

**An Evaluator's Perspective on Youngstown's Northside
Weed and Seed Strategy, Year One**

By

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Year One
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Abstract

The paper is an evaluation of the Youngstown North-Side Weed and Seed Strategy in its first year. The purpose of the study is to determine if crime has decreased within the target area during the strategy's first year determine how many crime prevention / community programs are in action and investigate collaboration among Steering Committee members. The methodology consists of content analysis, secondary analysis and a focus group. The analysis compares the number of crimes for 2005, 2006, and 2007. The future of the Weed and Seed strategy depends on the dedication and commitment of Steering Committee members; it is imperative for members to attend the monthly meetings. Starting crime prevention and community programs within the target area is essential; this provides the targeted community with activities and/ or other vital services. The Northside Weed and Seed Strategy is providing support and collaborating efforts among targeted area residents, community organizations, local government agencies, and other various groups and businesses during its first year.

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Chapter One

Introduction

Crime prevention initiatives are gaining popularity among local community agencies, organizations, and officials. Crime prevention continues to be an important issue for public and official agents of social control (Skogan, 2006). Today there is more evidence of the community policing movement than ever before (Lab, 2000). It is no longer simply enough to respond to calls for service, take reports, and arrest offenders. By employing an ever-widening array of interventions and actions, these efforts need to be enforced to stop people from committing criminal offenses. The prevention of crime requires participation of individual citizens, groups, and local agencies that in the past may not have had a direct involvement in safety and security issues (Lab, 2000).

Chapter One explains the reason for writing the thesis--my dual interest in crime prevention and in the city of Youngstown are both huge and that accounts for my enthusiasm. The chapter introduces the problem statement, the purpose followed by the definition of crime prevention. Following the discussion of crime prevention, the four components and other various elements of the Weed and Seed strategy are described. In the description of the Weed and Seed strategy, I will explain the several requirements needed for a federally funded program like the Weed and Seed program. Described in the paragraphs below are the elements and components of the Weed and Seed strategies along with its various activities. The chapter ends with a summary of the above-stated issues and briefly discusses the aspects of chapter two.

Reason for Writing the Thesis:

There are several grassroots crime prevention strategies and programs that a city can utilize in fighting crime. Weed and Seed strategy is one of those such strategies. Having an interest in crime prevention, the evaluation of the Weed and Seed program as it relates to the city of Youngstown became obvious. In addition, the program was recommended to me by a senior Criminal Justice professor at Youngstown State University which motivated me further to offer my services to evaluate the Northside Weed and Seed strategy and consequently to work actively with several actors of members of the strategy.

These community actors included the law enforcement agency, community organizations, and Youngstown's crime prevention initiative. During the evaluation process, a decision to carry out further studies on the subject matter was made because of its uniqueness and it being the first of its kind in the Mahoning Valley. With the evaluation, I was able to understand the importance of the program as it relates to the targeted area of the city of Youngstown.

Statement of the Problem:

The Weed and Seed Strategy is located on the Northside of Youngstown, Ohio, which is approximate a size of 2.6 square miles with a population of 7,967. The Northside is located in the 17th U.S. Congressional District. The area encompasses the following census tracts: 8034, 8035, 8040, and 8044. This area is designated the targeted area based on the analysis of crime, demographic, and neighborhood data.

In order for a Weed and Seed Strategy to be an approved site for federal funding, a community must provide information regarding the problems it is facing, such as drugs and criminal activity, community conditions, lack of available resources, and other concerns. In 2005, a grant application was sent to the U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Weed and Seed, detailing the conditions of the Northside community. Neighborhood conditions and crime rates from the grant application are provided below.

Community conditions in the targeted area are on average lower than the city. One-fifth (21.0%) of the residents in the targeted area are unemployed compared to a 13.0% unemployment rate for the entire city. Forty-two percent of the residents in the targeted area live in poverty with a median income of \$13,934. In comparison, one-fourth (27.0%) of Youngstown residents live in poverty with a city mean of \$22,162. The public high school in the targeted area has student dropout rate of 47.7%, while the Youngstown City Schools have an overall dropout rate of 43.1%. The community has pressing needs.

In terms of crime numbers in the targeted area, data show that the number of crimes was compared as number per 1,000 residents according to the census tract in the city. The homicide rate in the target area exceeded the average homicide rate for the city for the previous two years. In 2003, the homicide rate per 1,000 was 0.9 in the targeted area, while it was 0.2 for the city. In 2004, the homicide rate per 1,000 was 0.6 in the targeted area and 0.3 for the city.

An average of 26 residents per year reported being a victim of an aggravated assault. In addition, 21 per year were victims of robbery. The number of forcible rapes in the targeted area averages 1.1 per 1,000 for the previous two years with the entire city of

Youngstown averages .07 per 1,000. Although the Northside target area contains 8.4% of the city of Youngstown population, the residents placed 8.9% and 9.1% of the calls for service in the city during 2003 and 2004. The number of calls for service increased 57.0% in the target area between 2001 and 2004, while the total number of calls for service in the city decreased 5.2% for the same time.

One of the biggest gaps in service for the Northside target area is the lack of coordination and collaboration among various entities. There are many good programs, from the city to grassroots level; however, each entity often only works within its own small circle. This leads to a duplication of services and sometimes no services within the targeted area. Through the Weed and Seed effort, these entities can come together to share vital information, and leverage their resources together.

U.S. Department of Justice: Executive Office for Weed and Seed approved the grant application in the spring of 2006. With the approval of the federal grant money, the office determined the need for the strategy on the Northside of Youngstown. The federally approved money provided to the Northside Weed and Seed strategy began in January 2007.

The Purpose and Significance of the Study:

The purpose of the paper is to evaluate the Youngstown Northside Weed and Seed strategy, in its first year. Reviewing the goals and objectives of year one, a determination can be made to see what the accomplishments are and what problems the strategy encountered during its first year. The expectation is that the Northside Weed and Seed strategy will lower the number of crimes in 2007. increase community programs,

and increase Steering Committee's activities or participation. The issue guiding this study is: what are the short-term outcomes of the Weed and Seed strategy on the Northside of Youngstown. Several evaluations conducted on federally funded crime prevention initiatives discuss the short-term implications of crime prevention tactics utilized by federally funded projects (Dunworth, Terence, Mills, Gregory, 1999). This thesis builds from these evaluations.

While conducting an evaluation of the Northside Weed and Seed strategy, I discovered that there was a lack of published articles concerning Youngstown and its crime prevention initiatives. Opportunities arose that enabled me to become actively involved in various crime prevention initiatives. Becoming actively involved with Youngstown's crime prevention and with the community, my interest in the subject matter became more evident. Having an interest to obtain a doctoral degree in crime prevention spurs my involvement in the Youngstown's crime prevention strategies. The successful outcome of this program will benefit communities tremendously. In addition, it will encourage future research projects on Youngstown's crime prevention initiatives, which will be beneficial to the entire community at-large. My ultimate goal is to provide valuable research to the community.

Documentation of the success of the strategy is important in order to determine what works and what does not work. If the strategy is successful in the targeted Northside area, it may work on other areas of the city. Among other things, this study will determine if crime increased or decreased during the first year of the Weed and Seed strategy.

Crime Prevention:

Lab (p.2, 2000), in his book titled, *Crime Prevention Approaches, Practices, and Evaluations* defines crime prevention as “any action designed to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime”. He claims that the most important attribute of crime prevention is that it must attack both real and perceived levels of crime and victimization. The real measures of crime and the perceived threat of crime are different. Many definitions of crime prevention incorporate the ideas of lessening the actual levels of crime or prohibiting further increases in crime.

Crime prevention is not restricted to the efforts of the criminal justice system but includes activities by other individuals, groups, and organizations. There are many approaches to crime prevention just as there are many causes of crime. According to Lab (2000), crime prevention and crime control are not synonymous. Crime prevention denotes and attempts to eliminate crime either prior to the initial occurrence or before further activity. Then, crime control alludes to maintaining a given or existing level and managing the amount of behavior. Lab (2000), believes that crime control fails to adequately address the problem of fear of crime.

Crime prevention could be divided into three approaches, similar to those found in public health models of disease prevention. These approaches include primary, secondary, and tertiary. These approaches, according to Lab (2000), attack the problem at different stages of development. *Primary prevention*, within the realm of criminal justice, identifies conditions of physical and social environment that provide opportunities for criminal acts. In primary prevention, there are several types of approaches that are located within a wide range of social organizations. Included here are environmental

design, neighborhood watch, general deterrence, private security, and education about crime and crime prevention (Lab, 2000).

Environmental design includes a variety of crime prevention techniques aimed at making crime more difficult for the offender; surveillance makes it easier for residents to dictate potential offenders and ensures community safety. Primary prevention also includes a broader social issues relating to crime and deviance. Many times, it is referred to as a social prevention whose activities are aimed at alleviating unemployment, poor education, poverty, and similar social issues that may reduce crime and fear by attending to the underlying causes of the deviant behavior (Lab, 2000).

Secondary prevention engages in early identification of potential offenders and tries to intervene prior to a crime occurring. Implicit in secondary prevention is the ability to correctly identify and predict problem situations and people (Lab, 2000). The most recognized form of secondary prevention is situational crime prevention. According to Lab, situational prevention attempts to identify existing problems at the macro level and institute interventions that are developed specifically for the given problem. The solutions may involve physical design changes to an area, altering social behaviors, improving surveillance, and many other activities. Secondary crime prevention relies heavily on citizen involvement and is closely linked to situational prevention in turn, involved into the emergence of community policing (Lab, 2000).

According to Brantingham and Faust (1976), tertiary prevention deals with actual offenders and involves intervention in such a way they will not commit further offenses. The majority of tertiary prevention rests within the workings of the criminal justice system. The activities of arrest, prosecution, incarceration, treatment, and rehabilitation

all fall under tertiary prevention. Tertiary prevention is handling the offender after the crime has been committed. Other alternative models discuss crime prevention. These alternatives offer different views and approaches to crime prevention.

Definition of Weed and Seed:

Weed and Seed is a comprehensive strategy to assist communities in bringing people and resources together to prevent and control crime along with overall improving the quality of life within the specific target area (U. S Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 2005). The strategy stresses collaboration, coordination, and community participation. The approach gives communities experiencing high crime rate and social and economic decay a comprehensive structure, critical planning tools, and access to a national network focused on crime prevention, citizen safety, and neighborhood revitalization (U. S Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 2005). The initiative allows communities using the Weed and Seed strategy to develop and focus efforts tailored uniquely to the issues, needs, and concerns of each neighborhood. There are various forms of crime prevention, Weed and Seed is just one example of crime prevention at the grassroots level.

Operation Weed and Seed began in three pilot sites in 1991: since that time, it has spread quickly to designated high-crime areas throughout the nation. By early 2005, more than 300 communities had become Weed and Seed sites (U. S Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 2005). The Weed and Seed strategy is administered and managed at the national level by; the Community Capacity Development Office (CCDO) a program office within the Department of Justice. The CCDO provides various services,

technical assistance, training programs, and resources to support local Weed and Seed strategies (U. S Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 2005).

According to the CCDO's Weed and Seed Implementation Manual, the vision of the Weed and Seed strategy is based on a two-pronged approach:

- 1) Law enforcement agencies and criminal justice officials cooperate with local residents to "*weed out*" criminal activity in the designated area.
2. Social service providers and economic revitalization efforts are introduced to "*seed*" the area, ensuring long-term positive change and a higher quality of life for the residents.

