The Application of the Slippery Slope Theory to Police Corruption

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ABSTRACT

Two purposes were addressed in this study. One purpose was to see if the slippery slope theory applies to police corruption. It was assumed that it did exist. The second purpose was to explore the effect demographic factors of police officers have on police corruption. It was assumed that officers of higher rank, more work experience, and who work for larger agencies are the most likely to be corrupt. The assumptions and hypotheses used in this study stemmed from early literature.

The data used in this study was secondary in nature, whose original research was performed to explore police officers' understandings and thoughts of police corruption as it applied to the agency in which they work. Questionnaires were used to survey officers from 30 agencies in the United States, who had previous contact with the original researcher. The first part of the questionnaire listed eleven case scenarios that could be considered acts of police corruption, and asked officers how serious they thought the scenario would be, and how serious they thought other officers would answer. The second part of the questionnaire asked about the respondent's demographic factors including rank, years of experience, and the size of the agency employing them.

Results showed that none of the demographic factors in the current study had any statistical significant influence on police corruption. Similarly, there was no indication from the results that the slippery slope theory exists in police corruption. Implications for future research were discussed that might add further insight to studying police corruption and its predictors.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As of 1997 around 3,000 criminal cases were and still could be in limbo as a result of police corruption and misconduct. What makes the situation even graver is that the corruption responsible for the possible false convictions came not only from one department, but one division within one department and only over the span of three years. This situation is best known as the Rampart scandal. One of the largest incidents of police corruption in the United States, the Rampart scandal consisted of officers in the CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) unit within the Rampart division of the Los Angeles Police Department. Acts of police corruption in the scandal included but are not limited to: police brutality, drinking on the job, planting evidence, theft of drugs, and even the masterminding of a bank robbery. As of 2002 there were only four convictions of police officers involved, at least 70 more officers are under investigation, and 95 of the original convictions have been overturned. Further proceedings and investigations dealing with the scandal were still ongoing in 2003 (Reese, 2003).

Police corruption is very serious and often times overlooked (Klockars, 1997). The Rampart scandal was included in this discussion to demonstrate just how much damage corruption can do in a single unit, let alone a department, or even a country as a whole. The following section describes the brief history of policing in the United States, as well as the original role of policing. Following the history, there will be two sections given to outline the definitions needed for this study. The first section includes the

typologies, or areas, of police corruption. In addition to this chapter will be a discussion of the slippery slope theory and the definitions necessary for such a discussion.

History and the Original Purposes of Policing

In order to understand and discuss police corruption it is important to be aware of the ethical issues involved in policing. In the analysis of ethical issues of policing it is crucial to understand the original purposes of the police, and the police role. If the history of policing and the role of policing are known, ethical issues can be established, thus furthering the discussion into police corruption.

Before the development of organized police departments in America, policing took the form of a watch system in the 1700s, which mirrored the police system of England at the time. Watchmen were ordinary adult males of the community, usually appointed by local officials. However, at this time policing was not a profession as watchmen served as volunteers, according to Uchida (as cited in Dunham, 1997). The basic task of watchmen was to keep watch over a neighborhood or community, while warning and making potential problems aware to the citizens. An example of such a watchman was Paul Revere who let citizens know the British were on their way (Trajanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines, & Bucqueroux , 1998).

The first American Police Departments were created in the mid 1800s. Many aspects of the first American Police Departments were also taken from the London Metropolitan Police Department (LMPD) in England (Conser & Russell, 2000). The main aspect mimicked from London was the concept of preventive patrol. It was the belief that the mere presence of police would deter criminal activity and maintain order.

However, while the LMPD was a highly centralized department, American police departments were decentralized primarily in the local and municipal governments. Such agencies were run politically, as political officials selected and recruited officers. In contrast to the LMPD, American departments used more individual discretion, as officers were allowed to establish individual authority to use with the citizens under their areas of patrol (Dunham & Alpert, 1997).

The original purposes of police are briefly mentioned to demonstrate the goals of what American policing was based on. Police role and functions will be discussed in the following chapter. Throughout the years goals and purposes have differed among agencies, and even among officers. Corruption was to have had no part in policing, but has been present within the system ever since the introduction of American Police Departments. The following section (Police Corruption Overview) is important to this study, as it lists a typology of police corruption and includes a description of each. After discussing corruption, the theory of slippery slope will also be examined and defined, thus leading the study in applying the theory to police corruption.

Police Corruption Overview

As long as police have existed, so has the problem of corruption. Corruption is what actually forced Henry II of England to relieve sheriffs of their duty in 1170. There are a number of categories of police corruption. Before discussing the types, police corruption itself must be defined for purposes of this study. There are many definitions for the concept of police corruption. For this study, the definition used has come from The International Association of Chiefs of Police. This definition was chosen for a

reason. The association is made up of officers, including present and retired chiefs of police (Close & Meier, 1995). It is logical to assume that former officers and supervisors would produce an accurate definition for the term; similar as a coach of a sports team, with experience comes knowledge. The International Association of Chiefs of Police defines police corruption as "the misuses of official position either to commit or ignore an unauthorized act which may or may not violate the law" (Close & Meier, 1995; pg. 276). In return for misusing their official position, the officers expect something of value in return. Payback does not have to be monetary, and could take the form of influence, prestige, favoritism, or services either to the officer himself or someone else (Close & Meier, 1995).

Police corruption occurs for the same reasons white-collar crime occurs. Greed is normal in life, regardless of profession or situation. It is natural to want to enhance one's financial situation. Greed can be an excellent motivator for an officer to work harder by the book to move up the chain of command. However greed is bad when an officer takes matters into his own hands and acts criminally for his/her own benefit. It can be assumed that corruption is involved in policing because officers are presented with opportunities to benefit by their misconduct or corrupt acts. The interaction with citizens coupled with the authority police officers possess can create opportunities to take advantage of others (Perez & Moore, 2002). Police can also be approached by citizens for such opportunities, a subject that will be discussed later on.

Types of Police Corruption

There are many types of corruption. Perhaps the most popular division of the

concept of corruption is from Barker and Roebuck's typology of eight corrupt categories. Barker and Roebuck (1973) derived the typology from the content analysis of literature that spanned twelve years (from 1960-1972). According to their book, police corruption is analyzed "not as the exclusive deviant behavior of a few rotten apples, but as a form of organizational deviance hinging primarily on informal police peer group norms" (pg. Vii). The following will be a discussion of the various types of police corruption.

The first type of corruption is the corruption by the abuse of authority, often referred to as the gratuity type. Corruption by the abuse of authority occurs when an officer receives something because of their authority as an officer. Common practices include free coffee, half priced meals at restaurants, or half price discounts at various places of service. It is argued that small gratuities such as these are simply acts of kindness and appreciation for the police officer's services to the community. For this reason, small gratuities would not be considered corruption under the definition previously given. However, small gratuities are often given to the police to have their presence to discourage crime or disturbances from happening at or around their establishment. Gratuities for this reason would be considered corruption by the abuse of authority (Barker & Roebuck, 1973).

It can be argued that small gratuities such as free coffee or half-priced meals could have nothing to do with the corruption of authority. Neighboring businessmen or friends of business owners often receive the same perks, so it may be difficult to label such situations as the abuse of authority a police officer holds. While it may be viewed as wrong to accept small gratuities, rather than labeling these situations as abuse of authority, it may be more appropriate to consider these situations as simply taking

advantage of opportunities presented, no different than neighboring businessmen accepting free coffee. However, it can be assumed that the acceptance of gratuities can lead to other types of corruption. This is referred to as the "slippery slope," which will be discussed later on in the chapter.

Kickbacks are the second type of corruption, according to Barker and Roebuck (1973). Kickbacks are defined as goods, services, or money in exchange for referring business to people such as: towing companies, garages, lawyers, bail bondsman, etc. Similarly to gratuities, this is not illegal, but can be an example of an earlier stage of the slippery slope to more serious forms of corruption.

The third type of corruption according to Barker and Roebuck (1973) is that of opportunistic theft. Opportunistic theft occurs when an officer is presented an opportunity to illegally remove something from a victim and often has little chance of being caught. Stealing from those arrested is an example. Opportunistic theft can also be theft from a victim of murder, a victim of crime, or even the theft of victims in traffic accidents. An officer who takes a portion of evidence confiscated from a raid, or thefts from open or unlocked businesses after hours are also classified as engaging in opportunistic theft.

Shakedowns are the fourth type of corruption. A shakedown occurs because of opportunity. Shakedowns involve the acceptance of payments or other services beneficial to an officer for refraining from issuing a summons or arresting an individual in situations and actions, which have been called for. The shakedown can be initiated by the officer or citizen. A code of silence is necessary for this to work and is not always

successful, as those people being bribed tend to make the situation aware to the public and authorities (Barker & Roebuck, 1973).

The fifth type of corruption is the protection of illegal activities. This occurs when an officer is paid or compensated for protecting illegal activities. Protection can occur from ignoring the violations of something or someone, or by leading other officers or agencies away from the violation. No complainants are involved in these situations. This type of corruption occurs for a number of offenses, most commonly vice and drug offenses. Drug dealers may pay an officer for protection, thus allowing the sale of drugs. The same can be said for prostitution. In order for a prostitute to walk the streets, she pays the officer not to bother her or hassle potential customers. Officers may do this by themselves, or lead other officers away from these situations (Barker and Roebuck, 1973).

The sixth type of corruption according to Barker and Roebuck (1973) is labeled as 'the fix.' The fix occurs when an officer acts in ways to diminish cases in return for personal gain, or conviction. The fix can involve something as minor as a traffic ticket. An officer can dispose of or neglect to write a traffic ticket in return for some money from that individual who disobeyed the traffic law. In more serious cases, officers can tamper with or destroy evidence in a case, or perjure themselves on the stand to affect the case in the defendant's favor. This also occurs for personal benefits such as bribes of money. On the opposite end, officers can also commit perjury or tamper with evidence to assist the prosecution, resulting in a conviction.

The seventh form of corruption is the direct criminal activities of the officer. Basically, officers act as any other criminal. They commit burglary crimes, robbery, and

other crimes for personal gain. This form mostly deals with officers acting alone, but can, however, be a group effort (Barker and Roebuck, 1973).

