

American Command Failure:  
Disaster at Pearl Harbor

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
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
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
  
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## Abstract

On December 7, 1941, military forces of the Empire of Japan successfully attacked United States army and naval installations on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. The success of the surprise attack was due, in part, to the failure of American commanders in Washington, D. C.

The Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations failed to ensure that needed intelligence and diplomatic information reached their field commanders in Hawaii. Analysis of the military command structure, communication system, and the personalities of the chief commanders, General George C. Marshall and Admiral Harold R. Stark, will provide a new insight into America's greatest military disaster.

This paper is a military assessment; political and economic aspects are used only in relation to the military perspective. Primary sources are diaries, newspapers, correspondence, government documents, and books written by the participants in the events. Secondary sources provide the necessary background material relevant to the period.

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## Preface

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has long held a fascination for people. Thousands of tourists visit Oahu, Hawaii, every year and most make a tour of Pearl Harbor and especially the *Arizona* Memorial an essential part of their trip. Standing on that hallowed spot and looking across the tranquil harbor, it is almost impossible to picture the devastation of that fateful Sunday morning in December 1941. Only a few feet below the murky green water one can see the shadowy outline of the once-proud battleship. A plaque containing the names of over a thousand sailors who perished when the *Arizona* exploded stands majestically for all to see. Visitors stand in silence and pay homage to the men who paid the ultimate price in the defense of their country.

The tragedy of Pearl Harbor has inspired many books, articles, theses, and dissertations. The common opinion is that so much has been written on the subject that there remains little new ground to cover. Though there is some truth to this perspective, the controversy surrounding the attack continues to this day. It was one of the worst American military disasters in history. There remains no definitive answer as to why or how it happened, but happen it did.

My fascination with Pearl Harbor stems from early childhood while reading various accounts of the disaster and watching the many documentaries produced in the post-war period. In 1976, I visited Pearl Harbor several times including a trip to the Arizona Memorial. As I stood on the marble floor of the memorial I could not help but notice the faces of those viewing this hallowed space. Even children showed a solemn appreciation as their parents explained the meaning of the memorial and contents of the

ghostly outline below. Therefore, upon entering graduate school there remained no alternative for my thesis topic than Pearl Harbor.

This paper attempts not to shift the blame for the failed defense of Oahu, but to distribute that blame as required by the traditional rule of military hierarchy that command responsibility starts at the top. This is not a revelation; it is a reiteration of fact. The military commanders on Oahu, Army and Navy, are not devoid of responsibility; however, they were, in several respects, the victims of a failed command structure and command oversight emanating from their superiors in Washington, D. C. This paper analyzes the critical year of 1941 from an American military perspective in order to provide the reader an insight into the failures of the chief military commanders culminating in the Pearl Harbor disaster.

I would like to express my deep appreciation to Dr. Martin Berger for his valuable supervision in the preparation of this paper. Dr. Berger has been an inspiration since my days as an undergraduate. Without his help and personal attention, the contents of this paper would have suffered tremendously. Dr. Julian Madison and Professor Hugh Earnhart suffered through the various drafts and provided needed critical analysis and appreciated comments aimed at improving the quality of my work. To Professor Earnhart I owe a special gratitude; for it was he who convinced me of the value of a degree in history. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Frederick J. Blue. Without his help and consultation, my participation in the graduate program at Youngstown State University would not have become a reality. To these individuals I will forever be grateful. In the final draft of this paper, however, any errors or omissions in its contents are mine and mine alone.

## Abbreviations

Adm.	Admiral
AVG	American Volunteer Group
Brig. Gen.	Brigadier General
Capt.	Captain
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet
CMDR.	Commander
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
GHQ	General Headquarters
HMS	His Majesty's Ship
Lt. Cmdr.	Lieutenant Commander
Lt. Gen.	Lieutenant General
ONI	Office of Naval Intelligence
RADM.	Rear Admiral
USS	United States Ship

Yesterday, December 7, 1941

—a date which will live in infamy...



## Introduction

On December 7, 1941, military forces of the Empire of Japan successfully attacked United States Army and Naval installations on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. The success of the attack was due, in no small part, to the failure of American commanders in Washington, D. C. The Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations failed to ensure that needed intelligence and diplomatic information reached the field commanders in Hawaii. Though the Hawaiian commanders must share in the responsibility for the disaster, the lack of direction from their superiors in Washington, particularly the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, led to the tragedy of Pearl Harbor.

The Hawaiian commanders were deprived of information that might have provided them with a clearer picture of the rapidly deteriorating relations with Japan. In the military command responsibility starts at the top. The Pearl Harbor disaster was a direct consequence of a lack of command oversight at the highest levels of the American military. This paper is a military assessment that focuses on military preparedness from the command perspective. Political and diplomatic issues relating to the international situation are used only in the context of information available to the chief commanders.

The year 1941 began with the fires of war burning over most of Europe. England stood alone against the might of the Nazi war machine. By the late spring of 1941 the German air offensive over England claimed approximately 40,000 civilian fatalities.<sup>1</sup> In addition to the fatalities another 46,000 civilians were seriously injured. From the rubble

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<sup>1</sup> Alexander Rudhart, *Twentieth Century Europe*, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1975.

of a bombed-out building a dazed woman emerged repeating with a blank stare, “Man’s inhumanity to man.”<sup>2</sup>

Confident of eventual victory over England, German leader Adolf Hitler launched a massive offensive against Soviet Russia. The invasion, labeled “Operation Barbarossa,” commenced on June 22, when along a 3000-mile front the army of the German Wehrmacht swept across the Russian border.<sup>3</sup> Once a willing participant in Hitler’s dissection of Poland, Russia now faced the wrath of the German onslaught. The world held its breath as the winds of war swept over the continents of Europe and Asia.

In the East, the Japanese continued their ongoing war with China and on July 26, 1941, occupied Indochina. America’s response to the perceived Japanese aggression was an export embargo to cripple Japan’s ability to wage war. Secretary of State Cordell Hull claimed that the position of the United States Government was adamant; as a signatory of an alliance with the Axis powers, Japan was regarded as an ally of Hitler. Hull stated the embargo policy as follows:

Japan knew that our economic pressure was growing. By the beginning of 1941, shipments to her from the United States of iron, steel, most other important metals, high-octane gasoline, and plants for producing it had virtually ceased. We still permitted shipments of petroleum lest Japan use such an embargo as an excuse for taking over the oil production of the Netherlands East Indies.<sup>4</sup>

The deterioration of Japanese-American relations began when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, violating her obligation under the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928

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<sup>2</sup> Edward Jablonski, *Airwar*: vol. 1: *Terror From the Sky* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1971), 146-147.

<sup>3</sup> Richard Collier, *The Road to Pearl Harbor: 1941* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1981; reprint, New York: Bonanza, 1984), 125 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

<sup>4</sup> Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. II (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 982-983.

renouncing the use of war as a determinant of national policy.<sup>5</sup> Arms limitation talks in 1934, leading to the London Naval Conference of 1935, failed to reach any agreement among the participating countries of Japan, Britain, Italy, France, and America on ship sizes and ratios. Japan's announcement that it would not participate in the Conference led to renewed military buildups previously outlawed by the Washington Naval Conference of 1922.<sup>6</sup> Japanese militants applauded the failure that nullified the hated limitations. On December 12, 1937, the United States gunboat *Panay* was sunk, along with three Standard Oil Company tankers, by Japanese aircraft while protecting American interests near Nanking, China, resulting in the first serious provocation between the two countries.<sup>7</sup>

In 1938 the Japanese Naval General Staff devised their basic war plan in case of confrontation with America. The plan would begin with a Japanese attack on the Philippines. In response to this attack, the American Fleet would sail to the aid of the Philippines. In addition to the Philippines attack, Japanese forces would wage a campaign of attrition on the Marianas front. The Japanese leaders anticipated a great sea battle between the opposing fleets in which the American Pacific Fleet would be destroyed.<sup>8</sup> Though an interesting plan, it required the complicity of the enemy. On September 27, 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite pact with Germany and Italy despite opposition from the Imperial Navy and Combined Fleet commander Isoroku Yamamoto.

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<sup>5</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Congress of the United States Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79<sup>th</sup> Congress.* Albert W. Barkley, chairman (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1946; reprint, Laguna Hills, Calif.: Aegean Park, 1994), 1-2. (page citations are to the reprint edition).

<sup>6</sup> Hiroyuki Agawa, *The Reluctant Admiral* trans. John Bester (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1979), 51.

<sup>7</sup> Three Americans were killed and many wounded. Hull, *Memoirs*, 1:559.

<sup>8</sup> Agawa, *The Reluctant Admiral*, 196.

In April of 1941 the Japanese Government signed a non-aggression treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.<sup>9</sup> With their backs covered by the treaty, violated only when Russia attacked Japan in the final days of World War II, the Japanese turned their attention to the conquest of Asia and the elimination of military danger from the only country that stood in their way—the United States.

American public opinion was in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's belief a duality, with a majority of the people believing that Germany and Italy must be prevented from subjugating the British Empire even if it meant eventual American entry into the war. An even greater portion of the population, at the same time, remained opposed to any immediate American participation.<sup>10</sup> It appears that the American people realized the impending danger, however, they did not believe it was the responsibility of the United States to protect Europe by sacrificing the lives of America's youth.

The President's policy, approved by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, was to "buy time in the Far East, but not at the price of turning over China and Southeast Asia to the Japanese."<sup>11</sup> Robert Dallek, in his excellent account of Roosevelt's foreign policy, claims that though the President personally preferred a harsh attitude toward Japan, he had originally adopted a "middle ground" approach recommended by Hull. The deteriorating situation of German victories in Europe and Japanese aggression in China forced Roosevelt to take a tougher stand.<sup>12</sup> The United States pursued an active role in

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 186-188.

<sup>10</sup> Elliot Roosevelt and Joseph P. Lash, eds., *The Roosevelt Letters: Being the Personal Correspondence of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1928-1945*, vol. 3 (London: George G. Harrap, 1952), 344-345.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 237-238.

supplying all assistance possible to any country facing the wrath of any of the dictatorial governments of Europe or Asia.

President Roosevelt appeared almost paranoid on the necessity to defeat the Axis powers, especially Adolf Hitler. In a radio address to the nation on May 27, 1941, Roosevelt argued that if Hitler was left undefeated, Nazi weapons of destruction would eventually threaten the entire Western Hemisphere.<sup>13</sup> This remarkable statement that belied the reality that the Nazi weapons of destruction were so far unable to deal the death blow to Britain due to the efforts of a few men in their Hurricane and Spitfire fighters. His statement appeared to be one of several attempts to rouse a dormant people to a cause few believed was in their best interest. Regardless of the will of the people, the Administration continued to supply the Allied nations while sanctioning those opposed to the American idea of democracy. According to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the events of 1941 changed American precepts from those of neutrality to those of self-defense.<sup>14</sup> The world stood on the brink of total war.

The pressure of the embargo combined with Japan's thirst for expansion led to the Pearl Harbor attack of 1941. The surprise attack severely crippled American military power in the Pacific. American casualties at Pearl Harbor consisted of 2403 killed, including 68 civilians, and 1178 wounded compared to Japanese losses of 29 aircraft carrying 55 men, 5 midget two-man submarines, and one large submarine. Of the 394 operational aircraft in the Hawaiian Islands only a handful were able to give battle and most of the rest were either destroyed or damaged on the ground.<sup>15</sup> The war became a

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<sup>13</sup> Rosenman, *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 10:181.

<sup>14</sup> Hull, *Memoirs*, 2:919.

<sup>15</sup> Jablonski, *Airwar*, 1: 22-23.

two-front confrontation when Germany declared war on the United States a few days later. The United States of America was now a participant in the greatest war the world has ever witnessed. As the war progressed, many questions surfaced as to American officials' responsibility for the war and especially the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The American people, once united under the battle cry of "Remember Pearl Harbor," began to ask questions. Pearl Harbor was this country's worst disaster and someone must be held accountable. The investigations into the attack commenced with the Presidential Commission on December 18, 1941, through eight investigations ending with the Congressional Joint Committee of July 1946.<sup>16</sup> The result was less than expected at the time, but probably more than could be hoped for given the military necessity of the war and the political infighting that followed the victory over Japan in 1945.

The Second World War devastated much of Europe and Asia. America's losses, though less than those of the other major participants, were significant. Of the 16.2 million Americans serving in the armed forces during World War II, 292,131 died in battle. The surprise attack initiated by Japanese aircraft that forced America's entry into the war culminated with two B-29s, one over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, followed three days later by another over Nagasaki. The *Enola Gay* dropped the World's first atomic bomb and as many as 100,000 people perished in a single blast.<sup>17</sup> Man's inhumanity to man.

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<sup>16</sup> Gordon W. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981; reprint, New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 823-824 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

<sup>17</sup> James M. Morris, *America's Armed Forces: A History* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1991), 297-298.

On September 2, 1945, the Japanese Government surrendered aboard the battleship USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay.<sup>18</sup> It may seem ironic that the war that started with the sinking of battleships at Pearl Harbor ended with the surrender onboard one designed to replace those lost. The war was over but the controversy over the attack on Pearl Harbor continued. The analysis of historians over the years placed the blame on everyone from Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Hawaiian commanders. As with most controversial issues there are no easy answers as to where the blame lies and on whom the judgments should fall.

Command responsibility in any military remains complicated at best; in a democratic society even more so. Under the United States Constitution the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.<sup>19</sup> The idea of civilian leadership of the military originated from the experiences of the American Revolution and the fears of standing armies. The President, seldom a military professional, depends on his military advisors, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

On January 20, 1940, President Roosevelt announced the appointments of Henry I. Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy. Though both men were Republicans, while Roosevelt was a Democrat, they concurred with the President's policies, particularly in the area of foreign affairs.<sup>20</sup> Stimson, a graduate of Yale and Harvard Law, was a man of vast government experience, having served as Secretary of War from 1911 to 1913 and then Secretary of State from 1929 to 1933.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 297.

<sup>19</sup> U. S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.

<sup>20</sup> Roosevelt, *The Roosevelt Letters*, 3: 321 (author's notes).

<sup>21</sup> Henry I. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), x-xii.

Though advanced in age, he attacked the job with the vigor of youth. Frank Knox did not possess the political expertise of Stimson. A former newspaper editor and vice-presidential nominee in 1936, Knox lacked any explicit knowledge of his new position.<sup>22</sup> Though the new Secretary applied himself diligently to the task at hand, his appointment appears more political than practical.

The American Naval Base at Pearl Harbor is located on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. In 1941, Hawaii was a territory of the United States, consisting of several islands including Hawaii, Maui, Molokai, Oahu, and Kauai. The main military forces were based on Oahu with some minor units located on the other islands.<sup>23</sup> Originally intended as a refueling and recreation base, Pearl Harbor became the Headquarters of the Pacific Fleet in 1940. The movement of the Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, according to the Chief of Naval Operations, was to act as a deterrent against any possible Japanese aggression in the East Indies. The final decision to deploy the Fleet to Hawaii came from the President over the objection of then Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet Admiral James O. Richardson.<sup>24</sup> Richardson insisted that the facilities were inadequate and crowded and that keeping the men away from their families would cause a problem in maintaining a state of readiness.<sup>25</sup> Richardson's objections to the movement of the Fleet cost him his job.

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<sup>22</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 56.

<sup>23</sup> *Report of the Commission Appointed by the President of the United States to Investigate and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941*, by Owen J. Roberts, chairman (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), 3.

<sup>24</sup> Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 80-81.

<sup>25</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 159.



American consensus of opinion of the Japanese as a people was one of inferiority to Western culture. Considered a race of little people with buck teeth, a wide grin, and horn-rimmed glasses, the Japanese impressed few Americans as a serious threat to the security of the United States or any of its possessions.<sup>26</sup> America's stereotypes of the Japanese had its beginnings in the late 1800s, when the major portion of Asian immigrants came from Japan. The fear of a rising tide of color, labeled the Yellow Peril, brought an American self-induced persona of the Oriental villain. In 1909, military writer Homer Lea warned, "Either the Japanese would have to be virtually wiped out, or they would become the samurai of the human race and the remainder of man shall toil and trade for them and their greatness."<sup>27</sup> Lea's premonitions, though not well received at the time, realized a revival after December 7, 1941.<sup>28</sup>

The state of the world during the cloudy days of 1941 was one of confrontation, aggression, and failing hope for the future. The people of the United States feared the worst while hoping for the best. American political leaders ascertained that Hitlerism must be stopped if the world was to be made safe for democracy. As a people, Americans expressed mixed feelings about any involvement in the European war. After all, America should not be expected to save the democratic world by sacrificing the lives of her young. America's participation in the first war to end all wars appeared to have little affect on world stability; the Europeans were at it again. It was their war; let them fight it.

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<sup>26</sup> John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 110.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 158-159.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, (Yellow Peril originally referred to Chinese immigrants until Japanese immigrants surpassed them in numbers).

On a bright Sunday morning in December 1941 America was rudely awakened from her anti-war slumber. Treachery struck a devastating blow to a nation at peace. Unified for a common cause the people of the United States rose to the challenge. Despite the rallying call, questions concerning the attack began to surface that demanded answers. How could a backward, uncivilized people destroy the pride of the United States Navy? More importantly, who was responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor?

## Chapter 1: The Commanders, The Mission, The Magic

In the troubled days of 1941 the supreme military commander of the United States Army was the Chief of Staff, General George Catlett Marshall. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Marshall to the position on September 1, 1939; the General previously held the position of Deputy Chief of Staff since January 4, 1939.<sup>1</sup> Marshall's prior experience leaves little doubt that he realized the importance and pressure of his new job.

Marshall was born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania on December 31, 1880, the son of George Catlett and Laura Bradford Marshall. His father was a descendant of Reverend William Marshall, an uncle of former Chief Justice John Marshall.<sup>2</sup> A 1901 graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, he received a commission as an Army Second Lieutenant in 1902. His long list of duty assignments included a tour in France during World War I as Chief of Operations for the First Army. After the war he served as an aide to General John J. Pershing, Chief of Staff, from 1919-1924, and held several assistant command positions before being assigned as Chief of War Plans in 1938.<sup>3</sup> At age 59, the six-foot, blue-eyed Pennsylvanian with graying hair took over the Army's top job. His strong, forceful character combined with a quiet yet powerful personality exuded the persona of a command figure.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947), 226.

<sup>2</sup> Katherine Tupper Marshall, *Together: Annals of an Army Wife* (New York: Tupper and Love, 1946), 283.

<sup>3</sup> Greenfield, *United States Army in World War II*, 226.