The Weed and Seed strategy recognizes the importance of coordinating federal, state, local, and tribal offices, law enforcement agencies, and criminal justice initiatives with social service providers and private sector and community efforts to maximize the impact of existing programs and resources, identifying and filling in gaps of services. It also recognizes the importance of community participation. Community residents must be at the center of the strategy and be empowered to assist in solving problems in their neighborhoods. The private sector (business community) also plays a pivotal part in the Weed and Seed strategy.

The Weed and Seed strategy has goals and objectives. These goals and objectives are to reduce violent and drug-related crime in a designated high- crime community throughout the nation. It is a comprehensive approach to reduce and prevent crime and improve residents' overall quality of life. As a result, law-abiding citizens are able to live, work, and raise their families in a safer and more prosperous environment (U.S. Department of Justice, 2005).

The Weed and Seed Manual created by CCDO clearly states that Weed and Seed sites have primary objectives, which include the following:

- Develop a comprehensive community based strategy to control and prevent violent crime, gang activity, drug trafficking, and drug related crime.
- Coordinate existing and new government and private-sector initiatives, criminal justice efforts, and human services and concentrate those resources in designated neighborhoods to maximize their impact.
- Mobilize community residents to assist law enforcement in identifying and removing violent offenders and drug traffickers from their neighborhoods, assist human service agencies in identifying and responding to social service needs, and participate more fully in community planning and decision making processes.

The Weed and Seed strategy is a multilevel strategic plan that includes four basic components that every site must follow in order to exist and have recognition as a Weed and Seed strategy. The four basic components are the core of the Weed and Seed strategy, which without them would be no Weed and Seed strategy. The four main components of the strategy are Law Enforcement, Community Policing, Prevention Intervention and Treatment, and Neighborhood Restoration.

The Law Enforcement component is designed to “Weed” out crime and violence, especially violent crime, gang activity, drug trafficking, and drug related crimes. Efforts are directed toward identifying, apprehending, and prosecuting the most serious criminals located within the targeted area. This effort should reduce both crime and citizens fear, in

an attempt, to restore confidence and trust among residents in the distressed area.

According to the CCDO's Weed and Seed Implementation manual (2005, pg,52), most "Weed and Seed sites crime suppression activities are undertaken by a joint task force that represent a collaboration of law enforcements agencies from all levels of government." Suppression of activities may include repeat-offender programs, gun abatement, targeted patrols, intensified drug investigations, and targeted prosecutions. Various forms of law enforcement tactics are expanded with the purpose of involving many aspects of the criminal justice system.

Community policing supports intensive law enforcement operations and serves as a bridge to seeding components of the Weed and Seed (U. S Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 2005). Community policing embraces two key concepts; community engagement and problem solving. Community policing offers a dialog with law enforcement officials and community members to solve crime problems through a systematic process that addresses the underlying causes of crime. This part of the strategy focuses on the relationships between the police and the residents who live within the targeted area. Examples of community policing activities include foot patrol, police sub-stations located in the target area, victims referrals, and police athletic leagues.

The third component of the strategy is Prevention Intervention and Treatment (PIT). This component of the strategy focuses on neighborhood efforts to enhance protective factors while reducing risks and promoting good behavior that can lead to healthy living. The PIT component focuses on an array of human services on the designated community to create an environment in which crime and violence can not thrive. There are special links among local law enforcement, social service agencies, and

the private sector. An important part of PIT is the safe haven. Safe havens are important elements for the targeted area. They provide a mechanism for organizing and delivering an array of youth-and adult-oriented services in a multiservice setting, such as a school or community center (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 2005).

The fourth component of the strategy is neighborhood restoration. This component focuses on improving and revitalizing the economic and social conditions of the designated area. Neighborhood restoration is achieved through coordination of federal, state, local, and the private sector resources. Strategies focusing on economic development, employment opportunities for residents and improvements to the housing stock and physical environment of the neighborhood (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 2005).

The Weed and Seed strategy is based on key principles apart from the traditional approaches. The key components consists of collaboration, coordination, community mobilization and leveraging resources to have positive impacts on the targeted area. Collaboration of several resources must join forces for a common purpose. Residents, local government, state, federal, and community organizations must play a vital role in the community's safety. Weed and Seed, therefore, requires communities to establish a collaborative process to capatilize on the full potential that systematic interaction of stakeholders can provide. Collaboration channels of communication between partnerships among various organizations must be established (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 2005).

In conclusion, this chapter examined various aspects of program by highlighting issues as the problem statement, motives behind the study, purpose and significance, and the definition of crime prevention. It also gave a brief history and the main components of the Weed and Seed strategy. After reading this chapter, a comprehensive understanding of crime prevention and of the basic tenets of the Weed and Seed strategy are expressed. Having a valuable research study focusing on Youngstown and its crime prevention initiative benefits local practitioners, citizens, local government officials, community organizations, and other grassroots organizations tremendously.

Chapter two discusses the importance for conducting site evaluations of the Weed and Seed strategy. In this chapter, efforts will be made to review various evaluations carried out across the United States. In addition to this review, community policing will be discussed in relation to crime prevention and the Weed and Seed strategy. Finally, the theoretical framework guiding the study is presented and discussed in detail.

Chapter Two

Chapter two explains the three reasons why evaluations are required for the Weed and Seed strategies is important. Included in this chapter is literature review, which covers numerous national evaluations of the program. The role of community policing in crime prevention and the Weed and Seed strategy, the research question, and hypotheses will form an integral part of this chapter. The chapter also discusses the theoretical framework that guides the study. The concluding aspect of the chapter will summarize the entire chapter.

Why the Conduct of the Evaluation is Necessary

There are three reasons why site evaluations are conducted for the Weed and Seed strategy: first, to enable the Steering Committee to make the best and necessary decisions; second, to provide structures and the goals for the approved site; and third to review activities and determine if the program is successful. The 2005 CCDO's Weed and Seed Operation Manual says that an evaluation is the best way for the Steering Committee to determine if the current goals and objectives are effective or not for the targeted site.

This manual clarifies how a well-designed evaluation provides a thorough description of the structure and operation of the Weed and Seed activities. The appraisal of the activities determine if they are successful or if, the program needs an adjustment. Chapter twelve of the CCDO manual is dedicated to the design, development, and the use of an evaluation component for the Weed and Seed strategy. The manual provides an outline of how the evaluation should be conducted and who should conduct it. Every approved Weed and Seed site must conduct an annual evaluation of the designated

targeted area. Local site evaluations feed into the larger view of Weed and Seed strategy. They assist in making the case for positive and negative characteristics of the strategy nationwide. Local site evaluations are a vital part to the bigger picture of the Weed and Seed strategy (Community Capacity Development Office, 2005).

There are two national evaluations discussed in the literature review; both are of the opinion that Weed and Seed Strategies across the nation are an effective means of reducing crime and victimization within a targeted area. However, other studies suggest that the “Seeding” aspect of the strategy is not an effective means. According to these studies, one main reason for the inconsistency is the financial aspects of the Weed and Seed strategy, which depends on the funding an area receives (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 2005). Funding for such a program is an important factor and can determine the success or failure of the program.

Literature Review

The Federally sponsored Weed and Seed Project was initiated in 1991 to revitalize communities through the process of “Weeding” out existing problems and “Seeding” areas with educational programs and other community initiatives that inhibit the return of the communities’ social disorder and crime problems (Lab, 2000).

In 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted A National Process Evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed. The study, sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, gathered information on Weed and Seed program implementations and activities of 19 sites (Roehl et al., 1996). According to the National Institute of Justice Research Brief, the Weed and Seed initiative was launched, as a comprehensive effort to control crime and to improve the quality of life in targeted high crime areas. Approximately \$1.1

million was provided to each of the 19 sites selected for the 18-month demonstration period (Roehl et al., 1996). Each city worked through a blueprint provided by the U.S. Department of Justice; a customized program to meet the needs of its targeted area. As noted in chapter one, “Weeding” generally entails law enforcement and prosecutorial efforts against crime, while “Seeding” entails prevention and revitalization services to the targeted area.

Several key findings of the National Process Evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed were positive, while others were negative. One of the most important findings is that grant funds are used more often to support the “Weeding” efforts and community policing programs than the “Seeding” initiatives (Roehl et al., 1996). In many sites, the “Weeding” efforts were on gun crimes, drug related crimes, and violent crimes. The majority of the cities targeted street level crime offenders. The most common Seeding initiatives involved primary prevention for children and intervention strategies for older youth. Each site had a safe haven (Roehl et al., 1996), as previously described that offered varied services.

The evaluation revealed that community activists or actors who ordinarily did not consult with one another, such as prosecutors, police officers, area residents, and social service personnel, were able to coordinate their efforts, shares resources and solved specific problems (Roehl et al., 1996). A positive finding is that the interagency cooperation was stronger among law enforcement agencies in a majority of the sites (Roehl et al., 1996).

For a better understanding of the 19 sites of the National Process Evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed, the overview the cities and the targeted areas are, thereby,

discussed in a more detailed fashion. The 19-targeted areas reflect a wide range in population size and density. From the review, most of the cities chose to concentrate the Weed and Seed strategy in one area. However, five cities selected two locations, one city chose to concentrate the program in designated three locations, and two cities have four designated locations or neighborhoods. The average population of the targeted areas was 11,200. The sites ranged from a 1-block public housing development with 717 residents to a 15 square mile section with 38,770 residents (Roehl et al., 1996). The racial and ethnic composition of the designated sites varied sharply.

In four different designated sites, African Americans constituted more than 50 percent of the population; in three sites, Hispanics made up more or nearly 50 percent of the population; four targeted areas had predominately non-Hispanic white populations (Roehl et al., 1996). The above scenarios reveal that the cities varied widely in their racial and ethnic composition. Overall, they seemed to have a relatively high concentration of minorities.

Residents in the targeted area often welcomed the immediate effects of law enforcement and “Weeding” activities. However, for several sites, the mere announcement of the “Weeding” plan would automatically lead to negative reactions from citizens, particularly residents of the targeted areas, along with community and civil rights groups. The people viewed the “Weeding” characteristic of law enforcement as a stigma placed on predominately minority neighborhoods (Roehl et al., 1996). Certain sites responded with increasing involvement of residents in the planning process. This lowered their distrust and enhanced the “Seeding” strategy component.

The “Seeding” component of Weed and Seed is arguably the most diverse and complex element of the strategy (Roehl et al., 1996). The reason for such tough “Seeding” initiatives is due to the targeted neighborhoods. Most neighborhoods have deeply rooted social problems, such as high crime and a large percentage of citizens with income below the poverty line. The evaluation found that many sites had a designated seed coordinator who is required to handle and oversee the Seeding activities (Weed and Seed Implementation Manual, 2005).

One of findings of the National Process Evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed in 1996 was that all the 19 Weed and Seed sites customized a program from a common blueprint drawn by the U.S. Department of Justice. In order to meet each targeted areas, various needs must be met despite the difference in the community dimensions, such as the size, severity of crime, drug problems and the city’s history of interagency cooperation, community policing, and neighborhood empowerment. Each site was provided with the same amount of money from federal funds. However, a number of lessons were drawn from the differences between and across sites from the Weed and Seed programs (Roehl et al., 1996).

The findings of the evaluation found problems with organizational infrastructure, such as complex city government bureaucracies; and phasing problems, such as the need to have a facility to house a safe haven. One of the most important issues was how the funds could be used, particularly with the initial limitations placed on federal funds that could be allocated toward seeding aspect of the strategy that were not (Roehl et al., 1996). The funds were mostly used for the weeding phase of the strategy and little left over for the Seeding aspect.

