

YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY
ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM
Ecumenical Coalition Project

Ecumenical Coalition

O. H. 140

REVEREND JOHN SHARICK

Interviewed

by

Philip Bracy

on

April 14, 1981

JOHN SHARICK

Reverend John Sharick was born in Athens, Ohio October 5, 1935. He attended high school in Norwalk, Ohio and went on to the College of Wooster from 1953 to 1957 where he received an A.B. Degree, then on to Pittsburgh Theological Seminary from 1957 to 1960, where he received a Masters of Divinity and finally to the McCormick Theological Seminary where he received a Doctor of Ministry. He has been with Eastminster Presbytery since 1973.

Reverend Sharick is married and his wife's name is Sharon and they have two children, Joel and Jennifer.

During the Shutdown of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube announcement he was active early and remained so during the Ecumenical Coalition's brief life of approximately, September of 1977 until May, 1979. During this period he served on the policy board of the Coalition which was its Executive Committee.

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INTERVIEWEE: REVEREND JOHN D. SHARICK

INTERVIEWER: Philip Bracy

SUBJECT: Ecumenical Coalition

DATE: April 14, 1981

B: This is an interview with Reverend Dr. John D. Sharick for Youngstown State University's Oral History Program concerning the shutdown of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube and his participation in the Ecumenical Coalition as an Executive Board member; by Philip Bracy at Eastminster Presbyterian offices at 45 Idlewood Avenue on Tuesday April 14, 1981 at 1:30 p.m.

S: My name is John Sharick. I'm a clergyman in the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. My present vocation within the church is as Executive Presbyter for Eastminster Presbytery, which has ecclesiastical jurisdiction over all the United Presbyterian Churches in the Greater Youngstown area as well as the Greater Akron area.

Born in Athens, Ohio, spent most of my life in the northern part of Ohio, namely, Norwalk. Attended the College of Wooster where I received my Bachelors Degree, Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, a seminary of the United Presbyterian Church where I received the Masters of Divinity Degree and have just completed at McCormick Theological Seminary in Chicago, a Doctor of Ministries Degree.

My interest in social action is really a theological interest. That is, through all my ministry I believe the gospel of Jesus Christ leads one to become involved, not only in the ecclesiastical world, but also the world of work, economics, sociology, et cetera.

B: Do you recall the circumstances of where you were and how you found out about the announced shutdown of Youngstown Sheet and Tube?

S: Yes. Where I was, I do not recall. I did remember hearing about it both through the radio media as well as the printed media. My being contacted to become involved directly in it came through Bishops Burt and Malone in asking me to take particular responsibility for developing the process and the design for the original meeting that brought together all the people that eventually became the Ecumenical Coalition.

B: Do you recall approximately when you were contacted about participating?

S: I do not, the exact date, I'm sorry.

B: No, but I mean would that be like in the first week or so of the shutdown?

S: Yes, I believe it was. It was either the first or the second week when I was contacted and we began the process of bringing people together to take a hard look at it.

B: Was there any interim organization put together to kind of coordinate information per se?

S: Not to my recollection, no.

B: Do you know who was responsible for putting together the agenda for the October 28th and 29th Steel Conference meeting?

S: Which was the first meeting?

B: Yes.

S: Yes, my recollection is, and I'm relying on memory, the Bishop asked if I would, because of some process skills that I have, develop that particular meeting, design it and also preside at it, which I did. The people involved in designing that first meeting were Father Ed Stanton, Bert Campbell, I believe was involved in that, conceivable the Bishop himself was there although I don't really recollect. That's where I stop. I can't recall who else was involved. Wait a minute, I do believe Charles Rawlings was also involved with it.

B: Was Reverend Walton involved at that stage?

