

LORD MILNER AND SOUTH AFRICA  
THE FAILURE OF ANGLICIZATION, 1900-1905

by

Frank J. Tascione

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of  
Master of Arts  
in the  
History  
Program

Lowell J. Setre June 2, 1977  
Adviser Date

Martin Egan June 2, 1977  
Adviser Date

Sean Rand June 8, 1977  
Dean of the Graduate School Date

YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY

June, 1977

## ABSTRACT

## LORD MILNER AND SOUTH AFRICA

## THE FAILURE OF ANGLICIZATION, 1900-1905

Frank J. Tascione

Master of Arts

Youngstown State University, 1977

A few months after the start of the Boer War, England officially began an anglicization program aimed at establishing the English culture in a position of dominance in South Africa. Alfred Lord Milner was the prime mover of this effort which lasted until his departure from the South African political scene in 1905.

Milner had held the position of High Commissioner of the Cape Colony since 1897, having been selected by the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain. Milner had been an avid imperialist throughout his life and this belief carried over into the reconstruction of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony following the conclusion of the war in May, 1902.

Education and immigration were the two main tools of anglicization used by the High Commissioner and his associates. The education program in these South African territories was revamped to the point where the English language was made the official language of these Dutch-speaking countries. The education of the Afrikaner

children revolved around learning about England and its vast Colonial Empire. Certain sections of the British population in England were encouraged to emigrate to South Africa. By mingling with the Boers, it was hoped that the Afrikaners would pick up English ways and become more anglicized.

Unfortunately for Milner, this method of national indoctrination was going out of style. The education and immigration programs both fell far short of expectations. In addition, an economic depression in South Africa caused by a labor shortage, and bitter anti-British sentiment by the Afrikaners, all led to the ultimate failure of anglicization.

The major sources for this study were The Milner Papers ( volumes one and two ) and the Parliamentary Papers which both contained a large collection of Lord Milner's private letters and notes pertaining to his anglicization program.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation to my advisors, Dr. Lowell Satre and Dr. Martin Berger, for the constructive advice which they offered on my thesis. I especially would like to thank Dr. Satre for making available to me his private collection of notes and papers.

II. THE IMPERIAL SETTING . . . . .	11
III. RUGGERS, QUANTICOIN, AND MILNE . . . . .	40
IV. VEHICLES OF ACCLIMATION: LAND, LABOR AND EDUCATION . . . . .	72
V. ACCLIMATION: THE GUN RESISTANCE . . . . .	140
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . .	150
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	155

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT . . . . .	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . .	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . .	v
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
II. THE IMPERIAL SETTING . . . . .	4
III. KRUGER, CHAMBERLAIN, AND MILNER . . . . .	10
IV. VEHICLES OF ANGLICIZATION: LAND, LABOR AND EDUCATION . . . . .	22
V. ANGLICIZATION: THE BOER RESISTANCE . . . . .	40
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . .	50
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	55

-----

## CHAPTER I

### Introduction

On January 25, 1902, Alfred Lord Milner, British High Commissioner of the Cape Colony, made the following statement of his intention to institute a program to impose upon the Dutch Boer population of the Transvaal an entirely new English lifestyle:

The time has now arrived when, as it appears to me, it is necessary to adopt a policy, involving continuous and consistent action over a considerable period of time, with reference to a question which is of the deepest importance to this country- viz., the settlement of British colonists upon the land....<sup>1</sup>

This anglicization process would make English the official language of these areas, bring about changes in the education system, and provide land for the expected influx of British settlers into South Africa.

The object of this study is to try to understand Milner's anglicization policy and its failure. In attempting to see why this policy failed, however, we must consider much more than Milner's ideas on anglicization. We must, of course, look carefully at the Dutch Boers whom the English were trying to change. These people had such a tremendously strong pride in their ancestry

---

<sup>1</sup>The Times, July 29, 1902, p. 4, col. 1.

and way of life that they ultimately met the English challenge to their lifestyle and won out over anglicization.

The concept of anglicization is only one aspect of a wider theory to be discussed in this work: that of Imperialism. We must understand the English conception of its place at the head of a vast colonial empire that was perhaps on the decline. We will come to recognize that the Imperialists had a particular attitude concerning the Englishman's place in the society of man. Because Lord Milner was of this Imperialist frame of mind, we must recognize this attitude in order to comprehend why certain actions were taken during the reconstruction of South Africa following the Boer War. We must also look at the land itself, because economic problems played an important role in determining British policy throughout all of South Africa.

Individual personalities played perhaps the dominant role in formulating and carrying out the major policies instituted during the anglicization process. Joseph Chamberlain, as Colonial Secretary, was the man who had to support and sell the policies of Alfred Milner in England. We will witness the problems Chamberlain and others favoring anglicization faced both at home and abroad. Many of the difficulties that arose came about because of serious personality conflicts between men in high positions. These conflicts also help explain why Milner's anglicization policy ultimately failed in South Africa.

Finally, the reconstruction process under the direction of Lord Milner will be studied with special reference to a certain few areas that Milner and his associates emphasized: Programs were begun to bring in English settlers to mix with the Dutch Boers already settled in these areas. The English language was emphasized in all schools and became the official language of the territories under English control in South Africa. Immigration and language were counted on by Milner to ensure the success of the anglicization program.

After taking these ideas into consideration, we shall view a changing of English attitudes toward its colonies in South Africa, if not around the world. The Boers in these areas, buoyed by their success in withstanding anglicization, banded together even more firmly and gained political power in their own self-governing colony in 1910. We shall see the beginnings of a new age for England in relation to its colonies throughout the world and in its slipping from the position of a dominating world power to one forced to rely on other nations for much of its livelihood.



## CHAPTER II

## THE IMPERIAL SETTING

It is first necessary to envision the British Empire as a whole before we can focus on any particular area. We must form an image of the British Empire during the nineteenth century age of expansion. When one reflects upon the conglomeration of territories scattered throughout the world under the heading of the British Empire, does the conception of an "Empire" hold up? Was there any effective medium of central control over the multitude of lands under England's rule? Did the component territories have common features which would enable us to generalize about an Empire? Since we are dealing with an age that still lacked really adequate lines of communication, the Colonial Office ( responsible for the governing of the vast areas under England's manipulation ) had great difficulty maintaining a strong hand in the actual governing processes of these colonies. Decisions concerning the various lands were formulated by the Colonial Secretary and his superiors, but it was difficult to put those decisions into practice in the colonies.

Because of the slow communications between England and her colony, the person in control at the particular territory came to see himself as the ruler of

a miniature "Empire" of his own. This theory is studied extensively in John W. Cell's work: British Colonial Administration in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: The Policy-Making Process.<sup>2</sup> By the time the decision or recommendation of the Colonial Office reached the governor of a colony, the situation might have changed and he would then be forced to use his own judgment to solve the problem--with no help from his superiors in England. In a number of colonies the man representing the English Government had a relatively free hand in operating the area under his control. These Colonial officials had a fairly realistic appreciation of what was taking place in their areas because of their everyday presence which gave a more realistic understanding of the various problems that they encountered. This awareness of an individual colony's problems did not always assure that the governor would be able to put these problems in the perspective of the Empire as a whole. His solutions were possibly right for that colony but were not looked upon as the solutions to problems in other lands under British rule. On the question of central control, then, the Empire seems more an assemblage of relationships between a world power and an assortment of less powerful territories, than one all-encompassing structure.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> John W. Cell, British Colonial Administration in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: The Policy-Making Process ( New Haven: Yale university Press, 1970 ).

<sup>3</sup> Ged Martin, "Was There a British Empire?," The Historical Journal XV ( 3, 1972 ): 565.

The British Empire may have been a series of individual encounters between the Mother Country and its colonies, but the people who embraced the imperialist philosophy had definite ideas with respect to their purpose as Englishmen at the head of a vast holding of territories. The Victorians regarded themselves as the guides of civilization, the leaders of progress and industrialization. British industries exported machines throughout the world including the Empire. And over twelve million people emigrated between Waterloo and the end of the 1880's to British territories. This massive outpouring of material and men is emphasized by G.C. Bolton, author of Britain's Legacy Overseas, when he writes:

....In the long run the historical importance of the British Empire was greatest in its role of diffusing Western ideas, institutions, and media for adaptation and absorption in a significant number<sup>4</sup> of very varied communities throughout the world.