Another important finding of the National Process Evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed strategy revealed that good management and leadership with experience, effective, and well-regarded individuals in a management position help to mitigate problems that may occur. The evaluation also found that it is crucial from the start to bring the right people on board from the beginning.

The evaluation concluded that one of the important messages delivered by the U.S. Department of Justice in its design and shepherding of the Weed and Seed initiative was that a community's crime and drug problems are best addressed in a comprehensive fashion. In the context of current policy debate over whether to provide funding for enforcement, incarceration, and prevention, the Weed and Seed program serves as a demonstration that provide a sensible answer is both (Roehl et al., 1996).

The "Seeding" aspect is necessary to rebuild and sustain a safe and vital community; at the same time, if "Seeding" cannot be implemented successfully, community participation cannot be achieved; businesses will not invest; and the youths cannot be deterred from the economic attractions of crime. The National Process Evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed in 1996, was the first national evaluation conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice. They found important issues and concerns that will aid the Operation Weed and Seed in its future endeavors.

A second National Evaluation Process was conducted in 1999. In June of 1999, the National Institute of Justice published the Research Brief, detailing its findings. The Weed and Seed evaluation of 1999 was held in eight sites across the country: Hartford, Connecticut; Manatee and Sarasota Counties, Florida; Shreveport, Louisiana; Las Vegas, Nevada; Akron, Ohio; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Salt Lake City, Utah; and Seattle,

Washington. The eight sites were selected for the national evaluation because of their accomplishment and measurable effects on crime and public safety (Dunworth and Mills, 1999). The sites were selected by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to provide examples of successful aspects of the Weed and Seed.

In each of the sites, the evaluation focused on one or two Weed and Seed targeted areas. Although each site has its own distinctive crime problems, they all share a high number of violent crimes related to drugs, drug trafficking, and drug use. Other sites had gang or gang-related problems.

The 1999 evaluation findings shared the programs' effectiveness of "Weeding" and "Seeding" activities across the eight sites. The eight-site evaluation shows that preexisting community features make "Weeding" and "Seeding" easier or more difficult to operate. For example, local politics may play an important role in the strategy. However, some other important factors may affect the strength of social and institutional infrastructure, the severity of the crime problems, geographical advantages favoring economic development, and transiency of the community population (Dunworth and Mills, 1999).

The mix of "Weeding" and "Seeding" activities of the components appear to be important factors in gaining community support for the program. Several important positive factors were derived from the eight sites, which include early "Seeding," sustained "Weeding," high-level task forces combined with community policing and an active prosecutorial role. Dunworth and Mills (1999) noted that the 1999 evaluation sites appeared to have greater success if they concentrated their program resources on smaller population groups and/or smaller targeted areas. The most effective implementation

strategies included those that relied on the bottom-up approach, particularly when it came to making decisions. Each site made their own blue print on how the Weed and Seed strategy was set up and managed in their city.

The eight sites differ substantially in how they organized their Weed and Seed targeted areas. This is, in part, due to the unique law enforcement, social needs, existing organizational infrastructure, and resources available. The staff assigned to the strategy operated cohesively in conjunction with community representatives and organizations, a factor which led the successful of the program (Dunworth and Mills, 1999). Having an adequate and dedicated staff that is actively involved would produce positive results in the program implementation, cohesiveness, and oversight.

Today, the way the Weed and Seed strategy is set-up has made it possible for the U.S. Attorneys' Office in each state to play an important role in organizing the steering committee and bringing together community organizations along with other Weed and Seed participants. The basic Weed and Seed premise is that the U.S. Attorneys' Office provides federal oversight and coordinates federal, state, and local law enforcement activities.

In each of the sites, it is required to have a steering committee. The role and composition of the steering committee varies among sites; The Steering Committee must reflect representatives from the public sector whether resident or not in the targeted area. Other members of the Steering Committees can be drawn from various community organizations who are residents of the targeted area (Dunworth and Mills, 1999). The duties of the Steering Committees are to establish goals and objectives, and to provide guidance and oversight on key programs relating to the design and implementation of the

Weeding and Seeding strategy. The Steering Committee also plays an important role in coordinating efforts across agencies, sites, and jurisdictions. It also provides a critical means by which residents from all walks of life can participate actively in the programs' decision making (Dunworth and Mills, 1999).

It is important to acknowledge that findings of both National Evaluation Process of 1996 and 1999 respectively, claimed that the evaluation sites encountered community resistance to the Weed and Seed strategy because residents in those areas felt that their cities were heavily over policed and, consequently, residents felt they are being targeted for harassment. Another lesson learned from the National Evaluation Process of Weed and Seed in 1996 and 1999, is that resident involvement from the beginning is very vital to a successful Weed and Seed program. For example, the eight sites evaluated proved the case that when residents are involved at every stage of the program, the likelihood of the program's success is greater. What this entails that residents are important in the Weed and Seed strategy. Without their support, the program is most likely will not succeed or work.

In the eight-site evaluations, the law enforcement approaches that were developed and implemented responded to local conditions differently. Many sites incorporated stronger patrols at the street level. They also increased the number of officers dedicated to the Weed and Seed targeted area and increased special operations for drug-related crimes (Dunworth and Mills, 1999). A couple of sites created multi-jurisdictional task force operations, which focused specifically on the targeted areas.

The "Seeding" aspect is one of the greatest challenges of the Weed and Seed strategy. In order for the sites to develop an appropriate "Seeding" strategy with

community members, the targeted areas used resources from the public and private sector. The sites tried to build their own “Seeding” programs around existing resources, in addition to creating new partnerships. Seeding by its nature is resistant to short-term fixes. The National Evaluation Process of Weed and Seed of 1999 and National Institute of Justice Research Brief, concluded that the “Seeding” initiatives undertaken by the evaluation sites are as follows, in order of predominance:

- Prevention and intervention programs for youth that included afterschool programs, safe havens, recreation and sports programs, skills and employment training, job development, and health and substance abuse- related programs.
- Neighborhood restoration, such as neighborhood clean-ups and code enforcement were effective.
- Community building and community development initiatives were undertaken.
- Adult employment and economic advancement programs, such as computer, Internet, and educational training aided persons in the targeted area.
- Family support services targeted adults.

In comparing the variables of the two years under review, data shown that Part I crimes, (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft) in the year prior to the program implementation through the second year of Weed and Seed strategy declined in six sites (Dunworth and Mills, 1999). The six areas or sites that showed decline were: Stow Village in Hartford, 46 %; Crawford-Roberts a neighborhood in Pittsburgh, 34 %; North Manatee, 18 % ; the Shreveport target area, 11 %; the Central District in Seattle, 10 %; and West Las Vegas, 6 % (Dunworth and Mills, 1999). Although three of the targeted areas experienced increases in the Part I crimes. However, during the same time period, in seven targeted areas: Hartford, Pittsburgh, North

Manatee, South Manatee, Shreveport, West Las Vegas and Salt Lake City, the data also showed that the number of Part I crime declined drastically than in the rest of the city.

The National Evaluation Process of Weed and Seed of 1999, and National Institute of Justice Research Brief, found a correlation between crime trends and the concentration of program resources in the sites that had the largest dollar amount to the smallest dollar amount available to them. For example, Hartford has the smallest target area in terms of population size; Salt Lake City has the largest targeted area in terms of square miles, along with Akron, but all received the same amount from a federally funded budget, irrespective of their population size, demography and topography (Dunworth and Mills, 1999). Based on the pattern of findings on the number of Part I crimes as well as responses to crime related survey questions, the targeted areas fall into four categories, according to the evidence of reduced Part I crimes and the evidence of improved public perceptions:

- Pittsburgh and Hartford showed strong evidence of reduced Part I crimes and improved public perceptions on crime-related measures.
- Manatee/Sarasota (North Manatee) and Shreveport showed substantial evidence of reduced Part I crimes.
- Seattle, Akron, Las Vegas, (West Las Vegas) and Manatee/ Sarasota (South Manatee) showed some evidence of reduced Part I crimes. Akron and Seattle also showed improved public perceptions.
- Salt Lake City and Las Vegas showed no evidence of reduced Part I crimes and little evidence of changes in resident's perceptions.

The eight sites evaluation suggests the Weed and Seed strategy has affected the targeted areas through two avenues. First, program effectiveness relates to the initiatives that

focus on law enforcement and crime prevention. Both activities on “Weeding” and “Seeding” appear to have unstable degrees of success in reducing crime and improving the perceptions of public safety. Second community mobilization, is the process in which Weed and Seed provides a mechanism for greater involvement of neighborhood residents and community organizations (Dunworth and Mills, 1999).

The two mechanisms of change are clearly interrelated. The experience of the sites studied in the evaluation showed: The Weed and Seed program has been a strong stimulant to community coalition building. Both public and private organizations came together, for the first time in a number of the sites. According to the author’s of The National Evaluation of Weed and Seed 1999, “It seems clear these developments would not have occurred in the absence of Weed and Seed influence.” Another finding of the evaluation concluded that to maximize the impact on crime rates, Weed and Seed should seek out the highest concentration of funds. Having a focused strategy is another means of increasing the intensity of interventions.

Increasing coordination with other federal funding sources is another key element. Furthermore, the evaluation finds that Weed and Seed funding has acted as a significant catalyst for community revitalization efforts. Most target area communities’ undertaken programs and created community organizations that would not have come into existence without the Weed and Seed strategy (Dunworth and Mills, 1999).

The National Evaluation of Weed and Seed 1999 focused research toward the community policing aspect of the eight sites. The evaluation found the implementation of Weed and Seed enabled most target areas expand and strengthen their community policing efforts or institute new programs. This provides for better concentration,

coordination, and integrated efforts within the police departments. The dedication of Weed and Seed target area officers is important in building relationships with residents and aiding enforcement. Community policing officers assigned to the target areas gain knowledge of the neighborhood. The author's note that "Weeding" typically involved less resident participation than "Seeding" and communication between residents and the police has increased across many sites (Dunworth and Mills, 1999).

Community Policing

According to the CCDO Weed and Seed Manual (2005), community policing is a philosophy and style of policing that a law enforcement agency adopts to guide its delivery of services in Weed and Seed areas. The initial step in the Weed and Seed process is to "Weed" out the criminal elements before providing "Seeding" in terms of prevention, treatment, and neighborhood restoration. The bridge between the "Weeding" and "Seeding" components is community policing. The manual presents useful steps for implementing community policing into the strategy and describes key implementation issues.

Community policing officers assigned to a Weed and Seed target area are a mainstay of the strategy. They become involved with the community and help guide the site's initial law enforcement efforts to make the area safe and secure. Community policing officers provide continuity and maintain community safety and peace by communicating and forming partnerships, stimulating community mobilization, and encouraging prevention programs and community restoration efforts.

Most Weed and Seed sites have a joint task force of law enforcement agencies from all levels of government; aimed at reducing both crime and fear of crime.

Community policing embraces two key concepts—community engagement and problem solving. Community policing help develop cooperative relationships between the police and residents. A police agency must deal with several important issues when planning for and implementing community policing, including changing police culture and values, organizing the department to facilitate community policing, and early community policing efforts to build trust and work with the community on crime prevention goals and objectives should be coordinated with traditional enforcement.

All efforts managing the implementation should involve cooperation. Police initiatives conducted without input from residents could create hostility toward the police. If not developed in collaboration with the community, these enforcement efforts could undermine the credibility of the community policing effort.