- S: He may have been. I don't recall whether he was present at the meeting or not. I recall the design meeting transpired in the library of the First Presbyterian Church.
- B: With what impression did you come away from the Steel Crisis Conference, did you feel hope that something was going to come about?
- S: Yes, the conference was designed to allow, I thought, complete and total input by everybody present. Of course, there were key resource people in the persons of Gar Alpervitz, Dick Barnett and some others, but the local folks also had, I thought, a very strong input into what evolved in the meetings. That was extremely important, that those who were there went away with ownership, a psychological ownership in what was said and decided. I felt that that ownership was there, number one; and number two, there was an impetus to act upon what was decided.
- B: What goals and objectives came out at that meeting?
- S: Well, there were basically four. One was the development of a pastoral letter, which could almost be called a prophetic letter inasmuch as it made some very strong, hard statements to the Lykes Corporation and what had transpired there. We decided that such a letter would be drafted and be made public. Second, we decided that we would initiate studies for a feasibility, really, a feasibility study around a community-worker take-over of the Campbell Works. That was primarily motivated by the desire to re-establish jobs. Third was to try to advocate the formulation of a national policy to retain basic steel and associated jobs in communities where steelworkers live, which was an attempt, in effect, to say, "Yes, we are concerned in Youngstown, Ohio," but Youngstown is just one place among many. And fourth, to focus national interest on Youngstown as a means of developing a model for the retention of basic jobs. We wanted to make Youngstown, if you will, a showcase.
- B: Was anybody specifically assigned to the various tasks?
- S: Yes. With regard to the pastoral letter, an individual present at the Conference from, I don't recall the exact name of the Catholic organization out of Washington, but he was given the assignment of developing drafts, providing them back to the leaders of the Coalition for finality.

With regard to the Campbell Works and the feasibility study, at that time I can't recall whether or not the first step was the Beetle Report; I believe that it was. And then it went on to Gar Alpervitz and his associates in Washington.

The national policy? My recollection was that I can't recall any specific person that was given that responsibility nor the fourth. My recollection is the third and fourth kind of became the responsibility of the whole leadership.

B: During the process of that conference, the hierarchy, the representatives of the various faiths met, I believe, sometime during that period. Could you kind of relate what happened at that meeting?

S: Yes. My best recollection is that there was, in fact, no one in charge, but those persons who found themselves on what you might call the top layer of denominations. And we simply said, in effect, asking ourselves a question: Okay, given what it is we've decided to do, how can we best organize ourselves to continue the impetus and provide leadership in this way?

The structure that evolved was a structure that has become the Ecumenical Coalition of the Mahoning Valley and provided for an executive level, which included the Bishops and myself as executives, in other words, the executive layer, if you will, of the denominations involved. The second level was more or less a kind of a steering committee that did all the, really, the leg work and has to be given a lot of credit for many, many hours and the muscle power. And that level represented staff people of the denominations who had social action in their portfolios, ministers that could be freed up to have some time to do that kind of work away from their congregations.

B: So you would say that the Executive Committee was basically your policy making decision group?

S: That is correct.

B: And your Steering Committee would be responsible for doing it?

S: Implementing it, right, correct. And also provided data, by the way, by which policy was set. It was kind of a cyclical movement.

B: Where did the term, Ecumenical Coalition come from?

Was that a press thing or was that internally generated?

S: No, Phil, it was internally, but I don't recall the explicit way it came to pass, but it came from the inside, yes.

B: How often did the Executive Committee meet. In other words, were there set. . .like the first Friday of the month or something?

S: No, it did not meet regularly, it met on call. And through the heat of the first part, well, through the first years of the Coalition, really responding to crisis, patterned itself to meet in preparation for other kinds of meetings or in the response to certain things that were happening, and on occasion, by conference call.

B: What were the internal communications channels. For instance, if there was going to be a meeting in Washington, was the Steering Committee responsible for picking personnel who should go to those particular meetings or how were those internal decisions made?

S: Okay, the ultimate decisions were made by the Executive group, but they were made largely on the counsel of the Steering Committee, which was privy to the most recent kind of information available. So, the Steering Committee might meet on occasion very quickly at a particular time and place with Steering Committee members present. Sometimes meetings were held by conference call, whatever way was necessary to get the decision, the policy set for the forthcoming meeting.

B: On February 16, 1978, the Save Our Valley Campaign was announced. Could you tell me, was that generated from the Executive Committee? Was there a perceived need there?

S: No, that particular idea came largely from the Steering Committee and more particularly from the staff person that was hired at that time, Dick Fernandez, who was extremely adept at community organization. That particular idea was sent into the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee gave its approval for honing it up and sharpening it up and away it went.

B: So that was seen as the external communications network for the Coalition?

S: That being what, Phil?

B: The Save Our Valley. . .

S: Yes.

B: Well, I should clarify that because it is confusing. Save Our Valley, in that they also did publicist work for the Coalition.

S: Yes, two things evolved. Of course, they provided monies which were meant to demonstrate to Washington that the community was behind what was happening, but also it provided a huge communications network. Some people simply were the recipients of the material from the Coalition, other people stepped forward to do leg work.

