

A CALL TO ARMS: THE PROPAGANDISTIC RHETORIC OF PRESIDENTIAL
PETITIONS FOR WAR

by

Howard R. Reese

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the

English

Program

YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY

August, 2009

A Call To Arms: The Propagandistic Rhetoric of Presidential Petitions for War

Howard R. Reese

I hereby release this thesis to the public. I understand that this thesis will be made available from the OhioLINK ETD Center and the Maag Library Circulation Desk for public access. I also authorize the University or other individuals to make copies of this thesis as needed for scholarly research.

Signature:

Howard R. Reese, Student Date

Approvals:

Dr. Jay L. Gordon, Thesis Advisor Date

Dr. Jeffrey M. Buchanan, Committee Member Date

Dr. Steven R. Brown, Committee Member Date

Peter J. Kasvinsky, Dean of School of Graduate Studies & Research Date

ABSTRACT

Eleven times in the history of the United States has a President gone before Congress, asked for a declaration of war against a sovereign foreign state, and received it. This thesis contends that although there may be valid reasons to justify a petition for war, those reasons, if they exist, are secondary to propaganda that appeals to a public's fears, weaknesses, collective history, and desire for authoritative leadership. Chapter I of this study is an overview of propaganda—its origin as a device of the Roman Catholic Church for propagating the gospel of Christ throughout Europe and the Americas, its evolution into a device for promoting war, and its acquisition of sinister connotations in the 20th century. Also discussed will be the Aristotelian concept of classical rhetoric, and the not so easy to define differences between rhetorical persuasion and propagandistic persuasion. Chapters II, III, and IV examine the discourse of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lyndon B. Johnson, and George W. Bush, and function to identify and extract the propagandistic rhetoric in the context of a rhetorical problem. And the final chapter will discuss the recurring micro and macro level manifestations of Presidential crisis rhetoric, the Historical American, fear inducing rhetoric, and the placement of the enemy in an ideological context for the overall purpose of gaining public support for Presidential calls to arms.

Acknowledgements

First, I sincerely thank my thesis advisor and committee members for their expertise, time, and assistance. They are, respectively, Dr. Jay Gordon, Dr. Steven Brown, and Dr. Jeffrey Buchanan. The doors to their offices have always been open to me.

Second, I give due credit to the English Department at Youngstown State University. I have had the good fortune of coming under the instruction of faculty members who were able to generate my interest in matters towards which I might have felt ambivalence in another time and place. I do not take for granted what they have given me.

And along with that, I want to acknowledge the person who has held the conn of the English Department for all the time I've been a member—Dr. Gary Salvner, the department Chair. He runs a tight ship, but a happy ship that reflects his calm and congenial presence. I could not extend a greater compliment.

Table of Contents

Abstract	iii
I. Introduction	1
Propaganda: An Historical Overview	2
Propaganda as an Instrument to Promote War	4
Recognizing Propaganda	10
Rhetoric from a Classical Perspective	11
Concepts of Propaganda from the 20th to 21st Centuries	13
Interpretive Strategy	17
General Notes Concerning the Texts	19
II. Study: Franklin D. Roosevelt – Fireside Chat: September 11, 1941	20
Excerpt 1	21
Excerpt 2	22
Excerpt 3	23
Excerpt 4	24
Excerpt 5	26
Excerpt 6	27
Excerpt 7	28
Excerpt 8	29
Excerpt 9	30
Excerpt 10	31
Excerpt 11	31
Excerpt 12	32
Summary of Roosevelt’s Rhetorical Problem	34
III. Study: Lyndon B. Johnson – Message to Congress Concerning the Gulf of Tonkin Incident: August 5, 1964	36
Excerpt 1	37
Excerpt 2	39
Excerpt 3	41
Excerpt 4	41
Excerpt 5	42
Excerpt 6	44
Summary of Johnson’s Rhetorical Problem	45

IV. Study: George W. Bush – Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the Nation: September 11, 2001	47
Excerpt 1	48
Excerpt 2	50
Excerpt 3	50
Excerpt 4	52
Excerpt 5	53
Excerpt 6	53
Excerpt 7	54
Excerpt 8	55
Excerpt 9	56
Excerpt 10	57
Excerpt 11	57
Excerpt 12	58
Excerpt 13	59
Excerpt 14	59
Excerpt (Churchill)	60
Summary of Bush’s Rhetorical Problem	61
V. Conclusion: Patterns of Propagandistic Rhetoric in the Three Studies	63
Appendixes	
A. The Seven Propaganda Devices	69
B. Full Text – Roosevelt	70
C. Full Text – Johnson	75
D. Full Text – Bush	77
E. Full Text – Churchill	82
References	83

I. Introduction

The words are strangely brief and inconspicuous—“The Congress shall have Power . . . *to declare War*”—and they are placed not in the prominent position one would think words of such profundity would merit, but they are inserted into the seventh paragraph of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States (emphasis added). It is almost as if the authors of the Constitution had been working from a “to do” list, with the power to wage war weighing in at no greater importance than the equally profound measures of “establish[ing] Post Offices [and] Roads.”

Throughout the history of the United States of America, Presidential requests to the Congress for putting those words into action have been as striking as the words themselves are unnoticeable. Eleven times since the inception of this government has the President, either in writing or in person, requested from Congress that a declaration of war be invoked against a sovereign foreign state. And eleven times that request has been granted, authorizing the United States’ entry into five different wars. In addition, Presidents have received from Congress “authorization for the use of force,” an action that falls short of the official declaration required by the international community to recognize that a legal state of war exists. That official sanction of hostilities provides the legal blessing to kill enemy combatants, take prisoners, and seize territory.

This study will examine the rhetoric contained in three United States’ Presidents petitions for war, and the rationale they provide to Congress and the public for sending American sons and daughters into harm’s way. Focus will be placed on identifying the

propagandistic rhetorical techniques of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Lyndon B. Johnson, and George W. Bush as they make their case for engaging in hostilities with enemy forces.

The President, or for that matter, any speaker who pursues an agenda to influence an audience's opinions, is employing persuasive rhetoric in one form or another.

Therefore, before an analysis of Presidential propagandistic rhetoric can begin, elements of rhetoric unique to propaganda must be identified. Doing that will establish boundaries for distinguishing persuasive rhetoric from its subset of propagandistic rhetoric, and the elements of which the latter is comprised. The ultimate goal is to provide answers to the questions that are primary to this study: What propagandistic elements are employed in the Presidential rhetoric, and how are they used?

Prior to entering into this examination of Presidential rhetoric, an historical overview of "propaganda" will be provided. Within that survey, attention will be directed to propaganda's use in an historical context, as an instrument for promoting war. The background given will extend into the 20th century, with emphasis on its use during World War I, the era in which the modern concept of propaganda began to take shape and the potential of its power became apparent. The study will begin by providing a history of the word itself—propaganda—the context of its conception and original use, and the early changes that occurred in the application of the term.

Propaganda: An Historical Overview

"Propaganda," a derivative of the word propagate, was first used in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV as an official instrument for proselytizing the doctrines of the Roman

Catholic Church in both the new and the old worlds (*Sacra Congregatio Christiano Nomini Propagando*/ Sacred Congregation for Propagating the Name of Christ). As indicated by the name of the congregation, “propaganda” initially had a lexical meaning that referred to the institution charged with disseminating the message, and not the doctrine itself. In 1627, the Pope established the *Collegium Urbanum*, a seminary for the purpose of training missionaries ordained in The Propaganda.

One should note that at this point in time “The Propaganda” had come to represent the doctrine being propagated for the benefit of “‘the heathen masses of the Americas’ and . . . the ‘protestant populations of Europe’” (Qualter 3). (In contemporary usage, propaganda has also come to mean the *methods* by which the rhetoric is communicated, and those techniques, as have previously been indicated, will be the focus of this study.)

Significantly, The Propaganda was spread to induce the masses to voluntarily accept Catholic doctrines, propaganda providing an alternative to force. This use of propaganda as a means of non-violent coercion foreshadows its use in free societies, in which the precepts of democracy could not be overtly violated. Noam Chomsky stated it most succinctly in a WBAI radio interview in 1992: “Propaganda is to a democracy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state” (On Propaganda). As will be elaborated on later while analyzing the Presidential speeches, presenting a rhetoric that *seemed to indicate* governmental leadership was working in compliance with the nation’s democratic principles was critical in gaining public support for any show of military force.

Even before its establishment as an organ of the Catholic Church, evidence of propagandistic rhetoric can be seen in the writing of Confucius and the ancient Greeks. Furthermore, it would seem almost a certainty that from the time humans began to inhabit the planet, propaganda has been used as a tool to influence segments of society. But the reign of Julius Caesar provided a record of the Romans employing propaganda to the fullest extent possible within the limitations of ancient communications technology (about 50 B.C.). Architecture, literature, art, coinage, and the spectacle of elaborate ceremonial served as vehicles through which propaganda created the empire as a symbol of power and authority, informed Caesar as a benevolent dictator, and “seemed to justify his careful hints that he was descended from the goddess Venus” (Jowett 37-38).

Propaganda as an Instrument to Promote War

In *The Conquest of Gaul*, Caesar’s accounts of Gallic and Germanic men, women, and children being massacred by Roman soldiers might have served a dual propagandistic purpose to demoralize the enemy and keep his own Roman compatriots in tow (114-115, 195). And the theme of revealing atrocities through words and imagery has played a major part in providing justification for war, not only during the time of the Roman Empire, but most probably throughout all of history up to the present.

Additionally, as demonstrated by its use during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), the tactic of making allegations of atrocities was used by all factions through the vehicle of mass produced leaflets and posters made possible by innovations in the printing industry.

The propaganda of the atrocity story was put to use for the American cause in the Revolutionary War through a letter that had ostensibly been written by the Seneca Indian tribe and sent to the British governor in Canada. In it, the Senecas boasted of having sent the scalps of colonial women and children to King George as evidence of the tribe's loyalty to the British cause. Benjamin Franklin, whom historians think may have authored the letter, had made arrangements for its publication by various European press outlets. Europeans, including English, who read about the accounts of barbarity were outraged at the Crown's use of "savages" for fighting the Americans. The accounts of atrocities resulted in increased European support beginning to weigh in favor of the Americans (Thum and Thum 81-82).

Recounted by John MacArthur in *Second Front*, one of the more recent and powerful examples of the "atrocity story" is contained in a fifteen-year-old Kuwaiti girl's testimony before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus several months before the beginning of the 1991 Gulf War. Claiming to have been a volunteer hospital worker, she provided an account of Iraqi soldiers storming the hospital, removing fifteen babies from incubators, "and [leaving them] on the cold floor to die" (58).

It was a story that so outraged Americans that it significantly impacted their support for the war. But kept from the public was the fact that the girl was the daughter of Kuwait's Ambassador to the U.S. Also hidden from public view was that her testimony had been coached by Hilton & Knowlton, at that time, the world's leading public relations firm, and hired by the Kuwaiti government-in-exile to promote the war to

Americans (Ramptom and Stauber 70).¹ In this instance, it is not only the propaganda in what is said that is effective—the possible outright fabrication of events—but also in what is not said, the deliberate omission of pertinent facts.

Harold Lasswell, one of the prominent political scientists and propaganda theorists of the post-World War I era, in *Propaganda Technique in the World War* sums up the purpose of atrocity rhetoric thusly: “A handy rule for arousing hate is, if at first they do not enrage, use an atrocity” (81).

Propaganda has also functioned as PR in other ways. The document that has been recognized by Americans as a Declaration of Independence, is, as Charles Hunter Hamlin claims in *Propaganda and Myth in Time of War*, not an assertion of independence, but a propagandistic statement for the purpose of publicizing “to the world . . . the causes, [and to provide a rationale] that made necessary such a declaration” (11-12). There appears to be logic in Hamlin’s contention that the colonies’ justification of ‘No Taxation Without Representation’ is an over-emphasized half-truth, in that the slogan implies that taxation *with* representation would have been acceptable to the colonists (18).²

Although the use of propaganda served the political purposes of the American and French Revolutions in the 18th and 19th centuries, and was an essential element in the advent of consumerism in the latter part of the 19th, in the three hundred years preceding the 1900s, very little academic discourse concerning propaganda theory was published for the English speaking world. And when scholarly literature first began appearing at the

¹ Although chaired by Congressmen Tom Lantos and John Porter, the facts belie its name—the Congressional Human Rights Caucus is not an official committee sanctioned by Congress. Therefore, it has no power to subpoena, and witnesses provide testimony at no risk of perjuring themselves.

² It must be noted that Hamlin has written his book for the purpose of promoting the agenda indicated by the name of the organization that co-published the book—Association to Abolish War.

turn of the 20th century, what was being written was being read by a very erudite crowd. Thus, as a concept recognizable to the general public by name, propaganda was a comparatively unknown commodity until the first World War.

With a rhetorically unsophisticated public as the target, the yellow journalism that was omnipresent in the late 19th century was the vehicle for creating a jingoistic mindset among a large readership. William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, combatants involved in their own war for the newspaper circulation bragging rights of New York City, sought, in 1898, to create an international crisis out of a situation in which Cuban insurgents were pitted against the authority of Spanish rule. Through the use of exaggeration and outright fabrications, Hearst's *New York Journal* and Pulitzer's *New York World* painted a picture of Cuban suffering under the abusive regime of the Spanish government.

The mysterious blowing up and sinking of the USS Maine in Havana Harbor, an event that might be perceived as fortuitous for both Hearst and Pulitzer, was used to full effect by the press in bringing a public fervor for war to a fever pitch, and with a concurrent result of increased newspaper circulation. Although it was doubtful that Spain was the perpetrator of sabotage against the battleship, the Spanish government was condemned by the press, who popularized the battle cry—"Remember the Maine, to hell with Spain!"

The machinations of the press had its desired effect upon Members of Congress; a committee of lawmakers pressing for a declaration of war was received by President William McKinley, an opponent of American intervention. Interestingly, and significantly, government had become, in effect, an agent of a self-serving press. Sixteen

years down the road when German troops crossed the border into Belgium, the British Navy cut Germany's transatlantic cable links to the United States, thereby creating a situation in which American newspapers were cut off from German news sources. With communication being routed through and censored by the London news bureaus, the Allied Powers in Europe controlled what war information the Americans were to receive. Unlike the situation of the Spanish-American War, the press this time became the agent of government propaganda, specifically, to serve as a vehicle for British disinformation specialists.

Prior to the entry of the United States into World War I, the selling of the European war to Americans was in part facilitated through the covert dissemination of propaganda. A British "information" bureau, headed by respected Canadian journalist Sir Gilbert Parker, was set up in the United States. In part, Parker says his methods involved "establish[ing] association by personal correspondence with influential and eminent people of every profession in the United States" (qtd. in Lasswell 155). To promote the Allied cause, Gilbert targeted literature to universities, libraries, YMCAs, and hundreds of newspapers.

Although the literati and progressives were swayed rather quickly to jump aboard the Allied bandwagon, rank and file Americans maintained severe reservations about the United States intervening in Europe. By 1917, with Woodrow Wilson already determined to commit troops to Europe and with protest mail piling up, the Committee on Public Information (CPI) was created by Executive Order. A week after Congress declared war, steps were taken to rev up the propaganda machine and crank out the information at a fast and furious pace. Under the autocratic direction of George Creel, journalist and friend of

the President, the “committee”³ launched an over-the-top information campaign to malign the Germans, portraying “The Huns” as the “snakes of the human race” (Sproule, Propaganda 11).