The eighth type of police corruption, according to Baker and Roebuck (1973), are those that deal with internal payoffs. This form of corruption deals with those employed by the department only. Acts negotiated between higher ranking officers and their subordinates can include shift change, holidays, promotions, control of evidence, and so on. In return, the subordinate pays the super ordinate or supervisor. While it may not seem as serious as the other forms, it can actually involve more officers of a department, as it includes those officers in certain assignments with little opportunity to participate in other forms of corruption.

Because of the corrupt acts by the New York City Police Department in the 1970's, types of corruption have been broken down more broadly into two categories. "Grass eaters" refer to those corrupt officers who have no physical participation in corrupt acts. Officers labeled "grass eaters" are those who accept bribes or gratuities. "Grass eaters" are those officers who come about corrupt situations opportunistically. They do not seek corrupt activities, but happen to come by them when everyday tasks put them in situations to be solicited by the citizens (Perez & Moore, 2002).

The second broad category of police corruption, labels officers "meat eaters." "Meat eaters" are those officers who aggressively demand personal benefits. These officers are those who actively participate in corrupt behavior such as demanding bribes, making threats, or performing shakedowns. "Meat eaters" do not fall upon opportunities by chance, but rather create the opportunities to act corrupt for personal gains (Perez & Moore, 2002).

Slippery Slope Theory

Slippery slope is a phenomenon that is widely criticized to this day. Many feel that it is basically impossible to research. There are a number of definitions for the theory. While there is no universal definition (much like police corruption) all ideas focus on the same concepts. The problem arises because some try to make the theory too difficult. One such researcher, Hugh Lafollette (2005), applies mathematical equations to try and explain slippery slope.

For purposes of this study, equations explaining the slippery slope theory are much too complicated. It was O.W. Wilson who first attempted to associate slippery slope with police corruption. He explains his theory on the matter: "corruption begins with apparently harmless and well intentioned practices and leads over time.....to all manner of crimes for profit" (Delattre, 2006, pg. 79). While Wilson's definition is fairly concise, there needs to be some change and addition to the theory that should be addressed. First of all, the words "all manner," in which Wilson uses to describe crimes for profit should be substituted with "other, more serious." Also, Wilson fails to mention that when an officer becomes deviant he continues to do so in small increments, thus leading himself on a continuum from less serious, to more serious.

Types of Slippery Slope

John Kleinig (1996) points out and expands on two types of slippery slope first originated in 1984 by James Rachels. They are the logical slope and the psychological slope. Logical slope explains that there are no defined boundaries of what constitutes an acceptable gift. What types of gratuities are acceptable? This looks at the line drawn on

what is acceptable and what is not. While there is not much of a difference between accepting a free cup of coffee to accepting a free meal, the problem exists when that free cup of coffee escalates to a half-priced meal, then to a free meal, and so on. While a cup of coffee is rarely significant, it can have a cumulative significance if it escalates to larger gratuities. The logical slippery slope also looks at the level of wrongness. While accepting a large gift is more wrong than a cup of coffee, both are still wrong. Therefore, in order to stay away from serious types of corruption, it is important to not participate in any corruption, no matter how insignificant (Kleinig, 1996). As stated in the previous chapter, this situation being labeled as corrupt is one, which is debatable.

The psychological slippery slope states that once a certain practice is accepted, officers are likely to move on to accept other practices that are often increasingly unacceptable. Humans have the tendency to extend their boundaries, and once they become use to something, they tend to extend their flexibility. This can result in an officer moving down the slope to more serious forms of corruption (Kleinig, 1996).

Cognitive Dissonance

The concept of cognitive dissonance must be included in the discussion of slippery slope. Leon Festinger first introduced cognitive dissonance in 1957. Festinger (1957) based cognitive dissonance on the notion "that the human organism tries to establish internal harmony, consistency, or congruity among his opinions, attitudes, knowledge, and values. There is, in short a drive toward consonance among cognitions" (pg. 260). Dissonance (attitudes, opinions, or values) occurs for a number of reasons. Dissonance can arise from logical inconsistencies, cultural morals, or because of one's

past experience. Very few things or situations are black and white, which often lead to behaviors and attitudes that offer a mixture of contradictions (Festinger, 1957).

According to Pollock (2004), cognitive dissonance leads to the development of attitudes to justify an act or behavior. Therefore, under this concept, an officer who feels accepting free coffee is wrong, but does so anyway will justify his decision as acceptable. Once accepting free coffee is justifiable, other more serious behaviors, which may be originally thought of as unacceptable, could now be justified. Pollock states, "If we do acts that are contrary to the beliefs that we have heard, we will either stop doing the acts or change our beliefs to reduce the dissonance" (pg. 56).

The concept of cognitive dissonance can often be difficult to understand. Does accepting a free cup of coffee once, when it is originally believed to be wrong, sway one's beliefs to a situation that is now acceptable? Or, does it make the situation as half acceptable, and only acceptable if the situation occurs again. It is understandable that situations occur with a mixture of contradictions. New recruits may choose to participate in situations to fit in with the other officers, regardless of their beliefs. Officers could also participate in order to avoid conflict in certain situations. The concept of fight or flight could be used to reduce dissonance. Officers can simply refuse gratuities and other services (fight), or officers can simply avoid situations, restaurants that give free coffee, or other incidents of dissonance (flight).

Importance of this study

Little or no research has been performed to try to associate the slippery slope theory to police corruption. It is difficult to determine, as most corruption is never

reported, resulting in little statistical data. It is one goal of this study to show that while the results may not show a significant relationship, results will imply that slippery slope does exist when dealing with police corruption. Not all cases will show an existence, but some may, which will help in the reduction of corrupt acts by police officers. The second purpose is to see if demographic factors of individual police officers as well as the agency as a whole can affect or create corruption.

In no way is this author suggesting that police corruption is the norm among officers. Police corruption is believed to be the exception. However, it is another goal of this study to generate future studies on the topic, as well as make police management think over the procedures of their department. If results do show an existence of the theory, management can change procedures, such as accepting free coffee, in hopes that it will not escalate to more serious types of corruption. The result being the elimination of some corruption in the department. The Rampart scandal was included to show the damage police corruption could do to the whole criminal justice system, as well as to the citizens. Further studies expanding on this current research can help to eliminate such damage.

Summary

Police corruption can be hurtful to the criminal justice system. To explore why corruption occurs and escalates is of importance. Police corruption is what occurs when the misuse of official position to commit or ignore an authorized act, which may or may not be unlawful, to receive something of value in return. There are eight types of corruption widely used to classify police corruption. They range from simple acts of

accepting a cut to the cost of a free meal to more serious acts of bribery and shakedowns. Some researchers attribute police corruption to the attitude of the department in which they are assigned. This study, goes a different direction, and applies another theory to police corruption. The theory discussed being the "slippery slope" theory. Simply, "slippery slope" refers to performing a very minor act, which may be unacceptable or morally wrong for the profession, and escalating on to other more serious forms of corruption. Cognitive dissonance was also briefly discussed to further understand how one might continue on a slippery slope.

The following chapter will examine the work of others that are on the subject of police corruption. Past studies will help to theorize and guide this research. At the end of the next chapter will be the research hypothesis that was derived from the examination of past studies. Chapter Three will include the methodology used in this study, how data was gathered, and how the data was then analyzed. Chapter Four is a discussion of the results of the study. Finally, the last chapter will contain a summary of the study, along with conclusions derived from the research. Also included in the last chapter will be suggestions for future research and how to improve on this study.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Little research has been conducted on either police corruption or the slippery slope theory individually, let alone applying one to the other. Before going on with the methods section of this current study it is important to understand the police role and functions that go along with it. After discussion of the police role, the following section will examine ethical issues that occur in the profession. Included in this chapter is a brief review of some incidents of police corruption that have recently occurred in the United States. Finally, a brief review of some past studies on both corruption and the slippery slope theory are included. It is the goal of this review to apply each study and use them as references to the current research study.

Police Role

Before discussing the ethical issues that arise in a police agency, it is important to understand the role and functions of policing. The role of police is a part of the criminal justice system as a whole. Typically, police are viewed as crime stoppers, expected to prevent and deter crime. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973) states that if the purpose of police was to be narrowed to one aspect, it would be "to preserve the peace in a manner consistent with the freedoms secured by the Constitution" (pg. 13). However, the role of police includes other aspects as well. The role of police also includes the expectations, perceptions, and outcomes that

are expected of the police for purposes of achieving certain goals (Conser & Russell, 2000).

The role is one that is very broad, and is a collection of functions. The role often varies according to the goals of the agency. Herman Goldstein (1977) identified eight functions that make up the role of police:

1. To prevent and control conduct widely recognized as threatening to life and property
2. To aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm, such as the victims of violent attack
3. To protect constitutional guarantees, such as the right of free speech and assembly
4. To facilitate the movement of people and vehicles
5. To assist those who cannot care for themselves, the intoxicated, the addicted, the mentally ill, the physically disables, the old, and the young
6. To resolve conflict, whether it be between individuals, groups and individuals, or individuals and their government
7. To identify problems that have the potential for becoming more serious problems
8. To create and maintain a feeling of security in communities (pg. 35)

The number of functions an officer is expected to perform creates quite a workload. Not listed among them, but also not to be excluded is the concept of police discretion. Discretion is basically the authority to make decisions of policy and practice. Police are able to make decisions on whether laws shall be enforced, in what situations, at what

location, and at what time. The reason police are granted such discretion is because there is no set of laws that can let an officer know what to do in every possible situation that may arise. It is just not possible to have rules for everything that can happen. Furthermore, applying a rule to everything takes away the officers' experience, training, and ability to handle a situation. It is the power of discretion that gives the police a great deal of power and authority over people. This is the ability to decide whom to arrest and whom not to arrest (Pollock, 2004).

Ethical Issues of Policing

Codes of Ethics

The first code of ethics for police officers in the United States was developed in the early 1900s. Early reasoning for the code was to give society knowledge of the officers' determination to perform tasks, which are both accepted and predicted. A code of ethics hardly guarantees proper behavior of an officer, but does serve as a guideline to follow. Officers are required to take an oath, which is basically a promise to obey the code of ethics (Lersch, 2002).

