with Bill Sullivan and some others, decided that the best way to do it was a quick, down and dirty study that would look at the possibilities and then come back, if that were positive, with a much more elaborate follow-up study. We contacted George Beetle. George earned his undergraduate degree in engineering, and his graduate degree in economics. We figured that was a nice mix. George was also familiar with the valley because he was the one who had done the Economic Advantage or Disadvantage Transportation Study for us under a federal grant. He was also known to local steel companies because as part of that transportation study we had gathered from them their very private statistics, which they gave us freely and none of which ever leaked. His credibility was very well established.

We contacted George. He flew in and Bill Sullivan and Pat McMahon from Bill's staff, George, and myself went out and met with Tom Cleery, the Executive Vice-president of the then Youngstown Sheet & Tube. He brought in Dr. Jim Smith, who was his research engineering director. We sat down and after about half an hour when they had established that in their opinion George Beetle could do the job, they said, "What do you want from us." We said, "Anything you can give us." For about the next half an hour or forty five minutes, they outlined what would be available to us and how. That was basically any information that they had on the closed or to be closed portions of Youngstown Sheet & Tube properties in the Mahoning Valley. What that meant was any historical information they had, any planning information, anything in the computers, anything on cost, anything on production, anything on

manning tables, or anything that they had that could be helpful, he had access to. Besides that they offered George Beetle office space right there with access to the computers and access to their personnel that might have been able to tell him something that the computer didn't have. It was the highest level of cooperation that I could imagine without them doing the study themselves, which would have been suspect anyhow, not that I would suspect it but it would be suspect coming out of that company.

From then on George worked and did a yeoman's job of producing what became known as the Beetle Report. That arrived in town by plane somewhere around midnight. We sat and read it until three o'clock in the morning. The only guarantee we had given Sheet & Tube was that they would have veto power over anything in that report. The report went to them the next morning.

B: What day was that?

S: That was somewhere in early November after the October meeting. We had guaranteed that, so on December 14th, 15th, or 16th, whenever that date was, two copies of it went out to Sheet & Tube. We met with them a couple of hours later when they had had a chance to review it. If I remember correctly, there were two pages or three pages that they wanted deleted. Actually what it was was pricing information. What they didn't want was competitors to know their method of setting prices. Also, if we would ever reopen the mill and use the same price formula, we wouldn't want competitors to know what it was either. George Beetle took no exception to it and neither did any of the rest of us.

The Beetle Report was then retyped, or those sections retyped, printed, a press conference was held, and the Beetle Report was released.

B: Was the Beetle Report a result of a meeting of Bill Sullivan with Mr. Solomon, to the best of your knowledge?

S: The basic use that we were going to make of the Beetle Study was, if it became positive, to make a much more detailed study. The Beetle Study would be the basis for an application to the Federal Government for funding. Bill Sullivan already had indications from a meeting in November with Solomon, who was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, that such money would be forthcoming if and when a hard-nosed feasibility study came down. When it came down on the 16th of December we were pretty firm in that we couldn't move from there. There was some sort of a record set because it was on

the 31st of December that the grant from HUD to do the full-blown feasibility study was signed.

B: Prior to the signing, though, there was a White House meeting approximately December 20th arranged, I believe, by Congressman Carney. Could you tell me, to the best of your recollection, who was there and the topic of discussion?

S: It was called by the Congressman, you're correct in that, but it was at the behest of agencies involved, primarily HUD, the Treasury, the Department of Labor, the EPA, and of course, Commerce, and EDA. It was held in the Commerce Department. It was chaired by Bob Hall, who was the assistant Secretary for Economic Development, but all these other groups had people there. Without looking at a list, I can't tell you who was there from each group, but those were basically the governmental groups that were there. The Senator's offices were there. In fact, both senators were there for part of the meeting and their offices were represented throughout the total meeting, and of course, the Congressman and some of his staff. From Youngstown, from the Coalition--I'm sure I'm going to miss someone--but Bishop Malone, Bishop Burt, Chuck Rawlings, myself, and Burt Campbell were there. From WREDA Bill Sullivan and George Beetle were there. Chuck Carney, Frank Leseganich from District 26 of the Steelworks, Jim Griffith the former director of District 26 of the Steelworkers, and Phil Richley the incoming Mayor of Youngstown were there. There were probably others that don't occur to me right now, staff people for some of these and that sort of thing.

B: The basic thrust, though, at the meeting was to present the Beetle Report?

S: The basic thrust of the meeting was that they were telling us that the Congressman had already set up the Mahoning Valley Economic Development Corporation or what was to become MVEDC. The bureaucrats were saying they wanted to deal with one group or at least one lead group back there and how we put our act together they didn't care. The message came through loud and clear; get your act together and then come back.

I've never been more disgusted with a politician in my whole life than I was with Charlie Carney at that meeting. Charlie Carney saw Bill Sullivan as a possible threat somewhere down the political line and, as such, he cheap-shotted the Beetle Report, he had Jim Griffith cheap-shot the Beetle Report. I think it did a great disservice to the valley. That's personal opinion, number one thousand and one, but that's the way I felt

about it at the time. Whether Sullivan had political aspirations or not, I don't think should have entered into something like that. Charlie showed himself to be a politician and not a statesman in any way, shape, or form at that point.

We got the message. Sullivan and Beetle defended it as best they could, but all it was was a preliminary study and these guys were going on about all sorts of things. I can't remember it because I got so angry about halfway through the meeting I couldn't see straight, let alone remember anything.

When we came back from that meeting it was all pretty much up in the air. The Coalition members were somewhat vacillating. We weren't sure whether we should take the lead or not and whether or not that was our role, but when we saw the performance of the politician we decided somebody better get in there who is going to keep this thing in some sort of balance.

B: Was there any relationship, working or otherwise, between Charles Carney and Jim Griffith in terms of past work experience?

S: Yes, Charlie Carney was hired by Jim Griffith to be a staff man for District 26 of the Steelworkers. He held that position all the time that he was in the State Senate. He was an employee of the Steelworkers and Jim Griffith was his boss. Jim Griffith, I would say, was his mentor, he's the guy who made Charlie and that was that. I liked Jim, Lord rest him, he is dead now and gone. The fact that he's a relative of mine enters into it, but I just don't think that was the greatest performance I ever saw him deliver.

B: Upon returning to Youngstown after the December 20th meeting, I believe there was a meeting on December 22nd or 23rd called by Bishop Malone?

S: Yes, we had decided in Washington at the end of that meeting that there would be a meeting followed by a press conference at the congressman's office some time in the next week before Christmas. At that meeting it would be decided who was going to be the lead group and who was going to take over. It was very clear at that time that there was going to be a large grant that was eminent for the feasibility study, who was going to control it and that sort of thing were all the questions.

I think that the Coalition was of the mind to just say if we can find somebody that's clear-cut, a leader,

we will go with that. If there is some sort of a super coalition, if you will, that will come out of this, we are willing to go with that.

A couple of days later, two days before the meeting, I got a call that Congressman Carney had held a press conference and he had referred to the Beetle Report as ill-conceived and ill-timed. A reporter friend of mine called me and said, "Would you respond to that?" I said, "There ain't no way I'm going to respond to that until I clear a few things with the Coalition members." I was scheduled that same day to have a meeting with Bishop Malone to see what our response might be at the meeting with the Congressman's office. I purposely did not mention this to the Bishop until after we had made some strategy because I didn't want, in any way, to throw oil on the fire.