CPI propaganda functioned not only to increase public opinion in support of the war, but also served to weaken the fighting spirit of an enemy by appealing to a basic human survival instinct. As had Hessian mercenaries been enticed by leaflets during the American Revolution to desert British ranks, in a similar, but more sophisticated fashion, the CPI worked together with the Military Intelligence Bureau to spread “surrender propaganda” throughout the German lines. A campaign was initiated to air-drop leaflets that promised food and fair treatment to surrendering soldiers.

The CPI’s selling of the war may have been too successful; the promise and expectations for a long lasting peace and a worldwide democracy began to vanish very quickly at Versailles. Americans were left with a sense of disillusionment and an awareness that in the arsenal of a skilled rhetorician, propaganda could prove to be a danger to democracy. Furthermore, the rise of the Third Reich gave ample cause for enhancing the sinister connotation attached to propaganda.

Nothing need be said about the actions of the Third Reich—that has already been documented literally many thousands of times. However, that sinister element of Nazi rhetoric, or a sinister element that may be found in any rhetoric for that matter, indicates that there is something less than ethical, a negative characteristic unique to propagandistic rhetoric that separates it from simple persuasive rhetoric. This unique characteristic of propaganda has given it a special place and function in the world, as just

³ The CPI membership included the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, and as a group, only convened once (Winkler 2).

indicated, beginning at the time of the first World War and continuing afterwards, maintaining its distinctive rhetorical presence up to the present time. And accordingly, propaganda warrants a special and unique description that focuses on the distinctive elements that set it apart from persuasion. How else, that during times of war and national crises, governments have been able to use propagandistic rhetoric to induce its citizens to wrap themselves in the flag for what might be a marginal cause.

Recognizing Propaganda

To be able to recognize and identify propaganda, there must be some standard—an exemplar of propaganda—to which the specific elements of Presidential rhetoric can be compared. But it would not best serve the purposes of this study to assume that a search for a definition of propaganda should, or could, yield one “correct” and prototypical example. What makes the search for “the” standard difficult is the fact that propaganda has been studied within the different contexts of a variety of disciplines that include the historical, ideological, political, psychological, and sociological. The scholarly definitions of propaganda tend to be geared towards an application that is specific to the particulars of one or more disciplines.

However, an interdisciplinary linkage is shared through the concept of communications theory. Therefore, instead of examining the Presidential petitions from the perspective of one specific discipline, it is more appropriate that the investigation be conducted through a lens that will focus on elements of rhetoric as a communicative function.

But occupying an associated berth within the concept of rhetoric is persuasion, and it should be readily apparent that in their most basic form, the purpose of both persuasive rhetoric and propagandistic rhetoric seems to be very much the same—to facilitate imposing one’s own ideas onto others for influencing their way of thinking and behavior. But that very basic definition makes no distinction between persuasion and the propaganda, and for the purposes of this study, it is essential that any differences be highlighted.

From World War I to the present, a multitude of scholars have presented their own unique concepts of propaganda. While they all have potential to serve as resources for this study, it would be unrealistic to present a long list of definitions and then try to derive from them some consensus of meaning. Therefore, a choice has been made to place a focus on those leaders in the field of propaganda theory whose ideas were on the cutting edge in their own respective eras. In addition, the study will resource the more contemporary theoreticians who have gained prominence in the field, and who appear to have built their own work on the foundations of those who have preceded them. But before jumping into an examination of contemporary propaganda theory, this study will first look at rhetorical theory from a classical aspect by reviewing Aristotle’s ideas, which he had written about in *Rhetoric*.

Rhetoric from a Classical Perspective

In his writings (the source is the George A. Kennedy translation, *On Rhetoric*), Aristotle contends that the means of persuasion (*pisteis*) is embodied in two different

shapes. The first, aetechnic (non-artistic), is what pre-exists and is not provided by the speaker, for example, concrete evidence. The second type of persuasion, entechnic (artistic), is the speaker's process of taking what pre-exists to construct a method through a heuristic process—a “*use* [of] the [aetechnic to] *invent* the [entechnic]” (37). In other words, the speaker uses existing concrete evidence as the basis for fashioning an argument. Entechnic is the means of artistic persuasion that Aristotle articulates within his discussions of *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*. And those concepts, of course, describe the rhetoric to establish the speaker's credibility through the quality of his/her character, to provoke an intended emotional state in the audience, and to demonstrate the truth (or apparent truth) of the argument.

Of the three modes of artistic means of persuasion, “character is almost . . . the controlling factor in persuasion” (38). And the assessment of character should be dependent upon the words that the speaker utters (and the manner in which they are uttered) in the present moment, rather than from prejudices that have been formed about the speaker. Aristotle contends that for a speaker to gain the trust of an audience, more influential than demonstrating the logic of an argument is the necessity for the speaker to exhibit certain traits—practical wisdom, virtue, and good will.

Upon close examination, it appears that out of those three characteristics, virtue and good will would not be traits that are essential to the success of the propagandist. Logically, it would seem that the attribute of practical wisdom would need to be part of the successful propagandist's repertoire. And if the propagandist seeks to persuade for his or her own benefit alone without concern for the needs and welfare of the targeted audience, then it would seem that “good will” need not be an intention of the rhetor.

Although good intentions may not be included in the rhetorical arsenal of the speaker, that does not necessarily imply that “good will” cannot be used for bringing about mutual benefits for both the propagandist and the audience. Therefore, a distinguishing characteristic between artistic persuasion and propaganda may exist in the properties of good will—artistic persuasion, according to Aristotle, must include it, whereas propagandistic rhetoric can, but does not necessarily have to.

Concepts of Propaganda from the 20th to 21st Centuries

Harold Lasswell describes propaganda as “the control of opinion by significant symbols . . . and other forms of social communication . . . [a] direct manipulation [by] social suggestion . . .” (9). By asserting that propaganda through the essence of its nature must be manipulative, Lasswell distances propaganda from Aristotle’s idea of artistic persuasion. Because manipulation connotes deceptive practices, it would seem that the presence of virtue in propagandistic rhetoric would be ruled out, clearly setting it apart from persuasion in the Aristotelian sense of the word.

Nevertheless, in his contribution to the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (1937), Lasswell indicates that propaganda can indeed be used to benefit the masses. However, successful propagandists do not operate under democratic “dogmatism about men being the best judges of their own interests,” because “men are often poor judges of their own interests” (527). Lasswell’s notion also suggests that non-virtuous techniques such as deceit and manipulation can be used to promote a positive end result in which the needs of both propagandist and audience are met.

However, for political scientist Terence Qualter, the needs of the targeted audience do not enter the picture. As he strongly emphasizes in *Propaganda and Psychological Warfare* (1962), the key to distinguishing propaganda from any other form of rhetoric is the “deliberate attempt . . . to form, control, or alter attitudes” to achieve a predetermined result (27). Notably, Qualter views propaganda as more of a group influencing function rather than an individual one.

Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, in *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (1992), offer their contribution to a collective concept of propaganda. They observe that the definition of propaganda has evolved from connoting an association with “‘evil’ and totalitarian regimes,” to a post-World War I meaning of “mass ‘suggestion’ or influence through the manipulation of symbols and the psychology of the individual” (9). Relative to persuasion, as the title indicates, propaganda is an abuse of it.

Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, authors of *Propaganda and Persuasion* (1992), also agree that manipulation and deliberateness is an integral part of propagandistic structure, with the intent to shape thought and behavior to a predetermined end (4). In contrast to propaganda, they view “[p]ersuasion [as being] transactive [by] attempt[ing] to satisfy the needs of both the persuader and the persuadee” (21). Attending to his or her own desires is part and parcel of the propagandist’s work, and in their description of propaganda, Jowett and O’Donnell seem to preclude the targeted audience from benefiting as the result of that work.

However, that perception of their idea is not entirely correct; as they elaborate on the subject, they imply that the targeted audience’s well-being could be improved as a

result of propaganda, although the audience's desires are not of primary concern to the propagandist (32).

But as is in Lasswell's concept of propaganda, here also, the presence of manipulation is a factor that helps distinguish persuasion from propaganda. Therefore, based upon the ideas of Lasswell, and Jowett/O'Donnell, rhetoric that does not contain any manipulative or deceitful characteristics, it seems, should not be identified as propagandistic.

On the other hand, some might argue that if the intended audience does indeed secure benefits from the use of manipulative or deceptive rhetoric, then virtue and also good intent may reside within that rhetoric, even though it is labeled as propaganda. However, when one reviews the manner in which Aristotle assesses a rhetor's character, it can be seen that the *manner* in which the utterance is made is of prime importance in making a correct assessment. Although benefits to the targeted audience might be realized, if those audience members perceive that they are being manipulated, the rhetor's character would be placed in an unfavorable light—and with a corresponding erosion of ethos—resulting in audience distrust. Yet, the deceptive techniques of a skilled propagandist might go undetected by an audience that is unable to recognize manipulative rhetorical devices in action.

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) (1937-1942), a U.S. based organization whose ranks included important social scientists and educators, asserts that recognizing the propagandistic characteristics of rhetoric is key for the targeted individual to be able to make a determination of whose best interests the propaganda serves. Only through recognition, analysis, and appraisal will people know if propaganda

is being used to benefit them or to distort their views, in the latter instance, threatening to undermine society (Lee 14).

“‘[Propaganda is] expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends’” (Lee 15). This streamlined IPA definition does not impart enough meaning to make clear distinctions between propaganda and persuasive rhetoric. Yet, when examined within the context of the words that preceded it, it is clear that the IPA acknowledges that propaganda has the potential to either function in the best interests of society, or, to work against those best interests.

However, the IPA seems to imply that the ability of propaganda to further society's best interests is dependent upon the rhetoric coming from a place of truth, rather than from distortion; it does not acknowledge that beneficial results to society could occur by unethical means. That is what makes the IPA notion of propaganda significantly different from the two previous concepts that have been discussed. Lasswell, and Jowett/O' Donnell can visualize the potential for propaganda having a positive effect on society; however, they imply that any benefits would have to come as a result of rhetorical manipulation or deception, for by their implied definition of propaganda, the existence of truth is precluded. That concept is in accordance with the Aristotelian standard—rhetoric that contains no element of deception is entechnic (artistic) persuasion—and at risk of sounding somewhat simplistic, truth, it seems, if not the major factor in distinguishing artistic persuasion from propaganda, is at the very least, a very significant factor.

Interpretive Strategy

However, this study's purpose is not to conduct a search for the truth, nor is it to provide evidence of the presence of propagandistic rhetoric; the texts that will be analyzed have been pre-selected because the historical window has already provided evidence of the existence of distortions of fact, misrepresentations by omission of facts, and other manipulative, devious, or deceptive rhetoric. There is nothing to be proven—that the speeches contain propagandistic elements, and use propagandistic techniques to influence the audience, is a given.

Instead, what this study aims to do is to identify and analyze the methods that are employed in “doing propaganda.” The dissemination of propaganda, if it is employed skillfully, is not so readily visible to its targeted audience. In fact, if the propagandist is successful in his or her agenda to influence thought and behavior, the target will have no awareness of having been manipulated, deceived, or conned. In fact, propaganda does not have to be something that is said—its rhetoric can consist of what is *not* said.

In the 1930s, journalist Clyde R. Miller developed a means for identifying and analyzing methods of propagandistic persuasion; it was introduced to the general public by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis under the label of the “Seven Propaganda Devices” (Sproule, Authorship 136). Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee, in *The Fine Art of Propaganda* (a publication of the IPA), have described these devices as “homely devices of folk origin [that] have been developed into tremendously powerful weapons for the swaying of popular opinion and actions” (22).

The devices themselves are familiar sounding—they should be—they are the original constructs of what are now commonly referred to in textbooks as logical fallacies of rhetorical persuasion. They are: *Name Calling*, *Glittering Generality*, *Transfer*, *Testimonial*, *Plain Folks*, *Card Stacking*, and *Band Wagon*. (Appendix A.)

The seven devices, along with the IPA itself, fell out of favor during the early part of World War II, not due to a flaw in theory, but due to a shift in ideology as “liberals [turned] from isolationism to interventionism” (Sproule, Authorship 139). The problem that emerged was that the seven devices proved to be effective on two fronts. Although they were effective in identifying the deceptive and manipulative rhetoric in the discourse of Fascism and Nazism, when used to analyze the discourse of pro-democracy speakers, the results were unsettling to many. The seven devices also worked to extract propagandistic methodology from the government rhetoric that was seeking to alert citizens to the threat of totalitarianism from across the Atlantic.

Therefore, what proved to be revelatory as an instrument in analyzing propaganda in government discourse seventy years ago will prove useful in analyzing Presidential war rhetoric of the past century. The Seven Propaganda Devices and other rhetorical fallacies serve as a reliable method to extract propagandistic content from a discourse, and a good place from which to launch the analysis. However, this investigation will not limit itself to those functions alone; it will look beyond the seven devices and include within the scope of the study an analysis of the discursive elements from a rhetorical aspect.

Although there is video available of Bush’s address, and audio of Roosevelt’s broadcast, this study will limit the analysis to the printed transcripts of Roosevelt’s and

Bush's nationally broadcast addresses, and Johnson's formally delivered message to Congress. With no intent to suggest that body language and vocal inflection have a minimal effect on influencing an audience (quite the contrary), by focusing on the written discourse, attention will be placed on the power of the words alone, without one having to contend with an unquantifiable mixture of vocal and physical technique.

The texts, indicative of three distinct and unique cultural elements in time, will be analyzed from two aspects—first, at a micro-rhetorical level in which the focus will be on individual words and phrases, and second, from a macro-rhetorical level that will target entire lines, passages, and the complete text as one holistic unit.

General Notes Concerning the Texts

In the Roosevelt and Bush addresses, words that have been placed in parentheses are indicative of their presence in the written and prepared text, but have been omitted in the address. In addition, italicized text represents improvised speech, and is not part of the prepared text.

Furthermore, the selected discourses used for each study represent an abridged version of the original texts—the excerpts chosen represent the best examples of the Presidents' propagandistic rhetoric—avoiding redundancy has been a consideration in making those choices. However, the excerpts are presented in the sequential order in which they appear in the text, and the full texts are included in the appendixes.

II. Study: Franklin D. Roosevelt – Fireside Chat: September 11, 1941

For Franklin D. Roosevelt, the first two terms of his presidency coincided with the onslaught of international lawlessness in the Eastern Hemisphere. Invading armies and subsequent occupations in the Far East, North Africa and Europe, the product of Imperialist, Fascist and Nazi ideologies, left Roosevelt with a considerable challenge—how to prepare an American public for what seemed to be the inevitability of another global conflict. The President needed to find a means to short-circuit the isolationist mind-set wired into a majority of Americans after the first World War. The all-out propaganda campaign that had been successfully waged by the Committee of Public Information, to which Americans had become wise in the post-war years, left many citizens feeling that they had been duped by their government.

Between 1937 and 1941 Roosevelt gave a series of speeches that might be called an audience warm-up for intervention, non-committal speeches that focus on “the epidemic of world lawlessness” (Roosevelt, Quarantine).