The most widely used codes of ethics are: Canons of Police Ethics, The Police Code of Ethics, and The Law Enforcement Code of Ethics. While the three codes differ in wording, the concepts are basically the same. Officers are expected to perform to the highest standards during their duties, and to remain aware of the primary responsibilities of being a police officer. Duties are to be performed impartially, with no bias or prejudice toward anyone. Laws are to be enforced appropriately and courteously. The

aspect most important to this study is that all three codes of ethics included urge officers to perform tasks ethically, without participating in corrupt acts such as bribery, the acceptance of gratuities, receiving various favors, as well as refusing to condone such acts by other officers (Conser & Russell, 2000).

Sherman's Aspects of a Police Officer's Moral Career

Lawrence Sherman was one of the primary researchers for the Knapp Commission (Klockars, 1991). Later on Sherman (as cited in Gaines, 1999) identified four major aspects of a police officer's moral career. The contingencies faced on the job are the first aspect. Contingencies are the pressures from society that shape the behavior of the officer one-way or the other. The second aspect is moral experiences. Moral experiences are those experiences officers have when confronted with the contingencies, and the decision of what principles to follow when dealing with those contingencies. The third aspect is apologia, or the reasoning an officer gives for the change in his ethical beliefs. Stages are the fourth and final aspect of Sherman's analysis of the police officer's moral career. Stages, similar to the slippery slope, are the different levels of either moral improvement or moral deterioration on a moral continuum.

Carter's Illegitimate and Legitimate Corruption Goals

The ethical dilemma in David L. Carter's (1990) typology of police corruption is not whether or not to participate in a corrupt act. The dilemma is why the officer chooses to commit a corrupt act. Carter's typology refers to drug related corruption, however it can also refer to other types of corruption as well. There are two typologies

Carter advanced. Type 1 refers to the illegitimate goals of the officer. Illegitimate goals are those goals that will be of personal gain to the officer. Examples Carter gives for illegitimate goals are as follows: Relaying police related information to drug dealers in exchange for money; accepting bribes for non arrest; and the seizure of drugs for personal use instead of evidence for arrest.

Type 2 drug corruption, which Carter (1990) discusses, involves the legitimate goals of an officer who participates in corrupt acts. Legitimate goals refer to those goals that produce a benefit for the agency. Examples of legitimate goals of a corrupt police officer are as follows: false statements for arrest; committing perjury at trial for convictions; and intentional entrapment.

Police Subculture

Mentioned throughout this thesis is the point that corruption is rarely reported. One major reason corruption is not often reported is because of the loyalty involved in a police agency. Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1994) describe police loyalty and how police work is viewed on the concept of insiders and outsiders. Outsiders are those people who are not police officer and are thus suspiciously viewed. Fellow officers (or insiders) are those that can and should be trusted. The world through officers' eyes takes the form of an us/them mentality, which results in trust and loyalty in police agencies.

In cases of corruption, fellow officers and the code of silence often protect corrupt police officers. Testifying or bringing forth information on corrupt officers is negatively looked upon in a police agency. The code of silence refers to the police subculture and is against the informing of a fellow officer. Instances of corruption are to be kept secret.

Loyalty in police agencies exists due to the fact that police officers must depend upon one another (Pollock, 2004). Dependability is crucial in situations where backup is needed, especially in those situations where one's safety is concerned.

Whistle blowing is the term used when the code of silence is broken and an officer does come forth with information of corruption in the agency. Whistle blowing can have major consequences to the officer who comes forth. Officers who report corrupt acts are often looked down upon by other officers in the agency, which can result in either delayed presence or no presence at all for requests of backup. In some cases officers are pushed out of the department, as harassment from others becomes overwhelming. Officer safety is of further concern as other officers may attack them, or even harass and attack that officers' family. The ethical dilemma arises as to abide by the ethics sworn to, or to protect one's job security and safety (Close & Meier, 1995).

Incidents of Police Corruption

Throughout the 1990's, Cuban mobsters were able to control many officers of the West New York Police Department in New Jersey. In fact, fourteen officers, including the police chief, were charged with bribery and kickbacks totaling over $600,000 for protecting prostitution rings, illegal gambling, and illegal liquor sales. Thirty-two total convictions came about, resulting in four acquittals and five resignations of those officers not charged. One officer not charged in the department blamed contributed problems of corruption in the department to a slippery slope (State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation, 2004).

In a report written by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1998, researchers listed incidents of public disclosed investigations of drug-related police corruption in ten cities during the years from 1988-1998. A brief description of the incidents provided by GAO (1998) are listed here:

- Seven Chicago officers indicted for the theft and extortion of narcotics from known drug dealers in December of 1996.
- In January of 1998, 44 total officers of Cleveland were charged with crimes involving the protection of illegal activities (cocaine trafficking). Eight of the 44 pled guilty in April of 1998.
- 1991 in Detroit, nine officers were charged with the assistance of cocaine distribution.
- 28 officers in Los Angeles were charged with the skimming of millions of dollars of drug money while working narcotics. This occurred in 1994.
- In 1994, eleven officers in New Orleans were convicted of protecting a cocaine supply warehouse, which contained approximately 286 lbs of cocaine.
- As of 1995, ten officers in Philadelphia have been convicted of planting evidence, illegal shakedowns, and incidents of opportunistic theft.
- 12 officers of Washington D.C. were charged with protecting illegal activities of a drug dealer, who was actually an undercover agent, in 1994 (United States General Accounting Office, 1998)

These examples are included to emphasize the seriousness of police corruption, as well as to demonstrate the occurrence and existence of corruption over all regions of the

United States. Note that these are just those incidents, which were discovered. The research of GAO does not include those incidents over the ten-year span that have gone unnoticed or investigated, nor does it include smaller incidents of corruption. Government agencies have developed commissions over the years to address and investigate acts of corruption. The Knapp Commission is one such report that addresses corruption and will be discussed in the following section.

The Knapp Commission

The Knapp Commission (1970) came about from the investigation of officer Frank Serpico, who brought to light incidents of corruption in the New York City Police Department. There are three factors that influence police corruption according to the Knapp Commission of 1970. A police officer's character is one such factor. The character or attitude of an officer can determine whether the officer will take advantage of situations involving corruption. The second factor is dependant upon the section an officer is assigned to in the department. Certain assignments bring officers into situations where corruption is more likely to occur, such as undercover narcotic and vice operations. However, a dispatcher or desk officer is very unlikely to come across those kinds of opportunities. Temptation occurs with opportunity, thus the reason for the second factor. Factor three from the Commission deals with the geographical area in which the officer is assigned. This includes both the geographical area of the assignment, as well as the precinct in which they work. Opportunities are more available in certain areas of the city, as well as precincts that may have a reputation for being corrupt.

Corruption and Politics

As causal factors of police corruption have been discussed and defined by numerous authors, researchers are still examining such factors. While researching mandated screening and selection procedures for police hiring in Miami, Sechrest and Burns (1992) suggest that problems with police personnel seemed to increase as crime in the community increased. During the time of their research (the early 90's), social problems in the community, as well as drug trafficking significantly increased. Political leaders of Miami failed to respond to such problems, resulting in many officers resigning from the police force to seek work elsewhere. Corruption occurs in politics throughout the world. When examining corruption by country, one of Daniel Serra's (2006) five empirical determinants to corruption in general included political instability.

Serra (2006), as well as Sechrest and Burns (1992), suggest that government and politics have an affect on police corruption. But, what are the influences of political corruption? Meier and Holbrook (1992) using convicted public officials as their variable looked at four explanations to political corruption. Findings suggest three of the following four explanations contribute to political corruption. The first explanation deals with historical and cultural factors with a focus on urban areas of a community effecting political corruption. Second, a political system with higher voter turnout coupled with closely contested elections was found to reduce corruption. Finally, researchers' analyses suggest that those countries with more political competition seem to be considerably less corrupt. Corruption was also found to be lower as it relates to bureaucratic factors, specifically the size of the organization and the potential for various bribes.

A recent study conducted in 2002 examined why certain countries were more corrupt than others. With data from Business International, the study gathered data on countries risk factors, one of which was corruption. The study attempted to compare countries with a dictatorship to those countries with a democracy. Findings suggested that those countries with rather complete democracies exhibit the least amount of corruption (Montinola & Jackman, 2002).

The theory of self-deception is contributed to poor ethics in a profession according to Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004), who define the concept as "being unaware of the processes that lead us to form our opinions and judgments." Self-deception involves evading of the truth. Those falling under this concept tend to act how they want, and justify why they are doing so, thus claiming they are impartial in acts and decision-making. Self-deception might support the slippery slope theory, according to these researchers. One whose ethics begin to fade look at decisions and acts in the past they have participated in and compare them to current practices. If current practices are almost identical to those in the past, but just a little more unethical, that practice becomes acceptable.

Slippery Slope and Police Corruption

When examining police corruption, it is important to understand the mentality of the officers who work at a specific agency. As implied previously, simple acts of kindness such as a restaurant supplying free coffee for cops is often seen as courtesy rather than corruption. Other so-called acts of corruption according to the typology are often seen as non-serious offenses. For example, Thomas Barker (1977), who helped

derive the typology of police corruption, performed a study to examine what types of behavior police in an agency viewed as acceptable, and what types were viewed as unacceptable. Barker examined the South City Police Department, a small agency east of the Mississippi River. Results of the surveys given suggest that corruption of authority (receiving of unauthorized material because of their position, such as a free meal, or free event tickets) was the most prevalent type of corruption, with the sample believing approximately 62% of officers have engaged in such behavior. Kickbacks (the acceptance of goods or services for business referrals) came in second with about 22%. The least prevalent type suggested by the results was the typology of direct criminal activities at one half a percent.

While officers' responses of "unacceptable" increased as the type of corruption became more serious, results do express that applying slippery slope to police corruption is possible. A majority of the department felt using their authority for personal benefits was acceptable. Even though the number dramatically decreases as it reaches direct criminal activity, it may be plausible that those who felt the more serious types of corruption were acceptable were also those same officers who believed the lesser offenses of corruption were also acceptable Review of this study helped develop the first hypothesis (stated in a later chapter) that the slippery slope theory can be applied to police corruption.

Officer Opinions and Characteristics

Similarly, Khan and Spragans (1970) examined officers' opinions toward corruption, but included analyzing officers' opinion by age as well. The two researchers

looked at both American and Pakistani policeman. Officers were asked via questionnaire what was the most common reason for officer dismissal from the force in which they work. Answers were divided into three groups according to officer's age. Results show that regardless of age, 59% of all respondents (100 total American and Pakistani) believed officers are dismissed from the force because they displayed poor ethics in their tasks at work. Results also implied that those officers of the youngest age group, ages 20-30, had the highest response rate that dismissal is due to poor ethics of the officer. Interestingly, the response rate feeling poor ethics caused most dismissal dropped to the second age group, only to increase to the oldest officers who participated in the study.

