

POLITICAL UNREST IN  
GOVERNOR ROBERT HUNTER'S NEW YORK,

1710-1719

by

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## ABSTRACT

## POLITICAL UNREST

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Robert Hunter is remembered as one of the better colonial governors of New York. Students of that colony's history knew that he was sent to the province a generation after the end of Leisler's Rebellion from which new political alliances were emerging. However, most historians have not probed his administration in depth.

This study has such an object in mind. Its purpose has been to examine the nature of Hunter's rule in New York. In the course of this examination, the following questions have come to mind: Who were Hunter's allies? How and why did they become his supporters? Who were his enemies? What caused them to oppose Hunter? What helped Hunter to stay in power? Did Hunter actually score a triumph by managing the settlement of 1715? The answers to these questions bore heavily on the nature of Hunter's rule in the colony. However, this governor had to interact with people and forces such as the Palatines which raised other questions.

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Just as he had difficulties in ruling the colony and controlling the Assembly, Hunter also had difficulties with the German Palatine settlers he brought with him to New York. Hunter failed in the attempt to produce naval stores and it was only natural to ask why such a supposedly gifted man should fail. Was the failure due to his own shortcomings? What was the nature of his relations with the Palatines? In addition to problems with the Palatines, Hunter also had difficulties with the Indians.

During his governorship in New York, he found that his relationship with the Indians was vitally important. How important were the Iroquois to Hunter in relation to the other Indians of New York? Why was he effective in keeping the Indians loyal to the English? Why did the French fail in their efforts to lure the Indians to their cause? How did the Indians perceive the English and French as they came in contact with them? These questions also contributed to determining Hunter's overall effectivity as a governor.

Finally, conditions in New York were far from peaceful. Much tumult, political factionalism, some racial disturbance, increasing trade and religious unrest had their effect on the colonists. How well did Hunter react to these problems? What measures did he take to resolve them? All these questions required some investigation to

determine if Hunter was effective as a governor through his own ability or through plain luck. It seems fair to say that both had an effect on his administration.

Received considerable assistance from Dr. James P. Honda who patiently discussed the many aspects of Hunter's government, suggested options to explore and provided direction to contain this work within its intended framework.

The author also expresses his deep gratitude to his wife Dorothy who industriously assisted in the collection and collation of the materials used in this paper. Without her understanding and encouragement, this paper would not have been completed.

Yet with the assistance rendered to the author, the final responsibility for the paper is his. Any errors in historical methodology found by the reader must be laid at his feet.

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## CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

Most colonial governors sent to America from London arrived as political outsiders who had to learn to survive in their respective colonies. To the extent that they were successful in winning over or dominating hostile legislatures, they were able to rule with some longevity. However, not all colonial governors were adept in ruling. For the most part, they were a mediocre lot except for the subject of this study, Robert Hunter of New York.

He took office in 1710 under adverse circumstances, the origins of which are traced in Chapter Two. After he left for England in 1719, Hunter left New York in much better condition than when he assumed its administration almost a decade earlier. Hunter is considered to have been a better than average governor which initiated this study to examine the nature of the difficulties he faced and to determine, as well as possible, what factors contributed to his success.

Hunter's political problems were complex. Essentially connected to the economics of the colony, his political difficulties expanded as the number of his enemies increased in both New York and London. This situation in Hunter's governorship is covered in Chapter Three.

In the process of acquiring his gubernatorial appointment, Hunter became connected to a scheme to produce vitally needed naval stores in New York. The examination of his failure to make good the naval stores venture along with his inability to maintain good relations with the German Palatines sent to implement the plan will be found in Chapter Four.

Although Hunter failed with the naval stores plan he was successful in retaining the loyalty of the Indian tribes to the Crown. Chapter Five discusses Hunter's manipulation of the Indians and his thwarting French attempts at winning them over to their side.

Political implications were not only limited to legislative processes, relations with the Palatines and dealings with the Indians. They also touched upon the Church-State relationship between the Anglican Church and New York's citizens. Chapter Six deals with the religious, economic and civil conditions found in New York at that time.

Conclusions reached after having examined the evidence are found in Chapter Seven. They confirm the author's belief that colonial governors were officially sanctioned intruders who had to assert influence over the legislatures. Increased self-preoccupation with internal colonial affairs produced ever widening circles of interest less concerned with the Crown's immediate needs than the colonists own. This gradually growing gulf between Crown and colony,



subtle as it was at the time, contributed immeasurably to the final rupture between America and England.

Unfortunately, little about Hunter's personal life in New York has emerged from this study. The documents utilized in researching the paper were official documents such as memorials, petitions, letters and instructions to or from Hunter. Any remote mention of personal events in Hunter's life were only incidental to the documents. However, from these sources, a most important decade in the history of New York has been reconstructed.

This decade was the point of origin from which this political conflict sprang. Prominent elite families of the colony supported the faction which best served their interests and allied with their partisans from the less-well established ranks. Unfortunately, the English Crown appointed governors including Colonel Henry Sloughter (1691), Benjamin Fletcher (1694-1698), Richard Coote or Earl of Bellomont, (1698-1701) and Edward Hyde or Viscount Cornbury and later the Earl of Strensall (1702-1706) continued the Leislerian factionalism which led to increasingly worse conditions in the colony. During Brigadier Robert Hunter's governorship (1710-1719) this rivalry was finally laid to rest.

The prominent families of New York were often politically involved in colonial affairs. They were divided between commercial interests on one hand and land-owners allied with lawyers on the other.

## CHAPTER II

## NEW YORK POLITICS IN THE LATE 17th CENTURY

Between 1689 and 1710 colonial New York struggled through a period of bitter political warfare as pro-Leislerian and anti-Leislerian factions contended for power at the expense of their opponents. Arising simultaneously with the Glorious Revolution of 1689, Leisler's Rebellion was the point of origin from which this political conflict sprang. Prominent elite families of the colony supported the faction which best served their interests and carried with them partisans from the less-well established ranks. Unfortunately, the English Crown appointed governors including Colonel Henry Sloughter (1691), Benjamin Fletcher (1692-1698), Richard Coote or Earl of Bellomont, (1698-1701) and Edward Hyde or Viscount Cornbury and later the Earl of Clarendon (1702-1708) continued the Leislerian factionalism which led to increasingly worse conditions in the colony. During Brigadier Robert Hunter's governorship (1710-1719) this rivalry was finally laid to rest.

The prominent families of New York were often politically involved in colonial affairs. They were divided between commercial interests on one hand and land-owners allied with lawyers on the other.

New York's commercial gentry was led by four families between 1675 and 1725: The Philippses, the Van Cortlandts, the De Lancey's and the Schuylers. The first of these, the Philipse family was founded by Frederick Philipse (1627-1702) who became the richest man in the colony by 1674, acquiring his wealth from the Indian fur trade on the Hudson River. His son Adolph (1665-1749) later entered the business at the turn of the century and conducted a profitable trade with the West Indies.<sup>1</sup>

Oloff Stephen Van Cortlandt (1600-1684) arrived in New York around 1638 and like Philipse, had acquired his wealth by 1674. His two sons, Stephen (1643-1700) and Jacobus (1658-1739) also assisted in the family business. After 1700, Jacobus, the sole heir, was active in the provisioning trade to the West Indies and colonies.<sup>2</sup>

In 1686 the French Huguenot refugee, Stephen De Lancey arrived with £ 300 to his name. A proper marriage to Anne Van Cortlandt, daughter of Stephen Van Cortlandt, connections to the proper commercial houses of London such as Baker and Company, along with a profitable West Indies trade made him wealthy by 1720. Bellomont accused De Lancey of trading with pirates in 1699.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) pp. 60-62.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 62-63.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 63-64.

Arriving at Albany in 1650, Philip Pieterse Schuyler entered into the Indian trade and became one of the Indian Commissioners after 1658. His son, Peter Schuyler (1657-1724) married Marie Van Rensselaer, granddaughter of the original patroon of Rensselaerswyck. Peter Schuyler became a dominant figure in the Albany fur trade after 1686, was appointed the first mayor of Albany (1686-1694) and later served on the governor's council (1692-1720). Young Schuyler learned the Mohawk language and ultimately earned their respect, acquiring the name "Quidor" (sometimes spelled "Quiedor"), the Iroquois equivalent of his first name. Spokesman for the Albany fur traders and Iroquois, Peter Schuyler represented the up-river merchants while Philipse, Van Cortlandt and De Lancey led the New York City merchants. The commercial element received its opposition from the landed interest.<sup>4</sup>

Within New York the prominent land-owners were the Morris and Livingstons. Lewis Morris (1671-1746) inherited two valuable parcels of land from his uncle in 1691 and by 1697 he had erected the 3,000 acre tract in Westchester County into the grant of Morrisiana. Between 1691 and 1710, Morris was active in New Jersey, coming to New York at the same time Hunter arrived. A close friendship with Hunter ultimately resulted in Morris's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1715. He was a member of the

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 64-66.

New York Assembly as a representative from Westchester Borough from 1710 to 1728 and from Westchester County from 1733 to 1738 until he became the governor of New Jersey. Not too deeply involved in commerce, Morris was primarily a public servant and country squire.<sup>5</sup>

Unlike Morris, Robert Livingston (1654-1728) had started as a merchant who acquired land after having succeeded in politics and trade. He ultimately acquired Livingston Manor (in Albany County) along with other properties in Ulster and Dutchess Counties, forging ties to the other Hudson Valley proprietors. His knowledge of the Dutch language gained access for him into the government at Albany while his marriage to Alida Schuyler Van Rensselaer gave him good familial connections. Since Livingston and his son, Philip (1636-1749), did not fully participate in the Albany fur trade, they frequently allied themselves with the Van Rensselaers in challenging the Dutch grip on the fur trade. Both Livingston and his son benefitted from government patronage (including positions and supply contracts) which prompted them to support the aggressive policies of the governors who favored hostility toward the French which Albany did not like. These giants of the landed class also had three allies: James Alexander (1691-1756) a lawyer; William Smith, Senior, also a lawyer and

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 69-70.

Cadwallader Colden (1688-1776) who was a physician, surveyor and politician.<sup>6</sup>

Between 1713 and 1732 the merchants were led by Adolph Philipse, Jacobus Van Cortlandt, Stephen De Lancey and Peter Schuyler. The landed interest was led by Livingston, Morris, and James Alexander, the elder Smith and Cadwallader Colden with Philip Livingston as an ally. Despite the pre-eminence of these wealthy and powerful families, there was no English model aristocracy in the colony.<sup>7</sup>

Leaders in the colonial political arena arose by skill and achievement, not through heredity or place. For example, Robert Livingston and Cadwallader Colden were sons of Presbyterian ministers; Lewis Morris was the son of a captain in the Royal Army; William Smith was the son of a tallow chandler; Peter Schuyler was the son of an Amsterdam baker, all of whom emerged from an obviously non-aristocratic background. Having succeeded by their own ability, these nouveau riche had the desire and time for politics.<sup>8</sup>

Landowners, lawyers and merchants intermarried for generations, sharing common interests which they sought to protect. During the second and third decades of the Eighteenth Century, New York experienced sustained economic and

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 71-74.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 75, 7

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 7-8.

political growth during which basic decisions were made concerning fiscal policies and directions of future development. Quite naturally, each interest sought its own goals to the exclusion of its opponents and this resulted in heated political controversy. In addition to an economic basis of political conflict, there was also a sectional basis of conflict.<sup>9</sup>

Another aspect of politicking in the colony resulted in contests for power between various ethnic groups on a sectional basis primarily involving the Albany area. This settlement was located about 150 miles from the town of New York, requiring between three to five days travel between them, which distance was more than enough to build and maintain sectional partisanship. Prior to 1698, New York City had received many French and Dutch immigrants which resulted in English complaints that they were a minority group in their own city. However, after 1698, the English population surpassed the Dutch (except at Albany) and Dutch influence declined in New York City. By 1700, Dutch influence was centered at Albany and English influence was centered in New York County. Albany maintained its

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 58-59. According to Bonomi, records of Philipse and Van Cortlandt families as well as other colonial New Yorkers are being collected by Sleepy Hollow Restorations Inc., Irvington, New York. This collection includes microfilm documents of shipping records gathered from Exchequer and Colonial Office archives in London.

political and economic importance well beyond Hunter's administration.<sup>10</sup>

Although the town of New York was the center of the colony's government, Albany had strong political support from Livingston, Schuyler and Philipse. Albany was a small population center on New York's frontier, was the site of the Indian fur trade and was the locale of confrontations between the French and Iroquois for over three-quarters of a century. Because of the above mentioned reasons and separation from the rest of New York, Albany's inhabitants developed different political attitudes than the rest of the colony. These attitudes divided the colony into a North-South, frontier-seaboard and country-city polarity. As a city-state, Albany's strategic location made it the most important imperial frontier village in the colonies. Situated at the head of the Hudson River, Albany was the gate-way to Canada and being nestled in the Mohawk Valley, it was also the doorway to the western Great Lakes Region. Rivalry between Albany and New York was the result of Albany's geographic location and importance in relations to the rest of the colony.<sup>11</sup>

Sectional rivalry between Albany and New York served as a backdrop for Leisler's Rebellion. Named for Jacob Leisler, it espoused his causes of both proclaiming

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 26, 25, 24, 26.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 37, 40-41, 40.