The September 11, 1941 Fireside Chat was brought on by a confrontation in North Atlantic waters between a German U-boat and the destroyer USS Greer. Roosevelt describes the incident to his audience as a deliberate and unprovoked torpedo attack by the U-boat. However, the details of the incident are not as simply one-sided as Roosevelt presents them. At the very least, there is a clear intent by Roosevelt to deceive his listeners by omitting pertinent facts of which he had been made aware: After a British bomber sighted the submarine, it requested that the Greer track the U-boat and transmit its position. The Greer in fact, did not launch an attack on the German sub, but the

bomber dropped depth bombs in the U-boat's vicinity. The U-boat's captain, knowing only his ship was being stalked by a destroyer, fired two torpedoes at the Greer, which she was able to evade. In the hours subsequent to the commencement of hostilities, the Greer positioned herself for an attack and commenced to depth charge the U-boat.

The Roosevelt that is heard over the air waves is no longer non-committal—he has taken a stance—a strong one—on the United States' right to enforce the international concept of freedom of the seas.

Although Roosevelt initiates his radio address as a treatise on the United States' right to roam the seas without being molested, his discourse takes on other rhetoric that indicates the U.S. is already at war with Nazi Germany. FDR's address to his listeners represents clearly a call to arms for America.

Excerpt 1

1 My fellow Americans:
 2 The Navy Department of the United States has reported to me that on the
 3 morning of September fourth the United States destroyer GREER, proceeding
 4 in full daylight towards Iceland, had reached a point southeast of Greenland.
 5 She was carrying American mail to Iceland. She was flying the American flag.
 6 Her identity as an American ship was unmistakable. She was then and there
 7 attacked by a submarine. Germany admits that it was a German submarine.
 8 The submarine deliberately fired a torpedo at the GREER, followed later by
 9 another torpedo attack.

Roosevelt begins by establishing himself as one of the people (line 1)—by associating himself with all Americans, he indicates that what is at stake for his audience also applies to himself. The *plain folks* propaganda device is used to disassociate the President from his aristocratic and privileged upbringing, and to bring

him in close proximity to the concerns of all citizens. However, this strategy is deceptive; the office held by the President of the United States intrinsically distances him from all his constituents, and furthermore, the cultured characteristics of Roosevelt’s vocal traits betray his true persona—by any standard of the term, it would be difficult to place FDR into a social class of “plain folks.” Nevertheless, he uses this tactic throughout his address with the repeated use of collective plural pronouns such as “we” and “our.” Although Roosevelt can never be mistaken for one of the rank and file, his rhetorical choices can indicate that he stands with them.

The President maintains the long-established custom of referring to a warship with pronouns reflective of the female gender (lines 5-6). But more than just following a naval tradition (Roosevelt had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Woodrow Wilson), by engendering the USS Greer as female, Roosevelt informs the incident as an attack on a vulnerable woman, the equivalent to the violation of the sovereignty of her body. The rhetoric that portrays the Greer braving hostile waters to deliver mail to American troops not only informs the ship as a Good Samaritan, but also represents an appeal to a patriarchal and patriotic duty to defend “Lady Liberty.”

Excerpt 2

10 In spite of what Hitler's propaganda bureau has invented, and in spite of what
 11 any American obstructionist organization may prefer to believe, I tell you the
 12 blunt fact that the German submarine fired first upon this American destroyer
 13 without warning, and with deliberate design to sink her. Our destroyer, at the
 14 time, was in waters which the Government of the United States had declared
 15 to be waters of self-defense—surrounding outposts of American protection in
 16 the Atlantic.

In lines 10-11, Roosevelt directs the device of *name calling* at certain American citizens, specifically, to malign the intentions of isolationists. FDR portrays a negative image of them by constructing their ideology as an active state of doing. Rather than referring to them as isolationists—*isolation* denoting passivity, inactivity, and non-involvement—he calls them obstructionists, people who are instead informed as proactive in creating obstacles to America’s self-defense.

Additionally, the phrase “prefer to believe” suggests that isolationists are more disposed to accepting the lies of Nazi propaganda rather than the truth, which is “plainly evident.” The intent seems to suggest that the isolationists are ignorant, are of questionable character, or both.

With the declaration, “I tell you” (line 11), Roosevelt completely sheds his *plain folks* mask to assert the intrinsic authority of the presidential office; in that way he affirms his persona of the president as god—all-knowing and all-powerful.

Excerpt 3

17 In the North of the Atlantic, outposts have been established by us in Iceland,
 18 in Greenland, in Labrador and in Newfoundland. Through these waters there
 19 pass many ships of many flags. They bear food and other supplies to civilians;
 20 and they bear material of war, for which the people of the United States are
 21 spending billions of dollars, and which, by Congressional action, they have
 22 declared to be essential for the defense of (their) our own land. The United
 23 States destroyer, when attacked, was proceeding on a legitimate mission. If
 24 the destroyer was visible to the submarine when the torpedo was fired, then
 25 the attack was a deliberate attempt by the Nazis to sink a clearly identified
 26 American warship. On the other hand, if the submarine was beneath the
 27 surface of the sea and, with the aid of its listening devices, fired in the
 28 direction of the sound of the American destroyer without even taking the

29 trouble to learn its identity—as the official German communiqué would
 30 indicate—then the attack was even more outrageous. For it indicates a policy
 31 of indiscriminate violence against any vessel sailing the seas—belligerent or
 32 non-belligerent.

The wording that designates the Greer’s mission as one of legitimacy is ambiguous (line 22-23); viewed in the context of providing mail service to American troops in Iceland, it would seem Roosevelt’s claim would hardly be disputable. However, when examined in the context of lines 19-22, it can be seen that “legitimate” has the characteristics of a *glittering generality*. It seems that Roosevelt’s purpose is to get the audience to accept the mission as one that provides a humanitarian service for men in uniform—bearing mail from home (line 5). However, “legitimate” can also be perceived as *begging the question*—does the transporting of materials of war by a neutral nation (the United States) constitute legitimate commerce?

FDR suggests that an attack on any type of vessel—including one that is belligerent—is a criminal act (line 30-32). Therefore, it represents a flaw in the logic of his rhetoric—he destroys his own argument of the United States Navy having the right to defend its ships by taking offensive action against hostile vessels.

Excerpt 4

33 This was piracy—piracy legally and morally. It was not the first nor the last act
 34 of piracy which the Nazi Government has committed against the American flag
 35 in this war. For attack has followed attack.
 36 A few months ago an American flag merchant ship, the ROBIN MOOR, was
 37 sunk by a Nazi submarine in the middle of the South Atlantic, under
 38 circumstances violating long-established international law and violating every
 39 principle of humanity. The passengers and the crew were forced into open

40 boats hundreds of miles from land, in direct violation of international
41 agreements signed by nearly all nations including the Government of
42 Germany. No apology, no allegation of mistake, no offer of reparations has
43 come from the Nazi Government.

Within the discourse, “piracy” connotes sinister activity of Germany, *name calling* that is juxtaposed with the *glittering generalities* of “legally and morally.” The result is a construct of diametrical rhetoric with a purpose to evoke a negative emotional response towards the German government.

However, by documenting the torpedo attack on the Greer as part of ongoing hostility by the Germans, Roosevelt is setting up a rhetorical strategy to strengthen his position of aggressive defense that he is about to lay out to his listeners (lines 33-35).

Notably, Roosevelt’s utterance of “*this war*” as a demonstrative determiner rather than “*that war*” (line 35), suggests a rhetorical choice that places the United States in a closer proximity to being engaged in a shooting war with Germany. “This war” suggests engaging with the enemy in the here and now, “our war,” as opposed to someone else’s. Roosevelt uses additional evidence to support that notion by his description of the sinking of the SS Robin Moor (lines 36-39). Everything Roosevelt has said informs the United States’ involvement in the European war as a *fait accompli*; Roosevelt does not have to make the direct statement, “we are at war with the Axis.”

Roosevelt’s rhetoric also serves the purpose of acclimating Americans to the inevitability of war: The Germans continue to attack the ships of the Americas although the United States has demonstrated patience and a desire to maintain peace by its previous unwillingness to take the offensive. In effect, Roosevelt is saying to his

audience, “we’ve done all we can to stay out of the war, but Germany is insistent upon provoking us into battle.”

Excerpt 5

44 In the face of all this, we Americans are keeping our feet on the ground. Our
 45 type of democratic civilization has outgrown the thought of feeling compelled
 46 to fight some other nation by reason of any single piratical attack on one of
 47 our ships. We are not becoming hysterical or losing our sense of proportion.
 48 It would be unworthy of a great nation to exaggerate an isolated incident, or
 49 to become inflamed by some one act of violence. But it would be inexcusable
 50 folly to minimize such incidents in the face of evidence which makes it clear
 51 that the incident is not isolated, but is part of a general plan.
 52 This Nazi attempt to seize control of the oceans is but a counterpart of the
 53 Nazi plots now being carried on throughout the Western Hemisphere—all
 54 designed toward the same end. For Hitler's advance guards—not only his
 55 avowed agents but also—also his dupes among us—have sought to make
 56 ready for him footholds, (and) bridgeheads in the New World, to be used as
 57 soon as he has gained control of the oceans.

In line 44, Roosevelt makes a lexical choice in which he opts to use the habitual present tense of the verb *to be*—“we Americans are.” This choice in tense has significant meaning in that it misrepresents Roosevelt’s true intentions, which are revealed further on in the address. Use of the present tense gives the impression that the United States remains in that state of not “jumping into the fray feet first”—it doesn’t point to the shift in intended action that is about to take place. A more accurate representation would be “we Americans have been,” a signification of a continuous past action that is open to revision in the present. Therefore, at this point in the address, the audience is being misled.

As he continues, Roosevelt’s rhetoric takes on the characteristics of the *either/or* logical fallacy (lines 48-51); either the President’s listeners will act in accordance with the reputation the United States has forged of being a great nation, or they will be acting in such a way as a fool might. He presents no other options. Roosevelt’s rhetoric can also be viewed as *name calling*—“dupes” (line 55)—a means to disparage the isolationists, to construct them as a group unworthy to be considered part of a “great nation.”

Excerpt 6

58 To be ultimately successful in world mastery, Hitler knows that he must get control of
 59 the seas. He must first destroy the bridge of ships which we are building across the
 60 Atlantic and over which we shall continue to roll the implements of war to help destroy
 61 him, (and)to destroy all his works in the end. He must wipe out our patrol on sea and
 62 in the air if he is to do it. He must silence the British Navy.
 63 I think it must be explained (again and) over and over again to people who like to
 64 think of the United States Navy as an invincible protection, that this can be true only if
 65 the British Navy survives. And that, my friends, is simple arithmetic.
 66 For if the world outside of the Americas falls under Axis domination, the shipbuilding
 67 facilities which the Axis powers would then possess in all of Europe, in
 68 the British Isles and in the Far East would be much greater than all the shipbuilding
 69 facilities and potentialities of all of the Americas—not only greater, but two or three
 70 times greater, enough to win. Even if the United States threw all its resources into
 71 such a situation, seeking to double and even redouble the size of our Navy, the Axis
 72 powers, in control of the rest of the world, would have the manpower and the physical
 73 resources to outbuild us several times over.

In this excerpt, Roosevelt’s rhetoric can not be more direct and unambiguous—he has let the curtain drop—the pretext is over. Roosevelt is not sending destroyers into the North Atlantic to deliver the mail—he is “roll[ing] out the implements of war” (line 60).

This new rhetoric that suggests a shift in propagandistic strategy mid-speech, is of course, planned. By beginning his address as if he were talking to children, Roosevelt gives himself the opportunity to, later on, throw the engines into reverse, and indicate, “I’m going to level with you.” What this amounts to is not an over-the-top appeal to his listeners’ emotions, but it is rhetoric that is based upon great logic, and by being frank with his audience, Roosevelt has added much capital to his *ethos*. He is saying that his respect for the American people is such that he will provide them with the hard facts.

His message is “I will treat you like the adults that you are, not children, because you are Americans. And you Americans, throughout your history have proven to be tough, and have risen to the occasion when called upon.” In so doing, FDR is making a direct appeal to nationalistic pride.

What is most interesting is that these tactics indicate how logical and reasonable rhetoric can function in a propagandistic manner when held up against previous discourse that was structured on deception. The respect which Roosevelt now gives his audience is emphasized by the contrast of his previous rhetoric. It is not the new rhetoric in itself that is propagandistic—that exists in the relative change from the older, deceptive rhetoric to the current—the propaganda resides in Roosevelt’s manipulation of his audience.

Excerpt 7

74

It is time for all Americans, Americans of all the Americas to stop being

75

deluded by the romantic notion that the Americas can go on living happily and

76 peacefully in a Nazi-dominated world.
77 Generation after generation, America has battled for the general policy of the
78 freedom of the seas. And that policy is a very simple one, but a basic, a
79 fundamental one. It means that no nation has the right to make the broad
80 oceans of the world at great distances from the actual theatre of land war,
81 unsafe for the commerce of others. That has been our policy, proved time and
82 (time) again, in all of our history. Our policy has applied from (time
83 immemorial) the earliest days of the Republic—and still applies—not merely to
84 the Atlantic but to the Pacific and to all other oceans as well.
85 Unrestricted submarine warfare in 1941 constitutes a defiance—an act of
86 aggression—against that historic American policy.

Once again, Roosevelt’s rhetorical strategy is one of *name calling*—he continues to denigrate those Americans who view isolationism as a viable option for dealing with Nazism (lines 74-76). FDR’s tactics are manifested in the form of mockery, with intent to portray isolationists as “Pollyannas,” blindly optimistic and blissfully ignorant. The discourse is designed to appeal to one’s capacity for being shamed, and might also be viewed as a “swift kick in the pants” to jolt Americans out of a collective false sense of security.

The remainder of the excerpt focuses on the rhetoric of reminding Americans of their collective history and fighting spirit—an example of an *ad populum* appeal that uses as its role model the “real American”—the one who shoves when pushed.

Excerpt 8

87 No tender whisperings of appeasers that Hitler is not interested in the Western
88 Hemisphere, no soporific lullabies that a wide ocean protects us from him—can
89 long have any effect on the hard-headed, far-sighted and realistic American
90 people.

In this excerpt, FDR uses his own image-rich rhetoric to counter the sweet-talking language of appeasement. His words serve to ridicule anyone who would continue to be swayed by isolationist discourse; Roosevelt’s rhetorical choice of “appeaser” functions as an allusion to Neville Chamberlain and the corresponding imagery of him being “hoodwinked” by Hitler—a striking contrast to the image of the “hard-headed” American. In the rhetorical context of this address, hard-headedness is an admired American trait, and is indicative of the tough-mindedness that listeners are being persuaded to emulate.

Excerpt 9

91 Normal practices of diplomacy—note writing—are of no possible use in dealing
 92 with international outlaws who sink our ships and kill our citizens. One
 93 peaceful nation after another has met disaster because each refused to look
 94 the Nazi danger squarely in the eye until it had actually had them by the
 95 throat. The United States will not make that fatal mistake.

Here again, Roosevelt is returning to the theme of the inevitability of the United States’ entry into the European war. “Normal” diplomacy being ineffective, FDR implies that an irregular type of diplomacy must take its place (line 91). And from the entire context of his rhetoric, that other kind of diplomacy can only mean the diplomacy of the howitzer.

The rhetoric also represents an instance of the propaganda device of *either/or*—the U.S. will engage with Germany while it still has the strength and resources to stop their war machine, or it too will fall to Nazism.

Excerpt 10

96 We have sought no shooting war with Hitler. We do not seek it now. But
 97 neither do we want peace so much, that we are willing to pay for it by
 98 permitting him to attack our naval and merchant ships while they are on
 99 legitimate business.