While the study does not specifically include corruption, it can be argued that incidents of misconduct, dishonesty, and felonies can be viewed as corruption. Results of this study could suggest a number of things. The difference between the countries is of no significance to this review. It is significant to look at the total respondents according to the age groups. While everyone felt that dismissal was mostly because of poor ethics, the younger age group's response was more than that of the other age groups. Is this because younger officers are more likely to exhibit poor ethics, or because they themselves exhibit bad ethics? Are the older age groups less likely to have poor ethics, which is why they had a lower percentage on the survey response? The study does not try to explain why the officers answered how they did.

The above study is included here as it helps as a guide for this study when looking at what age groups are more likely to exhibit poor ethics. Khan and Spragans' findings leave some interesting impressions. Typically with age comes promotion, and promotion may be another factor when dealing with corruption among police. This previous

research helped guide hypothesis (stated in a later chapter) for this thesis, which explains corruption can be influenced by certain officer demographic factors, as well as agency size.

Summary

When discussing police corruption it is important to have knowledge of the policing role and its functions. The role of police has many aspects, eight according to Goldstein. Police are to: prevent and control threatening and dangerous behavior, aid and assist those in danger, protect the guarantees of the constitution, facilitate movement of vehicles, assist those who are unable to care or defend themselves, keep the peace, recognize problems that could possibly become larger and more serious problems, and to help the community feel safe and secure.

Issues of ethics are detrimental when discussing police corruption. Included in this section was a brief discussion of the codes of ethics in law enforcement. The three ethical codes presented basically mentioned the same concepts of ethics to follow. Officers are to be aware of their job's responsibilities, perform to their highest standards, show no bias toward citizens, and refuse to participate in acts of corruption.

Also included in this chapter were the moral issues involved in a police officer's career. The work of police officers is often times stressful with the tasks performed and the pressures and expectations from society. From those pressures are the moral experiences, or decisions of which principles to follow when dealing with a situation. Officers then deal with the decision that they have made, often creating justification for deciding a certain way. Finally, police officers follow levels of their moral beliefs on a

continuum. Levels can either incline toward moral improvement or decline toward moral deterioration.

This chapter examines studies, which are relevant to this current study. The first study examined officer's views on what types of corruption are viewed as acceptable. Reactions varied according to the type of corruption, which could suggest that those who felt more serious types of corruption are acceptable are the same officers who felt that a free meal and other types of corruption are acceptable continuing a moral decline along the continuum, suggesting a possible existence of slippery slope.

The second study looked at officers' opinions of corruption, asking why most officers are dismissed of their duties. Included was the age of the officer. The differences in age and opinion suggest that differences may also exist between the different ranks on the chain of authority, as well as years on the job.

The following chapter will discuss the methodology used in this study. First discussed will be an overview on what data was used for analysis, followed by the sample and design used for the methods. Also included is the rationale, or reason for choosing the data to be analyzed. The last section will include the methods of analyses used.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This thesis examined characteristics of police agencies and the demographic factors of officers within them, and examined if there is a relationship between those factors and police corruption. The thesis also examined the continuum of unethical behavior of the police, and how that behavior may escalate up the continuum, thus suggesting the existence of a slippery slope to police corruption. This chapter includes an overview of the study, the sample, the design, the rationale for choosing the methods used, and the analytic plan.

Overview

Data used for the analysis is secondary in nature and derives from the research of Carl B. Klockars (1997). The basis for his study was to explore police officer's understandings and thoughts of police corruption as it applies to the agency in which they work. Klockars also explored officers' opinions about what forms of punishment should be necessary for corrupt officers depending on the seriousness of the corrupt act. His results suggested that the officers were less likely to report the minor incidents than they were to report the major incidents.

Rationale

In Klockars' study, he found that the more minor the incident, the less likely it

would be reported. Most incidents that would be reported were found to deal with theft and bribery. Results also indicated a vast difference among the different agencies. While Klockars' data did not exactly address slippery slope per say, it is used in the current study for three reasons.

Convenience is the primary reason for selecting Klockars' data for this study. Corruption is a subject, which is not often reported and/or recorded. Consequently, very little data involving corruption are available to analyze (Klockars, 1997). Klockars' dataset is appropriate as it allows for secondary analysis of police corruption. The data is available for download for subsequent public use through the University of Michigan's Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, ICPSR.

Second, as this current study analyzed influences certain demographic factors have on police corruption, Klockars' dataset is ideal because it includes officer demographic factors from the respondents of the distributed questionnaires. Also ideal is that the dataset includes the sizes of the agencies in which the officers work. This allowed for tests to determine if the size of an agency has influence as it relates to police corruption.

Finally, the dataset allowed for an analysis of the application of the slippery slope theory. The scenarios on the questionnaire were of varying acts of corruption from minor, to major, and others in between. This supplied a corruption continuum to analyze.

Design

As previously discussed, the dataset used in this study was retrieved through data

access available online via the ICPSR. Therefore, the design of this thesis is secondary analysis. The particulars of Klockars' original study design are discussed below.

Klockars did a cross-national survey in 1997 that involved thirty agencies. The method for conducting interviews was the same at each agency, as questionnaires were distributed and collected from willing participants by a police officer liaison. The first part of the questionnaire listed eleven scenarios of what could be considered police corruption and/or misconduct. Questions in this section asked officers to give their opinion on the seriousness of the incident, the discipline their agency would hand down, and the probability the act would be reported. Written instructions were given to officers before the beginning of the questionnaire. The instructions informed subjects to assume the officer in question has been a police officer for at least five years and possesses a positive work record with no disciplinary action taken against them at any time. The second half of the questionnaire assessed both individual officer demographics and type of agencies in which they work.

Sample

Data for the study were generated by questionnaires, completed by officers of various agencies that participated. Thirty police agencies within the United States were used in total. The locations used were chosen because of previous contact with the investigator (Klockars) in the study, thus resulting in a convenience sample. Most of the organizations used were municipal police departments. The departments varied in size and were mainly in the Northeastern region of the United States. Some of the departments were also from the South, Southeast, and Southwest regions of the United

States, while there were no departments in the West Coast, Northwestern, or Mideastern regions. Response rate came in at 55.5%, with a total sample size of 3,232 officers of various ranks.

Instrument

Information was gathered via a seven-page questionnaire. The first part of the questionnaire listed eleven scenarios, which could be considered examples of police corruption. Examples include: receiving a free meal, kickbacks, and opportunistic theft. Respondents were to respond to such questions as the seriousness of the scenarios, how serious others would believe it to be, the discipline that would likely follow, the discipline that should follow, and whether the incident should be reported, etc. Answers were based on Likert-type scales from one to five (one being not serious, and five as most serious). Case scenarios given to participants are provided in their original form in figure 3.1. Figure 3.2 lists possible responses to the scenarios.

The next part of the survey was demographic, asking questions about respondents' occupational descriptions. Included were the officers' years of experience, years employed at the current agency, rank of the respondent, assignment of respondent, and size and/or type of agency in which they are employed. This section of the questionnaire can be seen in figure 3.3. Finally respondents were asked if they thought most officers would be honest in their responses on the questionnaire, and if they themselves were honest in their responses on the questionnaire. Choices for each were either yes or no.

While the purpose of Klockars' study was to examine corruption among police agencies in the United States and the officers' perceptions and tolerance of corruption, the scenarios provided on the questionnaire centered on the seriousness of corrupt activities. Therefore, using the data for this study has face validity, as it allowed for a continuum of corruption seriousness.

Figure 3.1

Police Scenarios

Case 1.	A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.
Case 2.	A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.
Case 3.	A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.
Case 4.	A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.
Case 5.	A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch, worth about two days pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during the burglary.
Case 6	A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of the cars damaged in the accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives a payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner.
Case 7.	A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune-up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the SUPERVISOR'S behavior.
Case 8.	At 2 A.M. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense he transports the driver to his home.
Case 9.	A police officer finds a bar on his beat which is still serving drinks a half hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.
Case 10.	Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.
Case 11.	A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains the amount of money equivalent to a full-day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property, but keeps the money for himself.

Figure 3.2

Scenario Response Options

1. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be?

Not at all serious				Very serious
1	2	3	4	5

2. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this behavior to be?

Not at all serious				Very serious
1	2	3	4	5

3. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?

Definitely not				Definitely yes
1	2	3	4	5

4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow.

1. NONE
2. VERBAL REPRIMAND
3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND
4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY
5. DEMOTION IN RANK
6. DISMISSAL

5. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WOULD follow.

1. NONE
2. VERBAL REPRIMAND
3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND
4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY
5. DEMOTION IN RANK
6. DISMISSAL

6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?

Definitely not				Definitely yes
1	2	3	4	5

7. Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?

Definitely not				Definitely yes
1	2	3	4	5

Figure 3.3

Officer Demographics Questionnaire

Please Circle, underline, or fill out your response

12. How many years have you been a police officer?

1. Less than 1 2. 1-2; 3. 3-5; 4. 5-10; 5. 11-15; 6. 16-20; 7. Over 20

13. How many years have you been employed at your current police agency?

1. Less than 1 2. 1-2; 3. 3-5; 4. 5-10; 5.11-15; 6. 16-20; 7. Over 20

14. What is your rank?

1. Recruit 5. Officer 9. Deputy
2. Corporal 6. Detective 10. Sergeant
3. Lieutenant 7. Captain 11. Major
4. Colonel 8. Chief/Sheriff
Other_____

15. Which of the following best describes your current assignment?

1. Patrol
2. Detective/Investigative
3. Special Operations (vice, juvenile, etc.)
4. Communications
5. Administrative
Other_____

16. Are you a supervisor or non-supervisor?

1. Non-Supervisor
2. Supervisor (unit supervisor, group supervisor, chief/sheriff)

17. Which of the following best describes your police agency?

1. Very Large Municipal Police (more than 500 sworn officers)
2. Large Municipal Police (201-500 sworn officers)
3. Medium – Sized Municipal Police (76-200 sworn officers)
4. Small Municipal Police (25-75 sworn officers)
5. Very Small Municipal Police (less than 25 sworn officers)
6. State Police

Analysis

The data used for this study were descriptive in nature. All data analyses were performed using version 11.5 of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. All tests used a consistent alpha level of .01 for statistical significance due to such a large population. For purposes of this study, officers' demographic factors were recoded. Service in general was recoded into three groups of least, medium, and most experience, in order to examine corruption over three stages of a career rather than the seven stages in Klockars' study. Group one consisted of officers with 0-5 years of overall time on the job. Group two consisted of officers with 6-10 years of experience. Group three consisted of officers with 11 or more years of experience. The various ranks of officers who participated in the questionnaire were recoded into two groups to test corruption among lower ranks and higher ranks in general, instead of each individual rank. The first group dealt with the lower ranking officers consisting: of recruits, officers, and deputies. Group two consisted of officers with various ranks such as sergeants, lieutenants, captains, chiefs, as well as other supervisors and managers. Finally, agency size was recoded into two groups to test corruption among smaller agencies and larger agencies. Group one consisted of agencies with up to 200 officers, and group 2 consisted of over 200 officers.