When I did that he said, "Well, I think that makes it pretty clear-cut. I want to meet with the Congressman before we have that meeting in his office." I forget the time sequence, I think it was Friday morning in his office. On Thursday in the late afternoon we had a meeting in Bishop Malone's office at which Phil Richley, Jim Griffith, the congressman, Rabbi Berkowitz, Bishop Malone, Bishop Hughes, and myself attended. I think John Sharick and/or Burt Campbell were there. Don Walton, I believe, was there also. At that time we pretty well solidified a position that the lead agency was going to be the Ecumenical Coalition because we had nothing politically involved and we had nothing economically involved. We were the very interested bystanders who could give the overall thing to them without a lot of vested interest getting caught up into it.

The Bishop made his presentation of why the Ecumenical Coalition should be the lead group. It was countered by all three gentlemen and at the end of that thirty-minute presentation the Bishop said, "As I was saying about thirty minutes ago gentlemen . . .", and that was the end of the discussion. I was talking to Rabbi Berkowitz later and he said, "The issue was never in doubt when all three of them started out with 'Your Excellency', you knew who was going to win." I think it was more than that, I think that enough power was there and the muscle was there and the right was there that this was the way it should be.

At the end of that meeting Jim Griffith and I worked that evening and then the next morning to prepare a press statement and a letter of agreement. The letter of agreement was signed by Phil Richley, the

Congressman, Bishop Malone, and Frank Leseganich from the Steelworkers. It stated the Coalition will be the lead group throughout the study period. If it comes to fruition and there has to be an implementation of the reopening, MVEDC would move in at that point. MVEDC was to be kept informed at all steps, which they were. Whatever cooperation would be needed in the meantime would be given.

B: MVEDC and the Ecumenical Coalition were joined at that point, even though they were settling their distinctive areas?

S: True. The cure for the valley, the quick, down and dirty cure, the quick fix, if you will, was reopening the mill, but you couldn't put all your eggs in that basket. The Coalition chose that as their thrust, and diversification, new industry, and retention of old industry was MVEDC thrust. That was fine. We didn't disagree with any of that, we never did. In fact, I served on MVEDC from practically the beginning and, as such, there was the aura of cooperation.

A lot of people, because everybody wasn't at every press conference all together, were making issues of it. There were no issues there. MVEDC would have never condemned the Coalition if we would have succeeded any more than the Coalition would have told MVEDC to quit fooling with those airplane plants and that sort of stuff because we wanted all the pressure on the other part /the effort towards reopening the mill/. That's not it at all. We wanted jobs in the valley and that was the end of both. That was the game and the goal of both of them. There really weren't crossed purposes. There was an effort to sort out who was going to do what and who was going to control but that was all.

B: That was really the reason why the following day, December 23, 1977, the mailgram was sent to Commerce and HUD signed by Congressman Carney, Frank Leseganich, Mayor-elect Phil Richley, and the Bishop?

S: Right.

B: Were there any meetings or follow-up before the announcement of the HUD Grant of December 30th of that year? Were there either White House people or any local meetings that you can recall?

S: No, but there were, undoubtedly, strategy sessions and meetings, but nothing that would have been anything more than asking how we were going to do this.

One of the things that did come up was a conference call. We didn't even have a meeting because we were in the Christmas-New Year season and we wanted this grant signed by the first of the year. HUD suddenly got very nervous in giving the grant to the Ecumenical Coalition. First of all, we weren't even a corporation yet. We had not filed corporations papers, that was done later. Secondly, HUD was afraid of a general accounting office audit down the road that they had given out this tremendous grant, hundred of thousands of dollars, without competitive bidding, to a group that had no track record. The way around that was to give it to Alpervitz's group directly, but with us having oversight on the thing.

B: Which was also part of that mailgram from what I understand?

S: Yes. The mechanics of working that out were strictly more mechanical meetings rather than any policy type thing that would have been going on.

B: How did the internal organization of the Coalition work?

S: We had a budget which we established early on, which was going to be about \$250,000, that was for staff and running things. The four major denominations were going to come up with \$50,000 apiece. The Presbyterians, Methodists, Episcopalians, and Catholics were each pledged to \$50,000. All of them came up with it and because we had the Campaign for Human Development, we came up with \$103,000 from the Catholics. Some of the other denominations came in smaller amounts from the Jewish community, Lutherans, Baptists, and that sort of thing. We had a warchest of well over \$300,000.

Through this we developed our own communication lines. There were regularly scheduled meetings of the steering committee, which grew as time went on. There was also, not regularly scheduled, meetings or conference calls when the steering committee felt that there was some need for the executive committee to meet. I would take that to Bishop Malone and then we would either set up the meeting or the conference call.

When we would get a call for a meeting in Washington, whether on the White House level or Commerce, HUD level, whatever it might be, it was pretty much the steering committee that would determine who should go or what types should be there. The White House would tell us when the meeting was. Then we would have to get to the



steering committee immediately and tell them to drop everything if they possibly could. They were very good about it. These were bishop types with tough schedules and they would twist things around as best they could. Sometimes it meant chartered airplanes and sometimes it meant borrowing an airplane because during part of this thing there was an airline strike taking away about half of the service from Pittsburgh into Washington. One line was on strike. It got very difficult, but we had lucked out and we always had a good representation there. It was a lot of good luck, and a lot of dedication by a lot of very busy men to do it. At times I had to call Bill Lyden and ask him what he was doing with his airplane the next day because we needed it. They came through. There was that cooperation with the community. Some of them thought we were never going to get it done, but they were not going to stand in our way of trying. I think that has to be said someplace along the line.

- B: The next thing that really came into focus was the Save Our Valley Campaign. February 2, 1978, was the announcement of the formation, how did that come about and how did it evolve?
- S: It came about during meetings in January of 1978 of the Steering Committee, sometimes by themselves and sometimes with people from the think-tank in Washington. This was not only a feasibility study, it was a campaign and in campaigns you look for something that's going to grab imaginations and get people turned on.

Mayor Koch of New York had gone to see Jimmy Carter in the White House looking for help for New York City. The press reports at that time said, "The President tells the Mayor to go home and get your own people rallied and do whatever you can, then come back. After you have done all you can, we will see what you need and what we can do to help you."

Nobody knows whose idea it was to do the Save the Valley Campaign. Nobody can really say it was so and so. We came to the conclusion sometime in January this was the way to go. We can say who the guys are that did it, but we can't say Burt Campbell did it, or Ed Stanton did it, or Chuck Rawlings did it, or Don Walton did it, or Alpervitz did it, or anybody else. Nobody can really stand up and say, "That was my idea."

The basic idea was that we had something that would involve the people, catch their imagination, and keep some solidarity and some hope alive in the valley. This

This was simply by telling these people to designate the money. All that meant was that if we had your name and that you had put money in a designated Save Our Valley Account, you controlled the money, it was your money, but we had control over it. All we got was your name and that you had opened an account, not the amount unless you wanted to tell us that. The bank would not give us that information. We didn't want it. Also, we would get a running total of how much was in there so we could play the number of accounts plus the number of dollars. It meant that if your name was on the list, you got a regular mailing of a newsletter from us. If and when it ever came to the point where we were going to be selling stock in a newly formed company, you would get a copy of the prospectus. We asked the people to leave the money in for a specified time so that we would have that possible pocket of cash available for investment.