The rhetoric of the United States not seeking to enter into a shooting war with Germany is an indication that America has been backed into a corner by the repeated attacks on its ships. However, the logic of the United States seeking no shooting war doesn't follow (line 96), and is therefore, deceptive—even if Germany should refrain from attacking any more American ships, that will not alter Roosevelt's insistence that the United States must come to Britain's aide to assure the survival of both nations (Excerpt 6)

Excerpt 11

100 But when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has
 101 struck before you crush him. These Nazi submarines and raiders are the
 102 rattlesnakes of the Atlantic. They are a menace to the free pathways of the
 103 high seas. They are a challenge to our own sovereignty.
 104 Do not let us (split hairs) be hair-splitters. Let us not ask ourselves whether
 105 the Americas should begin to defend themselves after the (fifth)
 106 first attack, or the (tenth) fifth attack, or the tenth attack, or the twentieth
 107 attack. The time for active defense is now. Do not let us split hairs. Let us not
 108 say: "We will only defend ourselves if the torpedo succeeds in getting home,
 109 or if the crew and the passengers are drowned". This is the time for
 110 prevention of attack.
 111 If submarines or raiders attack in distant waters, they can attack equally well
 112 within sight of our own shores. Their very presence in any waters which
 113 America deems vital to its defense constitutes an attack.
 114 In the waters which we deem necessary for our defense, American naval
 115 vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking

116 under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly
117 blow—first.

For approximately two-thirds of his address, Roosevelt has been using rhetoric to provide a rationale for United States warships taking action to defend themselves and all merchant ships of the Americas against Nazi raiders.

Defense, as it is inferred from lines 107-110, is the prevention of an impending attack. One might reasonably assume that an impending attack means a hostile craft has given some indication of aggression—perhaps in the tracking of a prospective target with active sonar, or in making headway at flank speed to maneuver into shooting position.

However, since what constitutes “waters vital to American defense” (line 112-113) has been determined by the sole and unilateral declaration of the United States Government (Excerpt 2, line 14-15), it has become clear through Roosevelt’s rhetoric that just the very presence of Axis craft anywhere on the high seas “constitutes an attack.”

The analogy of the “rattlesnake poised to strike” (line 100), represents another shift in Roosevelt’s rhetoric—it begins to become very clear that he has been employing a rhetorical maneuver to mislead his audience by substituting the connotated passivity of “defense” for what is in actuality amounts to offensive action. It is now crystal clear that United States Navy warships have been given the order to initiate a pre-emptive first strike upon Axis warships—to “shoot on sight” (lines 118-20).

Excerpt 12

118 This situation is not new. The second President of the United States, John
119 Adams, ordered the United States Navy to clean out European privateers and
120 European ships of war which were infesting the Caribbean and South American

121 waters, destroying American commerce. The third President of the United
122 States, Thomas Jefferson, ordered the United States Navy to end the attacks
123 being made upon American and other ships by the corsairs of the nations of
124 North Africa. My obligation as President is historic; it is clear. Yes, it is
125 inescapable.
126 The American people have faced other grave crises in their history—with
127 American courage, (and) with American resolution. They will do no less today.
128 They know the actualities of the attacks upon us. They know the necessities of
129 a bold defense against these attacks. They know that the times call for clear
130 heads and fearless hearts.
131 And with that inner strength that comes to a free people conscious of their
132 duty, (and) consciousness conscious of the righteousness of what they do,
133 they will—with Divine help and guidance—stand their ground against this
134 latest assault upon their democracy, their sovereignty, and their freedom.

Roosevelt demonstrates that there is historical precedence for the actions he is about to take. He draws upon the collective American history to inspire his audience to live up to the model of the “Historical American,” that individual who exhibits fortitude and courage, and in so doing, honors those who worked and fought to establish and maintain freedom. It is also noteworthy that Roosevelt, by specifying “American” courage and “American” resolution, implies a unique brand of values—not British, not Canadian—American. (line 127).

Additionally, pairing the ongoing U-boat attacks with Roosevelt’s assertion that his obligation is “inescapable” is rhetoric that is once again indicative of the inevitability of war. And as Roosevelt holds himself to a commitment to maintain Presidential honor and strength, he also holds his audience to the same standards that have been exhibited by all citizens during America’s darkest hours (lines 126-134).

Summary of Roosevelt's Rhetorical Problem

The root of Roosevelt's rhetorical problem is to find a way to convince his audience that war with Germany is necessary to guarantee the United States' long-term survival, and by taking swift and immediate action, America will ultimately prevail. Therefore, by justifying and initiating a "shoot on sight" policy, Roosevelt will be taking up Germany's gauntlet.

Roosevelt approaches the problem by first establishing that by Germany's actions, it has in effect declared war on the United States. FDR establishes a rhetorical state of war by employing what Theodore Windt identifies in "The Presidency and Speeches on International Crises: Repeating the Rhetorical Past" as Presidential crisis rhetoric (126). Roosevelt's discourse is constructed according to a formula based upon "New Facts" (the most recent U-boat attack, on the USS Greer), that create a "New Situation" (the Greer attack is the straw that has broken the camel's back), which leads to an argument for creating a "New Policy" (shoot on sight) (Windt 128).

Roosevelt's greatest obstacle to getting the United States into the war is the isolationists, who have steadfastly held to their position of neutrality. Perhaps even more troubling to Roosevelt are those Americans who would be willing to listen to reason but for the anti-war rhetoric of the influential members of American society who belong to the *America First Committee*.⁴ Therefore, Roosevelt engages in *name calling* in an effort to marginalize the isolationists' intellect, courage, and strength.

⁴ *America First* was a well-funded anti-war organization with perhaps close to a million members; its most influential and vociferous member was Charles A. Lindbergh, and it included other noteworthy names such as Alice Roosevelt Longworth, Sinclair Lewis, and Walt Disney. Future notables included Gerald Ford, Sargent Shriver, and Gore Vidal. *America First* disbanded several days after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

From the macro perspective, this rhetoric amounts to Roosevelt asking the question, “Which club do you want to be a member of? That of the weak, ignorant, and simple-minded—the phony Americans—or the club of those real “historical” Americans who are strong, savvy, and hard-headed—the men and women who understand and honor their collective American history?”

III. Study: Lyndon B. Johnson – Message to Congress Concerning the Gulf of Tonkin Incident: August 5, 1964

On the 5th of August, 1964, a message prepared by President Lyndon B. Johnson was delivered to a Joint Session of Congress regarding hostilities that had occurred between the U.S. Navy and North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin. The first of those incidents occurred on August 2 when three North Vietnamese torpedo boats opened fire on the USS Maddox, a destroyer that was engaged in reconnaissance in international waters off the North Vietnam coast.

The previous day, as part of ongoing covert operations independent of the U.S. Navy, North Vietnam's mainland had been shelled by a Swift boat manned by C.I.A. trained South Vietnamese soldiers under the command of Gen. William Westmoreland (Sheehan 267-8, Stavins 95-7). The Maddox, with the support of naval air power, returned fire to incapacitate the North Vietnamese gunboats. The Maddox, which had sustained virtually no damage, resumed its intelligence-gathering mission and presence in the Gulf with the destroyer USS Turner Joy now providing support.

On the night of August 4, a second attack on both destroyers was reported, the accuracy of which had long been open to dispute. From the reports dispatched by the Maddox, although no visual contact had been made, indications from electronic detection devices, i.e., radar and sonar initially convinced the Maddox's Commanding Officer that both ships were under attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. But a subsequent flash (highest priority) message from the C.O. stated "reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. . . . Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken"

(Ellsberg 9-10). Hours later, Admiral Ulysses S.G. Sharp (CINPAC)⁵ told Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara “that there was now confusion over whether an attack . . . had actually taken place” (Sheehan 270). By virtually all accounts, the August 4 incident was marked by mass confusion and uncertainty throughout the chain of command. Finally, upon evaluation of existing evidence, McNamara and the Joint Chiefs determined that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the attack did occur.⁶

Consequently, Johnson got what he was looking for—a pretext to escalate United States involvement in Vietnam, for which he had previously been unable to obtain Congressional and public support. The claim of ongoing infiltration of communist troops into the South had not been considered *prima facie* evidence to support a stepped-up U.S. commitment. In *Washington Plans an Aggressive War*, Stavens, Bamet, and Raskins maintain “the infiltration argument, aside from its gross falsity, lacked the glamour attendant upon a surprise or shock attack” (98). The attack on the 2nd and the alleged attack on the 4th provided the dramatic fodder for rhetoric that Johnson needed to stir the public’s emotions, and attain Congressional support for a resolution.⁷

Excerpt 1

- 1 Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had
- 2 conducted further deliberate attacks against US naval vessels operating in international
- 3 waters, and I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities
- 4 used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with
- 5 substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two US aircraft were lost in the action.

⁵ Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command.

⁶ Naval Historical Center senior historian Edward J. Marolda reveals “analysis of that data . . . gathered on the August 4 episode now makes it clear that North Vietnamese forces did not attack [the ships] (par. 3).

⁷ Johnson’s assertion in his message that the attacks had been unprovoked was evidently accepted by Congress without question—his Administration had not told Members of Congress that clandestine attacks against the North had been in operation for six months (Sheehan 244).

6 After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a
7 decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of
8 the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

Johnson begins his message by establishing the North Vietnam government as renegade. He does that by repeated reference to North Vietnam as a regime, which he first does in line 1. “Regime,” lexically, has no meaning beyond denoting the time frame a government is in power, or, the government itself. But it is a *bad label* with the negative connotations of an oppressive and autocratic system of rule suggestive of illegitimacy, although the fact is, the Geneva Accord of 1954 partitioned Vietnam and established North Vietnam as a legitimate government.

By stating that the actions of North Vietnam were “further deliberate attacks” (line 2), LBJ is indicating that he had not ordered retaliatory action after the attack on August 2 had occurred, an indication that his response to the phantom attack on August 4 was not made in haste. Johnson’s decision to order air strikes against North Vietnamese targets is constructed as one being carefully considered, contingent upon additional aggression. The macro-level purpose of the President’s rhetoric is to portray the United States as hesitant to escalate hostilities, and specifically, Johnson himself, as a peace-loving leader.

It is noteworthy that Johnson’s non-descript nomenclature of “supporting facilities” (line 3) opens the door to ordering strikes against targets without having to demonstrate a direct connection to their material support of the gunboats. By being vague, there is no need to justify the targeting of any specific area. Additionally, Johnson’s use of the word “direct” rather than “order” demonstrates to his audience that he had a direct hand in the planning and design of the aerial strikes—an indication that he

is completely in charge of the operations—a hands on Commander in Chief, not just a President who has been well briefed by subordinate commanders. That rhetorical choice constructs Johnson as a leader who is knowledgeable and responsible, one who can be trusted to take appropriate actions.

The matter of factness with which Johnson reports the downing of two U.S. aircraft signifies American casualties are to be expected as a matter of course, as part of the normal consequences of engagement with the enemy (line 5). Additionally, Johnson's words indicate that war, even though not declared, is in progress. This has the rhetorical effect of demonstrating to the Congress that he, as the President, has the authority to take offensive action independent of any resolution or declaration by its members. In his message to Congress, Johnson indicates that the deployment of forces is at the discretion of the President if he perceives it necessary in the defense of American troops. But he also presents the Members of Congress with the option of saving face by giving them agency to sanction his actions via an official resolution.

The *glittering generalities* of “supporting freedom” and “protecting peace” (line 8) represent virtuous words to couch the stark and unpleasant realism of what those actions mean in concrete terms—waging war, and in the wake of that, leaving behind death and destruction. Those words are also a direct appeal to an American tradition of ideology that promotes democracy, and a citizen's notion of what is expected of the “historically correct” American.

Excerpt 2

9 These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime has given a new and grave turn to

10 the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well
 11 known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They
 12 were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the
 13 Senate in February 1955.
 14 This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members
 15 to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression
 16 against any of the parties or protocol states.
 17 Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I
 18 summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:
 19 America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.
 20 The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that
 21 region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

Johnson persuades Congress to comply with previous Administrations’
 commitments and obligations by appealing to national pride and honor; Americans do not
 welsh on their promises. However, Johnson is misrepresenting those commitments—the
 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty does not obligate the United States to take
 unilateral action in Vietnam (line 14). And by invoking the name of Dwight D.
 Eisenhower (line 11), LBJ is employing the propagandistic device of *transfer* to cash in
 on the respect and esteem in which Eisenhower is still held. And in the style of a supreme
 commander, Johnson doesn’t leave any room for compromise with his subordinates as he
 insists the United States stand by its promises— “we must and shall” (line 19).

It is with that authoritative tone that the President exercises rhetoric for instilling
 fear in his audience, which he aims to accomplish through an assertion that smacks of the
 “domino theory.”⁸ But without supporting evidence, Johnson’s claim is unsound, a *non*

⁸ The documentary film *The Fog of War* exhibits a recorded phone conversation between McNamara and Johnson (25 Feb. 1964). Discussed is the rhetoric for framing the content of a planned speech by LBJ (transcript of dialogue):

McNamara: The problem is what to say about it.

LBJ: All right, I would tell you what I would say about it. I would say that we have a commitment to Vietnamese freedom. If we could pull out of there, the dominoes would fall, and that part of the world would go to communists (McNamara 01:02:25).

sequitur that falsely implies unhalted Communist aggression in Southeast Asia will lead to an inevitable threat posed at American shores.

Excerpt 3

22 Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.
 23 This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.
 24 Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the
 25 purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their
 26 independence.

LBJ's declaration that the United States has no agenda other than one that is peaceful is a misrepresentation of the word "peace" (line 22). In this context, "peace" functions as a surrogate word, a *glittering generality* that distorts the true meaning of Johnson's unspoken words, which in essence represent an ultimate agenda of the United States to secure peace under its own terms and conditions through the use of military force.

Johnson continues to obscure the true image of war with virtuous terms by removing the focus from the concreteness of a "jungle war" and shifting it to a metaphorical arena that signifies the righteousness of a struggle for the sake of humanity (line 23). Additionally, the emphasis placed on "assistance" and "help" places a positive and misleading spin on the U.S. troops' involvement, more suggestive of them continuing their roles of "advisors" rather than becoming combatants (line 24-26).

Excerpt 4

27 The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North
 28 Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This
 29 Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically

30 conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply
31 of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory.
32 In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian
33 territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat
34 operations—all in direct violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1962.
35 In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more
36 threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United
37 States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the
38 Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation
39 in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International
40 Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by
41 furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest
42 North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on armed
43 forces of the United States.

The middle section of the President's message is an exercise in *name calling* and *stacking the deck*. The discourse of the “red scare”—regime, threat, Communist, take over, infiltration, subversion, et al., becomes a diatribe of repeated rhetoric that is played out to its fullest to portray North Vietnam as a deviant and outlaw system of government. Johnson's depiction of a relentless Communist campaign of aggression cutting a swath of violence through Southeast Asia seems to parallel Harry S. Truman's response to the advice Senator Arthur Vandenberg gave him at the outset of the Cold War. To get the Congress and Americans to support foreign aid to countries threatened by Communist subjugation, Vandenberg “told [Truman] that he would have ‘to scare the hell out of the country’” (Freeland 89).