The data analysis used in this thesis consists of three phases. Throughout the analysis, the unit of analysis is a police officer. Phase 1 involved using the recoded variables to develop frequency distributions and descriptive statistics of the officer demographic factors, which calculates the percentages, ranges, means, and medians of the different variables. It must be noted that the question on the survey involving how

serious other officers feel the scenarios are will be used in analysis, and not what the respondent feels themselves. It is assumed in this study that reliability and validity will be better used in this technique, as it is believed that the responses involving other officers' opinions are actually more accurate to those officers' beliefs, whether it be shame, embarrassment, etc.

It was believed that corruption differs according to the rank or experience of an officer, as well as the size of the agency in which they work. After frequency distributions and descriptive statistics have been calculated, Phase 2 involved comparing the independent variables (officer demographic factors) separately with each of the eleven case scenarios (or dependent variables), testing the significance in means using a chi square significance test and correlations. Answers on the questionnaire were recoded to the following: 0=low seriousness, 1=medium seriousness, and 2=high seriousness. The eleven case scenarios were computed and summed up to create an ascending scale of seriousness (low level of seriousness, medium level of seriousness, high level of seriousness). For example, if one of the respondents chose high level of seriousness to all scenarios on the questionnaire, that officer's score on the total sum computation variable would be 22. This variable is labeled TOTALSUM Computation. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests were used to compare the means among the dependent variables of rank, experience, and agency size and the independent TOTALSUM variable to determine if any of the identified officer demographic factors influence police corruption.

Phase 3 of the analysis involved the testing of the slippery slope hypothesis. Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) was used to look at the relationship between the dependent TOTALSUM variable and the independent variables (rank, experience,

agency size) to establish if any of those variables explain the variance of the TOTALSUM variable. As a result, the test enables an analysis to see what variables are better to predict the value of the TOTALSUM computation to determine if there is a relationship or existence of not only the slippery slope theory to police corruption, but determine if officers' demographic factors influence the theory as well.

Research Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were developed for this study.

Hypothesis 1: The acceptance of low levels of corruption, such as receiving a free meal can lead to more serious offenses of misconduct. Becoming accustomed to minor acts of corruption, such as accepting a free meal, will eventually eliminate ethical dilemmas toward that minor act, thus resulting in the acceptance of more serious types of corruption (Barker, 1977).

Hypothesis 2: With promotion comes more temptation to participate in corrupt acts, and/or view acts of corruption as problems that are not very serious.

It can be assumed that with power and authority comes greed. Therefore, it is hypothesized that higher-ranking officers and supervisors feel they deserve more money or other favors. With increased authority, officers of higher rank may feel they cannot get caught as they may be able to hide acts much easier then lower-ranking officers (Kahn & Spragans, 1970).

Hypothesis 3: The more years on the job, the more likely an officer is to participate in corruption, or to feel that corruption is not serious. When officers are on the job for a long period of time, they become more susceptible to turn to illegal means of cash or other services. Officers become stressed, and fatigued, and with the income they receive compared to risking their lives on the job, they may feel they are owed more (Kahn & Spragans, 1970).

Hypothesis 4: The larger the size of the agency, the more likely there will be some corruption in the agency, and the more likely that the moral belief of acceptance toward corruption will occur with officers. Larger agencies typically cover more area and/or population. These agencies serve the larger cities. Larger cities and population tend to have more organized crime, and other opportunities to gain money or services by illegal means, thus resulting in more corruption per capita (Kahn & Spragans, 1970).

Summary

Klockars' data for examining the concept of police corruption among agencies were used in this study for analysis. Variables dealing with officer rank, years of experience, and the size of the agency in which they work were recoded into broader scales. Analysis' used to test the hypothesis dealing with the recoded variables took the form of frequency distributions and descriptive statistics followed by chi square tests to determine patterns and dependability connection among the variables and case scenarios, along with an ANOVA analysis to test the differences among the means grouped by officers' demographic factors (rank, experience, agency size). To test the slippery slope

hypothesis, an OLS regression analysis was performed to determine if predictors exist with the ascending scale of corruption seriousness. Chapter four will include a review and interpretation of the results.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

The purpose of this study was two fold. It was premised on the application of the slippery slope theory to police corruption, leading to the hypothesis that the theory does exist. The second basis for the study was examining different demographic factors of police officers and if they contribute to corruption. This led to the last three hypotheses, which infers a relationship between particular officer demographic factors and police corruption. The analysis and presentation of the results are included and discussed in this chapter.

The first section of this chapter includes the results of the frequencies performed on officer demographic factors and agency size. Officer demographic factors will be divided separately into sections labeled police rank and years of experience. The second section will include results of all respondents' answers to the case scenarios. Section three contains results of the chi-square tests to determine if there is a relationship between the officers' demographic factors and corruption. Data will be grouped by the eleven case scenarios and presented in three tables: years of experience, police rank, and agency size. Included in the final section of the chapter is the sum of computation of all case scenarios, as well as the results of the ANOVA test, comparing the means of the computation sum variable with the frequencies of officers demographic factors. Finally, provided in this chapter are the results from the OLS regression to determine whether or not the slippery slope theory can be applied to police corruption.

Officer Demographic Factors and Agency Characteristics

Respondents who participated were divided into two groups: lower rank, and higher rank. The majority of officers were of lower ranks with a total of 2,132 or 66%, while there were 1,044 officer's of higher ranks (32.3% (see table 4.1).

Table 4.1

Officer Demographic Factors

	Rank	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Valid	low rank: deputy/officer/recruits	2132	66.0
	higher ranks	1044	32.3
	Experience	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Valid	Least experience: less than 1yr-5yrs on job	875	27.1
	medium experience: 6-10 yrs on the job	777	24.0
	Most experience: 11 or more years on the job	1533	47.4
	Agency Size Officer is Employed	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Valid	smaller agency: less than 25-200 officers	600	18.6
	Larger agency: 201-500 or more officers	2185	67.6

The years of experience section of the questionnaire was divided into three groups. Of the officers who completed the survey, 875 had the least experience of five or less years on the job (27.1%), 777 officers (24%) had a medium amount of experience of six to ten years on the job, and 1533 officers who participated (47.4%) had the most experience of all the respondents, with eleven or more years of experience as police officers (see table

4.1). Finally, the size of the agency was divided into two sections. Smaller agencies (employing 200 or less police officers) included 600 police officers (18.6), while larger agencies (employing 201 or more police officers) consisted of 2185 (67.6%) police officers (see table 4.1).

Case Scenario Responses: All Respondents

Results of the case scenario questionnaire varied according to the incident. A majority of 87.5% of all respondents felt an officer who had his own private off-hour security business was of low seriousness. Responses to the acceptance of a free meal scenario also had a majority answer of low seriousness with 61.1%, while 23.2% felt it was of medium seriousness. The acceptance of a bribe for not issuing a citation was seen as very serious by 96.2% of all respondents. Responses for Case 4, involving the acceptance of liquor or food during holidays revealed a 48.9% response of low seriousness, followed by 25.7% for medium and 25.4% for high seriousness. The responses for the kickback scenario had a majority of 79.2% of respondents feeling the incident was of high seriousness. The case involving internal payoffs had the majority response of high seriousness at 68.4%, while 20.6% of respondents felt it was of medium seriousness. A response of low seriousness had the majority answer of 41.8% for the case involving departmental cover up, while 28.3% felt it was of medium seriousness and 29.9% of respondents felt it was of high seriousness. The protection of illegal activities case resulted in a majority response of 79.8% believing the scenario was of high seriousness. Police use of force brought about a high seriousness response of 59.5%, a medium response of 20.7%, and a 19.8% low response. Finally, the case involving stolen

property found a majority of responses (91.8%) being of high seriousness. Table 4.2 lists the means and standard deviations of all respondents' answers to all case scenarios (Keep in mind answers were recoded as 0=low, 1=medium, 2=high).

Table 4.2

All Officers Responses

CASE SCENARIOS	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Officers' Own Business	3193	0.169	.476
Free Meal	3192	.0545	.749
Bribery for not issuing speeding tickets	3194	1.949	.268
Receiving liquor and food as gifts on holidays.	3179	0.766	.829
Opportunistic theft of Jewelry store	3196	1.959	.248
Kickbacks	3192	1.724	.580
Internal Payoffs	3187	1.573	.681
Department Cover-up	3179	0.881	.838
Protection of illegal activities	3185	1.718	.602
Use of Force	3178	1.398	.797
Stolen property	3193	1.888	.399

Acceptance of Corruption Tally

As stated in a previous chapter, the Total sum computation (TOTALSUM) is a transformation of the officers' responses to the scenarios. Responses for individual scenarios were low seriousness(0), medium seriousness(1), and high seriousness(2). The computation of scenario responses adds all responses up to create a score. A total of 20 (.7%) respondents actually chose high seriousness as a response to every scenario, while 18 (.6%) respondents chose low seriousness to every scenario. The mean score was 14.5584 or an average of 1.32 on each question, which is a response of slightly above medium seriousness (see table 4.3).