The national media really caught on to this. It was the first ever where a community was saying that they would, in essence, escrow money. Now, you couldn't say they were escrowing money because that's a violation of the Securities and Exchange Committee, but they were willing to say they may take a gamble on saving jobs in the valley.

B: How was Reverend Richard Fernandez selected as director?

S: We needed somebody to come in who had some experience in organization on a local level and also some on a national level. Dick, at the time, was between jobs. He is a United Church of Christ Minister. He had been Executive Director or National Director, whatever the title was, of Clergy and Others Concerned and that was regarding the Vietnam situation. He had had extensive experience. We were looking for someone to come in and do this organizational bit. His background, his credentials, were such that he was good and because he was also available at the time, could move in immediately, so Dick was hired.

B: Who was familiar with him? Were all of you familiar with him on the steering committee?

S: I was not, but Chuck Rawlings was. I was the only one on the steering committee who personally did not know him. Breen Malone and Monsignor Malone with whom I lived at the time at St. Pat's, I was resident when he was pastor, were familiar with Dick. When I checked him out with Breen he got nothing but the highest of praise for his abilities and his heart being in the right place. He came in with no great hesitancy on the part of anyone.

B: At that time, were you actively soliciting the unions, trying to get them involved in the Coalition?

S: Yes, we were and it was an iffy, sort of nebulous thing. I think this is a time to interject the whole union set-up in it as to where the union was coming from because, of course, the five locals that had members losing jobs were immediately involved. The district had not only those five locals to worry about, they had other locals, especially of basic steel, to be concerned with. Everybody knew at the time that US Steel was iffy at best. In fact, it came as a shock to many that Sheet & Tube closed before US Steel did. They were between a rock and a hard place because the attitude of the US Steel guys was maybe this will save our jobs because they're still going to need so many thousand tons of the kind of steel that we produce and maybe it will keep us going. We're very sorry these guys lost their jobs, but charity begins at home. There was that diffidence there.

When you got to the international level, the Pittsburgh office, they not only had the problems that Frank Leseganich had in District 26, but they had all sorts of districts. If Youngstown suddenly gets modernized and remodeled, rebuilt and retooled, then what is going to happen to Aliquippa, or what is going to happen to Gary, or what's going to happen to someplace else? If they suddenly looked like they were getting all involved in Youngstown, they could be, politically, in a hot place too.

The involvement with the other unions were such that it was a touchy thing, with other steelworks' locals anyhow. I will say this however, everyone that I ever went to, and I went to a great number of them to try to get them to put money into Save Our Valley Accounts, I was received very well. When we went to the union at the Ohio Works, US Steel, the question came up if it happens to us, will you guys, the clergy, be ready to help us like you're trying to help there. When you said yes to that they immediately voted to open a Save Our Valley Account and put thousands of dollars in it out of the union conference.

You went to the autoworkers with the same kind of pitch. The pitch basically was, Lordstown is here because steel is available here. That's why they built it. Now, if steel is no longer available here, Lordstown might be iffy, but given the magnitude of the plant and everything else, they would probably bring steel in from someplace else. What happens if there's a general shortage of steel throughout the world and we've lost all this capacity in the United States? Do you think Japan

is now going to send raw steel in to be made into automobiles or are they going to send automobiles in? Well, it didn't take long to draw the picture. If I remember correctly, they put \$40,000 in Save Our Valley Accounts.

The reaction among the men was great. The gut feeling of the leadership in the district at the international level was such that they wanted us to succeed, but they couldn't get all that involved. When the final crunch came, when we were down to the final days of the UDAG Grant and everything else, we met with Lloyd McBride and Jim Smith in Lloyd's office and what came out of that was the letter to the White House which said we supported it, we wanted it, and orders to their lobbying efforts in Washington to get on the stick and push this thing.

B: That effort really took about nine months, if I remember the time frame. Was there a reason, perhaps, that the recent election with Sadlowsky might have been a problem as far as McBride was concerned?

S: No, I think there might have been some politics there, but I think that was overplayed because Sadlowsky carried the district, District 26. Frank Leseganich, who was a McBride man, not a Sadlowsky man, was re-elected as the district director. There was a mixed bag.

The thing is, too, philosophically and historically the union saw their role not as trying to get into the steel making business, which is what we were talking about, but as the negotiation position to better working conditions, get the best benefits, the best wages for their men, and in the event of a closing, the most advantageous retirement benefits, and that sort of thing that they could get. They felt they had done their job on that.

In a conference in Notre Dame, in October of 1978 or 1979 when Bill Sullivan, Bishop Malone, and Jim Smith said that one of the major things that was done by this that nobody was taking cognizance of was that the unions and management used to look at plant closings as an economic issue with some slight moral overtones and we had turned it into a great moral issue with some slight economic overtones. I think he said that that would affect further bargaining and further thinking in labor negotiations from now on.

B: Who I was referring to was Mr. Lynd, who later on became sort of general council of the Ecumenical Coalition.

I don't know if I'm stating that correctly, but there seemed to have been some conflict with Mr. Lynd.

S: All right, we're moving from the ideological level down to a personal level and that's true, Staughton Lynd had been a great backer of Sadlowsky. He had been active in Sadlowsky's home district and he had been active with Youngstown, within District 26. Staughton was a Quaker and that influenced him very much. He's a very devout man. Staughton's history was that he had been a professor, I believe, at Yale. He had gotten very involved in the Vietnam War issue. To him it was a peace issue. This follows with his Quaker upbringing and his Quaker theology. Staughton went with others to Hanoi on a mission and got himself deeply involved at a great personal risk as far as his future and everything else was concerned. He did not get tenure at Yale, lost his position, went on to law school in Chicago, and got his law degree. It was during this time that he was active with the steelworkers there. Then, through connections and friends that he had made in the Sadlowsky movement, he came to Youngstown and was hired at a law firm here.

On the Coalition he was always in sort of a fifty-fifty spot. He was there as an attorney, but he was also there as a Quaker. It was "which hat is he wearing at the moment" type thing. Because of that affiliation of Staughton with the Coalition there were some very bad feelings that were generated with the McBride people.

B: On April 25, 1978, there was an internal memorandum approved by yourself, Reverend Sharick, Bishop Burt, Attorney Staughton Lynd, and Mr. Asher. It stated that Staughton Lynd was to be the coordinating council or general council. Mr. Asher was to be the contact with the Justice Department. Mr. Arnoff and Mr. Bell would be utilized for the negotiations of Lykes and LTV concerning acquisitions. The attorneys were to constitute themselves as a team and were urged to follow rules of collegiality. All the attorneys were to report to the Coalition through Mr. Lynd to clear all the major initiatives and legal policies through him. What meetings led up to this April 25 announcement?

S: I have to preface this remark or this answer with a prejudice I feel towards attorneys generally. I think if we keep them out of things, we get a lot done faster. George Arnoff was a very fine attorney and Mr. Bell was another fine attorney. They were supplied to us at the behest, pro bona, at not charge, by Senator Metzenbaum because they were friends or acquaintances of his. He is a part of the thing that happened. He got some really good corporate attorneys for us.

Mr. Asher was an attorney in Washington D.C., a former employee of the Antitrust Division of the Attorney General's Office, and in my estimation was on a big crusade.