Excerpt 5

44 As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress,
45 on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met,
46 and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of
47 the area to defend their freedom.
48 As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no

49 wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to
 50 bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and
 51 effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to
 52 South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

Proclaiming that there is a “national determination” to “meet” all North Vietnamese attacks (line 45), such a determination must be taken to mean either a consensus of American opinion, or that the determination is Johnson’s, and he represents himself as the personification of the nation, an omniscient patriarch—a “father knows best” figure whose wisdom is beyond question. For those recipients of the message who interpret it to be the latter, Johnson may be viewed in terms of an autocratic, the sole determiner of the nations policies whose lead the Congress has but no recourse to follow.

If Johnson’s intended meaning of “national determination” is interpreted as an attitude already established and held by a majority of American citizens, then that *begs the question* if one does believe in fact that the majority of American citizens do voice a mandate for military intervention. From that aspect, the rhetoric represents an appeal to those who have not made a commitment to *jump on the bandwagon*. In either case, the rhetoric of national determination is capable of imposing the desired effect of influencing the audience to follow the leader.

Furthermore, there seems to be a rhetorical purpose to create ambiguity in reference to any future United States presence in Vietnam; an American response to Vietnamese aggression is vaguely defined by the language “attacks will be met”—and that discourse lacks completeness. From the repeated use of rhetoric that has focused on the concept of maintaining peace and defending freedom, Johnson’s words might lead

one to a conclusion that further North Vietnamese strikes against the South or U.S. will result in a *defensive* response by the military. Moreover, the President’s message is worded in such a way that does not seem to suggest that defense will be rendered through an extended counter-offensive, but rather, be limited to retaliatory measures, a scenario that is additionally supported by Johnson’s assertion that the United States “seeks no wider war” (lines 48-49).

Excerpt 6

53 I recommend a Resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary
 54 action to protect our armed forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty.
 55 At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any
 56 avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist
 57 subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.
 58 The resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in
 59 the past—to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in
 60 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the
 61 resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against
 62 our armed forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in
 63 accordance with the obligations of the United States under the southeast Asia treaty.
 64 I urge the Congress to enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give convincing
 65 evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our
 66 policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward—and that the peace and security of the
 67 area will be preserved.

Johnson frames his second request for a formal resolution as a recommendation. Initially presented in the vague terms of supporting freedom and protecting peace, it is now framed more specifically to endorse all active measures for protecting American troops (lines 53-54). Johnson’s rhetoric is an appeal to the idea of a dichotomy of citizenship similar to FDR’s construct of the real and phony American—the “Historical

American” who supports American soldiers, and the bad citizen, who does not.

Essentially, the rhetoric places the target, Congress, in the position of *either* standing by America, *or* not.

Nevertheless, Johnson’s tone appears to be modulated by the less demanding language of “recommend,” which is more representative of a suggestion. Although it may seem that Congress is being given a choice in the formulation of a resolution—“[it] could . . . be based upon”; “it could state” (lines 58-63)—Congress, in actuality, is being provided a set of suggested templates from which it may choose.⁹

When contrasted with the more authoritative tone the President has been displaying throughout his message, the holistic effect of Johnson’s choice in rhetoric can be seen as the completion of a binary construct of *bad cop vs. good cop*, with the latter seemingly providing Congress agency in decision-making.

Summary of Johnson’s Rhetorical Problem

By the time Johnson’s war message has been presented to Congress, he has already responded to the Gulf incidents with air strikes on North Vietnamese targets. Johnson’s war rhetoric provides a justification of why “defensive” actions against North Vietnamese targets have been initiated, and why those actions *will*—not *should*—continue. The President makes it clear that he has exercised his authority as Commander in Chief by ordering fighter planes to return all fire, and that order will stand.

⁹ The Johnson Administration did in fact draft the resolution that was put before both houses of Congress and approved.

The subtext of Johnson's discourse—that what is hidden within his rhetoric—boils down to this: I've given the call to arms, and you, Congress will support my actions with a resolution. If you fail to give me that, you will be perceived as anti-American, and therefore, opposed to freedom and democracy.

His rhetorical plan, then, is to make it easy for Congress to give him a resolution; he does that by constructing North Vietnamese attacks as ongoing actions. By categorizing North Vietnamese strikes as continuing, Johnson informs all further action by U.S. forces against North Vietnam as defensive. Furthermore, as in the previous study's situation of ongoing Nazi hostility in the North Atlantic, here also rhetoric that indicates "further deliberate attacks" (line 2) by North Vietnam creates a situation in which war is inevitable.

Johnson's overall justification for engagement with the North Vietnamese forces is rooted in four concepts—"to defend freedom and peace in southeast Asia," to defend military personnel who are under attack, to fulfill contractual obligations to SEATO, and "to protect national interests." Second, he needs to indicate to those citizens that he has the full support of Congress. Therefore, he requires a resolution by Congress to provide him with the *carte blanche* to make those decisions. To go it alone, without the support of both houses of Congress, would inform Johnson as a rogue President who forgoes all compliance with democratic principles of the Constitution.

In addition, giving the Congress agency by suggesting, but not demanding that they deliver a resolution, seems to operate as a political maneuver by Johnson to allow the Congress to maintain face.

IV. Study: George W. Bush– Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the Nation: September 20, 2001

On September 10, 2001, organized terrorism was not an alien concept to American citizens. For at least two decades previously, they had been exposed through media outlets to a steady array of terrorist attacks in which the venue was not only the Middle East, but also locales throughout Europe and Asia. The first real wake-up calls to Americans that indicated, they too, were potential victims of a “foreign phenomenon,” might have been the suicide truck bombings in 1983 of both the United States Embassy in Beirut, and six months later, the U.S. Marine Corps barracks.

Surely, the fact that Americans were not immune to acts of terror was brought closer to home with the failed, but deadly bombing attempt to bring down the World Trade Towers in 1993 (six people died), and the 1995 destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. And in 2000, the USS Cole suffered severe damage and loss of life to seventeen of its crew when it was hit by a suicide bomber while refueling in the port of Aden, Yemen.

But little could have prepared Americans for the magnitude of what they witnessed September 11, 2001 via live television coverage and videotape, when four airliner hijackings, plotted to occur almost simultaneously, resulted in a holocaust on American soil that had previously been unimaginable to most Americans. There is no need to provide any more details here; the images of 9-11 will persevere throughout the generations to come as have those images associated with that other “date that will live in infamy.”

On September 20, nine days after the attacks, President George W. Bush addressed Congress, the nation, and the world in a speech that has been regarded as his most effective since he had taken office eight months earlier. What follows is a rhetorical and discursive analysis of that address.

Note: The spelling of the Arabic alphabet in the Roman characters of English is subjective to the individual who documents the text—a matter of phonetic interpretation. In being faithful to the original text of the speech, and for consistency, the spelling of “al-qaida” and “Usama bin Ladin” will be retained throughout this analysis, rather than the more typical “al-Qaeda” and “Osama bin Laden.”

Excerpt 1

1 In the normal course of events, Presidents come to this chamber to report on
2 the state of the Union. Tonight, no such report is needed. It has already been
3 delivered by the American people.
4 We have seen it in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save
5 others on the ground—passengers like an exceptional man named Todd
6 Beamer.
7 We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers, working
8 past exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles,
9 the giving of blood, the saying of prayers—in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We
10 have seen the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief
11 of strangers their own.
12 My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself
13 the state of our Union—and it is strong.
14 Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom.
15 Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our
16 enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.

The first words of George W. Bush's address—"In the normal course of events"—seem to have an intent to draw upon Americans' familiarity with the opening words of the Declaration that was prompted by the crisis of 1776. The lexical and syntactical similarities of the first words of the Declaration of Independence—"When in the course of human events"—might induce a sense of *déjà vu* in Bush's audience—"Where have I heard this before?"

That beginning of Bush's address may be indicative of an attempt to *transfer* the reverence in which Americans hold their sacred Declaration to Bush's declaration(s) in this evening's address. Bush gets his speech out of the gate with words that suggest a connection between a newborn nation's struggle for existence and the current nation's battle against factions that seek to destroy it. That connection can function as a reminder of a shared national identity between the past and the present—a collective history. As the declaration of 1776 indicated a "mad as hell—not going to take it" resolve to smash the *status quo*, Bush expresses the fury of a nation and a resolve to take the necessary action to crush a nemesis (lines 15-16).

By holding up the image of the founding fathers as an example of will and fortitude, Bush is appealing to an American kinship to the spirit of '76, which he wants his audience to emulate. At the same time, he is sending a message to the world that the United States did not "take it" in 1776, nor will it "take it" now.

Along with setting a tone that appeals to national pride, Bush also appeals to national unity by drawing upon the virtuous concept of Americans willingly sacrificing themselves for their fellow citizens (lines 4-6). He directs the focus to the passengers on Flight 93 whom he portrays making the ultimate sacrifice to save others. Bush's depiction

can be perceived as propaganda that *begs the question* as to the passengers' actual motivation for staging a revolt.

Excerpt 2

17 And on behalf of the American people, I thank the world for its outpouring of
18 support. America will never forget the sounds of our National Anthem playing
19 at Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris, and at Berlin's Brandenburg
20 Gate. We will not forget South Korean children gathering to pray outside our
21 embassy in Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo.
22 We will not forget moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and
23 Africa and Latin America.
24 Nor will we forget the citizens of 80 other nations who died with our own.
25 Dozens of Pakistanis. More than 130 Israelis. More than 250 citizens of India.
26 Men and women from El Salvador, Iran, Mexico and Japan. And hundreds of
27 British citizens.

The theme of national unity is expanded to global unity as Bush points to the worldwide images of people united in rendering prayers for the victims of the attacks (lines 19-23). And as the citizens of the world unite in prayer, Bush's rhetoric suggests that the multi-national victims formed a bond in death—that feeds the concept that the attack on the World Trade Towers was an attack on the entire world (lines 24-27). Bush presents a propaganda inspired image to influence the world's nations to align with the United States in the war against terror.

Excerpt 3

28 On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against
29 our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they
30 have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans
31 have known the casualties of war—but not at the center of a great city on a

32 peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before
33 on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and
34 night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

Bush's target audience are those Americans whose previous concept of war was an event to be experienced only by "others" living "over there." The President, by calling up the imagery of that "one Sunday" (line 30), and juxtaposing it with September 11, is looking to influence Americans in at least two ways. First, because the enormity of the attack on Pearl Harbor has been kept alive by television and films, Bush is once again able to cash in on a collective awareness of history. Informed Americans know that the Pearl Harbor air raid resounded in a bugler's call to arms that was met with an overwhelming response from the people. By directing focus to Americans' collective history, and by calling attention to the parallels between December 7 and September 11, Bush is attempting to induce a spirit of nationalism through the manipulation of emotions.

Additionally, Bush is making an appeal to his audience's capacity for being afraid. Bush wants to drive home the fact that if U.S. soil and security can be violated from within to deliver a blow to not only New York, but also the Pentagon—the symbol of the nation's defense—then any locale is vulnerable, including Mayberry U.S.A.

In short, Bush's agenda is to receive total and unquestioning approval and support from his fellow citizens—he may achieve that if he is successful in his appeal to patriotic duty—if that doesn't obtain the desired results, he can focus on the consequences of failing to lend full support to the administration's policies. Once again, Senator Vandenberg's advice to Harry Truman applies.

In *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy*, Benjamin Barber contends that al-qaida's primary weapon is not an act of terrorism itself, but the anticipatory fear that terrorism creates in the population, the terror that manifests and dwells within the people between sporadic attacks (15). Ironically, if instilling fear in citizens can assist Bush in winning their loyalty, at the same time, it can play into terrorists' motives to disrupt and alter society.

Excerpt 4

35 This group and its leader—a person named Usama bin Ladin—are linked to
 36 many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic
 37 Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
 38 There are thousands of these terrorists in more than sixty countries. They are
 39 recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods, and brought to camps in
 40 places like Afghanistan where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are
 41 sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot
 42 evil and destruction.

Bush's methodology for inducing fear is best demonstrated in lines 35-42. First, he identifies al-qaida's leader, Usama bin Ladin, not by name only—that in itself would extend sufficient meaning. Instead, he prefaces the name with the phrase "a person named." There is a specific purpose for casting bin Ladin as "a person"—it indicates that he and the terrorists he is representative of are not *Bogeymen*. A terrorist is just another human who is able to blend into a crowd.

The humanizing of terrorists is intended to make it clear to Bush's audience that a terrorist possesses no physical characteristics that will set him or herself apart from the rest of society. Anyone has the potential to be an operative of bin Ladin, and may be

hiding anywhere in the world—it could be a neighbor, a co-worker—the terrorist is *everyman*.

Excerpt 5

43 Al-qaida is to terror what the mafia is to crime.

The analogy Bush makes between the business of organized terror and the business of organized crime seems intended to attach the public's perception of Mafiosi brutalization and ruthlessness to the operations of al-qaida. This is an example of the propaganda device of *transfer* working in reverse—instead of lending respect and admiration to al-qaida, this tool of propaganda is supposed to inform al-qaida as the most reprehensible of organizations.

However, the wisdom of using the Mafia analogy is questionable. Americans' contempt for al-qaida reached a pinnacle on September 11—comparisons to the Mafia are not only unnecessary, but they are also specious. Furthermore, the romanticization of the Mafia by movies and television, e.g., *The Godfather* and *The Sopranos*, seems to undermine Bush's intent. The President's poor analogy makes his propaganda effort transparent—Bush's audience may see him trying to “put something across” (Lee and Lee 15).

Excerpt 6

44 And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the
45 Taliban:
46 Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al-qaida who hide in your
47 land.

48 Release all foreign nationals—including American citizens—you have unjustly
49 imprisoned; (and) protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in
50 your country.
51 Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in
52 Afghanistan and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support
53 structure, to appropriate authorities.
54 Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make
55 sure they are no longer operating.
56 These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must
57 act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share
58 in their fate.

The President delivers a public ultimatum to al-qaida that is of such an absolute nature, bereft of all opportunity for negotiation, that it would not seem possible for al-qaida to comply even if it were so disposed (lines 44-58). Therefore, this section seems to indicate some grandstanding by Bush to establish himself as a strong and tough leader. There can be no question that the main purpose of this evening's speech is to obtain the full support of the American people in his declaration of war against terrorism.

From that context, one may surmise that his rhetorical intent here is to pump up Americans into a state of jingoistic fervor, so that the nation, *en masse*, will climb aboard the war wagon he is setting in motion.

Excerpt 7

59 We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind
60 before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth
61 century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions—by abandoning
62 every value except the will to power—they follow in the path of fascism, and
63 Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path
64 all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies.

It is interesting to note that in Bush’s damnation of the “murderous ideologies of the twentieth century” communism goes unmentioned, and in the space left vacant by its omission the much broader and more inclusive ideology of totalitarianism is substituted (lines 62-63). But to imply that totalitarianism is an ideological concept separate and unique from Nazism and fascism is somewhat misleading—after all, Nazism and fascism are included within the scope of totalitarian ideologies. Apparently, Bush is being deliberate in avoiding a direct reference to communism. His failure to include communism in what he would certainly consider a part of the twentieth century triumvirate of “murderous” ideologies seems to be a diplomatic move—a propaganda of omission to avoid damaging relations with the Chinese government. Bush does not want to open up a front to a rhetorical war with China.¹⁰

Excerpt 8

65 We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy,
66 every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial
67 influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the
68 defeat of the global terror network.