Table 4.3

TOTALSUM Computation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	18	.6	.6	.6
	1.00	2	.1	.1	.7
	2.00	6	.2	.2	.8
	3.00	8	.2	.3	1.1
	4.00	11	.3	.4	1.5
	5.00	17	.5	.6	2.0
	6.00	21	.6	.7	2.7
	7.00	41	1.3	1.3	4.0
	8.00	60	1.9	2.0	6.0
	9.00	80	2.5	2.6	8.6
	10.00	119	3.7	3.9	12.5
	11.00	154	4.8	5.0	17.5
	12.00	223	6.9	7.3	24.7
	13.00	268	8.3	8.7	33.4
	14.00	361	11.2	11.7	45.2
	15.00	356	11.0	11.6	56.7
	16.00	370	11.4	12.0	68.8
	17.00	317	9.8	10.3	79.1
	18.00	258	8.0	8.4	87.5
	19.00	178	5.5	5.8	93.3
	20.00	153	4.7	5.0	98.2
	21.00	34	1.1	1.1	99.3
	22.00	20	.6	.7	100.0
	Total	3075	95.1	100.0	
Missing	System	157	4.9		
Total		3232	100.0		

X=14.5584

Chi-Square Results

Chi-Square tests were performed to see if there was a relationship between officers' demographic factors and their responses on the case scenarios. While chi-square does not determine the strength of a relationship, it does determine if one exists. The tests performed were done by separating officers' demographic factors. Because of

the large population in this study, the alpha value is .01. Those significance values at .01 or less suggest a relationship. Those above .01 are those differences in means that are due to chance.

When looking at the years of experience, relationships not due to chance in figure 4.5 are Case 1 at .006(.6%), Case 2(.00), Case 4(.3%), Cases 6-8(.00), and Case 10(.4%). However, when comparing the means for a relationship between the total sum computation variable with years of experience using chi-square, the significance level is 0.149, or 14.9% likely that the differences are due to chance (see table 4.4).

Table 4.4

Chi-Square: Years of Experience

Scenarios	Value	df	Asym. Significance
Case 1	15.310	4	0.006
Case 2	53.904	4	0.00
Case 3	4.148	4	0.386
Case 4	16.392	4	0.003
Case 5	0.720	4	0.949
Case 6	32.510	4	0.00
Case 7	32.840	4	0.00
Case 8	21.383	4	0.00
Case 9	11.386	4	0.023
Case 10	4.979	4	0.289
Case 11	15.441	4	0.004
TOTALSUM Computation	**53.758**	**44**	**0.149**

Performing chi-square with police rank as the dependent variables produces similar results. Relationships not due to chance using police rank are Case 2, Case 4, Case 6, and Case 7 all at .00. Results are similar with that of the years of experience, being that not all significance levels show a real relationship. However, unlike the

previous test, using the TOTALSUM variable results in a relationship that is real at .004 (see Table 4.5).

Table 4.5

Chi-Square: Police Rank

Scenarios	Value	df	Asym. Significance
Case 1	4.392	2	0.111
Case 2	41.636	2	0.000
Case 3	0.667	2	0.715
Case 4	24.892	2	0.000
Case 5	4.245	2	0.12
Case 6	18.785	2	0.000
Case 7	19.778	2	0.000
Case 8	5.750	2	0.056
Case 9	1.727	2	0.422
Case 10	2.568	2	0.277
Case 11	0.097	2	0.953
TOTALSUM Computation	**43.928**	**22**	**.004**

Four total relationships are not due to chance when using agency size as the dependent variable. Case 2(.00), Case 9(.6%), Case 10(.00), and Case 11(.4%) assume real relationships. Similar to the chi-square, using experience as a variable, the TOTALSUM computation with agency size assumes the differences are due to chance with a significance level of .364 or 36.4% likelihood that differences are not real (see table 4.6).

Table 4.6

Chi-Square: Agency Size

Scenarios	Value	df	Asym. Significance
Case 1	6.363	2	0.042
Case 2	27.537	2	0.000
Case 3	4.594	2	0.101
Case 4	5.143	2	0.076
Case 5	0.415	2	0.813
Case 6	7.215	2	0.027
Case 7	2.623	2	0.269
Case 8	8.568	2	0.014
Case 9	10.403	2	0.006
Case 10	26.215	2	0.000
Case 11	10.998	2	0.004
TOTALSUM Computation	**23.688**	**22**	**.364**

Analysis of Variance Results

ANOVA tests were performed using the tabulated scores of the survey as the dependent variable and officers' demographics as the factors (independent variables). While results from the chi-square determine if there are differences between the means, ANOVA determines which means differ. Results were used to determine if hypotheses dealing with officers' demographic factors were supported.

The mean scores of officers, regardless of their experience, are almost identical. Least and medium experienced officers are basically the same with mean scores of 14.3496 and 14.3503 respectively. The more experienced officers had the highest mean score of 14.7478 (see table 4.7). Standard error values decrease from least experience to most. As a result, as experience increases, variation in officer score on TOTALSUM computation decreases (see table 4.7). As seen in the means plot diagram (table 4.8) as officer experience increases, the scores of seriousness on TOTASUM computation has a

very slight increase.

Table 4.7

Descriptives: Officer Experience

TOTALCOM

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Least experience: less than 1yr-5yrs on job	841	14.3496	3.75392	.12945
Medium experience: 6-10 yrs on the job	745	14.3503	3.47873	.12745
Most experience: 11 or more years on the job	1463	14.7478	3.66239	.09575
Total	3049	14.5408	3.64839	.06607

Table 4.8

Means Scatter Plot Involving Officer Experience

However, the performance of ANOVA shows (Table 4.9) that the statistical value of the F test was .011, slightly above the consistent alpha value of .01 in this study. As a result,

while there is practical significance that more experienced officers are less likely to be corrupt due to higher seriousness scores results show no statistical significance. Hypotheses 3 explained that more experienced officers would more likely be corrupt, or feel corruption is not serious. Practical significance implied in this study showed that more experienced officers feel corruption is of more seriousness than those less experienced officers. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is not supported.

Table 4.9

Analysis of Variance Results: Officer Experience

TOTALCOM

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	120.451	2	60.226	4.535	.011
Within Groups	40450.715	3046	13.280		
Total	40571.166	3048			

The means between higher rank and lower rank are similar as well. The mean score on the TOTALSUM computation for lower-ranking officers is 14.3719 with a standard error of 3.60372. Higher-ranking officers had a mean score of 14.8861 with a standard error of .11758 (see table 4.10). The standard error statistic increases, therefore as rank goes from lower to higher, the variation in scores increases. Table 4.11 illustrates that while there was little difference between the means, a steady increase of seriousness from lower ranking officers to higher-ranking officers increased.

Table 4.10

Descriptives: Police Rank

TOTALCOM

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Low rank: deputy/officer/recruits	2038	14.3719	3.60372	.07983
Higher ranks	1001	14.8861	3.72008	.11758
Total	3039	14.5413	3.64986	.06621

Table 4.11

Mean Scatter Plot Involving Police Rank



The ANOVA test (table 4.12) performed resulted with a F test value of .00, meaning the differences that existed between the means were real and not due to chance. However, this test also fails to support a previously stated hypothesis. Hypotheses 2

explained that as officers are promoted, corruption would be more likely. Results from ANOVA showed the opposite as higher-ranking officers had a higher mean score on the TOTALSUM computation, implying they felt corruption was more serious.

Table 4.12

Analysis of Variance Results: Police Rank

TOTALCOM

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	177.476	1	177.476	13.377	.000
Within Groups	40293.092	3037	13.267		
Total	40470.567	3038			

Like the previous officers' demographic factors, means involving agency size were very close to one another. Smaller agencies had a mean score of 13.9880, while 14.3340 was the mean score for larger agencies. Standard error decreased from .16262 for those smaller to .07993 for those larger (see table 4.13). As a result, as agencies get larger, the variation in seriousness scores increased. The means scatter plot shows a slight increase in means from smaller departments to larger ones (see table 4.14).

After performing an ANOVA test involving agency size, the F test of significance value was .046 or 4.6% chance the differences were due to chance (see table 4.15). While results imply that larger agencies have higher scores of seriousness, it does not prove statistical significance as the alpha value was above the .01 level of significance. Once again, the hypothesis dealing with agency size implying that corruption is more

likely in larger agencies is not supported. Practical significance shows that larger agencies view corruption to be more serious.

Table 4.13

Descriptives: Agency Size

TOTALCOM

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
smaller agency: less than 25-200 officers	585	13.9880	3.93329	.16262
Larger agency: 201-500 or more officers	2063	14.3340	3.63028	.07993
Total	2648	14.2576	3.70137	.07193

Table 4.14

Means Scatter Plot Involving Agency Size



Table 4.15

Analysis of Variance Results: Agency Size

TOTALCOM

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	54.545	1	54.545	3.986	.046
Within Groups	36209.804	2646	13.685		
Total	36264.349	2647			

Testing the Slippery Slope Theory

Ordinary Least Squares Regression results

OLS regression was performed to see if the theory of slippery slope can be attributed to police corruption. OLS regression was used to see if any of the independent variables (rank, experience, agency size) are predictors of the TOTALSUM variable scores. After regression analysis was completed, the first thing to analyze was the model fit (ANOVA) significance value, which was .002. Being that .002 is less than .01, the model was accepted. Of importance to this study is the adjusted R square value of .005 (see table 4.16). This implied that only ½% of the variation in the TOTALSUM computation was explained by the variations of the independent variables. This result did not support the hypothesis involving slippery slope and police corruption with such a small variation in the TOTALSUM scores.

To examine if any of the independent variables can predict the seriousness scores, the coefficients portion of the OLS regression test was analyzed (see table 4.17). The only significance level below the .01 alpha level was the level attributed to police rank at

.005. However the prediction is very weak with a .062 beta value. The closer the beta value is to –1 or +1 the more predictable the variable can be. With a +.062 value there is a very weak prediction that as police rank increases, more serious scores on the test also increase. The regression performed backs up some of the ANOVA results, and once again does not support the hypotheses dealing with officers' demographic factors.

