

**Populist Techniques Within Nazi and Neo-Nazi Rhetoric: A Comparative Analysis**

by

Nickiforos J. Mastorides

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Science

in

Criminal Justice

YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY

May, 2024

Populist Techniques Within Nazi and Neo-Nazi Rhetoric: A Comparative Analysis

Nickiforos Joseph Mastorides

I hereby release this thesis to the public. I understand that this thesis will be made available from the OhioLINK ETD Center and the Maag Library Circulation Desk for public access. I also authorize the University or other individuals to make copies of this thesis as needed for scholarly research.

Signature:

---

*Nickiforos J. Mastorides*, Student Date

Approvals:

---

*Richard Lee Rogers*, Ph. D., Thesis Advisor Date

---

*Ronald E. Slipski*, M.A., J.D., Committee Member Date

---

*Dorian L. Mermer*, M.A., Committee Member Date

---

Salvatore A. Sanders, PhD, Dean, College of Graduate Studies Date

## **Abstract**

Throughout Adolf Hitler's duration of power in Nazi Germany, he garnered unquestionable support from an entire nation while utilizing a variety of populist techniques to do so. While articulating many of the same general messages, Neo-Nazis have sparked their own movements within the United States, and many organizations perpetuating violent agendas have emerged. Subsequently, little currently exists that explains how populist rhetoric and communicative techniques have changed since Nazism's inception. This study aims to address this gap in the literature by comparing the populist techniques utilized by George Lincoln Rockwell and James Nolan Mason and their Neo-Nazi rhetoric to that of Adolf Hitler. By utilizing KH Coder, a qualitative analysis software, three separate analyses were conducted that determined each speaker's word frequency, placement, and links. This study asserts that Neo-Nazis have indeed altered their use of populism since the ideology's inception. Likewise, it also indicates that the speakers' use of pronouns not only differed but played a significant role in the messages being presented to their audiences. While Hitler focused more on personal pronouns to create homogeneity and collective action, Rockwell and Mason prioritized pronouns that targeted outgroups and individual action.

## Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Literature Review.....	4
Populism Defined.....	4
Framing Theory.....	5
Populist Techniques and Framing Theory .....	8
Populism and Far-Right Extremism.....	12
Hate Crimes Perpetuated by Neo-Nazi Rhetoric.....	16
Neo-Nazis Within this Study.....	17
Summary of Literature Review .....	19
Research Question .....	21
Methodology.....	21
Summary of Methodology .....	24
Results.....	26
Analysis 1: Frequency of Words (FOW) .....	26
<i>Analysis 1: Comparison of Results</i> .....	28
Analysis 2: Multi-Dimensional Scaling of Words (MDSW).....	33
<i>Analysis 2: Comparison of Results</i> .....	36
Analysis 3: Co-Occurance Network of Words (CONW).....	41
<i>Analysis 3: Comparison of Results</i> .....	43
Discussion .....	48
Summary of Results .....	50
Conclusion .....	52
Summary of Major Findings .....	52
Limitations and Validity Issues.....	52
Policy Implications and Future Research.....	54
References.....	56
Appendix.....	66

## **Populist Techniques Within Nazi and Neo-Nazi Rhetoric: A Comparative Analysis**

Plagued with uncertainty, economic despair, unresolved conflict, and emotional ruin, World War II-era Germany was no stranger to extreme hardship. Capitalizing on these struggles, one man, Adolf Hitler, promised his people “unimaginable opportunities” by making the impossible seem possible (Kershaw, 2004). Utilizing his political and charismatic authority to influence an entire nation, Hitler sufficiently coerced Germany into blindly following his leadership in pursuit of an extremist far-right Nazi agenda. Nazism for the German people highlighted a sense of “grandiosity” that simultaneously offered an emotional crutch, a scapegoat for Germany's hardships, and a disillusioned sense of German superiority that emphasized greatness and power (Hartmann, 1984). Germany remained as one of the most advanced societies, technologically and economically, to have ever adopted such extremist views in such a short amount of time (Kershaw, 2004), and this inevitably begs the question - how?

Guided under the umbrella of framing theory, much literature attributes the success of Hitler's techniques to his utilization of populism within his various forms of rhetoric (Holcombe, 2021). Principally, he framed and presented his ideologies in a way that captivated millions into an almost blind submission. Adolf Hitler mastered these techniques to the point that modern-day fascists, the extreme-right, and Neo-Nazis still echo the remnants of his techniques and various messages. Although the themes of his messages still circulate among these various groups, their communicative techniques and use may be different.

While this is true, the far-right extremist movements have recently encountered a resurgence of growth in terms of numbers and violence (Béland, 2020). Attributed to an

ever-growing political divide within the United States, extremist movements on both ends of the political spectrum have encountered an uptick in violence against different groups they deem as threats (Chermak et al., 2024). Acts of violence are increasing especially among groups associated with Nazism; therefore, it remains imperative to understand the rhetoric they are deriving their ideologies from, and to what extent their rhetoric encapsulates the themes and populist techniques articulated by Adolf Hitler within the ideology's inception. Could this inherent lapse in support be attributed to how Neo-Nazis are currently attempting to portray and frame their ideologies? Very little literature addresses this specific concept, and this study aims to conceptualize these discrepancies.

Hitler's use of populist techniques within his rhetoric garnered unquestionable support from millions of followers whereas current Neo-Nazi surges in the United States have not provoked nearly as much traction. Although this is the case, again, there has still been a recent surge in far-right rhetoric utilized by politicians and other groups to encapsulate the support of a multitude of audiences, i.e., former United States President, Donald Trump (Béland, 2020).

Whether intended or not, Donald Trump has seen a lot of success appealing to quite a few different groups, especially Neo-Nazi proponents and far-right extremists. Trump's use of populism appeals to these groups is unquestionable, and because of this, Trump has regularly been compared to Adolf Hitler (McHugh, 2023) and accused of entertaining Nazi / Neo-Nazi rhetoric (Burns, 2023), but can these depictions and accusations towards Trump and other politicians deemed as "far-right extremists" be accurately drawn without understanding how Nazi populist rhetoric has evolved since its inception with Adolf Hitler?

By comparing Adolf Hitler's populist techniques and rhetoric with that of some of the most influential Neo-Nazis, this study could begin to answer how Nazi rhetoric has changed since post-World War II Nazi-era Germany and how its different proponents have adjusted their populist techniques in an attempt to garner support. Additionally, this study can provide insight as to whether modern far-right extremists are modeling their populist rhetoric after Adolf Hitler, modern Neo-Nazis, or their own unique strategies. Finally, the study contributes to the recent expansion of research on domestic terrorism in criminal justice and criminology (Chermak et al., 2024; Qureshi, 2020), which includes research on the use of extremist language (Govers et al., 2023; MacAvaney et al., 2019).

Understanding how Nazi rhetoric has changed over time and between speakers could provide valuable insight not only towards the communication techniques of extremist populists of the right side of the political spectrum but the left as well. To initiate this understanding, the next chapter will entail definitions and descriptions of populism itself, populist techniques commonly used, and framing are currently being utilized by far-right extremists in the status quo, and current violence being perpetuated by the extreme-right.

## Literature Review

### Populism Defined

Populism is a political ideology that emphasizes government policies that revolve around the support and interest of average citizens as opposed to hierarchical political institutions or elitist classes of people (Holcombe, 2021). To elaborate on this concept, Béland (2020) emphasized previous literature articulated by Müller (2016) that provides a good baseline definition of populism. Müller explained that populism has two primary components. There exists a critique of an elite class of people as well as the assertion that the speaker is speaking on behalf of a “coherent and unified people.” The populist needs to create a sort of “symbiotic symbiosis” between themselves and the people by depicting that they know how to get the people what they want.

Populists prioritize the ability to charismatically exploit certain pressing factors such as racial discontent, resentment, a struggle to establish a social identity, economic decline, a cultural decline of a specific group, a movement against a “social elite,” or a combination of all of them (Cox et al., 2017; Spruyt et al., 2016; De Bruycker & Rooduijn, 2021). Populism and influential populists exploit these factors to gain support from the masses.

When looking at populism, an adversarial “us versus them” mentality is often articulated, and as a result, the promotion of a certain desired type of nationalism is instilled (Holcombe, 2021). The homogeneity populism creates also enforces a feeling of unification that conjoins a certain group of people into a unified front acting as their own sovereign body (Erisen et al., 2021). Successful populists, acting with various intentions, have mastered the mental cognition of establishing these groups. Split into two main



sects, an “ingroup” is a group that a person will psychologically identify themselves as part of, while an “outgroup” is identified as a group on the outside that will often be discriminated against (Abbink & Harris, 2019). Through traditional blame attribution, populism establishes numerous factors that influence an individual’s perception of their ingroup (people they identify with) versus that of an outgroup (people they should view as outsiders who are causing the aforementioned problems) (Hewstone, 1990; Busby et al., 2019). Typically referencing the failures of a government, populism emphasizes that the ingroup is suffering at the hands of an “elite” (or outgroup) that has intentionally and knowingly perpetuated societal issues (Busby et al., 2019). To sufficiently create an ingroup that is moving against a targeted outgroup, populism inevitably requires its endorsers to utilize techniques and strategies that directly coincide with framing theory.

### **Framing Theory**

Before discussing framing theory itself, it remains imperative to understand the importance of a “frame.” Expanded upon by Erving Goffman (1974), frames are subjective by nature, and they allow a person to make sense of and determine their own individualized involvement / perception of events and situations going on around them (p.10-11). Goffman explained that a variety of social and psychological factors influence an individual’s understanding of the context surrounding a situation, and these experiences contribute to subjective interpretation (p. 8-11). These past experiences and factors allow for someone to create a “frame,” or subjective definition of a situation. In essence, this is what Goffman refers to as frame analysis - the recollection, examination, and application of these experiences.

As a verb, “framing” has been defined as a communicative process by which different social realities have been depicted through various psychological and institutional practices and settings (DeVreese, 2005; Chong & Druckman, 2007). Different actors maintain the ability to frame certain issues in a way that reflects their own perception or desired outcome by creating different “realities” or points of view. The way people choose to portray differing messages plays a significant impact on audience perception. Goffman (1974) explained that when people carry a conversation, more often than not, they are attempting to “give a show” rather than simply “give information” (p. 508). This assertion lays the groundwork for framing theory.

Like Goffman’s frame analysis, framing theory suggests that when people begin the process of forming an attitude or a choice because of some situation, individuals will rely upon their previous and present evaluations or perceptions. There resides a direct correlation between the framing of a situation by the presenter and the audience’s resulting attitude or choice (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Slothuus 2008). The framing of a message itself resides both within the speaker and the audience. The more informed someone is about a certain topic or discussion, the more likely they are to have a previously established mental frame that is more difficult to manipulate (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Ardevol-Abreu (2015) explained that humans inherently have a decoding process that has been conditioned by elements from social environments, the situation itself, and / or other individuals. These influences affect an individual’s interpretation of a message and give people a new way to interpret that certain message in the future (p. 425). Emphasizing the method by which messages or elements of communication persuasively alter one’s accessibility and applicability of previously

conceived notions (Nelson et al., 1997), framing theory allows for an in-depth understanding of how an issue, situation, or message, is constructed, and communicated in various environments by different groups of people especially when the formulation of an identity is involved (Desrosiers, 2015).