With a litany of unyielding, non-negotiable demands having just been presented to the Taliban, one might wonder what Bush has in mind when he asserts “every means of diplomacy” will be used to defeat organized terrorism (line 65). The contradictory nature of his discourse suggests Bush is using empty rhetoric to pay lip-service to a

¹⁰ Support for this claim is provided in the text of George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy published by the New York Times 20 September 2002. Bush defines the United States’ relationship with China as “an important part of our strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region . . . we already cooperate well where our interests overlap, including the current war on terrorism and in promoting stability on the Korean peninsula” (Bush, scr. 17).

virtuous concept of negotiation—a *glittering generality*—while hoping his audience will accept what they hear at face value without any further examination.

One might perceive Bush’s claim of using “every necessary weapon of war” as another instance of empty rhetoric; however, that is not known for certain. The vagueness of his statement—the operative word being “necessary”—creates a situation in which meaning is subjective to each member of the audience. This word fits the profile of what Lee and Lee call an *omnibus* word—“words that mean different things and have different emotional overtones for different people” (27).

What Bush may be alluding to, but what politics prevent him from voicing, is an option to engage in a “no holds barred” war. And that means the potential use of NBC warfare—nuclear, biological, and chemical. Vagueness conceals Bush’s true intent, and enables him to avoid being pinned down.

Excerpt 9

69 Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes.
70 Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any
71 other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV
72 (television), and covert operations, secret even in success.

Concealment continues to factor into Bush’s address when he forewarns Americans to prepare for a different kind of war—a war conducted under the cloak of secrecy, the length of which will be open-ended, and the details and parameters of which will go undisclosed.

In this rhetoric is an analogy to Lyndon Johnson’s concept of waging war to maintain peace—from Bush’s words, one can infer that in order to maintain freedom

and democracy, one will have to relinquish the freedom and democracy one might expect to encounter in an open society.

Excerpt 10

73 Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with
74 us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that
75 continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States
76 as a hostile regime.

Bush doesn't attempt to conceal his use of the *either/or* propaganda device—he includes those exact terms in his rhetoric (lines 73-74). And what is not said explicitly is clearly implied—hostile regimes will be dispatched expeditiously.

Excerpt 11

77 Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies as well as state and local
78 governments have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts
79 must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of
80 a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me—the Office of Homeland
81 Security.

The President's announcement of the creation of the Office of Homeland Security—as opposed to an Office of *National* Security—exemplifies a purposeful choice in rhetoric for appealing to his audience's protective instincts of home and family (lines 80-81). The name chosen represents the selling of an idea based upon the virtuous connotation of "homeland" (*Home, Sweet Home*). The *glittering* label is an attempt to influence Americans to accept the new office's worthiness without an inquiry. Only

through a thorough examination could Americans tell if the new Cabinet department is in the best interests of a democracy.

Additionally, to many individuals, “homeland” has such a sacred connotation that a person who questions any of the office’s policies might be looked upon as un-American and anti-family. In this way, the propaganda can be effective in discouraging dissent. It has the ability to create an aura of fear that could stop an individual from voicing concerns regarding questionable national policies.

Excerpt 12

82 Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the
83 stability of legitimate governments. *And you know what—we’re not going to*
84 (and we will not) allow it.

Bush reinforces the image of himself as a man who means business. Altering one sentence of the prepared text with what seems to be an ad-libbed remark—“*And you know what—we’re not going to allow it*”—he informs himself with the swagger of a General George S. Patton brandishing twin ivory-handled Colt 45s. The rhetoric appeals to the notion of an America that is once again invincible; by standing behind their fearless leader, Americans will acquire the same heroic and powerful characteristics.

Bush’s ad-lib represents a departure from a formal discourse to a *plain folks* propagandistic device—rhetoric that signifies the language of the street. Bush surely knows that without the backing of the people, his power is diminished.

Excerpt 13

85 Americans are asking: What is expected of us? I ask you to live your lives, and
 86 hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to
 87 be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat. . . .
 88 I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have
 89 come here. . . .
 90 I ask you to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your
 91 contributions. . . .
 92 The thousands of FBI agents who are now at work in this investigation may
 93 need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it.
 94 I ask for your patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may
 95 accompany tighter security; and for your patience in what will be a long
 96 struggle.
 97 I ask your continued participation and confidence in the American economy. . . .
 98 And finally, please continue praying for the victims of terror and their families,
 99 for those in uniform, and for our great country.

Bush has framed the body of his speech in the context of a response to hypothetical questions Americans have been asking since September 11. To the fourth and final question, “What is expected of us?” the President does not respond with an imperative—his answers are given in the rhetorical tone and style of a caring patriarchal authority figure (lines 88-99).

Finally, Bush closes out his address with a series of declarations that may be drawing upon the stirring speech delivered by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill before the House of Commons in June of 1940. In sections of both Churchill’s, and Bush’s speeches, the rhetorical structure is marked by the repetition of a clause that begins a series of sentences (anaphora).

Excerpt 14

100 We will come together to improve air safety
 101 We will come together to promote stability

- 102 We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs
- 103 We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities
- 104 We will come together to . . . strengthen America's economy
- 105 We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.

In Bush's address, anaphora is evidenced first, through the repeated clause, "We will (come together)," and finally, by the words, "We will (not tire), we will not (not falter), and we will (not fail)."

Excerpt from Churchill's Speech

we shall fight on the seas and oceans,
 we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air . . .
 we shall fight on the beaches,
 we shall fight on the landing grounds,
 we shall fight in the fields and in the streets,
 we shall fight in the hills;
 we shall never surrender

In the Churchill speech, the anaphoric structure is represented by the repeated declaration of "we shall (fight)", and closing with "we shall (never surrender)."

Assuming that the rhetorical structure is not just coincidental, there are a number of reasons why Bush may have chosen to emulate certain aspects of Churchill's speech. First, it could represent a deliberate propagandistic, although genuine tribute to the strength and courage of the British people during the dark days of World War II. With the President desperately wanting the support of

Great Britain, and with the appearance that evening of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, there is some rationale to support this notion.

And second, a historical parallel exists within the similar circumstance of a leader, in a time of national crisis, attempting to inspire his people to persevere. Although many Americans in the President's audience may have no awareness of Churchill's historic address, and others may not be able to make a conscious connection between the two speeches, to some in the audience, the similarity may evoke some emotional response through a subliminal awareness. In any event, it seems logical that Bush's speechwriters would be well-versed in classical rhetoric, and would be familiar with Churchill's speechmaking rhetoric.

Summary of Bush's Rhetorical Problem

As was the case with Franklin Delano Roosevelt's war address to Congress on December 8, 1941, George W. Bush's rhetorical problem is not presenting a justification for striking back at an enemy—there is justification enough in the smoldering ruins of lower Manhattan. The problem for Bush is identifying to Americans a target at which to strike back—not an easy proposition especially when the enemy does not fly the colors of any one nation's *terra firma*.

In response to the hypothetical question from Americans that he poses, "Who attacked our country?" Bush points to al-qaida and indicts that organization for the terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa and the attack on the USS Cole. But with movements within nations, i.e., "the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan” being a representation of abstract concepts (lines 38-39), Bush must make a case for retaliation against a concrete target. Therefore, Bush places the focus on the Taliban because of its physical connection to Afghanistan. By focusing on the Taliban’s terrorization of the Afghani people, Bush links the evil of the Taliban with the evil of al-aqaida, and therefore, Bush’s depiction of Afghanistan as a central training center for terrorist organizations is made viable.

However, Bush is still faced with the task of getting Americans to unite behind him in a war against terrorism that through his self-admission, may have no clear end in sight. And with the decade-long Vietnam War still fresh in the collective memory¹¹ of many Americans, Bush must work for the long-term support he will need.

Nevertheless, it is the collective memory of a shared history that creates a common national identity. And that, along with fear, is the linchpin for uniting Americans.

¹¹ The concept of “collective memory,” or “historical memory,” as explained by Maurice Halbwachs in *The Collective Memory*, is the recollection of “the most noteworthy events of a national life.” They can be events not witnessed by the individual, or, might have occurred before his or her birth, a recollection borrowed from the memory of others. Halbwachs elaborates by describing the memory as a current of continuous thought [that] retains from the past only what . . . is capable of living in the consciousness of the groups keeping the memory alive (50-54, 80).

V. Conclusion : Recurrence of Rhetorical Patterns in the Studies

Although the three studies of war rhetoric reference three separate and unique acts of armed hostility against the United States, they are tied together by recurring themes that function as rhetorical strategies for each address/message. According to Theodore Windt's concept of "Presidential crisis rhetoric," that is to be expected. In "The Presidency and Speeches on International Crises: Repeating the Rhetorical Past" Windt contends that persuasive tactics of U.S. Presidents are not unique to each chief executive, but are constructed from recurring patterns of rhetoric that are common to all crisis rhetoric. Those patterns, he asserts, represent a Presidential style of which precedence has been set through history and tradition. Windt contends that this notion is most clearly evidenced in a genre of Presidential rhetoric he calls "speeches on international crises" (126).

In explaining his concept, Windt says that crises are created *primarily* through the political rhetoric of the President (emphasis added). First, a political decision is made to take an issue concerning foreign affairs and inform it as a crisis. Part of that plan may include an interruption of television programming with a Presidential address or news conference. Windt asserts that in situations *other than an external military strike on the United States*, the issue at hand does not in itself create the crisis—that is manifested through the President's perception of the situation and his rhetorical response to it (emphasis added).

If one accepts Windt's premise of rhetorically constructed crises, it seems that the dramatical context of the President's address, i.e., a special bulletin from the Oval Office,

intensifies the degree to which the situation is reflective of a crisis. It then follows that to some extent, in order for the public to recognize a situation as a crisis, a crisis needs to be indicated through the authoritative presence and statements of the President. Therefore, the dramatic venue and the President himself establish an effective propagandistic setting of the Presidential address.

The concept of rhetorically created crises seems to be supported by the political context of President Roosevelt's and President Johnson's discourse. (The 9-11 attacks, of course, do not constitute a politically created crisis; however, the crisis *rhetoric* may be politically motivated.) For example, the crisis involving the USS Greer does not represent the first pre-war German act of hostility against the United States. Likewise, the August 4, 1964 crisis involving the USS Maddox had been preceded by other "communist" attacks on U.S. reconnaissance flights over Laos.

In those other attacks that occurred prior to the Greer and Maddox incidents, major attention had not been drawn to them by any rhetoric targeted for Americans at large. It seems that the Greer and Maddox only became the center of a crisis when FDR and LBJ made a political decision to address the nation using rhetoric that indicated there was a threat to the nation's vital interests.

Much of George W. Bush's September 20, 2001 address, as does the discourse of Roosevelt and Johnson, fits into the narrative of crisis rhetoric. Although the crisis born of September 11 was not a political construct by the President, within Bush's discourse, along with FDR's and LBJ's, can be seen recurring patterns of rhetoric. In their calls to arms, the three Presidents demonstrate a macroscopic goal of establishing a unified

nation that will pledge unquestioning allegiance to the President and support for his policies.

An appeal to unity factors into one of the most repeated themes throughout the Presidential petitions for war; it shows up in the macro pattern of an appeal to a collective historical memory of Americans that is built around a core of “crisis” values. The model of American character and integrity during “grave crises in their history” is one of “courage, resolution, fearless hearts, and inner strength” (Roosevelt, Excerpt 11). An American history of trustworthiness and honor is summed up by Lyndon Johnson’s declaration that “America keeps her word” (Johnson, Excerpt 2). And George W. Bush alludes not only to the spirit of Pearl Harbor, but also to a very recent history of admired American values; he spotlights the courage and sacrifices of the passengers on Flight 93, and the rescue workers at ground zero in New York City (Bush, Excerpt 1).

Additionally, the theme of the Historical American also represents one-half of a binary device that is repeated in each Presidential petition. Taking the cue from an Army recruiting advertisement, Americans are given the opportunity to be informed as special—“being all that they can be”—by climbing aboard the bandwagon in support of their President. Their only other option is the other half of the manipulative *either/or* dilemma—citizens dissenting from the President’s plan will bring discredit upon themselves, and may be rhetorically attacked as being anti-American (Bush), non supportive of troops under fire (Johnson), or lacking brains (Roosevelt).

The *either/or* rhetorical device is in itself a repeating theme in the texts; “freedom vs. tyranny” shows up as a common through-line in all of the examined Presidential discourses. Its binary construction offers no possibility of any in-between

characterizations of the crisis. The enemy is always motivated by the desire to dominate the world and do evil, while the U.S. is a model of peace and righteousness.

Presidents Roosevelt, Johnson, and Bush pressure their audiences into lending their immediate support—time is of the essence in initiating a United States military response. Their rhetoric suggests that prolonged debate, or slowing down the war machine to seek diplomatic alternatives would be a waste of time that would place American interests and lives in jeopardy. And in Johnson's case, the President has already taken offensive action before his message has been received by Congress. At that point in time, the only possible debate can occur between the Members of Congress—"Do we give Johnson his resolution?" Their response translates into a binary choice—they are either for the President (America) or against him.

Placing an enemy within the context of an ideological concept is also prevalent throughout the Presidents' discourse. Nazism, Hitlerism, terrorism, fascism, communism, and totalitarianism complete a string of isms that focus on the ideologies perceived to be the most dangerous threats to democracy for each given era. Interestingly, FDR uses the word "terrorism" as he speaks directly to the Nazi government at one moment during his radio address—"You seek to throw our children and our children's children into your form of terrorism" (Roosevelt, Appendix B). These products of propagandistic *name calling* are held up in contrast to the implied *glittering generalities* of nationalism and patriotism that are part of the Historical American's character.

Calling to attention to "murderous" ideologies that pose a threat to freedom and democracy is part of a rhetoric for inducing fear in the audiences; fear rhetoric is

present in all the discourse that has been studied. The process begins with a repeated reference to the dangerous ideologies, and it is followed with an example of how they might manifest in a concrete threat if action is not taken. For Roosevelt, the danger is realized by indicating that a Nazi war machine gone unchallenged by the U.S. in the present will inevitably lead to an inability to halt it in the future. Similarly, Johnson focuses on the domino theory—stopping the threat before it spreads to American shores. And Bush appeals to Americans' fears by portraying a worldwide network of terrorists who will blend into society while planning the next attacks on the homeland.

In the same way that crisis can be constructed from the rhetoric rather than the situation, the inevitability of war can manifest from the Presidential authority invested in him not only by the Constitution, but more importantly, by the intrinsic esteem in which the Office is held by Americans. When a person assumes the Presidency, that high regard for the Presidential Office is transferred to the person himself, creating in him an almost godlike authority. Additionally, at the onset of a war, the President's approval rating tends to soar, with a corresponding increase in Presidential authority. Authority resides in the public's perceptions. When that perception is extremely positive, if the President wants something, "thy will be done."

In summary, the degree of a President's authority resides in the level of Americans' support for him. And with public trust, the Congress is more likely to abdicate its Constitutional authority to declare war, and defer that decision to the President. Therefore, the inevitability of war is determined by the public's perception of Presidential performance. So then, the primary agenda of a President's call to arms

must be a macroscopic goal to maintain the image of the all-knowing, patriarchal, godlike leader—to appear Presidential. Well developed and executed rhetoric will help strengthen that perception, and consequently, a positive appearance will add power to the rhetoric. In the arena of Presidential war rhetoric, one feeds the other.

Appendix A

The Seven Propaganda Devices

Name Calling—Giving an idea a bad label—is used to make us reject and condemn the idea without examining the evidence.