Table 4.16

Regression Model Summary

Mode	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.076(a)	.006	.005	3.69434

Table 4.17

Regression Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	13.695	.193		71.039	.000
	Size of Agency	.410	.176	.046	2.329	.020
	Officer Experience	.045	.097	.010	.460	.646
	Police Rankings	.490	.176	.062	2.785	.005

a Dependent Variable: TOTALCOM

Summary of Results

Overall, the results of the study were unsupportive to the hypotheses previously

stated. It was assumed that officers' demographic factors (rank, experience, and agency size where they work) would have an influence with police corruption. While results showed minor practical significance, no statistical significance was shown since significance levels were greater than the alpha value of .01. The practical significances that resulted were all opposite the hypotheses presented. It was assumed that officers of higher rank would be more corrupt or feel corruption was not serious. Results revealed that while not significant statistically, officers of higher rank actually viewed corruption as more serious than lower ranking officers. Agency size was expected to be a factor with corruption. Results show (not statistically significant) that larger agencies viewed corruption more serious than smaller agencies, opposite the belief that larger agencies view corruption as a minor subject. The experience of an officer was predicted to influence police corruption. Specifically it was predicted that with more experience comes more corruption. Results revealed no statistical significance in relationships, and practical significance implied if anything, more experienced officers viewed corruption as more serious than less experienced officers.

The hypotheses involving slippery slope was also not supported. It was assumed that the slippery slope theory would exist in police corruption. Results showed no existence, not even practical significance. Only ½% of variation in corruption seriousness was explained by the officer demographic factors, thus revealing no significance that the theory exists. The next chapter will discuss the results relating to the theory, limitations of this research, and recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The first chapter began with a brief history of American police. The beginning of policing in America was very similar to policing in England. In the 1700s, American police officers began as watchmen until organized American Police departments were developed in the mid 1800s, following the concept of preventive patrol.

The definitions associated with police corruption, along with the types of police corruption were discussed. This study refers to the definition derived from The International Association of Chiefs of Police, that defines police corruption as "the misuses of official position either to commit or ignore an unauthorized act which may or may not violate the law" (Close & Meier, 1995). In return for the misuse of position, the officer receives something favorable in return.

Thomas Barker and Jerome Roebuck (1973) developed the types of police corruption discussed in this study. Barker and Roebuck's typology consists of eight categories of police corruption. The eight types are as follows: corruption of authority, kickbacks, opportunistic theft, shakedowns, the protection of illegal activities, the fix, direct criminal activities, and internal payoffs. Corrupt officers are often divided into two broad categories of "grass eaters" and "meat eaters." "Grass eaters" refer to those corrupt officers who have no physical participation in corrupt acts. Officers labeled "grass eaters" are those who accept bribes or gratuities. "Meat eaters" are those officers who aggressively demand personal benefits. These officers are those who actively

participate in corrupt behavior such as demanding bribes, making threats, or performing shakedowns.

Chapter one also discussed the theory of slippery slope. Slippery slope in terms of this study refers to the movement on a continuum from minor acts of corruption to more serious acts of corruption in small increments. The two types of slippery slope discussed are the logical slippery slope and the psychological slippery slope. The logical slippery slope explains that there are no defined boundaries of what constitutes an acceptable gift. The accepting of the smallest gratuity may have little significance, but becomes increasingly significant when that gratuity escalates to the acceptance of larger gratuities. While accepting larger gratuities may seem more wrong than accepting small gratuities, the acceptance of any gratuity is wrong. The psychological slippery slope states that once a certain practice is accepted, officers are likely to move on to accept other practices that are often increasingly unacceptable (Kleinig, 1996). Cognitive dissonance was also briefly discussed to further the understanding of how one might continue on a slippery slope.

Chapter two reviews the past research of others regarding both police corruption and the slippery slope theory. The chapter begins with a discussion of the police role. The police role covers many aspects of an officer's job. This study refers to the eight functions that make the role of police as derived from Herman Goldstein (1977). Some functions according to Goldstein are: to prevent and control threatening conduct; to protect constitutional guarantees; and to resolve conflicts. The rest of this section focuses on the discussion of police discretion.

Ethical issues in policing were also included in the review of literature. All police agencies have a code of ethics to follow. Some concepts for officers to follow listed in the various codes of ethics include as follows: duties are to be performed impartially; perform to the highest standards; and to perform tasks ethically; without participating in corrupt acts. The aspects of a police officers moral career are next included in the chapter. This section discussed the factors that can affect the moral beliefs of a police officer. Along with moral factors, are the goals for corrupt officers. This study also examined the two goals as identified by David L. Carter (1990). Illegitimate goals are those goals that will be of personal gain to the officer, such as the acceptance of bribes for non-arrests. Legitimate goals refer to those goals that produce a benefit for the agency, such as perjury for a conviction.

Also included in the literature review were discussions on police subculture. Included are reasons why corruption is rarely reported (loyalty and the code of silence). Various incidents of the more serious types of corruption (drug theft, protection of illegal activities, etc.) were discussed as well. Also included in the chapter is a review of the Knapp Commission, as well as corruption and how it is also a part of politics.

Data used for analysis in this study were secondary in nature and were derived from the research of Carl B. Klockars, whose original research was performed to explore police officers understandings and thoughts of police corruption, as it applied to the agency in which they work. One purpose of this study was to see if the theory of slippery slope exists in police corruption. It was hypothesized that lower levels of police corruption will escalate on to more serious levels of corruption. The other purpose of this study was to understand what demographic factors might contribute to police corruption,

thus hypothesizing that officers of higher rank, more work experience, and those who work for larger agencies are most likely to be corrupted. The assumptions and hypotheses used in this study stemmed from early literature.

Data were retrieved through questionnaire completed by officers of thirty agencies. The agencies and locations were chosen because of previous contacts from the original researcher. The first part of the questionnaire consisted of eleven case scenarios of what could be considered acts of police corruption. Respondents were then asked to rate scenarios on seriousness, how serious other officers would feel it to be, punishment that would follow, and punishment that should follow such acts. The second part of the questionnaire asked for respondents demographic factors including: years of experience; years employed at the current agency; rank of the respondents; assignment of respondents; size and/or type of agencies in which they were employed. All answers to both parts of the survey were based on Likert-type scales.

Analysis' used to test the hypothesis dealing with the recoded variables of officer demographic factors took the form of frequency distributions and descriptive statistics followed by chi square tests to determine patterns and dependability connection among the variables and case scenarios. ANOVA tests were used to test the differences among the means grouped by officers' demographic factors (rank, experience, agency size). To test the slippery slope hypothesis, an OLS regression analysis was performed to determine if predictors exist with the ascending scale of corruption seriousness.

Conclusions

Chi-square tests regarding officers' demographic factors suggest that only police

officer rank has a relationship (p-value of .004) with TOTALSUM variable (or acceptance of corruption tally). The variables of experience and agency size had much larger p-values of .149 and .364 respectfully, meaning that there was a 14.9% chance that the relationship between the acceptance of corruption and officers experience was due to chance. Similarly, there was a 36.4% chance that agency size and acceptance of corruption was due to chance.

While results from the chi-square determine if there are differences between the means, ANOVA determines which means differ. After performing ANOVA tests on officers' demographic factors, it was evident that none of the hypotheses dealing with demographics were supported. The only demographic, police rank, shown to have a real relationship with acceptance of corruption still failed to support Hypotheses 2. Hypothesis 2 explained that as officers are promoted, corruption would be more likely. Results from ANOVA showed the opposite as higher-ranking officers had a higher mean score on the TOTALSUM computation, implying they felt corruption was more serious than officers with lower ranks.

Interestingly, using a level of significance of 95% rather than 99%, would still result in rejecting the demographic hypotheses. Regarding officer experience, the F test of significance value was .011 or 1.1% when performing ANOVA tests. Assuming a level of significance of 95%, an F test significance value of .011 shows that differences that existed between the means were real and not due to chance, as .011 is below .05. However, being that the mean score of seriousness increased as officer experience increased this finding would suggest that more experienced officers see corruption as more serious than less experienced officers, opposite what is explained in Hypothesis 3.

While still assuming a 95% level of significance, results would be similar regarding agency size as well. Regarding Agency size, the F test of significance value was .046 or 4.6% when performing ANOVA tests. As .046 is below .05, the result in the difference between means would not be due to chance. However, mean scores of seriousness were higher with officers from larger agencies. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 would be rejected as findings suggest officers from larger agencies view corruption as more serious when compared to officers from smaller agencies.

The hypothesis involving slippery slope was also not supported. It was assumed that the slippery slope theory would exist in police corruption. OLS regression test results showed no existence. Only ½% of the variation in the TOTALSUM computation was explained by variations of the officer demographic factors, thus rejecting Hypothesis 1.

Discussion

While none of the hypotheses were supported, much was learned from this study. Results suggested that the higher-ranking officers viewed corruption as more serious when compared to lower-ranking officers. It is possible that some of the higher-ranking officers are promoted because they do not participate in acts of corruption. Lower-ranking officers may stay as deputies and patrolmen because they take advantage of the smaller gratuities, which may be frowned upon by the department.

Results suggested that officers with more experience view corruption as more serious than those officers with the least experience. It may be assumed that older, more experienced officers have seen more incidents of corruption throughout the years, and

understand it exists in departments, thus believing it is serious. Less experienced officers have not worked as long in the profession to see possible acts of corruption, which may lead them to believe it rarely happens, and see it as not serious.

Results from this study also suggested that officers in larger agencies see corruption as a more serious concept than those officers working for smaller agencies. Officers of larger agencies have seen more incidents of corruption while working as officers, as their jurisdiction is larger. Also, vice and narcotics play a larger part in larger agencies, thus resulting in more acts of corruption. Being exposed to more acts of corruption may have them believe it is a serious concept. Also, smaller agencies can have closer relationships among everyone that may cause more departmental cover-ups. There may be reason to believe that smaller agency officers see corruption as less serious than larger agencies because of the police subculture discussed earlier in this thesis. They will not admit to it happening, thus viewing police corruption as not serious.

The slippery slope theory may or may not exist. Results suggested it did not exist in this study. However, the eleven scenarios were not separated by small amounts of seriousness. The second scenario lumped all gratuities together. If scenarios were divided into smaller increments, such as one scenario asking about a free cup of coffee, and the next scenario asking about a discounted meal, and so on little by little, results may have shown an existence of slippery slope. The next section will discuss the limitations further, as well as implications for future research.

Research Limitations

Any time respondents are surveyed about their opinions there will be weaknesses.

A survey does not detect truth from fiction. The questionnaire used for this study did not differentiate between corrupt and honest officers, and there is no evidence of actual acts of corruption. The final question of the survey asked about the respondents' honesty. However, when someone lies throughout a questionnaire, it is assumed that he/she will also lie when questioned about his/her honesty at the end. Future studies, using the same dataset, could also use the answers dealing with officers' opinion for analysis, instead of the answers of how they believe others officers feel toward the scenarios.