The thing was basically between him and me, so I'm prejudiced in my remarks; I'll start off with that. I see the role of an attorney as doing what his client tells him to do. I do not see and will never in my life see the role of an attorney as telling the client what's best for him and what he is to do. I think that sometimes there's dialogue there that are meeting of minds, but when any attorney supposedly in the employment of the Coalition, I say employee, he was not a pro bona, is going off and doing things contrary to policy issues and policy statements by the executive committee, contrary to direct orders from me as staff director, he should be, as was eventually done, terminated.

Had it not been that the next day we were to make a presentation to the Attorney General's Office in the Antitrust Division top to bottom, he would have been canned before he was for the simple reason that we were not interested in any great campaign he had against big business or corporations or anything else. We were interested in keeping jobs in the valley.

The proposed merger between Lykes and LTV, which was very questionable as to the good or bad, the merits and demerits of it, at that time, nobody was sure of including me and Lloyd McBride of the Steelworkers. Nobody was sure what was going to be best for the valley. Because this particular attorney felt that that should not be, he was going to put the Coalition on record as being against it and everything else; that was not the mind-set of the Coalition.

That's where that memo came from outlining who was to do what and what the relationship between the Coalition and its various attorneys was. There was only one that we had any problems with at that time and that was Mr. Asher running off and doing his own thing.

B: What kind of things was he doing?

S: He was giving the implication that the Coalition was against the merger and we had not reached a decision on it. We were a bunch of clergy; we didn't know what was best. We were listening to both sides. We were listening to the Attorney General. I was not interested in a bunch of consultants, a bunch of attorneys in Washington telling us what was good for the valley. We were getting too much of that throughout the whole thing. The crazies from outside can stay outside as

far as I'm concerned. I think the history of the valley and the good of the valley can best be determined by the people in the valley.

When we were talking about community-worker ownership, one of the better aspects of community-worker ownership was local control of our destiny. At the same time that we were preaching that these guys from outside were yea, yea, yea for community-working ownership, but then they were the ones from the outside that were going to tell us how to do it best. There was something wrong in that whole system.

Mr. Asher, I think, completely overstepped his bounds in quoting or pretending to speak for the Coalition. There was one very noisy meeting on the sixth floor of the United States Catholic Conference Building in Washington D.C., the Bishop's conference room, where he just had to be pulled up very short and told. Bishop Burt was there and backed my remarks completely that he was to follow the directions given to him by his employers and that was it.

B: What date was that approximately?

S: It was sometime right around those April days because it was before the final recommendations by Attorney General Griffin Bell.

B: Approximately in the summer of 1978 it was allegedly sponsored by Edgar Spears, a Chairman of US Steel, that the Coalitions' program was Communist or he at least implicated that Alpervitz and Lynd were Communist sympathizers. Did it have any significant impact and were there any efforts by the Coalition to combat that effort?

S: No, I would say from February or March on of that year there had been pieces circulated, anonomously circulated, which gives me great reason to believe anybody who doesn't have a spine to put their name to something can go jump in a lake. Alpervitz and Lynd, who had co-authored a book, were leaning towards socialism as the way that this country ought to go. There was no question about that, but suddenly socialism was equated with communism and those things got all mixed up. We did not think much of it. All of this was brought to the attention of the executive committee with the recommendation from me saying that we know about it, we've heard about it, now let's forget it because we're not putting it together under a socialist mode or anything else. In fact, it was free enterprise. It was the capitalist system in its better moments, not capitalism as it has come to be now.

The Edgar Spears thing that you're referring to, I think, was a speech he was giving to the Chamber of Commerce or something in McKeesport or McKeesrocks, somewhere there in the outskirts of Pittsburgh. He digressed it from the prepared text that he had to saying the efforts in Youngstown were communist. His definition of communism was when funds from private industry are used for the common good; that's communism. My definition of communism is slightly different. It is a dialectic materialism, and we could go on for a long way from that. I don't think Edgar ever read a book about communism or anything else; they had a red flag that was it. With all due respect to the gentleman who is now deceased and Lord rest him, I don't think he knew what he was talking about because when it comes down to it, if that's his definition, I want to know what communist in the United State Steel okay their annual donations to United Appeal. It's as simple as that. If you're a communist, you're a communist. It's like pregnancy, you're not a little bit; you either are or you aren't.

- B: Jumping ahead to July 12th, there was a joint press conference with yourself and Mayor Richley stating, in essence, that the Ecumenical Coalition and the Mahoning Valley Economic Development Committee were agreed that no matter what the use of the facilities would be pursued, whether you could get the reopening on a community-worker ownership or MVEDC's proposal for a National Research Steel Center, no matter which effort succeeded, you would both agree to support each other as far as to what was going on. Was there any prior meeting that took place to that?
- S: As I stated earlier no matter what either group was doing, the other group was supportive of it. We needed all the elements in there.

It was basically Jim Griffith's, but others came up with the idea to make part of the project at Campbell not only a research and development center, but a demonstration center. One of the problems of the steel industry is they get good ideas, but to implement those good ideas it may cost fifty million dollars or even one hundred million dollars. Nobody wants to do that all at once because it's taking a pretty big flyer. If it works that's great, but if it doesn't you're out big bucks. If the steel companies do get together to do something like that, the Antitrust Division of the government jumps in, everyone else, and you get all the bureaucrats mixed up in it, so they're very gun shy on this. And rightfully so; they've been burned.



There was nothing in our proposal that was antitrust. In fact, we could see a nice fit. If they could come up with a brand new piece of equipment and one hundred million bucks to make it a better operation and have MVEDC use or co-use some of the same facilities we were, that would be a plus. But as MVEDC announced that as one of their goals somebody said, "Well, that's sitting in the middle of the Coalition's goals, therefore, there's a fight going on." That was not the case at all.

I sat in on, I think, every meeting that they had on that subject. I travelled to Pittsburgh with Mr. Calderone and Mr. Griffith, calling on different people and throwing the weight of the Coalition behind the idea. None of this was really any "bone of contention," but in order to clear the air so that we didn't have somebody taking sides all over the place, Phil and I had the joint press conference. It was to lay aside any fear that there was a big division between the Coalition and MVEDC because there wasn't. They were privy to everything we were doing. When Alpervitz would come into town with any stage of this development ready, he would report to the Coalition usually in the morning, then in the afternoon there would be a meeting at MVEDC and he would go down and bring in the same charts and same information with him. The only one who got to sit through both of it was me and Alpervitz, and his staff of course.

- B: On September 14, 1978, the National Center for Economic Alternatives released the final report on their study. Could you give me a brief overview of what those findings were?
- S: Basically, the findings were that given the infusion of capital, government participation, et cetera, that the mill could be reopened. Now, from that there was a meeting at the White House level again. Both sides were well represented with all the bureaucrats from the various bureaucracies of the various departments of government, members of the Coalition, and the steelworkers represented, everyone. It was basically a much more detailed follow-up of the Beetle Report, being specific as to what was needed, what kind of infusions of capital, and what the plans were. There were some weaknesses that were found by the government, one of which was the market analysis, the market study. Basically, that was true because when the study was being done the presumption was that we were going to be dealing with Youngstown Sheet & Tube and the Lykes Corporation even though we knew that negotiations were on with LTV for the merger. Until that was an accomplished fact we wouldn't have the

money, the resources to do a "what if" situation. We had to go with one, so we went with the one that was there.