This concept revolves around framing effects when mostly small changes to the presentation of an issue or event produce a change in opinion (Busby et al., 2019; Chong & Druckman, 2007). For example, when issues are framed in a light that emphasizes favorable associations, individuals have a higher likelihood of supporting the position advocated in the frame. The truth is the same for the opposite - when unfavorable associations are emphasized as opposed to favorable ones, the framed issue maintains an increased likelihood of rejection (Levin et al., 1998). Framing assists the presenter in funneling certain ideologies by limiting or over-emphasizing various messages. By altering how a message is presented and perceived, framing primarily enhances or changes the accessibility and / or applicability of existing ideas (Busby et al., 2019).

Especially applicable to journalism and the media, presenters, and writers adjust their framing of stories to garner attraction from different targeted audiences. By manipulating various frames and perspectives, the origins of this communicative theory have been connected to framing studies within interpretive sociology and institutional politics. There are directly traced effects on political cognitions, information processing, and political influences (Roslyng & Dindler, 2022). As this literature almost unanimously indicates, populists unquestionably utilize framing theory, whether intentionally or not, to create their narratives.

## **Populist Techniques and Framing Theory**

In short, framing theory emphasizes the way an idea is presented or framed by a speaker to captivate a group or desired audience. Again, populism, by definition, is a political ideology that focuses on two main factors: a movement against a group of “elitists” (whichever the speaker deems as the “outgroup”), and an establishment of a homogenous group of people that the speaker emphasizes has the ability to act as its own sovereign body against the “outgroup” through that speaker’s proposed method(s) (Holcombe, 2021; Béland, 2020; Müller, 2016). When populists frame these arguments, there is a very prominent problem-solution format, thus indicating that populism serves as a means to an end.

Successful populists need to equip themselves with the ability to frame a message in a way that creates some sort of moral dilemma or moral panic to inspire action and create a symbolic symbiosis between themselves and within the group itself (Müller, 2016). This relationship is most easily instilled by recognizing Cohen’s (1972) 5-stage construction of moral panic:

1. Someone or a group is defined not only as deviant threats to the community but they are made to look subhuman (pp. 19-20).
2. The media or speaker depicts the threat is depicted in a simple and recognizable symbol that becomes synonymous with the negative narrative being illustrated (pp. 36-40).
3. The depiction of the threat is exacerbated to arouse public concern (pp. 62-64).

4. Different authorities such as police and policymakers begin to take action in their respective ways (pp. 133-137).
5. Through the flow of the aforementioned steps as well as the manipulation of the symbols, moral panic set in thus resulting in action social changes (pp. 217-226).

By directly applying Cohen's (1972) 5-stage construction of moral panic, it becomes apparent how this applies to populist framing. To incite this moral panic, populists will target different societal issues ranging but not limited to social identity, economic decline, a cultural decline of a specific group, unfair policies, alleged oppression, or a combination of all of them (Cox et al., 2017; Spruyt et al., 2016; De Bruycker & Rooduijn, 2021).

Depending on the proposed agenda as well as the surrounding circumstances of the movement, they are attempting to depict, populist speakers frame their arguments in a way that is entrenched with pathos-based arguments that appeal to stimulating various emotions (Thiele et al., 2021). Whether trying to incite fear, anger, aggression, dissatisfaction, resentment, sadness, etc., populists will almost always tend to frequently use emotional language. Regarding populism and framing theory, speakers must carefully choose their words to sufficiently frame a message to incite social unrest or initiate a desired action. As described by Macagno (2014), emotive words can be powerful and dangerous tools principally because they provide an appearance or perception of reality that the speaker can manipulate with ease.

Emotive words can easily be manipulated and framed in such a way that make them primary instruments for drawing value judgments on a speaker's desired target.

Because our emotions are derived from past experiences and perceptions, emotional words maintain the ability to turn simple evaluations into possible actions (Macagno, 2014). Whether positive or negative, emotional language has a direct effect on one's mental cognitions and potential behaviors, especially when negative words are used to describe negative events (Knuppenburg & Fredricks, 2021). Consistent with previous literature, negative expressions, and word choice are traditionally used by public speakers less often, but they carry more information regarding relevant events (Garcia et al., 2012). Negative expressions and depictions are both composed of emotional language that can incite desired attitudes and actions when utilized properly (Macagno, 2014; Knuppenburg & Fredricks, 2021; Garcia et al., 2012). While powerful action verbs and adjectives can stimulate emotion, personal and possessive pronouns are just as important. Especially when an audience is consistently exposed to a certain type of frame within a message, their perceptions are likely going to change (Price & Tewksbury, 1997).

When evaluating political speeches, Kaewrungruang & Yaoharee (2018) found that the use of pronouns can be used in different ways to project different messages. Whether personal or possessive, the frequency of pronouns like "I," "you," "we," "our," etc. all work to establish credibility, balance, understanding, and trust between the speaker and their audience (Haider et al., 2023). These pronouns are not only used to establish homogeneity within the ingroup, but so the leader can illuminate themselves as some sort of all-encompassing authority with whom the audience can easily assimilate with (Liu 2023). The speaker / presenter will define themselves as part of the "common man" to gain support, and this has proven to be an effective strategy when attempting to influence various masses of people (Spruyt et al., 2016).

Once this credibility and homogeneity are established, the speaker can begin framing their message in the common “us versus them” mentality that instills a feeling of moral panic that is found within traditional populist rhetoric (Holcombe, 2021). Using pronouns that objectify the outgroup as folk devils (“they / them”) helps establish this pathos-based conflict. These techniques and manipulation of the message’s frame almost serve as a prerequisite to populism. Since framing itself involves this type of subconscious and psychological manipulation to convey a certain idea or message, populists must utilize the tactics of framing theory to influence political cognitions, and information processing, to encounter some degree of success especially when applied to group assimilation (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Desrosiers, 2015; Spruyt et al., 2016).

Although these are common practices of populists, very little literature reflects which methods are most successful regarding which techniques are attracting the most support via the messages being interpreted by different groups (Busby et al., 2019). Many different populists attempt to use varying strategies to frame their ideas to invoke different emotions to incite moral panic depending on the circumstances of the movement. Current literature indicates that words / frames that create a sensation of fear and anger have seen a lot of success (Wunderlich, 2023). Additionally, the messages that enforce these emotions often establish anti-elitist frames that attempt to project blame on specific outgroups that “endanger the social identity” of the ingroup (Bos et al., 2020). This research remains consistent with Cohen’s (1972) 5-stage construction of moral panic and the need to stimulate moral unrest.

To achieve success under this guide, Busby et al. (2019) emphasized that populist messages and tasks framed in dispositional terms created an increased amount of

engagement. Busby et al. further found that successful populist rhetoric relies on dispositional rather than situational frames of blame attribution. These dispositional frames focus primarily on the mentioned “elitist” group knowingly creating the asserted problems that are leading to these feelings of moral unwellness. Successful populists assert and frame their argument in a way that blames the elite for creating these issues, and the affected group must unify as a single sovereign body to address the said problem.

In short, the traditional and most successful populist messages utilize framing theory to do a few different key things: identify a societal problem that is negatively impacting a claimed ingroup, projects blame on a desired “elitist” outgroup by utilizing dispositional language, invoke various emotions such as anger, resentment, aggression, and fear to promote social unrest and a call to action, establish a unified bond between the speaker with the ingroup through various techniques involving first-person pronouns, and will sometimes project themselves or their solutions as the only option to resolve the asserted social unrest (Bos et al., 2020; Busby et al., 2019; Cohen, 1972; Spruyt et al., 2016; Thiele et al., 2021).

### **Populism and Far-Right Extremism**

Different populist speakers equip themselves with different techniques to frame their message in a way that incites these aforementioned feelings of moral unrest. The previous section highlighted the successful elements used by traditional populists within their rhetoric while this section will focus on specifically the elements utilized within most far-right populist rhetoric. Before discussing the extreme-right specifically, it is important to note that the far-left has also utilized populism to garner support. Most



literature currently available revolves around far-right extremism, and as a result, this section will highlight this side's themes.

On par with traditional populist rhetoric, the radical right frames arguments and messages in a way that targets people's identities (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017). To do this, far-right extremists base their arguments on a pathos-framed approach mostly devoid of facts that promote overall discourse as opposed to deliberation (Hameleers, 2019). Without deliberation, the speaker cannot be challenged as easily. This pathos-centered "politics of fear" approach allows right-wing populists to encourage how people should or should not feel about certain policies or messages (Thiele et al., 2021). By prioritizing politics of fear and insecurity, these populists utilize frames that invoke fear and shame. This type of political framing will establish collective threats targeting the ingroup (Béland, 2020). Regarding different issues such as unemployment, welfare, labor migration, etc. they frame their arguments to invoke feelings of resentment and hatred towards "enemies" (elites) (i.e., refugees immigrants, the unemployed, etc.) (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Beland, 2020). These topics are heavily influenced by various radical-right organizations, and even right-winged politicians have begun using them to garner support.

When evaluating former United States President, Donald Trump, during one of his speeches, Béland (2020) explained that Trump was able to sufficiently create a frame that depicted immigrants as deviant "folk devils" that would bring disorder to society. By framing immigration issues that essentially paint foreigners as problematic, it is easy to render populist techniques that depict "elites," in this case, liberal policymakers, as corrupt. Trump was able to portray himself as a protector with whom people could easily

assimilate because he planned to fix the issues that this elitist group caused. Béland further indicated that this example is not unique. Many far-right Republicans utilizing these techniques who are attempting to appeal to the masses frame their arguments in such a manner that displays Democrats as the helpless elite who are the primary cause of multitudes of issues - immigration only being one.

These types of frames are not unique to the United States. Even moving towards immigration issues in Europe and the UK, the media as well as other politicians framed displaced asylum-seekers as “folk devils” (Jewell, 2013). Causing a problematic political divide, this heated climate created a breeding ground for populists to depict an “us versus them” rhetoric to garner support for their own proposed agendas or policies. Across the world, most of these types of populists exploit the issue of immigration to promote their own agendas and legislative action. Gruber & Rosenberger (2023) explained that in many Western European countries, the immigration argument has been a primary strategy that almost guarantees electoral success for the radical right. Revolving around exclusive nationalism, this idea tends to be a core value of this party (p. 155).

Additionally, within Austria and Europe, right-winged conservative frames that revolved around the migration crisis heavily emphasized the traditional “anti-elitist” approach that blamed a variety of factors such as old policies, their proponents, and actors within opposing political parties (Thiele et al., 2021). These movements, coupled with the ones in the United States, emphasized nostalgia as a notable driving force. Expressing “when times were simpler” remains an easy appeal to conservative-minded audiences that could begin to evolve into a driving force for right-wing populist conservative politicians (Lammers & Baldwin, 2020). Regardless of nostalgia-framing,

immigration and projection on physical outgroups appear to be the driving factors for right-winged populist attempts in creating moral unrest (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2023).