Glittering Generality—Associating something with a “virtue word”—is used to make us accept and approve the thing without examining the evidence.

Transfer carries the importance, sanction, and prestige of something respected and revered over to something else in order to make the latter acceptable.

Testimonial consists in having some respected or hated person say that a given idea or program or product or person is good or bad.

Plain Folks is the method by which a speaker attempts to convince his audience that he and his ideas are good because they are “of the people,” “plain folks.”

Card Stacking involves the selection and use of facts or falsehoods, illustrations or distraction, and logical or illogical statements in order to give the best or the worst possible case for an idea, program, person, or product.

Band Wagon has as its theme, “Everybody—or at least all of *us*, is doing it”; with it, the propagandist attempts to convince us that all members of a group to which we belong are accepting his program and that we must therefore follow our crowd and “jump on the band wagon.”

Reprinted from *The Fine Art of Propaganda Propaganda: The Study of Father Coughlin's Speeches*. Alfred McClung Lee, and Elizabeth Briant Lee, eds. New York: Harcourt, 1939.

Appendix B

Franklin D. Roosevelt – Fireside Chat: September 11, 1941

My fellow Americans:

The Navy Department of the United States has reported to me that on the morning of September fourth the United States destroyer GREER, proceeding in full daylight towards Iceland, had reached a point southeast of Greenland. She was carrying American mail to Iceland. She was flying the American flag. Her identity as an American ship was unmistakable.

She was then and there attacked by a submarine. Germany admits that it was a German submarine. The submarine deliberately fired a torpedo at the GREER, followed later by another torpedo attack. In spite of what Hitler's propaganda bureau has invented, and in spite of what any American obstructionist organization may prefer to believe, I tell you the blunt fact that the German submarine fired first upon this American destroyer without warning, and with deliberate design to sink her. Our destroyer, at the time, was in waters which the Government of the United States had declared to be waters of self-defense -- surrounding outposts of American protection in the Atlantic.

In the North of the Atlantic, outposts have been established by us in Iceland, in Greenland, in Labrador and in Newfoundland. Through these waters there pass many ships of many flags. They bear food and other supplies to civilians; and they bear material of war, for which the people of the United States are spending billions of dollars, and which, by Congressional action, they have declared to be essential for the defense of (their) our own land.

The United States destroyer, when attacked, was proceeding on a legitimate mission. If the destroyer was visible to the submarine when the torpedo was fired, then the attack was a deliberate attempt by the Nazis to sink a clearly identified American warship. On the other hand, if the submarine was beneath the surface of the sea and, with the aid of its listening devices, fired in the direction of the sound of the American destroyer without even taking the trouble to learn its identity -- as the official German communique would indicate -- then the attack was even more outrageous. For it indicates a policy of indiscriminate violence against any vessel sailing the seas -- belligerent or non-belligerent.

This was piracy -- piracy legally and morally. It was not the first nor the last act of piracy which the Nazi Government has committed against the American flag in this war. For attack has followed attack.

A few months ago an American flag merchant ship, the ROBIN MOOR, was sunk by a Nazi submarine in the middle of the South Atlantic, under circumstances violating long-established international law and violating every principle of humanity. The passengers and the crew were forced into open boats hundreds of miles from land, in direct violation of international agreements signed by nearly all nations including the Government of Germany. No apology, no allegation of mistake, no offer of reparations has come from the Nazi Government.

In July, 1941, nearly two months ago an American battleship in North American waters was followed by a submarine which for a long time sought to maneuver itself into a position of attack upon the battleship. The periscope of the submarine was clearly seen. No British or American submarines were within hundreds of miles of this spot at the time, so the nationality of the submarine is clear.

Five days ago a United States Navy ship on patrol picked up three survivors of an American-owned ship operating under the flag of our sister Republic of Panama -- the Steam Ship (S. S.) SESSA. On August seventeenth, she had been first torpedoed without

warning, and then shelled, near Greenland, while carrying civilian supplies to Ireland to Iceland. It is feared that the other members of her crew have been drowned. In view of the established presence of German submarines in this vicinity, there can be no reasonable doubt as to the identity of the flag of the attacker.

Five days ago, another United States merchant ship, the STEEL SEAFARER, was sunk by a German aircraft in the Red Sea two hundred and twenty miles south of Suez. She was bound for an Egyptian port. So four of the vessels sunk or attacked flew the American flag and were clearly identifiable. Two of these ships were warships of the American Navy. In the fifth case, the vessel sunk clearly carried the flag of our sister Republic of Panama.

In the face of all this, we Americans are keeping our feet on the ground. Our type of democratic civilization has outgrown the thought of feeling compelled to fight some other nation by reason of any single piratical attack on one of our ships. We are not becoming hysterical or losing our sense of proportion. Therefore, what I am thinking and saying tonight does not relate to any isolated episode. Instead, we Americans are taking a long-range point of view in regard to certain fundamentals (and) -- a point of view in regard to a series of events on land and on sea which must be considered as a whole -- as a part of a world pattern.

It would be unworthy of a great nation to exaggerate an isolated incident, or to become inflamed by some one act of violence. But it would be inexcusable folly to minimize such incidents in the face of evidence which makes it clear that the incident is not isolated, but is part of a general plan. The important truth is that these acts of international lawlessness are a manifestation of a design (which) -- a design that has been made clear to the American people for a long time. It is the Nazi design to abolish the freedom of the seas, and to acquire absolute control and domination of (the) these seas for themselves.

For with control of the seas in their own hands, the way can obviously become clear for their next step -- domination of the United States (and the) -- domination of the Western Hemisphere by force of arms. Under Nazi control of the seas, no merchant ship of the

United States or of any other American Republic would be free to carry on any peaceful commerce, except by the condescending grace of this foreign and tyrannical power. The Atlantic Ocean which has been, and which should always be, a free and friendly highway for us would then become a deadly menace to the commerce of the United States, to the coasts of the United States, and even to the inland cities of the United States.

The Hitler Government, in defiance of the laws of the sea, (and) in defiance of the recognized rights of all other nations, has presumed to declare, on paper, that great areas of the sea(s) -- even including a vast expanse lying in the Western Hemisphere -- are to be closed, and that no ships may enter them for any purpose, except at peril of being sunk. Actually they are sinking ships at will and without warning in widely separated areas both within and far outside of these far-flung pretended zones.

This Nazi attempt to seize control of the oceans is but a counterpart of the Nazi plots now being carried on throughout the Western Hemisphere -- all designed toward the same end. For Hitler's advance guards -- not only his avowed agents but also -- also his dupes among us -- have sought to make ready for him footholds, (and) bridgeheads in the New World, to be used as soon as he has gained control of the oceans.

His intrigues, his plots, his machinations, his sabotage in this New World are all known to the Government of the United States. Conspiracy has followed conspiracy. For example, last year a plot to seize the Government of Uruguay was smashed by the prompt action of that country, which was supported in full by her American neighbors. A like plot was then hatching in Argentina, and that government has carefully and wisely blocked it at every point. More recently, an endeavor was made to subvert the government of Bolivia. And within the past few weeks the discovery was made of secret air-landing fields in Colombia, within easy range of the Panama Canal. I could multiply instance(s) upon instance.

To be ultimately successful in world mastery, Hitler knows that he must get control of the seas. He must first destroy the bridge of ships which we are building across the Atlantic and over which we shall continue to roll the implements of war to help destroy him, (and) to destroy all his works in the end. He must wipe out our patrol on sea and in the air if he is to do it. He must silence the British Navy.

I think it must be explained (again and) over and over again to people who like to think of the United States Navy as an invincible protection, that this can be true only if the British Navy survives. And that, my friends, is simple arithmetic. For if the world outside of the Americas falls under Axis domination, the shipbuilding facilities which the Axis powers would then possess in all of Europe, in the British Isles and in the Far East would be much greater than all the shipbuilding facilities and potentialities of all of the Americas -- not only greater, but two or three times greater, enough to win. Even if the United States threw all its resources into such a situation, seeking to double and even redouble the size of our Navy, the Axis powers, in control of the rest of the world, would have the manpower and the physical resources to outbuild us several times over.

It is time for all Americans, Americans of all the Americas to stop being deluded by the romantic notion that the Americas can go on living happily and peacefully in a Nazi-dominated world.

Generation after generation, America has battled for the general policy of the freedom of the seas. And that policy is a very simple one, but a basic, a fundamental one. It means that no nation has the right to make the broad oceans of the world at great distances from the actual theatre of land war, unsafe for the commerce of others. That has been our policy, proved time and (time) again, in all of our history. Our policy has applied from (time immemorial) the earliest days of the Republic -- and still applies -- not merely to the Atlantic but to the Pacific and to all other oceans as well.

Unrestricted submarine warfare in 1941 constitutes a defiance -- an act of aggression -- against that historic American policy.

It is now clear that Hitler has begun his campaign to control the seas by ruthless force and by wiping out every vestige of international law, (and) every vestige of humanity. His intention has been made clear. The American people can have no further illusions about it. No tender whisperings of appeasers that Hitler is not interested in the Western Hemisphere, no soporific lullabies that a wide ocean protects us from him -- can long have any effect on the hard-headed, far-sighted and realistic American people.

Because of these episodes, because of the movements and operations of German warships, and because of the clear, repeated proof that the present government of Germany has no respect for treaties or for international law, that it has no decent attitude toward neutral nations or human life -- we Americans are now face to face not with abstract theories but with cruel, relentless facts. This attack on the GREER was no localized military operation in the North Atlantic. This was no mere episode in a struggle between two nations. This was one determined step towards creating a permanent world system based on force, on terror and on murder.

And I am sure that even now the Nazis are waiting, waiting to see whether the United States will by silence give them the green light to go ahead on this path of destruction. The Nazi danger to our Western world has long ceased to be a mere possibility. The danger is here now -- not only from a military enemy but from an enemy of all law, all liberty, all morality, all religion.

There has now come a time when you and I must see the cold inexorable necessity of saying to these inhuman, unrestrained seekers of world conquest and permanent world domination by the sword: "You seek to throw our children and our children's children into your form of terrorism and slavery. You have now attacked our own safety. You shall go no further."

Normal practices of diplomacy -- note writing -- are of no possible use in dealing with international outlaws who sink our ships and kill our citizens. One peaceful nation after

another has met disaster because each refused to look the Nazi danger squarely in the eye until it had actually had them by the throat. The United States will not make that fatal mistake.

No act of violence, (or) no act of intimidation will keep us from maintaining intact two bulwarks of American defense: First, our line of supply of material to the enemies of

Hitler; and second, the freedom of our shipping on the high seas. No matter what it takes, no matter what it costs, we will keep open the line of legitimate commerce in these defensive waters of ours.

We have sought no shooting war with Hitler. We do not seek it now. But neither do we want peace so much, that we are willing to pay for it by permitting him to attack our naval and merchant ships while they are on legitimate business.

I assume that the German leaders are not deeply concerned, tonight or any other time, by what we Americans or the American Government say or publish about them. We cannot bring about the downfall of Nazi-ism by the use of long-range invective.

But when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him. These Nazi submarines and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic. They are a menace to the free pathways of the high seas. They are a challenge to our own sovereignty. They hammer at our most precious rights when they attack ships of the American flag -- symbols of our independence, our freedom, our very life.

It is clear to all Americans that the time has come when the Americas themselves must now be defended. A continuation of attacks in our own waters or in waters (which) that could be used for further and greater attacks on us, will inevitably weaken our American ability to repel Hitlerism.

Do not let us (split hairs) be hair-splitters. Let us not ask ourselves whether the Americas should begin to defend themselves after the (fifth) first attack, or the (tenth) fifth attack, or the tenth attack, or the twentieth attack. The time for active defense is now. Do not let us split hairs. Let us not say : "We will only defend ourselves if the torpedo succeeds in getting home, or if the crew and the passengers are drowned". This is the time for prevention of attack.

If submarines or raiders attack in distant waters, they can attack equally well within sight of our own shores. Their very presence in any waters which America deems vital to its defense constitutes an attack. In the waters which we deem necessary for our defense, American naval vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly blow -- first.

Upon our naval and air patrol -- now operating in large number over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean -- falls the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas -- now. That means, very simply, (and) very clearly, that our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships -- not only American ships but ships of any flag -- engaged in commerce in our defensive waters. They will protect them from submarines; they will protect them from surface raiders.

This situation is not new. The second President of the United States, John Adams, ordered the United States Navy to clean out European privateers and European ships of war which were infesting the Caribbean and South American waters, destroying American commerce. The third President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, ordered the United States Navy to end the attacks being made upon American and other ships by the corsairs of the nations of North Africa. My obligation as President is historic; it is clear. Yes, it is inescapable. It is no act of war on our part when we decide to protect the seas (which) that are vital to American defense. The aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense.

But let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril. The orders which I have given as Commander-in-Chief (to) of the United States

Army and Navy are to carry out that policy -- at once. The sole responsibility rests upon Germany. There will be no shooting unless Germany continues to seek it.

That is my obvious duty in this crisis. That is the clear right of this sovereign nation. (That) This is the only step possible, if we would keep tight the wall of defense which we are pledged to maintain around this Western Hemisphere.

I have no illusions about the gravity of this step. I have not taken it hurriedly or lightly. It is the result of months and months of constant thought and anxiety and prayer. In the protection of your nation and mine it cannot be avoided.

The American people have faced other grave crises in their history -- with American courage, (and) with American resolution. They will do no less today. They know the actualities of the attacks upon us. They know the necessities of a bold defense against these attacks. They know that the times call for clear heads and fearless hearts.

And with that inner strength that comes to a free people conscious of their duty, (and) consciousness conscious of the righteousness of what they do, they will -- with Divine help and guidance -- stand their ground against this latest assault upon their democracy, their sovereignty, and their freedom.

Appendix C

Lyndon B. Johnson – Message to Congress Concerning the Gulf of Tonkin Incident: August 5, 1964

Dr. Newhouse, Chancellor Tolley, Governor and Mrs. Rockefeller, Members of the Congress, distinguished guests, members of the faculty, ladies and gentlemen:

I know that you share with me the great admiration and pride that the generosity of Dr. Newhouse has made possible for this area of our Nation and for this great institution. We all are in his debt, and in the years and generations and centuries to come, we will see the products of this great adventure.

On this occasion, it is fitting, I think, that we are meeting here to dedicate this new center to better understanding among all men. For that is my purpose in speaking to you. Last night I spoke to the people of the Nation.

This morning, I speak to the people of all nations—so that they may understand without mistake our purpose in the action that we have been required to take.

On August 2 the United States destroyer Maddox was attacked on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin by hostile vessels of the Government of North Vietnam.

On August 4 that attack was repeated in those same waters against two United States destroyers.

The attacks were deliberate.

The attacks were unprovoked.

The attacks have been answered.

Throughout last night and within the last 12 hours, air units of the United States Seventh Fleet have sought out the hostile vessels and certain of their supporting facilities.

Appropriate armed action has been taken against them. The United States is now asking that this be brought immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations.

We welcome—and we invite—the scrutiny of all men who seek peace, for peace is the only purpose of the course that America pursues.

The Gulf of Tonkin may be distant, but none can be detached about what has happened there.

Aggression—deliberate, willful, and systematic aggression—has unmasked its face to the entire world. The world remembers—the world must never forget—that aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed.

We of the United States have not forgotten.

That is why we have answered this aggression with action.