B: Do you know who was responsible for bringing in Reverend Fernandez?

S: The Steering Committee and the Executive Committee worked together on that. The Executive Committee made the final decision to hire him.

B: Getting back to the Save Our Valley Campaign, could you tell me what the goals and objectives were of the Save Our Valley Campaign?

S: The Save Our Valley Campaign evolved to, as I said, demonstrate a couple things. Number one, at that particular juncture, our trips to Washington to talk to various persons there, we got the decided message that, really, the question: Are you a few folks coming to Washington or is there, in fact, a strong community base for what it is you're trying to do? One of the objectives, therefore, from the Save Our Valley approach was to demonstrate with dollars in the banks that there was that kind of community support and the dollars there to speak. The second reason was to provide, as I said, a stronger base community-wide for which and to which the Coalition could be in correspondence.

B: So, it started as a kind of community organizing element?

S: Yes, it was.

B: And then also generated external information?

S: That is correct.

B: I believe there was a December 20th meeting at the White House or at Commerce, I'm not clear, where various groups

were invited through Congressman Carney's efforts to
a) present the Bettel Report as I understand it, and
b) to kind of see what the federal response would be.
I suppose I should ask, did you attend that meeting?

S: I did attend it, yes.

B: Could you kind of give me the essence of the feedback that you got?

S: Yes, okay. From the standpoint of the political people there, Carney, of course, was speaking strongly for federal involvement in the area, both financial and in terms of doing some planning. Senator Glenn also made an appearance and my recollection is Metzenbaum also appeared. And their rhetoric was pretty much the same. That is that we do have a crisis, we have had a heart attack, the Feds ought to be concerned about this. That was supported, also, by labor people present, Jim Smith from the Steelworkers. I don't know whether Lesiganich was there or not. But of course, our own representative was there as well.

The response of the Feds at that point was probably a little bit to the positive side of neutrality. That is, I don't recall any great enthusiasm for what was being said. It was pretty much the first time they'd heard, in detail, what was transpiring. My recollections, Phil, was that the answer was: go back and get your house in order and make a proposal and we'll look at it.

B: As a followup to that, I believe it was December 22, there was a meeting held with the Congressman and others, I don't know exactly who participated in it. Did you sit in on that meeting? Approximately December 22nd?

S: That is a Saturday as I recall and I was not present.

B: Okay, because then I know the next day the mailgram went out kind of detailing that you did have your act together collectively.

S: I know that an issue to that, by the way, as we came away and the issue was, if funds were coming from the Feds who would be the channel for them? My recollection was that Carney said, "I would be," the Coalition speaking through the Bishop said, "No, we will be." And the Coalition came away being the channel.

B: An Ecumenical Coalition memo dated April 25, 1978 kind of outlines which attorneys were to do what primarily.

Can you kind of tell us how that memo came about and what it means. . . ?

S: By this time, as you can probably suspect, communication was not only complex within Youngstown, but also complex within Youngstown and Washington and all over. The issue therefore, became, what attorneys assisting the Ecumenical Coalition in this effort would be responsible for what? And it was a case of some attorneys thinking they were responsible for certain areas and getting in the way of others who also thought that. This particular memo, and the result of it was simply to clarify who would, in fact, be responsible for what.

B: Yes.

S: Okay, Staunton Lynd, a local attorney, then in private practice was to be the coordinating council or the general council for the Ecumenical Coalition. Attorney Asher, who had his office in Washington, being on sight there, was to be the contact attorney in our continuing efforts with the Justice Department. Arnoff and Bell were to be utilized in the negotiations with the Lykes and LTV Corporations concerning the acquisition of the facilities. The attorneys were to constitute themselves as a team and were urged to follow a rule of collegiality in formulating recommended strategies and tactics. All the attorneys were to report to the Coalition through Mr. Lynd and clear any major initiatives and legal policies through him as his role as a coordinating council. It was made clear that the Coalition retained the option of indicating how and through whom it wants communication sent to the Justice Department, to Lykes, LTV or others. And the Executive Committee of the Coalition was to be the clearinghouse for all policy decisions. Bishop Burt in Cleveland was to be the Executive Committee's representative and contact point in any negotiations with Lykes and with LTV. All of which is to say each of us had a particular responsibility, the attorneys themselves, included, and was to establish lines of communications.

B: Do you know who was responsible for bring Attorney Lynd on board?

S: I do not. Knowing Staunton, my assumption was he just had a deep interest from the beginning. I do not know.