The Victorians had an extremely expansive spirit in all that they did. These people were certain that their ability to better the human condition everywhere was as enormous as their capability to produce wealth. The movement toward territorial expansion had a twofold purpose. The industrial growth of the country needed new areas in which to sell English manufactured goods and to replenish industrial resources. Also, expansion was seen as a "moral duty" to the rest of humanity; the

---

<sup>4</sup>G.C. Bolton, Britain's Legacy Overseas ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973 ), p. 30.

Victorians, like some other peoples, attempted to project their own image as the universal standard. This attitude was infused with a graphic sense of superiority and self-righteousness that was illustrated by the concept of the ladder of progress. The particular place where a nation or race stood on the ladder depended on its proven capacity for freedom and its desire to keep progressing and accomplishing new things for the benefit of all mankind. The British were, of course, at the top of the ladder, followed by the Americans and other "striving, go-ahead" Anglo-Saxons. People of Latin blood were next, although far below, with the huge Oriental communities of northern Africa and Asia following, but much lower still on the ladder. The aborigines stood lowest of all on the scale because it was felt that these people had never progressed enough to move from the family and tribe stage to the constructing of a state. By introducing English culture into new parts of the globe, the Victorians sought to lift these "backward" peoples up the ladder of progress which the English themselves had climbed.<sup>5</sup>

The move in the direction of South Africa, however, came before the general acceptance of the idea of England as a civilizing agent for mankind. On June 11, 1795, a period when much of Europe was at war with the French

---

<sup>5</sup>Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians ( London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1965 ), pp. 1-3; A.P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies ( New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1968 ), p. 84.

Republic, nine British warships with troops aboard sailed into Simon's Bay. A Dutch force, sympathizing with the French cause, was defeated by the English and surrendered as prisoners of war. The first British occupation of the Cape lasted until February 21, 1803, when, in compliance with the terms of the Treaty of Amiens, control of the area was turned over to the representatives of the Batavian Republic. Britain's second occupation occurred as Napoleon was changing the map of Europe. England wanted at least to assure itself of the route to India. The Cape defenses fell easily to the British in January, 1806; the area was formally ceded to England in 1814.<sup>6</sup>

During the early years of English rule, the Cape Colony territory was viewed as more a liability than an asset. The frontier areas were a constant source of problems because of the unremitting tensions between the settlers and the various African tribes. Commercially, the Colony proved of small significance as only two products, wine and especially wool, were exported in the early period. The shipping interests were one of the few groups to benefit from the British rule. Even after the repeal of the Navigation Acts, nearly all of the Cape's

---

<sup>6</sup>Eric Walker, A History of Southern Africa ( London: Longman's, Green and Co., Ltd., 1968 ), pp. 120, 122, 133, 137-38, 139.

imports and exports were transported in English ships. But there seemed to be little hope for improvement of the economic state of the colony or for its development into a large market for British products.<sup>7</sup>

In the late 1830's and early 1840's large numbers of Afrikaners (natives of Cape Colony or the neighboring regions of Africa born of white parents, especially Dutch or Huguenot) engaged in sheep and cattle farming, left the frontier districts of the Cape Colony and founded Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal. This mass migration of white Boers has been labeled the "Great Trek"—a journey induced by a definite spirit and intention and which brought with it far-reaching consequences.

The trek began in the last quarter of 1835. Piet Retief, one of the early trekkers, published a manifesto at this time stating the aims of the Boers:

We leave the Colony under the firm assurance that the English Government has nothing more to require of us and will allow us in the future to govern ourselves without further hindrance.

The Dutch Boers who participated in the Great Trek were as unique as the movement that they initiated. They lived like patriachs out of an Old Testament story:

---

<sup>7</sup>Eric Selver, The Great Trek (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1965), p. 4.

<sup>7</sup>John S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-1854 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 35.

## CHAPTER III

## KRUGER, CHAMBERLAIN, AND MILNER

In the late 1830's and early 1840's large numbers of Afrikaners ( natives of Cape Colony or the neighboring regions of Africa born of white parents, especially Dutch or Huguenot ) engaged in sheep and cattle farming, left the frontier districts of the Cape Colony and founded Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal.<sup>8</sup> This mass migration of Dutch Boers has been labeled the "Great Trek"--a journey induced by a definite spirit and intention and which brought with it far-reaching consequences.

The trek began in the last quarter of 1835. Piet Retief, one of the early trekkers, published a manifesto at this time stating the aims of the Boers:

We leave the Colony under the firm assurance that the English Government has nothing more to require of us and will allow us in the future to govern ourselves without further hindrance.<sup>9</sup>

The Dutch Boers who participated in the Great Trek were as unique as the movement that they initiated. They lived like patriarchs out of an Old Testament story:

---

<sup>8</sup>Eric Walker, The Great Trek ( London: Adam and Charles Black, Ltd., 1965 ), p. 4.

<sup>9</sup>John Fisher, Paul Kruger: His Life and Times ( London: Secker and Warburg, Ltd., 1974 ), pp. 5-6.

sleeping beneath the canvas "sails" of their wagons, driving their cattle and sheep into enclosures each night, and keeping themselves isolated from the rest of the world for months at a time.<sup>10</sup> Whenever they felt their lifestyle being threatened by too much exposure to outside influences, they packed up and moved to another location farther away from non-Afrikaner ideas.<sup>11</sup>

As the English expanded farther into the frontier areas in the early part of the nineteenth century, problems between the two groups ( Dutch Boers and English ) were bound to arise. The Boer's very nature prompted him to resist any outside forces that wished to place controls on his free style of existence. Language became another problem inasmuch as the Afrikaners did not speak English, nor Englishmen High Dutch or Cape Dutch. Many Boers were also alienated once the decision to emancipate all slaves throughout the British Empire became law in 1833. To these people, the compensation given them for their slaves was neither adequate nor realizable in cash.<sup>12</sup> Other difficulties arose between the two groups, and for the Boers, the solution to these problems was simple: move out of English-controlled territory. This they accomplished with the Great Trek. The result of this movement was the establishment of the Orange Free State

---

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>11</sup>Walker, Trek, p. 10.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 21; Fisher, Kruger, p. 6.



and the Transvaal as independent states opposed to British domination. The Transvaal officially became independent in 1852 when Great Britain signed the Sand River Convention giving freedom to the "emigrant farmers north of the Vaal river."<sup>13</sup> In the ensuing ten-year period, the Boers from the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, who had gained their independence from Britain in 1854, quarreled among themselves--each trying to establish superiority over the other.

Paul Kruger, who was born October 10, 1825, somewhere in the Colesberg district of the Cape Colony, played a vital role in Boer affairs in the nineteenth century. In 1839, his family emigrated across the Vaal River and eventually settled in the Magaliesberg area near Rustenburg. Kruger held an array of positions in the Transvaal Government during his career in public life: Commandant General of the South African Republic from 1863 to 1873; member of the Transvaal's Executive Council in 1872; Vice-President in 1877 before British annexation of the area; and finally President, after independence was restored, from 1882 until 1900. Kruger established his position as the man of authority, moderation, and responsibility during the Transvaal's struggle to regain its independence from England after annexation in 1877. Throughout his eighteen years as President, the consideration foremost in his mind was to promote the best interests

---

<sup>13</sup>Fisher, Kruger, pp. 19-20.

of the Afrikaner nation while at the same time holding together its many discordant factions.<sup>14</sup>

The Transvaal Republic remained in a bad economic state until 1885, when Hendrik and Frederick Struben were able to show President Kruger samples of gold quartz found in the Witwatersrand area. This discovery, more than anything else, enabled Kruger's Republic to become the leading state in South Africa. The transformation from bankrupt state to one of wealth began when the gold reef at Witwatersrand started yielding tremendous amounts of mineral wealth. The development of the gold mines progressed to the point where, in 1887, the Transvaal produced 35,000 ounces of gold bullion worth about \$600,000; in the following year the month of February alone produced 10,000 ounces. By 1894, the gold of Johannesburg was presumed to be almost inexhaustible; and toward the end of the second gold boom of 1895-6, 57 million pounds had been invested in the Rand area alone. Around the turn of the century, the Rand was producing a quarter of the world's gold supply. What all this gold production and the ensuing investments did was to make South Africa, for the first time, big business to the British and European merchant and investors. Between 1885 and 1895, South Africa's overseas trade nearly doubled in value, and a substantial number of emigrants flowed into the area.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 2, 10, 76, 156.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 47, 124, 169; Robinson and Gallagher, p. 210.

