

YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY

ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

History of Industry in Youngstown Project

Youngstown Sheet & Tube

O. H. 488

JOHN WEED POWERS

Interviewed

by

Janice Cafaro

on

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YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY

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INTERVIEWEE: JOHN WEED POWERS  
INTERVIEWER: Janice Cafaro  
SUBJECT: Labor relations, Problems in steel industry  
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C: This is an interview with Attorney John Weed Powers for the Ohio Historical Society and Youngstown State University's Oral History Program, by Janice Cafaro at Mahoning Bank Building on August 5, 1986, at 10:00 a.m.

Attorney Powers, could we start by you telling us a little bit about your family, your background, where you were raised, and went to school.

P: Sure. My family has deep roots in Youngstown. My forebearers were here at the time John Young had arrived. Issac Powers was my great, great, great uncle whose brother Jacob was my direct forebear. That goes back about four or five generations. I'm not really sure. Some day I'm going to pin it down. The Powers family lived in Youngstown since the time Youngstown was founded and developed. My grandfather, Frank M. Powers, whom I knew and who died in 1932, was a jeweler. He was a quality jeweler. He had fine merchandise and catered to the wealthy families of the area at that time. My grandmother I think came from a farm up in Mesopotamia or Mecca area. My father was a lawyer in Youngstown. He is the Powers in the firm of Manchester, Bennett, Powers and Ullman, a firm I was associated with up until the end of 1984. My father lived in Youngstown all of his life. My mother came from upper New York state. I have one brother and one sister. My brother is locally an officer of Butler Wick and Company and has been with that company since 1966.

My father's brother, Edward W. Powers, took over the jewelry business in the 1930's after my grandfather died. In the mid 1930's he decided to move into the brokerage business. He sold the jewelry store around the time of the Second World War to the Schmutz family. He stayed in the brokerage

business and he was quite successful. He was particularly successful in the trading of IBM stock. He thought IBM was a good stock back in the 1930's. He stayed with it until he died two years ago. He made a lot of people wealthy in Youngstown. There were a lot of customers he got hooked on IBM. In fact, he became known as Mr. IBM. He brought a lot of money into Youngstown. He put up the money to acquire the old Warner Theater, which is now Edward W. Powers Auditorium.

My father's other brother, Raymond, was a lawyer in Youngstown, who practiced for a number of years. He had a couple of partners. He was a partner with Art Morgan and James Cooper. His widow is still living in the Youngstown area.

The family has been associated with Youngstown for all of those generations. I put in an appearance around 1920. I was born in Poland as were my brother and sister. I went to high school in Poland and I went off to Wesleyan University in Connecticut in 1938 and graduated in 1942 and went into the Army at the beginning of the war. I had a checkered career in the Army. I was at MIT just before the war. In the first part of the war, I was studying to be a weatherman. I gave that up and went into the Army. I was in the field artillery and then they put me in a general training program. I finally wound up in the Signal Corps. I wound up in the South Pacific and basically was a truck driver. I had a terrific military career. I married Emily Park of Philadelphia, who came from Horsham, Pennsylvania. She is a Quaker lady. I married her in 1942. We have four children none of whom are living in the Youngstown area, all of whom are grown and three of them are married. When I finished the war, I went to law school at the University of Michigan. I finished there in 1948. I came back to Youngstown and joined the firm of Manchester, Bennett, Powers, and Ullman. I was with that firm from September of 1948 through December of 1984. I was there over thirty-six years. Since 1985, I have been practicing by myself. It gives me a little more freedom to engage in various community activities. That is about the story.

C: Do you know anything about Sheet and Tube stock? Did your uncle ever mention it?

P: Yes, of course he did. A lot of people in Youngstown had stock in the Sheet and Tube Company. That was a kind of company that was like the Pennsylvania Railroad. It was going to be forever. It was the more old-fashioned, conservative type of company and the stock in the old days was quite good. A lot of people around here owned it. Then in 1968 they had a merger with Lykes Corporation. It became Lykes-Youngstown. The Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company continued in existence but as a subsidiary. For three years, starting in 1972 and through 1974, I was on the Board of Directors for Lykes-Youngstown.

I knew about the stock and the problems of that particular company. As far as trading the Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Republic, and the U. S. Steel stock, the firm of Butler Wick traded in all of them. The stock rose a great deal in those days. Nowadays, steel stocks are not so desirable. In those days, they were. A lot of people owned them, particularly in Youngstown Sheet & Tube.