B: On September 11, 1978, there was a news conference held in the Catholic Action Center where you spoke as well as

Mr. Alpervitz. Can you tell me the essence of that particular news conference and the summation of Mr. Alpervitz's remarks?

S: Yes, twofold. I gave, if you will, an outline of what it is the Ecumenical Coalition was up to and was going to be up to. And Gar Alpervitz, from the National Center for Economic Alternatives, gave, a resume and an outline in laymen's terminology of the report that was evolving from the National Center. I don't recall in detail what Alpervitz said, except that he did put it in laymen's terms and used some charts in order to make people understand.

I have my remarks which I can read into the record. We made it clear that the Coalition was going to request that the Vice-President or the President directly appoint a representative to work with the Ecumenical Coalition and to coordinate federal efforts to achieve a model or showcase demonstration project for Youngstown. That came out of, in part, the National Center's report.

Secondly, the Coalition, I indicated, would ask for \$300,000,000 in loan guarantee authority to be held aside pending the completion of the financial package.

Third, that the Coalition would ask an integrated strategy to use government procurement policy in support of the demonstration project be consolidated by the Federal Task Force.

Fourth, and of immediate urgency, that the Coalition would ask that immediate assistance to the Ecumenical Coalition be provided by way of a UDAG Grant to the amount of \$15,000,000 to do two things. One, to purchase the closed down facility at the salvage value, and two, to hire a management team and support team into being, planning the resurrection of production. Those were the major points.

B: Up until this news conference--this is something that you could probably help me clear--the Center itself, its research did not focus strictly on community buyout as I understand it. They were looking at a number of options weren't they?

S: That is correct.

B: And, at this news conference, was the final report such that it recommended a community buyout?

S: My recollection is that it did, that the worker-community ownership model did evolve at that time.

B: December 28th, 1978 there was a meeting at the White House. I was wondering if you could relate, to the best of your recollection, who attended that meeting and what the results of that meeting were?

S: The meeting was attended by both the Executive and Planning Committee members of the Ecumenical Coalition, Phil Richley, the Mayor then of Youngstown was there, Frank Lesiganich and James Griffin of the Steelworkers were present. The meeting itself was called by the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter. and Jack Watson, who is Presidential Advisor and particularly on inter-governmental affairs, was the primary spokesperson for the government.

The issue was primarily the acquisition of loan guarantee monies and was, in fact, the feasibility in the plan being pursued by the Ecumenical Coalition so much in order that it could be considered to be positive. The fact was that \$100,000,000 of loan guarantee monies were assured by a Jack Watson at that particular point. The Coalition members present and others celebrated the fact that that amount was available. Some felt that while \$100,000,000 was to be applauded, it didn't provide enough to do what needed to be done.

B: Yes, because you were talking, at that time, about \$300,000,000.

S: Right.

B: Approximately the same day--I don't know if you flew back the same day--but the Save America-Save Youngstown Convocation gathered. Could you kind of tell me what kind of groups were involved? Was this religious or labor or a combination?

S: Social concerned group representatives from all over the U.S.A.

B: So, the Steering Committee was responsible for planning the basic agenda.

S: That is correct. Yes, the religious convocation, right, the Steering Committee took the major lead with the approval of the Executive Committee.

B: Were there any politicians involved in this one as

opposed to your October 1977 meeting?

S: My recollection is that there were. Costmeyer from Pennsylvania gave an address on Saturday morning, the last day of the conference, but political involvement was minimal. It was largely the religious community. And I recall a deep satisfaction with the amount of involvement from localities all over the United States.

B: When I said politicians I was talking about, say, the local politicians.

S: No, no, Mayor Richley made an appearance and a brief comment, but that was about it.

B: Maybe for the point of clarification, at this point, the Mahoning Valley Economic Development Committee and the Coalition had reached a rough alliance, the fact that that had already taken place, was that seen as the lack of need of participation directly of the politicians since you were both kind of. . . Like I know Father Stanton served on some of the committees of the Mahoning Valley Economic Development Committee. So, was that kind of the basic thrust of why the politicians weren't there that you recall?

S: No, I don't think so. I don't think that was the case at all. My sense about the two organizations you just mentioned was the Coalition was perceived, pretty much, as the renovation of steel thrust, the other was seen more of a diversifying approach. But I have no reason to believe that the two working in concert when necessary and at different directions when not necessary was perceived by politicians as not having the act together or any kind of tension.