While the economic status of the Transvaal continued to soar, other problems began to surface. Politically, the Rand area, after 1887, weighed more and more against the British Empire and its colonies in favor of the South African Republic ( another name for the Transvaal ). This meant that the key to the prosperity of all of southern Africa was slipping into the grasp of Africa's most anti-imperialist regime. With the increase of the Transvaal's financial solvency, the country's ability to resist the British imperial commonwealth also increased. And because of the wealth available in the Transvaal, England's interest in the area grew to huge proportions under the guidance of one of Her Majesty's most energetic Colonial Secretaries- Joseph Chamberlain.<sup>16</sup>

Chamberlain was born in London on July 8, 1836. His father was the master of the Cordwainers' Company, manufacturers of boots and shoes, with which the family had been connected for 120 years. Joseph was the eldest son and was sent to University College School in 1850. He left there shortly and entered into his father's business at the age of 16. He joined his uncle's business two years later and was active with this firm for the next twenty years. During that time, Chamberlain exhibited such mercantile prowess that he was able to retire at 38 with a good income.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup>Robinson and Gallagher, p. 211.

<sup>17</sup>William L. Strauss, Joseph Chamberlain and the Theory of Imperialism ( New York: Howard Fertig, Inc., 1971 ), p. 15.

Chamberlain first entered politics in 1869, being elected to the Birmingham city council. Throughout his political life, he leaned toward radicalism over the issue of social reform. After unsuccessfully running for Parliament in 1874, he became the colleague of John Bright in representing Birmingham in 1876. Because Chamberlain was instrumental in the Liberal Party's victory in 1880, he was made president of the Board of Trade in Gladstone's Government. Even though Chamberlain did not enjoy good rapport with his fellow Cabinet members between 1880 and 1885, his business experience proved invaluable at the Board of Trade, and for this reason he was a success in his first Cabinet position.<sup>18</sup>

Chamberlain resigned from William Gladstone's Government on March 15, 1886, over the question of Home Rule for Ireland. By opposing the Government's scheme, he destroyed his political future in the Liberal Party, where he was widely acknowledged as the successor to Gladstone. This characteristic of remaining loyal to his convictions would be shown time and again in his future dealings with another equally strong-willed individual, Alfred Milner.<sup>19</sup>

Chamberlain's ideas concerning the British Empire

---

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., pp. 15-18.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 18; H.W.C. Davis and J.R.H. Weaver, eds., Dictionary of National Biography ( London: Oxford University Press, 1947, with decennial supplements ), supplement 1912-1921, p. 108.

began taking shape even before he was appointed Colonial Secretary in 1895. A speech given on March 20, 1893, exposes his thinking on imperialism and its benefits to England. He stressed the need to follow the same paths pursued by earlier Englishmen, who had not shrunk "from making sacrifices of blood and treasure, and who were not ashamed...to peg out claims for posterity...."<sup>20</sup> He further added that without the huge amounts of foreign trade between England and her colonies, the food supplies in the Mother Country would not be as well off as they presently were.<sup>21</sup> As regards further expansion, Chamberlain stated that:

...those who agree with me, have also a policy, and I believe in the expansion of the Empire, and we are not ashamed to confess that we have that belief....<sup>22</sup>

With these ideas in hand, Joseph Chamberlain was appointed Colonial Secretary in Lord Salisbury's Unionist Government in 1895. He had two objects in mind when he accepted this position: first, to see what steps had to be taken in order to tighten the bond between England and the self-governing colonies; and second, to try to develop the resources of the Crown Colonies and to increase the

---

<sup>20</sup> Charles W. Boyd, ed., Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches, ( New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1970 ), I, 343.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 345.

trade between them and the Mother Country.<sup>23</sup> In time, however, the South African area dominated Chamberlain's thoughts and actions.<sup>24</sup> In December, 1895 occurred the ill-fated Jameson Raid into the Transvaal, and its repercussions were felt throughout South Africa and England. These repercussions exacerbated the bitter feelings between the Dutch Boers and the English which, in time, led to the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899. Chamberlain's appointment of Alfred Milner to the position of High Commissioner at the Cape provided him with one of his most trusted advisors throughout the difficult period of the Boer War. However, the selection of Milner also proved to be the cause of future problems for the Colonial Secretary- problems that were not to be solved by either Chamberlain or Milner.

Alfred Milner was one of the most complex and controversial men to ever surface on the English political scene. To some, Milner's ideas, statesmanship, and policies seemed coarse, unkind and un-English. But, for others, especially "The Kindergarten" ( a group of aides to Milner during his stay in South Africa who adopted Milner's philosophies and held him in the greatest esteem: Geoffrey Robinson, Philip Kerr, R.H. Brand, John Buchan,

---

<sup>23</sup>Dictionary of National Biography, 1912-1921, p. 110.

<sup>24</sup>Strauss, p. 70.

Lionel Curtis--to name a few ), these same devices had the plainness and candor of genius.<sup>25</sup>

Milner was born March 23, 1854, in Germany, at Giessen, Hesse-Darmstadt. His father, Charles Milner, failed to attain financial success in his medical practice, and ended up taking an academic post at Tübingen University. His mother, Mary Ready Milner, a sturdy product of the English middle class, was an inspiration to Alfred throughout his life despite her death when he was only fifteen years old. Following her death, Alfred was sent to England under the guidance of his uncle, Colonel Charles Ready.<sup>26</sup>

In 1872, Milner won a scholarship at Balliol College in Oxford. He won many academic honors at Oxford and also started many lasting friendships with contemporaries such as H.H. Asquith, Herbert Warren, Arnold Toynbee, and others. Milner was called to the bar in 1881 and later turned to journalism, working on the Pall Mall Gazette until 1885.<sup>27</sup>

Milner's first overseas position came in 1889, when he was chosen for the post of director-general of accounts in Egypt. In 1890, he was promoted to the office of under-secretary in the finance ministry of Khedive Tewfik. Milner returned to England in 1892 and assumed the important post of the chairmanship of the Board of Inland Revenue.

---

<sup>25</sup>A.M. Gollin, Proconsul in Politics ( New York: The MacMillan Co., 1964 ), pp. 4, 42, 102.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 5-6.

<sup>27</sup>John Evelyn Wrench, Alfred Lord Milner: The Man of No Illusions ( London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd., 1958 ), pp. 38, 51, 60.

He remained at this post until 1897, when the problems between Kruger's South African Republic and England showed no signs of letting up. With the retirement of Lord Rosmead from the post of High Commissioner for South Africa, Joseph Chamberlain chose Milner to fill the vacant position.<sup>28</sup>

The new High Commissioner arrived at Cape Town May 5, 1897. For the first year of his tenure, Milner attempted to assess the South African situation with an open mind. But after traveling around the Cape Colony and its surrounding areas, he soon realized that the problems confronting England were no nearer solution. Milner's assessment of the state of affairs in South Africa came in a letter to Chamberlain written February 23, 1898:

....There is no way out of the political troubles of S. Africa except reform in the Transvaal or war. And at present the chances of reform in the Transvaal are worse than ever....In their determination to keep all power in their own hands and to use it with a total disregard of the interests of the unenfranchised, as well as in their own hatred and suspicion of Great Britain, the vast majority of them ( the Dutch Boers ) are firmly united.<sup>29</sup>

The problems emphasized by Milner in this letter surfaced when 20,000 Uitlanders ( foreigners; especially British residents in the South African republics of the

---

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp. 96, 158, 159.

<sup>29</sup> Milner to Joseph Chamberlain, February 23, 1898, Cecil Headlam, ed., The Milner Papers ( London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1931 ), I, 221.



Transvaal and Orange Free State ) of the Rand area submitted on March 24, 1899, a petition of grievances to Milner to be forwarded to the Queen. The Uitlanders contended that Kruger's government deprived them of basic rights, placed them at the mercy of an antagonistic police force and hostile juries, and hampered them in their daily living-- including the education of their children-- by unfriendly legislation. These grievances were sent to Chamberlain in the form of Milner's famous telegram of May 4, 1899, of which the most controversial part follows:

....The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in the position of helots, constantly chafing under undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for redress, does steadily undermine the influence and reputation of Great Britain and the respect for the British Government within its own dominions....<sup>30</sup>

Because of the mounting tension between the two countries over the case of the Uitlanders, among other things, Chamberlain authorized Milner to meet with Kruger to discuss these problems. They met at Bloemfontein from May 31 to June 5, 1899, with nothing being accomplished except to further strain relations between England and the Transvaal. The breaking point was reached when Kruger issued an ultimatum on October 9, 1899, which amounted to a declaration of war.<sup>31</sup>

The second Boer War between England and the South

---

<sup>30</sup>Milner to Joseph Chamberlain, May 4, 1899, Headlam, I, 353.