William III as king and preserving individual liberty while it overthrew the incumbent ruling elite. A German immigrant from Frankfort, he had resided in New York since 1660. As a successful merchant he married well enough to have entered into the social-set of the Schuylers, Bayards, Van Cortlandts and Philipses. Leisler, a contentious man, embroiled himself in a quarrel with Nicholas Bayard over some property which ultimately led to deep-rooted ill feelings between them. Active in the community, Leisler was an elder in his church and after 1684, a captain in the militia. Uneducated, coarse, hot-tempered, violent and lacking in self-restraint, he was never-the-less a courageously forceful person with a gift for organization. Despite his domineering personality and revengeful nature, he attracted merchants, traders, militia officers, bricklayers, farmers and some members of the laboring masses to his cause. Leisler was a product of "...an age in which convictions... rigid and partisan, were deeply rooted...enmities were easily aroused...(and) perils were immoderately exaggerated...." This man unwittingly supplied the framework for New York's political turmoil which lasted for the next twenty years.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Period of American History, Vol. III: The Settlements. (4 Vols. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934-1937) pp. 317-318, 136, 135. Andrew's description of this emotionally charged time is important to understanding why events occurred as they did.

Jacob Leisler's moment of opportunity came after King James II's flight from England in December, 1688 when the monarch had experienced a difficult political situation. In February, 1689, the Glorious Revolution was completed when the crown was accepted by William of Orange and Mary, the daughter of James II. After the news of this event arrived in the colonies, the governor of the Dominion of New England, Sir Edmund Andros, was imprisoned. His Dominion collapsed resulting in all the colonies resuming their former condition of separate existence. By late April, 1689, the news of Andros's imprisonment arrived in New York. Firm action to retain control in New York was now indicated but the Lieutenant-Governor, Francis Nicholson instead did nothing.<sup>13</sup>

Upon learning of Andros' overthrow in Massachusetts, only Nicholas Bayard, Stephen Van Cortlandt and Frederick Philipse chose to remain as Nicholson's councillors, but these men could not cope with the spreading fear of Catholicism which grew in late May. Without instructions from England, Nicholson and his Council would not officially proclaim William III's accession to the throne. Thus Nicholson's silence and the inactivity of the Council led to their alienation from the anti-Catholic community and

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 124; David S. Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972). p. 209.

led to the ultimate loss of control over the situation. This difficult situation had been made worse by high taxes, a frustrated economy, elitist control of the government and fear of a Catholic conspiracy. Into this highly charged atmosphere came the personage of Jacob Leisler.<sup>14</sup>

The rebellion started on May 31, 1689 when a militia unit led by Leisler took possession of Fort William in New York City. Failing to dislodge Leisler, Nicholson left for England on June 11 to present the matter directly to the Crown. Leisler later claimed that he took action to serve God and King William III to deliver the colony from King James II and Catholicism. To this merchant turned militiaman, James II and Catholicism were synonymous with "oppression." As a ploy in acquiring legality for his regime, Leisler proclaimed the new king and queen in New York on June 22 and in Albany on July 1, 1689. Moreover, he asked the various towns to elect members to the Assembly. Less than a third of the eligible electors voted with the result that only nine towns sent a grand total of sixteen men. However, Leisler's regime was not a mob-rule during its twenty-two month existence. During its life, they "...organized a government, raised money, made a seal, issued commissions, erected courts and put down riots...." Justification of his government was based on a royal instruction ordering the proclamation

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 251-254.

of William and Mary as the Sovereigns. This proclamation was addressed to Nicholson or "...in his absence to such as for the time being take care for Preserving the Peace and administering the Lawes of our said Province in New York in America." Unfortunately, reliance on the preceding phrases as an indication of royal approbation of Leisler's administration was un-realistic since the new King never did intend to legitimatize the rebel government. Leisler's rule lasted as long as it did only because of the inefficiency and confusion present in the English government at that time. Although the rebel leader's political organization was workable, its overall operation was anything but smooth.<sup>15</sup>

New York proved to be quite difficult to manage. Various factors such as thinly populated settlements around Albany and on Long Island; the entrenched strength of the previous regime; the political ability of previous government officials; the nature of Leisler's government and the nature of the man himself encouraged strong resistance to his rule. He not only antagonized such prominent families as the Bayards, Van Cortlandts and Philippses, but he also lost the support of the smaller merchants and

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<sup>15</sup>Andrews, The Settlements, pp. 125-129; Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution, p. 295.

others who had supported him from the beginning. Those who remained loyal to him were of varied backgrounds.<sup>16</sup>

Merchants, artisans and shop-keepers were among Leisler's followers. They included Cornelius Pluvera, who retailed rum and beer; Hendrick Cuyler and Henry Johne, bakers; Abraham Gouverneur, a street urchin who rose from clerk to Deputy Secretary of the colony; Joost Stoll, a dram merchant, and Everett and Gerrit Duyckinck, father and son who were limners and glazers. Others who supported Leisler were men of means and attainment such as Gerardus Beekman and Samuel Staats, physicians; Charles Lodwyck, the merchant and militia officer; Abraham De Peyster, merchant and Jacob Milborne, Leisler's son-in-law, who was his second-in command as well as being a merchant and part-time lawyer. Leisler's supporters were small and moderately successful merchants, artisans and shop-keepers. His opposition came from the prominent merchant families and from the area around Albany.<sup>17</sup>

In an effort to thwart a counter-revolution, Leisler persecuted Catholics and those favorably inclined toward them. Unfortunately for all concerned, he did not differentiate between those who were actually "papists" and those who merely opposed him politically. The incumbent Councillors, Bayard, Philipse and Van Cortlandt had

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<sup>16</sup>ibid., p. 295.

<sup>17</sup>ibid., p. 301.

been commissioned by the previous government and as his opponents they now came under his attack. Both Bayard and Van Cortlandt had political influence since 1664, having prospered under King James II and Governor Thomas Dongan, both Catholics. Early in 1690, opposition to Leisler reached a new high. Major Thomas Willet of Queens County, Long Island, led troops against Leisler but was routed and forced to flee to New England. Contributing to this heightened tension and opposition was the alienation of the lesser and moderately successful merchants which led to their allying themselves with their more substantial fellow-merchants.<sup>18</sup>

The lesser-merchants had become dissatisfied at the levying of a tax on April 23, 1690 amounting to three pence in the pound on all real and personal visible property for the defense of the colony. On April 24, Leisler's Assembly broke the flour and bolting monopoly allowing New Yorkers to bolt and bake their flour anywhere, terminating the system which had provided a lucrative trade for the New York City merchants and millers. These merchants and millers now faced a conflict between loyalty to the Rebellion or severe economic hardship. After three weeks, thirty-six merchants petitioned the Crown for relief from Leisler's actions which were destroying their business. Furthermore, when Leisler organized his expedition of 1690

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid., pp. 284,330,321,321-323.

against Canada, merchants were required to supply provisions for that debacle. Both the large and small merchants provided one phase of opposition to the fiery German. The other area of opposition came from Albany.<sup>19</sup>

Albany provided the important geo-political center of resistance against Leisler. Leadership for the opposition was provided by Mayor Peter Schuyler who led his "Albany Convention" composed of aldermen, justices of the peace and district militia officers. Concerned about the existence of this center of resistance, Leisler sent Jacob Milborne up the Hudson River with fifty men in November 1689 to ostensibly reinforce the Albany garrison against possible Indian attack. This ruse failed as did Milborne's demand for Albany's surrender. The threat of attack by a Mohawk war party forced Milborne to retreat to New York in defeat. Albany now faced a bleak situation in the winter of 1690. Hostilities with the French were momentarily expected, the fur trade had diminished to a trickle, disproportionately high taxes were impoverishing the village and now they were involved in rebellion against Leisler. Without warning, on February 8, 1690, a party of two hundred and ten men, part French and part Praying Iroquois from the Caughnawaga mission attacked Schenectady. Only a few miles from Albany, the village lost sixty persons who were killed and had about eighty or ninety taken

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 317-318.

prisoner. The "Albany Convention" blamed the Schenectady attack on Leisler, alleging that his loose talk about liberty and his breaking of their trading monopoly had unsettled the people. Worse still, their unity had now been destroyed so that they would not defend themselves. Robert Livingston further believed that Leisler had perverted the hapless Schenectady victims by what Livingston claimed were "seductive" letters which were found in the streets of the village. Those recriminations did not deter Leisler from sending Milborne back to Albany with one hundred and sixty men to again "reinforce" the Albany garrison. Instead, the Schenectady massacre and fear of another French thrust in this area got Milborne and his troops accepted at Albany. Once Albany's resistance was broken, Leisler had control of New York. It was unfortunate for him that his agents in England were not able to control their situation.<sup>20</sup>

Of Leisler's agents in England, Joost Stoll was ineffective while Matthew Clarkson spent time seeking his own political betterment. Nor for that matter, was Benjamin Blagge able to refute the reports of the ousted Lieutenant-Governor Nicholson. Because of Nicholson's reporting, King

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<sup>20</sup>Bonomi, A Factious People, p. 46; Lovejoy, p. 313; Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century. (Port Washington, New York: Ira J. Friedman Division, Kennikat Press, 1971) p. 299; Ibid., p. 300; Bonomi, p. 46; Trelease, Indian Affairs, p. 301; Lovejoy, p. 316; Trelease, p. 302.



William III was definitely prejudiced against Leisler. Even the new governor-designate, Colonel Henry Sloughter, already considered the New York government to be a "rable". In spite of this deteriorating situation, Leisler held on to power as long as he could. On January 29, 1691, Major Ingoldesby arrived from England with a regiment of troops and authoritatively demanded the surrender of Fort William. Leisler resisted Ingoldesby's demand, denying that officer's authority in the colony. With three hundred men, Leisler occupied the fort and prepared to wait out the situation. Lieutenant-Governor Sloughter finally arrived at New York on March 19, 1691, published his commission and ordered Ingoldesby to again demand the fort. After three such demands for the fort's surrender, some legal-hair splitting over surrender terms, Leisler finally gave it up only to be promptly arrested with his eight closest supporters. Leisler's brief rule now gave way to Colonel Sloughter's short reign.<sup>21</sup>

Soon after being taken in custody, Leisler was executed. Amid partisan proceedings, Sloughter permitted a brief trial which doomed both Leisler and Milborne when it was adjourned in mid-April. One examiner and later judge was Joseph Dudley who arrived at New York in January 1691 to become President of Council. Along with Dudley, Stephen

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<sup>21</sup>Lovejoy, p. 336; Andrews, The Settlements, pp. 131, 133.

Van Cortlandt also functioned as an examiner. Later Van Cortlandt, Bayard and Nichols prepared the evidence which was used against Leisler. In addition Sloughter's new Council was staffed with Leisler's enemies: Dudley, Bayard, Van Cortlandt, Philipse, Nichols and Major Thomas Willet. Except for Dudley, these men strongly insisted that Leisler and his companions be executed for leading the rebellion. Only Dudley cautioned Sloughter to first ascertain the King's pleasure in this matter before proceeding. Additional pressure to have Leisler executed came from the Assembly which met on the ninth of April and listed his crimes on the seventeenth. In May, Sloughter acceded to their demands and ordered the execution of Leisler and Milborne which took place on May 16, 1691. After Leisler's death the political situation should have stabilized. Instead, for almost twenty years New York experienced partisan warfare between Leislerian and anti-Leislerian factions.<sup>22</sup>

Leisler's death heightened faction between his followers and their opponents. After 1691, the Leislerians were led by the moderately successful merchants such as Gerardus Beekman, Abtaham De Peyster, Samuel Staats, Peter Delanoy and Abraham Gouverneur. The anti-Leislerians continued to be led by the wealthy merchants and land owners such as Stephanus Van Cortlandt, Robert Livingston,

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<sup>22</sup>Lovejoy, pp. 354-457.