Many of these extremist right-winged populist frames also encapsulate traces of Nazi / Neo-Nazi ideologies such as xenophobia, racism, islamophobia, antisemitism, nationalism, nativism, and chauvinism (Wodak, 2015). For the ingroup with which populists are attempting to resonate, the previously mentioned ideologies create easy targets of hate because the targets can be deemed as “non-conservative” and as “deviants.” Many of these groups have been targeted throughout history based on their identity, and because they do not fit the typical “White majority,” extremists can easily frame a narrative in a way that depicts the group as an outgroup or folk devil. For example, because immigrants can easily be depicted as outsiders, it is easy for extreme populists to blame different pressing societal issues on this outgroup as well as the “left / liberal-leaning elites” who are letting it happen (Thiele et al., 2021; Jewell, 2013; Beland, 2020; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Gruber & Rosenberger, 2023).

This type of populist rhetoric presents a dispositional attribution frame that resides as one of the most heavily utilized techniques by the far-right because it revolves around a pathos-centered appeal that perpetuates feelings of social unrest (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Cohen, 1972). Although these techniques are utilized by a multitude of far-right politicians across the world (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2023), they are also being utilized by Neo-Nazi organizations in the United States. While there remains a lapse in literature regarding populist Neo-Nazi rhetoric, the increased number of hate crimes perpetrated by these groups is unquestionable. Neo-Nazi populism has not been studied

nearly as much as extreme-right rhetoric, but the messages portraying specific outgroups as threats remain consistent.

### **Hate Crimes Perpetuated by Neo-Nazi Rhetoric**

Far-right extremists are often the primary enablers of many violent hate crimes within the United States, and these populations are typically condensed into religious areas (Medina et. al, 2021). These Neo-Nazi groups will often target different groups of individuals that traditional right-winged populism deems as threats. DiLorenzo (2021) emphasized that these individuals will commit hate crimes especially when they feel threatened by outsiders, are facing socio-economic hardships, and feel like they are losing their culture. These groups of individuals will often join together and create communities that promote the same ideas of White supremacy. Whether online or locally, there are currently 109 White nationalist groups that have caused 5,064 flyering incidents and hate crimes in 2022 alone (SPLC, 2022).

A token example of the rationale and motivations for these groups to incite hate crimes resides within the Proud Boys, a far-right extremist organization that aspires to rally young men across the country to stand up against the looming threats jeopardizing “Western society and conservative ideals” (Kriner & Lewis, 2021). Within the Proud Boys reside many different thematic elements of the far-right populism described in the previous section. These include standing up against “oppressors” that include but are not limited to minorities, women, feminist movements, DEI efforts, the LGBTQ+ community, followers of Islam and Judaism, liberal government systems, and anything else that could potentially resemble a left-leaning ideology (Eichenwald, 2016). All these directly contradict conservative ideals and place a sense of fear among those within these

communities. These agendas are why White supremacists and extreme conservatives feel threatened (DiLorenzo, 2021).

From this, the Proud Boys openly “declare war against the anti-White system” that seeks to oppress Whites as well as conservatives in general (Stewart et. al, 2023). By creating the Proud Boys, one of the most violent modern-day hate groups, its founder, Gavin McInnes aimed to create a conservative community that was “fraternal” in nature and allowed people to speak freely with little to no persecution (Dickson, 2021). Starting as a simple podcast, the Proud Boys evolved into a functioning organization with local chapters, a strong social media presence, formal leadership, the ability to stage in-person events, and a formal vetting process for recruitment that openly condones hate crimes against deemed threats (Mapping Militant Organizations, 2023).

McInnes framed his messages and his organization to target different outgroups because of who they are and the alleged issues they have imposed on his ingroup. These outgroups, within his vision, have jeopardized traditional American ideals, and McInnes has constructed a community that openly opposes these deemed threats. Hate and violence illuminate from this group, and dispositional frames that encourage blame are present (Dickson, 2021). Even though McInnes and the Proud Boys are shining examples of radical-right populism, there resides an inherent lapse in literature that actually identifies these traces of populism within Neo-Nazi rhetoric and how it has evolved over time.

### **Neo-Nazis Within this Study**

Undeniably, Neo-Nazi organizations are perpetuating violence across the United States. To do this, they must first attract people to their organizations’ ideals and motives.

To understand how and why the leaders of these organizations communicate the way they do, one must first look at how their techniques and frames have evolved over time. From Hitler to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, many different Neo-Nazis have framed and communicated their ideologies in a variety of ways. In addition to Hitler, this study evaluated two of the largest influences of the American Nazi movement: George Lincoln Rockwell and James Nolan Mason.

Rockwell, the founder of the American Nazi Party (ANP), had a tremendous influence on the initial Neo-Nazi movement within the United States, and the same is easily said about his successor, James Nolan Mason (*James N. Mason Papers*, n.d.). Both men have produced various works that articulate their own perceptions of Hitler's initial messages, and had a direct influence on many violent far-right organizations. Smith (2020) explained that during the 1960s, both Australia and Britain adopted a border control system to keep people and groups that perpetuated violent political ideologies out of their countries. Known for his dedication to influencing various Neo-Nazi groups to adopt acts that created violent public discourse as well as racial violence, Rockwell was specifically prohibited from entering both countries. Since Rockwell consistently advocated for racial violence, many previous and contemporary White supremacists and their respective groups have adopted this destructive mentality (Berger, 2003). Reflecting this mentality, within the Charlottesville "Unite the Right" protests in 2017, many far-right protestors were quoted chanting lines from Rockwell's *White Power* (Miller, 2017). This event devolved into pure chaos between protestors and counter-protestors which caused wide-scale violence between the groups (Keneally, 2018). Ware (2019) drew the same parallels for Mason.

The Atomwaffen Division (AWD), another violent Neo-Nazi group, requires its members to read Mason's *Siege*. After already having several of its members arrested for murder, the Atomwaffen have publicly declared to intensify their violence across several social media platforms, and more often than not, they are targeting people Mason deemed as threats (Wilson, 2020; Ware, 2019). Playing a key role in accelerationism, a movement emphasizing the inevitability and desirability of a race war, a multitude of different violent Neo-Nazi groups (such as the AWD) have adopted these violent mentalities and actions as a direct result of Mason (Gartenstein-Ross, 2020).

Both Rockwell's and Mason's ideologies have not only been accepted among these violent Neo-Nazi groups but acted upon as well. By openly advocating for violence, both men's works have provided a framework and foundation for these groups. By understanding their baseline communication techniques as well as their utilization of populism, we can begin to recognize how these groups are recruiting members as well as the successful / unsuccessful strategies they use to provoke violent crimes. To begin to provide this baseline understanding, this study will analyze Rockwell's *This Time the World* and *White Power* as well as Mason's *Siege* by comparing them with the rhetoric of Adolf Hitler.

### **Summary of Literature Review**

The end goal of populism is to incite some sort of movement that simultaneously balances the identification / targeting of an outgroup (primarily categorized as an elite), with the establishment of a homogeneous ingroup that the speaker can assimilate with (Müller, 2016; Erisen et al., 2021; Busby et al., 2019; Hewstone, 1990). For successful populists, this is done most often through the framing of pressing issues that stimulate

various emotions that incite feelings of social unrest and action (Cox et al., 2017; Spruyt et al., 2016; De Bruycker & Rooduijn, 2021). Through various techniques involving framing, emotive language, and pronoun use, populists can alter perceptions of reality for their ingroup (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Busby et al., 2019; Thiele et al., 2021; Spruyt et al., 2016). Among far-right extremists currently, there has been a large emphasis on immigration as well as other “liberal” policies to target people’s identities (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Béland, 2020). Although far-right politicians’ use of populist techniques has been studied, virtually no literature analyzes the populist techniques utilized by violent Neo-Nazi organizations that are currently inciting violence across the United States. George Lincoln Rockwell and James Nolan Mason, two pivotal Neo-Nazis perpetuating Nazi ideals in the United States, were analyzed within this study in an attempt to fill this inherent gap in literature.



## Research Question

Does post-World War II-era Neo-Nazi rhetoric reflect the same populist techniques utilized by Adolf Hitler during his time of power within Nazi Germany?

## Methodology

To answer the above question, a comparative and qualitative analysis was conducted between Nazi versus Neo-Nazi populist techniques within their rhetoric respectively.

Adolf Hitler composed hundreds upon hundreds of different speeches throughout his rise to power; therefore, for the sake of balancing the amount of content for a comparative analysis within this study, only 13 of Adolf Hitler's speeches were analyzed. These speeches included two declarations of war, six general addresses, and five annual speeches he would give to celebrate the day he took power over Germany (January 30<sup>th</sup>). Because of the consistency of each of these addresses, both by date and overall message, they are some of the most balanced opportunities to evaluate populist techniques. Translated to English, access was provided to each of the following speeches by the Institute for Historical Review and the World Future Fund (Hitler, 1922-1945; Hitler, n.d.):

- *Speech on Enabling Act 1933 – The last day of the Weimar Republic;*
- *Speech before the Reichstag – January 30, 1937;*
- *Adolf Hitler Speech – January 30, 1939;*
- *Adolf Hitler – Speech at the Berlin Sportspalast – January 30, 1940;*
- *Adolf Hitler – Speech before the Reichstag – January 30, 1941;*
- *Adolf Hitler – Speech at the Berlin Sportspalast – January 30, 1942;*
- *Adolf Hitler's speech to the German people - June 22, 1941 - Declaration of war on Russia;*

- *Adolf Hitler's speech to the German people - December 11, 1941 - Declaration of war on the United States;*
- *Adolf Hitler – Speech in Sportpalast Berlin, September 26, 1938;*
- *Adolf Hitler - New Year's Proclamation to the National Socialists and Party Comrades Fuhrer Headquarters, January 1, 1945;*
- *Adolf Hitler - Speech at the Sportpalast on the opening of the Kriegswinterhilfswerk Berlin, October 3, 1941;*
- *Adolf Hitler - Proclamation to the German folk Berlin, June 22, 1941 German Volk!;*
- *Adolf Hitler - Speech at the Sportpalast on the opening of the Kriegswinterhilfswerk Berlin, October 3, 1941.*

For the rhetoric on the other side of the analysis, popular literature from two of the most famous Neo-Nazi influencers within the United States was analyzed: George Lincoln Rockwell and James Nolan Mason. Rockwell's *White Power* and *This Time the World*, as well as Mason's *Siege*, were analyzed for this study. All these works are some of their most popular contributions to various Neo-Nazi movements within the United States.