Also, the study only included agencies in certain regions of the United States. No agencies from the West Coast, Northwestern, or Mideastern regions of the United States were included in the original study. Agencies were also not evenly spread according to jurisdiction. Most agencies that participated were municipal police departments. Very few village departments, sheriff departments, and other jurisdictional departments were surveyed. Future studies should include agencies from every region of the United States, as well as other jurisdictional departments.

The study did not allow for regional differences among the agencies. There was no question on the survey asking about the location of the respondents' agency. This would be helpful, as it would allow researchers and police management to know what sections of the country are more prone to corruption. Future research could focus on implementing this strategy if looking at corruption in the different regions of the United States.

Studies and literature used for research in this thesis were not very recent. Research on police corruption seems to be declining as of late. Reasons could vary for a decline in research. Corruption is a topic that is often scrutinized, and some may shy

away from researching the topic to avoid possible controversy. For future research, it is encouraged to focus on more recent studies for review.

Perhaps, the biggest limitation of this research is the data used for the analysis, which may not have been sufficient for the hypotheses advanced. The hypotheses presented in this thesis are better suited for real life data. Questions on the survey were hypothetical, which asked for the opinions of others. For future research in the area of police corruption compared to officers' demographic factors, as well as the theory of slippery slope, it is recommended by this author that actual data of corruption be used for the analysis. While data on police corruption are hard to find, future research may need to be delayed until such data are available.

APPENDIX A: INSTRUMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FIGURES

Figure 3.1

Police Scenarios

Case 1.	A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.
Case 2.	A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.
Case 3.	A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.
Case 4.	A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.
Case 5.	A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch, worth about two days pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during the burglary.
Case 6	A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of the cars damaged in the accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives a payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner.
Case 7.	A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune-up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the SUPERVISOR'S behavior.
Case 8.	At 2 A.M. a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense he transports the driver to his home.
Case 9.	A police officer finds a bar on his beat which is still serving drinks a half hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.
Case 10.	Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.
Case 11.	A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains the amount of money equivalent to a full-day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property, but keeps the money for himself.

Figure 3.2

Scenario Response Options

1. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be?

Not at all serious				Very serious
1	2	3	4	5

2. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this behavior to be?

Not at all serious				Very serious
1	2	3	4	5

3. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?

Definitely not				Definitely yes
1	2	3	4	5

4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow.

1. NONE
2. VERBAL REPRIMAND
3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND
4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY
5. DEMOTION IN RANK
6. DISMISSAL

5. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WOULD follow.

1. NONE
2. VERBAL REPRIMAND
3. WRITTEN REPRIMAND
4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY
5. DEMOTION IN RANK
6. DISMISSAL

6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?

Definitely not				Definitely yes
1	2	3	4	5

7. Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?

Definitely not				Definitely yes
1	2	3	4	5

Figure 3.3

Officer Demographics Questionnaire

Please Circle, underline, or fill out your response

12. How many years have you been a police officer?

1. Less than 1 2. 1-2; 3. 3-5; 4. 5-10;
5. 11-15; 6. 16-20; 7. Over 20

13. How many years have you been employed at your current police agency?

1. Less than 1 2. 1-2; 3. 3-5; 4. 5-10;
5.11-15; 6. 16-20; 7. Over 20

14. What is your rank?

1. Recruit 5. Officer 9. Deputy
2. Corporal 6. Detective 10. Sergeant
3. Lieutenant 7. Captain 11. Major
4. Colonel 8. Chief/Sheriff
Other_____

15. Which of the following best describes your current assignment?

1. Patrol
2. Detective/Investigative
3. Special Operations (vice, juvenile, etc.)
4. Communications
5. Administrative
Other_____

16. Are you a supervisor or non-supervisor?

1. Non-Supervisor
2. Supervisor (unit supervisor, group supervisor, chief/sheriff)

17. Which of the following best describes your police agency?

1. Very Large Municipal Police (more than 500 sworn officers)
2. Large Municipal Police (201-500 sworn officers)
3. Medium – Sized Municipal Police (76-200 sworn officers)
4. Small Municipal Police (25-75 sworn officers)
5. Very Small Municipal Police (less than 25 sworn officers)
6. State Police

APPENDIX B: TABLES OF RESULTS

Table 4.1

Officer Demographic Factors

Rank		Frequency	Percent
Valid	low rank: deputy/officer/ recruits	2132	66.0
	higher ranks	1044	32.3

Experience		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Least experience: less than 1yr-5yrs on job	875	27.1
	medium experience: 6-10 yrs on the job	777	24.0
	Most experience: 11 or more years on the job	1533	47.4

Agency Size Officer is Employed		Frequency	Percent
Valid	smaller agency: less than 25-200 officers	600	18.6
	Larger agency: 201-500 or more officers	2185	67.6

Table 4.2

All Officers Responses

CASE SCENARIOS	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Officers' Own Business	3193	.169	.476
Free Meal	3192	.545	.749
Bribery for not issuing speeding tickets	3194	1.949	.268
Receiving liquor and food as gifts on holidays.	3179	.766	.829
Opportunistic theft of Jewelry store	3196	1.959	.248
Kickbacks	3192	1.724	.580
Internal Payoffs	3187	1.573	.681
Department Cover-up	3179	.881	.838
Protection of illegal activities	3185	1.718	.602
Use of Force	3178	1.398	.797
Stolen property	3193	1.888	.399

Table 4.3

TOTALCOM

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	18	.6	.6	.6
	1.00	2	.1	.1	.7
	2.00	6	.2	.2	.8
	3.00	8	.2	.3	1.1
	4.00	11	.3	.4	1.5
	5.00	17	.5	.6	2.0
	6.00	21	.6	.7	2.7
	7.00	41	1.3	1.3	4.0
	8.00	60	1.9	2.0	6.0
	9.00	80	2.5	2.6	8.6
	10.00	119	3.7	3.9	12.5
	11.00	154	4.8	5.0	17.5
	12.00	223	6.9	7.3	24.7
	13.00	268	8.3	8.7	33.4
	14.00	361	11.2	11.7	45.2
	15.00	356	11.0	11.6	56.7
	16.00	370	11.4	12.0	68.8
	17.00	317	9.8	10.3	79.1
	18.00	258	8.0	8.4	87.5
	19.00	178	5.5	5.8	93.3
	20.00	153	4.7	5.0	98.2
	21.00	34	1.1	1.1	99.3
	22.00	20	.6	.7	100.0
	Total	3075	95.1	100.0	
Missing	System	157	4.9		
Total		3232	100.0		

X=14.5584

Table 4.4

Chi-Square: Years of Experience

Scenarios	Value	df	Asym. Significance
Case 1	15.310	4	0.006
Case 2	53.904	4	.00
Case 3	4.148	4	0.386
Case 4	16.392	4	0.003
Case 5	.720	4	0.949
Case 6	32.510	4	0.00
Case 7	32.840	4	0.00
Case 8	21.383	4	0.00
Case 9	11.386	4	0.023
Case 10	4.979	4	0.289
Case 11	15.441	4	0.004
TOTALSUM Computation	**53.758**	**44**	**0.149**

Table 4.5

Chi-Square: Police Rank

Scenarios	Value	df	Asym. Significance
Case 1	4.392	2	0.111
Case 2	41.636	2	0
Case 3	0.667	2	0.715
Case 4	24.892	2	0
Case 5	4.245	2	0.12
Case 6	18.785	2	0
Case 7	19.778	2	0
Case 8	5.75	2	0.056
Case 9	1.727	2	0.422
Case 10	2.568	2	0.277
Case 11	0.097	2	0.953
TOTALSUM Computation	**43.928**	**22**	**.004**

Table 4.6

Chi-Square: Agency Size

Scenarios	Value	df	Asym. Significance
Case 1	6.363	2	0.042
Case 2	27.537	2	0
Case 3	4.594	2	0.101
Case 4	5.143	2	0.076
Case 5	0.415	2	0.813
Case 6	7.215	2	0.027
Case 7	2.623	2	0.269
Case 8	8.568	2	0.014
Case 9	10.403	2	0.006
Case 10	26.215	2	0
Case 11	10.998	2	0.004
TOTALSUM Computation	**23.688**	**22**	**.364**

Table 4.7

Descriptives: Officer Experience

TOTALCOM

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Least experience: less than 1yr-5yrs on job	841	14.3496	3.75392	.12945
Medium experience: 6-10 yrs on the job	745	14.3503	3.47873	.12745
Most experience: 11 or more years on the job	1463	14.7478	3.66239	.09575
Total	3049	14.5408	3.64839	.06607

Table 4.8

Means Scatter Plot Involving Officer Experience

Table 4.9

Analysis of Variance Results: Officer Experience

TOTALCOM

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	120.451	2	60.226	4.535	.011
Within Groups	40450.715	3046	13.280		
Total	40571.166	3048			

Table 4.10

Descriptives: Police Rank

TOTALCOM

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Low rank: deputy/officer/recruits	2038	14.3719	3.60372	.07983
Higher ranks	1001	14.8861	3.72008	.11758
Total	3039	14.5413	3.64986	.06621

Table 4.11

Mean Scatter Plot Involving Police Rank



Table 4.12

ANOVA: Police Rank

TOTALCOM

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	177.476	1	177.476	13.377	.000
Within Groups	40293.092	3037	13.267		
Total	40470.567	3038			

Table 4.13

Descriptives: Agency Size

TOTALCOM

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
smaller agency: less than 25-200 officers	585	13.9880	3.93329	.16262
Larger agency: 201-500 or more officers	2063	14.3340	3.63028	.07993
Total	2648	14.2576	3.70137	.07193

Table 4.14

Means Scatter Plot Involving Agency Size



Table 4.15

ANOVA: Agency Size

TOTALCOM

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	54.545	1	54.545	3.986	.046
Within Groups	36209.804	2646	13.685		
Total	36264.349	2647			

Table 4.16

Regression Model Summary

Mode	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.076(a)	.006	.005	3.69434

Table 4.17

Regression Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	13.695	.193		71.039	.000
	Size of Agency	.410	.176	.046	2.329	.020
	Officer Experience	.045	.097	.010	.460	.646
	Police Rankings	.490	.176	.062	2.785	.005

a Dependent Variable: TOTALCOM

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