Nicholas Bayard, Peter Schuyler, Frederick Philipse and William Nicoll. Both factions' political fortunes rose and fell with the governors sent to New York. In their turn, the governors were themselves subject to the rise and fall of Tory or Whig influence in England. Sloughter had been sent to the colonies with solid Tory backing. Upon his death in the summer of 1691, his interim successor, Major Ingoldesby, continued Tory rule. Benjamin Fletcher arrived in 1692 also strongly supported by the Tories. Had he been interested in healing the politically torn colony, Fletcher might have adopted a course of neutrality. Instead he cast his lot with the anti-Leislerians who held political power at that time. During his administration, Fletcher (1692-1698) sought to increase his personal fortune with the result that the colony became a pirate haven while vast unwise land sales took place. Fletcher aided Frederick Philipse to erect his manor of Philipsburg of 90,000 acres in 1693; Adolph Philipse received the Highland Patent of 205,000 acres, and in 1697, Fletcher granted the 86,000 acre manor of Cortlandt to Stephanus Van Cortlandt. Charles M. Andrews tersely summed up Fletcher's personality and administration by saying: "He was not an amiable man himself, and his administration was marked by corruption,

Andrews, p. 77; Lovejoy, p. 360; Andrews, pp. 77, 66; Andrews, p. 357.

24-1-12. Lovejoy, p. 362.

intimidation, and factional rule." After six years, Fletcher was removed from office by the Crown.<sup>23</sup>

By 1695, leading Leislerians were successful in bringing the miserable conditions of the province to the attention of the Lords of Trade, who after examining reliable witnesses, concluded that Fletcher's removal was necessary. His successor was Richard Coote, Earl of Bellomont, whose appointment coincided with the rise of the Whigs in Parliament.<sup>24</sup>

Bellomont contrasted favorably with his predecessors. Intelligent and zealous in his service to the Crown, he was unfortunately also filled with a deep sense of self-righteousness as well as a lack of warmth during his years in office (1698-1701). Seeking to redress conditions in the colony, Bellomont allied himself with the Leislerians. He enforced the collection of customs duties, installed some Leislerians in office and managed to break a number of exorbitant land grants. One important source of concern to Bellomont was that of Indian affairs. Mohawk resentment against Fletcher's granting in 1697 of fifty miles of land on the Mohawk River to Pastor Godfrey Dellius, Peter

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<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 362; Bonomi, p. 76; Lovejoy, p. 362; Bonomi, p. 77; Lovejoy, p. 360; Bonomi, pp. 77, 66; Andrews, p. 357.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., Lovejoy, p. 362.

Schuyler, Albany Mayor Dirck Wessels and Evert Banker impelled Bellomont to force enactment of the vacating act of 1699 with the help of a Leislerian controlled Assembly. This vacating act met with strong opposition from several Assemblymen who perceived it as a threat to the title of their own vast estates and the act remained a bitter partisan issue until it was finally allowed by the Crown in 1708. As an ironic aftermath, Bellomont's agents secretly persuaded the Mohawks to surrender all timber rights on their lands for the future production of naval stores which initiated the first process of encroachment on Iroquois lands. By any standards, however, Bellomont was a vast improvement in character over Fletcher and Cornbury.<sup>25</sup>

Upon his becoming governor, Edward Hyde, Viscount Cornbury, (1702-1708) promptly swing the political pendulum back in favor of the anti-Leislerian faction by aligning himself with the great merchants and land holders. More than his predecessors, Cornbury embroiled himself into religious controversy. His cause celebre was the unsuccessful prosecution of two dissenting (Presbyterian) clergymen who were accused of preaching without a license

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<sup>25</sup>Trelease, p. 333; Bonomi, p. 77; Trelease, pp. 333, 330, 309, 339-340.

in the province. Cornbury's rule was distinguished only for his bizarre behavior and his administrative corruption.<sup>26</sup>

After the Leislerian Rebellion ended, the first Assembly which met issued a statute law declaring the "Rights and Priveledges of Her Majesties Subjects inhabiting within their province of New York" on May 13, 1691. Political power was believed to reside in the Governor, Council and the "people" via the Assembly. Suffrage was limited to forty shilling freeholders while parliamentary privileges were accorded the Assembly. The governor held the power of a veto and annual meetings were required for the Legislature. Although this statute was disallowed by the Crown in 1696 the provincial legislature continued to operate according to these principles. Coupled with the increasing importance of the Assembly was the rising influence of cliques which transformed the legislature into a faction-ridden battleground. Petty struggles and heated debates which were apparently un-connected to colonists rights and Assembly prerogatives were later escalated into high principles. From this time forward the Assembly embodied the colony-wide ideal of popular government.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Bonomi, pp. 294,78; Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century. (3 Vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1924), II pp. 17-18.

<sup>27</sup>Lovejoy, pp. 358-359; 362-363; Bonomi, p. 13.

Often underestimated were the many small local government units which sprang into existence after the Assembly was established in 1691. The ten sparsely populated counties of New York divided into two or more precincts per county and elected their own minor supervisory officials. Small manors often combined to form a precinct or township and they frequently joined with other precincts or townships to defend their local interests in trade, fishing or agriculture. These units relied upon memorials, petitions and their local gentry who were elected to the General Assembly to protect their vital interests. Certainly the local governmental unit had the greatest effect on the lives of ordinary individuals. When the precincts or townships were confronted with difficulties beyond their abilities to cope with, they turned to the provincial legislature for assistance.<sup>28</sup>

Men who served in public office were often reputable, were freemen or free-holders and while not legally required to be, were almost always men of considerable property. Provincial Assemblymen came from a broad cross-section of the upper strata who enhanced their importance in the colony by their public service in the legislature.<sup>29</sup>

The entire twenty year period between Leisler's Rebellion and the arrival of Robert Hunter was a period of

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp. 34, 35, 38.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

sectionalism, factionalism, economic readjustment and profound political instability. None of the governors of this period, from Sloughter to Cornbury had restored political peace to the colony. On the contrary, their activities deepened the sense of disunity and mood of political hostility until New York was almost an open tinder-box. This was the province which greeted Hunter in 1710.

Robert Hunter's entry into the political arena of New York came about through his connections in England. He had served at the battle of Blenheim under George Hamilton, the Earl of Orkney, whose influence with the Duke of Marlborough most probably got Hunter appointed Lieutenant-governor of Virginia in 1707. Enroute to Virginia, Hunter was captured by a French privateer, was held hostage for about a year and finally exchanged for the French Bishop of Quebec. After his return to England, he was appointed to the governorship of New York in 1709. Hunter's friendship with Marlborough, through the Earl of Orkney, was apparently instrumental in obtaining this position.<sup>30</sup>

Friendship and influence with Marlborough during Queen Anne's reign was important to any office seeker. Marlborough was a military hero who had captured the fancy of the English people and who was also politically well-connected. His brother George was prominent in the

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<sup>30</sup>W. Manners Chichester, "Hunter, Robert" in Dictionary of National Biography, ed. by Sidney Lee (21 Vols. London: Smith, Elder and Company, 1908), I, p. 299.



## CHAPTER III

## HUNTER AND THE GAME OF POLITICS

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Admiralty until 1708; his son-in-law Sunderland was the principal Secretary of State; Lord Godolphin, his close friend was in charge of the Treasury and Marlborough's wife was as highly esteemed as the Queen. It is not unreasonable to assume that the Earl of Orkney's influence with Morlborough helped get Hunter appointed governor of New York.<sup>31</sup>

Both Hunter's Commission, dated September 15, 1709 and his Instructions, dated December 27, 1709 were intended to legitimize him in power and direct him in governing the colony. Unfortunately, the Instructions were so voluminous and highly detailed that they restricted his courses of action. Failure to comply with his Instructions, Hunter was informed, would be considered by the Crown, "...as a breach of the trust reposed in you by us which we shall punish with the loss of your place in that Government, and such further marks of our displeasure, as we shall judge reasonable to be inflicted upon you..." The most

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<sup>31</sup>Walter Allen Knittel, Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration; A British Government Redemptioner Project to Manufacture Naval Stores. With Foreward by Dixon Ryan Fox. (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, 1937) pp. 51-52.

difficult of those Instructions would be the settling of factionalism in New York and the smooth operation of the government to the Crown's expectations.<sup>32</sup>

Awareness of the troubled political climate in New York was indicated by the Crown in the sixth clause of Hunter's Instructions which said, "...whereas the inhabitants of our said Province have of late Years been unhappily divided and by their enmity to each other our service and their own general welfare have been very much obstructed." Therefore, Hunter was "...to avoid the engaging...in any Parties but on the Contrary to use such moderation as may conduce to our service, by quieting the minds of the people and reconciling all differences amongst them". Finally, the Board of Trade added emphasis to the Queen's Instructions in a letter to Hunter in the fall of 1710 when they reminded the new governor that his "prudence and good conduct" were necessary to put down

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<sup>32</sup>"Commission for Robert Hunter Esqr to be Her Majesty's Captain General and Govr in Chief of Her Majesty's Province of New York, and the Territories Depending thereon in America", Whitehall, September 15, 1709, in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York., ed. by. E. B. O'Callaghan (15 Vols. Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1853-1887), V, pp. 92-98. Hereafter cited as NY Col Doc., V; "Draft of Instructions for Robert Hunter, Governor of New York", N. P., December 27, 1709, in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 124-154; Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics. Vintage Books. (New York: Random House, 1970) pp. 71-72. Bailyn suggested that Colonial governors were politically disadvantaged by the finality and detail of their instructions. The author has drawn heavily on Bailyn's interpretation of gubernatorial ruling difficulties.

the "feuds and animositys" in New York. The settlement of political factionalism in New York would require co-operation between the Council and the General Assembly.<sup>33</sup>

According to Hunter's Commission, New York was authorized a Council comprised of seven members which could be maintained at full strength through the governor's acts of appointment. The Crown did reserve the right to confirm those appointments or recommend its own. As an additional check on the governor, his Instructions stated that under normal circumstances, he was to act with a quorum of five Councillors, resorting to three Councillors only upon "extrardinary imergencies." A check against Hunter's manipulating the Council was found in the twelfth clause of his Instructions which forbade him to dismiss any Councillor without proven, good and sufficient causes.<sup>34</sup>

This prohibition against the arbitrary dismissal of his Councillors made the task of obtaining the Council's agreement and support difficult for Hunter. In late November 1710, Hunter described his Council as having behaved "with more virtue and resolution with regard to H(er) M(ajesty's)

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<sup>33</sup>"Hunter's Instructions", N.P., December 27, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 125; Board of Trade to Hunter, Whitehall, October 26, 1710 in Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies..., ed. by Cecil Headlam. (42 Vols. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1860-1926), XXV, #448. Hereafter cited as CSP Col.

<sup>34</sup>"Hunter's Commission" Whitehall, September 15, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 93; "Hunter's Instructions", N.P., December 27, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 125-126.

right and prerogative" except for one man, the Treasurer, Colonel Abraham De Peyster. According to Hunter, De Peyster had not voted the same as his fellow Councillors on all issues and the governor informed the Board of Trade that one un-named Councillor publicly rebuked the Treasurer for acting as an agent of the Assembly.<sup>35</sup>

Within the Council, Abraham De Peyster, Adolph Philipse and Peter Schuyler opposed Hunter's wishes concerning the raising of a revenue and its disbursement. Both Philipse and Schuyler were merchants and therefore favored raising a revenue from taxes on land. De Peyster held the position of Treasurer in the colony and in this situation he held an important political job. Bernard Bailyn, in his The Origins of American Politics, pointed out that when a governor could not control the treasurer he also could not control the political bosses in the colony. Involved as he was in the reception and disbursement of funds, the treasurer wielded considerable power in the legislature. De Peyster's involvement with the Assembly was indicated by Hunter's reference to the Treasurer's public rebuke for acting as an agent of that body.<sup>36</sup>

Because of the Crown's prohibition against dismissing members of the Council without good and sufficient

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<sup>35</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, November 28, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #517.