In June the Attorney General signed off and said, in his opinion, it was not a violation of antitrust or even though it was a violation of antitrust, there was a legitimate reason for allowing the merger to take place. Again, I'm rusty on these numbers, but Van Huffel II, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of Youngstown Sheet & Tube, took a great percentage of the production of the Campbell Works. The presumption we went on was that if we dealt with Youngstown Sheet & Tube, if they still wholly owned that subsidiary, their deal could be cut for part of the purchase, that we would get that business. It was considerable, I think 30 percent, 35 percent, or something like that of the production.

When LTV moved in, LTV's biggest component was Jones & Laughlin Steel, Jones & Laughlin produced some of the same stuff in Cleveland and Aliquippa in Pittsburgh, the flat roof that could be used by Van Huffel. Suddenly it was very clear to us that J & L /Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation was not going to say, "Okay, go and buy it off this competitive mill and we just won't sell it." It changed the whole picture. That was the biggest weakness that was there. There were a couple of other things that they had that were internal to the government and that sort of thing, but that was the big one.

There was more money given at that time to the Coalition group to go and study the thing further. Then the big thing that came up also was the limited loan guarantees question. Once again, as they had previously, that could be set aside because it was not statutory. It was not law, it was a federal regulation made by bureaucrats. It could be changed by bureaucrats without action of congress or the president or anybody else. The extra \$93,000 was given then for a market study taking into account the new conditions that were there because of the merger and, basically, the one I outlined.

There are some other points, details that escape me at the moment, but the big thing was the market analysis and the one hundred million dollar loan guarantee.

B: That was at the September 27th meeting?

S: Right, it was the September 27th meeting. The one hundred million dollar loan guarantee was not brought up at the

table by either side; it was brought up by the press afterwards. The response of Mr. Jack Watson, Chief something or other of the President, and Bob Hall, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Development, was "Poo-poo, that's not problem."

- B: You were talking about a minimum of at least three hundred million dollars, but they seemed to have a problem with that?
- S: No, at that time they didn't. I believe they were lying. But at the time that's what they told us and that's what you have to go with.
- B: The next event of interest was the September 28th and 29th Save America Religious Convocation.
- S: The people came in from all over the country. There were others who had rallied to our cause over the year. It really was not tied into the previous conference, which was a local thing. This was a lot of national people coming together, who really wanted to join with us, who wanted to be part of it, and who had been part of it in various ways, who had been instrumental in helping us with advertising, with funding, with Save Our Valley accounts, and that sort of thing. It was sort of an update, but it really wasn't any follow-up or evaluation of what had been done to date.
- B: On October 25, 1978, Governor Rhodes sent a letter to Bishop Malone supporting the assistance of the federal UDAG grant, which was being sought by the Coalition to reopen the Campbell Works. What was the feeling of the steering committee or the Coalition in general about this; did they see that as substantive?
- S: The letter indicated the controlling board had a ten million dollar balance in its industrial development fund. He mentioned that both funds had been depleted, but he also pledged in the letter that he was willing, at the appropriate time, to try and come up with ten million dollars in state funds. The day before that, if I remember correctly, or two days before, I was at a meeting with Jim Smith from the Steelworkers Union and Bill Sullivan from WREDA in New York. We were meeting with the United Church of Christ people and their hierarchy, if you will let me slip a Catholic term in there, to bring them up to date on what was going on. The three of us were making presentations and I think it was during Jim's fifth presentation I got a call to the phone. The governor was on the phone and this is when we discussed the ten million dollars.

It was a day or two before that. He was very cordial and straight out about the whole thing. He did make that commitment, which he did in the letter, that he was not going to guarantee anything, but he would give it his best shot.

As it developed, when we got into the UDAG process and a very key part of the UDAG would have been ten million dollars from the state, it went through the finance committee, which was chaired by Harry Meshel, our own State Senator, through hearings, and by an almost unanimous vote it was passed. I don't think there were any negative votes, but I think there were a couple of abstentions because people just weren't sure what was going on. The ones who testified at that hearing were the Coalition people that we had taken down. We had set up pretty well with Harry the types he wanted there. It was all done and presented. There was only one other speaker that I was not aware was going to speak and that was the Assistant Director for Economic Development of the State coming to speak for the governor in favor of it.

It never got to the point of being passed by the Senate or the House because they did not want to commit the money until the government's UDAG grant was there, but they were ready to do it at anytime. We kept stalling it and stalling it. It was number one on the agenda for I don't know how many days in the Senate and it always kept getting set aside. He did deliver; there's no way I can say anything other than that.

There was a Coalition of the Republican governor and Harry Meshel, the Democratic Finance Chairman from the Senate, who happened to be from this district and on the controlling board. So there is no doubt in my mind, had the thing gone ahead, that the ten million dollars from the state would have come through.

- B: Later that year you began negotiations with Jones & Laughlin, the new owners of the Campbell Works; could you give me a rundown of how those progressed and who you were dealing with?
- S: In the beginning, even before the merger was okayed, it was very apparent to me that Jones & Laughlin was in charge. Tom Graham, the President of Jones & Laughlin, was the spokesperson across the table from me at the negotiations. We had three or four meetings. I think the most meaningful meeting was where--in order to get it all on record, this was after the merger was okayed--

we prepared a list of questions which Bishop Malone asked as the head of the Coalition. Number one, he asked for it to be sold for one dollar, all the facilities, to the Coalition or a representative group that was going to reopen it, which was turned down as expected.

B: The announcement was June 21, 1978, so this was in July, or what time frame are we talking about?

S: It would have been July or August, somewhere in there, before September, I'm sure of it. Then other proposals were made. At that meeting it was decided we could get it for about twelve million bucks, which was a pretty fair price.

B: Approximately what date was this when you received the price?

S: It was in November of 1978 after our feasibility report was such that it possibly could be done; that's when they finally came up with the acceptable price. Again, with my tension for attorneys getting in the road, at either that meeting or a subsequent meeting, Tom Graham informed us that the new structure of the new corporation was going to be such that there was going to be a number of presidents of divisions under him. The president of the central division, within which these facilities were located, was a man named Gordon Allen from Cleveland. He said that Gordon Allen was the one we would deal with. In negotiations as the way I like to conduct them, I called Gordon Allen and we had dinner, just sit down and learn who one another is and that sort of thing. I think that things were going well.

I hesitate to say it, but I'm going to say it because I think it happens to be the truth. Given the paranoia of some members of the Coalition that Stanton was cutting deals and not to be trusted, they decided that I should not just be dealing straight on with Gordon Allen. I think we were making some pretty good progress. We were getting some numbers; we were getting some commitments; we were talking about a lot of things; but they decided that they better get an attorney in there, so they got attorneys in.

B: When you say, "they," who are they?

S: The other members of the Coalition.

B: The executive committee or the steering committee?