Community policing is a department wide effort that requires long-term, substantial changes in the entire police agency and its relationships with the public and other government institutions. Weed and Seed does not require a top to bottom change in the culture of policing for community policing to be successful. A dedicated group of officers can develop community partnerships and implement problem solving in Weed and Seed sites; however, this approach requires that all policing activity in the area be coordinated with these officers. Equally, important community policing officers engaged in Weed and Seed activities must be able to call on other specialized police units to support community engagements and problem solving activities. These units include narcotics, gangs, crime analysis, intelligence, crime prevention, investigations, communications, and special weapons and tactics, and school resource officers.

In summary, community policing is an important component of the Weed and Seed strategy. It is important for community policing to be implemented successfully. Community policing requires training and technical assistance; the training should primarily cover the delivery of services in the Weed and Seed sites. However, the community policing aspect should be implemented throughout the entire police department.

Interactions of Community Policing

Citizens can play an active role in their neighborhood with the aid of the police the Weed and Seed Community policing initiatives such as nuisance abatement, landlord programs, graffiti eradication, code enforcement, and neighborhood clean-ups helped to improve property maintenance and neighborhood environments (Dunworth and Mills, 1999).

An article published in The Weed and Seed INSites Magazine, *Community Policing in Hamilton, Ohio* (2002) states, that community policing efforts through the Weed and Seed strategy are an important aspect of the strategy. Hamilton County developed several “Weeding” activities in the target area. Ten years ago, Hamilton Police Department had community-oriented policing officers but they had little interaction with the citizens of Hamilton (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2002). One of the first changes was the designation of Hamilton’s highest crime rate area as an official Weed and Seed site.

Hamilton police concentrated their efforts in this area with curfew sweeps, drug sweeps, and extra police patrols funded by the new “Weeding” money. This reduced crime in the area but the department did not stop there. The Police Chief decided to add

one officer to the target area and the officer would involve himself in the “Weeding” and “Seeding” efforts; the step was to aid in efforts of community police trust. During the first year, the Chief assigned officers to go door to door to conduct a survey. This was a way to make the officers more assessable to citizens and for officers to learn the target area. This will aid in improving the police/community relations (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2002).

Various other “Weeding” activities took place in the area and the Hamilton Police Department continues to enforce laws in the Weed and Seed target area. There are two keys to its successes in reducing crime. First, everyone in the police department works well together from the top down to the uniformed officer. Second, the community trusts and supports the police. Community members feel good about their police department and the officers feel good about the community (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2002). Without community trust and support, what was accomplished would not have taken place.

Skogan, (2006) notes in his book , *Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities*, that community policing is highly popular with both public and political leaders. He continues to say; “community policing is the most important development in law enforcement in the last twenty-five years.” Cities across the country report that they are moving toward this new model, which supplements traditioal crime fighting with problem-solving and prevetion oriented approaches that emphasize the role of the public in helping set police priorities.

Community polcing is not a set of specific projects; rather it invloves changing decsion- making processes and creating new cultures within the police department. It is

an organizational strategy that believes citizens have a right to set priorities and a means to achieve them in their neighborhoods. Community policing is a process rather than a product (Skogan, 2006). In his book, Skogan reports the findings of a study that took more than a decade to complete. It is one of the first comprehensive evaluations of a city-wide program, examining the impact of crime, neighborhood residents, and police. Chicago instituted the nations largest community-policing initiative. The book emphasises that in Chicago, community policing is not the police department's program: it is the city's program.

One of the larger cities in the nation, moving toward this new model is Chicago; which developed the most prominent big-city neighborhood-oriented program in the nation. It features extensive resident involvement, a problem solving approach toward tackling chronic crime and disorder problems, and coordination between police and a wide range of agencies (Skogan, 2006). The program is political; developed by the Mayor's office as a response to the mounting crime problem of the early 1990s, when violence reached the highest point the city ever seen. Despite the programs origins the city decided to turn toward the community rather than heading toward tougher enforcement. Embracing the "broken windows" theory of neighborhood decline, it deploys a network of volunteers, community organizations, and city service agencies to help fix the windows, not just arrest people (Skogan, 2006).

Theoretical Background:

The theory behind the paper is the Broken Windows Theory by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. The reason behind choosing the theory lies in urban and neighborhood decay. Neighborhood decay and decline of its values and morals can lead

to a breakdown of its normal activity. Many neighborhoods were once considered good have become bad places to live with high crime. Many leave the neighborhood when things turn bad; however, many cannot simply afford to leave. The decline of a neighborhood can happen for many reasons. Operation Weed and Seed targets high crime areas and decaying neighborhoods. As reported in chapter one, the Northside of Youngstown had higher crime than the rest of the city when the grant application was approved.

The process we call urban decay has occurred for centuries in every city (Wilson, Kelling, 1982). What is happening today is different in at least two important ways. First, the period prior to World War II, city dwellers- because of money costs, transportation problems, and family and church connections- could rarely move away from neighborhood problems. Today mobility has become easier for all but the poorest. Earlier, crime waves had a built-in-self-correcting mechanism: the determination of a neighborhood or community would reassert itself and take control over its turf again. Areas in Chicago, New York, and Boston would experience high crime and gang wars, and then normalcy would return. The residents had no choice but to reclaim their authority in the neighborhoods. Second, the police in this earlier period assisted in that reassertion of authority by acting violently on behalf of the community. Many were arrested for vagrancy, prostitution, and petty offenses (Wilson, Kelling, 1982).

From the earliest days of the nation, the police function primarily as that of a night watchman: to maintain order against threats to order- fire, wild animals, and disreputable behavior. In the past solving crimes were viewed as a private matter (Wilson, Kelling, 1982). Earlier, Wilson wrote an article in the Atlantic Monthly in 1969,

stating a brief account of how the police role had slowly changed from maintaining order to fighting crimes. By the late 1970s, the role of police as crime fighters was well under way. Police would concentrate on arrests, solving crimes, and gathering of better evidence. The link between order maintenance and crime prevention is obvious to earlier generations, was forgotten (Wilson, Kelling, 1982).

The Broken Windows theory based on an article; *The Police and Neighborhood Safety*, published in the Atlantic Monthly in March 1982, by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling suggests that:

That link is similar to the process whereby one broken window becomes many. The citizen who fears the ill-smelling drunk, the rowdy teenager, or the importuning beggar is not merely expressing his distaste for unseemly behavior; he is also giving voice to a bit of folk wisdom that happens to be a correct generalization-namely that serious street crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behavior goes unchecked. The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window. Mugger and robber believe they reduce their chances of being caught if they operate on streets where potential victims are already intimidating by prevailing conditions. If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.

Wilson and Kelling suggest that “untended” behavior also leads to the breakdown of community controls. A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes, mind each other’s children, and frown upon unwanted intruders can change, in just a few short

years or months. For example, they suggest; that when there is an abandoned property or building in the neighborhood, weeds grow up, and a window is smashed. Then, this occurs to other buildings in the same area then adults stop yelling at rowdy teenagers. They become more rowdy. Families move out leaving more homes abandoned and unattended. Then unattached adults move in. Litter accumulates, people start drinking in public, panhandlers move in and according to the paragraph above the panhandler leads to more serious crime.

The authors suggest that at this point it is inevitable that serious crime will flourish or violent attacks will occur. Many residents will think that violent crime, is on the rise, and they will modify their behavior accordingly. They will use the streets less often, and when on the streets they will stay away from others, and hurry along. “Don’t get involved” “for some residents, this growing atomization will matter little, because the neighborhood is not their home” but “the place where they live” (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Where people are more confident they can regulate public behavior by informal controls, stopping the drugs changing hands, stopping the prostitutes that try to solicit, and paying attention to cars parked out on the street so they are not stripped down.

The police play an active role in the community. According to Wilson and Kelling; “the essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself” (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). The police cannot without committing extraordinary resources, and provide a substitute for that informal control. On the other hand, to reinforce those natural forces the police must accommodate them. The citizens must take an attitude of keeping their neighborhood secure from vandals and vagrants. They must not allow that first “broken window” to

occur. Today many citizens are becoming increasingly involved with their community. The authors note, the key is to identify neighborhoods at the tipping point--where public order is deteriorating but it is not irreclaimable, where the streets are used frequently but by apprehensive people, where a window is likely to be broken at any time, but it must quickly be fixed if all are not to be shattered (Wilson and Kelling, 1982).

The Police and Neighborhood Safety article concludes that the most important requirement is to think that to maintain order in precarious situation is a vital job. Above all, we must return to our long-abandoned view that the police should to protect communities as well as individuals. Our crime statistics and victimization surveys measure individual losses, but they do not measure communal losses. Therefore, police and the rest of us must recognize the importance of maintaining, intact, communities without broken windows.

Research Question and Hypotheses:

My focus for the study is in answering the for the study is whether the targeted area crime number is lower on the Northside in 2007, the first year of the Weed and Seed Strategy, than in previous years. The reason behind my thinking is, having short-term positive outcomes are better than nothing positive happening in the deprived area. Even though the program has not sustained itself to date the short-term effects will benefit the target area. Having the focus on the Northside of Youngstown will tremendously benefit the area. The police have conducted saturation patrols and worked with local, state, and federal agencies to reduce the crime that is occurring in the targeted area.

Another important factor is the targeted area residents. They now believe that things may change, for the better in their neighborhood. Therefore, the residents trusting

the police and having other community programs initiated because of the Weed and Seed strategy is a positive for the targeted area. A measurement of the 2007 monthly steering committee meetings is analyzed along with several other analyses are done in this study.

Research Question: What are the short-term implications of having the Weed and Seed Strategy located on the Northside of Youngstown in its first year?

Hypotheses:

1. The crime in the four target areas will be lower. Homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny/theft, and rape, are lower in 2007 than in the previous two years.
2. Number of calls for service increased in 2007.
3. Three to five programs were started by the Northside Weed and Seed strategy that will aid in crime prevention.
4. Collaboration among local government, various agencies/organizations, citizens, and community groups have improved in the following ways due to the strategy:
 - There are no duplication of services.
 - Various agencies, local government, citizens, and community groups meet monthly. (I will examine who has attended the meetings in the last year).

In conclusion, the chapter discussed several studies concerning national evaluations in detail. The conclusions of the evaluations were presented in the paragraphs above. The subsection of the chapter discusses how community policing is an important component of the Weed and Seed strategy. The theoretical framework for the study is discussed and a determination was made that the Broken Windows Theory correlates with crime prevention, and the Weed and Seed strategy. The conclusion of the chapter explained the research question and the three hypotheses used in the study.

Chapter three discusses the research question and hypotheses, as well as the design used for the study. The chapter examines the measurements and samples used during the research. Lastly, an in-depth discussion of the methods used to analyze and test the hypotheses is presented.

Chapter Three

The chapter explains the overall research question and the four hypotheses guiding the study. Several designs are used to test the four hypotheses: secondary analysis, content analysis, and focus group. The research designs form a triangulation. The measurements and samples are explained and reviewed. The analysis section describes the statistical tools used throughout the analysis. An explanation of why the actual number is used instead of the population is discussed briefly. The analysis section organizes the hypotheses in order to determine the results of the measurements and samples. The conclusion briefly discusses the components of the chapter and touches on the next chapter.

Research Question and Hypotheses:

The research question for the study is what are the short-term implications of having the Weed and Seed Strategy on the Northside of Youngstown in its first year. The hypotheses are: 1) crime will be lower in 2007 than in prior years (specifically, homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, rape, and larceny/theft), 2) the number of calls for service increased in 2007, 3) three to five crime prevention programs were started by the Northside Weed and Seed strategy in 2007, 4) collaboration among local government, various agencies/organizations, citizens, and community groups have improved in the following ways due to the strategy: 4a) there is no duplication of services, 4b) collaboration among various agencies, local government, citizens, and community groups meet monthly.