C: Would you say they were popular throughout the late 1960's or did their popularity fade before then?

P: The steel stocks up until the mid 1970's were felt to be reasonably safe. 1974 I remember was a particularly good year. Sheet & Tube had an interesting history after the merger. The old Sheet & Tube common was traded for preferred in the new corporation. It gets a little bit involved. The preferred Lykes-Youngstown stock had a pretty good market. Lykes-Youngstown common never really had much of a market. The former owners of Sheet & Tube turned all of their Sheet & Tube common and got Lykes-Youngstown preferred. The Sheet & Tube common to that time had been paying about a dollar and eighty per year per share in dividends. The merger agreement specified that new corporation would pay the preferred owners a dividend of \$2.50 a year. It was a pretty good bargain for the people in Youngstown who owned Sheet & Tube stock, assuming that the company would survive.

The steel business in Youngstown and everywhere started going downhill in the early 1970's. Nobody really could see how bad it was going to be at that time. They couldn't make their payments on their preferred dividends so I got on the board. They caught up with their preferred dividends in 1974 and I left the board. I was on the board supposedly as a representative of the former Sheet & Tube owners who now own preferred stock. At the time of the merger not all of the stock owners felt that the merger was a good idea. Some big owners insisted on being bought out especially the Tod family. They went along with the merger and they insisted that they be bought out which they had the right to do. There was quite a bit of controversy about the merger. A lot of people feel that Sheet & Tube started to go downhill after that. It is true that the last banner year for Sheet & Tube was 1974 and from then on it went downhill as did most other steel companies. The reason that it had happened was a number of reasons that caused the demise of the steel industry as we knew it.

C: Foreign steel competition and competing with overseas steel contributed to it.

P: It was a combination of a lot of factors. Foreign competition was a big part of it. High labor rates also was a big part of it. Management wasn't as farsighted as it should have been. Hindsight is 20/20. The capital requirements for the steel

industry are extremely heavy. The government taxing policy of the steel industry was unrealistic. You couldn't write off your heavy investments that were needed. Not many heavy investments were made--the concern about pollution equipment, which is completely understandable. It was costly and it was non-productive. It was a combination of all of those things. It made it impossible.

C: Why were people afraid of the merger?

P: They felt that Lykes didn't know anything about running a steel mill. Lykes was in the steam ship business and also had big family holdings in agriculture and cattle. They had big holdings in Florida and Texas. They were quite an interesting outfit. It is true that they didn't know the steel business. It caused some problems. People resented the "foreigners". A lot of people resented people coming to Youngstown and buying this steel company. At the time it happened, a lot of people felt that Lykes was out to milk the cash requirement or the cash position of Youngstown Sheet & Tube. They had a pretty healthy cash balance on the books when Lykes came in, about one hundred and twenty-five million dollars. The merger frenzy was getting under way in this country. Accountants went around looking for companies with a heavy cash balance and they would go in and merge with these companies and use the cash position to in effect buy the company. That didn't happen so much with Sheet & Tube. The people who criticized the merger on that basis aren't being entirely fair about it. However, the fact is that the management of the new Lykes Corporation was not as knowledgeable as it should have been in the steel business. There are a number of reasons why I say that. The handwriting was on the wall about the steel industry here. You cannot blame the demise of Sheet & Tube on the merger. It was a contributing factor but a small one. What killed the steel industry were the factors I named, and management in steel has to take its share of the blame in the sense that it didn't foresee what was taking place. Had it foreseen what was going to take place, it might have done something different. Honestly, the problems that the steel industry had to confront were so heavy and burdensome that I doubt that anything could have saved them.

C: Why was Youngstown Sheet & Tube interested in merging?