<sup>31</sup>Wrench, pp. 200, 207.

African Republic lasted from October, 1899 to May 31, 1902. At the beginning of the conflict most Englishmen thought that the Boers would be subdued very quickly. The ministers in the English government agreed on the importance of bringing the Transvaal under control in order to uphold British supremacy. The war was widely accepted by the English public because it was made to look inevitable. But, as English losses grew and the war dragged on, the enthusiasm of the people declined rapidly. When the war finally ended, England had won but only after extending herself to the limit in order to defeat this "small community of farmers."<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>32</sup> Bernard Porter, The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1970 ( London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1975 ), pp. 177-78.

## CHAPTER IV

## VEHICLES OF ANGLICIZATION:

## LAND, LABOR AND EDUCATION

The task of reconstructing the Transvaal began officially after the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging on May 31, 1902. This process followed Lord Milner's ideals with regard to the British Empire as a whole. These ideals were summed up in a letter of November 28, 1899, from Milner to Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, future President of the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines ( 1902 ):

....There must be one flag, the Union Jack, but under it equality of races i.e., [Boers and British] and languages. Given equality all around, English must prevail, though I do not think, and do not wish, that Dutch should altogether die out....all South Africa should be one Dominion with a common government...a considerable amount of freedom should be left to the several States. But though this is the ultimate end, it would be madness to attempt it at once. There must be an interval, to allow the British population of the Transvaal to return and increase...before we can apply the principle of self-government to the Transvaal....<sup>33</sup>

The latter part of this statement emphasized the important role immigration was to play in reconstruction. This introduction of British settlers into the Transvaal area coupled with an education system which stressed the English language and English ideas were to be the two

---

<sup>33</sup> Milner to Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, November 28, 1899, Cecil Headlam, ed., The Milner Papers ( London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1933 ), II, 35-6.

most significant components of Milner's anglicization program.

Of these two components, immigration of British settlers was the key. If enough of the "right type" of English could be re-located in the Transvaal, the movement toward a self-governing Confederation would advance a step closer. But Milner stressed that no movement should be made until "a British-minded majority" was assured in the area.<sup>34</sup> This majority should be more than simply a huge mass of people transplanted from England to South Africa with no skills of their own. Milner explained that one or two mistakes should be avoided when the introduction of new settlers was begun:

....The first [mistake] is to send here unskilled workmen labourers or mere clerks. The unskilled labour of this country must be black, and the market for...clerical labour is here...overstocked....What does need careful encouragement...is the introduction of [British] into the rural districts....The South African problem will not be solved, until a larger proportion...of the farmers are British....<sup>35</sup> [The reason for this latter statement being that the Boers were a rural people and putting Englishmen in the cities would not be sufficient to reach the majority of the Boers].

Immigration, then, was to be used not only as a means of strengthening the British numbers in the Transvaal, but also as an aid to reviving the economy. The

---

<sup>34</sup>Milner to Home Government, November 8, 1901, Headlam, II, 279-80.

<sup>35</sup>Milner to Joseph Chamberlain, May 9, 1900, Headlam, II, 144.

destruction done to the South African countryside during the Boer War had hurt the economy of the area and Milner hoped that an influx of skilled English immigrants would be of great help in getting the mines and farms functioning once more. In addition to the economic components of immigration, there was also a political side. In December, 1900, Milner wrote why he felt that a substantial increase in the British population would have a decided political effect on the country:

....British and Dutch have to live here on equal terms. If, ten years hence, there are three men of British race to two of Dutch, the country will be safe and prosperous. If there are three of Dutch to two of British, we shall have perpetual difficulty....<sup>36</sup>

The above quotation contains the typical Victorian Imperialist attitude ( for which Milner was famous throughout his life ) toward people of other than English extraction. If the Transvaal should become controlled by anyone except the British, "perpetual difficulty" would result.

Besides skilled laborers and farmers, Milner's immigration program included British soldiers still stationed in South Africa at the close of the war. In a letter of June, 1900, to Lord Roberts ( who took over command of the English army in South Africa from Sir Redvers Buller following "Black Week," December, 1899 ) , Milner laid out his proposals for the stationing of a large garrison

---

<sup>36</sup>Milner to Major Hanbury Williams, December 27, 1900, Headlam, II, 242.

of English troops in South Africa:

....A large force in Cape Colony will have the double effect of overawing disaffection, where it is likely to be most serious, and of slowly modifying the composition of the population. In the case of every large occupying army in a Colony... a certain proportion take their discharge in the country and stay there. Nothing could be better for us in this Colony than a greater admixture of men...who have served the Queen....<sup>37</sup>

Other proposals along this same line were made a few years later. L.S. Amery, who had been The Times' chief war correspondent during the first year of the Boer War and who often communicated with Milner and even admired him, made certain suggestions for army reform. These appeared in a series of articles in The Times published in January and February, 1903 under the title of "The Problem of the Army." Amery proposed that the First Army Corps be stationed in South Africa and be treated as a home establishment. New recruits could subsequently go directly to that base from Britain where they could receive their training on the spot. As both Amery and Milner pointed out, South Africa had ample training space available, while England did not.<sup>38</sup>

In a note to the British Cabinet in April, 1903, Joseph Chamberlain pointed out that those men whose term of service expired in South Africa, and who had no prospect

---

<sup>37</sup>Milner to Lord Roberts, June 21, 1900, Headlam, II, 161.

<sup>38</sup>L.S. Amery, "The Problem of the Army," The Times, January 27, 1903, p. 10, col. 1-4.

for employment in England, could be induced to stay in South Africa with the possibility of settling in the country. Even if the number of veterans who remained in the country was small, Chamberlain believed that the availability of eventual settlement in South Africa would be alluring enough to a large number of new recruits with farming backgrounds.<sup>39</sup> Such immigrants were exactly what Milner had in mind for promoting the anglicization of the Dutch Boers. These immigrants knew the country, had served the Queen, and possessed agricultural skills that would enable them to settle in the farming districts where Englishmen were scarce.

With the Government ( or more particularly Milner, who, with his extensive powers as High Commissioner, acted as the spokesman for the British Crown throughout the South African territories ) trying to "sell" South Africa as a place for army veterans to settle, another problem came to the front: women. Women of all nationalities had been in the minority ever since the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in the 1880's. As mining towns rose up, the male population grew rapidly with little or no growth in the number of females, especially British females. In the Transvaal, before the start of the war, there were approximately 52 women to every 66

---

<sup>39</sup>"Notes on a Proposal to Keep 30,000 Men in South Africa as a Part of the Home Establishment," by Joseph Chamberlain, April 11, 1903, Cabinet Papers, CAB 37/64, No. 23, p. 5.

men--and of these women, the large majority was Boer, not British.<sup>40</sup>

The shortage of women in South Africa was attacked through an appeal to the British female's sense of patriotism. The Nineteenth Century And After magazine ran a number of articles appealing for women to emigrate to South Africa in April, 1902. Duty toward the Empire was foremost in these passages:

....The feeling that girls may find themselves really wanted must appeal to many of them who have ...come to fancy that they were in the way at home, and who know the hardships of over competition. It is not, however, those who fail to succeed through their own fault in this country who would be any help in solving the problem of how to bring about a loyal and peaceful South Africa. It is women of high moral character, possessed of common sense and a sound constitution, who can help to build up our Empire, who, given a fair chance, would succeed anywhere....<sup>41</sup>

Women immigrants would also exert a stabilizing effect on family life in South Africa. A British couple was less likely to give up English ways for the nomadic life of the Boer. A single man, however, might be inclined to fall under the influence of the Dutch Boers if unprotected by a British wife and family. Milner commented on the need for the "immigration of suitable women" in conversations with Chamberlain between May 31 and June 2, 1901. The Transvaal and Orange River Colony

---

<sup>40</sup>Alicia M. Cecil, "The Needs of South Africa," The Nineteenth Century And After, April 1902, p. 684.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.



were to assist this immigration in connection with the Women's Emigration Association in England and its Committees in South Africa.<sup>42</sup>

Women were called for in South Africa, not only to fill the need for wives, but also to relieve the short supply of domestic servants. The problem that caused this shortage was the fact that whites in South Africa looked upon labor of this type-- or any type-- as degrading. The blacks, they thought, should make up this labor force. This same attitude caused a shortage of labor in the mines, where whites generally refused to work next to blacks no matter what the pay.<sup>43</sup>

During the waning months of the war ( January to April, 1902 ), the call went out once more for English women to emigrate to South Africa to help fill the need for domestics. As with the attempt to persuade women to go to South Africa to marry, a patriotic plea was used. Articles in the British press described the type of women needed:

....Strong, able-bodied, healthy-minded women... with a sense of responsibility, who take pleasure and pride in their work, and whose traditions and upbringing have taught them..., that work,...is elevating or degrading according to the spirit of the worker....<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup>Memorandum by Joseph Chamberlain, June 3, 1901, Cabinet Papers, CAB 37/57, No. 53, pp. 2-3.