When analyzing the literature to create a comparative analysis, KH Coder, a free computer software program for qualitative content analysis, was utilized (Higuchi, 2001). Previous research on domestic extremism using KH Coder include Baele et al. (2021a; 2021b). As explained by Hsieh & Shannon (2005), there are three types of qualitative content analysis: conventional, directed, or summative. The analysis present within this study is summative. While conventional and directed approaches involve coding categories and schemes, a summative analysis focuses on counting and comparisons. Summative analyses typically begin with the identifying and quantifying of particular

words or specific content to actually evaluate and understand its contextual use (p. 1283). An analysis of this variety, specifically the type that KH Coder articulates, provides insight as to how words are being used as well as the context of the overall message they are trying to convey. Qualitative content analysis that is summative in nature is crucial to understanding the messages being depicted within this study. To begin the evaluation of the qualitative content of the text, the program creates different graphs and charts dependent on desired outcomes. To examine each person's rhetoric for this study, the following 3 analyses were created by the program: the frequency of the top 25 most-used words, multi-dimensional scaling of words, and a co-occurrence network of words. To conduct each analysis, each speaker's rhetoric was combined into its own txt file. All of Hitler's speeches were combined into their own single txt file, and the same goes for Rockwell and Mason. All three files were plugged into KH Coder individually to create the three separate analyses.

Analysis 1, the frequency of words, depicted which words each populist used most frequently and how this could translate into populist themes. This analysis depicted various frequencies of words such as pronouns to determine the most common themes regarding word use. Before the actual analysis was conducted, proper nouns, nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs were the only categories slated for the figures. After the top 25 most frequent words were identified, they were split into columns identifying the part of speech (POS), how many times they appeared (frequency), and what percentage of the total amount of words they composed.

Analysis 2, the multi-dimensional scaling of words, portrayed the location and proximity of words in relation to one another. By evaluating physical proximity, the

study could determine what kind of words were consistently located near each other, and what kind of themes they could imply. Like the first analysis, proper nouns, nouns, verbs, and adverbs were all incorporated. To reduce the clutter and create a clearer picture of proximities, adjectives were left out.

Analysis 3, the co-occurrence network of words, emphasized which words were most often strung together in different chains or sequences. By physically seeing which words were most often used in the same sequences, this study could analyze which words were most often connected and what overarching messages were being articulated. Similar to the first analysis, proper nouns, nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs were all slated in order to create the most accurate word chains possible.

To focus on populist rhetoric, Stanford stop words were applied to the analyses to reduce excess words. Because of the nature of how populist rhetoric is framed, personal and possessive pronouns such as “I,” “we,” “us,” “everyone,” “they,” “them,” “their,” “themselves,” “together,” “you,” “yours,” “your,” and “yourselves” were all kept in the study. Due to the sheer importance of emotional language and pronouns within populist frames, these were the two indicators most heavily relied upon to locate populist themes. These themes included the identification / targeting of an outgroup (elites or whatever target the speaker illustrated), the identification of an ingroup, an effort to construct homogeneity between the speaker and within the ingroup itself, and emotive language to incite action.

### **Summary of Methodology**

KH Coder was utilized to identify populist themes within Hitler, Mason, and Rockwell’s rhetoric to begin to conceptualize an understanding of how Nazi / Neo-Nazi

rhetoric has changed since Hitler's rise to power in Nazi Germany. Personal pronouns and emotive language that emphasized the need for action were heavily relied upon to identify as well as compare each analysis. All three analyses entailed a comparative analysis between the speakers. Each analysis yielded its own results, and the next section compares which populist techniques were used (via pronouns and emotive language), which themes were identified, how they contrasted, and how their results match current literature within this field.

## Results

### Analysis 1: Frequency of Words (FOW)

**Table 1.1.** Hitler's FOW

#	Word	POS	Frequency	% of words
1	we	PRP	1657	1.704%
2	they	PRP	1215	1.236%
3	I	PRP	1201	1.222%
4	german	Adj	796	0.810%
5	people	Noun	535	0.544%
6	Germany	ProperNoun	476	0.484%
7	war	Noun	321	0.326%
8	year	Noun	306	0.311%
9	state	Noun	284	0.289%
10	world	Noun	270	0.275%
11	National	ProperNoun	262	0.267%
12	nation	Noun	251	0.255%
13	you	PRP	246	0.250%
14	make	Verb	228	0.232%
15	Reich	ProperNoun	215	0.219%
16	today	Noun	208	0.212%
18	know	Verb	176	0.179%
19	man	Noun	172	0.175%
20	-RSB-	ProperNoun	170	0.173%
21	come	Verb	170	0.173%
22	new	Adj	161	0.164%
23	power	Noun	161	0.164%
24	life	Noun	158	0.161%
25	force	Noun	157	0.160%

**Table 1.2.** Rockwell's FOW

#	Word	POS	Frequency	% of words
1	I	PRP	3776	1.601%
2	they	PRP	3220	1.365%
3	we	PRP	2841	1.205%
4	you	PRP	1003	0.425%
5	Jews	ProperNoun	872	0.370%
6	people	Noun	821	0.348%
7	man	Noun	776	0.329%
8	White	ProperNoun	570	0.242%
9	world	Noun	461	0.195%
10	make	Verb	460	0.195%
11	Jewish	Adj	442	0.187%
12	know	Verb	351	0.149%
13	Jew	ProperNoun	340	0.144%
14	just	Adv	327	0.139%
15	Negro	ProperNoun	325	0.138%
16	year	Noun	323	0.137%
18	thing	Noun	306	0.130%
19	America	ProperNoun	301	0.128%
20	race	Noun	301	0.128%
21	way	Noun	299	0.127%
22	black	Adj	296	0.126%
23	little	Adj	288	0.122%
24	New	ProperNoun	288	0.122%
25	come	Verb	279	0.118%

**Table 1.3.** Mason’s FOW

#	Word	POS	Frequency	% of words
1	they	PRP	2260	1.220%
2	we	PRP	2255	1.220%
3	I	PRP	1555	0.839%
4	you	PRP	1451	0.783%
5	Movement	ProperNoun	492	0.266%
6	people	Noun	409	0.221%
7	know	Verb	404	0.218%
8	man	Noun	394	0.213%
9	make	Verb	392	0.212%
10	thing	Noun	384	0.207%
11	come	Verb	327	0.176%
12	say	Verb	309	0.167%
13	year	Noun	308	0.166%
14	way	Noun	299	0.161%
15	White	ProperNoun	280	0.151%
16	National	ProperNoun	263	0.142%
18	today	Noun	243	0.131%
19	Hitler	ProperNoun	236	0.127%
20	Manson	PoperNoun	224	0.120%
21	world	Noun	212	0.114%
22	order	Noun	201	0.108%
23	revolution	Noun	199	0.107%
24	enemy	Noun	198	0.107%
25	Rockwell	ProperNoun	189	0.102%

***Analysis 1: Comparison of Results***

Within Analysis 1, each speaker’s frequency of words depicted various indications of populist techniques. Looking first towards personal pronouns, Table 1.1 portrayed Adolf Hitler’s primary words across his speeches: “we” (1657), “they” (1215), and “I” (1201) in that order. Their percentage of usage across his rhetoric far surpassed that of nearly every other word. Because pronouns are used to illustrate different messages as well as create credibility and understanding between the speaker and their ingroup (Kaewrungruang & Yaoharee, 2018; Haider et al., 2023), it is no surprise Hitler



prioritized them so heavily. Additionally, this is a notable outcome primarily because he focused on words that build a homogenous ingroup by using “we” to establish baseline assimilation. Consistent with populist frames, by continuously repeating “we,” Hitler was able to emphasize ingroup social identity and create a narrative that he was part of the common man, thus making his message more easily reciprocated (Holcombe, 2021; Spruyt et. al, 2016).

Regarding the outgroup, “they” is the second most utilized word. Focusing on blame projection, the use of “they” indicates the identification of a target which is critical to populism in and of itself (Holcombe, 2021; Béland, 2020; Müller, 2016). Because “we” was prioritized above “they,” there is a clear emphasis on building homogeneity rather than just presenting a target. To build his own credibility and self-assimilation, it is no surprise that “I” resided as the third-most used word. It is still important to note that because “we” was more utilized than both “they” and “I,” Hitler focused more on using words that constructed integral feelings of homogeneity within his ingroup. This is very evident when looking towards the resonating emotive language among his other most frequently used words such as: “german” (796), “people” (535), “Germany” (476), “National” (262), “nation” (251), and “Reich” (215). These words ultimately build feelings of assimilation because they are words that target the identity of his ingroup uniting as a collective body. Populism requires the establishment of a homogeneous ingroup that prioritizes the symbiotic nature between themselves and the speaker in order to create an “endangered social identity” (Müller, 2016; Spruyt et al., 2016; Bos et al., 2020; Busby et al. 2019). As for a specific call to action, Hitler used “you,” a direct call to the audience 246 times, but ultimately, there was a much larger emphasis on the

collective action previously described. After all, emotional attachment is pivotal to populist rhetoric to create a social identity (Holcombe, 2021), and this is what Hitler focused on.

By comparison, within Table 1.2, Rockwell's priority of wording was much different. He emphasized "I," "they," and "we" respectively. By comparison, Rockwell focused much more on himself and establishing his own self-assimilation and credibility than Hitler. While populists will oftentimes project themselves as an illuminated all-encompassing authority (Liu, 2023), Hitler spent less time doing this than Rockwell. Although, similarly, Rockwell's second most-used word, "they," also resided as a top priority for blame projection as well as the identification of an outgroup. This projection and time spent emphasizing the targets of an outgroup is much more visible in this table. He used emotive language such as "Jews" (872), "people" (821), "jewish" (442), "Jew" (340), "Negro" (325), and "black" (296) more frequently to construct a targeted outgroup and stimulate negative emotions. This provides reasoning as to why he used "they" as frequently as he did. Traditional among most far-right populists, Rockwell frequently used words that would truly depict a well-defined outgroup (elite) (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Beland, 2020).

Similar to Hitler, Rockwell frequently used "we" (2841) to create the needed establishment of an ingroup within a populist movement (Holcombe, 2021), but used the word "you" (1003) much more frequently. This depicts a call to action by speaking to the ingroup directly. While populist speakers conjoin an ingroup into a unified front acting as its own sovereign body (Erisen et al., 2021), Rockwell focused on individual action

(“you”) as opposed to collective action. In general, fewer words were used to incite homogeneity among the ingroup than words that targeted an outgroup.

With Mason’s word choice, Table 1.3 indicated several overlapping themes shared between Hitler and Rockwell. Similarly, Mason’s top four words were “they,” “we,” “I,” and “you” respectively, but “they” was only used 5 more times than “we.” “They” was used 2260 times while “we” was used 2255 times. It is important to note that all four of these pronouns were used over one thousand times more than every other word within this work.