P: Well, what happens with those mergers is the person taking over comes in and buys enough stock to have a big voice in the shareholders' meeting. If you are an owner whose stock has been bought up in a big block by an outsider, you have to determine whether or not that person's block of stock is going to be enough to permit him to elect the officers and in effect, they go with the company. If it looks as if he

- is in position to do that, you have to deal with him. Some people at Sheet & Tube didn't want a merger. The merger occurred I think because some people felt that it was inevitable that Lykes would acquire control. They decided to work a deal with them and make it as good as possible for the former owners. Some people accused the principals in that merger of feathering their own nests. They did make contracts with the new company to protect their own interest, but that is very commonly done. A lot of people in this town weren't happy about that. Those things sort of happened. As far as the deal itself was concerned, the main thing about it was that officers of Sheet & Tube did drive a pretty hard bargain on behalf of the former owners of Sheet Tube.
- C: So, the merger was inevitable. Lykes was interested in taking over.
- P: If it hadn't been Lykes, it would have been somebody else. The driving force from behind the merger from the Lykes side was a fellow by the name of Frank Nemeec. He came to town and ran the steel company for a while. There were others who were looking around to grab them, such as Signal Corporation and a couple of others. It probably would have happened with somebody who wasn't in the steel business. From the standpoint of the former owners, many of who subsequently got rid of their stock, it was not too bad a deal. As far as the employees are concerned, it is very difficult when you have a big industry that starts to have trouble and can't bail itself out because of circumstances that you really can't control. A lot of people suffered. It is the give and take of economics.
- C: What were some of the problems and concerns that you encountered serving on the board of directors?
- P: I was on from 1972 through 1974. In 1974 they had a banner year. Things looked might fine at the end of that year when I got off. They made up 11 of their arrearages in preferred dividends to former Sheet & Tube owners. The kind of problems that we were up against starting in those days, was the necessity of buying the pollution equipment, which was very expensive and which didn't produce any income. That was a big problem. Labor problems were always serious in the steel industry. We had a number of strikes. The basic steel industry was a favorite whipping boy of some government people. The government taxing policies really, unfortunately, you couldn't write off your capital investments realistically. The kind of capital you needed in the steel plant . . .
- C: Such as modernization.
- P: Yes, such as modernization. It is tremendously expensive.

It is difficult to find it. A debt that was manageable when I went on the board was something like a couple hundred million of dollars, which had been used from time to time to improve equipment. We had a couple of basic oxygen furnaces in Chicago and had big hot strip mills that were pretty expensive items. They were a hundred million dollars. Unfortunately, it is just very expensive to try to improve the equipment.

- C: You might not know this because you were only on the board of directors for a period of time. Maybe you could give some insight as to why it took them so long to modernize. The need for modernization must have throughout the 1950's and 1960's . . . you are talking about very old mills. It seems that during the good years there should have been money set aside to modernize.
- P: Perhaps, but not everybody could foresee the necessary changes in techniques of making steel. As far as the basic techniques are concerned, they haven't changed until very recently. We started to get the electric furnace and continuous casting in what they call the mini-mill. Up until then you had basically a blast furnace, the open hearth, both of which were improved by oxygen ingestion. Then you had the BOF. The basic oxygen furnace which was still the same process, but faster because oxygen was injected. All of that stuff was improved. They did put money into it. As far as finishing is concerned, they did spend money when I was on the board. They put some money into seamless mills and some continuous pipe mills. All of the other mills, the electric weld mill and the rest of them, tried to pick the mills to modernize where they felt the market was. The same was true down in the Campbell mill. J & L recently put sixty million dollars into the seamless mills about four or five years ago, with the feeling in the oil industry that there was going to be a good market. They put a lot of their money down there. They have modernized. They modernized where they could. Maybe they should have done more. They responded to the market. The basic problem with basic steel making is it hasn't changed since 1900 until about 1970. That is the blast furnace and open hearth method. Basically, it hasn't changed. The oxygen equipment made it a little faster and they built bigger blast furnaces. They were very, very expensive. You have to reline those furnaces. Just maintaining those furnaces is a very expensive thing. When you shut down a furnace and reline it, that in itself is millions of dollars. Just to maintain it and to keep it working is expensive. Youngstown, of course, kind of fell behind Chicago because it was more expensive to ship the ore and coal into Youngstown.
- C: You feel that the location was disadvantageous economically because of the higher price of transportation?