<sup>43</sup>Benjamin Sacks, South Africa: An Imperial Dilemma ( Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1967 ), p. 53.

<sup>44</sup>May Hely Hutchinson, "Female Emigration to South Africa," The Nineteenth Century And After, January 1902, p. 74.

Colonial Office reaction to this immigration policy of Milner's was entirely favorable. Although Chamberlain denied any attempt to pack the country with British immigrants solely for political reasons, he did believe that large scale English land settlement, if done slowly, could be very vital from an economic point of view for the Transvaal area:

....There is no earthly reason why the country should not be a great grain-producing country.... In order to bring about that result you must increase... the number of people upon the land....How is that to be done?...We cannot make more Boers than exist... we can only do it by bringing in settlers, who must be British settlers....That is the policy which Lord Milner favours, and which we, the Home Government, entirely support....<sup>45</sup>

The next problem facing the High Commissioner was where to put all of these proposed immigrants once they began coming into the country. To study the land situation, Milner obtained the services of Mr. William Willcocks, a leading authority on irrigation in Egypt. Willcocks' report, published in The Times, emphasized that if agriculture was to succeed in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, large scale irrigation utilizing the existing torrents and rivers would have to be undertaken.<sup>46</sup> While Milner was encouraged by Willcocks' report, the High Commissioner's immediate concern seems to have remained

---

<sup>45</sup>Julian Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain ( London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1951 ), IV, 74.

<sup>46</sup>The Times, February 3, 1902, p. 11, col. 1.

with the quality and quantity of British settlers rather than the utilization of extremely costly modern irrigation.<sup>47</sup>

The High Commissioner had sought funds for the purchase of land while in England in 1901. He asked for authority to spend 2 million pounds, the money to be raised by the new colonies with a British guarantee. This money was intended to be administered by a government board which would be authorized to buy the land, arrange for settlement, and make advances to proposed occupants. These settlements were to be made where there was already a certain number of British, and they were not to consist of "isolated farms in a Boer district."<sup>48</sup> Even though the results of the immigration program were not impressive, by 1906 almost 1,200,000 acres of state-owned land in the Cape Colony had been allotted to 660 families, both Dutch and English. In the Transvaal, nearly 1,000,000 acres were purchased by 596 families.<sup>49</sup>

In order to complete the anglicization process, Milner knew that he could not simply rely on British immigrants--no matter how large their numbers--to infuse the British culture into the native Boer population. Making the English lifestyle and beliefs a part of the Boer's

---

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., July 29, 1902, p. 4, col. 1. The irrigation scheme proved too costly to implement.

<sup>48</sup>Memorandum by Joseph Chamberlain, June 3, 1901, Cabinet Papers, CAB 37/57, No. 53, pp. 2-3.

<sup>49</sup>Headlam, II, 383 footnote.

life would be a lengthy and risky process. Education in the schools was the surest and speediest way to anglicize the Dutch Boers. The Boer leaders, of course, saw educational developments during the period of reconstruction as a means of brainwashing Boer children with British ideas about the past and future of the South African territories. The Boers feared that their children would be taught English and other subjects that gave the British point of view about the South African colonies. The Dutch Boer ideas concerning their own country would be overlooked by the British instructors.<sup>50</sup> But Milner saw the worth of an English education somewhat differently:

....To teach a Dutch child English is to teach him something of the greatest possible value to him, and which he would have to learn in any case if he wanted to get on in life in any other line except the most backward forms of agriculture....My policy would be to make English indispensable in the future, and to prepare the rising generation...by...compelling them to learn it, but to admit Dutch until the Anglicizing process is consummated....<sup>51</sup>

Given Milner's intense nationalistic fervor, it seemed normal that he would push for an "official" language-- that, of course, being English. The anglicizing method had to touch the main flow of a person's life, if it was to have a chance at success. Milner saw the Dutch language as a hindrance to his policies because he

---

<sup>50</sup>W.K. Hancock, Smuts- The Sanguine Years, 1870-1919 ( Cambridge: at the University Press, 1962 ), pp. 174-75

<sup>51</sup>Milner to Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, November 17, 1900, Headlam, II, 42-3.

felt that the Boers used their mother tongue "purely as a political engine." High Dutch, according to the High Commissioner, was simply kept alive to provide an opposition alternative to the use of English.<sup>52</sup>

The Colonial Office at first resisted this attempt to stamp out the use of the Dutch language. Chamberlain had doubted the wisdom of out-and-out discrimination against the native tongue of the Transvaal whites, in so far as this language had flourished in the Cape area in spite of a long period of English-language primacy. The Colonial Secretary's opposition to the language issue was short-lived after he received a private letter from one of Milner's secretaries, explaining the "tactical appreciation" of the High Commissioner. Milner had believed that the English language possibly would be accepted as the sole official tongue if no public discussion were raised. It is not known if the Colonial Office also took this point of view, but Chamberlain's subsequent backing of Milner's proposals seems to point in that direction.<sup>53</sup>

As the war drew to a close, Milner busied himself with making provision for the predominance of the English language. He advised Chamberlain that they should be "somewhat stiffer" on the language question. The High

---

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>Donald Denoon, A Grand Illusion: The Failure of Imperial Policy in the Transvaal Colony During the Period of Reconstruction, 1900-1905 ( London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1973 ). pp. 75-6.

Commissioner made it clear that he would not promise equality of the two languages after the treaty was signed.<sup>54</sup> The Colonial Secretary agreed with these proposals and accordingly article 5 of the Treaty of Vereeniging read:

The Dutch language will be taught in public schools in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony where the parents of the children desire it, and will be allowed in courts of law when necessary for the better and more effectual administration of justice.<sup>55</sup>

It was emphasized to the Boer commissioners that English would be the only medium of instruction in the public schools of the two colonies.<sup>56</sup>

In the months following the signing of the Treaty, an intricate system of government schools was set up throughout the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. Certain ordinances were passed which officially made English the only language of instruction in these schools. Dutch was permitted to be taught for no more than five hours per week.<sup>57</sup> The government officials overseeing the operations of these schools made certain that Dutch

---

<sup>54</sup>L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa: 1902-1910 ( Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1960 ), p. 10.

<sup>55</sup>Arthur Percival Newton, ed., Select Documents Relating to the Unification of South Africa ( London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1968 ), I, 205-207.

<sup>56</sup>Thompson, p. 10.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

was "used to teach English, and English to teach everything else...."<sup>58</sup>

The Director of Education in the two new colonies, E.B. Sargent, built quite a respectable case against the use of the Dutch language. He pointed out that the majority of Dutch Boer children were raised speaking Afrikaans ( a Germanic language that developed from 17th century Dutch- also called Cape Dutch or the Taal ) rather than Dutch. If these children became fluent in Dutch, they found themselves quite restricted if they wanted to pursue their education, since a higher education in that language was available only in Holland. For these reasons, Sargent would not recommend the use of Dutch in the government schools. This is much the same argument used by Milner earlier in describing the usefulness of the English language as opposed to Dutch. Sargent did, however, advise his instructors to learn Afrikaans, if their dealings would bring them into contact with Afrikaner children. But he would not permit the Taal to have any official status in his educational system. Sargent lacked the linguistic and cultural arrogance of the other British administrators. He also submitted his arguments from an educational rather than a political standpoint. These "good points" notwithstanding, his opinions on the language question were identical with those of his associates.<sup>59</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> Milner to Major Hanbury Williams, December 27, 1900, Headlam, II, 243.

<sup>59</sup> Denoon, pp. 76-7.