<sup>4</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 57.

In addition to serving as the immediate advisor to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff supervised “the planning, development, and execution of the military program.”<sup>5</sup> His various responsibilities in preparing the army for its combat roles included recruiting, mobilizing, organizing, supplying, equipping, and training. Under Marshall’s leadership the War Department achieved a high level of reorganization and efficiency. The General was renowned throughout the regular Army for his administrative brilliance.<sup>6</sup> The personal side of the Chief of Staff was a different matter.

Marshall possessed a dynamic personality that sometimes intimidated junior officers and inspired strong feelings of either steadfast devotion or sharp aversion and could be, at times, unapproachable to subordinates and peers. Marshall was a man of strong character; when he reached a decision, “those who opposed him did so at their own risk.”<sup>7</sup> This is not to say that Marshall did not allow creative thinking or new ideas; only that once his mind was set, changing it could prove a perilous endeavor. Katherine Marshall, the General’s second wife, disputed the contention that the Chief of Staff lacked confidants. She insisted that it was just the opposite; the General’s affection and friendship were as “sincere as the man himself.”<sup>8</sup> She admits, however, “... the cold steel of his eyes would sear the soul of any man whose failure deserved censure.”<sup>9</sup> Marshall’s aloofness was not only reserved for his men but included those to whom he reported.

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<sup>5</sup> Larry I. Bland, Sharon R. Ritenour and Charles E. Wunderlin, Jr., eds., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: We Cannot Delay, July 1, 1939-December 6, 1941*, vol. 2 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 3.

<sup>6</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1948), 16.

<sup>7</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 57.

<sup>8</sup> Marshall, *Together*, 89.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 109.

Though loyal, his relationship with President Roosevelt was not personally close. Marshall insisted, "I was not on that basis or intimate relationship with the President that a number of others were."<sup>10</sup> Though respect for his new Chief of Staff grew as time went on, Roosevelt continued to ignore the General's advice that overseas commitments were placing a severe strain on the capabilities of the armed forces and military production.<sup>11</sup> The President had his own ideas of the best way to handle the deteriorating world situation, including military options. The lack of professional and personal intimacy between Roosevelt and his chief soldier may explain part of the communication breakdown in the dark days of early December 1941.

Marshall took a personal interest in the creation and training of new divisions. He insisted on replacing aging, ineffective officers with aggressive young commanders. The army during the spring of 1941 was experiencing substantial growth in manpower due to the deteriorating situation in Europe. Thousands of men filled the training centers thanks to the Selective Service Act of 1940. The ranks of the Regular, National Guard, and Reserve Army units swelled with the influx of recruits. There was, however, a negative that accompanied the positive; many of the senior officers were in their later years and physically unable to cope with the new modernization.<sup>12</sup> It was a situation Marshall needed to correct.

In the summer of 1940 Marshall established the General Headquarters (GHQ) to oversee training of field forces in an effort to decentralize the War Department.<sup>13</sup> The

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<sup>10</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:3.

<sup>11</sup> Mark A. Stoler, *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century* (Boston: Twayne, 1986), 84.

<sup>12</sup> Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, 9.

<sup>13</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:519

civilian and military workforce multiplied drastically during mobilization to over 20,000 persons working in 23 separate buildings.<sup>14</sup> The General designated that officers over the age of fifty not be assigned to GHQ.<sup>15</sup> The shortage of capable senior commanders prohibited forced retirement of all aging officers. Marshall advised Lt. Gen. Leslie J. McNair, Chief of Staff GHQ, to place the older officers in fixed installations, leaving the younger officers to command the field combat units.<sup>16</sup> Marshall was able to circumvent the established seniority system with the aid of Congress and President Roosevelt.<sup>17</sup>

In the summer of 1941, Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah introduced a bill initiated by the Senate Military Affairs Committee that called for a “‘revitalization’ of the Army.”<sup>18</sup> Officers considered unfit for retention by no fewer than five General Staff Officers would be dismissed. The previous method of awaiting recommendations by a special board before which the objecting officer could argue his case resulted in unexceptionable delays. Under the new bill, promotion would be a matter of selection instead of depending completely on seniority.<sup>19</sup> In view of his concept of young aggressive leadership in field commands while reassigning aging commanders to fixed installations, Marshall’s selection of Lieutenant General Walter Short as Commander Hawaiian Department demonstrated the lack of importance placed on the defense of Hawaii.

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 531.

<sup>15</sup> Greenfield, *American Armed Forces*, 25.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>17</sup> Stoler, *Marshall: Soldier-Statesman*, 84.

<sup>18</sup> “Army Asks Purge of Unfit Officers,” *New York Times*, 28 June 1941, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup> George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, 1 July 1939-30 June 1943* (Washington: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1996), 16.

Short, at age 61, was in the evening of a long military career when Marshall advised him of his appointment to Hawaii in February 1941. Short received his commission in the Army in 1902 after graduating from the University of Illinois in 1901 and attending the Western Military Academy from 1901 to 1902. The son of Hiram Spait Short and Sarah Minerva Short, he was a Captain of the University Regiment in college and a member of the math club. Upon receiving his commission as a Second Lieutenant in 1902, Short was assigned to the 25<sup>th</sup> U. S. Infantry at Fort Reno, Oklahoma. An expert marksman, he won the national pistol championship in 1909.<sup>20</sup>

In 1916 he was part of the American punitive expedition into Mexico under General John J. Pershing. Short served with distinction in World War I on both the British and French fronts before joining the training section of the General Staff. After graduating from the Command and General Staff School in 1920, Short served three years with the War Department General Staff in Washington, D. C. Several command positions followed a tour of duty in Puerto Rico that led to his first star as a Brigadier General in 1937.<sup>21</sup> Marshall viewed the tall slender Short as an able, energetic, determined, though rather stubborn commander, capable of handling the problems and producing results in a mobile army.<sup>22</sup>

Due to an illness in his family, Short was less than enthusiastic about the Hawaiian appointment; he advised Marshall that he wanted to remain stateside, but the Chief of Staff insisted that the appointment was important.<sup>23</sup> Though Short was an

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<sup>20</sup> Courtesy of the University of Illinois Alumni Association, Alumni Records 1901-1916.

<sup>21</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 53.

<sup>22</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:205-206.

<sup>23</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 53.

excellent officer known for his training efficiency, he appeared to lack an understanding of the importance of his new command. If youth was vital to command aggressiveness, Marshall's selection of the aging Short reveals his assumption that training rather than defense was the basic function of the Hawaiian Department. It seems unlikely that the Chief of Staff perceived the importance of defending Hawaii in the troubled days of 1941, in the light of Short's advanced age and reluctance to leave the mainland and Marshall's policy of reassigning aging officers to fixed base commands. Qualified officers were in short supply but Hawaii was more than a training post or a stop on the road to war in the Pacific.

Marshall's counterpart in the Navy Department was the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Harold R. Stark. Appointed by President Roosevelt over fifty senior officers, Stark assumed his office on August 1, 1939, at age 58. His white hair and light blue eyes covered by horn-rimmed glasses belied his excellent health. A 1903 graduate of the Naval Academy, his career consisted of sea duty on destroyers, cruisers, and battleships including command of Cruiser Division of the Battle Force. On the administrative side, Stark's tenure as head of the Bureau of Ordnance was one of hard work and long hours resulting in his reputation as a thorough thinker. Stark's relationship with the President dated back to 1914 when he was a lieutenant on a destroyer transporting the assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt. Their friendship continued until Roosevelt's death in 1945.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> B. Mitchell Simpson, III, *Admiral Harold R. Stark: Architect of Victory, 1939-1945* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 1-2.



In 1941 the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations were few in number, but long on responsibility. Navy Regulations Article 392 designated the responsibilities of the CNO as follows:

1. Charged with the operations of the fleet.
2. Charged with preparations and plans of readiness for its use in war.
3. Charged with the coordination of the functions of the Naval Establishment afloat together with the determination of priorities relating to repair and overhaul of ships in commission or about to be commissioned.<sup>25</sup>

As a staff officer, Stark possessed outstanding ability, but he “lacked the ruthlessness of decision required of a ... combat commander.”<sup>26</sup> Stark had a tendency to hedge when the situation required an immediate decision. Secretary of War Henry I. Stimson claimed that Stark was a “little bit cautious when it comes to a real crisis.”<sup>27</sup> The Admiral did not possess the strong leadership ability that the job demanded. Stark, according to an unnamed Cabinet member, was “the weakest one of all the President’s advisers.”<sup>28</sup> Unlike Marshall, Stark was a personable individual who preferred working in a friendly atmosphere. The CNO did not believe in standing over his subordinates or as he colorfully claimed, “breathe down their necks....”<sup>29</sup>

Frank Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, considered Stark a “Tower of Support.” Though Knox had held administrative positions in civilian life, he was completely unfamiliar with his new surroundings. Roosevelt and Stark remained the key players in

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<sup>25</sup> Gordon W. Prange, *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), 213.

<sup>26</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 41.

<sup>27</sup> Taken from Stimson’s Diary of November 17, 1944. Prange, *Verdict of History*, 213.

<sup>28</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 41.

<sup>29</sup> Simpson, *Admiral Harold R. Stark*, 3.

the growth of the new Navy. The harmony between Stark and Knox remained unmatched by subsequent CNOs. Stark considered Knox to be less a boss and more an older brother. Their friendship, despite the Pearl Harbor controversy, would last until Knox's untimely death in 1944.<sup>30</sup> Knox's fondness for and dependence on Stark's abilities left the Secretary of the Navy in the wings of the drama slowly unfolding in the Pacific.

Stark's relationship with Roosevelt was more intimate than Marshall's. In a letter to Stark on March 22, 1939, the President expressed his admiration for the Admiral, insisting that his only objection to the appointment was that in case of war Stark would have to occupy a desk since it would be impossible for him to be in two places at once.<sup>31</sup> The Admiral agreed with Roosevelt's commitment to support Britain in her desperate struggle against Nazi Germany. Stark centered his efforts on preparation for war, realizing that the Navy was incapable of participating in a two-ocean conflict. A strategic planner and logistics coordinator with few equals, Stark accentuated three main areas of concern: recruit sufficient numbers of officers and men for the fleet, build new ships and recommission old ones, and strategic planning to revise existing and prepare new war plans. By the end of his first year as CNO, the Navy expanded from 116,000 to 191,000 men and Marine Corps grew from 20,000 to 43,000 men.<sup>32</sup> While new ships and increased manpower highlighted Stark's short-term achievements, his people-handling skills during this period cast a shadow on his command ability.

Stark, in contrast to Marshall, appeared more the intimidated than the intimidator. To a dangerous degree he was under the dominant influence of his Chief of War Plans,

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 132-135.

<sup>31</sup> Roosevelt, *The Roosevelt Letters*, 3:257.

<sup>32</sup> Simpson, *Harold R. Stark*, 10-11.

Admiral Richmond Kelley Turner.<sup>33</sup> Turner was in charge of War Plans throughout 1941. He would pick up the nickname “Terrible Turner” for his turbulent temper, domineering ego, and renowned passion for alcohol. His influence on Stark and his bullying of other department heads made him the second most powerful individual in the Navy in 1941.<sup>34</sup> Turner wielded power previously unknown to any Chief of War Plans.

The most controversial appointment made by President Roosevelt was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel’s selection as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) over several senior admirals. The President selected Kimmel because of his hard-driving, conscientious reputation.<sup>35</sup> Roosevelt’s familiarity with the Admiral’s ability stemmed from Kimmel’s days as his assistant when Roosevelt was Secretary of the Navy.<sup>36</sup> Kimmel took over his post at Pearl Harbor on February 1, 1941. A 1904 graduate of the Annapolis Naval Academy, Kimmel was the picture of a winner; rising through the ranks alternating between sea and shore duty, “always in responsible posts.”<sup>37</sup> The six-foot, blue-eyed Kentuckian was an imposing figure of an ideal officer at the zenith of his naval career.<sup>38</sup>

Kimmel lacked the outgoing personality of Stark. The CNO insinuated that though Kimmel had a kind heart, he could be “brusque and undiplomatic in his approach to problems... he appeared rough in his methods of doing business.”<sup>39</sup> In the opinion of

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<sup>33</sup> Prange, *The Verdict of History*, 214.

<sup>34</sup> Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton U.S.N.(Ret.), Captain Roger Pineau U.S.N.R.(Ret.) and John Costello, *And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway-Breaking the Secrets* (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 19-20.

<sup>35</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 75.

<sup>36</sup> Husband E. Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel’s Story* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955), 5-6.

<sup>37</sup> Prange, *The Verdict of History*, 416-419.

<sup>38</sup> “Adm. Husband E. Kimmel Dies; Pearl Harbor Commander,” *New York Times*, 14 May 1968, p. 1.

<sup>39</sup> Letter to Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short dated February 7, 1941, Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:411.

the CNO, however, Kimmel's qualifications for command were exemplary.<sup>40</sup> The Admiral's physically short stocky build belied his inner strength and the self-determination of an individual possessed by his work. A taskmaster, he never expected more of others than he did of himself. Kimmel served with the British Grand Fleet in World War I as an observer. Kimmel's assignment to the Office of Naval Operations in Washington followed a tour of duty as a destroyer squadron commander. At the time of his appointment as Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Kimmel was commander of the light cruiser force in Hawaii consisting of the most modern vessels in the Navy at the time. A man of few hobbies, he was all Navy.<sup>41</sup> The Admiral's devotion to duty was so extreme that he did not bring his wife to Hawaii, fearing a distraction from his job. The Fleet medical officer, concerned with the Admiral's relentless work habits, insisted he relax and exercise. His staff forced him onto the golf course whenever possible despite the Admiral's reluctance to leave his work.<sup>42</sup> A complex individual of strong character and moral fiber, Kimmel's dedication was never questioned. Successful from day one, the thought of failure never entered Kimmel's head.<sup>43</sup> The strong, the old, the weak, the egocentric, and the over-confident, these were the men who stumbled into the quagmire of Pearl Harbor.

The function of the Army command in Hawaii was to protect and defend the island and its military installations against possible attack by foreign forces. The function of the Navy was to contribute to the defense by establishing and maintaining the vital sea

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Eugene Burns, "New Navy Chief is Short on Words, Long on Action," *Youngstown Vindicator*, 9 February 1941, p. 2.

<sup>42</sup> Interview with Capt. Walter S. Delany. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 69.

<sup>43</sup> Prange, *Verdict of History*, 419.

areas of the coastal frontier.<sup>44</sup> The problem with this arrangement was that it required command cooperation, not always possible with intra-service squabbling over manpower, equipment, and authority. During the economic crunch of the prewar period the services were left to fend for themselves when it came to congressional appropriations. The Army's request for production of the new B-17 Flying Fortress four-engine bomber met with heated rebuke from the Navy. Opposed to long-range bomber development, the Navy feared a threat its mission at sea.<sup>45</sup> The quarreling over money was overshadowed by a lack of any unified command in areas shared by Army and Navy forces.

The lack of a unified Hawaiian command resulted in differing opinions of responsibility between the services. General Short, as army commander, believed that he should command the island forces since it was the Army's responsibility to provide the manpower for their defense. Admiral Kimmel vigorously opposed any Army command authority over Naval installations on the Hawaiian Islands.<sup>46</sup> Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii Coastal Frontier based on the Rainbow 5 War Plan, the Army commander had the responsibility for close-in reconnaissance of the Hawaiian area while long-range surveillance belonged to the Navy.<sup>47</sup> The plan depended on mutual cooperation pending the possible establishment of a unified command.<sup>48</sup> The unified command concept never materialized in the hectic days before the attack. The result of this conflict in command authority was that Short and Kimmel did not differentiate

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<sup>44</sup> *Presidential Commission*, 3.

<sup>45</sup> William Frye, *Marshall: Citizen Soldier* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), 253.

<sup>46</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 242n.

<sup>47</sup> Rainbow 5 was jointly prepared by the Army and Navy Chiefs and approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, under the plan military efforts would be in the Atlantic and European areas, operations in others areas would be defensive, see *Report of the Joint Committee*, 87-88.

<sup>48</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 82-83.

between “friendly cooperation and active official cooperation” required for a combined effort in time of crisis.<sup>49</sup> The lack of a unified command structure was not unique to Hawaii.

The problem of overall command deficiency extended all the way to Washington. Recommendations to unify the armed forces under a Department of Defense faced criticism from many Army and Navy Officers.<sup>50</sup> Though Marshall and Stark attempted to find a solution to the unification problem, they could not bridge the age-old belief that “only an Admiral could exercise even strategic command over a fleet.”<sup>51</sup> The Army and Navy Chief’s lack of agreement to unify their field commands under one commander resulted in abandonment of the unified command concept for the remainder of 1941.<sup>52</sup> Their failure to reach an amiable solution to the problem played no small part in the disaster of December 7. General Marshall was chief of the Army and Admiral Stark was in charge of the Navy; coordination between the services required civilian oversight unique to a democratic military.

The coordination of the services was the responsibility of the War Council which “consisted of the President, Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, Chief of Staff, and Chief of Naval Operations.”<sup>53</sup> The President presided over the Council that met once a week or at the call of the President. The War Council acted as a clearing house of information; its main purpose, however, was to solidify the departments with the White House.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 661.

<sup>50</sup> Statement of Brig. Gen. William Rivers, USA (Ret.) United States of America, *Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 77<sup>th</sup> Congress, First Session, vol. 87, part 12, May 20, 1941 to July 14, 1941* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1941), A2793.

<sup>51</sup> Frye, *Marshall: Citizen Soldier*, 283.

<sup>52</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 243.

<sup>53</sup> Hull, *Memoirs*, 2:1079.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

Unfortunately, information from the Army and Navy chiefs filtered through separate communications systems to their field commanders. Failure to coordinate the messages sent by the Army and Navy chiefs resulted in contradictions as to the seriousness of the military situation as relayed to the field throughout all of 1941.

Though both Marshall and Stark concurred in Roosevelt's concern that Germany was the prime evil to civilization, they were adamant in their contentions that the military was not prepared for war.<sup>55</sup> In May 1940, Marshall indicated the necessity for caution in committing American military forces to either Europe or the Far East. The General believed that any operations beyond the defense of South America in relation to the security of the Western Hemisphere over the next year would overextend the present capabilities of the armed forces.<sup>56</sup>

The military chiefs had sufficient reason for concern. The President expressed his position in his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1941, when he stated, "In the face of great perils never before encountered, our strong purpose is to perpetuate the integrity of democracy... We do not retreat, we are not content to stand still. As Americans, we go forward, in the service of our country, by the will of God."<sup>57</sup> A week earlier, Secretary of State Hull advised the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Japan's "new order" in the Pacific was tantamount to "the destruction of personal liberties and the reduction of the conquered peoples to the role of inferiors."<sup>58</sup> Hull argued that Americans were slowly awakening from their isolationist beliefs and were realizing the dangers posed by the

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<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 1087.