- P: There is no question about that. It cost about \$5 more a ton to produce steel in Youngstown than it did in Chicago or other places.
- C: Then, things such as the water way may have helped the area?
- P: Well, it might have. Of course, there was a fight which went on with the railroad companies where they were kind of short-sighted. They were protecting their interests. They tried to have their trains ship the ore. When I was on the board, we tried bringing it down by trucks from Ashtabula. We bought a few trucks and they were going twenty-four hours a day. It saved a little bit of money, but not to a great advantage.
- C: I know that the steel industry has a strong union. How did that affect the industry? Were their wages too high to compete with foreign steel? Or were they reasonable and willing to work with the companies?
- P: By the time the foreign steel, after the war when foreign steel started coming in to this country, there is no question about it. Our wages were way out of line. We made a lot of mistakes. We helped these foreign countries rebuild and put in modern mills. They were more efficient than ours and the wages were a lot lower. Some of them are subsidized by governments. You have this problem. You are not really competitive. Wages and the hourly costs of an employee in the steel industry on the average is over \$20. That is not all wages. That is benefits included. I just heard on the radio the other day that in Korea now they are paying \$1.83 an hour equivalency. That has been a problem. Management have been accused of caving into the unions, not being strong enough in the days when the unions were powerful. Maybe some of them did that.
- I remember back in 1959 they had a strike over pensions. The government would get involved and the companies were the target of the government pressure because politically, you could pressure the company easier than the union. Some of the capitulation by the company was not what they wanted. They didn't want it at all. The circumstances were such then that it was inevitable that the wage cost got out of line. Unfortunately in our industrial history, we had developed an adversarial relationship, which has now pretty much disappeared in this area with the steel workers. The officers of the international union understand that in order to have jobs you have to have these companies survive. The steel workers union has lost about one-third of its membership. It is hurting too. Now you are getting the other side of the coin because USX is being very tough in their bargaining. Of course, public sympathy is usually with the labor people. That is the nature of our country. Management has a tough time being tough. Everybody condemns them. There has been no question about it. High labor costs of the steel industry have been a big part of the problem. It is not the



entire thing though.

C: I know in 1976 Youngstown Sheet & Tube merged with LTV. Was that foreseeable also?

P: Oh, LTV. That is Ling Tempco Vought. As the steel industry started to go downhill, more of these mergers were inevitable. Sheet & Tube and Lykes-Youngstown merged with J & L. It became J & L. It was hoped that it would make the company stronger. I know when Lykes-Youngstown merged with J & L, everyone hoped that it would work because the two steel companies in a sense complimented each other. When they bought Republic, a lot of people felt that was a mistake because Republic and J & L were competitors. Who knows? Maybe it was a big mistake. There were hard times. People think that it is dangerous to merge while a conglomerate because if a company is failing in a particular area, the conglomerate is more likely to get rid of it.

Again, you are getting into social philosophy and economic philosophy. I am not in favor of these mergers and conglomerates in a lot of cases. Of course, when they happen and the local company is taken over by an outsider, a lot of times you have bad teams on the local front. The conglomerate is not interested in the local situation and it can be unprofitable. They will unload it, sell it, or whatever. On the other hand, sometimes when a company is failing and a conglomerate buys it, it will strengthen the company because they have got more behind it. I have sold a number of local companies, one in particular that I work for which was a small company, and sold it to a big national company. The small company couldn't find the money to do what it had to do. The big national company came in and took it over. But it was related to the steel industry and the steel industry went down so the whole thing went down. At least for a few years, the strength of a national company made the local company survive. It couldn't have otherwise. It works both ways. Unfortunately, there are a lot of greedy people in these conglomerates who don't look at the human side of the matter and some tragedies occur. It depends on the people involved.

The steel industry got so bad that they began to skip and they had to combine their strengths. It hasn't helped. All of the steel companies are in trouble. A couple of them now are beginning to come around, I hope. We are going to need a steel industry in this country. We have to save some of the companies. One of the problems about a merger such as LTV is that it becomes so big and so complex it is almost unmanageable. Nobody can make things work. That happened with Pennsylvania and New York central. The railroad industry went through the same thing as the steel industry. Finally you had a bail-out by Conrail simply because the railroad had the same type of thing. Mergers didn't help it. Shortsighted management and shortsighted

unions and terribly restricted work rules in the railroad industry is what hurt.

C: Do you remember the little steel strike of 1937?

P: Yes.

C: Would you like talk about some of the issues there and how Youngstown felt about the strike?

P: Those were the early days of the steelworkers and the capitalists of Youngstown and anywhere else in the steel industry were deadly opposed to the strike. They tried to operate and it got rough. It was just industrial conflict at its worst. The steel workers were trying to get recognition and they did. It was good to have unions but as happened the unions got too powerful and the pendulum went way over and now it is starting to swing back again. We are paying the price again. The people who ran industries in this town were opposed to unions, very definitely. They fought them. It was a rough time.

C: Why do you feel the unions succeeded?