Milner concerned himself with more than the question of language. In a memorandum written in 1900, the High Commissioner had noted that:

....Language is important, but the tone and spirit of the teaching conveyed in it is even more important. Not half enough attention has been paid to school reading books. To get these right would be the greatest political achievement conceivable. I attach especial importance to school history books....<sup>60</sup>

For Milner, as with other cultural imperialists, no stone could be left unturned. It was not enough to force an alien language on the youth of the Transvaal; some sort of fanaticism had to be reached in the very tone of the instruction. For the English culture to supplant the existing ways of life and beliefs of the Boers, the instructors had to pass on the feeling that the British Empire was the best of all possible systems.

In order for British ideals to be passed on to the Boers on a positive note, the selection of teachers was of the utmost importance. When the selection began, Sargant wanted to terminate the services of the Afrikaner teachers working in the many concentration camps which had been ruthlessly set up during the war. Sargant's reasons for wanting this were simple: "...however carefully these men may be watched...I cannot feel certain that they are imparting the right tone."<sup>61</sup> To ensure the

---

<sup>60</sup>Milner to Major Hanbury Williams, December 27, 1900, Headlam, II, 243.

<sup>61</sup>Denoon, p. 77.



proper tone, the Board of Education asked potential instructors the following questions:

Are you in sympathy with the intention of the Government to make the Orange River and Transvaal Colonies permanently part of the British dominions?

Will you use your best endeavours...to reconcile all the Boer men, women, and children...to their new position as citizens of the British Empire?<sup>62</sup>

One does not have to explain the consequences of a negative response to either of these questions.

With the introduction of teacher-training in the Transvaal, Sargent stated his resolution that those instructors trained in the Normal College would be "imbued with the true ideas of the relations which should exist between Great Britain and her self-governing colonies."<sup>63</sup> Yet, in spite of the importance placed on education, salaries of teachers were lower than those of most skilled workers in South Africa. In Johannesburg, bank clerks started on a salary of 250 pounds; teachers were hired on a scale from 100 to 200 pounds.<sup>64</sup>

The curriculum in the state-operated schools obviously had a decidedly imperial outlook. For the most part, content rather than medium of instruction came to be the primary concern of the educational hierarchy in South Africa. With English as the medium of instruction, parents could, however, request that their children receive

---

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

15 minutes per day of religious instruction in Dutch, and a further three hours per week could be used for the study of the Bible in Dutch ( before confirmation ) or Dutch literature ( thereafter ). To the imperialists, this was indeed a lot of time to spend on a language whose future was supposed to be dark.

The rest of the curriculum ran as follows: primary school history was taught to the first two standards via the learning of folk tales; standards three to six studied world history; and standards six and seven were taught Government and Citizenship as the culmination of the historical studies. Students in Geography began with a map of the class-room in their first year and thereafter the horizon expanded to encompass the largest unit: namely, the British Empire. Dutch-language education consisted of instruction in the Netherlands classics, which did little more than illuminate the differences between European tradition and reality in South Africa. Instruction in or relating to Afrikaans was omitted from the curriculum. Instructors who embraced the theory of imperialism found this curriculum greatly suited for putting nationalism in its rightful perspective.<sup>65</sup>

This anglicizing educational policy seemed to have covered everything to assure satisfaction among British leaders as to the program's success. But success was not to be won. The administrators major error was

---

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., pp. 78-9.

their failure to realize that the people with whom they were dealing had little use for education. This policy probably became affected somewhat by the private schools set up by the Afrikaner leaders. But, for the most part, the educational apathy of the parents of the Afrikaner children ruined the program. State-provided education was free of charge and was not compulsory. But the curriculum required regular attendance over a period of years if the student was to be properly assimilated into the British culture. In truth, most children attended school only for a very short time and quite irregularly. By 1905, the enrollment in the state schools had grown to 28,540 pupils and private school enrollment to nearly 9,000; but still, more than 25,000 school-age children ( between 5 and 15 years old ) were not enrolled in any type of school.<sup>66</sup> If we can assume that nearly all English-speaking children attended the state-operated schools, this must have left approximately 10,000 Afrikaner children in the state school system. Thus, one can assume that only a very small minority of Afrikaner children attended school at any particular time.

Absenteeism could have been caused by the long distances to the schools, but it was largely the result of Afrikaner parents' belief that a single year's schooling was sufficient. The remainder of the child's education

---

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

was nonexistent except for whatever the parents themselves could teach the child. Figures gathered by the Transvaal Indigency Commission in 1904 showed that only a few children went to school after the age of five, and of those who did, more than a third left school before they reached the age of ten. Administrators, clergymen, social workers, and others argued that education should be made compulsory; but the parents had little interest in education, the state had too little money, and the private institutions had too few facilities to accommodate the students.<sup>67</sup> Even though this anglicizing policy in education caused some problems for the Afrikaners, the actual impact on the political philosophies of their children could not have been significant.

---

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

## CHAPTER V

## ANGLICIZATION:

## THE BOER RESISTANCE

One thing that the immigration and educational programs of Lord Milner actually did accomplish was to stimulate the cause of Afrikaner resistance. The Dutch Boers in the Transvaal and Orange Free State had just cause for standing up against many of the High Commissioner's policies. Prior to the outbreak of the Boer War, the English Government faced a list of grievances submitted by the Uitlander population of the Transvaal. This group of non-Afrikaners controlled most of the wealth in President Kruger's republic, yet had no voice in the government. Chamberlain's thinking on this situation had been formulated some years earlier, when he had stated in January, 1885 that:

...our fellow-subjects may rest assured that their liberties, their rights, and their interests are as dear to us as our own; and if ever they are seriously menaced the whole power of the country will be exerted for their defence....<sup>68</sup>

This attitude was sufficient cause for England to go to war with the South African territories; but, when England tried to establish a predominance over the Afrikaners long after the peace treaty had been signed-

---

<sup>68</sup>Boyd, I, 136.

then, a problem was created. The programs initiated by Milner were denationalizing and no proud group of people would stand idly by and watch their culture smothered by alien beliefs.

Much of the bitterness and hostility openly displayed by the Boers was due to the memory of the concentration camps set up by the British during the war. After much of the Boer army had stopped fighting in late 1900 and early 1901, groups of commandos still roamed the countryside causing the British quite a few problems. Lord Kitchener, who had taken over the reins of army leadership in December, 1900, began rounding up the women and children of those men who made up the commando ranks. The English seized their stock, destroyed crops, broke dams, and burned farms--this being an extension of the "scorched earth" policy initiated by Lord Roberts in June, 1900.<sup>69</sup> British officials could not leave the women and children on these demolished homesteads; thousands of people were rounded up and put in camps that had been set up only as military installations and were not equipped to handle such a population. The supply of doctors and the availability of sanitary facilities were both overlooked, with the predictable results.<sup>70</sup> By May, 1901, 77,000 whites and 21,000 non-whites had

---

<sup>69</sup>Rayne Kruger, Good-Bye Dolly Gray ( New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1960 ), p. 364.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., pp. 401-02.

been placed in these camps. Of every five white people in the camps, one would die within a year. The majority of these deaths occurred among the children and prompted David Lloyd George, an opponent of the war, to prophesy that: "A barrier of dead children's bodies will rise up between the British and the Boer races in South Africa."<sup>71</sup> By October, 1901, the death rates had grown to 344 per 1,000 in the camps, creating a gulf between the British and Boers that was never to be bridged.<sup>72</sup> Memories of this nightmare would have been sufficient to cause the Afrikaners to resist the English even if the latter had not attempted anglicization.

What Milner's programs did, then, was only to add fuel to the fire of hatred already burning within the majority of Boers. Milner completely ignored the Afrikaners' nationalistic ideals. Being of an imperialist cast of mind, he did what he thought was in the best interests of both the British and the Boer populations. When the list of Uitlander grievances had come before the English Cabinet in 1899, A.J. Balfour, leader of the Unionist Party in the House of Commons and the nephew of the Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, stated that even though the grievances were serious and were inflicted by a minority upon a majority, the fact that the majority was

---

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., pp. 401-02.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 437.

an alien majority gave a "patriotic justification to the oppressive policy of the Boers...."<sup>73</sup> Milner, by not taking into account the factor of nationalism, seriously miscalculated the tenacity of Boer resistance.