<sup>36</sup>Bonomi, p. 82; Bailyn, Origins, p. 76.

cause, Hunter retained De Peyster, Philipse and Schuyler among the eleven Councillors of the colony. The only changes that Hunter made to the Council were to replace David Provoost, who entered the Fourteenth Assembly in 1711 as representative from New York City, with Thomas Byerly, the Receiver-General, and to replace both Samuel Staats and Roger Mompesson, both of whom died in 1716, with John Johnston and George Clarke, respectively. Before Hunter had arrived in New York, the Board of Trade had asked the Earl of Sunderland to recommend to Queen Anne that Samuel Staats be appointed to replace William Peartree who had harbored several deserters from Her Majesty's Ships Tritons Prize and Lowstoft in violation of the Act for Incouragement of the Trade to America. At the same time, the Board of Trade had asked that Robert Walters be appointed to take the place of Thomas Wenham, who had died. These changes, dictated either by the Board of Trade or by necessity were the only ones made in the Council during Hunter's time. Despite the opposition Hunter encountered in the Council, he still had their concurrence in important matters and he was able to maintain a workable relationship with them. Hunter's relation with the Assembly was not as amicable.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>37</sup>Bonomi, p. 314. Bonomi compiled the list of Councillors in her Appendix "D" which the author has condensed into Appendix "A" of this paper; Board of Trade to Earl of Sunderland, Whitehall, December 23, 1709, CSP Col., XXIV, #924.

The New York General Assembly's existence was acknowledged in Hunter's Commission within the Crown's statement that the Assembly could be called "...with the advice and consent of our said Council from time to time, as need shall require...." Only freeholders, "...duly elected by the Major part of the freeholders of the respective counties and places..." and properly sworn in would constitute the Assembly.<sup>38</sup>

During the nine years Hunter governed New York, the Assembly varied in size with a slight tendency toward growth. The Thirteenth Assembly consisted of twenty-three members until late November of 1710 when Lewis Morris was expelled. He was not replaced and the Thirteenth Assembly functioned with twenty-two members until it was dissolved on April 20, 1711. During its life, the Fourteenth Assembly was comprised of twenty-two members, twenty of whom (91%) were re-elected from the previous assembly. Of the twenty-three members in the Fifteenth Assembly, fifteen (or 65%) were hold-overs from the Thirteenth Assembly. Twenty-four members were elected to the Sixteenth Assembly

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<sup>38</sup>"Hunter's Commission," Whitehall, September 15, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 93-94.

although it sat for half of its life with twenty-three members after Samuel Mulford was expelled in early June of 1715. Fourteen members of that Assembly (58%) were returnees from the Thirteenth Assembly. The Seventeenth Assembly's twenty-seven members contained eleven former members (41%) of the old Thirteenth Assembly. As the percentage of former members of the Thirteenth Assembly decreased in the next four succeeding Assemblies, Hunter's relations with his Assemblies improved culminating with success in the Sixteenth Assembly.<sup>39</sup>

When the new governor met with his Assembly and Council at Fort Anne of September 1, 1710, he stressed the need for a suitable long-term support for the government, the need to repair the forts in the province and the need to re-enact certain lapsed laws which were particularly desired by the Crown. In an ostensible effort to avoid factionalism and certainly to establish his independence, Hunter advised then that, "You have but one common interest and & consequently ought to be of one minde; if any go about to Disturb your Peace by reviving buried parties & piques or creating new ones they shall meet with no Countenance

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<sup>39</sup>Bonomi, pp. 301-303. Bonomi also compiled a list of the Assemblymen in Appendix "C" of her book which is the source of reference for the author's Appendix "B". For some reason, the publishers of Bonomi's book failed to number the pages of her Appendix "C", which prompted the author to insert page numbers 295-311 as references.



or Encouragement from me & I am sure they deserve as little from you." On September 9th, the Assembly sent their reply to the governor.<sup>40</sup>

Although the Assembly's reply was in basic agreement with Hunter's requests, that agreement was tempered with such qualifications as, "...as we can...", "...as we are able...", "...and as far as our Circumstances permit..." and "...as much as in us lies..." Taken at face value, the Assembly's reply appeared reasonable. Actually, their reply served notice to the governor that a struggle for political supremacy was taking place. Within the Assembly, the merchant interest led by Jacobus Van Cortlandt and Stephen De Lancey vied for power against the landed interest led by Lewis Morris. The issue at stake was simply that of who would dominate the political affairs of New York. Hunter's arrival on the scene as governor complicated the struggle since he represented the Crown's interest which did not always coincide with the local interest. His success depended upon his alignment with the winner of the local struggle for power or, as an alternative, manipulation of both interests for the Crown's benefit. The Assembly's

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<sup>40</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, N.P. October 3, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, # 414; New York, Senate, Journal of the Legislative Council of the Colony of New York, Began the 9th Day of April 1691; and ended the 27th of September, 1743. (2 Vols. Albany: Weed, Parsons Company, Printers, 1861), I, p.297. Hereafter cited as Council Journal, I.

reply therefore, signalled the beginning of a political test of strength between Hunter and his Assembly.<sup>41</sup>

As the Thirteenth Assembly sat, Hunter sent his periodic reports to the Board of Trade, in which he gave his interpretation to the events which took place in the colony. In one letter to the Board sent in early October, Hunter described the Assembly as being "in very indifferent humour" at the beginning, but he hoped they were now more manageable. Hunter informed the Board of Trade that the Assembly had passed an act for levying an excise on strong liquors retailed in the colony for one year with the money derived to be paid to the Treasurer who was allied with the Assembly. The official who Hunter insisted should control the funds was the Receiver-General, a Crown official, and therefore Hunter's man. With the passage of this act, Hunter's test began. If he capitulated on this point, he would have been surrendering the Crown's power to govern in the colony and indirectly, his own power to govern.<sup>42</sup>

During November Hunter sent another letter to the Board of Trade in which he elaborated upon the excuses and

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<sup>41</sup>New York. [Colony]. General Assembly. Journal of the Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Colony of New York, 1691-1765. (2 Vols. New York: H. Gaine, 1764-1766), I, p. 273. Hereafter cited as Assembly Journal, I.

<sup>42</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, N.P. October 3, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #414.

activities of the Assembly. They had been asked by Hunter to prepare a bill which set fair charges for the performance of governmental services. This bill was passed twice by the Assembly but was found un-acceptable by the Council because the fees set were too low. The Assembly allowed the matter to lie quietly and proceeded to enact a resolution on October 25 which allotted 2500 Ounces of Plate for the governor's salary. This action on the part of the Assembly brought the issue of who would control who to a head.<sup>43</sup>

The committee which sat on the allowance of plate for Hunter's salary was led by Jacobus Van Cortlandt, a prominent New York City merchant. Hunter questioned the Committee's apparent "generosity" on October 28, 1710 when he informed the Assemblymen that the Queen allowed him £1200 Sterling per year as his salary which was to come from the revenue of the colony. After having the 25th through the 28th Instructions read to the Assembly, the governor then told them that he could not imagine why he should be singled out for this treatment and why the Queen should have her authority questioned respecting her right to appoint official salaries. Hunter informed the Board of Trade that his speech to the Assembly did not have any

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<sup>43</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, November 14, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #487. Also found in NY Col. Doc., pp. 177-182.

effect on them because they continued to eliminate articles for the support of the government or retrenched them. However, the matter was not yet closed.<sup>44</sup>

Lewis Morris, a representative from Westchester County, took up the matter of a Bill of Fees on November 8th and just after the Assembly had given a first reading to An Act for Ascertaining the Wages or Allowance of the Representatives of the General Assembly. During his talk to the Assembly, Morris took them to task for not providing Hunter's salary. Why Morris did this is best explained by Bailyn, who described Morris as, "Avid for distinction and power...endlessly scrabbling for gain, shuffling nervously for position in an unstable world, and disciplined to pursue to the last wearisome turn the petty intrigues that surrounded him." Stung by Morris's heated remarks and perhaps incensed at the impudence of this relative newcomer to New York politics, the Assembly held a debate on the afternoon of November 9 and expelled him for having "... falsely and scandalously vilified the Integrity and Honesty

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<sup>44</sup>Assembly Journal, I, pp. 280-281; Council Journal, I, p. 302; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, November 14, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #487. Instruction 25 forbade Hunter to accept any gifts from the Assembly; Instruction 26 allowed Hunter a salary of £1200 from the revenues; Instruction 27 stipulated that any monies given before as presents to the governor were now to be applied to the defence of the colony and Instruction 28 ordered that the preceding Instructions 25 thru 27 were to be communicated to the Council and Assembly. Hunter complied with this order on September 1, 1710 at their first meeting.

of this House." If Morris had not previously become an ally of Hunter, surely he did at this point. After having heard of the Assembly's action, Hunter sent an assessment of the Assembly's activities up to this point and he also sent his analysis of why the Assembly acted this way.<sup>45</sup>

Following the proroguing of the Assembly, Hunter sent a report to the Board of Trade dated November 28, 1710 in which he accused the legislators of having done nothing. During the last weeks of the session, bills introduced to provide a revenue were tied-up because the Assembly insisted upon the Treasurer's accountability to them alone. In response to these actions of the Assembly, the Council attached amendments to make the Treasurer responsible to the Governor, Council and Assembly. The political issue of who would control the purse strings of the colony and thus control the politics of New York had surfaced. This applied to a bill for laying a duty on chimneys, a bill to exempt the Palatine refugees from that duty and a bill to lay a duty on all goods sold at auction. In these cases, the Assembly would not permit the Council to amend any money bills. One example was An Act for the Treasurer's paying sundry Sums of Money, to which the

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<sup>45</sup>Assembly Journal, I, p. 283. The Assembly Journal does not detail the incident; Bonomi, A Factious People, p. 82; Bailyn, Origins, pp. 108-109. Bailyn's account infers that Morris sought a cause with which to identify.

Assembly informed the Council it would not admit amendments to this act for the following reasons; Firstly, the amendments would destroy the "Essence and Intent of the Bill"; secondly, the bill was the same as an act of the governor, council and assembly; thirdly, the Council had agreed to such arrangements before and had therefore provided a precedent; fourthly, either the Council was in agreement with the Assembly over the use of the money or it was not, in which case the Council might not have been completely honest. Their fifth and final reason was that the intent of the bill was to prevent the mis-use of the money. The council had tacked on an amendment that the funds were to be issued by a warrant of the governor with the advice and consent of the Council which was in consonance with Hunter's Instructions (the 33rd Clause). However, the Assembly refused to meet with the Council over this issue to resolve the impasse. Furthermore, the Council was obliged to table a bill of fees for the officers of the government after the Assembly had forwarded a bill similar to the one disallowed by the Crown in 1709, because it was so low. Hunter also told the Board of Trade that the Assembly had brought up a naturalization act which he encouraged the Assembly to adopt on November 11, since it would include the Palatines whom Hunter had orders to get naturalized. To Hunter's amazement, the Assembly dropped the matter and Hunter could only guess that perhaps it was only because he suggested it to them that they suddenly lost

interest in this naturalization act. Hunter's speculation as to why the Assembly dropped the naturalization act may well have been correct. It is very possible that the Assembly believed that the governor was under great pressure to have this act passed so that the Palatines would be included in it. However, Hunter took an action later which indicated to the Assembly that it was making a serious mistake in pursuing this course with the governor.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Hunter to the Board of Trade, New York, November 28, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #517; Assembly Journal, I, pp. 286-287; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, November 28, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #517; "Hunter's Instructions", N.P. December 27, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 129. Hunter's 33rd Instruction ordered him "...not to suffer any publick money whatsoever to be issued or disposed [of] otherwise than by Warrant under your hand and with the Advice and Consent of the said Councill, but the Assembly may be never the less permitted from time to time to view and Examine the Accounts..."; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, November 28, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #517. The Naturalization Act was entitled, "An Act Declaring, that all Persons of Foreign Birth, heretofore Inhabiting within this Colony and Dying seized of any Lands, Tenements, and Hereditaments, shall be for ever hereafter deemed, taken and esteemed to have been Naturalized; and for Naturalizing all Protestants of Foreign Birth, not Inhabiting within this Colony." This act was intended to naturalize all persons who had acquired property since November 1, 1683. All persons of foreign birth had to take the prescribed oaths, take the Test, and take the Abjuration Oath in a court of record. The fee was nine shillings. If a certificate was desired by the new "native" another three shillings was required. All prospective citizens had nine months to comply with the act. The dead were automatically naturalized. With respect to the merchants, only a native could operate his business in the colony. For them, also, the Naturalization Act was a necessity. See Colonial Laws of New York, pp. 211-214.