Research Design:

The design used in the study is a triangulation design; secondary analysis, content analysis, and a focus group were conducted. The actual number of crimes is measured twice. First, the actual number of crimes is measured for the targeted area as a whole for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007. The second crime data measurement is the actual number of crimes broken into the four census tracts that are located within the targeted area. The third data analysis is the actual number of calls for service for the three years. Another analysis measures the annual percentage of the attendance of Steering Committees monthly meetings for 2007, along with an examination of the crime prevention programs that were started by the strategy. Finally, a focus group was conducted summarizing the responses of the Northside Weed and Seed Steering Committee members.

The first measurement includes the entire targeted area measuring the four-census tracts as a whole with the years 2005, 2006, and 2007. The seven variables of the six Part I crimes and the number of calls for service are measured using actual crime numbers. The reason for using crime numbers instead of rate is because the targeted area population is not taken into account. The actual numbers were analyzed and charts were made using Microsoft Excel.

The number of calls for service was measured separately to accommodate the wide volume between number of calls for service and the actual crime number for the targeted area. The second phase of the design breaks the target area down into the four census tracts. The four census tracts measure the actual number of crimes in each tract and compare the crime numbers. The four census tracts are compared with each other to determine if the tracts increased or decreased throughout the three years.

An examination of the Weed and Seed strategy's goals and objectives were examined and a determination was made on the programs that were started by the Northside Weed and Seed strategy in its first year. Finally, a focus group conducted during a monthly meeting in the spring of 2008 asked questions to the Steering Committee members given this is the most efficient way to obtain a sense of the Steering Committee and learn how the members feel it is progressing. In the following paragraphs, the reasons why the data are used and the collection of it is illustrated. To have support for the focus group, an annual percentage was compiled for the Steering Committees monthly meetings.

Reason for Secondary Analysis:

There are several reasons why a secondary analysis was chosen for the paper. First, it was a matter of efficiency and the targeted area population is not taken into account given its unavailability. The crime data was readily available and the analysis called for the use of secondary data. Without secondary data, the four hypotheses cannot be measured. Analyzing the seven variables and comparing them to the three years is the only way to determine if the crime numbers have lowered after the strategy's first year. It is important to note any changes that may occur throughout the strategy.

The crime data received is from the fiscal agent for the Northside Weed and Seed strategy. The fiscal agent is a member of the Steering Committee. While independently conducting an evaluation during spring of 2008 the crime numbers for the targeted area was provided to me for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007. The police officer in charge of recording the crime data for the Northside targeted area also provided some of the crime numbers.

Changes in the first year can be an insight to what is coming in the next few years of the strategy. The slightest change can send a message to the Steering Committee and the Northside citizens whether or not the “Weeding” and the “Seeding” of the target area is making a difference. Documentation of the seven variables is important into the understanding of what crime is happening within the targeted area. Since the implementation of the Weed and Seed strategy has crime increased or decreased? Documenting any slight changes that may occur every year is very important.

Second, the short-term implications can have a great impact on the community. If the residents of the targeted area see signs of effectiveness in the strategy’s first year, then they are more likely to become involved and committed. If there is only a slight change this provides the residents, the Steering Committee, and others outside the targeted area hope.

The Weed and Seed operation on the Northside is an effective means of crime control and bringing the community together. Initiating a stronger bond between several fundamental agencies and organizations will make the Northside targeted area a better place to live. The first year crime number analysis can determine where the strategy may need to focus more of its efforts in the following year(s). It can also aid in future events. With the numbers of crime in the targeted area the Steering Committee and its members can determine what type of events should be held.

Documenting the short-term implications of the strategy will provide the stakeholders with a practical view of what is occurring within the targeted area. This will ultimately aid criminal justice practitioners, local government agencies, citizens in the targeted area, and the agencies/ organizations that have involved countless hours into the

strategy. They can determine where and when they should focus certain efforts.

Ultimately, the reason for using the crime numbers per year and then breaking it down into census tracts is to determine what works and what does not. Analysis of the crime numbers will provide vital feedback to the targeted area and valuable research in the area of crime prevention.

The second crime number analysis will break up the target area by census tracts. There are four census tracts located within the targeted area. The tract numbers consists of 8034, 8035, 8040, and 8044. Breaking down the targeted area and measuring the actual crime number can determine if there are certain areas affecting the outcome of the first crime measurement. Measuring the crime numbers per census tract can determine if the residents are benefiting from the Weed and Seed Strategy in the targeted area.

In order to determine the year that has the highest or lowest amount of calls for service in 2005, 2006 and 2007, the actual crime numbers were measured. The number of calls should increase in the three-year span. Residents will feel that they are able to trust the police. They may want to take part in their community and have pride in throughout their neighborhood. If the number of calls increased, then crime located within the targeted area should be lower in 2007 than in 2005. A breakdown will show if there are certain census tracts that need more law enforcement. Breaking the target area up into the census tracts provides a more detailed view of the targeted area.

A focus is an important aspect of understanding and learning what the committee members feel and think of the strategy. Asking questions to the members can give vital feedback on how the strategy is working out and progressing. It is important to have the feedback of steering committee members. The Steering Committee is the heart and soul

of the strategy and having their thoughts and feedback is important. Conducting a focus group provides very important feedback even years into the strategy. The more the Steering Committee is dedicated and committed the better the program will run.

Having conducted the focus group provides a well-rounded feedback on how well the strategy progressed during the first year. Obtaining a list of each agency and/or organization that attends the monthly meetings can aid in the effectiveness of the strategy. Determining how many organizations/agencies attend the monthly Weed and Seed meetings can provide information on the dedication and commitment of its members.

Measurements

There are three aspects of the measurement of the crime numbers and the numbers of calls; therefore, three analyses are examined. First, a comparison is done of numbers of the seven crime variables as whole for the targeted area and for the years of 2005, 2006, and 2007. This will determine which year has the highest number of crimes and the highest number of calls for service. The Northside Weed and Seed strategy started in 2007, therefore this data can aid in determining if the strategy has made a difference in one year. The way to determine this is to look at the first year numbers and then the two years prior to the strategy. Listed below in Chart 1 are the seven variables for each year and the overall totals.

Table 1

Seven Variables for 2005, 2006, & 2007

Part I crimes	2005	2006	2007	Total
Homicide	7	7	6	20
Rape	3	4	4	11
Robbery	22	31	22	75
Burglary	196	109	128	433
Felony Assault	62	20	19	101
Larceny/ theft	200	98	113	411
Number of Calls for Service	8423	8544	9496	26,463

The second measurement is the seven crime variables divided into their census tracts. The four census tracts are located within the targeted area. Therefore, a cross-sectional analysis of the crime numbers by census tract will determine the census tract with the highest number of crimes. There are seven variables measured using the actual numbers for each of the census tracts. The three years 2005, 2006, and 2007 is measured. This will determine which of the census tracts had an increase or decrease in crime overall and for the year 2007.

Focus Group

The third part of the data collection was the focus group. The Steering Committee is the core of the strategy and I wanted to obtain a feel for how the strategy operates and functions. A focus group is the most efficient way to gain an insight to the Steering Committee. Conducting a focus group provides an essential insight on how the program is progressing. The focus group will determine the dedication and commitment of the


Steering Committee. Validity for the focus group is the measurement of the yearly attendance of the monthly Steering Committee meetings.

Samples

The samples included in the targeted area map below are the number of calls for the three years for the four census tracts of the targeted area. There are seven variables measured along with the five questions asked during the focus group. The attendance rate for 2007 Steering Committee meetings was analyzed.

The map below includes the entire target area. It is 2.6 sq. miles, located on the Northside of Youngstown Ohio; encompassing the census tracts 8034, 8035, 8040, and 8044. The targeted area runs on the lower Northside of Youngstown.

Figure 1
Target Area Map



<http://www.weedandseed.info/map.aspx?state=OH&status=>

Listed below in table format is the actual crime numbers collected from the four census tracts that are located in the target area. This provides a breakdown of each census tract and the seven variables. Below are the census tract crime numbers in the specified areas:

Table 2

Variables for Census Tract 8034

Crime Item	2005	2006	2007	Total
Homicide	1	0	1	2
Rape	1	0	1	2
Robbery	6	7	4	17
Burglary	31	25	33	89
Felony Assault	5	5	5	15
Larceny/ theft	25	16	20	61
Number of Calls for Service	1448	1623	1702	4773
total crime	69	53	64	186

Table 3

Variables for Census Tract 8035

Crime Item	2005	2006	2007	Total
Homicide	4	3	1	8
Rape	0	3	1	4
Robbery	2	5	1	8
Burglary	19	31	18	68
Felony Assault	36	4	1	41
Larceny/ theft	44	18	14	76
Number of Calls for Service	1380	1431	1788	4599
Total Crime	105	64	36	205

Table 4

Variables for Census Tract 8044

Crime Item	2005	2006	2007	Total
Homicide	1	1	0	2
Rape	0	1	0	1
Robbery	2	7	8	17
Burglary	34	21	18	73
Felony Assault	11	5	3	19
Larceny/ theft	38	18	18	74
Number of Calls for Service	1884	1666	1862	5412
Total Crime	86	53	47	186

Table 5

Variables for Census Tract 8040

Crime Item	2005	2006	2007	Total
Homicide	1	3	4	8
Rape	2	0	2	4
Robbery	12	12	9	33
Burglary	112	32	59	203
Felony Assault	10	6	10	26
Larceny/ theft	93	46	61	200
Number of Calls for Service	3711	3824	4144	11679
Total Crime	230	99	145	474

Measurements of the targeted area for three consecutive years and then analyzing the four census tracts, a change should occur with the crime numbers and number of calls for service. The measurement will determine the census tract with the highest and lowest number of crimes, and number of calls for service. After reviewing the numbers we can establish there is a pattern and with the census tract that has high crime numbers.

Answers to the question did the seven Part I crimes numbers lower after Weed and Seed strategy in the targeted area can then be found.

Focus Group:

The focus group was conducted on 15 February 2008, at Heart Reach Ministries, located within the targeted area. Fifteen committee members attended the meeting. The focus group answers remain individually anonymous. They answer as a group, not as an individual. Members were informed of this and signed a consent form. The focus group was held during their normal monthly meeting; therefore, allotted time for the question/ and answer phase was 15 to 20 minutes. There were five questions asked to the group as a whole. The following are the questions that were asked:

1. What are your overall thoughts of the Northside Weed and Seed Strategy?
2. How do you see the strategy benefitting the target area in the first year?
3. How can the Weed and Seed Strategy be improved or become more productive in the following year?
4. How can the strategy maintain sustainability?
5. What are some strengths of having the Weed and Seed strategy on the city's Northside?

Deciding on conducting a focus group on the Northside Weed and Seed strategy took some effort. The Steering Committee did not want to say anything negative or conducive to hurt the strategy in any way. This relates to the Hawthorne effect of a study. The Hawthorne effect is when the participants do not want to show negative outcomes and/or may act different around the investigator. However, once I was present for a while and kept asking questions and talking people began to open up and answer the questions.