By using “they” and “we” an exact same amount, there is almost an identical emphasis on the establishment of an ingroup while also identifying / targeting an outgroup. Both of these words are critical for the criteria of populism (Müller, 2016), but while this is true, Mason took a bit of a different approach with his frequencies than both Hitler and Rockwell. Populists want to establish an “us versus them” mentality (Holcombe, 2021), so by coupling “we” and “they” with other frequently used words such as “Movement” (492), “White” (280), “National” (263), “revolutionary” (252), “revolution” (199), and “enemy” (198), Mason illustrated emotive language that depicted a solution- a revolutionary movement. By creating favorable associations within this type of frame, more people are likely to adopt this mentality (Levin et al., 1998). With Mason frequently proposing an alteration of the status quo, he maintained the potential to incite violence, especially when the establishment of a social identity (“White” and “we”) is involved (Desrosiers, 2015).

Similar to the other speakers, Mason used “I” the third-most to establish his own credibility and self-assimilation, but like Rockwell, he used “you” the fourth-most in

order to speak directly with his ingroup. Both Rockwell and Mason used “you” much more frequently than Hitler, and this indicates a divide between individual versus collective action.

Through Analysis 1, each speaker’s frequency of words unanimously depicted populist techniques within their rhetoric. While this is true, each speaker’s frequency of words depicted some variation. All three of the speakers used the personal pronouns “we,” “I,” “they,” and “you,” but their frequencies varied from speaker to speaker, and this directly impacted which other emotive words they used. Hitler (Table 1.1) focused on “we” much more than the other pronouns. This shows the prioritization of collective action as an ingroup as opposed to action on an individual level. As a result, other words that focused on forming this collective action followed (i.e. “German,” “Germany,” “nation,” “national,” etc.). Although Hitler frequently used “they” to create an outgroup, and “I” to create self-assimilation, he focused much more on words that emphasize collective ingroup identity.


On the other hand, Rockwell’s word frequency (Table 1.2) prioritized other sentiments establishing himself as the speaker as identifying / targeting an outgroup(s). Rockwell’s most frequently used word was “I” whereas Hitler’s was “we.” By prioritizing “I,” Rockwell spent more time establishing himself as the speaker for his ingroup (we). As for the ingroup itself, Rockwell also used “we” quite frequently, but he also placed a much larger emphasis on the pronoun “you” than Hitler. Rockwell prioritized “we” and “you” to directly build and communicate with his ingroup. Hitler and Rockwell both used emotive language to construct an ingroup, but had different ways of doing it. Rockwell had used more emotive language to establish and

target an outgroup(s) than Hitler. “They” was their second-most used word, but Rockwell used much harsher language and more frequently referenced his portrayed outgroups. Paired with “you” and “they”, Rockwell focused his word choice more so on individual action and an outgroup whereas Hitler focused his language on creating a collective identity.

In comparison, for Mason (Table 1.3), his frequency of the pronouns “they,” “we,” “I,” and “you” were much higher than Hitler and Rockwell’s. While this is true, the frequency of “they” and “we” were almost identical as his most-used words. Unlike Rockwell, Mason prioritized language that focused much less on targeting an outgroup and more so on collectively establishing a movement that challenged the status quo. Hitler focused words on collective action and collective identity, and Mason took a similar approach, but more frequently used “you” paired with other words such as “Movement,” “National,” “revolutionary,” and “revolution.


## Analysis 2: Multi-Dimensional Scaling of Words (MDSW)

Figure 2.1. Hitler's MDSW





**Figure 2.3.** Mason’s MDSW



***Analysis 2: Comparison of Results***

Similar to Analysis 1, Analysis 2 also yielded results that displayed different elements of populism. Beginning with Hitler, Figure 2.1 illustrates different establishments of homogeneity, blame projection, and emotive language, which again, are all core elements of populist rhetoric (Müller, 2016; Macagno, 2014; Hewstone, 1990; Busby et al., 2019). Located in Cluster 1, as Analysis 1 indicated, personal pronouns such as “we” and “they” were at the center of speeches. Similarly, words that create sensations of ingroup assimilation such as “state,” “nation,” “Germany,” and



“power” were all located within this cluster. Joining these words of assimilation, words like “war,” “end,” and “struggle” found in this cluster also indicated hardships felt by the “we” and “german people” of this cluster. As populists typically do, these clusters of words depict negative social unrest and struggles among the ingroup (Müller, 2016; Bos et al., 2020), thus making it easier for Hitler to affect mental cognitions (Knuppenburg & Fredricks, 2021). This theme can also be traced moving into the intersection of Clusters 1, 4, and 5. Words found near each other such as “struggle,” “movement,” and “revolution” all dictate the need for an alteration within the status quo.

Looking towards Cluster 3, “problem” and “enemy” are located near each other. This outgroup targeting spreads into Clusters 6-8. Cluster 3’s “enemy” can be found near the other clusters’ “Italy,” “Britain,” “Roosevelt,” “France,” “Russia,” and “England.” Successful populists blatantly create dispositional frames that attribute blame to elites or outgroups (Busby et al., 2019), and that is exactly what these clusters show. Additionally, all these targeted outgroups are also within close proximity of Cluster 7’s “attack.” Cluster 8 also placed “Europe” near “fight.” Not only did Hitler identify all these outgroups as enemies, but he also dictated the need to “attack” and “fight” them. This call to action expands further into Cluster 6 with words like “want,” “sacrifice,” “live,” “help,” and “come.” By placing these types of emotive words near each other, Hitler was able to create a traditional yet successful populist frame that turned evaluation into action (Macagno, 2014). Moreover, by strategically placing these words, he created a frame that designated struggles with these various outgroups and influenced the mental cognitions of his ingroup (Knuppenburg & Fredricks, 2021)

Overall, Figure 2.1 indicated that Hitler strategically placed different words near each other to establish homogeneity among his ingroup, to incite action both within the ingroup and towards the outgroup, and to establish some feelings of social unrest / discontent.

Table 1.2 already indicated Rockwell's prioritization to establish himself as a speaker as well as enhanced targeting of an outgroup in comparison to the other speakers, and the same is found within Figure 2.2. Cluster 2 depicts "I" and "you" near "know" and Cluster 8's "want," "say," "tell," "think," "look," "ask," and "hear." These all display Rockwell's themes of both speaking directly to his ingroup as well as asserting his own thoughts. While depicting himself as an all-encompassing authority (Liu, 2023), he placed words around each other that attempt to establish a sovereign body of people working towards the objective (Erisen et al., 2021; Müller, 2016).

Cluster 2 also placed "they" and "we" as central points of the rhetoric. This displayed Rockwell's style of primarily emphasizing the targeting of an outgroup. These pronouns were right next to "make" and "Jews" which created a "they / Jews make..." frame that created an easy projection. This projection and identification of an outgroup is primarily found in Cluster 1 (except for "Jews" in Cluster 1) and parts of Cluster 3. Cluster 1 entailed language involving outgroup identification and action verbs against them. These words included "Negro," "liberal," "lie," "war," "fight," "kill," and "enemy" all within close proximity of each other, Cluster 6's "hate," and Cluster 3's "attack." Clearly, these clusters show Rockwell's establishment of outgroup "folk devils" (Abbink & Harris, 2019; Béland, 2020), and by using powerful pathos-framed language, he can sufficiently create discourse and social unrest for his movement (Hameleers, 2019).

Although most of the outgroup identification and projection resided in these clusters, Clusters 2 and 7 both displayed words like “Jew,” “money,” “communism,” and “communists.” It is important to note that these outgroup indicators are relatively spread apart from the other clusters that depicted outgroups and actions against them. In comparison to Hitler, Rockwell did not cluster nearly as many words that indicated feelings of homogeneity among his ingroup. Instead, his clusters insinuated self-illumination, action verbs, and emotive language against his deemed outgroups.

In comparison to Hitler and Rockwell, Figure 2.3 indicated that Mason was a little more sporadic with his word clustering throughout his rhetoric. The centralized cluster, Cluster 1, placed “they” and “we” almost completely overlapping in the middle of the entire figure. Due to Table 1.3, this is to be expected. Additionally, “I” and “you” both reside near these other pronouns, showing that Mason balanced his use of pronouns and placed them within relative proximity of one another throughout the entirety of his rhetoric. Near “I,” the words “know” and “say” both indicated (like Rockwell) an attempt at generating self-assimilation and credibility within his rhetoric (Liu, 2023). Surrounding these pronouns within the same cluster, words including “make” and “come” display the easier construction of frames articulating different ideas such as “you / we / they make” which, like Rockwell, created alleged assertions of truth (Müller, 2016).

Surrounding these pronouns and verbs, emotive words such as “enemy,” “power,” “life,” and “Movement” all made appearances. Near “Movement” within Cluster 1, words that paint the need to challenge the status quo involved Cluster 4’s “mass” and “death” as well as Cluster 2’s “struggle,” “world,” “order,” “end,” “war,” “society,” and “today.” Similarly, these words can be found near Cluster 3’s “revolution,” “action,” “need,”

“ourselves,” “themselves,” and “future.” Cluster 2 also entailed words that established an ingroup mindset. By surrounding “White” with words like “struggle,” “state,” “race,” “lose,” and “war,” he created an ingroup who’s social identity is being targeted (Bos et al., 2020) and dispositional frames (Busby et al., 2019). From all three of these clusters, the words Mason utilized within such close proximity to one another framed a clear message that the status quo needs to be challenged by his ingroup via a “revolution” and / or “movement” to resolve this social unrest. By strategically placing an internal struggle, a designation of an outgroup, and the articulation of a solution, Mason utilizes some of these negative expressions formulated to incite desired attitudes and action towards his movement ((Macagno, 2014; Knuppenburg & Fredricks, 2021; Garcia et al., 2012). While Hitler and Rockwell did not focus nearly as much on this concept within their clustering, Mason spent the least amount of time naming a specific outgroup. Although he utilized “they” and “we” almost the same amount, this analysis only depicted the identification of an outgroup within Cluster 2- “Jews” and “kill.”

Analysis 2 indicated some key differences among all three speakers in terms of how they most often clustered words throughout their rhetoric. Hitler’s clusters (Figure 2.1) balanced the identification of several outgroups, action against them, homogeneity within his ingroup, and problems within the status quo. While Hitler utilized “I” frequently (Table 1.1), he did not place nearly as many words as his own thoughts or feelings around it. Rockwell did this the most, and Mason did as well. Hitler’s clusters surround his most used word “we” with all of the aforementioned themes. In comparison, Rockwell’s clusters (Figure 2.2) are much more dependent on word placement that identifies outgroups and calls the audience to take action. While Hitler focused on a

collective body (we) to take action, Rockwell's clusters indicated a large emphasis on all his deemed outgroups as opposed to grouping words that established homogeneity. Like Hitler, Mason's clusters somewhat established this homogeneity by grouping words that depicted the need for a revolution or movement against the status quo. Although this is true, Hitler excelled at spreading words that established his ingroup identity throughout the majority of his rhetoric while simultaneously depicting the need to move against his deemed outgroups.