In both his November letters to the Board of Trade, Hunter put the Assembly's actions in a bad light and he made a suggestion which countered their dropping of the naturalization act. He wrote the Board of Trade that he did not believe the Assembly's alleged reasons for acting as it did. The Assembly insisted that it could not raise the required revenues because the colony had made great sacrifices for the 1709 expedition against Canada. Hunter expressed disbelief, stating that the expedition had been paid for by a land tax while the expenses of the government were raised by an impost on goods and by an excise. When the Assembly insisted that the revenues received by the colony be entrusted to the Treasurer, Hunter offered to allow the Assembly to insert a clause in their bills that the Receiver-General, Hunter's man, must also be accountable to them as well as the Crown. He suggested that the Assembly also insert a clause that no warrant be drawn by the governor that was official or demand made upon the revenue until the Receiver-General accepted it. Further, the Receiver-General was not to permit warrants to be drawn for more money than was in his possession. He was to present his books to the Assmblly on a quarterly schedule for their inspection and was to give security in New York as well as in England. According to Hunter, this should have satisfied the Assembly. At the same time, this would effectively give financial control to Hunter while it served the purpose of satisfying the Assembly's alleged



desire to cut down the corruption and waste in spending the government funds. Hunter's shrewdness was apparent to the more astute members of the Assembly, since they saw that except for giving security in New York as well as in England, the role of the Receiver-General was the same as directed in the governor's 31st through 33rd Instructions. Another comment of Hunter's which put the Assembly in a bad light was his stressing the ten shilling per day allowance paid to the Assemblymen. The governor recommended this allowance be terminated since he estimated that their pay amounted to about half of what the Assembly had voted for the support of the government. Such an observation by Hunter must have been galling to the Assemblymen, many of whom, such as Van Cortlandt, De Lancey and even Morris, must have sought membership in that body because of its selectivity and prestige. Since these excuses and circumstances defeated the purpose of obtaining a support for the government, Hunter proposed an alternative method of obtaining his much needed revenue.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, November 14, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #487 and Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, November 28, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #517; Massachusetts spent about £20,000 per year to defend her frontier while New York's "...are for the most part defended by H. M. Forces and Purse, for it is apparent that it Costs the Queen at least £20,000 a year in maintaining of Forces and ships of warr for the defence of their Country and Trade..."; Instruction 31 required all money to be accounted for to the Queen and Lord Treasurer; Instruction 32 required that attested accounts of Revenue be transmitted every six months to the Crown; Instruction 33 required that all money be issued by Governor's warrant with the advice of Council.

Observing that lands had been granted without reserving quit-rents or under very low rates, Hunter suggested to the Board of Trade that all lands presently granted or to be granted in the future, be assessed a quit-rent of two shillings six pence sterling for every one hundred acres. Ostensibly, the benefits of this proposed act would be to raise a respectable continuous revenue, to force large land-owners to surrender some of their lands to settlers, and to force some of the large land-owners to surrender valuable timber-land for the Crown's use. Although this suggestion might have appeared to have been a political blunder on Hunter's part, since it would have offended Morris and others of the land-owning interest, the governor's suggestion for increasing the quit-rents was actually a good idea. Morris was a newcomer to New York politics and as such he could not have had the total support of the land-owning interest. This would explain why he was expelled from the Assembly in November, 1710 for making a speech in support of Hunter. The governor's proposal to the Board of Trade could only have been a club wielded by the executive to swing the local landed gentry into line. It was certainly not unusual that Hunter's sympathies might have lain with the land-owning interest since he was the grandson of Hunter of Hunterston, of Ayrshire, who was listed in Burke's Landed Gentry of England. That Hunter's proposed act was intended as a lever to obtain the backing of the landed interest was indicated by the fact that he did not press the issue at

that time. Instead he offered an alternative scheme to the Board of Trade, by which a revenue might be raised by the laying of an impost on all imported and exported goods of the colony, extending even to retailed liquors. By the offering of this alternative measure to raise a revenue, Hunter gave the Board of Trade the appearance of a governor who sought a long-term support for the government of his colony from any source. He, at least, was avoiding indulgence in factionalism as his Instructions ordered him.<sup>48</sup>

Hostility on the part of the Assembly was shown to Hunter at the abbreviated session which lasted from April 12 through 20, 1711. Prorogued on November 25, 1710, the Thirteenth Assembly was originally to convene on March 1, 1711. However, while sitting with the New Jersey legislature in February, 1711, Hunter was forced to prorogue the New York Assembly until April 3rd. The New York Assembly finally met on April 12, 1711 when fourteen of the twenty-two members were available for the governor's opening address. After having reminded the Assembly that it still had not provided a long-term support for the government, the governor then bluntly asked them if they

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<sup>48</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, November 14, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #487; Bonomi, A Factious People, p. 301. The first arrival of Morris on the New York political scene was in the Thirteenth Assembly; DNB, X, p. 299.

would so so. On April 13, the merchant Stephen De Lancey and Captain Lawrence Reade, both representatives from New York City and County, asked Hunter to justify to the Assembly the basis for his performing an act of government while not in New York. Hunter's reply to their request touched off a debate in the Assembly on April 19. That debate questioned whether the men then assembled could act as the General Assembly since they had been prorogued from New Jersey. At the conclusion of the debate, twelve Assemblymen believed that they could not while five believed that they could act as the Assembly. Upon being advised of the Assembly's conclusion in this matter by the Speaker, William Nicoll, Hunter sought the advice of the Council which advised him to dissolve the Assembly since the Assembly might dissolve itself. Accordingly, Hunter dissolved the Thirteenth Assembly which provided the greatest opposition to him.<sup>49</sup>

Hunter continued to meet with frustration from the Fourteenth Assembly as he tried to obtain the much needed long-term support for his government. During its first session, the Fourteenth Assembly did pass An Act for Levying the Sum of Ten Thousand Pounds on July 26, 1711 to fund the expedition of that year against Canada and the colony

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<sup>49</sup>Bonomi, p. 301; Assembly Journal, I, p. 287; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, May 7, 1711, CSP Col., XXV, #832 also found in NY Col. Doc., V, p. 199; Assembly Journal, I, p. 288; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, May 7, 1711, CSP Col., XXV, #832.

did raise six hundred men for the same purpose. However, they had previously resolved to address the Crown begging for relief from the last expedition to Canada (1709) which the Assembly said had caused "wretchedness and poverty" in the colony. Notwithstanding this reluctant but generous contribution to the military efforts of the Crown in the colonies, the Fourteenth Assembly still failed to provide a revenue for the government. After the ill-fated expedition had ended, Hunter wrote to Secretary St. John in England that conditions in the colony were "...in a bad state, the frequent tumults in all parts, and ye generall aversion to the support of Government in most are sufficient indications." In this letter, Hunter urged Her Majesty to remind the Assembly "...that all such priviledges as they claime as bodys politick, they hold of her especiall grace and no longer than they shall use them for her interest and the support of her Government." If this did not settle a revenue for the government, Hunter believed it would at least help "...keep them within bounds in other matters." Hunter was correct that no instruction from the Queen would obtain the revenue that he sought

<sup>20</sup>The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution, including the Charters to the Duke of York, the Commissions and Instructions to Colonial Governors, the Duke's Laws, the Laws of Dongan and Leibler Assemblies, the Charters of Albany and New York and the Acts of the Colonial Legislatures from 1691 to 1775. (2 Vols. Albany: J. B. Lyon, State Printer, 1894-1895). I, pp. 730-731. (Cited as Colonial Laws of New York; Assembly Journal, I, p. 291. The date of this resolution was July 1709. 1891, p. 296.

but he was incorrect in believing that any instructions, even if issued, would "keep them within bounds in other matters."<sup>50</sup>

During the second session of the Fourteenth Assembly, October 2 through November 24, 1711, the issue of Council's right to amend money bills re-surfaced and destroyed Hunter's chances of obtaining a support for his government. Jacobus Van Cortlandt (of New York City) led the committee of the House which considered a support for the government in the amount of £3,874 on October 11. By October 27, this sum had been whittled down to 3,750 ounces of plate to be paid to the governor. As the last two weeks of the session drew to a close, the Council informed the Assembly on November 16, that it had the right to amend money bills since the Assembly had already assented to such changes in the past, establishing a precedent and because the Council too, was part of the Legislature constituted by the same authority as the Assembly. Undaunted, the Assembly replied that the Council was only advisory in nature, that the power to dispose of

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<sup>50</sup>The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution, including the Charters to the Duke of York, the Commissions and Instructions to Colonial Governors, the Duke's Laws, the Laws of Dongan and Leisler Assemblies, the Charters of Albany and New York and the Acts of the Colonial Legislatures from 1691 to 1775. (5 Vols. Albany: James B. Lyon, State Printer, 1894-1896), I, pp. 730-731. Hereafter cited as Colonial Laws of New York; Assembly Journal, I, p. 291. The date of this resolution was July 12, 1711, CSP Col., XXVI, #96.

the money of the people of this colony came from the people, that prior concurrence of the Assembly to changes on money bills by the Council were merely "Condescensions" and were not meant to be precedents and finally, just because the Lords of Trade did not see any reason why the Council should not amend money bills did not mean there weren't any reasons. Within this train of argument between the Assembly and Council, petty interest groups contended for place and power as they inflated their squabbles to the height of principles from which they would not or could not retreat.<sup>51</sup>

This contention over rights to amend money bills sank a number of much needed financial support bills for Hunter's government including An Act, for the Treasurer's paying 8025 Ounces of Plate to his Excellency. Just one day before the session of the Assembly was to end, that body sent a message to the Governor in which it protested that "The obstructions made by the Council, in the passing of Money Bills here, will wholly debilitate this Colony..." and pointed out to Hunter that the purses of the People were put in their trust which they could not betray. This session ended with Hunter giving his assent to An Act for

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<sup>51</sup>Bonomi, p. 301; Assembly Journal, I, pp. 300, 303; Council Journal, I, p. 328; Assembly Journal, I, p. 307. Bailyn, p. 64 described strife between branches of government as being "...strife so rampant as to be more noteworthy by its absence than its presence and so intense as to lead on occasions to a total paralysis of government".

Raiseing Two thousand Eight hundred ffifty ffive Ounces of plate (intended for the defence of the frontiers for the winter) and An Act for ye Treasurer's paying Three thousand Seaven hundred and ffifty Ounces of Plate to his Excellency.

Hunter later explained to the Board of Trade that the first act was to pay one hundred and fifty men who acted as the defence force of the frontier and the other act was a warrant to pay for the repairs to the forts at Albany and Schenectady along with payment to the previously mentioned one hundred and fifty militiamen. Again, Hunter saw his Assembly depart for the winter without having settled a support for the government after having quarreled over the Council's rights to amend money bills.<sup>52</sup>

The Fourteenth Assembly met again between April 30 and June 26, 1712 and did not vote a support for the government during that third session. Little was accomplished in its last session between August 25 and December 10, 1712, with the exception of their concurrence in An Act to appoint Commissioners to examine and state several Claimes alledged as Debts of the Government, which was assented to by Hunter on December 10, 1712. Lewis Morris, now representing Westchester Borough, was chairman of the committee which met to appoint the commission to examine and

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<sup>52</sup>Assembly Journal, I, pp. 307-308; Council Journal, I, p. 331; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, January 1, 1712, CSP Col., XXVI, #251, also cited in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 297-302.



state the many claims outstanding against the colonial government of New York. Determination of these debts was important to the later settlement of the long-term revenue on the government and Morris was in an influential position to help Governor Hunter when the time arrived to evaluate the debts owed by the province. After this Assembly was dissolved on March 3, 1713, a new election was held.<sup>53</sup>

Just after Hunter dissolved the Fourteenth Assembly, he sent a report to the Board of Trade which stated his belief "...that there remains not the least glimpse of hopes that an Assembly there will ever doe anything effectually for support of H(er) M(ajesty's) Government amongst them upon any other terms than giveing it up entirely to them...". Hunter reiterated his complaints against the Assembly, reciting the examples of their refusal to permit the Council to amend money bills, their refusal to allow the Receiver-General to handle and disburse the colony's operating funds and their insistance upon specifying the official's salaries, thus usurping the Crown's prerogatives in these matters. Therefore, Hunter said, "I have however with ye advice of ye Councill dissolved this Assembly,

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<sup>53</sup>Bonomi, p. 301; Assembly Journal, I, pp.331,323; Bonomi, pp. 83,301. Morris's assistance to Hunter commenced with his chairing the commission which determined outstanding claims against the colony. The second step Hunter took to obtain the Revenue was his capitulation allowing the Treasurer to be the principal fiscal officer of the colony.

not out of any hopes wee conceive from a new election, but neerly as a duty incumbent upon me, after ye disrespectfull behaviour of ye last...." The Assembly's behaviour gave the governor good cause to deny the Assembly's much desired Naturalization Act which they had passed on October 14, 1712 and which the Council had agreed to without amendments eleven days later. As his excuse for not having assented to the act, Hunter said, "...an Act of like nature being soe lately repealed in England, and their behaviour here not intitling them to noe such favour from ye Crown at present, I judg'd it adviseable and for H(er) M(ajesty's) service to refuse my assent to it at this time." Their expression of interest in the Naturalization Act was important to the Assembly, for all new emigrants to New York since 1689 had to be naturalized to own property and conduct trade legally. The governor's awareness of this fact provided him with some leverage to apply against the Assembly at the proper time. His same letter to the Board of Trade also brought out Hunter's comments on the quit-rents in the colony which indicated that perhaps some of Morris's wavering allies, particularly merchants who also owned property, might well find it convenient to support the governor.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, March 14, 1713, CSP Col., XXVII, #293, also found in NY Col. Doc., V, pp 356-358; Assembly Journal, I, pp. 324, 326; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, March 14, 1713, CSP Col., XXVII, #293.