Below is a list of the Steering Committee members. Their names are kept anonymous, however the agency or organization they are with is provided. The Youngstown Northside Weed and Seed strategy continues to generate partnerships and

linkages. Below is a list of the leveraged resources of the Northside Weed and Seed strategy:

1. Youngstown Parks Department
2. Youngstown Police Department
3. Youngstown Prosecutor's Office
4. United States Attorney's Office Northern District of Ohio
5. Mahoning County Juvenile Justice Center
6. Mahoning County Prosecutor's Office
7. United States Drug Enforcement Agency
8. Youngstown State University Police Department (YSUPD)
9. Mayor's Crime Prevention Task Force
10. Youngstown Block Watch Association
11. Youngstown City Schools
12. Youngstown State University
13. Youngstown Police Athletic League (YPAL)
14. Volunteer Service Agency (VSA)
15. Prevention Partners Plus
16. Tabernacle Baptist Church
17. Temple Rodef Shalom
18. Increase the Peace
19. Humility of Mary Health Partners
20. Heart Reach Ministries
21. First Ward Council
22. Third Ward Council
23. Burdman Group
24. Beatitude House
25. Park Vista
26. Antioch Baptist Church
27. Youngstown Community Development Agency
28. Youngstown Community Health Center
29. Youngstown Demolition Department
30. Youngstown Litter Control and Recycling
31. Youngstown/Mahoning Valley United Way
32. Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority

Analyses:

The first analysis of the crime numbers was to determine if the seven crime variables increased or decrease for entire target area. Included in the measurement is the years, 2005, 2006, and 2007. This will determine what crimes occurred during the first year of the Weed and Seed strategy.

The first hypothesis tested involves the crime numbers being analyzed via the seven variables, six are the Part I crimes as well as the number of calls for service for the three years. I used Microsoft Excel to analyze the number of crimes and the number of calls for service for the three years. By means of taking the total number of crimes for the entire target area, we can make an assumption of whether the implementation of the Weed and Seed strategy in 2007 has made any difference in the numbers.

The second test breaks the seven crime variables into four census tracts that are located within the targeted area. With the examination of the total number of crimes, we can determine which census tract(s) has the higher crime numbers for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007. This measurement includes the number of crime per year in the four census tracts. The second hypothesis is three to five crime prevention programs were started by the Northside Weed and Seed strategy. An examination of the strategy's goals and objectives was done. A detailed list of the programs started in the first year is included in the next chapter. Determination is made on what community programs were started in the first year from the report.

The third hypothesis is collaboration among local government, various agencies/organizations, citizens, and community groups has improved in the following ways after the strategy started--no duplication of services: The Steering Committee meets monthly therefore, tallying the number of members who attended the meetings in 2007 was conducted. The focus group responses were recorded and then broken down into a range of responses. Summarizing the responses along with a list of the attendance records for the entire first year of the strategy will determine collaboration among members.

In conclusion, chapter three explained the methodology used for the thesis. First, the chapter described the research question and hypotheses, followed by the testing the statistical crime number for the target area. Then the chapter explained the reason why the analysis was chosen and how the data were attained. A map of the target area is provided in the chapter so the reader can have a visual view of the area. Next, the chapter went into detail concerning the measurements of the crime data.

The following chapter will explain the findings from the measurements described in this chapter. The findings will include the yearly Part I crime data analysis, second the chapter will include the broken down target area findings. The breakdown of the target area is for the three years mentioned above. This will provide an informative look at each census tract. It will determine the census tract that has the lowest Part I crime rate and the census tract that has the highest Part I crime rate. Finally, chapter 4 will explain the feedback received from the focus group was conducted in the spring of 2008.

Chapter Four

Chapter four introduces the overall findings of the crime number measurements for the targeted area as a whole, number of calls for service, and then data broken down for the four census tracts by using the actual numbers. The measurements were conducted to determine how many crime prevention/community programs were started by the Weed and Seed strategy in its first year, and then a yearly measurement of the Steering Committee attendance for the monthly meetings. Finally, the focus group questions and responses are listed and explored in this chapter. The chapter is a presentation of the findings, therefore there are several figures and tables. The findings are relative to the research question and the four hypotheses presented earlier. The conclusion summarizes the chapter and introduces chapter five. Chapter five describes the major findings from the tests and analysis conducted in chapter four.

The first analysis is the actual crime number for the entire Northside Weed and Seed targeted area. The analysis will test the seven variables for the years of 2005, 2006, and 2007. This will provide a view on the crime number. The total number of crimes in the targeted area will determine if crimes has increased or decreased after the first year of the strategy.

The second data analysis breaks down the targeted area into the four census tracts and compares the census tracts per year. Therefore, each census tract compares to the two years prior to the strategy to the year of the strategy to determine any differences. The census tracts crime numbers can determine where the strategy may need to focus attention in the next year.

The third analysis will examine the collaboration among the various agencies, organizations, and the local government that leverage resources for the Northside Weed and Seed strategy. A determination of what programs the strategy started in 2007 to deter crime is presented and then a review of the monthly meetings is presented pertaining to the percentage of attendees throughout the year. The more agencies, organizations, and other various entities are involved will presumably provide no duplication of services and aid in building the strategy. The chapter details the focus group questions and responses.


Findings for Targeted Area:

As mentioned above, the first analysis is to determine if the 2007 Part I crimes were lower than the two previous years, 2005 and 2006. This is determined by taking the total number of the seven Part I crimes for each year and running a frequency analysis using the actual crime number. Below is the chart explaining the year and the total number of the seven Part I crime variables. The chart is listed on the following page.

Once the numbers were ready for graph format to determine the year that had the highest or lowest crime rate, the test was conducted. We will discuss the results below in the graph. The discussion will talk about each variable. Did the variable increase or decrease? Which variables were lower in 2007 than the previous two years? Below is the figure:

Figure 2

Target area Total crime



As reflected in Figure 2, the first hypothesis is accepted, the actual number of crime is lower in 2007. In 2007, crimes have decreased overall. There is a clear sign that the year 2007 does decrease in overall crime from 2005. The first year of the Northside Weed and Seed strategy is 2007. By examining the figure above, 2005 has noticeably the highest number of crime overall with larceny/theft close to nearing 200 and burglary closely behind. Larceny/theft was highest in 2005 and lowered slightly in 2006, then increased in 2007. Felony assaults were the highest in 2005 than the following two years. Robbery was slightly lower in 2005 than in 2006, and then it declined in 2007. There were seven homicides in 2005, four in 2006 and then it increased to six in 2007. The violent crimes decreased in 2007 while only two burglary and larceny/theft had increases.

Rape has consistently increased from 3 in 2005 to 4 in 2006 and held the same number in 2007. Robbery increased from 2005 to 2006 and then fell just a bit in 2007. We can determine that burglary actually increased in 2006 to 2007. There were 196 burglaries in 2005 then fell in 2006 to 109 however, it increased in 2007 to a total of 128.


Homicides increased from 2006 to 2007. Notice the larceny /theft area of the chart; a determination is that in the year 2005 there was 200 reported, then in 2007 we can determine there were 113 reported. This shows a lower number from 2005 to 2007.

Number of Calls for Service:

The number of calls for service included in the chart below:

Figure 3

Number of Calls for Target Area Per Year



From the information in Figure 3, a determination can be made that the total number of calls increased during the three years. The second hypothesis is accepted. Number of calls did increase. In 2005 the total number of calls was 8,423 and in 2006 the number of calls increased to 8,544. Finally, for the year 2007, the number of calls increased to 9,496. An increase of 952 calls for service from 2006 to 2007. A conclusion is made that there has been a consistent increase in the number of calls for service. As noted in the previous chapter, this may be due to the trust of target area residents. The Weed and Seed

strategy may have increased their trust with the police and they are reporting more offenses.

There could be several explanations of why the number of calls has increased. This is a positive outcome for the targeted area because it may show that the residents in the target area have come to realize that if they call in a complaint to the police they will respond.

The Breakdown of the Four Census Tracts:

The paragraphs below discuss the breakdown of the targeted area by census tracts. As mentioned earlier in the chapters, there are four census tracts located in the targeted area. Below are the four census tracts and the seven variables crime numbers. The seven variables are homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, felony assault, larceny/theft, and the number of calls for service.

Below, Figure 4 provides a visual view of the Part I crimes by census tract for each year. In the following paragraph, we will discuss the Part I crimes and how they increased or decreased throughout the three years. Each census tract total was analyzed per year to determine the actual number of the Part I crimes as a whole. They are taken as a total for each of the three years and are recorded on the following page.

Figure 4

Crime per Census Tract and Year





Figure 5

Crime per Census Tract



An examination of Figure 5 above shows a clear view of the years 2005, 2006, and 2007 Part I crime variables for each of the census tracts. The year 2005 has the highest number


of total crimes. However, there is a decline for all four census tracts from 2005 through 2007. Census tract 8040 has the sharpest decrease in crime from 2005 to 2006 however, it rose slightly in 2007. Census tract 8035 continued on declining slope for the three years with the lowest number of crimes for the three years. The first year of the Weed and Seed strategy graph shows an increase in census tracts 8040 and 8034.

Below figure 6, shows a pie chart of the Part I crime data for the four census tracts and the years, 2005, 2006, and 2007. In this chart, we are able to view the Part I crime numbers the four census tracts. Using the numbers of crime we had the total number of crimes by census tract and analyzed it with the three years. The pie chart below shows census tract 8040 having 45% of the crime, with 948 actual crime number of events from 2005- 2007. The other three census tract numbers are of little concern.

However, census tract 8035 has 19% of the total crime and the strategy should recognize there is a possibility for the crime to increase in the next few years. The other two census tracts are equal at 18% of the total crime for the three years. From an examination of the pie chart below, it is clear that census tract 8040 has the highest amount of crime for the three years. On the following page is Figure 6.

Figure 6

Percentage & Number of Crimes for 2005, 2006, 2007, per Census Tract



In the conclusion, the two census tracts 8040 and 8034 increased in overall crime during the first year of the Northside Weed and Seed strategy. Therefore, after analyzing the number of Part I crimes, it did decrease overall in the three years, however, the number of calls for service in the three years increased.

Programs Started by the Strategy:

The Northside Weed and Seed strategy prides itself in developing many crime prevention programs and outreach strategies to the Northside community. Below are the highlights of the first year:

- A Police sub-station was opened and is now located within the target area
- Two Safe Havens are now located within the area:

-Heart Reach Ministries
-Tabernacle Baptist Church

- A new Block Watch formed: the “We Stand Together” Block Watch.
- A Youth Summer Program was held with within the target area. Target area residents took part in streetscape the City- Wide Clean-Up.
- During the summer, area residents, including youth, “Planted the Four Corners” of the target area.
- During the holiday season turkeys were distributed to needy target area residents
- A “Beautification Award” for the best yard on the block is given to an area resident.
- The “Best Block Award” is given to the best block in the target area.

The Northside Weed and Seed strategy is developing a few more outreach programs for the beginning of year 2008. For example, a “Criminal Justice Fair” is now in the planning phase for February 2008. The Fair will be held at the Safe Haven: Heart Reach Ministries. This Fair invites all area law enforcement, along with other local agencies and organizations, to interact with residents and provide information creating a positive environment for area residents. The Youngstown Police Athletic League (YPAL), a certified Police Athletic League, was formed and Basketball and baseball leagues began in February 2008.

In conclusion, several programs were started and my second hypothesis was supported. There are at least three to five programs started by the Northside Weed and Seed strategy to aid in the prevention of crime. There are many crime prevention programs in the planning stages for 2008.

Steering Committee Members Attendance:

This section of chapter four is an assessment of the Steering Committee members and how many of the agencies/organization attended the monthly meetings throughout

year one. Afterwards, how many crime prevention programs were started by the Northside Weed and Seed strategy is presented.