<sup>56</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:219.

<sup>57</sup> Rosenman, *Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 10:6.

<sup>58</sup> Hull, *Memoirs*, 1:71.

situations in the Pacific and the Atlantic.<sup>59</sup> The aggressive position of Hull and Roosevelt suggests an apparent lack of appreciation for the precarious military situation of America's armed forces, especially in relation to the lack of equipment and personnel to cope with a two-front confrontation.

As Chief of Staff, Marshall realized the importance of rapid expansion of the dormant peacetime army to meet the requirements of the deteriorating world situation as of September 1939. Pleading before a Congress divided between participation and isolation in world affairs, the General faced a monumental task. He feared, rightfully, that waiting until the last minute would spell disaster. Roosevelt and Marshall slowly convinced a wavering Congress by the Fall of 1940 to appropriate 128 million dollars, a trivial amount by today's standards,<sup>60</sup> for basic necessities to support a gradual buildup of regular and reserve forces.<sup>61</sup>

Stark faced the same problems that plagued Marshall. The lack of equipment and commitments to the protection of convoys in the Atlantic strained a Fleet unable to meet the requirements of a possible two-ocean war. As late as November 1941 the problem not only remained but increased with additional transfers of units from the Pacific to the Atlantic, crippling the primary function of the Pacific Fleet: deterrence against perceived Japanese aggression.<sup>62</sup> If the mission of the Fleet was deterrence first and then global operations, the provisions for its defense were paramount. The lack of support from the government despite the deteriorating state of world affairs was another piece of the

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<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 1:72.

<sup>60</sup> National defense budget for 1992 was 290.4 billion dollars. *Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Years 1993* (Washington: Government Printing Office, February 1992), Part Two-3.

<sup>61</sup> Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 5-8.

<sup>62</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 166n-167n.



puzzle confronting an already overworked Chief of Staff. Regardless of deficiencies in personnel and equipment, the strength of the Army and Navy units in Hawaii was sufficient, if not to avert an attack, at least to make the enemy pay a high price. The fault must lie elsewhere.

The primary questions, in the Pearl Harbor controversy, were how much information did Marshall and Stark possess concerning Japanese intentions leading up to the attack, and how much of the information did they pass on to their field commanders? The diplomatic corps and the highly secret breaking of the Japanese code known as "Magic" provided the most important sources of information supplied to Washington.

The United States attempts to decipher Japanese codes dates back to just before the Washington Naval Conference of 1922. The Black Chamber under the auspicious leadership of Herbert Yardley broke Japan's code and provided American negotiators the upper hand in their dealings with the Japanese. An intercepted message from Tokyo to Japan's negotiator provided the Americans with valuable information that Japan would settle for less than originally proposed. The rest is history; the established ratio of capital ships was: Britain 5, United States 5, Japan 3. America had its first triumph in international diplomacy, thanks to the code breakers. Unfortunately this advantage ceased to be a factor when Yardley, upset over his lack of recognition and personal rewards, went public with his code breaking operation. In 1929 the Chief of the Signal Office absorbed the decoding duties and dissolved the Black Chamber, resulting in Yardley's treachery and Japan's development of an encoding machine. In the early

thirties the Japanese developed a new mechanical encoding device known as the "Purple" machine.<sup>63</sup>

The Navy, meanwhile, initiated its own decoding unit in 1924 attached to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Officially designated OP20G, the unit comprised approximately 700 officers and men of whom only a small number actually worked in cryptanalysis. By 1945 that number increased to over 6000 in Washington alone.<sup>64</sup>

William F. Friedman, the Army's cryptanalysis expert, broke the Japanese diplomatic code in 1940. Solving the Japanese Navy code remained elusive until after the Pearl Harbor attack; the Japanese Army code took considerably longer, remaining unbroken until the summer of 1943. Regardless of obvious evidence to the contrary, the Japanese remained confident in the security of their codes.<sup>65</sup> The breaking of the diplomatic code was significant in importance to the question of information available to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and its dissemination to their field commanders. As in the case of the lack of adequate equipment and personnel, the deciphered information may not have been everything, but it was enough to make the holder beware.

The Army and Navy agreed that the responsibility for translation of the Japanese intercepts would be divided between the two services. Based on the dates of the messages, the Army would be responsible for the even dates and the Navy for the odd dates. Secrecy remained the predominant issue. Field commanders were not included in

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<sup>63</sup> Ronald Lewin, *The Other Ultra: Codes, Ciphers, and the Defeat of Japan* (London: Hutchinson, 1982), 19-34.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 34-36.

the distribution of the “Magic” intercepts, regardless of importance, for the following reasons: the Japanese might conceivably intercept the relayed “Magic” intelligence and learn of our success in decrypting Japanese codes, the volume of intercepted traffic was so great that its transmission, particularly during the critical period of diplomatic negotiations, would have overtaxed communication facilities, and the responsibility for evaluation of this material, which was largely diplomatic in nature, was properly in Washington, where the “Magic” could be considered along with other pertinent diplomatic information obtained from the State Department and other sources.<sup>66</sup> The fact that a decoding machine was sent to Cavite in the Philippines, much closer to the Japanese Islands than Hawaii, cancels out reason number three and questions the validity numbers one and two. The value of intelligence depreciates when the information it supplies stagnates.

The new year of 1941 began with speculation, possibilities, and an ever-increasing flow of information that all was not well. The commanders in Washington and Hawaii, though capable men of vast experience, faced an enormous task of elevating a dormant peacetime military to wartime readiness despite political uncertainty of how to counter Japanese growing militarism while focusing on the main threat—Nazi Germany. A mere twelve months later the hopes of the new year exploded under the detonations of Japanese bombs and torpedoes on the unsuspecting sailors, marines, and soldiers on the island of Oahu. Had the warnings of January been heeded, perhaps the disaster of December might have been avoided.

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<sup>66</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 180-181.

## Chapter 2: The Darkening Clouds: January - May 1941

On January 27, 1941, the United States Ambassador to Japan, Joseph G. Grew, advised the State Department that a Peruvian colleague told a member of Grew's staff that he had information, verified from several sources, of Japanese military plans in case of trouble with the United States. According to the Ambassador's report, the Japanese planned a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Grew made no attempt to verify the sources. The ambassador was sufficiently concerned that he sent two follow-up messages to the State Department in November 1941, insisting that these plans not be taken lightly.<sup>1</sup> The date of Grew's original message coincided with Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's receipt of a report on the feasibility of using aerial torpedoes at Pearl Harbor.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet originally conceived the idea of an offensive strike against the Pacific Fleet during the basic Japanese Fleet maneuvers in the spring of 1940.<sup>2</sup> It was, however, after receiving the torpedo report in January 1941, that Yamamoto decided on the Pearl Harbor attack as the first blow against the United States by the Imperial Navy in the advent of war.<sup>3</sup> On January 7 the Admiral instituted his "View on Preparations for War" that officially made the Pearl Harbor attack a part of the Japanese war plan. Naval Air Staff officer Minoru Genda, "madman Genda" to his Naval Staff College colleagues, drafted the Hawaiian attack plan. Yamamoto went so far as to consider taking prisoners American officers in Hawaii making recovery difficult for

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<sup>1</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 77.

<sup>2</sup> Shigeru Fufudome, Vice Admiral, "Hawaii Operation," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 81 (December, 1955), 1317.

<sup>3</sup> Paul S. Dull, *Battle History of The Imperial Japanese Navy* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1978), 9.

the United States in terms of personnel.<sup>4</sup> The invasion aspect of the Pearl Harbor attack never materialized in the final plan.

When Grew's message arrived in Washington the following day it aroused little concern. Secretary of State Hull considered the plan "fantastic," but forwarded the contents of the ambassador's message to both War and Navy Departments.<sup>5</sup> Hull was a politician, not a military strategist; tactical planning lay beyond his realm. It was the beginning of a long and frustrating year for American political and military leaders.

Ironically three days earlier on January 24, 1941, the Secretary of Navy, Frank Knox, wrote a memo to the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, claiming that in the eventuality of war with Japan, a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a definite possibility; Stimson agreed. Knox contended that Hawaii's defense posture sufficiently thwarted any attack by submarine and/or surface vessels, but remained inadequate to repel an air attack. The Secretary believed that a carrier strike force could successfully launch such an attack. Precautions countering a carrier raid included: the location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched, the location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives, repulse of enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire, concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke, and protection of vital installations by balloon barrages. The dissemination of this information included the Commander of the Pacific Fleet Admiral Kimmel. The Admiral acknowledged Knox's letter to the CNO on January 27 advising that the number of pursuit planes and antiaircraft guns available in Hawaii remained inadequate for proper

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<sup>4</sup> Agawa, *The Reluctant Admiral*, 219-222.

<sup>5</sup> Hull, *Memoirs*, 2:984.

defense.<sup>6</sup> Again the overextended commitments strained equipment capabilities to the breaking point.

On February 1, 1941, Admiral Stark advised Kimmel of Grew's information. Stark, however, added, "The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors... no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned in the foreseeable future."<sup>7</sup> Stark's February evaluation of the situation as related to the field, according to Kimmel, was never withdrawn.<sup>8</sup> The CNO continued to water down the importance of information with follow-up personal messages, especially to Kimmel. Stark's focus on the Atlantic as the hot spot for American, particularly naval, concern forced a policy that underestimated the situation in the Pacific and paved the way for disaster.

General Marshall advised Short, "The fullest protection for the fleet is *the* rather than *a* major consideration for us..." Marshall watered down the responsibility for protection by adding, "the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii."<sup>9</sup> The General's wording in this assessment to Short is curious. The Joint Committee investigation in 1946 insisted that Marshall's statement reiterated the importance the Army placed on protecting the Fleet when in port.<sup>10</sup> If this was the case, that importance appears questionable; proper wording necessitated emphasis on *the* major instead of the *a* rather.<sup>11</sup> There remains little doubt that Marshall was in a tight spot. The Navy's request

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<sup>6</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 76-77.

<sup>7</sup> *Presidential Commission*, 232.

<sup>8</sup> Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, 36.

<sup>9</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:411. (italics are Marshall's).

<sup>10</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 79.

<sup>11</sup> Author's italics.

for anti-aircraft protection at its bases throughout the Pacific exceeded the amount of the existing inventory of weapons available and would remain so until future production could alleviate the problem.<sup>12</sup> Regardless of the equipment situation, Pearl Harbor was the main naval base in the Pacific; the protection of the fleet in the harbor was the Army's primary responsibility, especially given the information of lurking danger.

Kimmel and Lt. Cmdr. Edwin T. Layton, Kimmel's intelligence officer, pondered over the Grew message. Layton advised his chief that the Japanese were known for their unorthodox military strategy. The possibility of a surprise attack could not be discounted. The presumption from Washington was that the shallow depths of Pearl Harbor invalidated the use of aerial torpedoes. In 1938 Admiral Ernest J. King demonstrated the possibility of a surprise attack on the harbor with an undetected strike launched from the carrier *Saratoga*. In November 1940, British torpedo aircraft successfully attacked the Italian battleships anchored at Taranto, a harbor not unlike Pearl Harbor. British and American torpedoes required a depth of 75 feet to properly arm, while the depth of Pearl Harbor was only 40 feet.<sup>13</sup> American officials discounted the ingenuity of Japanese technicians. As late as November 1941, an article circulated in the United States claimed that Japan's aircraft were "obsolete or obsolescent... with the highest accident rate in the world."<sup>14</sup> Washington rejected both Short's and Kimmel's requests for additional reconnaissance aircraft; the bureaucracy bogged down under the weight of over-

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<sup>12</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:411.

<sup>13</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 78-79.

<sup>14</sup> Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 109.

commitment.<sup>15</sup> Not only was the arsenal of democracy empty, the need, apparently, was negligible.

The inadequacies of the Army were under scrutiny by the GHQ in January 1941. Though the responsibility of GHQ centered on training, its report revealed the Army's preoccupation with offensive operations. Some of GHQ's concerns surfaced later in an evaluation of the failed defense of Hawaii as outlined in the report's findings of inadequate reconnaissance, faulty communications, and a general lack of joint contact between the various units.<sup>16</sup> The realization of these deficiencies in early 1941 appeared directed more at offensive mobile units rather than at base defenses suffering from the same problems. The advancement of technology in weapons elevated training to the top of Marshall's list in importance and would remain so throughout the year as the continuing crisis plaguing the continents of Europe and Asia appeared increasingly ominous to the security of the United States and its possessions.

Throughout January and February the President expressed a deep concern for possible simultaneous and surprise assault against America by the Germans and Japanese. Roosevelt sincerely believed there was a one in five chance that it could happen any day; therefore the military must be ready to confront any situation with the manpower and equipment immediately available. While admonishing the military for its dependence on predicted resources, the President insisted that aid to Britain must continue at top priority.<sup>17</sup> Roosevelt's program diverted desperately needed equipment away from the Army and Navy at a time when Congress was less than enthusiastic in

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<sup>15</sup> Layton, *And I Was There*, 76-78.

<sup>16</sup> Greenfield, *United States Army in World War II*, 33.

<sup>17</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:391-392.



allocating additional funds for military expenditures. Marshall wrote Stark in February that both he and Stark were concerned with equipment deficiencies in Hawaii as well as other areas but the fact was that it was a problem throughout the Army.<sup>18</sup> With equipment moving slowly off peacetime production lines, the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations must have wondered what would be available once Britain cleaned out the arsenal. As the days of February fell off the calendar the military chiefs adjusted their views.

On February 26 Marshall's strategy gradually shifted to the Philippines as a deterrent to any Japanese aggression in the Far East. From the decoded intercepts Marshall knew that the Japanese-American relations were worsening due to Japan's southward movements into "Hainan Island, the Spratley Islands, French Indo-China and Thailand."<sup>19</sup> Japan's leaders realized that any movement against Singapore and the Dutch East Indies would result in an embargo that could end up with the United States cutting off vital sea lanes, culminating in a lengthy and extensive oceanic guerrilla war.<sup>20</sup> With this information in hand, Marshall's and Stark's advocacy of the Lend-Lease Act with Britain appeared detrimental to American security.

In late January the Chief of Staff advised the Senate Military Affairs Committee that Lend-Lease would be beneficial for the following reasons: (1) our own resources will not be diminished until the finished products come off the production line and are ready for shipment, (2) Lend-Lease commitments would encourage the nation's friends—

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 411.

<sup>19</sup> Dept. of Defense, *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor*, vol. 1 (Washington: U. S. Printing Office, 1978), A1.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., A14.

particularly the British and various Latin American countries—and demonstrate to our enemies that “we mean Business,” and (3) the Lend-Lease Act provided that the U. S. would become the primary contractual party with its own manufacturers; Great Britain could no longer place its own orders directly.<sup>21</sup>

Marshall’s reasoning lacks substance in that he had previously advised Short of the scarcity of equipment. Now the Chief of Staff claimed that sufficient resources existed for both U. S. Army and foreign requirements. Yet by the end of February he advised Roosevelt to pursue a more active role in the defense of the Philippines as a deterrent to Japanese southern aggression. The production lines would not supply the needed equipment before late Spring of 1942. Something had to give and that something was the defense of Pearl Harbor.

Meanwhile Stark was already on the British bandwagon. A vocal proponent of defeating Hitler first, Stark vigorously testified for the Lend-Lease bill. The CNO realized that this policy negated any possible offensive operations in the Pacific in the advent of war with Japan.<sup>22</sup> The Admiral’s “Plan Dog” stated the course of action as follows: “The United States could eventually develop a strong offensive in the Atlantic as an ally of Britain and maintain a defensive in the Pacific.”<sup>23</sup> If this was to be the case, the deterrent effect of the Fleet in Hawaii was a sham. Deterrence required maximum offensive capability that was slowly being drained away to counter the Atlantic threat.

In Hawaii the offensive role of the Pacific Fleet was taken seriously. Kimmel instituted strict training routines according to Stark’s letter of April 3, insisting that

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<sup>21</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:436-437.

<sup>22</sup> Simpson, *Admiral Harold R. Stark*, 80.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

training take precedence over all other operations. The CNO insisted that offensive operations would be required immediately after the United States entered the war. Stark's orders countered the "Plan Dog" defensive posture. The constant shifting of priorities from Washington forced Kimmel to either ignore the continuous volume of message on Japanese aggression in the Far East or curtail the training program. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet chose training as his main focus in the preparation for war.<sup>24</sup> Kimmel's actions appeared justified by a meeting of the War Council on February 26 in which the President advised that tensions in the Far East had eased considerably due to the lack of Japanese aggression toward Malaysia.<sup>25</sup>

Short advised Marshall in mid-February that importance must be placed on cooperation with the Navy, dispersion of aircraft and support facilities, and improvement in antiaircraft defense, searchlights, and protections of communications centers from air attack. Despite Short's assumption of command only two weeks earlier, his conception of the defensive posture of the Hawaiian Department was on target.<sup>26</sup> In Washington it appeared the crisis was in remission as the Ides of March replaced the icy cold of February. Regardless of appearances, the military chiefs prepared for any possibilities despite bureaucratic opposition.

During the first week of March Marshall reiterated to Short the importance of air defense. Short replied that problems persisted regarding activation of the new Aircraft Warning System. Construction was behind schedule due to the unavailability of preferred

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<sup>24</sup> Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, 36-37.

<sup>25</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:430-431.

<sup>26</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 79-80.

sites for the radar units.<sup>27</sup> Haleakala Mountain on Maui was one of the highest points on the islands; the National Park Service refused to debase the natural beauty of their parks with military equipment. The War Department advised Short that he would have to find alternate sites. The Park Service refused authorization without the “submission of preliminary building plans showing the architectural and general appearance. They were also very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearances of the reservation.”<sup>28</sup> The War Department added that it would not attempt to alter the decision or prolong the matter by going to a higher authority. Though Marshall was aware of the controversy, he did nothing. Evidently the view from the mountain top was considerably more important than the establishment of an efficient radar screen capable of detecting an approaching enemy.<sup>29</sup> The hard-pressed War Department ran into the stone wall of a bureaucracy that would not budge.

The Chief of Staff’s attention during the early weeks of March focused on the administrative problems that continued to plague a growing army. While Short fumed over Washington’s misplaced allegiance to the Park Service, Marshall worried over the shortage of typewriters at Fort Bragg, a concern better left to GHQ. The General’s distraction with the ongoing Lend-Lease negotiations resulted in staff officers’ waiting several days for an interview on military problems.<sup>30</sup> In the field commanders’ ongoing

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 80.