Unable to obtain the long-term revenue he required from both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Assemblies, Hunter sought to increase his influence with the next assembly. In the hard-fought election campaign of 1713, Lewis Morris made a considerable effort to win that influence for Hunter. Morris published a pamphlet, Address to the Inhabitants of Westchester, which discussed the merits of direct versus indirect taxation and in which he opposed a land tax as being a burden to the farmer. Instead, he advocated a duty which fell on luxury items and was paid solely by those who purchased them. Predictably, Morris as a leading spokesman for the landed interest favored a governor who would not press so strongly for efficient collection of quit-rents. His zealous effort on Hunter's behalf complemented another pamphlet which had been printed around the same time that put the merchants in a bad light.<sup>55</sup>

Although Hunter did not sign his name to this pamphlet, To All whom these Presents may Concern, the language used and ideas expressed within it are strongly suggestive of his thinking. This document started out by saying, "Had I not been Eye and Ear-witness of the late rash Measures in this Province, I could not have believ'd that an Infant Colony of England...so distinguished by many Marks of Her Majesty's Gracious Favor, could be so ungrateful, as to brand Her most just and gentle reign with

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<sup>55</sup>Bonomi, pp. 82-84.

the odious Name of Tyranny..." The pamphleteer's "Apprehension that attends these Measures" had induced him to publish this paper showing that the people of New York had been "blinded with false Colours, and bambouzled with Noise and Absurdities." His apprehension might also have been felt because of the governor's inability to control his assemblies and this same apprehension therefore brought on this condemnation of the Assembly. After a discussion and repudiation of the Assembly's alleged right to exclude the Council from amending money bills, the pamphlet's author defended the governor's authority to erect the Chancery Court, primarily by stressing its necessity in the colony. Turning to the controversy regarding whether the Receiver-General, Hunter's man, or the Treasurer, the Assembly's man, should handle the funds of the colony, the pamphleteer emphasized the fact that only since 1706 had the Treasurer been allowed by the Queen to handle colonial funds and then only for extra-ordinary purposes. Seeking to show the popular representatives at their whimsical worse, he ascribed the only apparent reason for the refusal of the Assembly to use the Receiver-General to their dislike of him. This dislike of the Receiver-General was also offered as an example of the Assembly's unreasonable attitude since he had offered to give bond in New York to satisfy the Assembly. As a reflection on the honesty of the Assembly, the author suggested that perhaps the real reason for the

Receiver-General being un-acceptable to the Assembly was his refusal to allow squandering and misapplication of the funds. As an illustration of the Assembly's impracticality, the pamphleteer referred to the Assembly's willingness to allow the Treasurer  $2\frac{1}{2}\%$  of the funds received for the performance of this duty while the Receiver-General did this same job for nothing, being paid from the collected quit-rents. In reference to the Revenue, which depended on "an Impost on Goods imported and exported only", the author of the pamphlet indicated that Governor Hunter would accept money for a revenue from any source, "though you should load your Lands, for the Ease of a few Merchants to the Value of Four Shillings in the Pound, as the people of England have paid for twenty years past...".

This last comment by the pamphleteer appears to have been an attempt to also make a change in the rates of the quit-rents unpopular. Thanks to the activities of the Assembly, the people of New York had not "learned" that "Revenue and Slavery are synonymous Terms" and the author of this pamphlet sarcastically advised the people that they too, should avoid the same tyranny which fell on England, Holland, New England, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia. He deplored their not listening to men such as Colonel Caleb Heathcote and Colonel Lewis Morris who both favored a revenue for the government. Seeking to impress the readers with the seriousness of the Assembly's actions, the

author brought the issue of loyalty into the problem by advising them that in any event, the Queen would not surrender her rights and the colony to the Assembly. The people would be well advised not to be misled by "Republican visions of one Man" and obvious reference to Samuel Mulford. Assemblies are a new thing, a novelty, which were not to provoke the Crown. For their own well-being and that of the colony, they must settle a revenue for the government. After all, says the pamphleteer, "There was a Revenue without Slavery" under the Duke of York, Sloughter, Fletcher, Cornbury and Lovelace. As an effective piece of political propaganda, the pamphlet failed to unseat Hunter's principal opponents as the results of the following election showed.<sup>56</sup>

Written in the style familiar to Hunter's writings, referring to documents written by Hunter to the Board of Trade and from the Board to him, strongly suggesting that the writer held a position of high importance, To All Whom these Presents May Concern must certainly have been written by the governor. Although the pamphlet's author repeated Hunter's arguments denying the right of the Assembly to exclude the Council from amending money bills with good effect, his attempts to deal with the really

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<sup>56</sup> [Robert Hunter], To All whom these Presents may Concern..., Pamphlet. (New York: William Bradford, printer, 1713). This eight page pamphlet set forth Hunter's protests in favor of the revenue.

important issue whether the Receiver-General should be the principal financial agent of the colony were subject to dispute by persons who could spot the flaw in his logic. The Receiver-General was paid to do his job out of the quit-rents, a fixed amount, whereas the Treasurer was paid a percentage of the money he handled; in any event, both men were paid. It was only the author's word that the Receiver-General refused to allow squandering and misapplication of the funds. Under other governors, receivers-general had disbursed funds under questionable circumstances. People who understood what was politically at stake in this election saw the issue of Receiver-General versus Treasurer as a struggle for control of the colony. The pamphleteer's statement that Hunter did not care where the revenue came from was belied by the statement, "though you should load your lands, for the Ease of a few Merchants..." since it connoted dislike for the merchants while ignoring the land-owners. Attempting to influence the electors against the incumbent Assembly, the writer appeared to have forgotten about Hunter's Instructions not to unsettle the minds of the people and he also appeared to have forgotten the importance attached by the colonists to the Assembly in the previous twenty years.

As an example of an effort to influence the election of 1713, this pamphlet did not stop many of Hunter's opponents from being re-elected.<sup>57</sup>

When the Fifteenth Assembly met in late May, 1713, Hunter's principal opponents were again seated. The two most prominent merchants from New York City, Jacobus Van Cortlandt and Stephen De Lancey, were joined by two of Hunter's most vocal critics, Speaker William Nicoll of Suffolk County and his fellow representative, Samuel Mulford. The Suffolk representatives were spokesmen for the "East End" interests which opposed New York City's being the only port of customs and entry for the colony. Use of the port of New York in this manner caused trade to be diverted from direct shipment to New England, thus increasing transportation costs, placing eastern Long Island at a distinct trade disadvantage. Nicoll continued to function as the Speaker of the Assembly, a post which must have served as the gathering point of Hunter's opposition. Despite the election, this assembly proved to be no more pliant to Hunter's demand for a revenue than its predecessors.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> The pamphlet's construction implies that it was written by a person very close to the political activities of the time. This person was profoundly interested in the passage of a revenue act. It is probable that Hunter did not sign the pamphlet because of the aggressive writing in it.

<sup>58</sup> Bonomi, pp. 302, 82, 86.



Seeking to obtain a revenue for the maintenance of the government Hunter reopened the Court of Chancery which had been inoperative for some years and issued, with the advice of the Chief Justice, Roger Mompesson, writs to force payment of quit-rents which were years in arrears. Clause fortyseven of Hunter's Instructions authorized him to reopen previously constituted courts and his Council advised him that his custody of the Province's Seal made him the Chancellor. Hunter's re-opening of the Chancery Court drew great criticism from the Assembly which he described in a letter to the Board of Trade on January 1, 1712. This criticism of the Assembly's said, "...that the erecting such a Court without their consent is against law, without precedent and of dangerous consequence to the liberty and property of the subject." Re-opening of the Chancery Court seemingly should have hurt Hunter politically with the land-owning interest whose support he needed. Hunter made this move out of necessity.<sup>59</sup>

Writs were issued to land-owners who were behind in their quit-rent payments, which documents posed no threat to those served with them. Several of the land owners who replied to their writs answered that they did not

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<sup>59</sup>Ibid.; "Hunter's Instructions", NY Col Doc. V, pp. 131-132, This was Instruction No. 47; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, January 1, 1712, CSP Col., XXVI, #251. The resolution condemning the re-opening of the Court was dated November 24, 1711. See Assembly Journal, I, p. 308.

intend to pay their quit-rents and if they were sued for the money they doubted that any jury of local land-owners would vote against them. The re-opening of the Chancery Court would provide Hunter with the legal machinery to pursue his own ends in granting land, if he desired to do so, while demonstrating to the Crown that Hunter was not showing preference to the landed interest. It was not surprising to Hunter that very little money was collected from quit-rents through the writs issued by the Chancery Court.<sup>60</sup>

Meagerness of the collected quit-rents caused Hunter to ask the Lords of Trade a number of questions about the rates. Because some land-owners had either received their lands at low rates or had managed to get previously set high rates lowered by other governors, he wanted to know if this was legal. At this same time, the Queen had instructed Hunter that all future grants of land were to be made with a quit-rent of two shillings and six pence for each hundred acres and he wanted to know if all land grants would have to pay this rate. Secretary Popple of the Board of Trade referred Hunter's questions to Attorney-General Edward Northey for his opinion. The Attorney-General's opinions on the matter undercut the

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<sup>60</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, March 14, 1713, CSP Col., XXVII, #293. Reference to letter from Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, January 1, 1712, CSP Col., XXVI, #251 also indicates that the business of the colony regarding deeds, wills and the like had to be taken care of.

governor's attempts at controlling the land-owners interests and limited Hunter's chances of being completely independent. Northey's first opinion was that retrenchment of previous quit-rents and lesser charges for subsequent grants depended entirely on the powers granted to the governors in their Commissions and Instructions. Concerning the second question, Northey believed that unless laws or declarations had been made by the government, or if the Duke of York's heirs and assigns made such stipulations, the quit-rent rates called for under the original grants were in effect. In all other cases, the Queen's instructions were in effect. Trying to be helpful, Northey did not "...think it amiss if an Act of Assembly were past for establishing this matter." Knowledge that the Assembly would not co-operate in passage of such an act and the general tenor of Northey's decisions only served to force Hunter more into reliance upon the land-owners for assistance.<sup>61</sup>

Convinced that the Assembly would not vote a long-term support for the government, the Board of Trade notified Lord Dartmouth in a letter dated April 1, 1713 of their belief and recommended to him that Parliament pass an

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<sup>61</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, March 14, 1713, CSP Col., XXVII, #293; Popple to Mr. Attorney-General, Whitehall, April 28, 1713, CSP Col., XXVII, #328, also in NY Col Doc., V, p. 362; Mr. Attorney-General to Board of Trade, N.P. May 5, 1713, CSP Col., XXVII, #334, also in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 362-363.

act to settle a revenue on New York. After three weeks, the Board of Trade notified Hunter in a letter dated April 23, 1713 that the Queen had been informed of the colony's difficulty and they expected that an act of Parliament would be soon passed settling a revenue on New York. The Board of Trade sent another letter dated July 20, 1713 in which Hunter was informed that the Queen had now commanded a revenue be settled on New York's government and although Parliament was now adjourned, the next session would hopefully see the problem solved. Unfortunately, Parliament did not settle a support for Hunter's government, either then or later.<sup>62</sup>

During 1713, the Assembly conducted business in much the same manner as it had the previous two years. It did appoint a committee composed of Robert Livingston, Jr., (Albany County), Colonel Thomas Willet (Queens County), Captain John Stillwell (Richmond County), Major Cornelius Van Brunt (Kings County) and Samuel Mulford (Suffolk County) to determine the debts of the government. This was an important first step in setting the colony's financial affairs in order. On July 1, 1713, Hunter gave his assent to a Support for one year for the government but he did not