B: At that particular release it mentioned Sister Joanne-- if I'm pronouncing that right, of the School Sisters of Notre Dame, who had gone to the Lykes Shareholders meeting in New Orleans and had raised the resolution to request the Board of Directors to support and cooperate with the efforts by workers and the Youngstown Religious Coalition and other groups to reopen shutdown facilities in Youngstown. Even though it failed 52% to 47%, almost 48%, was that effort, to the best of your recollection initiated by the Coalition or was that a separate effort?

S: To the best of my recollection it was not initiated by the Ecumenical Coalition, rather, through the Roman

Catholic communications system the sisters heard about our effort and, in effect, said they were available, would respond to that and did so, with a blessing and with the encouragement of the Coalition.

B: On March 5, of 1979, a new steelworkers' group evolved, if you will, the Steelworkers United for Employment. To the best of your recollection, was the Ecumenical Coalition involved in trying to get steelworkers together or even providing a forum?

S: Yes, the Steering Committee of the Coalition, I do not believe, provided the impetus for that, but they were the ones that worked closest with the rank and file steelworker, whereas they did not precipitate that organization, they certainly encouraged it and provided help wherever they could.

B: Do you feel it was, perhaps, a spinoff from the . . . I know, at the time, that some of the members of the Coalition were visiting the steel unions, perhaps that was a . . .

S: I'm sure that that kind of dialogue and communication gave the steelworkers the what--courage, the impetus to do such. Largely, Steering Committee members were involved in that, Chuck Rawlings, Bert Campbell, Staunton Lynd were generally in the steelworkers' union halls.

B: April 6th, 1979 there was a news conference held. Could you kind of tell us what the highpoints of that were?

S: Bishop Malone and I announced during the conference that the Coalition would be about the business of addressing a pastoral letter to the community and the nation, particularly with reference to giving attention to the moral and political implications of the Carter Administration's failure to approve plans to reopen the Campbell Works; that we would be addressing a letter to President Carter describing the political implications of the administration's negative decision regarding the Coalition's plan; and also that we would announce, upon receipt of the detailed reply from Presidential Aide Jack Watson, explaining the role of the President in the recent refusal and the national policy consequences of this decision.

The issue, of course, was for the Coalition to respond as politically as possible to the Carter administration with regard to their refusal to respond.

B: Following that news conference or news release, on May 15, 1979 there was a labor-management conference, I believe, held at First Presbyterian Church.

S: That's correct.

B: Could you kind of tell us a) What kind of groups participated, labor, religious, whatever; and what you came away with as being the thrust of that meeting or any results of that particular meeting.

S: Yes, my recollection is that this particular conference did not evolve directly from the Ecumenical Coalition, but really evolved more directly from the Presbyterian constituency. But again, had the impetus of and the blessing of the Ecumenical Coalition.

The issue that the May 15th, labor-management conference was addressing is: Okay, now what? That is, shall the labor management conversation and communication that had begun, even slightly through the efforts of the Ecumenical Coalition--and which, I understand, historically was not too common in the Youngstown area--shall that communication be continued, fostered, and strengthened? And therefore, this labor-management conference was held to, in effect, address the question: Can labor and management continue to have an open mind, continue to address each other, not from a self-interest point of view, but from the point of view of the interest and goodness of Youngstown?

Therefore the conference was put together and the kind of model that was used was Jamestown, New York, where a great deal of success transpired in this area of keeping communication and mutual support of labor and management alive using the consultation skills and expertise of consultants from the State University of Buffalo. So, the morning session of the conference was given over to Chris Meek, who was that consultant, who gave, if you will, a thumbnail sketch of what transpired in Jamestown. The rest of the conference was given over to: number one, can something like this happen in Youngstown, Ohio, labor and management cooperation and number two, if so, what shall the next steps be.

A result of that was there was a continued Steering Committee developed made up of labor and management people, which continued to meet for a little while and I don't know, frankly, what transpired beyond that.

B: Do you know if this particular meeting evolved from First Presbyterian's Church and Society Committee?

S: Well, my recollection is that that committee within the church gave the meetings its blessing and support, but it largely happened as the result of three people working together on the design, namely Gene Bay, the Pastor, Bert Campbell, the Associate Pastor, and myself; and with the impetus again, and encouragement of the Ecumenical Coalition.

B: On May 24, 1979 was the release of the letter by Jack Watson and a corresponding resolution released by the Ecumenical Coalition. Could you please comment on the highlights of the letter and the Coalition's response to that?