<sup>28</sup> Courtesy of the National Archives. Congress, *Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 97<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21 November 1945, 1071.

<sup>29</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 63.

<sup>30</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:440-447.

battle with the War Department and the bureaucracy they were not the conquerors, but the conquered.

In April and May the realizations of the Rainbow 5 war plan commitment to the Germany-first theory began to be felt at the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet. Kimmel lost one-quarter of his fighting strength with the dispatch of one carrier, three battleships, four cruisers, and eighteen destroyers to the Atlantic. Stark advised Kimmel that these units would form “the first echelon of the Battle of the Atlantic; any opposition Kimmel intended to make was cut short when Stark added, I am telling you, not arguing with you.”<sup>31</sup> The CNO’s hard work culminated in March with the signing of the Lend-Lease and Base-Lease agreements with Britain. Operations in the Pacific were now tied to the shooting war in the Atlantic; the neutrality of the United States belonged to a bygone era. Roosevelt stressed the urgency of providing help to the British regardless of the consequences in a radio address to the nation when he stated. “The war is approaching the brink of the Western Hemisphere itself. It is coming very close to home.”<sup>32</sup> The die was cast. If only he knew how true his prediction would be, but not in the Atlantic.

The United States possessed a secret weapon that unfortunately like most technical revelations was compromised by ineptitude and jealousy. The primary source of information on Japanese political intentions was “Magic.” Although the breaking of the Japanese codes provided a wealth of information, the secrecy surrounding “Magic” was considered so vital that its value as an intelligence source began to erode. The coded intercepts were available only to top officials in Washington. Only sporadic pieces of

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<sup>31</sup> Transferred ships included the carrier *Yorktown* and the battleships *Mississippi*, *Idaho*, and *New Mexico*. Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, 21.

<sup>32</sup> Rosenman, *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 10:185.

information were sent to Hawaii, and neither Kimmel nor Short knew that “Magic” existed.<sup>33</sup> In late May Kimmel expressed his concern to the CNO that any information pertaining to the Pacific and especially Pearl Harbor be made immediately available to him. Stark assured Kimmel that he would receive all available information.<sup>34</sup> This was not Stark’s first confrontation over a subordinate’s concern that critical information be supplied immediately. Former Pacific Fleet commander Admiral James O. Richardson expressed his opinion in May of 1940 that the Chief of Naval Operations’ failure to provide such information, whether intentional or unintentional, was a fundamental military error.<sup>35</sup> The CNO had the opportunity to personally advise Kimmel of the code-breaking operation when the latter arrived in Washington on June 9 for a meeting with the President, but chose not to do so.<sup>36</sup> It seems strange to trust a subordinate with an entire fleet, but not with the source of information that may protect it. Stark’s reluctance to advise his Pacific Fleet commander on the importance of “Magic” was not his only failure of command responsibility.

Stark’s domination by the Chief of War Plans, Admiral Turner, resulted in an intelligence breakdown. Turner pushed his own intelligence estimates and he alone decided who would receive the information.<sup>37</sup> Turner, with Stark’s backing, won a personal victory over Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) commander Captain Alan Kirk; as a result of Turner’s ego, the intelligence responsibility was now in Turner’s realm of

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<sup>33</sup> Layton, *And I Was There*, 81.

<sup>34</sup> Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel’s Story*, 80-81.

<sup>35</sup> James O. Richardson and George C. Dyer, *On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson USN (Retired)* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973), 311.

<sup>36</sup> Prange, *At dawn We Slept*, 140.

<sup>37</sup> Layton, *And I Was There*, 101.

War Plans. Kirk, relatively new to the position, was one of the few who refused to be bullied by the Chief of War Plans and as a result ONI was reduced to little more than a collective clearinghouse. Turner lacked the ability, in both language and knowledge of Japan, to properly evaluate the Japanese or their military.<sup>38</sup>

Turner failed to relay vital intelligence to Hawaii. When the truth of his own errors of judgment surfaced, he blamed his subordinates and played a leading role in the persecution of Kimmel for the Pearl Harbor disaster. On board a battleship during the war, Turner blurted out that Kimmel should be hanged. Layton came to his former chief's defense and was physically attacked by Turner. The two officers had to be separated by the ship's captain.<sup>39</sup> Turner's stormy temper remained as uncontrollable as it was in 1941. In May 1941, ONI chief Captain Kirk sent a memo advising Turner that in his view, "the Japs will jump pretty soon."<sup>40</sup> The Admiral sarcastically replied, "I don't think that the Japs are going to jump now or ever."<sup>41</sup> Turner's remarks do not agree with his testimony before the Joint Committee in 1946. The Admiral insisted that all along he perceived an attack on Hawaii by the Japanese as a "50-50 chance." He contended that such an attack had been considered a possibility by both the Army and the Navy all along.<sup>42</sup> If true, the failure to keep the field commanders informed showed a lack of initiative on the part of the War and Navy Departments that was inexcusable. It was this kind of command inefficiency that Stark either refused or was not strong enough to correct, the responsibility as Chief of Naval Operations was his alone.

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<sup>38</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 88.

<sup>39</sup> Layton, *And I Was There*, 19-21.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 100.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 234-235.

In early May 1941 American intelligence officers received a scare from which they would not soon recover. The intercepts revealed that the Japanese suspected that their codes might have been compromised. The information came from the Germans but the Japanese remained skeptical until Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo that he believed it was possible.<sup>43</sup> While the Americans scrambled to find and plug the leak, the Japanese investigated Nomura's report. Less than a week later the Japanese Chief of the Cable Section, Katsuji Kameyama advised his Foreign Minister that though the Americans might be reading some codes, the A and B machines, which produced the "Magic" material, were secure.<sup>44</sup> Fortunately for the United States, vanity was not unique to American bureaucracy. The secret remained safe, though more closely guarded than ever.

Assured that "Magic" remained secure, the Chief of Staff turned to more pressing matters. The morale of the rapidly expanding army became a prime concern. The issue of permitting enlisted men to drink beer on base, so as to prevent excursions to the local bars, was high on the list of Marshall's problems. The General argued against a proposed bill preventing the sale of 3.2% alcohol at military installations and drew fire from the leader of the Women's Christian Temperance Union. The General insisted that the military could police its personnel better on the base rather than in the community. The proposed amendment to Senate bill S.860 was dropped and the sale of beer continued, no doubt to the cheers of the troops.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Dept. of Defense, *"Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor*, 1:A53.

<sup>44</sup> Ladislav Farago, *The Broken Seal: The Story of "Operation Magic" and the Pearl Harbor Disaster* (New York: Random House, 1967), 197-198.

<sup>45</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:499.



Adding to the Chief of Staff's problems, Northern Blacks opposed the training of black pilots in Alabama. Marshall worked with Frederick D. Patterson, President of Tuskegee Institute, to provide the best training possible despite northern claims of racial segregation. The standards of the training at Tuskegee, Alabama, were brought in-line with other army training centers under Marshall's supervision.<sup>46</sup> While Marshall reeled under the constant pressure of command, his thoughts were with his wife who remained in Walter Reed Hospital recovering from a heart attack.<sup>47</sup> His personal and professional problems, along with the European war weighed heavily on an already overworked Chief of Staff, distracting attention from the growing problems in the Far East.

The President added to the problems confronting the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations when on May 27, 1941, he declared an unlimited national emergency. Roosevelt directly specified Hitlerism as the main threat menacing people of the Western Hemisphere. The President argued that if the Germans seized any islands in the North Atlantic, America's defensive posture would be compromised.<sup>48</sup> Roosevelt's call for American resistance was more than an attempt to rouse a despondent nation; it was a call for action. The war was rapidly approaching a nation whose military remained caught between what was needed and what was available.

While Stimson and Knox pondered over the possibility of a Japanese attack on Hawaii, The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations struggled to provide equipment and manpower for the multiply requirements of keeping the Allies supplied with vital equipment while rearming their forces for the war they believed was coming.

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 518.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 496-502.

<sup>48</sup> Rosenman, *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 10:181-194.

The Hawaiian commanders, both new to their positions, realized the importance of bringing their forces up to an efficient status of readiness. Short's mission was primarily one of defense, while Kimmel's required planning and training for offensive operations if and when Japan struck. Though lack of equipment plagued both commanders, the transfer of a sizable part of the Pacific Fleet's ships to the Atlantic could only have added to Kimmel's uncertainty of any perceived move on the part of Japan by Washington.

As the freshness of spring gradually gave way to the heat of summer, the American commanders planned for any eventuality. Stark and Marshall worked with a feverish ferocity in the midst of a continually changing world crisis. While the Roosevelt Administration pointed a half-loaded gun at the European aggressors, Hitler turned his attention to the vast lands of Russia. Across the Pacific, the Far East slowly sank into an abyss forced on it by the aggressive determination of the Japanese war machine.

### Chapter 3: The Long Days of Summer: June - August 1941

As the summer of 1941 brightened the American landscape, the dark clouds of the deteriorating diplomatic situation with Japan rolled overhead. Despite the situation in the East, Marshall spent his time planning for a possible American expeditionary force to be sent to Europe as early as 1943. The American occupation of Iceland, originally an Army operation, was turned over to the Marines. Unfortunately the logistics problems of the occupation remained Marshall's responsibility since the Marines depended on Army equipment to supply their units.

On June 22, 1941, Hitler's Army invaded the Soviet Union. A positive effect was that the danger in the Atlantic appeared, at least temporarily, diverted. A negative effect was that in addition to continuing requests from the British and the Marine Corps a Russian envoy had recently arrived in the United States seeking military aid. The Chief of Staff did not know if anything would be left for his Army.<sup>1</sup>

A week before the attack on Russia, China requested an additional 100 P-40 fighter planes. Unfortunately the planes required .30 caliber and .50 caliber ammunition of which the Army had none to send. In addition, China requested another 500 pilots. Previously stripped of many qualified fighter pilots to equip the American Volunteer Group already in China as well as ferry services around the world, the Army could not bring its own groups up to strength. When Stimson asked Marshall, "what have you on this (pilot shortage)." Marshall replied, "I just have a headache on this question."<sup>2</sup>

While Marshall pondered his logistical nightmare, Stark and Knox believed the

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<sup>1</sup> Frye, *Marshall: Citizen Soldier*, 287-288.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 289.

United States should seize the opportunity by escorting the Atlantic convoys. Stark claimed that “American action would almost certainly involve us in war.”<sup>3</sup> The Admiral’s boldness belied the reality that the Navy also suffered from the same logistic problems that faced the Army. Stark’s assumption that British survival depended on the immediate entry of the United States into the war clouded his appreciation of the main issue that the Navy could not fight a war and supply its Allies with the equipment available.<sup>4</sup> Knox, as early as September 1940, originally believed that America would be in the war by March 1941.<sup>5</sup> The war the Secretary of the Navy contemplated, however, was in Europe, not in Asia.

On June 20 Marshall advised General Douglas MacArthur that it was the Secretary of War’s and his opinion, “your outstanding qualification and vast experience in the Philippines make you the logical selection as the Army Commander in the Far East should the situation approach a crisis.”<sup>6</sup> As the threat of Japanese expansion grew, the strategic value of the Philippines took a central role in the Chief of Staff’s perceived defense of the Pacific. The crisis Marshall feared became reality as the midsummer sun turned the green grass brown.

During the latter half of summer, the American attitude toward Japan shifted again. Despite ongoing diplomatic talks between Secretary of State Hall and Japanese Ambassador to Washington Kichisaburo Nomura, Japan continued its advance into southern Indochina. Stimson considered the State Department’s efforts to improve

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<sup>3</sup> Simpson, *Admiral Harold R. Stark*, 87.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 87-88.

<sup>5</sup> Richardson, *On the Treadmill*, 378.

<sup>6</sup> Confidential letter to Douglas MacArthur dated June 20, 1941. Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:540.

relations nothing more than appeasement. The end came on July 26, 1941, when President Roosevelt completed the embargo he had cautiously and gradually implemented over the past three years. Disgusted with perceived Japanese avoidance of honest diplomacy, the President froze all Japanese assets in America.<sup>7</sup> Executive Order No. 8832 “brings all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests are involved under the control of the Government, and imposes criminal penalties for violation of the Order.”<sup>8</sup> The Far East situation forced the President’s attention away from his primary concern, Europe. Japan’s actions dictated a response that could no longer be avoided. A Japanese ultimatum forwarded to the Vichy Government in France on July 21 demanded air bases in French Indochina.<sup>9</sup> This move precipitated Roosevelt’s sanctions against Japan. The political and military leaders held their breath anticipating the Japanese response. The Hawaiian command would meet its first test under its new commanders, Short and Kimmel.

The oil embargo and freeze on Japanese assets by President Roosevelt placed a strain on the continuing diplomatic talks with Japan.<sup>10</sup> Opposed to the President’s embargo, Admiral Stark pleaded for moderation in dealing with Japanese aggression. The CNO insisted that the Japanese were in one of their “indecisive periods” and would return to diplomacy as a means of setting their differences with the United States.<sup>11</sup> Stark’s concern was not diplomatic but military; the Navy was not ready to confront the

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<sup>7</sup> Stimson, *On Active Service*, 387.

<sup>8</sup> Rosenman, *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 10:281.

<sup>9</sup> Collier, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, 155-156.

<sup>10</sup> Dull, *Battle History*, 5.

<sup>11</sup> Simpson, *Admiral Harold R. Stark*, 104.

might of Japan's Combined Fleet.<sup>12</sup> On July 1, Roosevelt, in a letter to Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, admitted that there was not enough Navy to cover both the Atlantic and the Pacific. The President believed that control of the Atlantic depended on peace in the Pacific.<sup>13</sup> A frustrated Stark complained, "policy seems to be something never fixed, always fluid and changing."<sup>14</sup> The Admiral's frustration was more than just professional; Stark was a personal friend of Japanese Ambassador Nomura, a former Admiral in the Imperial Navy. In despair Stark tendered his resignation several times; the President refused to let him go.<sup>15</sup>

Marshall, like Stark, was confronted with a fear that had plagued many military commanders—war on two fronts. The General, worried over his health, confided to his concerned wife, "I cannot allow myself to get angry, that would be fatal, it is too exhausting."<sup>16</sup> Under his supervision, the growing Army had expanded eight-fold since 1939 to over 1,400,000 men. Production, however, would require another four months before sufficient supplies to equip the new army would reach the field. The Air Corps lacked modern combat aircraft in quantity to deal with enemy types. Only when production accelerated to a war footing would the situation be rectified.<sup>17</sup> Until then, the field commanders would have to make do with what was available.

With the gloomy political situation the Army and Navy chiefs sent alerts to their field commanders. Due to a lack of clear and forceful communications on the part of

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<sup>12</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 170.

<sup>13</sup> Roosevelt, *Roosevelt Letters*, 3:374-375.

<sup>14</sup> Simpson, *Admiral Harold R. Stark*, 90-104.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Marshall, *Together*, 110.

<sup>17</sup> Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 13-15.

Stark and Marshall as to the severity of the situation, the alerts perplexed the Hawaiian commanders. Part of the confusion rested on Short's three-tier alert system:

Alert Number 1- Defense against sabotage and uprisings. No threat from without.

Alert Number 2- Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to No. 1.

Alert Number 3- Requires occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.<sup>18</sup>

The Navy's alert status consisted of a Number 1, full alert, with Numbers 2 and 3 nothing more than a tapering off to routine conditions.<sup>19</sup> These alerts differed considerably from their predecessors.

During a perceived crisis with Japan the previous year, Short's predecessor as commander Hawaiian Department Lt. Gen. Charles D. Herron, received the following alert order on June 17, 1940 from the Chief of Staff General Marshall:

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal in possible trans-Pacific raid to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria in provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communications direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.<sup>20</sup>

Marshall advised Herron that information from several sources pertaining to a recent Japanese-Russian agreement might permit Japan to undertake a raid in the Pacific area.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 120.

<sup>19</sup> Wohlstetter, *Warning and Decision*, 47.

<sup>20</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 266-M.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

Washington had been keeping tabs on the Japanese Fleet through radio surveillance. The Imperial Fleet initiated radio silence in June and Washington feared the worst. The safety of the United States Pacific Fleet was the prime concern as reiterated by the Army's Chief of War Plans in 1940. Major General George Strong claimed "wherever the fleet was, there would the danger be greatest."<sup>22</sup> Herron had only one alert status, full alert, that he immediately initiated. The Hawaiian General advised his Navy counterpart Admiral Claude C. Bloch, commander 14<sup>th</sup> Naval District. The alert remained in effect until July 16 when, except for precautions against sabotage, it was canceled.<sup>23</sup>

Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet in 1940, was on maneuvers off Lahaina Anchorage and did not receive word until June 18. Upon returning to Pearl Harbor the following day, Richardson noted that the Navy Department had neglected to alert anyone. Wondering what was up, the Admiral sent a message asking if the alert was real or a training exercise. Four days after the Army alert the Navy Department answered Richardson message; the alert was real. Richardson was dumbfounded. The Admiral made a formal request that definite information be supplied jointly to him and General Herron immediately so that they could coordinate action. The Army alert went off without a hitch; the Navy response was a fiasco and Richardson so advised Stark. Though Stark had assured that information would be supplied as pertaining to the Pacific area. Richardson insists that the CNO failed again to comply on

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<sup>22</sup> George Morgenstern, *Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War* (New York: The Devin-Adair, 1947), 53-54.

<sup>23</sup> Wohlstetter, *Warning and Decision*, 91.



December 7, 1941.<sup>24</sup> Washington's lack of coordination in the June alert should have sounded warning bells; it did not.

Admiral Kimmel insisted that had the War Department ordered the same alert on December 1941 as in June 1940 the disaster could have been avoided. The Admiral believed that even if an order to mobilize under the War Plan been initiated, it would have produced positive results. Unfortunately, according to Kimmel, the order was not given though the War Department had sufficient information for its justification.<sup>25</sup> The Admiral was correct; the information was available.

In July 1941, the "Magic" intercepts provided Washington with a clear image of Japanese reaction to the embargo. On July 25, Stark advised Kimmel of the proposed July 26 embargo and freeze on Japanese assets. The CNO watered down any warning by adding that, "Do not anticipate immediate hostile action by Japan through the use of military means, but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against hostile eventualities."<sup>26</sup> Kimmel alerted his forces. For all practical purposes the Navy, on July 26, was at war.<sup>27</sup> On July 30 the Japanese Tokyo press rebuffed the perceived American infringement of Japan's territorial rights. The United States consulate in Shanghai announced, "Japanese Officials in occupied China have begun to seize American property."<sup>28</sup> The threat of pending danger stirred the Hawaiian Department to action.