- S: It came from the steering committee to the executive committee who bought it. About that time I was about to tell the whole bunch of them to shove it, but I didn't. Maybe I should have. Anyhow, they have to let the attorneys in there. The first time that contact between the Coalition and Gordon Allen was in the form of a letter from an attorney and not a phone call from Ed Stanton. He immediately shot back his attorneys and things went into a very long, drawn-out stalemate because the attorneys couldn't get past the other attorneys to Gordon Allen. There was no decisions being made without Gordon Allen making them. The more you can keep attorneys out of a picture, the better it is.
- B: Two points seem to be missing from the Ecumenical Coalition's attempt to get an Urban Development Action Grant through the city of Youngstown. That was the lack of participation of the CASTLO /Campbell, Struthers, and Lowellville/ mayors which seemed to be focused in the MVEDC group and the lack of authorization of the EDATA board. Could you comment on this situation?
- S: I think it was a tempest in a teapot or much ado about nothing, whichever cliché you want to use. First of all, the mayors of the three cities were more than anxious to put people back to work, the same goes for city council. The basic problem was, according to government regulations based on the 1970 census, which was completely outmoded and screwed up, but the Feds could not see it at that point because they were all tied up in regulations, the only community eligible for UDAG was Youngstown. It had to go through there.

I think Phil Richley politically and practically said, "We're not about to apply for a grant without the ones involved asking us to do it on their behalf." Again, you get a bunch of attorneys who are all oriented that we have to do this this way and this thing this way and some others who are going to say, "We're going to put muscle on these guys." You don't have to put muscle on these men; all you have to do is call them up and rationally say, "We need this from you and we need it by a certain date," and you'll have it. That's what eventually happened.

The same thing is true with your A-95 review process from EDATA. First of all, to my knowledge, EDATA has never turned down an A-95 review. That's all it is, is a review. It's not a veto power. When you go to the meeting, if you go presuming that everything is going to go along, that everybody is interested in the valley, that everything is positive, that's the way it's going to come out with that group. I've dealt with

them a lot longer and a lot more than either Chuck Rawlings, Staughton Lynd, Ed Weisheimer, or any of the rest of the Johnny-come-lately's on the scene who made a big issue out of it and caused a very strained meeting. The strained meeting was that you're going in accusing these people of not caring about people in the valley and everything else. They're going to get their back humped up. All you have to do is go in and say, "Hey look, here it is; here's what we're asking for; here's what we're proposing; and here's why."

If they had been watching television or reading the newspapers for the last year or year and a half, they would have known exactly what it's all about. The strain I don't blame on EDATA; I don't blame it on the A-95 Review Board; I don't blame it on Bill Fergus or anyone else; I blame it on our side going in and humping their back. The A-95 Review, even if it came out negative, wouldn't have stopped the UDAG. It was going to go through anyhow because it was just a review process; it was not a veto power.

B: That meeting took place approximately on what date?

S: January, February, maybe into March, but I think probably February of 1979.

B: Do you remember how many people attended besides those mentioned?

S: I didn't bother attending myself, so I don't have any idea who attended.

B: Towards the end of 1978, the Ecumenical Coalition was somehow involved in the proceedings in Dallas as far as the vote on whether the merger should take place. Could you relate your knowledge about that effort by stockholders to stop the LTV merger?

S: One of the ways that has been developed by social activists of dealing with corporations, and this would be the Dow Chemical and the napalm situations in Vietnam, is by getting stockholders to introduce resolutions at stockholder's meetings. Generally in those things you get three percent of the vote. That was pretty good. You don't get them passed, but at least you bring up the social issues, raise them. Early on we were looking for people with Sheet & Tube stock to help us in this situation; Sheet & Tube converted to Lykes et cetera. We found a group of nuns someplace in the Midwest, I think Minnesota or Wisconsin, someplace there,

represented by Sister Joanna Hillig, who was the Treasurer of the School Sisters of Notre Dame. They introduced a resolution and I think it was something to energetically support /worker-community ownership/. It requested the board of directors fully cooperating with efforts by workers, the Youngstown Religious Coalition, and other groups to reopen the shutdown facility in Youngstown, Ohio, under worker-community ownership. This was introduced as part of a general resolution.

As I said it is usually 3 percent to 5 percent of the vote in those things, and this was a great victory in a sense that it was only like 52 or 48 percent that it lost, which showed a great social consciousness on the part of a lot of the people. Again, it was a ploy; it was a tactic that was being used to get the people to realize that the bottom line is not only profit, but that human equation somehow has to be started to be worked into our dealings in this country, that people are important, not just dollars. That's all that resolution talked about.

Sister Joanna was a very vibrant lady. She, I'm sure, made a very great presentation in the meeting in Dallas. I was not there, but apparently, if she carried it almost 52 to 48 percent, she had some good things going for her. It shows a social concern and social consciousness, which I think is one of the pluses of the Coalition, that nothing is ever going to be the same again in plant closings because of some of the things we did.

- B: Was this action initiated by the steering committee? Did you actually solicit this action?
- S: Yes, we solicited through the National Inter-religious Office for Corporate Responsibility. Through their files we located the School Sisters of Notre Dame and Sister Joanna in order to start some of this process.
- B: I would like to move from that to May 15, 1979. There was a labor-management conference at the First Presbyterian Church; again, was this an effort of the steering committee?
- S: Yes, that grew out of the Coalition. It was basically the steering committee and Burt Campbell, I think, that took most of the initiative in that. He and Gene Bay were sort of co-pastors at the First Presbyterian Church. This was modeled on some things that were done



in Jamestown, New York; I believe it was. One of the bad images that kept industry from coming into the valley was that it is too union a town, the union is unreasonable and that sort of thing, which is nonsense because they /business/ made money here.

An effort was made to get a labor management committee group, which is a big plus, to get other industry to come in. The effort didn't succeed and for a number of reasons, change in personnel, moving around, and that sort of thing. It's not an issue which I think is completely dead. It can be revived at any time. You had people sitting around at a table talking to one another who had, I think literally, crossed the street in downtown Youngstown a month before to avoid having to say hello to one another. It probably can still work. This group is not going in to settle strikes or anything like that. When you get into that function, it can't work. They have to be completely independent from one another.

We need a group that will sit down and say, "Look, get your group within your plant together; labor, management at the lowest possible level, the floor level, and the shop level, whatever it might be and let's start talking about things," get a lot of things resolved, and establish a rapport so when it comes hard negotiation, there's not going to be that animosity across the table." Immediately there's going to be, well, we settled a lot of other problems, let's sit down and settle the big ones now.

B: Just to pursue that one point, you mentioned the mistaken impression that the workers weren't willing to help. In fact, wasn't Mr. Smith of Mr. McBride's staff responsible for coming up with a worker's agreement or some kind of worker's statement in relation to what the actual cost containment could be?

S: Oh yes, it was very much so that Jim sat down and pointed out to us where savings could be made. He and others within the union were very instrumental in getting the rank and file to sit in and say, "Look, we guarantee that we're not going to fool around with seniority; we're not going to fool around with your pension plan; we're not going to fool around with the basic wage package, but some of the fringes, some of the staffing patterns, those are all up for grabs." They would redo it. That hard-nosed routine is not as hard-nosed as some people would let you believe.

B: Finally, on May 24, 1979, you received the text of the Carter Administration's response to certain questions posed by the Ecumenical Coalition at the April 3rd meeting of the Presidential Aide, Jack Watson, and his staff. Could you tell me the results of that correspondence and the resolution of the Coalition growing out of that?