### Analysis 3: Co-Occurance Network of Words (CONW)

Figure 3.1. Hitler's CONW






Figure 3.2. Rockwell's CONW



**Figure 3.3.** Mason’s CONW



***Analysis 3: Comparison of Results***

Building off the previous two analyses, Analysis 3 also reinforces several themes uncovered. For Hitler, Subgraph 1 of Figure 3.1 reinforces Hitler’s prioritization of collective homogeneity among his ingroup. “We” directly links with “people,” “German,” “nation,” “entire,” “Volk,” and “Reich.” “Government” connects this strand of homogeneity with words indicating further classification of the ingroup: “National,” “Socialist,” “party,” “Germany,” “state,” “movement,” and “revolution.” All of these words strung together in some capacity blatantly illustrates not only Hitler’s assimilation

with the ingroup but also the establishment of a social identity for his ingroup that is so pivotal to any populist movement (Müller, 2016).

Among this homogeneity, Subgraphs 4, 3, and 12, display Hitler's illustration of the problems the ingroup was enduring as well as the outgroups perpetuating it. Subgroup 4 depicts a string of words that entail “military,” “political,” “economic,” “life,” “foreign,” and “policy.” All of these illustrate pressing societal issues perpetuated by Subgraph 12’s “England,” “France,” “Great Britain,” and Subgraph 3’s “attack,” “Roosevelt,” and “Soviet Russia.” By consistently linking the outgroup with a word like “attack” it is easier for populists like Hitler to mobilize action (Bos et al., 2020).

To better portray solutions for the ingroup for these issues perpetuated by the targeted outgroups, Hitler used emotive language strung together within Subgraphs 5, 8, 11, and 10. Subgraph 5 shows “war,” “world,” and “end.” Nearby, Subgraph 8 reads “place” and “hope” while Subgraph 10 strings “begin,” “work,” and “peace.” Subgraph 11 shows the promise of “new,” “order,” “social.” By stringing together “you” with “speak,” “know,” and “say,” Hitler framed a message saying that these were the things *you all* have been asking for. Pronouns and other emotive language gave Hitler the ability to establish credibility and trust within these strings (Haider et al., 2023). Like other populists, these desires were framed as if they were coming from the ingroup, and the speaker is the one who can deliver (Müller, 2016). Simply put, within Figure 3.1, Hitler was not only able to string words to create homogeneity among his ingroup, but he was able to portray outgroups and the societal issues they caused. Through further emotive language, he depicted feelings of desired peace, the end of war, and a new order.



As depicted in Figure 3.2, Rockwell's methodology was very different. Rockwell's co-occurrence of words maintained much more overlap than Hitler's. For example, Subgraph 3 and Subgraph 2 depicted a couple of different themes. Even though it was not the most frequent word, "they" tended to be the center point for almost all themes within this Figure. "They" is connected to "political," "power," "force," "I," "you," "people," "we," and "jews." Due to the results from the previous analyses, this wide variety of interpretations makes sense. Rockwell focused on the identification and projection of an outgroup much more than the other speakers and the plethora of connectors he used to connect "they" with other subgraphs fulfill this theme. The complexity of this Figure depicts how Rockwell integrated blame projection as well as the targeting of an outgroup to build upon nearly every message he conveyed to his ingroup, and this is consistent with many other far-right populists who prioritize projection on outgroups (Gruber & Rosenberger, 2023). For example, "they" connect directly with "jews," and this links to Subgraph 1 which also entails "Jew," "enemy," "communist," "Jewish," "world," "war," "fight," "win," and "mass." Furthermore, because "they" provides another direct link between Subgraph 3 and 2, this connection connects "they" directly with "White" and "power" which also share links with "race," "color," "Negro," "black," and "man." Regardless of the messages depicted by Rockwell within Subgraphs 1, 2, or 3, almost every line leads back to "they" in some capacity. This establishes a very apparent outgroup prioritization, in which populism inherently thrives (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Beland, 2020, Müller, 2016).

Regarding feelings of assimilation or ingroup prioritization, Subgraph 2 connects "White" with "young," "man," "America," "today," "fight," and "war." While these are

not all the connected strings of words, again, almost every single path leads back to “they.” It creates a clear populist message that “they” are endangering “us” and “you” (Cox et al., 2017). When looking back to Subgraph 3, “you” and “I” share several connections such as “know,” “think,” “want,” “hear,” “tell,” and “learn.” By linking these pronouns between shared verbs, Rockwell depicted shared goals that he and his ingroup have in common. This also displays an attempt to establish his credibility and self-assimilation with his group (Liu et al., 2022) as well as a “politics of fear” strategy that tells the ingroup how they should feel (Thiele et al., 2021). The word “know” also played a large role in this concept. “Know” from Subgraph 3 is connected to “they,” “I,” and “you.” This strategy presents Rockwell in a way that everything he was saying remained as common knowledge among himself, his ingroup, and the outgroup. While Hitler’s co-occurrence of words maintained a balance of homogeneity of the ingroup, targeting / establishing an outgroup, emotive language, and establishing credibility, as individual concepts, Rockwell meshed them all into one main theme that emphasized the outgroup. A projection of this degree creates a sound environment for mobilization (Busby et al. 2019).

Figure 3.3 illustrates several different strategies utilized by both Hitler and Rockwell. While almost all of Rockwell’s co-occurrences are directly linked to “they,” for Mason, almost all the occurrences connect to all four of the personal pronouns he prioritized in Table 1.3: “we,” “they,” “I,” and “you.” Table 1.3 shows these were Mason’s most frequently used words, so Figure 3.3 is fitting. Similar to Rockwell, almost every single significant co-occurrence is somehow connected to these pronouns.

Wholistically, the figure does not depict too much of an actual identified outgroup. Subgraph 6 includes “real,” “enemy,” “attack,” and “able,” but it is not connected to any other subgraphs. Although this figure does not necessarily target a specific outgroup, Mason heavily emphasized his priority of inciting a movement with his ingroup. In Subgraph 1, “I,” “we,” “ourselves,” and “member” are all connected in some way to “Movement.” “Movement” also serves as a connector to Subgraph 2 that includes “revolutionary,” “National,” “Socialist,” “party,” “old,” “wing,” and “Nazi.”

Referencing the old party, this subgraph also connects to Subgraph 3 where Mason strung “world,” “war,” “Germany,” “Hitler,” and “Commander Rockwell” with “say,” and “they.” Mason illustrated previous influences from old Nazi influences, and he integrated this into his communication for his movement. Similar to Rockwell’s, “know” also provided a large basis for self-assimilation, projection, and ingroup homogeneity. “Know” connects with all four of his prioritized pronouns. By stating “I / we / you / they know,” everything Mason said sounded like issues of fact that are common knowledge among everyone. Again, this “politics of fear” approach explains how people should feel (Thiele et al., 2021). By integrating a “politics of fear” strategy with consistently talking about past people / parties, Mason was able to establish a frame that endorsed a “when times were simpler” message (Lammers & Baldwin, 2020) that aimed to create mobilization for his movement.

Analysis 3 provided quite a bit of insight regarding how each speaker projected their messages and overall constructed individual frames to do so. Hitler’s co-occurrence of words provided a balance of homogeneity within the ingroup and established credibility while simultaneously prioritizing emotive language that provided solvency to

declared social issues. In comparison, Rockwell and Mason integrated personal pronouns within nearly every co-occurrence. Rockwell prioritized the projection of “they” to both build homogeneity among his ingroup as well as build projected outgroups that should be targeted. Mason’s co-occurrence, on the other hand, heavily utilized all four of his main personal pronouns (I, we, they, you) to construct the need to create a movement. Due to their utilization of the word “know,” Rockwell and Mason’s co-occurrences both framed messages in a way that appeared to be a matter of fact and common knowledge. Hitler’s co-occurrences did not reflect these trends nearly as much.

## **Discussion**

Analyses 1, 2, and 3 are all consistent with the literature regarding the utilization of populist techniques and framing theory. While this is true, both Rockwell's and Mason’s rhetoric echoed some notable differences from Hitler’s. Analysis 1 depicted a clear indication that all three speakers prioritize pronouns differently. Pronouns are a common way for populists to frame different messages (Kaewrungruang & Yaoharee, 2018) as well as establish an “us versus them” mentality to instill feelings of homogeneity (Holcombe, 2021). Taking a more homogenous approach, Hitler focused on “we” as his most frequently used word throughout his rhetoric (Table 1.1), and he consistently linked and grouped words emphasizing a collective national identity (Figures 2.1 & 3.1). By using this type of emotive language, like many other populists, Hitler was able to establish credibility, balance, and an identification of being part of the common man (Haider et al., 2023; Spruyt et al., 2016). Through his rhetoric, Hitler primarily framed himself as someone his ingroup could easily assimilate with while also establishing a collective identity. Because a strong, collective ingroup identity was

established by Hitler, literature indicates that this is a prime formula for outgroup social projection (Cohrs et al., 2022; Mullen et al., 1992).

Rather than placing a large emphasis on homogeneity within his ingroup, Rockwell focused more so on frames that prioritized the need to identify and target outgroups. While Hitler also did this, Rockwell made it his most significant priority. Naturally, since Rockwell's most frequently utilized words were "I" and "they" (Table 1.2), there was a strong adversarial mentality that populists typically utilize (Holcombe, 2021), especially extreme-right speakers depicting outgroups as folk devils (Beland, 2020). Common among extreme-right populists, prioritizing the targeting of various outgroups to garner feelings of resentment or hatred is not unique (Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; Beland, 2020), and it was the primary strategy shown by Figures 2.2 and 3.2. When evaluating Rockwell's rhetoric, these analyses indicated that Rockwell focused much more on outward projection as opposed to constant ingroup assimilation, and this was best indicated by his most frequently used pronouns as well as targeted language towards outgroups (Table 1.2).

Among all three speakers, Mason maintained the most frequent and balanced use of the pronouns. "We" and "they" occurred at an almost identical frequency while "you" just barely trailed "I" (Table 1.3). Although every other speaker utilized pronouns to establish projection and homogeneity, due to Mason's vast number of uses, almost every message articulated was linked to one in some capacity (Figure 3.3). Like Hitler and Rockwell, the pronoun "you" was found close to "know." This dispositional frame focused on the outgroup knowingly perpetuating asserted problems that are plaguing the ingroup (Busby et al., 2019). For Mason and Rockwell, this was a primary avenue in

establishing assimilation between themselves and their ingroup. The occurrence was there for Hitler, but it happened much less frequently. By directly linking pronouns such as “we,” “I,” “you,” and “they” with the word “know” (Figures 3.2 & 3.3), the speakers created a feeling of all-encompassing authority and trust that most populists commonly utilize to appeal to their ingroups (Liu, 2022). By linking these words, they created a frame that depicts what they are saying as common knowledge or a common truth they can deliver while simultaneously projecting blame (Müller, 2016). Emotive in nature, this type of word choice alters perspectives and changes the appearance of reality (Macagno, 2014). This methodology is much more applicable when the speaker emphasizes the word “you” more frequently. Whereas Hitler primarily focused on the collectivity of “we” when speaking to his ingroup, Rockwell and Mason used “you” more frequently by comparison. Regardless, both Hitler and the Neo-Nazis maintained different ways of establishing communication and inciting action among their individual ingroups.