There are 32 members of the Northside Steering Committee. Various agencies, organizations, churches, volunteers, businesses, and others are welcome to join the monthly meetings. The list below shows the number of persons attended as well as when and where the meetings were held. Every monthly meeting is held within the target area. All Steering Committee meetings are held the third Tuesday of the month at 11:00 a.m. In addition, all members are mailed a meeting notice and tentative agenda one week prior to the meeting. Below is list of the attendance throughout 2007:

Steering Committee Meetings Roster:

Date	Location	Attendance
Tuesday, January 16, 2007	St. Elizabeth's Hospital	22
Tuesday, February 20, 2007	Mahoning County Juvenile Justice Center	23
Tuesday, March 20, 2007	Heart Reach Ministries	30
Tuesday, April 17, 2007	Youngstown Community Health Center	24
Tuesday, June 19, 2007	Tabernacle Baptist Church	17
Tuesday, July 17, 2007	Antioch Baptist Church	20
Tuesday, August 14, 2007	Sts. Peter and Paul Church	26
Tuesday, September 18, 2007	Tabernacle Baptist Church	24
Tuesday, October 16, 2007	Sts. Peter and Paul Church	29
Tuesday, November 20, 2007	Antioch Baptist Church	21
Tuesday, December 18, 2007	Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority	19

In order to examine the percentage of agencies, organization, community groups, and members that attended the monthly meetings, I took the total the number attended for the 11 meetings and divided by the total number that could have attended. This is a yearly attendance percentage; it is not broken into in monthly percentages. The percentage of attendance for 2007 was 77%. There were only 11 meetings during 2007; the Steering Committee did not meet in the month of May.

In conclusion, this develops support for the 4th hypothesis--77% of attendance for the entire first year is good. The percentage is higher than expected. This provides the organizations, agencies, and other various members a direct involvement with what is occurring with the Northside Weed and Seed strategy. This ensures no duplication of services by similar agencies and they all join once a month to discuss the targeted area.

Focus Group:

Believing this is the most efficient way to obtain a sense of the Steering Committee and learn how the members feel concerning the future of the strategy, a focus group was conducted. The Steering Committee is the core of the strategy. As an evaluator, I wanted to obtain a feel for how they operate and function; a focus group is a good way to gain insight. A focus is an important aspect of understanding and learning what the committee members feel and think of the strategy. Asking questions to the members can give vital feedback on how the strategy is working out and progressing. It is important to have the feedback of Steering Committee members. The Steering Committee is the heart and soul of the strategy and having their thoughts and feedback is important.

Steering Committee members held their monthly meeting on 15 February 2008, at Heart Reach Ministries, located within the target area. Fifteen committee members

attended the meeting and the allotted time was 15 to 20 minutes. The focus group answers remain individually anonymous. Five questions were asked to the group as a whole. The following are the questions asked and responses given:

Q1. What are your overall thoughts of the Northside Weed and Seed program?

The Steering Committee gave several responses.

- The majority of members is satisfied and said the program has been progressive.
- Members have seen a difference in the target area.
- Support among law enforcement entities has been positive.
- The members believe people from the community must actively participate.
- The Steering Committee can become more proactive.

Q2. How do you see the program benefiting the target area?

- Community members living in the target area have become more involved.
- The strategy supports the community through various events.
- The program has provided much needed resources to the target area Safe Havens.
- The Weed and Seed strategy will aid in bringing community members out of their homes and actively participating in community events.
- Community members enjoy and participate in Safe Haven activities.
- Officers are out and about within the target area more than before the strategy started. This provides a working and trusting relationship between law enforcement and community members.
- Beautification awards are given to area residents. Awards will go to the person and/or the block with the best landscaping:
 - “Most Improved Yard” Award
 - “Most Improved Block” Award
- High community involvement--the community has participated in target area outreach.
- The strategy will ultimately provide much-needed support to the community.

Q3. How can the Weed and Seed Program be improved upon in the following year?

- Provide more opportunities for community members to get involved with the Steering Committee.
- Invite local area youth to become active members and sit on the Steering Committee.
- Invite a local judge or a City representative from the courts to sit in on the Steering-Committee meetings--one who lives within the target area.
- Have more interaction between police officers and young people. Officers can give a positive impression of the police to young members of the community.
- The next phase is to get more community members from other areas more involved.

Q4. How can the Strategy continue its momentum?

- Develop a Sustainability Committee. The committee will look at certain issues regarding the long-term goals.
- Get community members involved, and keep them involved, by providing them with opportunities to participate in events and/or become involved with the program itself.
- Keep the youth involved. Therefore, provide events and programs for the youth.
- Get the elderly more involved and active; youth may be able to assist elderly with chores and/or yard upkeep.
- Youth living within the target area need to be on the Steering Committee. This will provide insight for the youth and what they want and/or need.
- Make the residents of the target area aware of the program and the events that will be up-coming. Get them excited about being proud of their community.
- Obtain more partnerships throughout the City.
- Retain the partnerships that we have.

Q5. What are the Strengths of the Northside Weed and Seed Program?

Collaboration among partners and members of the Steering Committee has been an important aspect of the strategy. The Steering Committee is committed to having all

entities and agencies involved. If these organizations continue to work together, they will achieve the goals of the program.

The fourth hypothesis is supported by the data. Collaboration among various agencies and organizations is occurring in the first year. The focus group provided me an insight to what is occurring with the Steering Committee members and it also gave them a chance to speak their mind. It seems that some members felt respected and that the message needed to get out to the public about the progress they have made in the first year.

The findings above have shown not every one of my hypotheses was supported. This chapter focused on the findings from the crime numbers analyzed for the target area then a breakdown of the crime numbers for the census tracts. Next, the programs the Northside Weed and Seed strategy started in hopes to aid crime prevention were presented. Finally, the chapter examined and analyzed the attendance rate of the monthly meetings held by the Northside Weed and Seed Steering Committee. Conducting a focus group provides very important feedback.

Throughout the chapter, the hypotheses were tested and after analyzed it is concluded that all had findings of fact. The first hypothesis is supported--crime numbers were lower in 2007 than in the previous years. The number of calls for service increased which supports my second hypothesis. The third hypothesis was supported; clearly, the strategy has made efforts in preventing crime within the target area by starting many programs. Finally, the fourth hypothesis is supported--having a 77% attendance rate for the entire year the information obtained by the focus group shows collaboration among various entities. The focus group provided an insight to the Steering Committee and its

members along with their thoughts and concerns for the Northside Weed and Seed strategy.

Chapter five describes the major findings of the thesis and analyses of chapter four. The major findings from the study are discussed along with the focus group and the caveats of the paper. There is a suggestion put forth for future research to examine the many outlining factors that may skew the data. A couple of outside things could have affected the data and the number of crimes. Chapter five discusses future research endeavors that others may want to conduct based upon this study.

Chapter 5

Chapter five summarizes the major findings of the research and states the caveats and/or limitations. It describes how some things could have been done differently during the research process and then provides recommendations for future research. Explained are the important research findings including what my expectations were and what the findings showed. There could be a number of outlining factors causing certain crime numbers to rise in 2007. The demolishing of homes may impact results. However, there were some positives that the Northside Weed and Seed strategy brought to the Northside targeted area. A few limitations to the research are discussed in the paragraphs below. There are several suggestions for future research. Finally the chapter concludes with focus on the Northside Weed and Seed strategy and its Steering Committee members.

Major Findings of the Study:

The most important findings are in the paragraphs below. First, the crime numbers for the entire targeted area decreased and only two crimes increased slightly from 2006 to 2007. The breakdown of the target area showed an increase in two of the census tracts. Third, the strategy started several programs. The number of calls for service increased consecutively for the three years and a 77% average for the yearly attendance of the Steering Committee members is promising; validating the focus group responses. The focus group provided important information to what the Steering Committee members are thinking and what they believe the strategy can provide the community.

As a reminder, we are examining the crime numbers for 2007, which is the first year of the Weed and Seed strategy. From the analysis of the seven Part I crime numbers, the data showed an overall decrease in crimes. The 2005 crime numbers are the highest

for the three years. A couple of crimes did increase from 2006 to 2007. Burglary increased from 109 in 2006 to 128 in 2007. Homicides increased by two from 2005 to 2006 but fell in 2007. Overall, we see that rapes continued consistently around the same number throughout the three years. In 2007, rape increased by one for the targeted area. A breakdown of the four census tracts analyzed the crime numbers per census tract.

The second analysis measured the number of crimes and included the four census tracts. The analysis showed target area crimes showed that $\frac{1}{2}$ or two out of two of the census tracts had their crime numbers increase from 2006 to 2007. Census tracts 8040 and 8034 increased their crime in 2007. On a positive, 8035 consistently decreased in crime throughout the three years. Finally, after reviewing the numbers and the three years it is possible to conclude that census tract 8040 has the highest number of crimes overall. This census tract needs law enforcement attention.

The second crime number analysis concluded that the number of calls for service increased significantly throughout the three years. There could be several explanations for this. First, residents may feel safer and have a take-charge attitude about their community now and are calling the police more often than before. This is noted in the previous chapters. Many citizens may be aware of the Weed and Seed strategy and are calling in the crimes because they believe something will be done about the crime. However, there could be several other reasons for the increase. The increase in the number of calls could have played a part in the Part I crime variables measured.

The third hypothesis is supported because the number of programs and strategies started by the Northside Weed and Seed strategy increased more than five. These programs will enhance the target area and hopefully decrease the crimes. Block watch

programs, safe havens, and various other programs will provide residents opportunities to take an interest in their community.

The attendance rate of 77% for the monthly Steering Committee meetings is more than I expected. I thought that during the start of the strategy people, agencies, organizations, and various others become involved, and then as time goes by less would attend the meetings. However, this is not the case for the first year of the Northside Weed and Seed strategy. Therefore, the 77% is a positive for the Weed and Seed strategy. This assumes that people are still interested in what occurs at the monthly meetings and therefore, within the target area. Finally, the focus group responses are discussed in the previous chapter and the collaboration among members is vital to the success of the program.

The focus group asked questions to the Steering Committee. My findings concluded that community members, and other various agencies have a stake in seeing the Northside Weed and Seed strategy be successful. In order for the Weed and Seed strategy to work with different agencies and entities, all must join as one. For this to occur without any problems along the way is highly unlikely.

During the evaluation, it was discovered that there are some goals and objectives that need more attention brought to them. However, having no doubt of the commitment of members and all involved, the pressing issues and goals are going to be addressed in the following year. According to the information obtained in the focus group and research conducted along with that was conducted a number of issues need attention and/or addressing in the following year(s):

- Have law enforcement become more active (daytime activity)
- Provide more outreach programs for seniors

- Educate adults on different career areas
- Promote families to take an interest in their child's education
- Make a business plan, working with target-area businesses
- Create more activity for youth
- Have the Adult Parole Authority and law enforcement work more closely together
- Keep a record of the proactive approaches of law enforcement efforts within the target-area

Caveats of the Study:

There were some limitations throughout the thesis. First, the data of the census tracts for the Northside target area is somewhat limited. Second, the length of the study. Finally, the focus group may have some bias. The first limitation is the perimeter of data with which I worked. The data provided to me was by the Northside Weed and Seed strategy's fiscal agent. An outside source did not acquire the data. Therefore, there may have been bias on that part. However, the data did match with the police officers records. The officer assigned to the strategy kept records of the crimes within the target area.

Data records could have been more detailed than they are. For example, the year 2007 crime data includes weapon offenses and drug arrests. However, it does not for the previous two years. Therefore, a test could not compare the two variables with the years prior to the Weed and Seed strategy.