S: Basically, what the Coalition resolved, upon receipt of the correspondence, was to terminate its work of reopening the Campbell Works. The Coalition would continue to encourage groups and people in the Mahoning Valley to respond creatively to the changing economic and social conditions in the valley. Basically what it was was that we had lost. We were shot down; it was all over. I have to add this footnote, especially since this is on oral history; as I saw it, I suspected in the September 1978 meeting at the White House we were being lied to. It was just before a November election at which all of the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate were up for re-election. The Carter Administration, at that time, said no to us when we had billed this thing as a creative way of solving urban problems. The Carter Administration had not come up yet with their Urban Policy. They had done nothing, and the best way to say no to the one group that was trying to do something was to throw another \$93,000 at them and tell them to go ahead and do another study. I had a gut feeling at the time that we were being lied to. It is tough to call the President of the United States a liar or his representatives liars, but at this point I will. They couldn't risk losing control of the House and/or the Senate because of the fact that they were doing nothing for the cities.

We all know the muscle they sent in to get Charlie Carney re-elected. We also know the upset that took place when Charlie was not re-elected. It should have sent a message, very clearly, to the Administration. Whether it did or not, I don't know. Apparently it didn't because they didn't do anything beyond that.

They should have said, "No. Remember in the conversation about the September meeting, the one hundred million dollar limit was nothing. We can take care of that." The final bottom line of that letter that came was that "All things considered, we can't go above the one hundred million dollars and that's that." That's where I think we were lied to then. They spent another \$93,000 to perpetuate the lie and when it came down they never had any intention whatsoever.

There are other government things that have come out through the Freedom of Information Act since then that just beef up that opinion.

B: There's one final question, why did the Ecumenical Coalition quit at that point? Was there just no hope?

S: There was no hope of reopening, which was our thrust, the main thing we did. We have stood ready, and will stand ready, to do anything we can to help any other group in the valley since then.

B: So you've gone into dormancy; you haven't really given up the whole fight?

S: That's right.

B: I would like to explore a little bit further the internal, shall we say, competition among the federal agencies, how you perceived their reaction to the Coalition, and the battle amongst themselves.

S: Part of the whole thing, I think, from the very beginning, was the competition between HUD and Commerce, who was going to control economic development and how this was going to be brought about. EDA, I think, took umbrage at the fact that the basic grant for the feasibility study came from the Department of Housing and Urban Development and that Patricia Harris, the then secretary, was making statements in the economic development area. Part of the confusion, I suppose, came from the fact that we in the Coalition were billing this as a model of how a decaying urban center can turn around and come back. That was all part of it. Then as things got down the road, sometimes it got clarified, sometimes muddied further that it was just any ongoing in-house fight within the government that we really had no control over. I'm sure we don't have the full story on it one way or the other.

My comments that I really felt that we were lied to were based on something that came out since then. It came out through Greg Garland, a reporter from the Warren Tribune Chronicle, who, following-up another Freedom of Information Act, had filed for certain papers. He didn't even ask for this particular memo, but it came through with the package. The memo was, if I remember correctly, written previous to the September meeting from Bob Hall to the White House saying that there was no way that they could go along with this Coalition thing. It was so far afield and so outlandish that it could never work.

If that was their feeling why didn't they tell us that at the September meeting instead of giving us \$93,000 more to complete the study? It was a waste of federal funds for one thing, and it really brings the false hope issue up. I don't think we had any false hopes until we got the final turn-down. If the government was lying to us from September to March or April or May, then that's where the false hopes were being engendered. I don't think it was us.

Greg Garland would have that memo and he would have all the information leading up to it.

B: Since you mentioned Greg, the series that he ran reportedly were the internal problems of the so-called Ecumenical Coalition and MVEDC and so forth. Were you ever contacted or anybody that you're familiar with as far as the sources of his stories?

S: Yes, I talked with Greg a number of times on it. I don't think this particular memo was in that particular series though. I think it was something independent that he did. I think it was a fairly accurate story that Greg did, but there were some readings into it, some editorial comments that were not all that factual.

As I remember the series, and I read it at the time and I don't remember all the ramifications of it, but the Ecumenical Coalition didn't really come up too often in that whole series. It was mostly the thing on MVEDC. He questioned what they accomplished, how much money had been spent, how was it spend, and what were the results since MVEDC had been around really from September of 1977 up until the date which was late 1980 or early 1981, I forget which. I think he asked some very legitimate questions. There were a lot of internal ramifications of how it got started, why it got started, the political motivation in the beginning, which, hopefully, is gone now, the personalities involved, the fact that the first full-time director had to be fired because he just wasn't producing, and the government saying what was the sense of it. The whole concept was a whole political thing that never should have been.

B: In the March 20, 1978, meeting a steel subcommittee of the Mahoning Valley Economic Development Committee reported that Professor Robert Pelkey of the University of Michigan was to add to the Ramser Miller Report. Could you clarify what both of those reports were involved with?

- S: My memory is not exactly clear on this, but as I remember it the Calderone process of the whole idea of a research, development, and demonstration center was being discussed at that time. As often happens the professorial type university does the consulting work and we had some engineering firms that had been looking at some of this stuff. They had all sorts of problems with it because it hadn't been tried on any scale. Basically, we were getting a lot of negative stuff to something that, locally, we thought was positive. We were not really getting enough stuff to convince us, no facts and figures, only a lot of opinion. We always felt that our opinions were as good as anybody else's. This one professor from Michigan had come up with something relatively positive on it and I offered it at that time, as I remember it, to pursue this as the Coalition, but I reported back as a member of the steel committee of MVEDC to them because they were more interested in it. I think, again, that was one more instance where cooperation was there that never hit the press or anything else. We were all working for the same goal doing anything we could do to help the valley.
- B: Basically, did your initial participation in the Mahoning Valley Economic Development Committee start about the time of the meetings with the Bishop and Congressman Carney in 1977?
- S: Yes, Chuck Carney set this committee up within a week of September 19, I think, the 22nd or the 23rd, somewhere in there. It only had four or five members in the beginning. I was not one of them and that's perfectly understandable because it was a hurry-up type thing and it was certain types who went, but he didn't have anybody from Campbell, Struthers, or Lowellville on it. Chuck admitted the hurry-up element of it and everything else, then moved to explain it later on and that's fine. In the expansion I was on there really representing the Coalition to liaison as much as anything else. Sitting on both committees, then, I would be very open to being privy to everything. Where I saw tie-ins, we tied in, such as this thing we just discussed a moment ago. That's the way it worked.
- B: Who got you appointed to the committee? Did somebody from the committee call you or did somebody call the Bishop?
- S: Chuck called me and said, "We need somebody on there and I think you're the logical one. I want you to do it."

B: That would have been approximately when?

S: I would say early 1978. It might have been late 1977, but I would think it was after 1978 when the committee was really starting to expand. It could have been before the December meetings in Washington. I honestly don't remember, but I think it was after that.

B: So it would be early 1978?

S: Early 1978, yes.

B: We're jumping around here, but in March of 1979, March 21st to be exact, I believe Reverend Campbell requested a meeting just before a meeting with EDA's Assistant Secretary, Bob Hall, as well as other federal officials in Washington. Did you attend that meeting, and could you tell me what was discussed?

S: Yes, if I remember correctly, what that meeting was about was in regards to ESOP. ESOP was an Employee Stock Ownership Plan that comes as a direct grant from the federal government through a third party, in this case MVEDC, Mahoning Valley Economic Development Corporation, because it had been decided by that time that any federal economic development funds would be channeled through MVEDC. The basic reason for the meeting was that MVEDC had to formally apply for this. If they formally applied for it, there would be a grant to buy the stock in the name of the employees then, which would be paid back. The grant would be to MVEDC loaned to the Employee Stock Ownership Plan. As things came and money was available, this loan from MVEDC to ESOP would come back. Details had to be worked out, so instead of that money being repaid to the federal government and MVEDC having control of it permanently, it would become a revolving loan fund so that other industry, new industry, expansion, whatever it might be in the valley, would be able to borrow this money at a low rate of interest. It would be a plus, not only for the reopening of the Campbell Works, but also down the line, a plus for time and time again that same money being used to start new industry in the valley or additional jobs in the valley.