P: It was needed. It had a sympathetic government and the populace was generally on the side of the workers. They have now gone too far, in my judgment. At that time, it was needed.

C: You began practicing law in 1948. What type of law did you begin in? Were you involved in general practice, in industry, or in other areas?

P: I was involved a little bit in general practice. I got into the labor area. It became my specialty for quite a few years.

C: What did you do in labor relations?

P: I represented management and some unions.

C: Who did you work for?

P: I worked for a lot of companies. I worked for Sheet & Tube, U. S. Steel, and some smaller companies that have come and gone. There has been a whole list of them. There were a bunch of small little companies I worked for for a while. I worked for the Vindicator with the printer's union and various unions. They have about five unions over there. I worked for the contractors that formed the Builders Association and dealt with the construction unions. There were about 300 contractors in the association and we dealt with about eighteen unions. It sort of runs across the board. I worked with the General Motors plant up here in Lordstown. I worked for the contractor that

built that plant dealing with the trade unions in Warren. I regret very much that the unions in the construction industry still haven't gotten the message about the necessity to get off of it. They still want higher and higher wages. They are getting up to the point where it is becoming very difficult to expand construction. They're forcing themselves out of a job. It is sort of across the board.

C: You were involved with the steel strike of 1959 over pensions?

P: Yes, peripherally I was involved. I didn't do the negotiations for the basic steel company. I represent locally, when they had certain problems locally and the local plant site would get involved. As far as the pension strike was concerned, I was only involved peripherally.

C: What were the major issues in that?

P: There was an attempt by the union to get hospitalization and pension benefits, which are now taken for granted in almost all of the industry, but at that time it was a brand new idea.

C: Representing management is basically what you did. You didn't represent the workers?

P: I have represented some unions in some labor agreements but not in negotiations generally. A couple of times I have. I represented the police one time in dealing with the city of Youngstown. I represented some workers at the library.

C: From an attorney's standpoint, what are some of the problems managements is facing during negotiations?

P: Nowadays?

C: Well, back ten and now and comparing from your experiences.

P: The problems that they are facing are the economic problems of doing business and how do you keep your labor costs from getting out of hand and making it noncompetitive. Most managements that I represented were not anxious to give money away. They felt that the employees were well paid and they were fair in their labor relations. The problems were trying to keep your costs down as much as possible while at the same time trying to establish a good working relationship at the plant. I was a great believer of once you sign a contract for two or three years, making it work. That meant opening the lines of communication and trying to see what made the other fellow tick and where he was coming from. In some cases, it is easier to do than others. Some of the relationships that I had tried during a contract--one of the things that I believed in for ever is that you have to get rid of the adversarial relationship that developed in industry because jobs are precious.

Everybody in an enterprise has got to work for it. I have for many, many years advocated that management figure out a way of sharing with the workers when they have a good year and when they have a bad year to just pay a basic wage. Finally, after all of these years, this is beginning to take over. Some of these steel companies have been trying to get their workers to buy that kind of a deal. We are so far down the road now that it is very difficult. Some workers buy it and some workers don't in the steel industry. Copperweld workers turned it down. It greatly depends on the individual players. If you are dealing with an irresponsible union leader across the table you are going to have problems despite your best effort. If you are representing a guy who doesn't appreciate the importance or doesn't understand how to make communications work, you have got a problem. I represented one company that employed 150 persons and the owner of the company was the bull of the woods type. He was a self-made man. He built that company and put it together and created 150 jobs by hard work and genius. It was his company and he wasn't about to have the workers tell him how to run it. You can understand a fellow like that. He put his heart and soul into that thing and he has a bunch of irresponsible characters come along and tell him how to run it. I worked for him for thirty years until the time he died. I finally got his confidence so I could run the show more or less dealing with the union. We established one with the best working relationships over there. Fortunately, the guys on the other side of the table made it possible. Some representatives of the steelworkers that I have dealt with that you couldn't get a working relationship. They were politicians. They weren't interested in making things work. They were interested in their own position and their own power and recognition. You run into those situations and when you do, you have a problem. Both of you are trying to make it work even though you have differences of opinions, but you can make it work.

C: You are saying that from your experiences in the steel industry some of the problems in labor has been that they were more into making themselves look good?