Another caveat is the length of the study, as mentioned above. The length of the study consisted of the first year of the strategy only. Many research papers conducted several years of research. However, due to the nature of this study I feel that it is appropriate for this paper to determine the short-term implications. It is highly important to understand the short- term issues and outcomes.

The focus group may obtain bias comments and remarks about how well the strategy is progressing. As noted earlier, the Hawthorne effect may have occurred somewhat. However; analyzing the attendance rate verified the dedication and collaboration among the Steering Committee members. Steering Committee members have a stake in the strategy. They want to see the strategy succeed. I felt that this study needed input from the Steering Committee to determine the dedication they have for the strategy. The monthly meetings attendance records follow up the findings. They are expected to have some bias towards the strategy; however, when asking the questions, they seemed very comfortable in telling their story and not shying away from their weaknesses. Another outlining factor could be the many demolished houses on the Northside of the City. The demolition department said 70 houses were demolished during the three-year span on the Northside; however, they did not have specific census tract data to provide. This can be an outlining factor related to the crime rate. Demolishing of abandoned homes could lead to higher crime within the target area.

In two years, City-backed demolition crews have leveled an unprecedented 1,000 unsafe and unsightly buildings (Schmitt 2008). The article, written in the Vindicator on Tuesday February 12th, 2008 by Angie Schmitt said; “The occupants who would normally conduct illegal activity inside the abandoned homes can no longer do so, therefore they are conducting various crimes in the street and getting caught because the houses are demolished”. The article continued to focus on Youngstown’s demolition department and getting prepared for Youngstown 2010 project. However, according to the City’s demolisher, the City is making real progress and need to continue to do so until every abandoned home is demolished (Schmitt, 2008).

Another outlining factor is the possibility that residents feel secure with calling for service now than in the past. Therefore, when the residents make calls for service to the police it is more likely that arrests are being made. According to a study, the community policing concept is the community and the police working together towards addressing the social and criminal concerns of the community. It requires forming a partnership with the community and developing a form of accountability with the community (West Side Crime Group, 2002).

Due to community support and officers working the area a 10% increase in arrests in Wilmington Delaware has occurred (West Side Crime Group, 2002). This could be a reason for the increase in crimes in 2007. It is possible that in previous years residents did not trust the police or they felt it made no difference and did not bother to call for assistance. However, due to the strategy and the outreach it has had in the community during 2007, residents may have begun to trust the police and the number of crimes could have increased in 2007 due to that factor. Prior to the strategy, it is possible.

The things I would do differently are to study and analyze every agency and organization that attended the monthly meetings. It needs to be determined if the same people were present at every meeting or did different people, organizations, agencies part-take in the meetings. Knowing that every agency/organization that is considered a Steering Committee member can attend every meeting, it would be valuable to analyze which agencies, organizations and other various officials attended and how many they attended and when did they attend. The analysis provided in this paper used percentages of the entire first year. The measurement did not provide more detailed results.

Future Research:

Future research can conjure up various analyses of the Weed and Seed grassroots strategy. An approach is to examine other grassroots programs and how they function. The goal would be to correlate the targeted area crime data numbers with the rest of the City's crime numbers and compare the targeted area to the surrounding areas.

The Weed and Seed strategy can have many analyses run from one target area or with many target areas. An analysis can include examining the goals and objectives for a specific Weed and Seed strategy site. This will determine if the strategy is meeting the goals they set in place for each year. If examining the strategy, then several analyses can be conducted. One for example can be to determine how many programs are held for seniors, juveniles, addiction treatment, and various other opportunities that residents of the target area could be a part of in their neighborhood. A survey of the target area residents could be conducted to analyze their reactions to having the strategy in their neighborhood. A longitudinal study can be conducted for one strategy or include several strategies. Researching target areas across the nation with like demographics is an option.

Another area that may need studying is other grassroots organizations and how they operate and what they consider a successful completion. For example, a block watch or several block watches within a citywide area could be studied to determine the ones that are reducing crime and the ones that are not. A person can analyze numerous datasets when it comes to grassroots programs and strategies.

A future study can analyze the various census tracts and compare with census tracts around the target area. This can determine if dispersion takes place when a strategy such as Weed and Seed takes over a neighborhood. They can analyze crime data from the

entire city and compare it with the target area data. This may determine the reason why the crime increased or decreased during a specified period. For example, if the crime increased throughout the entire City it is more likely that the crime will increase for the target area.

Conclusion:

Chapter five summarizes the major findings of the study as well as the caveats and future research ideas that others may want to follow. There are issues hovering over the Northside Weed and Seed strategy for year two. The caveats and/or limitations are stated that may have existed. There may be a number of outlining factors that contributed to the crime data results. For example, the demolishing of houses on the Northside may have an impact of the number of crimes during 2007. Discussed in the chapter is a description of how a couple of things could have been done differently and how some changes could have been made in conducting the research. The chapter also recommended future researchers to examine various possibilities that are out there concerning the Weed and Seed strategy along with various other grassroots organizations and crime prevention strategies. The Northside strategy showed many positives but it also showed some negatives.

A well-balanced Steering Committee demands hard work and during the first year of the strategy. The Steering Committee can make or break the strategy therefore, it is important to study its members especially during the first year. The Steering Committee must learn to work together toward the goals and objectives outlined in the strategy's four pronged approach. Crime prevention continues to grow in the nation today due to various reasons; research is need in this particular area, especially research in grass-root

programs. Future research can focus on several aspects of the Weed and Seed strategy or any other grassroots crime prevention programs.

The Youngstown area can benefit from various grassroots crime prevention programs and strategies. The area can use block watch groups, Weed and Seed target areas, and other preventions programs. Community policing efforts need attention in the Mahoning Valley. Community policing can have a positive impact on the targeted area if the police gain the residents' trust. Overall, the crime prevention strategies started by the program can only benefit an area for the better, whether in short-term or for the long-term. The Northside Weed and Seed strategy is a starting point for target area residents to take charge of their neighborhoods and bring the community together for the better.

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
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Appendix A:

Map of the Target Area



Courtesy of the Center for Human Service Development- Youngstown State University

Appendix C:Targeted area Crime Numbers

Part I Crime	2005	2006	2007	Total
Homicide	7	7	6	17
Rape	3	4	4	11
Robbery	22	31	22	75
Burglary	196	109	128	433
Felony Assault	62	20	19	101
Larceny/ theft	200	98	113	411
Number of Calls for Service	8423	8544	9496	26,463

Appendix D: Target Area Census Tract Crime Data: 8034, 8035

8034

8034				
Crime Item	2005	2006	2007	Total
Homicide	1	0	1	2
Rape	1	0	1	2
Robbery	6	7	4	17
Burglary	31	25	33	89
Felony Assault	5	5	5	15
Larceny/ theft	25	16	20	61
Number of Calls for Service	1448	1623	1702	4773
Total Crime	69	53	64	186

8035

Crime Item	2005	2006	2007	Total
Homicide	4	3	1	8
Rape	0	3	1	4
Robbery	2	5	1	8
Burglary	19	31	18	68
Felony Assault	36	4	1	41
Larceny/ theft	44	18	14	76
Number of Calls for Service	1380	1431	1788	4599
Total Crime	105	64	36	205

Appendix E: Target Area Census Tract Crime Data for: 8044 & 8040

8044


Crime Item	2005	2006	2007	Total
Homicide	1	1	0	2
Rape	0	1	0	1
Robbery	2	7	8	17
Burglary	34	21	18	73
Felony Assault	11	5	3	19
Larceny/ theft	38	18	18	74
Number of Calls for Service	1884	1666	1862	5412
Total Crime	86	53	47	186

8040


Crime Item	2005	2006	2007	Total
Homicide	1	3	4	8
Rape	2	0	2	4
Robbery	12	12	9	33
Burglary	112	32	59	203
Felony Assault	10	6	10	26
Larceny/ theft	93	46	61	200
Number of Calls for Service	3711	3824	4144	11679
Total Crime	230	99	145	474

Appendix F:


Target Area Crime Figure




Number of Calls per Year



Appendix G: Target Area Graphs per Census Tracts and Year



Crimes by Census Tract for 2005, 2006, & 2007



Appendix H:

Target Area Demographics

Community Capacity Development Office: Weed and Seed Data Center Contact Data: Youngstown

Summary Demographic, Housing trends & Characteristics, Education Characteristics, and Income Northside, Site Summary

Geography

Area, sq. mi. 2.65

Demographics

Population	7967
Males, Age 18 and Up	3099
Females, Age 18 and Up	3199
Males, Age 17 or Less	874
Females, Age 17 or Less	795

Family Structure

Total Households	2299
Households with Families	1072
Households with Children	736
Single Parent Families with Children	634
Non-Family Households	1227

Education

Adult population without a high School diploma	19.3%
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Race/Ethnicity

White	42.08%
Black	51.83%
American Indian/Eskimo	0.21%
Asian/Pacific Islander	1.38%
Other	1.67%
Hispanic Ethnicity	4.18%

Income/Housing

Per Capita Income	13099
Median Household Income	16259
Percent Renting	39.08%
Percent Lived in Residence for less than five years	53.67%

<http://www.weedandseed.info/sitedetail.aspx?sitekey=0601S00>

Appendix I: Focus Group Questions

Below are the questions asked during the focus group in February 2008, at the Steering Committee's monthly meeting.

1. What are your overall thoughts of the Northside Weed and Seed program?
2. How do you see the program benefiting the target area?
3. How can the Weed and Seed Program be improved upon in the following year?
4. How can the Strategy continue its momentum?
5. What are the Strengths of the Northside Weed and Seed Program?

Appendix J:

Consent Form for Focus Group

Informed Consent Form

Dear Sir or madam;

I (Stacey Stein) am conducting a study to determine the Impact that community policing has in Youngstown's north- side weed and seed program. In the study, you will be verbally asked to answer questions as a group. Your participation should take approximately 15 min.

There are no risks to you.

All information will be handled in a strict confidential manner, so that no one will be able to identify you when the results are recorded.

Your participation in the study is totally voluntary and you may withdraw at any time without negative consequences. If you wish to withdraw at any time during the study you may either provide no response to the question or questions being asked and/or you may leave the room if you wish.

Please feel free to contact John M. Hazy (assistant professor at YSU) and/or Stacey M. Stein (teaching assistant, conducting the research for a thesis) at Phone: 330-941-3279 if you have any questions about the study. Or for any other questions, contact the Director of Grants and Sponsored Programs at YSU (330-941-2377)

I understand the study described above and have a copy of the description as outlined above. I am 18 years of age or older and I agree to participate.

Signature of Participant

Date

Appendix K: Northside Weed and Seed Steering Committee Members

Office
U.S. Attorney's Office
Community Resident
Community Resident
Community Resident
Community Resident
Office of the Mayor
Third Ward Councilman
First Ward Councilman
Youngstown Police Department
DEA
Youngstown State University Police
Humility of Mary Health Partners
City Prosecutor's Office
County Prosecutor's Office
City Demolition Department
Youngstown Recycling Program
City Parks Department
Youngstown CDA
Youngstown Metropolitan Housing Authority
Youngstown City Schools
Increase the Peace – YCS
Heart Reach Ministries
Rodef Shalom
Richard Brown Memorial Church
St. Peter and Paul
Antioch Baptist Church
Ohio Dept. of Rehab & Corrections
Youngstown/Mahoning Valley United Way
Beatitude House
Burdman Group, Inc.
Mahoning Co. Juvenile Court
Youngstown State University