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<sup>62</sup>Board of Trade to Lord Dartmouth, Whitehall, April 1, 1713, CSP Col., XXVII, #313, also in NY Col. Doc., V, p. 359; Board of Trade to Hunter, Whitehall, April 23, 1713, CSP Col., XXVII, #324, also found in NY Col. Doc., V, pp 360-361; Board of Trade to Hunter, Whitehall, July 20, 1713, CSP Col., XXVII, # 409 also in NY Col. Doc., V pp. 367-368.

assent to the Naturalization Act agreed upon by the Council and Assembly on July 4, 1713. While the second session was in progress during late October, the House addressed Hunter asking him to agree to a bill which would pay the officers of the Assembly. Since the available funds in the Treasury had already been allocated for other uses, the governor must have fully enjoyed denying the Assembly's request particularly because the officers of the government had not been paid either. Little more was accomplished in the next session which came in 1714.<sup>63</sup>

The third session of the Fifteenth Assembly lasted from March 24 to September 4 when it was dissolved by the death of Queen Anne. About two months after the session opened, Hunter had written to Mr. William Popple of his doubts about obtaining the long term-support he needed. Hunter had evidently sounded-out his supporters in the Assembly and he found that "...the best minded amongst them give me only hopes of such another scanty sum and uncertain method of the insuing year." He was correct, for on July 6, 1714, the governor again had to assent to a one year support for the government. During this session,

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<sup>63</sup> Assembly Journal, I, pp. 337, 341-342, 344-345. The committee for determining the government's debts was appointed June 17, 1713. Hunter informed Speaker William Nicoll on October 30, 1713 that all funds were already allocated.

the Assembly was involved in a preliminary action which would obtain the desired long-term support in the following year.<sup>64</sup>

When the third session opened, Hunter reminded the Assembly that they had to complete the settlement of the public debt. That debt had accumulated over a period of years and its payment was in-effect the settlement of a revenue after-the-fact. Until the old debts of the colony were paid-off, it was foolishness to talk of incurring new ones, even though they were clearly necessary and certainly un-avoidable.<sup>65</sup>

Hunter was fortunate that Lewis Morris chaired the committee which deliberated upon and examined the debts owed to various claimants. By his presence in the chairman's post, Morris was able to look out for the governor's interests and see to it that Hunter's enemies did not take advantage of him. At the same time, he was able to see to it that the adjudication of the debts was made diplomatically with the settlement of a long-term revenue kept firmly in mind. Some of the legislators who were owed money by the colony were men like Councillor Robert Walters, Speaker

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<sup>64</sup>Bonomi, p. 302; Hunter to Popple, New York, May 7, 1714, CSP Col., XXVII, # 665, also in NY Col Doc., V, pp. 377-378; Assembly Journal, I, p. 361.

<sup>65</sup>Assembly Journal, I, p. 345. The date of the joint opening session was March 24, 1714.

William Nicoll and former Assemblyman Dirck Wessels (of Albany). Although the Assemblymen were not just serving for the money, it is not unlikely that they were reluctant to vote a support for the government until they and the former members were reimbursed. Hunter's opinions on the ten shillings per day allowance for the Assembly made this into an issue which Morris was able to influence in favor of the governor. This made Hunter's job just a little easier and paved the way for the eventual settlement.<sup>66</sup>

Writing to the Board of Trade, in a letter started in late August, Hunter added a post-script on September 6, 1714 that the act for paying and discharging the public debts had been passed and he hoped that it would be allowed. The method of paying the public debts was to be a fund created by an excise on strong liquors retailed in the colony, a form of taxation which was not then allocated to any purpose by the Crown. In order to pay for the support of the government, duties on wine, rum Negroes, tonnage of ships and goods imported from Europe would be levied in accordance with Her Majesty's instructions. Although the merchants of the colony were to oppose these duties, Hunter

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<sup>66</sup>Assembly Journal, I, p. 360,350. Hunter's emphasis on the 10 shilling per diem salary of the Assemblymen may have reminded them of the debts due them and the Assemblymen may have made this a point with the governor. Settlement of the back debts due to the Assemblymen might have been important to them just as Hunter emphasized his not having received his salary.

characterized them as "...sufficient for an honourable support to her Government here..." and he described the Act to pay the public debts as "...an Act for support of Government, it being for payment for what is due for its past support and publick services in it...." Because one of the concessions he had to make was to allow the Treasurer to handle these funds, Hunter felt obliged to gloss over this point which he had previously denied to the Assembly. Despite his prior protestations against surrendering the Crown's prerogatives to the Assembly over this issue, the governor was a realist enough to accept the Assembly's demand that its own man control the receipt and disbursement of the public monies. Without Hunter's concession to the Assembly on this issue, it is reasonable to believe that the act for paying the public debts of the colony would not have been enacted and the first important step toward the ultimate passage of a long term support act would have died at that point. Hunter justified his action by reminding the Lords that "...In other Provinces the fund is lodged in the country Treasurer's hands for the Country's use, so that is no new thing." Allowing the Treasurer to handle the colony's funds was significant in Hunter's reaching some accommodation with his Assembly.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>67</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, August 27, 1714, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 378-380.



The governor threw a small sop to the small and moderate merchants of the colony when he approved an Act for Licensing Hawkers and Peddlars within this Province for four Years which ran from June 1, 1714 to June 1, 1718. Peddlars, hawkers and petty chapmen were included in the act which forbade them to sell their wares in both Albany and New York City. This was a good political move which built political support for Hunter. Both the small and moderate sized merchants were affected by this law which took effect in the two important sections of the colony. Under the terms of the law, violation carried a fine of £30 while failure to produce a license (sold by the governor for 10 shillings) could result in either a £5 fine or one month's lodging in the local jail. While the license fee probably did not enrich Hunter, the smaller merchants and shop-keepers of New York City, who had supported Leisler, and the traders at Albany could not have failed to notice this gesture on the part of Hunter in assenting to this act.<sup>68</sup>

Just as the small merchants received something in the Act for Licensing Hawkers, the three Albany Assemblymen, Robert Livingston, Jr., Myndert Schuyler and Peter Van Brugh were among the Five Partners (the others being

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<sup>68</sup>Colonial Laws of New York, I, pp. 805-806.  
The act was passed June 21, 1714.

John Schuyler and Peter Wileman) who shared in Hunter generosity. Old Nicholas Bayard's Schoharie Grant had been deeded to this troupe on November 3, 1714. Later, this group was expanded when Lewis Morris, Jr., and Andries Coejemans joined forces with the five to become the Seven Partners. Although the three Albany Assemblymen were not returned to the Sixteenth Assembly in 1715, Hunter's conferrance of the grant to them surely was not missed by the important men of the Albany region. The New York based governor had done what he could to mend fences and influence the Assemblymen.<sup>69</sup>

Although Hunter made his efforts to win the Assembly over to his side, he apparently knew what the majority of its members felt toward him. He expressed his own feelings toward the Assembly in a private play entitled "Androborous" which he astutely refrained from publishing. This three act farce was written about and dedicated to the Assembly, although the namesake of the play, Androborus is Francis Nicholson. Hunter viewed this former Lieutenant-Governor of the colony as his nemesis and nothing gave Hunter more glee than to see this exalted personage humbled. As its central theme, the play featured the down-fall of

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<sup>69</sup>Knittel, Palatine Emigration, pp. 201-202; Bonomi, p. 302. The conferral of the Schoharie Grant to the Five Partners may have been done as a gesture of vindicateness against the Bayard family for its opposition against Hunter in the Assembly.

Androborus (Nicholson) who was lionized by the Assembly (known in the play either as the Senate or Consistory). But Androborus's down-fall comes about because the Senate-Consistory plots to do in the Keeper (Hunter) in such an inept and ludicrous manner that the Keeper assisted by Solemn (Lewis Morris) and Aesop (Robert Livingston, Sr.) is able to turn the tables on his enemies. Within the play, Hunter was careful to insert the expulsion of Solemn (Morris) from the Senate despite the heroic defence in Solemn's behalf offered by Aesop. Solemn's expulsion was shown to be a childish act of pique on the part of the Senate and Hunter fully intended to exploit this occurrence to its utmost political potential. Through-out the rest of the play, Hunter displayed a Rabelaisian satire which depicted the Assembly as stupid, venal, irresponsible and cowardly. This negative characterization of the Assembly appears to have been due more to Hunter's occupation as a soldier than any possible contempt he may have held for popular government. His impatience with committees, the need for him to influence members of various factions rather than ordering them about and certainly his discovery that his patronage powers were so limited that he actually could but directly control a few people contributed to his ill feelings about the Assembly. In all probability, he must certainly have viewed their performance as awkward, indecisive and unintelligent when compared to the military standards of the

day and he used this vehicle of the farcical play to pour out his wry humor upon them. The dedication is the best display of Hunter's wit. Dedicated to "don. Com. Fiz" (the Assembly) Hunter says "But tell me, will You be quiet for the Future? You shall be paid for't, nay you have been paid for't; and it is hard that Men must be Brib'd for Not doing what they ought not to do." He then told them that he once knew "...an Odd Fellow upon Pont Neuff..." who extorted money from people whom he threatened to ram a hot iron up their ass. "Now", he asks, "I know that it is not an easie matter for you to get rid of your Forge and Bellows, but Can't you blow your Bellows and heat your Iron at Home, and quit that unaccountable Rage of Running it into your honest quiet Neighbours Arses, who pay you amply and meerly for Forbearance?" Although this play was not published, it was printed in August 1714 and copies were distributed to Hunter's friends. While this play reflected Hunter's real or imagined feelings about the Assembly, he refrained from publishing it. Publication would not have helped him in his efforts to obtain the Support Act and it would

*Jarce in Three Acts, viz: The Senate, The Congressary and The Apothecary.* (New York: Printed at No/50/rocollis [by William Bradford] since 1st August, 1714). Hunter's opinion of the Assembly is best characterized in the dedication. He accused them of acting petulantly, childishly, irresponsibly and ignorantly. His friends privately enjoyed the play, the title of which, "Androborus" means "man-eater".

<sup>72</sup>Bononi, p. 302; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, October 16, 1714, *NY Col. Doc.*, V, pp. 380-381; Hunter to Earl of Stair, New York, October 18, 1714, *Ibid.*, p. 453.

have violated his instructions against indulging in factionalism while serving as governor.<sup>70</sup>

Upon the death of Queen Anne, the Assembly was dissolved on September 4, 1714. In a letter to the Board of Trade dated October 18, 1714, the governor acknowledged the death of the queen and informed the Lords of Trade that he had taken it upon himself to proclaim the new sovereign. On the same date, he wrote the Earl of Stair that his friends had told him, "...if there was a revenue settled I might depend upon being superseded...." Unhappy at not having a long-term settlement for support conferred on his government by either the Crown or the Assembly, he "...beg'd of those who wrote soe to me that if they found the least inclinations in the Ministry to recall me, they would make it my request to them that I might fall as decently as might be...." Hunter's concern about his possible removal commenced as he almost achieved successes in obtaining the much sought-after revenue.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup>Robert Hunter, "Androborus. A Biographical Farce in Three Acts, Viz: The Senate, the Consistory and the Apotheosis." (New York: Printed at Mo/no/ropolis [by William Bradford] since 1st August, 1714). Hunter's opinion of the Assembly is best characterized in the dedication. He accused them of acting petulantly, childishly, irresponsibly and ignorantly. His friends privately enjoyed the play, the title of which, "Androborus" means "man-eater".

<sup>71</sup>Bonomi, p. 302; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, October 18, 1714, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 380-381; Hunter to Earl of Stair, New York, October 18, 1714, Ibid., p. 453.