America's course is not precipitate. America's course is not without long provocation.

For 10 years three American Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—and the American people have been actively concerned with threats to the peace and security of the peoples of southeast Asia from the Communist government of North Vietnam.

President Eisenhower sought—and President Kennedy sought—the same objectives that I still seek:

That the governments of southeast Asia honor the international agreements which apply in the area;

That those governments leave each other alone;

That they resolve their differences peacefully;
That they devote their talents to bettering the lives of their peoples by working against poverty and disease and ignorance.

In 1954 we made our position clear toward Vietnam.

In June of that year we stated we "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the 1954 agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."

In September of that year the United States signed the Manila pact on which our participation in SEATO is based. That pact recognized that aggression by means of armed attack on South Vietnam would endanger the peace and the safety of the nations signing that solemn agreement.

In 1962 we made our position clear toward Laos. We signed the Declaration of Neutrality of Laos. That accord provided for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and respect for the neutrality and independence of that little country.

The agreements of 1954 and 1962 were also signed by the government of North Vietnam.

In 1954, that government pledged that it would respect the territory under the military control of the other party and engage in no hostile act against the other party.

In 1962 that government pledged that it would "not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel."

That government also pledged that it would "not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries."

That government of North Vietnam is now willfully and systematically violating those agreements of both 1954 and 1962.

To the south it is engaged in aggression against the Republic of Vietnam.

To the west it is engaged in aggression against the Kingdom of Laos.

To the east it has now struck out on the high seas in an act of aggression against the United States of America.

There can be, there must be no doubt about the policy and no doubt about the purpose. So there can be no doubt about the responsibilities of men and the responsibilities of nations that are devoted to peace.

Peace cannot be assured merely by assuring the safety of the United States destroyer Maddox or the safety of other vessels of other flags.

Peace requires that the existing agreements in the area be honored.

Peace requires that we and all our friends stand firm against the present aggressions of the government of North Vietnam.

The government of North Vietnam is today flouting the will of the world for peace. The world is challenged to make its will against war known and to make it known clearly and to make it felt and to make it felt decisively.

So, to our friends of the Atlantic Alliance, let me say this, this morning: the challenge that we face in southeast Asia today is the same challenge that we have faced with courage and that we have met with strength in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Korea, in Lebanon and in Cuba. And to any who may be tempted to support or to widen the present aggression I say this: there is no threat to any peaceful power from the United States of America. But there can be no peace by aggression and no immunity from reply. That is what is meant by the actions that we took yesterday.

Finally, my fellow Americans, I would like to say to ally and adversary alike: let no friend needlessly fear—and no foe vainly hope—that this is a nation divided in this election year. Our free elections—our full and free debate—are America's strength, not America's weakness. There are no parties and there is no partisanship when our peace or the peace of the world is imperiled by aggressors in any part of the world.

We are one nation united and indivisible. And united and indivisible we shall remain.

Appendix D

George W. Bush— Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the Nation: September 11, 2001

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President Pro Tempore, members of Congress, and fellow Americans:

In the normal course of events, Presidents come to this chamber to report on the state of the Union. Tonight, no such report is needed. It has already been delivered by the American people.

We have seen it in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on the ground—passengers like an exceptional man named Todd Beamer. And would you please help me (to) welcome his wife, Lisa Beamer, here tonight.

We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers, working past exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers -- in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own.

My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state of our Union -- and it is strong.

Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.

I thank the Congress for its leadership at such an important time. All of America was touched on the evening of the tragedy to see Republicans and Democrats, joined together on the steps of this Capitol, singing "God Bless America." And you did more than sing; you acted, by delivering \$40 billion to rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military.

Speaker Hastert, Minority Leader Gephardt—Majority Leader Daschle and Senator Lott—thank you for your friendship, for your leadership and for your service to our country.

And on behalf of the American people, I thank the world for its outpouring of support. America will never forget the sounds of our National Anthem playing at Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris, and at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate. We will not forget South Korean children gathering to pray outside our embassy in Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo. We will not forget moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa and Latin America.

Nor will we forget the citizens of 80 other nations who died with our own. Dozens of Pakistanis. More than 130 Israelis. More than 250 citizens of India. Men and women from El Salvador, Iran, Mexico and Japan. And hundreds of British citizens. America has no truer friend than Great Britain. Once again, we are joined together in a great cause—so honored the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with America. Thank you for coming, friend. (And tonight we welcome Tony Blair.)

On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign

soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war—but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking: Who attacked our country?

The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al-qaida. They are some of the (same) murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole.

Al-qaida is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world—and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.

The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics—a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists' directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military and civilians, including women and children.

This group and its leader—a person named Usama bin Ladin—are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

There are thousands of these terrorists in more than sixty countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods, and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.

The leadership of al-qaida has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al-qaida's vision for the world.

Afghanistan's people have been brutalized—many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough.

The United States respects the people of Afghanistan—after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid—but we condemn the Taliban regime. It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing

murder. And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban:

Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al-qaida who hide in your land.

Release all foreign nationals—including American citizens—you have unjustly imprisoned; (and) protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country.

Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities.

Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.

These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.

I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It is practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.

Our war on terror begins with al-qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.

Americans are asking, why do they hate us?

They hate what we see right here in this chamber—a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.

They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa.

These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way.

We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions—by abandoning every value except the will to power—they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies.

Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war?

We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.

This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV (television), and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.

Our Nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans.

Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies as well as state and local governments have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me—the Office of Homeland Security.

And tonight I also announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to strengthen American security—a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a trusted friend—Pennsylvania's Tom Ridge. He will lead, oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism, and respond to any attacks that may come.

These measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.

Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks, and all have our prayers. And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our military: Be ready. I have called the Armed Forces to alert, and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud.

This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.

We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. The United States is grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded—with sympathy and with support. Nations from Latin America, to Asia, to Africa, to Europe, to the Islamic world. Perhaps the NATO Charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on all.

The civilized world is rallying to America's side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what—we're not going to (and we will not) allow it.

Americans are asking: What is expected of us?

I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat.

I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith.

I ask you to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your contributions. Those who want to give can go to a central source of information, libertyunites.org, to find the names of groups providing direct help in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.

The thousands of FBI agents who are now at work in this investigation may need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it.

I ask for your patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany tighter security; and for your patience in what will be a long struggle.

I ask your continued participation and confidence in the American economy. Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not touch its source. America is successful because of the hard work, and creativity, and enterprise of our people. These were the true strengths of our economy before September 11th, and they are our strengths today.

And finally, please continue praying for the victims of terror and their families, for those in uniform, and for our great country. Prayer has comforted us in sorrow, and will help strengthen us for the journey ahead.

Tonight I thank my fellow Americans for what you have already done and for what you will do. And ladies and gentlemen of the Congress, I thank you, their representatives, for what you have already done, and for what we will do together.

Tonight, we face new and sudden national challenges. We will come together to improve air safety, to dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic flights, and take new measures to prevent hijacking. We will come together to promote stability and keep our airlines flying, with direct assistance during this emergency.

We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home. We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they strike.

We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America's economy, and put our people back to work.

Tonight we welcome two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New Yorkers: Governor George Pataki, and Mayor Rudolph (Rudy) Giuliani. As a symbol of America's

resolve, my administration will work with Congress, and these two leaders, to show the world that we will rebuild New York City.

After all that has just passed—all the lives taken, and all the possibilities and hopes that died with them—it is natural to wonder if America's future is one of fear. Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead, and dangers to face. But this country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world.

Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom—the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time—now depends on us. Our nation—this generation—will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause, by our efforts, (and) by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.

It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to normal. We'll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good. Even grief recedes with time and grace. But our resolve must not pass. Each of us will remember what happened that day, and to whom it happened. We'll remember the moment the news came—where we were and what we were doing. Some will remember an image of a fire, or a story of rescue. Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever.

And I will carry this: It is the police shield of a man named George Howard, who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others. It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my reminder of lives that ended, and a task that does not end.

I will not forget this wound to our country, or those who inflicted it. I will not yield—I will not rest—I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people.

The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.

Fellow citizens, we'll (we will) meet violence with patient justice—assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America.

Thank you.

Appendix E

Winston Churchill – Address to the House of Commons: June 4, 1940

"I have, myself, full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone.

At any rate, that is what we are going to try to do. That is the resolve of His Majesty's Government-every man of them. That is the will of Parliament and the nation.

The British Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause and in their need, will defend to the death their native soil, aiding each other like good comrades to the utmost of their strength.

Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail.

We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France,
we shall fight on the seas and oceans,
we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be,
we shall fight on the beaches,
we shall fight on the landing grounds,
we shall fight in the fields and in the streets,
we shall fight in the hills;

we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old."

References

- Barber, Benjamin R. *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2003. Print.
- Brandenburg, Earnest. "The Preparation of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Speeches." *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*. 35.2 (1949): 214-221. Print.
- Bush, George W. "The National Security Strategy of the United States." *New York Times* 20 Sept. 2002. Web. 28 June 2009.
- . "Transcript of President Bush's Speech Before a Joint Session of Congress, Sept. 20, 2001." *NPR*. 20 Sept. 2009. Address. Web. 17 May 2009.
- Cherwitz, Richard A. "Lyndon Johnson and the 'Crisis' of Tonkin Gulf: A President's Justification for War." *Essays in Presidential Rhetoric*. Eds. Theodore Windt and Beth Ingold. Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1987. 182-189. Print.
- . "Masking Inconsistency: The Tonkin Gulf Crisis." *Communication Quarterly*. (Spring 1980) 27-37. Print.
- Chomsky, Noam. "On Propaganda." *Interview*. WBAI Radio. Jan. 1992. *Chomsky. Info: The Noam Chomsky Website*. Web. 14 May 2009.
- Churchill, Winston. "We Shall Fight on the Beaches." *The Churchill Centre and Museum at the Cabinet War Rooms, London*. Before the House of Commons, London. 4 June 1940. Address. Web. 26 June 2009.
- Cragin, Kim. "Understanding Terrorist Ideology." *The RAND Corporation*. Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 12 June 2007. Testimony. Web. 23 June 2009.

- De Cillia, Rudolf, Martin Reisigl, and Ruth Wodak. "The Discursive Construction of National Identities." *Discourse & Society*. 10.2 (1999): 149-73. *EBSCO*. Web. 13 Mar. 2009.
- Doob, Leonard W. *Public Opinion and Propaganda*. 2nd ed. Hamden, Ct.: Archon, 1966. Print.
- Ellul, Jacques. *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*. Trans. Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1965. Print.
- Ellsberg, Daniel. *Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers*. New York: Viking, 2002. Print.
- Freeland, Richard.M. *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972. Print.
- Freidel, Frank. "FDR vs. Hitler: American Foreign Policy, 1933-1941." *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*. 99 (1987): 25-43. *JSTOR*. Web. 5 May 2009.
- Halbwachs, Maurice. *The Collective Memory*. Trans. Francis J. Ditter, Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter. New York: Harper & Row, 1980. Print.
- Hall, Robert N. "Lyndon Johnson's Speech Preparations." *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*. 51. (1965) 168-76. *EBSCO*. Web. 4 May 2009.
- Hamlin, Charles Hunter. *Propaganda and Myth in Time of War*. New York: Garland, 1973. Print.
- Johnson, Lyndon B. "President Johnson's Message to Congress on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and U.S. Raid Against North Vietnam, August 5, 1964." *Yale Law*

School. Lillian Goldman Law Library. The Avalon Project. 4 Aug. 1964.

Message. Web. 17 May 2009.

Joint Resolution of Congress H.J. RES 1145, August 7, 1964. "Yale Law School. Lillian Goldman Law Library. The Avalon Project. 4 Aug. 1964. Web. 11 July 2009.

Jowett, Garth S., and Victoria O'Donnell. *Propaganda and Persuasion*. 2nd ed. Newbury Park: Sage, 1992. Print.

Kellner, Douglas. "Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the 'War on Terror'." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*. 37.4 (2007): 622-45. EBSCO. Web. 26 May 2009.

Kennedy, George A., trans. *Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. By Aristotle. New York: Oxford UP, 1991. Print.

Kepel, Gilles. *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. 4th ed. London: I. B. Tauris, 2006. Print.

Lash, Joseph P. *Roosevelt and Churchill 1939-1941: The Partnership that Saved the West*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1976. Print.

Lasswell, Harold D. *Propaganda Technique in the World War*. New York: Garland, 1972. Print.

Lee, Alfred McClung, and Elizabeth Briant Lee, eds. *The Fine Art of Propaganda: The Study of Father Coughlin's Speeches*. New York: Harcourt, Brace 1939. Print.

MacArthur, John R. *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War*. Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1993. Print.

Marolda, Edward J. Dept. of the Navy. Naval Historical Center. Naval History & Heritage Command. Washington Navy Yard. 13 July 2005. Web. 7 June 2009.

- McNamara, Robert. *The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara*. Dir. Errol Morris. Sony Pictures Classics, 2003.
- Miller, David., ed. *Tell Me Lies: Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq*. London: Pluto Press, 2004. Print.
- Pratkanis, Anthony, and Elliot Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. New York: W. H. Freeman, 1991. Print.
- Qualter, Terence H. *Propaganda and Psychological Warfare*. New York: Random House, 1962. Print.
- Rampton, Sheldon, and John Stauber. *Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq*. New York: Penguin, 2003. Print.
- Roosevelt, Franklin Delano. "Fireside Chat 18: On the Greer Incident." *University of Virginia. Miller Center of Public Affairs. Scripps Library*. 11 Sept. 1941. Address. Web. 29 Apr. 2009.
- . "'Quarantine' Speech." *University of Virginia. Miller Center of Public Affairs. Scripps Library*. 5 Oct. 1937. Address. Web. 29 Apr. 2009.
- Ryan, Halford Ross, ed. *American Rhetoric from Roosevelt to Reagan: A Collection of Speeches and Critical Essays*. Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1983. Print.
- Ryan, Harold R. *Franklin D. Roosevelt's Rhetorical Presidency*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988. Print.
- Seligman, Edward R. A., and Alvin Johnson. *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. Vol. 12. New York: Macmillan, 1933. 15 vols. Print.

- Sheehan, Neil, Hedrick Smith, E.W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield. *The Pentagon Papers: as published by The New York Times*. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971. Print.
- Smith, Ted J. III, ed. *Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective*. New York: Praeger, 1989. Print.
- Sproule, J. Michael. *Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997. Print.
- Stavins, Ralph, Richard Barnet, and Marcus Raskins. *Washington Plans an Aggressive War*. New York: Random House, 1971. Print.
- Steele, Richard W. *Propaganda in an Open Society: The Roosevelt Administration and the Media, 1933-1941*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985. Print.
- Thum, Gladys, and Marcella Thum. "War Propaganda and the American Revolution: The Pen and the Sword." *Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays*. Eds. Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2006. 73-82. Print.
- Weis, Stuart L. "American Foreign Policy and Presidential Power: The Neutrality Act of 1935." *The Journal of Politics* 30.3 (1968): 672-5. *JSTOR*. Web. 5 May 2009.
- Western, Jon. *Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public*. Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 2005. Print.
- Windt, Theodore. "The Presidency and Speeches on International Crises: Repeating the Rhetorical Past." *Essays in Presidential Rhetoric*. 2nd ed. Eds. Theodore Windt and Beth Ingold. Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1987. Print.

Winkler, Allan M. *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information 1942-1945*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1978. Print.