S: Yes, Mr. Watson, in effect, in his letter said, "No" to the Ecumenical Coalition plan. It lined out the disagreements the Coalition had with Mr. Watson and the Carter Administration, too with, first, we had assumed and had good reason to believe that early on \$300,000,000 was, in fact, made to be a reasonable figure by the administration. Watson replied, "No, we've only said \$100,000,000 and that's what we're holding to." We also indicated that as far as a consultative process of developing the project happening, we believed it was not consultative and used as a previous model, the Wheeling Steel Consultation between the government and those people. I think it was Wheeling Steel, I'm not sure about the company. Ours was far different, far more limited. Again Mr. Watson said, "No, we did use a consultative model."

Then he also dealt with the feasibility. We, of course, believed our plan to be feasible. He said, "No, it was not feasible," and ultimately came to the place where he simply said, "It will be \$100,000,000. Keep us posted if you have anything else in mind." Those were the major issues.

Our reply to that, our resolution, in effect, said that the Ecumenical Coalition of the Mahoning Valley has resolved upon receipt of Watson's correspondence, to terminate its work at reopening the closed Campbell Works. The Coalition will continue to encourage groups and peoples from the Mahoning Valley to respond creatively to the changing economic and social conditions of the Valley. That said, in effect, that all through the effort, the re-establishment, the re-creation of steel making jobs which Youngstowners knew best had come to an end.

People ask, why did we continue to ride on that particular project, and it was simply because the bottom line was the re-establishment of a goodly number of jobs. Watson's letter said, "No."

B: Do you see the effort of the Ecumenical Coalition as a success? And by that I mean any criteria that you want to use.

S: Success?

B: Yes.

S: From a religious point of view, just let me simply say that many of us in the religious community make a differentiation between success as what you might call the world defines it and being faithful to the gospel and to the prophetic message. I firmly believe that, whereas the Campbell Works was not reopened, thereby being successful, we were successful in a sense that the religious community sought to be faithful, both to the workers of Youngstown, which in effect would be saying then, faithful to Youngstown as a whole given the economic and sociological impact the workers have on the greater community; but also faithful in terms of response and caring and the good news of the gospel and God's love, which would also include the Jewish community.

Secondly, I think we've been successful in a couple other ways. One, lifting up before the United States and certainly before the religious constituencies that we represented, not only locally, but nationally. The fact that plant closures are symptomatic of capital and labor flight from the Midwest and from the Northeast. I think our effort made that more comprehensible than ever before. Therefore, I would say success along that line.

Thirdly, and I think it was witnessed in the closure of some United States Steel installations. We gave, it appears, a laboring people the courage, whatever you wish to call it, to in fact, not to step back and say, "Well, we've had it." But at least, it gave them the alternative of speaking out and saying, "Just a minute. There may be some other alternatives to what transpired."

I think we also begun to open up locally, as well as nationally, a continued dialogue between labor, management, between the religious community and national and

multi-national corporations.

B: What were your own personal feelings about community-worker buyout?

S: My personal feelings were positive. I did not stand with those persons who, in reference to community-worker buyout, made noises of socialism and communism. I find that particular model historically sound, going back to Massachusetts Bay Colony and the economics of that whole structure. I would have thought that it would have given a great deal of community--I don't mean real ownership--but psychological ownership to industry here. Number two, it would have prevented reoccurring what, in fact, did occur, namely that corporations elsewhere made decisions to affect the life of Youngstown. And most of all, if we're really talking about the production of steel, I think studies, particularly those done at the University of Michigan, indicate that when workers have an integral say in the production of materials and so forth, that production goes up. And for that reason I thought it to be very positive.

B: Did you see any merit once the Coalition proposal was denied, well even before that, of the National Steel Research Center as put forward by the MVEDC people?

S: Yes, I did. It seemed to me that Youngstown had, not only the need for such a center given the work, jobs that it would have provided and so on, but it had the national focus and attention at that point that it would have been beneficial, not only for Youngstown, but also for the steel industry as well as the government. So, I saw it as a possibility.

B: Was there any attempt anywhere along the line to introduce the concept of perhaps using public employee pension funds as part of the source of funding of the Coalition's effort?

S: My recollection is it was mentioned, but I don't recall how serious that was taken.

B: I'd like to thank you for giving us your time this afternoon.

S: You're welcome.

END OF INTERVIEW