### **Summary of Results**

To answer whether post-World War II-era Neo-Nazi rhetoric reflects the same populist techniques utilized by Adolf Hitler during his time of power within Nazi Germany, this section articulated three analyses of rhetoric from Hitler, Rockwell, and Mason. Analysis 1 covered their frequency of words, while Analysis 2 depicted their multi-dimensional scaling of words, and Analysis 3 covered their co-occurrence network of words. After comparing their results, the analyses each displayed different techniques and themes articulated by each speaker to convey their rhetoric. Post-World War II-era Neo-Nazi rhetoric has slightly changed in variation and style. Hitler used pronouns and emotive language that primarily focused on building collective action and homogeneity

within his ingroup, Rockwell focused primarily on establishing a targeted outgroup, and Mason focused more on balancing pronouns in a way that incited action towards a revolutionary movement against the status quo.

The next section highlights the major findings of this study, Additionally, it illustrates a few limitations, how this study could be changed if done again, and some implications and recommendations for future research.

## **Conclusion**

### **Summary of Major Findings**

Regarding how populist techniques within Neo-Nazi rhetoric have changed since Adolf Hitler's time in power, this study articulated a few key findings. First, when Hitler's rhetoric was directly compared to that of two major Neo-Nazis, George Lincoln Rockwell and James Nolan Mason, personal pronouns were used differently. This inherently affects how the speaker frames their ingroup as well as identifies / targets their outgroup(s). Within Hitler's rhetoric, he used "we" much more than every other pronoun. In comparison to the Neo-Nazi rhetoric, Rockwell used "I" and "they" significantly more than "we" while Mason used "we" as well as "they" at almost an exact frequency. For the Neo-Nazis, this utilization of pronouns depicted that they both placed a larger emphasis on the outgroup than Hitler did. Furthermore, regarding the ingroup, Hitler utilized much more homogenous language ("German," "German People," "Reich," "Volk," etc.) and dispersed it much more evenly across his rhetoric, than both Rockwell and Mason. Although Hitler dedicated more effort to dispersing this language, both Neo-Nazis utilized the pronoun "you" to a much higher degree. Hitler focused more on displaying an "us" versus "them" collective mindset whereas the Neo-Nazis depicted a more "you" versus "them" individualist mindset.

### **Limitations and Validity Issues**

There were a few limitations and validity issues within this study. The first one involves the method of using KH Coder. While KH Coder does a good job presenting analytical and logistical snapshots of the rhetoric, due to the nature of qualitative analysis, it cannot truly capture and depict all the thematic elements being studied within



these analyses. KH Coder creates good images and figures, but these most likely do not fully capture the speaker's entire intent.

The next issue involves the type of rhetoric analyzed. Naturally, in most cases, the average person writes differently than they speak. Directly comparing Hitler's speeches to his writing could produce different variations in how he communicates. It also resides as an inherent possibility that this analysis would have yielded different results if his writing had been analyzed as opposed to his speeches. The same logic applies to that of the Neo-Nazi rhetoric. Instances of their actual speaking could have yielded different results if directly compared to Hitler's.

The final reliability issue pertains to the amount of rhetoric analyzed. Hitler gave hundreds of speeches while this study only analyzed 13. To say that this study encapsulated all of Hitler's rhetorical populist elements would be a hasty generalization. For example, we know Hitler focused a lot of his rhetoric on targeting Jews, however, that element is not portrayed in this study. The same logic applies to Mason. Only one of his works was analyzed. Although this was likely his most well-known piece, it still does not encapsulate all his styles. Two of Rockwell's pieces were used for the analysis, and while they provide a good picture of the techniques he used, it does not fully depict the entire picture.

If done again, in general, more works by all parties should be analyzed. To create a more accurate picture of these techniques, most (if not all) of these speakers' works should be analyzed within a single study. This comparative analysis would entail as many relevant pieces of rhetoric as possible (both written and spoken) to create a more holistic picture of every speaker within the study.

## **Policy Implications and Future Research**

Despite the limitations, this study yielded some noteworthy results that could provide groundwork for future research. When looking at this select rhetoric, the prioritization of pronouns is evident among all speakers. Both Neo-Nazis displayed a more prominent “*you*” versus “*them*” message while Hitler articulated more of a “*we*” versus “*them*” type of technique. The Neo-Nazis placed a higher priority on the outgroup and tended to speak more directly to their ingroup via the pronoun “*you*” as a call to action. Future contributions to this type of research will inevitably begin to fill the gap in studies regarding populist rhetoric. Most literature regarding populist rhetoric entails what populism is and how it is used, but not necessarily which techniques garner the most support and are deemed the most effective (Busby et al., 2019).

Studying the use of pronouns in populism can deepen the rhetorical understanding of why populism works the way it does, and how it is currently being used to garner support. Whether looking at politicians, political figures, or extremist organizations, future research can entail how their populist techniques, specifically with pronouns, are perceived by various ingroups and outgroups. Additionally, the research can begin to connect modern-day populist strategies versus the ones utilized by Hitler or historical figureheads. By drawing parallels between these types of techniques used by historical populists as well as their movement’s respective outcomes, we can build a better understanding of the effectiveness of *specific* populist strategies as opposed to just its generalized definition.

The same goes for violent organizations. By evaluating specific pronouns and other emotive language, we can begin to understand some of their efforts in recruitment

and overall messages to pick up traction. This can be applied to far-left and far-right extremism as well. By comparing these types of populist techniques on both sides of the political spectrum, future research can entail how both groups are structuring their rhetoric, and whether these varying uses of pronouns create support. This can lead to a better understanding of the growing political divide within the United States, and why it is leading to cases of violent extremism. This research can begin to answer not only *why* extremism is growing via populist techniques, but *how*.

## References

- Abbink, K., & Harris, D. (2019). In-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in naturally occurring groups. *PLoS One*, *14*(9), e0221616.  
<https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221616>
- Ardèvol-Abreu, A. (2015). Framing theory in communication research in Spain: Origins, development and current situation. *Revista Latina de Comunicación Social*, *70*(70), 423-450.  
<https://nuevaepoca.revistalatinacs.org/index.php/revista/article/view/868/1320>
- Baele, S. J., Brace, L., & Coan, T. G. (2021). From “incel” to “saint”: Analyzing the violent worldview behind the 2018 Toronto attack. *Terrorism & Political Violence*, *33*(8), 1667–1691. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1638256>
- Baele, S. J., Brace, L., & Coan, T. G. (2021). Variations on a theme? Comparing 4chan, 8kun, and other chans’ far-right “/pol” boards. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *15*(1), 65–80. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26984798>
- Béland, D. (2020). Right-wing populism and the politics of insecurity: How president Trump frames migrants as collective threats. *Political Studies Review*, *18*(2), 162–177. <https://doi-org.eps.cc.ysu.edu/10.1177/1478929919865131>
- Berger, A.L. (2003). Review of the book “American Fuehrer: George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party,” and “Troubled Memory: Anne Levy, the Holocaust, and David Duke's Louisiana.” *Holocaust & Genocide Studies* *17*(1): 180-185. <https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/43124>
- Bos, L., Schemer, C., Corbu, N., Hameleers, M., Andreadis, I., Schulz, A., Schmuck, D.,

- Reinemann, C., & Fawzi, N. (2020). The effects of populism as a social identity frame on persuasion and mobilization: Evidence from a 15-country experiment. *European Journal of Political Research*, 59(1), 3–24. <https://doi-org.eps.cc.ysu.edu/10.1111/1475-6765.12334>
- Burns, M. (2023, November 15). Trump goes all in on Nazi rhetoric, and the media gives him another free pass. *The Hill*. <https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/4310834-trump-goes-all-in-on-nazi-rhetoric-and-the-media-gives-him-another-free-pass/>
- Busby, E. C., Gubler, J. R., & Hawkins, K. A. (2019). Framing and blame attribution in populist rhetoric. *Journal of Politics*, 81(2), 616–630. <https://doi-org.eps.cc.ysu.edu/10.1086/701832>
- Chermak, S., DeMichele, M., Gruenewald, J., Jensen, M., Lewis, R., & Lopez, B. (2024, January 4). What NIJ research tells us about domestic terrorism. *National Institute of Justice*. <https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/what-nij-research-tells-us-about-domestic-terrorism>
- Chong, D., & Druckman, J. (2007). Framing theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*, (10): 103–26. <https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054>
- Cohen, S. (1972). *Folk devils and moral panics: The creation of the mods and rockers*. Routledge. [https://infodocks.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/stanley\\_cohen\\_folk\\_devils\\_and\\_moral\\_panics.pdf](https://infodocks.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/stanley_cohen_folk_devils_and_moral_panics.pdf)
- Cox, D., Lienesch, R., & Jones, R. P. (2017, May 9). Beyond economics: Fears of cultural displacement pushed the White working class to Trump. *PRRI/The*

*Atlantic Report* 25. <https://www.prii.org/research/white-working-class-attitudes-economy-trade-immigration-election-donald-trump/>

De Bruycker, I., & Rooduijn, M. (2021). The people's champions? Populist communication as a contextually dependent political strategy. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 98(3), 896-922.

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1077699021998648>

Desrosiers, M.-E. (2015). Tackling puzzles of identity-based conflict: The promise of framing theory. *Civil Wars*, 17(2), 120–140. <https://doi->

<https://doi->  
[org.eps.cc.yasu.edu/10.1080/13698249.2015.1070449](https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2015.1070449)

DeVreese, C. H. (2005). News framing: Theory and typology. *Information Design Journal*, 13(1), 51-62.

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/250888488\\_News\\_Framing\\_Theory\\_and\\_Typology](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/250888488_News_Framing_Theory_and_Typology)

Dickson, E. J. (2021, June 15). The rise and fall of the Proud Boys. *Rolling*

*Stone*, 1353/1354, 122–153. <https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/proud-boys-far-right-group-1183966/>

DiLorenzo, M. (2021). Trade layoffs and hate in the United States. *Social Science*

*Quarterly*, 102(2), 771–785. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12930>

Eichenwald K. (2016, February 12). Right-wing extremists are a bigger threat to America

than ISIS. *Newsweek*. <https://www.newsweek.com/2016/02/12/right-wing-extremists-militants-bigger-threat-america-isis-jihadists-422743.html>

Erisen, C., Guidi, M., Martini, S., Toprakkiran, S., Isernia, P., & Littvay, L. (2021).