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<sup>24</sup> Richardson, *On the Treadmill*, 342-345.

<sup>25</sup> Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, 39.

<sup>26</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 93.

<sup>27</sup> Layton, *And I Was There*, 128.

<sup>28</sup> The Associated Press, "Japs Seize U. S. Goods," *Youngstown Vindicator*, 30 July 1941, p. 1.

Short, sensing danger from Japan's reaction to the embargo and the Philippine mobilization, ordered a full alert. The coordination between the Army and Navy during this alert was, according to Short's report to Marshall, exemplary. Short added, "The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of the Army Air Force and Navy Air Force and anti-aircraft than we had during any previous exercise."<sup>29</sup> Short's original positive perspective of the situation loses credibility in his use of the term "exercise." The gravity of the deteriorating diplomatic situation appeared to pass the General by like a speeding train in the night. The lack of guidance from above was having a telling effect. If the military hierarchy could not grasp the situation with all the information available to them, how could a field commander thousands of miles away from the seat of government be expected to comprehend? Washington warned of possible hostile action, then discounted any Japanese military action.<sup>30</sup> The contradictions in both the Army and the Navy messages continued a pattern of uncertainty started in January 1941.

The problem of communications between Washington and the field as well as between the Army and Navy plagued military throughout 1941. The different missions assigned to the Army and Navy in relation to Pearl Harbor culminated in varying reactions to the changing political situations. Successful alerts pertained more to non-interruption of training than actual combat readiness.<sup>31</sup> Considering that both services had access to the same information in Washington, delays in transmitting information to the field resulted in as much as a five-day delay in receipt of the Army messages

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<sup>29</sup> Wohlstetter, *Warning and Decision*, 103.

<sup>30</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 167.

<sup>31</sup> Wohlstetter, *Warning and Decision*, 71-72.

compared to those of the Navy. Navy messages were usually worded stronger than those of the Army despite Stark's watered-down postscripts.<sup>32</sup> Captain Kirk of ONI continued to send "Magic" information to Kimmel over Turner's objections. When Marshall found out, he informed Stark that security of the decoding operation required these messages to Hawaii be terminated. Stark complied without advising Kimmel. The Pacific commander, still unaware of the origin of this information, believed that the lack of information meant that there was nothing to report.<sup>33</sup> Silence from above led to complacency below culminating in the lack of preparedness of the American military and especially the Pacific command in the waning days of peace.

From the available information, Marshall was sure of an eventual Japanese attack. Although he considered an attack on Pearl Harbor, his mind changed as the summer sun burned the American landscape. Marshall was now convinced that the Philippines were the main target. In a letter to General Henry "Hap" Arnold of the Air Corps on July 16, Marshall insisted that any southern movement by Japan would place an even greater significance on the strategic importance of the Philippine Islands. The General believed that bombers and pursuit aircraft operating from Philippine bases could protect the fleet while threatening Japanese vital communication lines.<sup>34</sup> There can be little doubt that Marshall realized that the situation would reverse if the Japanese took control of the Philippines. With Japanese aircraft now in French Indochina, the Philippines became a prime target. At a meeting with Roosevelt and Stimson in late September, Marshall claimed that a critical period in the Philippine situation could come as early as the next

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 105-106.

<sup>33</sup> Toland, *Infamy*, 60.

<sup>34</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:567-568.

two weeks.<sup>35</sup> The Chief of Staff remained obsessed that a Japanese attack on the Philippines would be the prelude to war.

One possible reason contributing to his lack of comprehension of the intelligence evidence was that he suffered from the pressure of command. Marshall had been dealing with so much information and the internal strife of upgrading a peace time army to a war time army, that he was “approaching a state of mental and physical exhaustion.”<sup>36</sup> The General initiated the GHQ to handle the everyday problems of training and supply, yet he persisted in handling minor matters better left to his subordinates.

Marshall was a hands-on commander who arrived for work early and possessed “ruthless efficiency that terrified his subordinates.” The General was a self-contained individual with few confidants.<sup>37</sup> The Chief of Staff prized privacy to the extent that he did not even have an aide. Marshall stated, “I cannot afford the luxury of sentiment, mine must be cold logic. Sentiment is for others.”<sup>38</sup> Feeling a need to abandon sentiment for logic was one thing, but the Chief of Staff’s refusal to delegate authority resulted in delays that showed his weakness as an effective administrator.<sup>39</sup> Marshall’s function was to see that the War Department and his field commanders carried out their assigned tasks and were provided with all available support.

Marshall believed in President Roosevelt’s Europe-first policy that the Germans were the greater threat to civilization. The General received a large number of threats of violence against him and the President from a German group in New Jersey. In a letter to

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 614.

<sup>36</sup> Stoler, *George C. Marshall*, 85.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 85-86.

<sup>38</sup> Marshall, *Together*, 110.

<sup>39</sup> Prange, *The Verdict of History*, 243.

General John Palmer, dated August 15, 1941, Marshall complained of “getting knocks from all sides.”<sup>40</sup> The General complained of mental fatigue and refused to accept calls at his home unless they were from the White House.<sup>41</sup> Marshall made plans to check into the Army-Navy hospital at Hot Springs Park, Arkansas, with his wife in mid-December.<sup>42</sup> Unfortunately, events would override any concern Marshall had for his health.

On August 1 Roosevelt extended the embargo to include aviation and motor oil to Japan. The Japanese estimated that they only had enough oil to supply the Navy for a year, major industry less than half that time.<sup>43</sup> Japan’s situation was serious and her alternatives were few. Admiral Yamamoto faced off with a reluctant Army General Staff over the Pearl Harbor operation.<sup>44</sup> While the Army looked southward, the Chief of the Combined Fleet prepared for what he feared was inevitable, war with the United States.

In Washington, competing demands on Marshall’s attention taxed an already overworked commander. While the Chief of Staff tried to keep abreast of matters pertaining to the crisis, resurfacing charges of racism in the military reared its ugly head. According to the opinion of author William Frye, Negro soldiers lacked the self-discipline and responsible behavior required in combat troops. Frye argues that these deficiencies resulted in Negroes being deprived systematically and kept in a state of dependence by a society that “uses but does not accept them.”<sup>45</sup> Marshall proposed that Negro servicemen be granted voluntary release at age twenty-eight. The General later

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<sup>40</sup> Testimony before House Military Affairs Committee on July 22, 1941. Bland, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:589.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 633.

<sup>42</sup> Stoler, *Marshall: Soldier-Statesman*, 86-87.

<sup>43</sup> Interview with RADM Sadatoshi Tomioka, July 16, 1947. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 169.

<sup>44</sup> Agawa, *The Reluctant Admiral*, 223.

<sup>45</sup> Frye, *Marshall: Citizen-Soldier*, 296.

amended that proposal to only noncommissioned and commissioned officers only, “lest all elect to stay.”<sup>46</sup> The Chief of Staff’s proposal denotes the general prewar feeling that Negroes lacked equality with Caucasians. Marshall, though by general consent allegedly brilliant, was not above the petty prejudices of the period.

During the first week of August, Marshall mysteriously disappeared. The General departed without even advising his wife, Katherine, where he was going. After several attempts to reach Marshall at his office produced no results, a *Herald-Tribune* reporter called the General’s residence and Katherine’s sister answered the phone. To the reporter’s inquiry on the whereabouts of the Chief of Staff, her sister replied, “That is funny. I just bought a *Herald-Tribune* to try to find out.” The reporter answered “you win!” and hung up.<sup>47</sup> Marshall was not alone; the President, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations were aboard the USS *Augusta* headed for Newfoundland.

On August 7 the *Augusta* dropped anchor in Placentia Bay off the coast of Newfoundland. Two days later the British battleship HMS *Prince of Wales* arrived carrying British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. A round of continuous talks ended three days later.<sup>48</sup> The President and the Prime Minister agreed that any confrontation with the Japanese must be delayed until the conclusion of proper defensive measures.<sup>49</sup> Despite the proposed peaceful intentions of the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt and Churchill decided to issue a warning that Japan desist in pursuing any further aggression in the Far East.<sup>50</sup> The Japanese considered the Charter and the warning as “tantamount to a

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Marshall, *Together*, 95.

<sup>48</sup> Editor’s notes, Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:585-586.

<sup>49</sup> For text of *Atlantic Charter* see Appendix A.

<sup>50</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 22.

declaration of war... and signaled the Anglo-American powers' intention of world conquest through the maintenance of the status quo as defined by liberalism."<sup>51</sup> If buying time was critical, the employment of embargoes, freezing of assets, and warnings against aggression were more likely to provoke than pacify Japanese ambitions.

Adding to the dilemma, Roosevelt closed the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping on August 26. The President authorized Navy, Marine, and Army pilots to leave their selected services and sign up for the American Volunteer Group under Brig. Gen. Claire L. Chennault.<sup>52</sup> The AVG would eventually fight in China for the Nationalist forces against the Japanese. Though training began in 1941, the group would not see action until after the Pearl Harbor attack.<sup>53</sup> Roosevelt mobilized the Philippine National Army and ordered the immediate shipment of all available equipment to strengthen the Islands.<sup>54</sup> B-17 bombers critically needed in Hawaii were detached for duty in the Philippines. Marshall complained in a letter to the Secretary of War on August 29 that spare parts were in such short supply that one-fifth of the Army's available aircraft remained grounded for lack of parts. Marshall insisted that America's generosity to its allies was at the expense of American military strength.<sup>55</sup>

The Summer of 1941 found the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations embroiled in the rebuilding of their forces while maintaining a weary eye on the deteriorating world situation. Marshall's reluctance to delegate authority buried him in

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<sup>51</sup> Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (New York: Longman, 1987), 155-156.

<sup>52</sup> Morgenstern, *The Story of the Secret War*, 100.

<sup>53</sup> Jablonski, *Airwar*, 2:32.

<sup>54</sup> Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 40.

<sup>55</sup> Memorandum for the Secretary of War dated August 29, 1941. Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:595-596.

the day-to-day problems of supply, morale, race, and medical problems that swayed his attention from the important matters involved in providing for the efficient defensive posture of the many military installations, Army and Navy. The overload of work effected his health which could but have an adverse effect on his work. Stark's lack of hands-on supervision and his downplaying of critical messages left his subordinates confused. Like chess players in deep concentration, the Washington commanders contemplated Japan's possible moves and focused on what looked like the sure target, the Philippines.

After August 1941 any references from Washington of an attack on Pearl Harbor or Hawaii were scarce. Marshall stated before the Joint Committee in 1946, "Our thought was that the Japanese were engaged in a campaign southward... we thought that a blow in the Hawaiian district was most improbable."<sup>56</sup> On August 28 Stark wrote Kimmel proclaiming, "I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender."<sup>57</sup> The contention that Hawaii was not a target of the Japanese was to be disputed in a revealing intercept from Tokyo as the hot summer sun slowly gave way to the falling leaves of a blustery autumn.

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<sup>56</sup> Seth W. Richardson, "Why Were We Caught Napping at Pearl Harbor?" *Saturday Evening Post Magazine*, 24 May 1947, 21.

<sup>57</sup> Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, 35.



#### Chapter 4: The Warnings of Autumn: September - November 1941

In a speech to the American Legion on September 15, 1941, General Marshall claimed that regardless of the state of emergency previously declared by the President, the Army continued to operate under peacetime conditions. The General added an interesting revelation:

As Chief of Staff I am largely responsible for the military program and for the decisions of subordinates. Mistakes have been made and it is to be expected that more will be made. However, I am certain that we in the Army are the most severe critics and also that we can best detect deficiencies and are better prepared to determine the method for their correction.<sup>1</sup>

Marshall's comments came only five days after Roosevelt issued a "shoot first" order directed at German and Italian naval, land, and air forces encountered in the Atlantic.<sup>2</sup> The Army may have been at peace; the Navy was at war, at least in the Atlantic. The General's insistence that errors had and would continue to be made precedes a turning point when mistakes and complacency in Washington paved the way to disaster.

On September 24, 1941, Japanese Naval Intelligence sent a message to the Honolulu consulate requesting a breakdown of the Pearl Harbor Navy Base into grids. The harbor, according to the instructions, should be divided into five sub-areas as follows:

Area A: Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B: Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C: East Loch.

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<sup>1</sup> Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:608-609.

<sup>2</sup> Dallek, *American Foreign Policy*, 287.

Area D: Middle Loch.

Area E: West Loch and the communicating water routes.

Included in the report were the types and classes of vessels and a special notation when two or more ships were berthed side-by-side.<sup>3</sup> This message became known in Washington as the “Bomb Plot” message. Warships, in port, were to be reported by type and location on the grid. The message was relayed through the Japanese Foreign Office in the standard diplomatic code.<sup>4</sup> The message was intercepted by MS-5, the Army’s Signal Intelligence Service radio station at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. Though MS-5 could receive messages, they did not have the equipment to decipher the codes. The function of MS-5 was to forward the messages to Washington for analysis. MS-5 was receiving so much material that there was a delay in forwarding the messages. The “Bomb Plot” message was not received in Washington until October 6.<sup>5</sup> The delay can be attributed to two factors: (1) the message was sent by mail and the Pan Am Clipper flight was delayed due to weather, and (2) Japan transmitted the message in the J-19 consular code which received a lower priority in decryption than “Magic.”<sup>6</sup>

Washington received the “Bomb Plot” message and forwarded separate copies to the Army and Navy. Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Far East Section G2 Intelligence, translated the message on October 9, and sent copies to his superiors. Marshall showed no interest in the message, claiming that it was of importance only to the Navy. Bratton was a 1914 graduate of West Point and proficient in the study of the Japanese language

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<sup>3</sup> Dept. of Defense, *“Magic” Background of Pearl Harbor*, 3:130-131.

<sup>4</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 182.

<sup>5</sup> John Toland, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* (New York: Doubleday, 1982), 61.

<sup>6</sup> Layton, *And I Was There*, 163.

due to three tours of duty in Japan.<sup>7</sup> Though he had been Chief of Military Intelligence since 1937, the Colonel lacked the authority to alert the Navy which was not a problem; the Office of Naval Intelligence had received a copy and was hard at work decoding it.<sup>8</sup>

Captain Alwin Kramer, Naval Intelligence Translation Section and also proficient in the Japanese language, realized the importance of the “Bomb Plot” message and rushed a translated copy to Admiral Stark. Stark later claimed, before the Joint Committee, that he did not remember the message or any impression that it may have made on him. The CNO presumed that Kimmel had received the message and decoded it in Hawaii.<sup>9</sup> Stark was either clearly confused or oblivious of the value of the intelligence sources. He knew Kimmel was not on the “Magic” list and did not have the equipment necessary for decoding the messages. The Admiral need only have checked with his Office of Naval Intelligence Chief Captain Kirk to ascertain whether Hawaii was or was not on the “Magic” list.

The “Bomb Plot” message was probably the most important source of information relating to Japanese interests in Pearl Harbor to date. Neither Kimmel nor Short knew of the message’s existence until after the attack. Short claimed that such information would have been useful to the Japanese only for sabotage or an air attack.<sup>10</sup> Kimmel came more to the point:

In no other area was the Japanese Government seeking information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the dispatch of September 24, the information which the Japanese sought and obtained about Pearl Harbor followed the general pattern of their interest in American Fleet movements in

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<sup>7</sup> Farago, *Broken Seal*, 279.

<sup>8</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 266-E.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 183.

other localities. One might suspect this type of conventional espionage. With the dispatch of September 24, 1941, and those which followed, there was a significant and ominous change in the character of the information which the Japanese Government sought and obtained. The espionage then directed was of an unusual character and outside the realm of reasonable suspicion. It was no longer merely directed to ascertaining the general whereabouts of ships of the fleet. It was directed to the presence of particular ships in particular areas; to such minute detail as what ships were double-docked at the same wharf. In the period immediately preceding the attack, the Jap Consul General in Hawaii was directed by Tokyo to report even when there were no movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. *These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor.* The information sought and obtained, with such painstaking detail had no other conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint. Its utility was in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. Its effective value was lost completely when the ships left their reported berthings in Pear Harbor.<sup>11</sup>

In a follow-up message on November 15, Tokyo requested that absolute secrecy be maintained in reference to the Pearl Harbor report.<sup>12</sup> The requirement of secrecy in itself, for American Intelligence analysts, was not as important as the written request for secrecy.

The controversy surrounding the “Bomb Plot” message continues to plague historians and military strategists today. Though it was true that the Japanese were requesting information on other American and British installations in the Pacific, in no other area did they require the precise detail as at Pearl Harbor. Captain Kirk, ONI, advised Admiral Turner that Kimmel should be advised of the message immediately. Turner refused and Kirk was replaced by Admiral Theodore Wilkinson.<sup>13</sup> The new Chief of Naval Intelligence brushed off the message as a defensive measure by the Japanese to

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<sup>11</sup> Admiral Kimmels Testimony. *Report of the Joint Committee*, 182-183.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 182.

<sup>13</sup> Toland, *Infamy*, 62.

ascertain how fast ships could sortie from Pearl Harbor in case of an armed emergency in the Pacific, not to set up an attack on the Hawaiian naval base.<sup>14</sup> Wilkinson dismissed the message as a defensive, not offensive, preparation of the Japanese military. Before the Joint Committee in 1946 he admitted his error and regretted its consequence.<sup>15</sup>

Both General Marshall and Admiral Stark share the blame for their failure to notify Kimmel and Short that the Japanese were taking more than a casual interest in Pearl Harbor. Hawaii's defense depended on the Army, yet Marshall saw no need to inform Short that Pearl Harbor was under Japanese military scrutiny. Marshall's reasoning that it was a Navy problem adds to the conclusion that the Chief of Staff did not understand the Army's primary function, defense of Hawaii. Stark's convenient lapse of memory would reappear in his account of his whereabouts on the evening of December 6. That the man who would later receive acclaim for his strategic planning in the Navy's part in the invasion of Europe in 1944 could not remember a message requesting detailed information on the major United State Naval base in the Pacific remains a mystery in the puzzle of the disaster.

The first week of October found the Chief of Staff physically distracted with the flu bug.<sup>16</sup> In addition to his worries over the protection of the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and particularly the life-line to the Philippines, Marshall's wife was in Walter Reed Army Hospital as a result from a fall in which she broke four ribs.<sup>17</sup> His personal and professional problems were taking their toll. Marshall refused to have his evenings

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<sup>14</sup> Farago, *Broken Seal*, 230-232.