Opposition to the educational program was led by the Dutch Reformed Churches which revived the Christian National Education movement, aimed at educating Dutch-speaking children in privately financed schools under local, not government control.<sup>74</sup> This movement led by the Church denounced Milner's secularizing and denationalizing system. We have already seen the large numbers of children who did not attend any schools at all. Couple these with those in private schools under Afrikaner control and one can see what the likely results of the anglicizing policy in education would be. To the Afrikaners, the proper education for their children was a major solution to the threat of anglicization.

Economic factors added two more problems for Milner and his associates. First, the intended immigration of British was drastically curbed by the post-war depression which hit the Transvaal mining districts. One of the inducements that Milner had counted on ( to bring in new settlers ) was the availability of work. He realized that

---

<sup>73</sup>Telegram from Milner to Chamberlain, May 1, 1899, Cabinet Papers, CAB 37/49, No. 49, p. 2.

<sup>74</sup>T.R.H. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond: A History of a South African Political Party, 1880-1911 ( Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1966 ), pp. 266-7.



if his policies were going to succeed, the economy of this area had to be rebuilt very quickly. Although almost 27,000 British subjects entered the Transvaal during 1903, by March, 1904, the flow of migrants was in the opposite direction, with many people who had come to South Africa looking for work returning to England. Between November, 1902 and November 1903, British immigration had numbered some 2,245 per month. From November, 1903 to March, 1904, the number had dropped to 800 per month.<sup>75</sup>

The depression in trade and industry immediately following the war was blamed on a shortage of labor in the mines. Before the war an estimated 90,000 laborers worked in the mines; by 1903, the number had dwindled to 50,000.<sup>76</sup> The Boer War was blamed for the small return of native labor to the mines in 1902. During the conflict, the English had paid these men as much as five pounds per month to transport materials. This was a large increase over what they normally were paid for mine labor. This fact caused many of them to retire to reservations in order to use their new-found wealth for an easier life than they would have found in the mines.<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>75</sup>Headlam, II, 524.

<sup>76</sup>"Recruitment of Native Labour for the Transvaal in the African Protectorates," by the Foreign Office, February 18, 1903, Cabinet Papers, CAB 37/64, No. 64. p. 1.

<sup>77</sup>Sacks, p. 39.

Milner's solution to the labor shortage was to import Chinese coolies from Asia. Once again, Milner made a decision that united all Afrikaner interests in South Africa against the British. The Afrikaners would never agree to the importation of foreign labor which would have the effect of creating new racial problems and add to the problem of rising unemployment. To the Boers, this idea was just one in a series that was aimed at keeping their people subjugated to the hated British. Smuts wrote:

...there burns in the Boer mind a fierce indignation against the sacrilege of Chinese importation—this spoliation of the heritage for which generations of the people have sacrificed their all.<sup>78</sup>

The High Commissioner had made the suggestion for Chinese labor upon receiving the report of the Transvaal Labor Commission, which he had formed in July, 1903. The report was published in November, 1903, with ten of the twelve members agreeing that the importation of labor from outside of Africa was the solution for the labor shortage in the gold mines.<sup>79</sup> A Minority Report was submitted by the two objecting members, Quinn and Whiteside. This report argued that the mine-owners'

---

<sup>78</sup>W.K. Hancock and Jean van der Poel, eds., Selections From the Smuts Papers ( Cambridge: at the University Press, 1966 ), II, 147-48.

<sup>79</sup>Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Transvaal Labor Commission, issued November 19, 1903, in Parliamentary Papers, 1904 ( Cd. 1897 ), XXXIX, 404-5.

testimony was motivated by greed to make the greatest profit in the shortest time.<sup>80</sup> During Chamberlain's visit to South Africa from December, 1902 to February, 1903, he spoke to Milner about Chinese labor, observing 'that it would raise a storm at home' to bring over Asiatic coolies.<sup>81</sup> Milner, then, attempted to ease the flow of English public opinion against Chinese labor by drawing up a resolution, passed in March, 1903, stating that once the term of service expired, for the coolie, he must return to Asia; no permanent settlement was permitted by the Chinese in South Africa.<sup>82</sup>

As the Chinese-labor controversy raged on, Milner went to England in October, 1903, to try to gain support for the importation of coolies with members of the home government. He argued that with the economy in such a sad position, chances of increasing the British population were small indeed.<sup>83</sup> Conservative circles in England embraced the Majority Report as Milner had done and recommended the importation of Asiatic labor. A productive gold industry was the primary need for the repair of the Transvaal's economic ills.<sup>84</sup>

---

<sup>80</sup>The Minority Report of the Transvaal Labor Commission, issued November 19, 1903, in Parliamentary Papers, 1904 ( Cd. 1896 ), XXXIX, 45-77.

<sup>81</sup>Sacks, p. 30.

<sup>82</sup>Concerning the Draft Customs Union, in Parliamentary Papers, 1903 ( Cd. 1640 ), XLV, 12.

<sup>83</sup>Headlam, II, 476-7.

<sup>84</sup>Sacks, p. 38.

On December 28, 1903, the Cape Town Legislative Council passed a motion asking the Transvaal Government to permit the importation of "indentured coloured labourers." The Ordinance became law on February 10, 1904 and Royal assent was given May 11.<sup>85</sup> The first group of 1,006 Chinese coolie laborers arrived at Johannesburg on June 22; the eventual limit was set at 55,000.<sup>86</sup>

To the Afrikaner nationalists this episode with Chinese labor completed the cycle which had begun with the war between the two nations. The concentration camps, the plans for immigration, the educational programs, and now the coolie problem- all had been initiated by the British, with Lord Milner leading the way, to try to stamp out the dreaded Afrikaner nationalism. The idea of anglicization was nothing new and unique. National indoctrination was a policy with a history both in Europe and in the colonial possessions of European nations. The Austrians had attempted it in Bohemia and the British in Ireland. In South Africa, the Dutch had had great success with this policy in its dealings with the French Huguenots.<sup>87</sup> But, these had been earlier periods and times

---

<sup>85</sup> Correspondence concerning the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, Jan., 1903 to Jan., 1904, in Parliamentary Papers, 1904 ( Cd. 1895 ), LXI; Correspondence concerning labor for the Transvaal, Jan. to May 1904, in Parliamentary Papers, 1904 ( Cds. 1898, 1941, 2026 ), LXI.

<sup>86</sup> Sacks, p. 65.

<sup>87</sup> Hancock, Sanguine Years, p. 175.

were changing. Regrettably for Lord Milner, anglicization was falling out of style.

We have already seen that the attempt to educate the Afrikaner young was not successful for a number of reasons. At final count, the numbers of immigrants also turned out to be insignificant. Milner had blamed the economic depression for the drop in immigration after November, 1903. Whatever the cause, the figures of immigrants actually placed on the land in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony were far short of the numbers that the High Commissioner had planned for in his grand design. At the time of his departure from office in March, 1905, the number of British established on the land in the Transvaal was only 557. In the Orange River Colony, the number of settlers was 691. After assets and loans had been tallied up, some 500,000 pounds had been spent by the British Government to establish an immigrant British population of between 2,000 and 3,000 persons on the land in these two colonies.<sup>88</sup> These numbers hardly formed the nucleus that was to make British political ideals prevail in the new colonies as Milner had hoped. Added to this small immigrant population was the failure of the home establishment for the army. Milner had hoped to have certain numbers of English soldiers stationed in South Africa who could settle in the country following discharge

---

<sup>88</sup>William Basil Worsfold, The Reconstruction of the New Colonies Under Lord Milner ( London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd., 1913 ), II, 102.

from the army. However, under pressure from the British Treasury, the proposed garrison was reduced from the agreed establishment of 30,000 to 25,000; it was reduced again in February, 1904, in spite of Milner's protests. In time, the garrison was so small that it lost all of its significance as far as Milner's thinking went. Large numbers of soldiers might have had some effect on the Boers, but small groups, scattered throughout the colonies, could not serve this purpose.