P: Individually. I can name several people in the steel union who were that type. I can name a lot of them who weren't. I got along with most of them. Since I left the firm for my own practice, I have represented several of them. Over the years, they got to believe in me and when they have problems they come to see me. It is a matter of being trusted and having credibility. Once you have that, you are a long way toward making it work. I believe in them and they believe in me. When you are sitting on the opposite side of the table, you can make it work. You figure out ways to do it when the fellow on the other side of the table wants to make it work but when he had a bunch of characters that he represents, he has to try to retain his control and credibility with the

people he represents and sometimes that is very difficult for him. Some of these people who work in these plants have gotten used to the easy road and they don't know how to get away from it. It is very difficult to get them to move backwards and make concessions or to understand the problems of management. Many times the union guy wanted to make that work and he couldn't because the people he represented were so unreasonable and arbitrary that they didn't give a damn. Those are the human problems that you encounter in these situations.

C: Is there a poor relationship between management and unions?

P: I will have to say **again** whether a relationship works or not depends solely on the people. It does not depend on the arguments, the logic. Management always wants to be efficient and to be profitable and they can lay the figures on the table if they want to or they can explain their competition or competitive picture and they can bring statistics to the bargaining table supporting their position. A lot of them feel that all they have to do is show the union their problem and then the union will understand it if it doesn't understand them that is too bad. That is a very small part of the deal. What makes the deal work or not is strictly the people. Some managements are good at it and some are not. Some union leaders are good and some are not. Some unions rank and file are good at it and some are not. What makes a relationship work is kind of a "feel" for the game. In the old days, workers if you have a small company and you had a bull of the woods type and I had two or three of them, they kind of appreciated the old man. They kind of liked the big, rough, tough boss and so on. You have younger guys in the union that are a little more sophisticated. They have an idea of this, that or the other thing. The old man hasn't seen this and we have to straighten it out, so they get together and they put some pressure on and the old man, he didn't like that at all. It took a while to work out from under that and into a more enlightened relationship on both sides. With General Motors, it is the last thing that could happen. It started up in Lordstown. First of all, you had a bad labor climate. Secondly, the people who went up there thought they had the works by the tail and General Motors tends to be a big powerful company. It tends to be a little arrogant sometimes. It depends on who you are dealing with. I have dealt with officials from General Motors in the personnel department. Some of them are very realistic. Others in those days when they built that plant were just General Motors types who were "above" pragmatic dealing. It depends on the people who are the players. Now General Motors in Lordstown has swung all the way around where Lordstown is one of their model plants for union relations. General Motors had learned a lot and that is the whole idea. That process has been pretty successful up there. Other places it has not been. U. S. Steel has

- elected to take a tough approach right now because they have problems. That is their approach. It is justified. The unions have been hammering management and if you don't agree with them they will strike you and then you take a beating. New management turns around up there in the driver's seat to some extent and they are starting to get tough. Maybe that is the way to do it. Sometimes you have to be tough in order to get your players tough.
- C: The climate now though in the past several years has been in most industries, including steel, to take concessions as opposed to layoffs?
- P: They will take early settlements and concessions to make things work. That is a good, healthy development.
- C: Do you have any final insights on your experiences with industry and the steel industry in particular or industry in general as to what happened to Youngstown or the climate of labor in Youngstown?
- P: As I said before, the number one consideration in trying to have a working and healthy climate is people who genuinely want to make the relationship work, as opposed to having some private ambitions, people who are empathetic and try to understand the other side. A man who runs the business and wants to make a million dollars and doesn't care about his people, he is going to have problems. A union leader, whether he is a local or international representative, if he has power ambitions then you are going to have problems. If both sides want to make it work and want to find out how to make it work, it will work if they have a positive attitude and a basic understanding. In order to have jobs, you have to get together and make the enterprise work. I think there is a lot of that happening now. The reason it is happening is that jobs are tough. Benefits have run out and people are now up against the wall and they have to do something. They may as well go to work and try to make it work. There has been a lot of "the world owes me a living" and that has come out in this country in the last fifty years. We have to get over that and start getting to work. We have to try to understand each other.
- C: Do you feel perhaps that Youngstown was tougher than other areas?
- P: Of course it is, but by the same token we have a great opportunity. We have a low cost of living. We are well located and people have to start realizing we have something to attract people and we have to sell it. We have to quit bad mouthing the community. We have got problems, but we also have opportunities. We have got problems, but we also have opportunities. I think we have very strong opportunities. We should quit complaining and get to work.

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C: Thank you very much.

P: You are welcome.

END OF INTERVIEW