<sup>15</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 184.

<sup>16</sup> Letter to Allen T. Brown. Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:629-630.

<sup>17</sup> Marshall, *Together*, 97-98.

interrupted with “shop talk” and went to bed every night by 9 P.M. lest he be unable to focus on the wide range of problems facing him the following day.<sup>18</sup> While uncertainty filtered down from the seat of power to the shores of sunny Oahu, the Japanese Navy faced its own dilemma.

Across the Pacific staff officers of the Combined Fleet pressed for an attack on Pearl Harbor as the prelude for War with America. The General Staff objected, claiming that Hawaii was beyond the operational sphere of planning then under consideration. The General Staff expressed five major reasons for their concern as to the success of any such attack: (1) success of Hawaiian Operation was dependent upon the achievement of surprise, (2) the Hawaiian Operation was not so indispensable as to be executed regardless of risk, (3) almost all naval vessels participating in the Hawaiian Operation would have to be refueled at sea en route; destroyers at least twice, (4) high probability that the task force would be spotted by enemy patrol planes at the point from which the attacking planes were to be launched, with consequent enemy interdiction, and (5) knowledge that it would break down the negotiations between the United States and Japan.<sup>19</sup>

Imperial Fleet commander Yamamoto countered these concerns with his own opinions. The Admiral argued that “The present situation, i.e., that of the U. S. fleet in the Hawaiian Islands, strategically speaking, is tantamount to a dagger being pointed at our throat. Moreover, when we consider the naval strength ratio between the United States and Japan, we would have no chance of victory unless a decisive attack was

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<sup>18</sup> Letter to Harry H. Woodring, Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:633.

<sup>19</sup> Fukudome, *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 1318-1320.

launched at the earliest possible opportunity. This operation is beset with numerous difficulties, none of which, however, makes it impossible.”<sup>20</sup>

Yamamoto’s will overcame the apprehensions of the General Staff; the attack plan was approved.<sup>21</sup> Stephen E. Pelz, in his excellent account of the failed second London Naval Conference, adds credence to Yamamoto’s beliefs that the timing of 1941 as the year for war resulted from the Japanese Naval leaders’ recommendation “to seek battle while they were still fairly confident of victory.”<sup>22</sup> The road to Pearl Harbor and war in the Pacific fell on the shoulders of the Imperial Fleet and its commander, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.

On October 16, 1941, Stark advised his Pacific commanders that the Japanese military was in control of their government and Japan might strike the United States and/or Britain. The message to Kimmel with a copy to Short stated:

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the U. S. In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan. Second and third aedes [addressees] inform appropriate Army and Navy district authorities. Acknowledge.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 1320-1321.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Stephen E. Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 228.

<sup>23</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 96.

The next day, however, Stark sent a personal message to Kimmel stating, "I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent merely stated the 'Possibility.'" <sup>24</sup> The Chief of Naval Operations' personal postscripts did little to alleviate an already confusing situation.

In the Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, General Short centered on sabotage as the main threat to security due to the large Japanese population (157,905) in the Hawaiian Islands. <sup>25</sup> On October 20, Marshall advised Short that though tension with Japan mounted, no change in foreign policy appeared likely. Short remained satisfied that his precautions against sabotage were adequate. <sup>26</sup> The harried month of October ended with the sinking of the U. S. destroyer *Reuben James* by a German submarine. Despite heavy loss of life little Congressional or public indignation was aroused. <sup>27</sup> In the War Department Colonel Bratton plotted Japan's perceived march to war. On a map in his office, from the information provided by "Magic" through the middle of October, a marker rested on the spot containing Pearl Harbor. <sup>28</sup>

Information that Japan might be up to something was available to anyone properly analyzing the available material. Missed opportunities and poor communication with field commands continued a pattern of uncertainty. Contradictory messages from the Washington chiefs clouded an already confusing situation that was about to get worse as the November weeks rolled by.

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<sup>24</sup> Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, 41. ('possibility' the italics are Stark's).

<sup>25</sup> Collier, *Road to Pearl Harbor*, 211.

<sup>26</sup> Wohlstetter, *Warning and Decision*, 133-134.

<sup>27</sup> Simpson, *Harold R. Stark*, 94.

<sup>28</sup> Farago, *Broken Seal*, 233.



On November 22, 1941, the Japanese Pearl Harbor strike force assembled at Takan Bay in the Kuriles north of Hokkaido, Japan. Six fleet carriers, 1 light cruiser, 2 heavy cruisers, 2 battleships, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, and 8 tankers and supply ships under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo received orders, on November 25, to sail for Hawaii.<sup>29</sup> An advance force of five submarines, each carrying a midget submarine, left on the November 18 for a special attack on Hawaii to be coordinated with the main attack. On November 26, 1941, the Japanese Navy sailed into history.<sup>30</sup> Across the Pacific, American military and civilian leaders struggled to piece together a viable assessment of Japanese intentions.

Three days earlier at a secret meeting with Admiral Stark, Ambassador Nomura insisted that if the United States did not ease trade and economic restrictions, Japan would have no alternative but war. Even Nomura did not know how right he was. The Imperial Conference held on November 5, decided on war with the United States and Great Britain if a mutual economic and trade agreement could not be reached.<sup>31</sup> Time was running out. On November 24 Stark warned his Pacific commanders that any diplomatic success with Japan was in doubt. At a meeting of the War Council later that day Roosevelt concurred with Stark's and Marshall's pleas for more time.<sup>32</sup> Time was a commodity in short supply.

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<sup>29</sup> See Appendix E for list of Japanese Strike Force.

<sup>30</sup> Dull, *Battle History*, 10-13. (taken from Japanese Defense Agency, War History Section).

<sup>31</sup> Editor's notation, Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:685.

<sup>32</sup> Simpson, *Harold R. Stark*, 107-108.

On November 25, President Roosevelt advised the War Council that the Japanese could attack any time and were known for using the advantage of surprise.<sup>33</sup> Secretary of State Hull accentuated the critical situation concerning Japanese relations:

There is practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. It would be a mistake to assume that our conversations are going to go on.... The Japanese are likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force. The question of safeguarding our national security lies in the hands of the Army and the Navy.... I must express my judgment that any plan for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy. They might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination of defense.<sup>34</sup>

The day before in a letter to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the President claimed that a proposed *modus vivendi* from the Japanese on November 20 contained proposals unacceptable to the United States. Roosevelt advised the Prime Minister that Hull would convey an alternative proposal that included:

pledges of peaceful intent, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement into areas which would include northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdrawal its forces from southern French Indo-China.... This Government would undertake to modify its freezing order to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunkers and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifications, raw cotton up to \$600,000 monthly, petroleum on a monthly basis for civilian needs....<sup>35</sup>

The President admitted that a positive reply was doubtful and trouble could be expected at anytime.

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<sup>33</sup> Wohlstetter, *Warning and Decision*, 239-240.

<sup>34</sup> Hull, *Memoirs*, 2:1080.

<sup>35</sup> Roosevelt, *Roosevelt Letters*, 3:400-401.

Roosevelt agreed with Hull and predicted that an attack could be expected as early as next Monday.<sup>36</sup> Marshall informed General Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines, but no one mentioned Hawaii as a possible Japanese target.<sup>37</sup> As the crisis of November unfolded, Marshall left Washington on the morning of November 27 to attend field maneuvers in North Carolina. Evidently Marshall believed that the danger signs did not warrant prudent attention.

In mid-October Marshall expressed concern to Stark over the possibility of a trans-Pacific raid on Wake Island. Though Stark advised the Chief of Staff that a raid might be hard to detect, he advised Marshall not to worry; the Navy was on guard.<sup>38</sup> On November 27 the Navy Department issued orders to Kimmel to transfer some of his fighter aircraft to Midway and Wake islands via the aircraft carriers *Enterprise* and *Lexington*. Admiral William Halsey, task force commander, asked Kimmel what he should do if Japanese ships were spotted. The reply he received was in character: "Goddammit, use your common sense!" Halsey considered it "as fine an order as a subordinate ever received."<sup>39</sup> Kimmel claimed that the transfer of aircraft confirmed the contention that Pearl Harbor was not the planned target of the Japanese.<sup>40</sup> Though Kimmel knew of Marshall's concern over a possible raid on Wake Island, fighter planes were of no value in long range reconnaissance; therefore, an attack against Wake or any other Pacific Island appeared more possible than probable.

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<sup>36</sup> Morgenstern, *The Secret War*, 154.

<sup>37</sup> Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope 1939-1943* (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), 208.

<sup>38</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 96-97.

<sup>39</sup> Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey USN and Lieutenant Commander J. Bryan III USNR, *Admiral Halsey's Story* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1948), 73-74.

<sup>40</sup> Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, 48.

The probability of war with Japan was strengthened by the southern movement of a Japanese expeditionary force. Bratton examined his map and a startling picture began to develop in his mind. Multiple movements of Japanese forces along the China coast, Shanghai, and the Pescadores convinced him that the Japanese were going to attack. Believing that Japan would attack on a weekend, Bratton placed the date of attack on Sunday, November 30. The Colonel reported his findings to his superiors.<sup>41</sup> Stimson concurred and received authorization from the President to send a final warning to MacArthur, and informed Stark, who seemed cautious and timid to act in the emergency. The Army message was sent on November 27 to the Philippines with copies to all Pacific commands:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future actions unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat should not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.<sup>42</sup>

Stimson's message, however, did not contain the phrase "war warning" that the absent Marshall had intended.<sup>43</sup> The Army message advised that though negotiations with Japan had terminated, there was still the possibility that Japan may resume talks. Stimson's

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<sup>41</sup> Farago, *Broken Seal*, 281.

<sup>42</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 123.

<sup>43</sup> Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 209.

message did advise the commanders that hostilities might be unavoidable, but Japan must “commit the first overt act.”<sup>44</sup> The Stimson message detracts from its significance by adding that commanders must not “alarm the civilian population or disclose intent.”<sup>45</sup> A message from the War Department later that same day advised that acts of sabotage were a definite probability. Short replied that he had only taken precautions against sabotage. Neither Marshall nor Stimson ever advised Short that precautions against sabotage was not the intended response; a full alert was.<sup>46</sup>

The Navy message of November 27, considering Stark’s cautious demeanor, immediately came to the point:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL46X inform district and army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Spenavo [Special naval observer] inform British. Continental district, Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage.<sup>47</sup>

Stark’s claim that the target of the Japanese appeared to be either the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, or Borneo impressed Admiral Kimmel as significant since Hawaii was not mentioned as a possible target.<sup>48</sup> Roberta Wohlstetter in her enlightening book insists that Washington was better equipped to determine the time and type of alert necessary as related to the information available. Kimmel and Short were still in the dark concerning

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<sup>44</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 123.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 256.

<sup>47</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 98.

<sup>48</sup> Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel’s Story*, 45-46.

the information provided by “Magic.” She claims, and rightly so, that Washington’s responsibility centered on ordering the exact degree of alert and making sure it was put into effect; this Washington did not do.<sup>49</sup> The result of the warning messages left Hawaii less ready for a surprise attack than it had been before the messages arrived.

At a press conference on November 28 President Roosevelt insisted that negotiations had not broken down. Roosevelt added, “... our one desire has been peace in the Pacific, and the taking of no steps to alter that prospects of peace, which of course has meant non-aggression.”<sup>50</sup> Two days earlier Roosevelt received a startling report from the Chief of Staff that the Japanese had assembled a ten-to-thirty-ship convoy on the Yangtze River below Shanghai.<sup>51</sup> Japan’s military deployment was gaining momentum.

The serious situation in the Far East caused the Chief of Staff to reevaluate the command effectiveness of the Army. General Marshall admitted to Stimson that “effective command over field forces cannot be exercised from the War Department.”<sup>52</sup> Though the General’s comments were aimed at cooperation between air and ground forces, they would explain Short’s failure to initiate defensive measure and his reliance on communication from Washington. Marshall’s dissatisfaction with the oversight ability of the War Department was expressed in a letter to the Commanding General, Port of Embarkation, San Francisco, on November 29. Infuriated at a delay in getting fighter planes shipped to the Philippines, Marshall vented his anger stating, “the Department can

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<sup>49</sup> Wohlstetter, *Warning and Decision*, 139.

<sup>50</sup> Rosenman, *Public Papers and Addresses*, 500.

<sup>51</sup> Memorandum for the President dated November 26, 1941. Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:686.

<sup>52</sup> Memorandum for Secretary of War dated November 26, 1941. *Ibid.*, 684.

never be an efficient command post agency, considering direct operation of affairs.”<sup>53</sup> If the General sincerely believed this, then failure of the War Department to supply the field commanders with all information pertaining to their commands was not unique but one in a series of command deficiencies. The fact that the Chief of Staff knew these deficiencies existed places him in the precarious position of being guilty of dereliction of duty, the same charge leveled at the Hawaiian commanders by the Presidential Investigation.

At Manila, MacArthur’s headquarters in the Philippines, local intelligence officers analyzed the Japanese Hawaiian Consulate’s reports on ship movements at Pearl Harbor. Manila, unlike Hawaii, had direct access to “Magic.” From the information available, it was clear that the battleships were being targeted by Japan.<sup>54</sup> This accurate assessment was not passed on to Hawaii or Washington. If Manila had figured it out, chances are that properly informed, Oahu would have also.

November 30 came and went without any attack by the Japanese. The information on which Bratton based his analysis proved inconclusive. In reality Bratton missed the date of the Japanese attack by a week. Unfortunately the cry of wolf had been yelled once to often. The “Bomb Plot” message was filed and forgotten. The Washington commanders looked to the Philippines as the main target of any Japanese aggression. The warning messages of late November did little to clear up the confusion. The first week of December would provide the civilian and military leaders in Washington with their last chance to alter the disaster in progress.

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 687.

<sup>54</sup> Charles Andrew Willoughby (Maj. Gen.) and John Chamberlain, *MacArthur, 1941-1951* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), 22-23.

## Chapter 5: The Storm Strikes: December 1941

On December 1, the President's attention focused on the Japanese occupation of Thailand. He requested that the State Department attempt to ascertain Japan's intentions from the Japanese Ambassadors, Nomura and the recently arrived Saburo Kurusu. From the "Magic" intercepts, Roosevelt already knew that Japanese troops had landed near Saigon. The ongoing negotiations between Japan and the United States appeared more of a Japanese stalling tactic than good faith talks aimed at a peaceful conclusion.<sup>1</sup> The President had cause for concern.

Aboard the flagship of the Japanese task force, slowly plowing its way across the dark, forbidding waters of the northern Pacific, Admiral Nagumo waited for the final order from the General Staff that would pit his armada against the might of the American Fleet and its main bastion in the Pacific, Pearl Harbor. In Tokyo, the Imperial Conference made the final decision for war; negotiations would continue until the last moment. The next day Nagumo received a dispatch from the Combined Fleet stating, "X Day will be December 8 (December 7 Hawaiian time)."<sup>2</sup> The Japanese Fleet was committed.

In the Munitions building in Washington, Headquarters of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations dispatched information to Kimmel of a possible Japanese landing at Khota Baru in Malaya. Stark advised Kimmel that the move appeared to be an attempt by the Japanese to lure the British into Thailand. Japan would then come to Thailand's aid and thereby gain bases on the Kra Peninsula from which to mount operations against

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<sup>1</sup> Memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Undersecretary of State (Sumner Welles). Roosevelt, *The Roosevelt Letters*, 3:402.

<sup>2</sup> Mitsuo Fuchida, "I Led The Air Attack On Pearl Harbor," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 78 (September, 1952), 942.



Malaya.<sup>3</sup> Stark's message added to the conclusions of the November warnings and appeared to confirm the Pacific Fleet commander's understanding that Washington believed the Japanese plans centered on Southeast Asia, not Hawaii.<sup>4</sup> One problem plagued both Washington and Hawaii, the location of the Combined Fleet and its aircraft carriers.

During the 1920s and 1930s naval strategists centered on the battleship as the main weapon in sea warfare. The various disarmament conferences sought to regulate ratios and tonnage specifically aimed at the construction of battleships. Nagumo's Pearl Harbor strike force, however, included only two battleships. Kimmel's force comprised eight battleships, all in various stages of obsolescence. The airplane and the aircraft carrier were considered offensive weapons only in the area of spotting targets for direction of battleship gunfire. Their primary use, however, revolved around defense of the battle-line. Britain's successful deployment of aircraft at Taranto, sinking several Italian battleships, and the destruction of the German battleship *Bismarck* changed this perception only slightly. Perhaps this lack of understanding of the offensive ability of aircraft explains what now seems remarkable: that even though the carriers remained undetected by American Intelligence, their absence appeared more of a minor inconvenience than a major concern. The disappearance of Japan's carriers should have been a red flag. On December 2, Kimmel asked Layton if the Japanese carriers could be in the immediate area of Oahu. Layton replied, "I hope they would be sighted before now."<sup>5</sup> The irony would shortly become reality.

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<sup>3</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 99.

<sup>4</sup> Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, 50-51.

<sup>5</sup> Layton, *And I Was There*, 244.

While Naval Intelligence searched for the missing carriers, General Marshall replied to Admiral Stark's request that 30,000 enlisted men be transferred from the Army to the Navy. The General argued that replacements would require admittance of black personnel. The Chief of Staff insisted that the Army was "already heavily over-burdened with an excess of colored troops, and I could not agree to a still greater proportion."<sup>6</sup> It is easy to brush off Marshall's comments as a sign of the times (integration in the Army waited till 1948) except that he was not just another officer; Marshall was the Chief of Staff of the United States Army charged with defending all American citizens. That defense required the utilization of all available manpower. Admiral Stark's request for transferring soldiers to the Navy shows an apparent lack of concern for the Army's defensive as well as offensive commitments that had already stretched its resources to the limits.

While the Chiefs dueled over manpower, Colonel Bratton faced a dilemma of his own. "Magic" provided information that Tokyo was ordering some of its embassies to "destroy all codes except one, one of the cipher machines, and all confidential documents."<sup>7</sup> Revised the next day to include Washington, the message originally included only the embassies of London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila.<sup>8</sup> Since his false warning of an attack on November 30, the Colonel kept a low profile. Biting the proverbial bullet, Bratton showed the message to his immediate supervisor General Leonard T. Gerow and requested all overseas commands be notified. Gerow curtly

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<sup>6</sup> Letter to Admiral Harold R. Stark, December 2, 1941. Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:688-689.

<sup>7</sup> Farago, *Broken Seal*, 324-325.