B: Who was familiar with the Employee Stock Ownership Program?

S: A number of us. I suppose our resident expert would have been Staughton Lynd because of the legalities and that sort of thing of it. It would be based, for instance, on the similar plan with Southbend Lathe in Southbend, Indiana. There was a five hundred million

dollars similar grant there to aid development corporations. When the former revolving loan fund was lent to Southbend Lathe employees, they set up their ESOP and went from there. It was a precedent, I mean ours would have been the biggest, but the concept was there.

- B: Saturday, March 17, 1979, there was a rally on the Federal Plaza primarily sponsored by the Briar Hill Local 1462, the Coalition, and steelworkers. At that rally Mr. Jim Smith of the United Steelworkers of America, speaking about the potential of the Employee Stock Ownership Program, mentioned a finance meeting sponsored by Senator Russell Long of Washington, where he made two major points. First, that the United Steelworkers of America should be an employee exclusive bargaining agent and, second, that the funds should not come from the public employees or employee pension funds. This was followed by Attorney Duton mentioning the fact of Southbend Lathe's program in Southbend, Indiana. Could comment on that particular program?
- S: As I remember that meeting, Jim Smith, who is sort of the economic advisor to Lloyd McBride and the Steelworkers, made the point that, and this goes back to the Southbend Lathe situation where there's still a bargaining agent, they never had a contract signed with Southbend Lathe because of the community-worker ownership thing. This goes back, historically, as to part of the reason why the Steelworkers are not interested too much in ownership because, historically, the Knights of Labor, which was the predecessor of the present AFL-CIO, got in the idea of taking the dues of the members and buying into the companies, which they were. Then suddenly the workers became owners and entrepreneurs; the reason for the existence of a union dissolved and almost wrecked the labor movement in this country. It was one of the elements that almost wrecked it.

In the Southbend Lathe situation what happened was that the accrued liability or pension was picked up by Southbend Lathe in the parent company as part of the closing. Instead of negotiating into a contract a new pension program, they let the ESOP, Employee Stock Ownership Program, become the pension program, which meant that funds which would ordinarily have gone into a pension fund went to buy back or pay off the stock that was purchased by the ESOP, a federal grant. Basically then, all the pension funds were in one stock, in one investment, so that if that investment went great, everything was fine. If it somehow faltered, then they were out. The union did not see this as a good program for the protection of the worker's pension plan.

It's one of the reasons why we, in our talks with the unions, had said that one of the things we would not fool around with, no matter what it was, was the pension plan. The ESOP might become an addition to the pension plan, but we would not supplant the pension plan in our scheme of things. It was just too iffy a situation for a man's future, for his retirement to be based on. I think that's what Jim had reference to in that.

B: In the Board of Trustees meeting of April 4, 1978, it was made mention that Glen Walter informed Mr. Griffin of the visit on April 3rd where he, yourself, William Sullivan, and Jim Smith, as well as Danny Thomas Jr., went to Washington to talk to the Department of Commerce. Could you relate what took place at that time?

S: At that meeting what we were talking about was the Calderone process, the horizontal caster, and things that would fit very well into the mutual plans of both the Ecumenical Coalition and the Mahoning Valley Economic Development Corporation. Their idea of putting in place a demonstration project of new technology, such as the horizontal caster, would fit very well. That would be using products that the new mill or the revamped mill would be putting out, also getting a superior product at the end that would be much more marketable and take care of part of the marketing problems we had.

That's why the group that went to Washington was very diversified. It had myself representing the Coalition, Danny Thomas representing the Steelworkers on the local level, Jim Smith representing them on the international level, Bill Sullivan from WREDA, and Jim Griffin from MVEDC. I think it's another example of cooperation towards the mutual goal of getting things going again in the valley, especially the steel industry.

B: On September 1, 1978, there was a Board of Trustees meeting. At that meeting the funding for a two-year program was broken down and \$60,000 was allocated for CASTLO; how did the Mahoning Valley Economic Development Corporation get CASTLO's participation given its earlier snubs?

S: I think, basically, what it was was almost a haste makes waste situation in which the original set up of the committee /MVEDC/ which had only four or five members, completely neglected Campbell, Struthers, and Lowellville, the CASTLO acronym, which caused some hard feelings. I don't think that anything was done with any malice. I think it was just, again, hurry up and get something done and it was not done right.



Campbell, Struthers, and Lowellville deciding to ban together was sort of historical in itself because they usually didn't talk to one another either, but it caused this crisis to bring them together. They set up a group, which was doing some good things in order to get everything going in the valley. The federal government did not want to deal with a number of groups, so you would somehow have to fund CASTLO through MVEDC. The negotiations were down to the point where it was going to be 10 percent or \$60,000 out of \$600,000 on the grant. That was acceptable to all parties. The negotiations went on and that was done. It was just sort of canonized at this meeting.

As part of that the mayors and other officials from these three communities would take part in MVEDC and CASTLO would also go along and there would be mutual cooperation back and forth. It has happened that if something comes into CASTLO that they can't handle, they'll refer it to MVEDC, hopefully someplace else in the valley. When MVEDC gets a proposal, one of the places they look at first is CASTLO to see if it will fit in there. So I think that difficulty was worked out and part of the work out was that there be funding for the separate group, sort of a rump group, if you will, or a subgroup within the larger community.

B: What was the organizational structure of MVEDC?

S: MVEDC started out as just sort of a group of people that were appointed by the congressman. Then they decided what they had to have was elected officials, labor, the private sector, and the general public. Those four elements were mixed, merged, and they have been balanced back and forth, but still the four elements have been kept in there and that's what MVEDC is supposedly made up of.

B: That was in their incorporation?

S: Yes, not in the original appointment, in the eventual incorporation.

B: Could you give me some information concerning where the term Ecumenical Coalition came from?

S: It's hard to nail down, but basically, the Second Vatican Council was an ecumenical council. Ecumenical, historically in the church and within Christianity, means cooperation, getting together and all that sort of thing. Ecumenical means intra-Christian groups. The more technical term is interfaith if others than

Christians, such as the Jewish Community, is being brought in. I must admit this slipped by me when we started talking about the Ecumenical Coalition. We were wondering about the initials because there is the Mahoning Valley Association of Churches. We didn't want to get that mixed up with the Mahoning Valley Ecumenical Coalition, so we started changing that around to the Ecumenical Coalition of the Mahoning Valley so the initials didn't get all mixed up. At that point Bishop Malone pointed out to me that since the Jewish faith was also involved, it should more properly be the Interfaith Coalition of the Mahoning Valley. I called Rabbi Berkowitz, who was on the executive committee, an old friend, and explained to him what the problem was. Sid's response, typical of the cooperation that we have found in the valley among the various faiths over the years, was, "Well, that Ecumenical Coalition sounds sexier Ed. Let's use that because we know the technicalities, but nobody else does. Let's not worry about it."

B: Thank you very much Father Stanton.

END OF INTERVIEW