- Psychological correlates of populist attitudes. *Political Psychology*, 42, 149–171.  
<https://doi-org.eps.cc.ysu.edu/10.1111/pops.12768>
- Garcia, D., Garas, A. & Schweitzer, F. (2012). Positive words carry less information than negative words. *EPJ Data Science*, 1(1):3 <https://doi.org/10.1140/epjds3>
- Gartenstein-Ross, D., Hodgson, S., & Clarke, C. (2020, April 20). The growing threat posed by accelerationism and accelerationist groups worldwide. *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/04/the-growing-threat-posed-by-accelerationism-and-accelerationist-groups-worldwide/>
- Goffman, E. (1974) *Frame analysis: An essay of the organization of experience*. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
- Govers, J., Feldman, P., Dant, A., & Patros, P. (2023). Down the rabbit hole: Detecting online extremism, radicalization, and politicised hate speech. *ACM Computing Surveys*, 55(14s), 319. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3583067>
- Gruber, O., & Rosenberger, S. (2023). Between opportunities and constraints: Right-wing populists as designers of migrant integration policy. *Policy Studies*, 44(2): 155-173. <https://web-p-ebSCOhost-com.eps.cc.ysu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=6&sid=a572070d-1a14-4ea9-8d90-ea3f10d16b0c%40redis>
- Hameleers, M. (2019). Putting our own people first: The content and effects of online right-wing populist discourse surrounding the European refugee crisis. *Mass Communication & Society*, 22(6), 804-826.  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15205436.2019.1655768>

- Hartmann, D. D. (1984). Anti-Semitism and the appeal of Nazism. *Political Psychology*, 5(4), 635–642. <https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1986-19735-001>
- Haider, A., Ahmad, A., Yagi, S., & Hammo, B. (2023). The influence of audience on the topics discussed by King Abdullah II of Jordan: A corpus-assisted discourse study. *Contemporary Levant*, 8(2), 1-21.  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20581831.2023.2241005>
- Hewstone, M. (1990). The “ultimate attribution error”? A review of the literature on intergroup causal attribution. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 20(4), 311–335. <https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1002/ejsp.2420200404>
- Higuchi, K. (2001). *KH Coder*. <https://kncoder.net/en/>
- Hitler, A. (1922-1945). Collection of speeches. *Internet Archive*.  
<https://archive.org/details/AdolfHitlerCollectionOfSpeeches19221945>
- Hitler, A. (n.d.) Some key speeches of Adolf Hitler. *World Future Fund*.  
<https://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/Hitler%20Speeches/Hitler%20Key%20Speeches%20Index.htm>
- Holcombe, R. G. (2021). Populism: promises and problems. *Independent Review*, 26(1), 27–37. [https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\\_26\\_1\\_03\\_holcombe.pdf](https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_26_1_03_holcombe.pdf)
- Hsieh, H-F., & Shannon, S. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. *Qualitative Health Research*. 15(9):1277-1288.  
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1049732305276687>
- James N. Mason Papers* (n.d.). Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas. <https://archives.lib.ku.edu/repositories/3/resources/5069>



- Jewell, J. (2013, August 16) Asylum seekers the latest in a long line of tabloid “folk devils.” *The Conversation*. <https://theconversation.com/asylum-seekers-the-latest-in-a-long-line-of-tabloid-folk-devils-17026>
- Kaewrungruang, K., & Yaoharee, O. (2018). The use of personal pronoun in political discourse: A case study of the final 2016 United States presidential election debate. *Reflections*, 25(1), 85–96. <https://doi.org/10.61508/refl.v25i1.136268>
- Keneally, M. (2018). What to know about the violent Charlottesville protests and anniversary rallies. ABC News. <https://abcnews.go.com/US/happen-charlottesville-protest-anniversary-weekend/story?id=57107500>
- Kershaw, I. (2004). Hitler and the uniqueness of [German] Nazism. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 39(2), 239–254. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3180723>
- Knuppenburg, R. M., & Fredericks, C. M. (2021). Linguistic affect: positive and negative emotion words are contagious, predict likability, and moderate positive and negative affect. *Inquiries Journal*, 13(03). <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=1884>
- Kriner, M., & Lewis, J. (2021). Pride and prejudice: The violent evolution of the Proud Boys. *CTC Sentinel*, 14(6), 26-39. <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/pride-prejudice-the-violent-evolution-of-the-proud-boys/>
- Lammers, J., & Baldwin, M. (2020). Make America gracious again: Collective nostalgia can increase and decrease support for right-wing populist rhetoric. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 50(5), 943–954. <https://doi-org.eps.cc.yosu.edu/10.1002/ejsp.2673>
- Levin, I. P., Schneider, S. L., & Gaeth, G. J. (1998). All frames are not created equal: A

typology and critical analysis of framing effects. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 76(2), 149–188.

<https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1998.2804>

Liu, L., Mirkovski, K., Lowry, P. B., & Vu, Q. (2023). "Do as I say but not as I do":

Influence of political leaders' populist communication styles on public adherence in a crisis using the global case of COVID-19 movement restrictions. *Data and Information Management*, 7(2), 100039.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dim.2023.100039>

Macagno, F. (2014). Manipulating emotions: value-based reasoning and emotive language. *Argumentation and Advocacy*, 51(2), 103-122.

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345032533\\_Manipulating\\_Emotions\\_Value-Based\\_Reasoning\\_and\\_Emotive\\_Language](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345032533_Manipulating_Emotions_Value-Based_Reasoning_and_Emotive_Language)

MacAvaney, S., Hao-Ren, Y., Yang, E., Russell, K., Goharian, N., & Frieder, O. (2019).

Hate speech detection: Challenges and solutions. *PLoS One*, 14(8), e0221152.

<https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0221152>

Mapping Militant Organizations (2023). *Proud Boys*. Stanford University.

<https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/proud-boys>

McHugh, C. (2023, December 19). "Trump knows what he's doing": The creator of Godwin's Law says the Hitler comparison is apt. *Politico Magazine*.

<https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/12/19/godwins-law-trump-hitler-00132427>

Medina, R. M., Nicolosi, E. A., Brewer, S., & Moore, E. (2021). A geographical

- analysis of socioeconomic and ideological drivers of hate crime in the United States. *International Journal of Applied Geospatial Research (IJAGR)*, 12(2). <https://ideas.repec.org/a/igg/jagr00/v12y2021i2p39-56.html>
- Miller, M. (2017, August 21). The shadow of an assassinated American Nazi commander hangs over Charlottesville. *The Washington Post*.  
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/08/21/the-shadow-of-an-assassinated-american-nazi-commander-hangs-over-charlottesville/>
- Mullen, B., Dovidio, J. F., Johnson, C., & Copper, C. (1992). In-group-out-group differences in social projection. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 28(5), 422–440. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031\(92\)90040-Q](https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(92)90040-Q)
- Müller, J-W. (2016) *What is populism?* Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.  
<https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.9783/9780812293784/html?lang=en>
- Nelson, T. E., Clawson, R. A., & Oxley, Z. M. (1997). Media framing of a civil liberties conflict and its effect on tolerance. *The American Political Science Review*, 91(3), 567–583. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2952075>
- Qureshi, A. J. (2020, August 14). Understanding domestic racialization and terrorism: A national issue within a global context. *NIJ Journal*.  
<https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/understanding-domestic-radicalization-and-terrorism>
- Price, V., & Tewksbury, D. (1997). News values and public opinion: A theoretical account of media priming and framing. In G. A. Barnett & F. J. Boster (Eds.), *Progress in the Communication Sciences*, 13, 173-212.

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304834087\\_News\\_values\\_and\\_public\\_opinion\\_A\\_theoretical\\_account\\_of\\_media\\_priming\\_and\\_framing](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304834087_News_values_and_public_opinion_A_theoretical_account_of_media_priming_and_framing)

Roslyng, M., & Dindler., C. (2023) Media power and politics in framing and discourse theory. *Communication Theory*, 33(1), 11–20, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ct/qtac012>

Salmela, M. & von Scheve, C. (2017). Emotional roots of right-wing political populism. *Social Science Information*, 56 (4), 567-95.

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0539018417734419>

Slothuus, R. (2008). More than weighting cognitive importance: A dual-process model of issue framing effects. *Political Psychology*, 29(1), 1–28.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20447096>

Smith, E. (2020). Keeping the Nazi menace out: George Lincoln Rockwell and the border control system in Australia and Britain in the early 1960s. *Social Sciences*. 9(9): 158. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci909015>

Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC]. (2022). *In 2022, we tracked 1,225 hate and antigovernment groups across the U.S.* <https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map>

Spruyt, B., Keppens, G., & Droogenbroeck, F. V.. (2016). Who supports populism and what attracts people to it? *Political Research Quarterly* 69 (2): 335–46.

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299412979\\_Who\\_Supports\\_Populism\\_and\\_What\\_Attracts\\_People\\_to\\_It](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299412979_Who_Supports_Populism_and_What_Attracts_People_to_It)

Stewart, N. K., Al-Rawi, A., Celestini, C., & Worku, N. (2023). Hate influencers' mediation of hate on telegram: “We declare war against the anti-White system”.

*Social Media + Society*, 9(2).

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371442017\\_Hate\\_Influencers'\\_Mediation\\_of\\_Hate\\_on\\_Telegram\\_We\\_Declare\\_War\\_Against\\_the\\_Anti-White\\_System](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371442017_Hate_Influencers'_Mediation_of_Hate_on_Telegram_We_Declare_War_Against_the_Anti-White_System)

Thiele, D., Sauer, B., & Penz, O. (2021). Right-wing populist affective governing: A frame analysis of Austrian parliamentary debates on migration. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 55(5), 457–477. <https://doi-org.eps.cc.ysu.edu/10.1080/0031322X.2021.2014089>

Ware, J. (2019, July 1). *Siege: The Atomwaffen Division and rising far-right terrorism in the United States*. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19615>

Wilson, J. (2020, March 6). Sweep of arrests hits U.S. Neo-Nazi group connected to five murders. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/06/neo-nazi-arrests-deals-blow-us-group-atomwaffen-division>

Wodak, R. (2015). *The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean*. London: Sage.

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305709485\\_Rightwing\\_Populism\\_and\\_Antisemitism](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305709485_Rightwing_Populism_and_Antisemitism)

Wunderlich, P., Nguyen, C., & von Scheve, C. (2023). Angry populists or concerned citizens? How linguistic emotion ascriptions shape affective, cognitive, and behavioural responses to political outgroups. *Cognition & Emotion*, 37(1), 147–161. <https://doi-org.eps.cc.ysu.edu/10.1080/02699931.2022.2152430>

## Appendix



**YOUNGSTOWN  
STATE  
UNIVERSITY**

Apr 23, 2024 1:35:58 PM EDT

Richard Rogers  
Cr Just & Cons Sciences 141212

Re: Modification - 2022-191 Frames of Misinformation and Extremism

Dear Dr. Richard Rogers:

Youngstown State University Human Subjects Review Board has rendered the decision below for Frames of Misinformation and Extremism

Decision: Approved

Findings: This is a request to modify a previously approved study. The modification is the addition of one team member. The addition of the team member will not change the level of risk. The request for modification is approved.

Any changes in your research activity should be promptly reported to the Institutional Review Board and may not be initiated without IRB approval except where necessary to eliminate hazard to human subjects. Any unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects should also be promptly reported to the IRB.

The IRB would like to extend its best wishes to you in the conduct of this study.

Sincerely,  
Youngstown State University Human Subjects Review Board