<sup>8</sup> Depart. of Defense, "Magic" *Background of Pearl Harbor*, 4:92.

replied that they already had enough information and he did not want to discuss it further.<sup>9</sup> Another valuable piece of the puzzle went unheeded.

Kimmel received the code destruction information on December 3. The Admiral contended that it followed a probability that war was imminent. He concluded that Japanese aggression in Southeast Asia would be answered by a declaration of war by the United States. Fearing a takeover of their embassies by the Americans, it was justifiable that secret codes and code machines be destroyed to prevent their falling into enemy hands.<sup>10</sup> Kimmel did not notify Short of the code destruction message. Kimmel received criticism from the subsequent investigations into the disaster for his failure to communicate with Short. In truth, the War Department in Washington did not consider the information valuable enough to pass along to Short. The problem between Short and Kimmel reverts to the absence of a unified command in Hawaii; the fault belongs to Marshall and Stark.

The attention of the Chief of Staff remained not on Hawaii but on the Philippines.<sup>11</sup> “Magic” intercepts from July through September revealed that the Japanese were keeping tabs on ship movements throughout the islands. Unlike the “Bomb Plot” message, there was no mention of any particular harbor. Reports did not consist of any breakdown of ships in port, only ships movements between the islands.<sup>12</sup> General Douglas MacArthur, commander of all forces in the Philippines, agreed with Marshall that the Philippines were “the key that unlocks the door to the Pacific.”<sup>13</sup> The

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<sup>9</sup> Farago, *Broken Seal*, 324-325.

<sup>10</sup> Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, 51.

<sup>11</sup> Letter to Lt. Gen. Ben Lear, December 3, 1941, *Bland, Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:692-693.

<sup>12</sup> Depart. of Defense, “*Magic*” *Background of Pearl Harbor*, 4:128-130.

<sup>13</sup> Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 112.

Philippines might have been the key, but the Japanese were about to kick in the door and attend to the lock later.

The deteriorating situations in the Far East and in Europe were not Marshall's only concerns. The General's focus was again turned from the deteriorating world situation. An age-old problem confronted the Chief of Staff, VD. The question of the Army's urging of its men to use prophylaxis to counter venereal disease came under scrutiny of the Congress and various religious and women's organizations. The moral versus education issues forced Marshall to explain the Army's policy of controlling the disease as a preferred supplement to medical treatment for those infected.<sup>14</sup> Sexual diseases in the military were not a revelation; at this particular period in time, the deteriorating political situation and its military consequences required the General's immediate attention, not social problems.

The severity of the situation with Japan appeared, in the minds of the American people, as only a temporary glitch in the path to normalcy. The feeling of relaxation from the tense days of November spilled over into the Army. The consensus was that the calling of the Japanese bluff had averted a Pacific War, at least for the present. Even some newspapers expressed an opinion that evidently the Japanese desire for war with the United States was more show than go.<sup>15</sup> Senator Elbert D. Thomas went even farther when he stated, "Japanese ties with Axis unnatural. She would soon cooperate with the

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<sup>14</sup> Letter to Andrew J. May (Congressman) December 3, 1941. Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 2:690-691.

<sup>15</sup> "Japan warned by Koo," *New York Times*, 7 December 1941, p. 1.

United States and Great Britain.”<sup>16</sup> Their optimism could not have been further from the truth.

On December 5 President Roosevelt sent a letter to Wendell Willkie, Republican Presidential candidate in 1940, expressing his apprehension at the critical situation with Japan. Aware of the southern movement of a Japanese expeditionary force possibly headed for the Philippines, the President remarked, “Perhaps the next four or five days will decide the matter.”<sup>17</sup> Roosevelt’s prediction was not far off the mark.

General Harry J. Malony, Deputy Chief of Staff GHQ, prepared a report on the efficiency of the War Department based on experience to date:

1. Transportation and delivery of supplies... is inefficient.
2. Joint Board procedure is ponderous and provides no direct supervision....
3. War Department retains control in such detail as to make administration confusing.
4. War Department is not organized on a war basis.<sup>18</sup>

The organization charged with the administrative and operational oversight was not up to par. Marshall knew of the deficiencies yet corrections remained for the future. Malony’s report supports the conclusion that mismanagement was rampant in the highest echelons of the United States Army, of which General Marshall was Chief.

As an evening chill fell over Washington on December 6, 1941, Army and Navy intelligence officers worked frantically to decipher a fourteen-part message intercepted

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<sup>16</sup> “Sees Japs Joining U. S.,” *New York Times*, 4 December 1941, p. 5.

<sup>17</sup> Roosevelt, *The Roosevelt Letters*, 3:403-404.

<sup>18</sup> Greenfield, *United States Army in World War II*, 145.

from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.<sup>19</sup> With the decoding of each part, it became evident that Japan was about to break diplomatic relations with the United States. All but the last part of the Japanese message had arrived and been decoded on December 6.<sup>20</sup> The Japanese were holding the final fourteenth part for Sunday morning.

President Roosevelt received the thirteen parts Saturday evening while conferring with his advisor, Harry Hopkins. Upon reading the message, the President looked at Hopkins and said, "This means war."<sup>21</sup> Earlier in the day the President had sent a personal appeal to Japanese Emperor Hirohito. After reiterating the peaceful intentions of the United States and its Allies, Roosevelt ended the message as follows:

I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.<sup>22</sup>

It was now apparent, however, that circumstances were beyond the influence of the Emperor. President Roosevelt doubted the message would spur the Emperor to action; the military controlled the government. The President shares a sizable portion of the blame for his negligence on that fateful evening. Roosevelt did not phone Marshall and an attempt to reach Stark was delayed. The Admiral was at the theater and the President

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<sup>19</sup> See Appendix D for complete text of the message.

<sup>20</sup> Collier, *Road to Pearl Harbor*, 223.

<sup>21</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 216.

<sup>22</sup> Rosenman, *Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 10:511-513.

did not want any undue public attention possibly caused by paging the CNO. He left a message at Stark's quarters to call.<sup>23</sup>

Upon returning from the theater, Stark received the message from the President and returned the call. Though the Admiral remained unsure of his whereabouts on the evening of December 6, his aide and friend Captain Harold D. Krick testified before the Congressional Committee in 1945 that both he and Stark were at the National Theater watching a performance of *The Student Prince*.<sup>24</sup> After returning Roosevelt's call, sometime after 11:30 P. M., Stark remarked to Krick, "relations with Japan were in a critical state." Regardless of the situation, the CNO saw no reason to act and retired for the evening.<sup>25</sup> While Washington rested in peaceful slumber, dark foreboding shapes slipped through the vast waters of the northern Pacific.

In the pre-dawn darkness of the cold northern Pacific Ocean, the Japanese attack force prepared to launch the air strike that would catapult Japan into four long years of bloody warfare. Air strike force leader Commander Mitsuo Fuchida reported to Admiral Nagumo and exclaimed, "I am ready for the mission."<sup>26</sup> With a stern expressionless face Nagumo expressed his confidence in his flight leader. When the task force was 230 miles from Pearl Harbor Nagumo gave the final order, "Take off according to plan."<sup>27</sup> The Japanese carriers turned into the wind; The Empire of Japan turned into the pages of history.

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<sup>23</sup> A. A. Hoehling, *The Week Before Pearl Harbor* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), 152.

<sup>24</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 217-219.

<sup>25</sup> Stanley Weintraub, *Long Day's Journey Into War: December 7, 1941* (New York: Truman Talley, 1991), 126.

<sup>26</sup> Fuchida, *Naval Institute Proceedings* 78, 945.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

Marshall, in keeping with his routine, retired early Saturday evening and did not know of the fourteen-part message until Sunday morning. Army intelligence officer Colonel Bratton placed a frantic call to the Chief of Staff, but Marshall was taking his morning horseback ride. When he returned to his quarters, Marshall took a shower before returning Bratton's call. Bratton could only stress the importance of the message on the phone without going into details on the unsecured phone. Marshall arrived at his office and was reading the message aloud when Bratton joined him at 11:25 A.M. (Washington time). Bratton showed Marshall the final part of the message that had just arrived. Unlike the fiasco of November, the evidence was clear. Something was going to happen and it would happen today.

Throughout Marshall's career he never committed himself to a course of action until he knew he was right. The General based his reputation on being right.<sup>28</sup> In the uncertain days of 1941, Marshall's fear of damaging his reputation may have accounted for the indecisiveness that filtered down to the field commands. Whatever the reason, the time for inaction had given way to action. The Chief of Staff issued a warning message to all Pacific commands:

The Japanese are presenting at 1 P. M. Eastern Standard Time, today, what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know, but be on the alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication.<sup>29</sup>

No one realized that 1:00 P.M. in Washington was 7:30 A.M. in Hawaii. Due to atmospheric conditions, Colonel Edward F. French, in charge of the message center,

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<sup>28</sup> Marshall, *Together*, 259.

<sup>29</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 224.



could not get through to Hawaii. French sent the message via commercial radio:

12:01 P. M. (Washington)-6:31 A. M. (Hawaii)-Message filed at Army signal center.

12:17 P. M. (Washington)-6:47 A. M. (Hawaii)-Teletype transmission to Western Union.

1:03 P. M. (Washington)-7:33 A. M. (Hawaii)-Received by RCA Honolulu.

5:15 P. M. (Washington)-11:45 A. M.(Hawaii)-Received by signal officer Ft. Shafter.

Short's copy of the message was sent by telegram and did not reach Hawaii until the attack was in progress. The three-hour delay from Honolulu to Ft. Shafter was due to the message being delivered by a bicycle messenger.<sup>30</sup> The failure of Marshall's staff to react in the face of crisis and in the absence of the General both on Saturday evening and early Sunday morning reveals the frailty of Marshall's command system. The noted author and historian Gordon Prange stated in his extensively researched work on the attack, "When it [an organization] falls apart or halts pending his return, something is seriously wrong."<sup>31</sup> Something was definitely wrong.

Admiral Stark read the final part of the Japanese message about 10:30 A.M.(Washington time) and reached for the phone to call Kimmel in Hawaii. At that moment destiny struck a blow against the American military commanders and the victims of Pearl Harbor. Stark hesitated. He replaced the receiver and said, "No, I think I will call the President."<sup>32</sup> Roosevelt was busy and could not be reached; the Chief of

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 224-225.

<sup>31</sup> Prange, *Verdict of History*, 242.

<sup>32</sup> Hoehling, *The Week Before Pearl Harbor*, 173.

Naval Operations sat back in his chair and did nothing. The Admiral was still debating what to do when Marshall called him advising that he was sending a message to the Pacific. Stark decided against any more messages; he felt too many had already been sent. Stark asked the General to include the Navy commanders in his message, which Marshall did.<sup>33</sup>

In retrospect, Kimmel claimed that the Navy's rapid communication service was not experiencing any delays in receipt or transmission of messages from Washington. The receipt of a routine message from Washington sent the same time as Marshall's message was being rerouted as a telegram proved the Admiral's point. According to Kimmel, if the General's message had been sent on the Navy system, it would have been received, decoded, and delivered in less than half an hour.<sup>34</sup> General Marshall and Admiral Stark, like President Roosevelt, thought they had time to act; time was the commodity in short supply.

Neither General Marshall nor Admiral Stark used the telephone to contact their field commanders. Stark refused to call Hawaii due to indecision and lack of initiative. Marshall feared that conversations on the phone, even though it contained a scrambler to prevent unwanted listeners, could be compromised.<sup>35</sup> The Chief of Staff insisted before the Joint Committee in 1945 that had he used the phone, his first call recipient would have been the Philippines and second the Panama Canal.<sup>36</sup> A phone call, even as low as number three on the priority list, ordering a full alert could have given the defense a

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 172-173.

<sup>34</sup> Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, 4.

<sup>35</sup> Hoehling, *The Week Before Pearl Harbor*, 176.

<sup>36</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 225.

chance to scramble its fighters and man its guns. There was no need to mention the source of the information only its implication, a possible attack. Had the Japanese picked up on the call, one can only guess their reaction; recalling the strike force, though unlikely, was a remote possibility. Whatever the scenario, the positives far exceeded the negatives.

Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu arrived at the State Department to deliver the Japanese message at 2:20 P. M. President Roosevelt advised Secretary Hull of the attack before the Ambassadors arrived. Hull made them wait in the outer office until he received confirmation of the report. After glancing at the message and pretending he did not already know of its contents, the Secretary looked the Japanese envoys in the eye and stated:

I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is born out by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them.<sup>37</sup>

Hull abruptly dismissed the envoys, and he later contended that contrary to published reports, he did not use profanity.<sup>38</sup> The crusty Tennessee diplomat realized that the time for talk had been replaced by the bellowing of guns; no words however strong could change what was.<sup>39</sup>

At 2:00 P. M. Secretary of War Stimson received a call from the President advising him of the Japanese attack. Stimson, after the shock wore off, believed that

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<sup>37</sup> Hull, *Memoirs*, 2:1906.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 2:1100.

Japan's military forces must have received a crushing blow from the alerted Pacific command. It was not until later that evening that he learned the truth.<sup>40</sup> The question of when and where Japan would strike was over; the question of responsibility and guilt for the failed defense would become the issue.

As the evening sky darkened over the Washington metropolis, Marshall returned home from what must have been the longest day of his life. The hard work resulting in the long hours of the past years since his appointment as Chief of Staff appeared destroyed in the dawn attack on Hawaii. The General entered his house, his face glum and forlorn expressing a deep depression that few could understand. His wife stood by the door hoping to soothe her husband's anguish. Marshall said little except that he was tired and going to bed.<sup>41</sup> While Marshall retired for the evening the fires of Oahu filled the Hawaiian sky with an eerie orange glare. The once proud ships-of-the-line were either sinking in the mud of Pearl Harbor or damaged beyond immediate value to the Fleet.

At Wolfsschanze (Wolf's Lair), Hitler's headquarters on the Eastern Front, the German leader received the information on the attack late on December 7. After reading the report Hitler proclaimed to his officers, "We cannot lose the war! Now we have a partner who has never been defeated in three thousand years."<sup>42</sup> It was short-lived euphoria; within days Hitler realized the implications of the Japanese attack. Russia no longer feared an attack from the east and could concentrate all its resources on defeating the Nazi invaders. Germany's fate, as well as that of Japan, was sealed.

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<sup>40</sup> Stimson, *On Active Service*, 390-391.

<sup>41</sup> Marshall, *Together*, 98-99.

<sup>42</sup> John Toland, *Adolf Hitler*, vol. 2 (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1976), 795.

At 7: P. M., Admiral Stark phoned Admiral Bloch in Hawaii for details on the raid. Bloch related the day's activity. When told of the submarine contacts before the actual air attack, Stark asked if they were German.<sup>43</sup> Evidently, the Chief of Naval Operations still could not believe that the Japanese were capable of pulling off a surprise attack with such coordination. The oil-fouled waters of Pearl Harbor begged to differ.

Across the Pacific, the shadowy shapes of the Japanese strike force slipped back into the unknown confines of the Pacific Ocean from which they came. Aboard the carrier flagship *Akagi* Admiral Nagumo listened to one of his officers recount a radio report from Hawaii about the attack. The report said Kimmel would lose his head. The officer assured Nagumo that Kimmel would be relieved not hanged. The Admiral lowered his head and said, "I feel I have done a very sorry thing to him."<sup>44</sup> Truer words were never spoken.

Admiral Kimmel watched the attack from his office at the submarine base. The mighty battleships, the pride of the Pacific Fleet, the backbone of America's armed naval force were scorched and burning; their guns aimed skyward in a futile attempt stop the havoc raining down on them. While he stood at the window watching the disaster in progress a bullet pierced the glass and bounced off the Admiral's tunic. In a moment of complete despair Kimmel solemnly said, "It would have been merciful had it killed me."<sup>45</sup> For Kimmel and Short the trials of Pearl Harbor had just begun; their careers, however, were over.

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<sup>43</sup> Simpson, *Harold R. Stark*, 114-115.

<sup>44</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 574.

<sup>45</sup> Weintraub, *Long Day's Journey into War*, 243.

## Chapter 6: Conclusion

The controversy surrounding Pearl Harbor has divided historians for years. America's entry into World War II has been blamed on everyone from President Roosevelt to Admiral Kimmel and General Short; even the Japanese have been mentioned as playing a major part in the disaster. Though it is a stretch to attribute the cause of the war on Short and Kimmel, had the Imperial Fleet been defeated at Pearl Harbor, Japan's ability to wage any major war with most of her carriers on the bottom of the Pacific would have been in doubt. If the American carriers, of which there were only three in the Pacific at the time, been sunk, the reverse was not as likely due to America's industrial potential. The battle of Midway, a mere six months after Pearl Harbor, saw the destruction of four of Japan's first-line carriers and though Japan's Navy remained a potent force, the Midway losses negated its offensive capability.<sup>1</sup> The problem, therefore, is to define the reasons for the failed defense of Pearl Harbor and point an accusing finger at the perpetrator or perpetrators.

The revisionist historians, George Morgenstern, Charles Beard, and others, claim that the entire blame for the war as well as the successful attack on Pearl Harbor belongs to President Roosevelt. Not an unpopular point of view among revisionists, it contends that the President of the United State would deliberately place American men in harm's way without providing them with the information available to at least prepare a defense. The Princeton historian Robert G. Albion, in his review of Morgenstern's controversial book *Pearl Harbor: The Secret War* in 1948, argued that the evidence does not add any

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<sup>1</sup> Dull, *Battle History*, 175.

acceptable credence to this theory.<sup>2</sup> Charles C. Griffin, Vassar College, insisted that Beard's 1948 book *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities* was a regrettable partisanship writing, that it did not equal the sober reality of the author's earlier work, *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940*, which "avoided sweeping conclusions unwarranted by the record."<sup>3</sup>

In 1962, Roberta Wohlstetter added an entirely new perspective as to the causes of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Stressing the realities of human frailties, Wohlstetter claims that various factors culminated in the military establishment's inability to conclude that Japan was about to strike. Vast amounts of information tended to blind intelligence experts as they strained to attain a clear perspective of the overall situation. Service rivalries, both internal and external, confused perception and delayed communication among intelligence agencies during the period leading up to the attack. Honest, dedicated, and intellectual officers were the victims of failed human perception that lay in the improbability of surprise. Pearl Harbor revealed that uncertainty persists and humans must "learn to live with it."<sup>4</sup> Robert Dallek supports Wohlstetter's contention that the surprise at Pearl Harbor resulted from a national failure to anticipate. He stated, "The country's political and military leaders simply discounted or underestimated the likelihood of a Japanese attack on Hawaii."<sup>5</sup> The problem goes deeper than either Wohlstetter or Dallek comprehended.

