The significance of the Battle of the Metaurus

Abstract

The Rise of Rome to world dominance is attributed to a myriad of circumstances, some less obvious because of their sublety, and others more easily interpreted and universally acknowledged because of their general acceptance by historians as having been significant to world history.

A paper concentrating on the political and social institutions of the Roman State, reinforced by a scientific examination of the economic atmosphere in which Rome developed, would perhaps present a more convincing analysis of the reasons behind Rome's unprecedented ascendancy to world leadership than would a work that is dependent upon the interpretation of ancient sources for its validity. While the efficacy of these factors, as presented by the former, cannot be denied, the singular nature of armed conflicts, as narrated by the latter, has drawn me irresistibly to the examination of the physical encounters between two of the great states of antiquity. I have chosen to expound upon a theme proposed by Sir Edward Creasy nearly a century and a half ago. Creasy contended that the Battle of the Metaurus River in 207 B.C. was the decisive event in the second Punic War. I will attempt to illustrate the historical superfluity of the battle by describing the events leading up to it, and giving a disposition of the relative strengths of the antagonists.

I seek not so much to disparage the work of Creasy, whom history has shown to be an extremely entertaining popularizer, but rather to put the battle in its proper perspective. By studying the events preceding the Metaurus, I hope to prove that the result of the second Punic War was decided long before this battle, which Creasy has so conclusively declared to be decisive. The inequality of the resources at the disposal Rome and Carthage was to be the determinant in the war that the outcome of one battle did not dictate the course that history would take in the centuries to follow.

It is not my purpose to prove that the outcome of the Punic Wars was predetermined, although if I succeed in my presentation of the facts, that may be the logical conclusion. By questioning the decisiveness of the battle, I seek to reveal certain critical aspects of the war that Creasy omitted in his thesis. Roman advantages, such as manpower, the relatively uncontested control of the seas, and the ability to manipulate their Italian allies while maintaining partial control of the Iberian peninsula, made their defeat a virtually impossibility, certainly not dependent upon the result of one battle as late in the war as 207 B.C.