## CHAPTER VI

## CONCLUSION

Lord Milner's term in South Africa expired in March, 1905; he was replaced as High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies by Lord Selborne who had served as First Lord of the Admiralty in the Cabinets of Salisbury and Balfour. Upon returning to England, Milner came under attack from both the Liberal and Radical circles for allowing corporal punishment to be administered to the Chinese coolies. Even though the floggings, etc., were illegal, the former High Commissioner had raised no objections when he was informed of them. To make matters worse, the House of Commons began hearings on these charges regarding punishment of the Chinese, and when Alfred Lyttelton, the Colonial Secretary ( Joseph Chamberlain had resigned as Colonial Secretary during the tariff reform campaign of 1903 ), was questioned, he denied that corporal punishment was being used. It seems that Milner had never informed his immediate superior of these occurrences. With an election campaign coming in December, 1905, the opposition parties took dead aim on exposing Milner's "illegal" activities while High Commissioner. Subsequently the Conservatives were routed in the election and Milner was censured for his part in these affairs concerning the

Chinese labor question.<sup>89</sup> From 1905 until 1916, Milner took little part in party politics in England; indeed, dislike for the British system, British politics, and British democracy ( ironically, as an Imperialist, he desired to preserve this British system throughout the world), was rooted in Milner all his life.<sup>90</sup> In the midst of World War I, when he became a member of the War Cabinet; after the war, he held the position of Colonial Secretary.

\* \* \* \* \*

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman became Prime Minister in the new Liberal government formed in 1905. Immediately, the wheels were set in motion to grant self-government to the Transvaal and Orange River Colony. On December 6, 1906, the British Government instituted self-government in the Transvaal. On June 5 of the following year, the same grant was made to the Orange River Colony. In the General Elections held in February, 1908, the South African Party ( formerly the Afrikaner Bond Party ) was returned to power in three of the four South African colonies. The culmination of these years of struggle came on May 31, 1910, when the Union of South Africa was established with Louis Botha, a Boer who had been in command of the Transvaal's forces during the war, becoming the first Prime

---

<sup>89</sup>Gollin, pp. 70-3.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., pp. 602-3.



Minister of the Union.<sup>91</sup> The victory over anglicization was now complete.

When Lord Milner left South Africa in 1905, he did so with the knowledge that he had fallen far short of his purpose. The Transvaal region had not been made into an outpost of the Empire and the Boers themselves had not been converted into loyal members of that Dominion. In fact, the Boers found themselves united under a common cause more than they had ever been before. Milner had failed even to unite British public opinion behind him and his policies. Other than his close associates who formed the "Kindergarten," the enthusiasm which he generated did not extend very far.

In addition to the handicap of an outdated policy, Milner lacked the one quality essential to those who governed successfully:

...the ability to appraise opposition, to understand the resistance that may be evoked from the weaker by the pretensions of the stronger, to guess correctly what was happening on the other side of the hill....<sup>92</sup>

The above statement was made by G.H.L. LeMay in his work entitled British Supremacy in South Africa, 1899-1907, because time and again Milner showed his lack of this quality. During the crisis period before the outbreak of war, Milner foresaw a short fight, easily won by the

---

<sup>91</sup>G.B. Pyrah, Imperial Policy and South Africa, 1902-10 ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955 ), pp. xiv-xvi.

<sup>92</sup>G.H.L. LeMay, British Supremacy in South Africa, 1899-1907 ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965 ), p. 10.

British. Instead, the war dragged on for almost three years with much expenditure and loss of British life. He presumed that Afrikaner nationalism could be sufficiently stamped out and British ideals instituted in their place. Because of his policies, Afrikaner nationalism grew stronger with every year of his administration. Not all of the results of his programs can be blamed entirely on him. But his unbending ideas and refusal to change courses caused him to have no alternative plans when the "grand design" began to fail.

The final problem that must be examined concerns Lord Milner's actual purposes for his programs of reconstruction. Did he really intend to turn the Dutch Boers into quasi-British? Or were the many requirements established by him simply initiated to keep these people in subjugation? It seems that the answer must be a combination of the two. Obviously by importing large numbers of British and placing them in strategic locations amidst the Boers, Milner was indeed trying to have some aspects of English culture rub off on the Transvaal natives. By making the English language the official one in the area, he, again, was trying to force-feed the English culture to the Boers. If the plan succeeded, Milner saw the Afrikaners as becoming better people because they would be embracing the greatest culture in the world at that time: that of the British people.

It is doubtful, however, that even if anglicization had been totally successful, that Lord Milner would have

actually embraced the Boers as one of his "kind." His attitudes of racial hierarchy would not have allowed him to do this. Even though the Afrikaners would be better people for assuming certain aspects of English culture, the fact remained that they were still aliens. Anglicization would improve their stature in the world community, but they were still less than British.

The real question seems to be not to what extent Milner "cared for" the Boers, but to what extent he hated the Afrikaner nationalists. These people, not the average Boer farmer, were the Empire's real enemies. Anglicization, by bringing the core of the population closer to Britain's way of thinking, would insure that the tendencies toward nationalism and independence would not influence the greater part of Afrikanerdom. Milner's lack of empathy caused him to suppose that an alien English nation that had inflicted much suffering on the major part of a country's population could still be embraced by these same people. In an age when nationalism was becoming ever stronger, Milner's lack of ability to "guess correctly what was happening on the other side of the hill," caused him to misjudge the strength of Afrikaner nationalism. This misjudgment led directly to the failure of anglicization.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

## I. Primary Sources

## A. Public Documents

- Great Britain. Parliament. Cabinet Papers, 1899-1903.  
Youngstown State University microfilm collection.
- Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Papers ( House  
of Commons & Command ), 1903, Vol. XLV. Cd. 1640.
- Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Papers ( House  
of Commons & Command ), 1904, Vol. LXI. Cd. 1895.
- Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Papers ( House  
of Commons & Command ), 1904, Vol. XXXIX. Cd. 1896.
- Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Papers ( House  
of Commons & Command ), 1904, Vol. XXXIX. Cd. 1897.
- Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Papers ( House  
of Commons & Command ), 1904, Vol. LXI. Cds.  
1898, 1941, 2026.

## B. Newspapers and Periodicals

- Amery, L.S. "The Problem of the Army," The Times. January  
27, 1903, p. 10, col. 1-4.
- Cecil, Alicia M. "The Needs of South Africa," The Nineteenth  
Century And After, ( April, 1902 ), 683-692.
- Hely Hutchinson, May. "Female Emigration to South Africa,"  
The Nineteenth Century And After, ( January, 1902 ),  
71-87.
- The Times ( London ). 1900-1905.

## C. Published Papers and Speeches

- Boyd, Charles W., ed. Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches. Vol. I.  
New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1970.
- Hancock, W.K. and van der Poel, Jean., eds. Selections  
From the Smuts Papers. Vol. II. Cambridge:  
University Press, 1966.
- Headlam, Cecil., ed. The Milner Papers. Vols. I and II.  
London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1931, 1933.

## II. Secondary Sources

- Amery, Julian. The Life of Joseph Chamberlain. Vol. IV. London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1951.
- Bolton, G.C. Britain's Legacy Overseas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Cell, John W. British Colonial Administration in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: The Policy-Making Process. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.
- Davenport, T.R.H. The Afrikaner Bond: A History of a South African Political Party, 1880-1911. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1966.
- Davis, H.W.C. and Weaver, J.R.H., eds. Dictionary of National Biography. Supplement 1912-1921. London: Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 108.
- Denoon, Donald. A Grand Illusion: The Failure of Imperial Policy in the Transvaal Colony During the Period of Reconstruction, 1900-1905. London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1973.
- Fisher, John. Paul Kruger: His Life and Times. London: Secker and Warburg, Ltd., 1974.
- Galbraith, John S. Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-1854. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.
- Gollin, A.M. Proconsul in Politics. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1964.
- Hancock, W.K. Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870-1919. Cambridge: University Press, 1962.
- LeMay, G.H.L. British Supremacy in South Africa, 1899-1907. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.
- Martin, Ged. "Was There a British Empire?" The Historical Journal, XV ( 3, 1972 ), 562-569.
- Porter, Bernard. The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1970. London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1975.
- Pyrah, G.B. Imperial Policy and South Africa, 1902-10. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955.
- Robinson, Ronald and Gallagher, John. Africa and the Victorians. London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1965.

- Sacks, Benjamin. South Africa: An Imperial Dilemma.  
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,  
1967.
- Thompson, L.M. The Unification of South Africa: 1902-1910.  
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.
- Walker, Eric. The Great Trek. London: Adam and Charles  
Black, Ltd., 1965.
- Walker, Eric. A History of Southern Africa. London:  
Longman's, Green and Co., Ltd., 1968.
- Worsfold, William Basil. The Reconstruction of the New  
Colonies Under Lord Milner. Vol. II. London:  
K. Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd., 1913.
- Wrench, John Evelyn. Alfred Lord Milner: The Man of No  
Illusions. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, Ltd.,  
1958.