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<sup>2</sup> Robert G. Albion, review of *Pearl Harbor: The Secret War*, by George Morgenstern, *Journal of Military Affairs* 12 (Winter, 1948), 240-241.

<sup>3</sup> Charles C. Griffin, review of *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities*, by Charles A. Beard, *American Historical Review* 54 (October-July 1948-1949), 382-386.

<sup>4</sup> Wohlstetter, *Warning and Decision*, 395-401.

<sup>5</sup> Dallek, *American Foreign Policy*, 312-313.

Intelligence gathering, much like radar, was still in its infancy. Proper procedures remained to be established to evaluate the information available. Had the information been laid out and examined in context, the results might have been different. The Report of the Congressional Committee looking into the Pearl Harbor attack criticized both the Army and Navy War Plans and Intelligence Departments with the failure:

(a) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24, November 15, and November 20 (the Harbor berthing plan and related dispatches) and to raise a question as to their significance....<sup>6</sup>

Though the Committee insisted that individuals in these departments failed to follow through, it also implied that standardized procedures and a unified intelligence service were required for efficient intelligence gathering and dissemination.<sup>7</sup>

In 1981, the historian Gordon W. Prange insisted that although errors were made in Washington, the military commanders in Hawaii, particularly General Short, were responsible for the lack of preparedness of their forces for the defense of Pearl Harbor.<sup>8</sup> Prange contends that Kimmel's conception of the Navy's role as offensive led him into complacency that translated into inaction during the last days of peace.<sup>9</sup> The author, given his extensive thirty-year study of the attack, failed to admit that Washington placed the Fleet at Pearl Harbor as a deterrent to Japanese aggression, not a defense of the Hawaiian Islands. The Chief of Naval Operations reiterated time and again the need to continue training and attain a high level of proficiency for offensive operations once war

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<sup>6</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 520.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 520-521.

<sup>8</sup> Russell D. Buhite, review of *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor*, by Gordon W. Prange, *American Historical Review* 88 (February-April 1983): 497-498.

<sup>9</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 734.



began. General Short's case differs from Kimmel's in that his one and only function was defense of Hawaii and the Fleet when in port. In this respect he failed to fulfill his mission.

John Toland does not support the revisionists' theory that places blame for the surprise attack solely with the President Roosevelt. He does, however, follow the revisionists' theory that Washington, for whatever reason, had sufficient information of Japanese intentions, but did not pass it along to the military commanders. Though he admits that Roosevelt wanted war and believed that a Japanese attack would provide sufficient justification for war, the main culprit for Toland was the Chief of Staff. Whatever Roosevelt's reasoning for instigating a conflict with Japan, it was Marshall who denied information to his commanders and then covered up the facts.<sup>10</sup> Though Toland's 1981 interpretation is suspect, his account of the many personalities involved in the disaster makes his book a "valuable addition to the literature."<sup>11</sup> The government investigations into the attack, provided the fuel that flamed these historical controversies.

On January 23, 1942, the Presidential Commission looking into the attack on Pearl Harbor, chaired by retired Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, placed the blame for the failure of the defense of Hawaii solely on Kimmel and Short. The Commission charged the Hawaiian commanders with dereliction of duty, while exonerating Marshall and Stark of any negligence in fulfilling their obligations and command responsibilities.<sup>12</sup> The Commission came to these conclusions without any knowledge of the "Magic" intercepts and the information this source provided during the critical year of 1941.

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<sup>10</sup> Toland, *Infamy*, 344.

<sup>11</sup> Russell D. Buhite, review of *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath*, by John Toland, *American Historical Review* 88 (February-April 1983): 496-497.

Justice Roberts testified before the Joint Committee in 1945 stating, "I would not have bothered to read it [the intercepted Japanese traffic] if it had been shown to us."<sup>13</sup> The Congressional Committee ascertained that the failure of the Presidential Commission to analyze the information available in Washington but not provided to Hawaii prevented the Commission from arriving at a correct assessment of the responsibility for the disaster.<sup>14</sup> Admiral James O. Richardson, former Pacific Fleet commander, claimed that the Presidential Commission's report was "unfair, unjust, and deceptively dishonest" in its content.<sup>15</sup> To the charge that Kimmel and Short did not communicate with each other on the messages from Washington, Kimmel replied, "The mere statement that such consultation was necessary to determine the meaning of an order is an indictment of the agency which originated it."<sup>16</sup> If Washington's orders required joint analysis by the Hawaiian Commanders, then they were too confusing to begin with. The solution was a unified command.

On October 20, 1944, the Army Pearl Harbor Board reported that the failure of command rested with the War Department in its negligence to advise Short that his sabotage alert was inadequate. General Marshall was criticized for his failure to keep Short advised of the political situation with Japan. The Board contended that Marshall was negligent in his failure to contact Short by phone on the morning of December 7, 1941, with the critical information from the fourteen-part message. The Board did not, however, let the Army Hawaiian commander off the hook. Short was criticized for his

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<sup>12</sup> *Presidential Commission*, 19-20.

<sup>13</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 266-P.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 266-Q.

<sup>15</sup> Richardson, *On the Treadmill*, 453.

<sup>16</sup> Kimmel, *Admiral Kimmel's Story*, 150.

failure to alert his forces only against sabotage and to place his command in a readiness state as indicated by prior war warnings. Short received no letters from Marshall after November 1, 1941. The board stated, "... no action after Nov. 1, 1941, appears to have been taken... to reveal whether General Short was doing anything, whether he was doing it correctly, what his problems were, and what help could have been given him."<sup>17</sup>

Though criticism of the Board's motives centered on the Board members' perceived dislike of the Chief of Staff, their conclusions were sound and justified.

On October 19, 1944, the Navy Court of Inquiry criticized Stark for his failure to follow up on the November 27, war warning message. Stark was further criticized for not calling Kimmel on the morning of December 7, 1941, with the news of the Japanese ultimatum. The Navy Board concluded that Admiral Stark did not display sound judgment. In its report, the Board stated:

It is a fact that Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operation of the Fleet, and having important information in his possession during this critical period, especially on the morning of Dec. 7, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington.<sup>18</sup>

Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal amended the Navy Court's findings by adding that the faults of Admirals Kimmel and Stark were ones of "omission rather than commission."<sup>19</sup> The Army Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry were the only major investigations in which military personnel were judged by their peers. No one can better determine military issues than experienced military officers.

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<sup>17</sup> "Pearl Harbor Summary" *New York Times*, 30 August, 1945, p. 1, p. 6.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

On September 12, 1945, Major Henry C. Clausen reported on his investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack at the request of the Secretary of War. Clausen's investigation refuted the Army Board's conclusion that Marshall was primarily responsible for any failure to provide intelligence information to General Short in Hawaii.<sup>20</sup> The charges of responsibility for the attack continued. In 1991, Clausen attempted to answer charges of bias in his conclusions in his book *Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement*. He did not succeed.

The Joint Congressional Investigation into the Pearl Harbor attack completed its findings on July 15, 1946. The members were split in their decisions along party lines. The Democratic majority report criticized Marshall and Stark for failure to ensure that their commanders were properly alerted. Marshall was criticized for his failure to initiate a clear-cut alert order as he had done previously in 1940.<sup>21</sup> The majority placed the bulk of the blame, however, on the Hawaiian commanders for the lack of preparedness of their forces to defend against a surprise attack. The Republican minority filed a separate report claiming that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations must accept the responsibility for the errors of their commanders. The minority stated, "Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and decisive action are of the essence."<sup>22</sup> The Congressional reports did concur that the Hawaiian commanders were not derelict in their duties, but shared responsibility for errors of judgment.<sup>23</sup>

The Presidential Commission and the Joint Committee missed the point of

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<sup>20</sup> Toland, *Infamy*, 151.

<sup>21</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 266-M.

<sup>22</sup> Roland H. Worth, Jr., *Pearl Harbor: Selected Testimonies from the Congressional Hearings (1945-1946) and Previous Investigations of the Events Leading Up to the Attack* (Jefferson, Ky.: McFarland, 1993), 552-554.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

command responsibility. Marshall admitted that he lacked the knowledge to properly oversee the intelligence operations under his command. Marshall stated before the Joint Committee, "I didn't know enough about where they were wrong to relieve them."<sup>24</sup> Marshall suffered from a lack of administrative ability. The Chief of Staff admitted that it was his responsibility to ensure that Short had properly alerted his forces as intended by the warning messages of November 27, 1941.<sup>25</sup> As an administrator and a commander he failed to carry out his responsibilities during the waning days of peace.

Admiral Kimmel and General Short were relieved of command and forced into retirement.<sup>26</sup> General Short, after the Congressional Investigation stated, "I am satisfied that the testimony... fully absolved me from blame, and I believe such will be the verdict of history."<sup>27</sup> The tall grey-haired soldier spent his last days at his home in Dallas, Texas. The former Hawaiian Commander died on September 3, 1949, and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.<sup>28</sup> His forty years of faithful service to his country will forever be marred by those two hours on a Sunday morning in December 1941.

Admiral Kimmel refused to accept any condemnation of his actions leading up to the Pearl Harbor disaster. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet spent his remaining years with a fixation to justify himself before the American people. He had spent his life in determined sacrifice to his country and the Navy he loved so much. The Admiral built his life on the premise of hard work, diligence, denial, and a belief in obeying the laws of God and man. The remorse he felt on that Sunday morning gave way

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<sup>24</sup> Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 200.

<sup>25</sup> Toland, *Infamy*, 174.

<sup>26</sup> Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 215.

<sup>27</sup> Associated Press, *Youngstown Vindicator*, 5 September 1949, p. 16.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

to a sincere belief that the fault must lie elsewhere.<sup>29</sup> Kimmel died on May 14, 1968, at the age of 86 of an apparent heart attack.<sup>30</sup>

Admiral Stark was relieved as Chief of Naval Operations and assigned to a staff position in Europe. A brilliant tactician, Stark was instrumental in the planning of operation Overlord, the invasion of Europe.<sup>31</sup> Kimmel's and Short's contributions to the war effort, given the chance, might also have proved impeccable. Stark, according to the historian Mitchell B. Simpson, refused to point a finger or attack anyone. It may well be that he was aware of his own culpability. Stark retired on April 1, 1946, without any official ceremony, after 47 years of service.<sup>32</sup> He died at age 91 on August 20, 1972, after a heart attack at his home in Washington D. C.<sup>33</sup> The former CNO passed quietly into the pages of history.

The tragedy of Pearl Harbor was one of command breakdown at the highest military level. As chiefs of their respective services, Marshall and Stark shared the ultimate responsibility for the preparedness of their commands. Neither Marshall nor Stark picked up the phone on that fateful Sunday morning and ordered a full alert. General Marshall received a mild reprimand and remained in command of U.S. Army forces in World War II.<sup>34</sup> On December 17, 1944, Marshall received his fifth star and title of General of the Army.<sup>35</sup> Marshall died on October 16, 1959, at age 78 while recovering from a stroke suffered two months earlier. The General was buried with military honors

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<sup>29</sup> Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 728-729.

<sup>30</sup> "Adm. Husband E. Kimmel Dies; Pearl Harbor Navy Commander," *New York Times*, 14 May 1968, p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> Martin Well, "Former Naval Operations Chief Adm. Harold R. Stark Dies," *The Washington Post*, 22 August 1972, p. C4.

<sup>32</sup> Simpson, *Harold R. Stark*, 275-285.

<sup>33</sup> Well, *The Washington Post*, p. C4.

<sup>34</sup> Stoler, *George C. Marshall*, 88.

<sup>35</sup> Marshall, *Together*, 286.

in Arlington National Cemetery.<sup>36</sup> Marshall's exemplary service both as Chief of Staff during the war and later as Secretary of State was without question. His failure during the critical period leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack will forever remain a dark cloud on an otherwise brilliant career.

The Army was responsible for the protection of Hawaii from any assault by a foreign power. The defense of Hawaii, its installations, and the Fleet, when in port, was its only reason for being there. The Army possessed land and air capabilities to provide for an adequate defense if alerted in time. The Army had 152 pursuit aircraft of which 30 were obsolescent types. Of these, 108 were serviceable for combat. Though not an overwhelming number, their presence in the air would have extracted a greater toll than the 29 Japanese planes shot down during the attack.<sup>37</sup> They were useless on the ground. Neither the Army nor the Navy possessed sufficient aircraft or crews for extensive long-range patrols. All information available was immediately required by the local commanders to counter the deficiency in patrol capability. Radar was still experiencing growing pains, especially in the technique of applying the information it provided with aerial defensive operations. The fact remains that when the enemy struck, the defense was not on the alert.

Admiral Stark was responsible to ensure that Kimmel had all vital information available. Stark failed in his responsibility. Stark's personal postscripts on his warnings to Kimmel detracted from the importance of messages. The CNO's unwillingness to act on the morning of December 7, despite information that something was going to happen

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<sup>36</sup> "Marshall Is Dead In Capital At 78; World War Chief," *New York Times*, 17 October 1959, p. 1.

<sup>37</sup> *Report of the Joint Committee*, 70-71.

soon, left his commander in the precarious situation of presuming that the situation was stable when the opposite was true.

Marshall did not respond to Short's message that an alert only against sabotage was in effect leaving the Hawaiian Department commander under the impression that his precaution was sufficient. The Chief of Staff's lack of communication with his Hawaiian commander in the final weeks before the attack added to Short's conclusion that he was acting in accordance with the War Department's orders. Marshall's obsession with the Philippines, as the prime target of any Japanese attack in the Pacific, resulted in complacency in properly disseminating information to other areas. No one realized that the perceived deterrent effect of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters might have an opposite implication for the Japanese: elimination of the deterrence as a prelude to war. The failure of the Army to protect Pearl Harbor was a direct result of the Chief of Staff's failure to command.

On May 25, 1999, the Senate of the United States voted to exonerate Kimmel and Short of the blame for "failing to anticipate the devastating Japanese attack on December 7, 1941."<sup>38</sup> Senator William V. Roth Jr., claimed, "We're not rewriting history. We're just correcting the record."<sup>39</sup> Seventy-seven years after the fact, justice has been served.

The historian George Morgenstern made a significant point, in his book on the attack, insisting that by not keeping the Hawaiian commanders informed of the information available, Washington relieved them of the duty of making their own

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<sup>38</sup> Philip Shenon, "2 'Scapegoats' of Pearl Harbor are Cleared by a Split Senate," *New York Times*, 26 May 1999, p. A26.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*



decisions.<sup>40</sup> He was right. Both the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations knew that information pertaining to Japanese military scrutiny of Pearl Harbor and the surrounding bases existed, yet they did not see the need to inform their commanders in Hawaii. Regardless of the need for protecting the source of information, “Magic,” this violation of military necessity was and remains inexcusable. The death and destruction wrought at Pearl Harbor bears witness to this point. Admiral Harold R. Stark and General George Catlett Marshall must bear the responsibility for the “American Command Failure: Disaster at Pearl Harbor.”

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<sup>40</sup> Morgenthern, *The Secret War*, 263.

## Photographs

1. General George Catlett Marshall - Reprinted from Marshall, George C. *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary War, 1 July 1930-30 June 1945* (Washington: Center of Military History: United States Army, 1996.).
2. Admiral Harold R. Stark - Reprinted from Simpson, Mitchell, III. *Admiral Harold R. Stark: Architect of Victory, 1939-1949* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).



General of the Army George Catlett Marshall



**Admiral Harold R. Stark**

*Photo courtesy of United States Naval Institute*

## Appendix A

### The Atlantic Charter


1. Their countries (England and U. S.) seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.
2. They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.
3. They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.
4. They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.
5. They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all Nations in the economic field with the objective of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security.
6. After the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all Nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.
7. Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.
8. They believe that all Nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force....<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Official Statement on Atlantic Charter Aug. 14, 1941, Rosenman, *Public Papers and Addresses*, 10:314-315.

Appendix B

Navy Department as of December 7, 1941




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Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, .

Appendix C

War Department Chart as of December 7, 1941



Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*.

## Appendix D

### 14-Part Memorandum

(Part 1 of 14)

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the establishment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views, concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of east Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of warlike disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the tripartite pack with Germany and Italy.

(Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstructs the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavors toward the stabilization of east Asia, exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies or menacing the French Indochina, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity on cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indochina, both American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possessions and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.



(Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavored strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

(Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20 still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

1. The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indochina, in the southeastern Asia and Southern Pacific area.

2. Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

3. Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

5. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indochina upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indochina to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

(Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as “introducer” of peace

between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

(Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indochina, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from southern French Indochina as a measure of easing the situation.

(Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes

one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

(Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American Government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of east Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the tripartite pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

(Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

(Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of east Asia. It is a fact of history that one country—(45 letters garbled or missing)—been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the —es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese

Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

(Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indochina is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China, and Thailand—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indochina and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indochina of a system similar to the n--(50 letters missed)—sible for the present predicament of east Asia.

(Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of east Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically, or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to east Asia.

(Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the 4 years of the China affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. *Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiations.*

6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26 as a result of frequent consultations

with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, andnd (probably “and as”) presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of Chtual ylokmtt (probably “China, can but”) be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan’s position.

(Part 14 of 14)

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

*The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.*

(The “One O’Clock” Message)

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 P. M. on the 7<sup>th</sup>, your time.

## Appendix E

### Japanese Strike Force

Six Aircraft Carriers: *Akagi* (Admiral Nagumo's Flagship), *Kaga*, *Hiryu*, *Soryu*, *Shokaku*,

*Zuikaku*

Two Battleships: *Hiei*, *Kirishima*

Two Heavy Cruisers: *Tone*, *Chikuma*

One Light Cruiser: *Abukuma*

Nine Destroyers: *Isokaze*, *Urakaze*, *Tanikaze*, *Hamakaze*, *Arare*, *Kasumi*, *Kagero*,

*Shiranuhi*, *Akigumo*

Three Submarines: *I-19*, *I-21*, *I-23*

Eight Train Vessels: Consisting of Tankers and Supply Ships

## Appendix F

### President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Address to the Congress of the United States December 8, 1941.

Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese squadrons had commenced bombing of the American Island of Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to our Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. And while this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or of armed attack.

It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost. In addition American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.

Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.

Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.

And this morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

Japan has, therefore, undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday and today speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their own opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our Nation.

As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense.

But always will our whole Nation remember the character of the onslaught against us.

No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory.

I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us.

Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests are in grave danger.

With confidence in our armed forces—with the unbounding determination of our people—we will gain the inevitable triumph—so help us God.

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Taken in its entirety from: Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Call to Battle Stations, 1941* vol. 10 (New York: Harper, 1950), 514-515.



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