In the meantime, Hunter received his new Commission from George I. This Commission, dated February 8, 1715 was substantially the same as the one received from Queen Anne, except that it was more concisely written.<sup>72</sup>

February 8, 1715 was also the date upon which the former governor of New York and New Jersey, Edward Hyde, Viscount Cornbury, now the Earl of Clarendon, wrote to the Board of Trade concerning the 1714 act to pay the public debts. This letter by Clarendon, which indicated the kind of opposition which Hunter faced in England, denounced the act as being "so unjust in its nature, as to direct the Payment of considerable sums of Money where none is really due, and allows to other just debts, to some one half, to others a third, to others a fourth part and to others nothing...." It complained of Clarendon's being excluded from receiving just payment for debts owed him simply because he was not there to press his claims. Clarendon had been an enemy of the elder Robert Livingston and Hunter had angered Clarendon by not retaining a sherrif appointed and recommended by the former governor. More than just being an act of ingratitude, this letter of Clarendon's was also

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<sup>72</sup>"Commission of Robert Hunter, Esq., to be Governor of New York", Whitehall, February 8, 1715, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 391-397.

an act of political sabotage in return for Hunter's slight concerning the appointment of the sheriff.<sup>73</sup>

In July, 1710, Hunter had accepted a note for £200 from Clarendon after he had obtained this sum of money from one Captain Paston "...who had advanced it to his Lords at my desire and on my promise of payment upon his Lordship leaving this place, & without which he then affirm'd he could not stir from hence...." If Hunter only registered anger at this ingratitude, the Assembly and Council jointly did take action by replying to Clarendon's statement in a memorial dated mid-May, 1715. Both the Council and Assembly denied that anything was owed to Clarendon since the support for his government had been adequate if he had managed it properly. They justified their settlement of the amounts owed by explaining that they had made "...a long examination of the particular accounts of warrants by which they were Claimed...." Despite Clarendon's effort to sabotage this act to settle the debts of New York, King George I gave his assent to the act on June 17, 1715 settling the matter.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup>Clarendon to Board of Trade, Somerset House, February 8, 1715, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 398; Note of Clarendon to Hunter, Maidstone at Sandy Hook, July 31, 1710, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 406. Clarendon asked Hunter to retain one "Mr. Anderson the present Sheriff of New York."; however, Hunter replaced him.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., Memorial of Council and Assembly of New York, New York, May 20, 1715, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 406; Order in Council Confirming the Acts for Laying an Excise and Paying the Public Debts, St. James, June 17, 1715, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 412.

Hunter addressed the Sixteenth Assembly on May 4, 1715 the day after they met and he expressed his impatience with the Assembly for not having provided a substantial support nor for having paid all the debts. Referring to Clarendon's caveat against the act to pay the debts in New York, Hunter stated that he had been maligned and if the charges were true, he would have quit of his own volition. From the wording of his speech, he clearly expected the co-operation of the Assembly in solving the problems before it.<sup>75</sup>

Two days after Hunter made his opening speech to the Assembly, it framed the Naturalization Act and by May 7, this bill had been given a second reading in the House. Between those early days in May to early June, the Assembly re-examined portions of the Naturalization Act and continued exacting less important legislation. On June 2nd, the Assembly required the Assemblyman from Suffolk County, Samuel Mulford, to answer why he had permitted a hostile speech made to the Assembly to be printed. This speech had also been hostile to the governor as well as the Assembly and that body feared that the hostility shown to the governor in Mulford's speech would cause him to veto the Naturalization Act. After heated words with his fellow Assemblymen, Mulford was expelled. At this point, the

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<sup>75</sup>Council Journal, I, p. 368; Bonomi, A Factious People, p. 302.



Assembly clearly indicated its interest in the Naturalization Act which Hunter did not miss.<sup>76</sup>

At the meeting of the Council at Fort George on June 15, the Naturalization Act was read for a second time and committed to the Councillors for their consideration. Hunter replied to Doctor Samuel Staat's comment that the governor had given his word several times to pass this act but had failed to do so. In his comments to the Council, Hunter emphasized that the promises had been conditional upon the Assembly voting an ample long-term support for the government and upon payment of the debts owed him. Hunter insisted he had not renigged on his promise. Although there is no evidence to support his belief, the author suggests that the Council being fully aware of Hunter's demand for a long-term support without further delay, took the first step. Probably acting with Hunter's tacit approval, the Council agreed to the Naturalization Act on June 18th.<sup>77</sup>

Details of the deal between Hunter and the Assembly which obtained the Support Act for the governor and the Naturalization Act for the legislators are not available in the Assembly Journal or the Council Journal. However, if an answer is sought to why the deal took place at that time there is a possible explanation which may be derived from

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<sup>76</sup>Assembly Journal, I, pp. 368-369; Ibid., p. 372.

<sup>77</sup>Entry dated June 15, 1715, Council Journal, I, p. 386; Entry dated June 18, 1715, Assembly Journal, I, p. 374.

two preceding events. In 1713, Hunter's questions to the Board of Trade concerning the quit-rent rates undoubtedly attracted some official interest in previously granted deeds. Any deeds held by un-naturalized residents of New York might have been placed in jeopardy of being reclaimed by the Crown and their holders would quite naturally have desired Hunter's acquiescence to a Naturalization Act. The other event appears to have been the action on the part of the Board of Trade which convinced the Queen that the Assembly would not vote the governor his Support. Because of this, fear that the Crown might settle a revenue of New York and recoup its expenditures by either higher duties on imports and exports or an increase in the quit-rents imposed from London could have been at the bottom of increased colonial pressure for the Naturalization Act and thus added the leverage Hunter needed to obtain his Support. Although there is no written evidence in the commonly used sources such as the Journals of the Assembly and Council and although Hunter does not mention these points in his official correspondence to the Board, this pair of premises may not be as far-fetched as they may seem. The colonists did appear to give the impression of wanting to run their own affairs and did not want London prescribing higher quit-rent rates or higher duties on goods, both of which would play havoc with the land-owner and merchant alike. It was better to vote a support and prescribe its own payment than be dictated

to. Available evidence does not indicate whether Hunter planned these moves in advance expecting the results which occurred or if he was the recipient of good fortune from chance occurrences.

On June 21, 1715 the Assembly resolved to bring in a Support Act. Two days later, the Support Act received its first reading and its second on June 24. Between this last date and July 4, alterations were made to it and an Act for Bills of Credit, to be struck. Relieved at having gotten the support he had desired for so long, Hunter readily assented to both the Support Act and Naturalization Act on the very next day. The Support Act, entitled An Act for a Supply to be Granted to his Majesty for Supporting His Government, in the Province of New-York and for Striking Bills of Credit for that Purpose was to run for five years. In the case of the Naturalization Act, entitled An Act Declaring, that all Persons of Foreign Birth, Heretofore Inhabiting Within this Colony, and dying seized of any lands, tenements and Hereditaments...Colony, both citizenship and legality of land ownership were conferred on those not formerly naturalized in the colony. Hunter's comments

*A Supply to be Granted to His Majesty for Supporting His Government, in the Province of New York, and for striking Bills of Credit for that Purpose," passed on July 5, 1715, is Acts of the Assembly, Passed in the Province of New York, from 1691 to 1715. (London: Printed by John Baskett, Printer to the King's most Excellent Majesty, and by the Assigns of Thomas Newcomb and Henry Hills, Deceased, 1719), pp. 204-208. Hereafter cited as Acts of the Assembly; "An Act Declaring that all Persons of Foreign Birth, heretofore inhabiting within this colony and dying seized of any lands, tenements, and hereditaments...colony," passed July 5, 1715 in Acts of the Assembly, pp. 211-214.*

on both of these acts are interesting for they indicate the amount of give-and-take between the governor and Assemblymen.<sup>78</sup>

In late July, Hunter wrote to the Board of Trade concerning the Support Act and Naturalization Act which both had been recently passed. He informed the Board of Trade "...that the Naturalization Bill was the block laid in the way of the revenue...." Only after Mulford was expelled from the Assembly could the faction interested in getting a Naturalization Act passed have its own way. This group informed both the Council and Assembly that the bill should either be sent to England requesting the Crown to direct Hunter to pass it or this bill should have a clause added to it which suspended it until the King's pleasure be made known. The latter suggestion was significant since it was

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<sup>78</sup>Entries of June 21, 24 and 25, 1715, Assembly Journal, I, pp. 374-376. The Support Act was committed to Committee on June 24, just after the second reading; Entry of July 4, 1715, Council Journal, I, p. 390. Act granting a Supply for the King and act for the Bills of Credit was passed by the Council; Entry of July 5, 1715, Assembly Journal, I, p. 377 and entry of July 5, 1715, Council Journal, I, p. 390. Both entries show the Support Act and Naturalization Acts were assented to on that date; "An Act for a Supply to be Granted to His Majesty for Supporting His government, in the Province of New York, and for striking Bills of Credit for that Purpose," passed on July 5, 1715, in Acts of the Assembly, Passed in the Province of New York, from 1691 to 1718. (London: Printed by John Baskett, Printer to the King's most Excellent Majesty, and by the Assigns of Thomas Newcomb and Henry Hills, Deceased, 1719). pp. 204-208. Hereafter cited as Acts of the Assembly; "An Act Declaring that all Persons of Foreign Birth, heretofore Inhabiting within this colony and dying seized of any lands, tenements, and hereditaments...colony," passed July 5, 1715 in Acts of the Assembly, pp. 211-214.

the "escape clause" which Hunter could use in giving his assent to the legislation. In giving his assent to the act under such a circumstance, Hunter was acting in consonance with his royal instruction not to pass unusual legislation without a suspending clause to protect the Crown's interests; if the act was disallowed by the Crown, at least Hunter could point to his assent and wash his hands of the blame for its failure. The governor had made these same suggestions with no success and as a last resort, he sought to bargain with the Assembly. As Hunter put it, "...I at least asked them what they would do for the Government if I should pass it in their way, since they did not like mine, I asked nothing for myself, tho' they well knew that I had offers of several thousands of pounds for my assent, they at last agreed that they would settle a sufficient Revenue for the space of five years on that condition...." Feeling as if he had to offer some explanation for his actions, he apologized saying, "If I have done amiss, I am sorry for't, but what was there left for me to do...." As interesting as his comments are on the political maneuvers involved in obtaining the Support Act, they do not rival his remarks concerning the technicalities of the act.<sup>79</sup>

Within this same letter to the Lords of Trade, Hunter discussed the objections of these who had dissented

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<sup>79</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, July 25, 1715, NY Col Doc., V, p. 416.

in passing this bill. One objection was that now the Assemblymen's salaries were to be paid out of the revenue and not from the country taxes as before. For his part, the Governor welcomed this for it ensured that a revenue would be settled regularly. The other objection to the Support Act was that the money was in the hands of the Treasurer and not the Receiver-General's keeping. However, the Receiver-General did not seem to mind, since he kept his post and salary while he also rid himself of the trouble of performing his job. As was previously mentioned above, Hunter had often complained about the expense of the Assemblymen's salaries and in the act to pay the public debts the Treasurer was also the principal financial figure involved in the colony's monetary transactions.<sup>80</sup>

The Lords of Trade replied to Hunter's letter of late July in their own letter of September 7, 1715. Having examined the Support Act they found that the portion concerning the striking of bills of credit conflicted with the Act of Parliament for settling the rates of foreign coins in the Plantations. In the New York act, they found, "...an ounce of plate is valued at 8 shillings, where as by the Act of Parliament here a piece of Eight of sevil. Pillar or Mexico of 17½ penny weight is not to pass for more than 6 shillings 10-10/25 pence...." If the act were approved by the King, other colonies would pass the same laws which

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<sup>80</sup>Ibid., pp. 416-417.

would inflate the value of their money and defeat the purpose of the Parliamentary act. Therefore, they would not present the Act to the King until Hunter explained it more fully to their satisfaction. Hunter's problems back in England concerning the much needed support began with this letter from the Board.<sup>81</sup>

Concerning the Naturalization Act, Hunter wrote in his letter of July 25, that the act spoke for itself and if the King was willing to approve it, then the Act would "unite the minds" of the prominent land-owners to better serve the King. If the Act did not receive the King's approval, then Hunter could "...see no harm in suffering it to lye upon your Lordships table for some time." In either case Hunter came off well since he already officially went on record in favor of the act by assenting to it. Anything that happened to it from this point was not by his design. The Lords of Trade's reply in their September letter to Hunter was only that they would consider his recommendation concerning it. This act, which naturalized all foreign born Protestants in New York since 1689, did not receive recommendation for allowance from the Attorney-General, Edward Northey. In his opinion, the Act should not be allowed since provision was made to naturalize those who came to New York after 1689 by applying for naturalization

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<sup>81</sup>Board of Trade to Hunter, Whitehall, September 7, 1715, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 435.

by an act of assembly. Often, newcomers to the colony did not bother to apply for naturalization since an Assembly dominated by merchants would not be too likely to pass an individual's naturalization request while an Assembly dominated by land-owners who had also not complied with the regulation to become naturalized were not likely to raise questions or pass ordinances detrimental to the newly arrived emigrant. Then, too, ignorance of the law itself kept many emigrants from applying for naturalization or just as often, lack of cash to pay for the complicated process were equally prevalent reasons for many people not applying for naturalization. For whatever reasons that emigrants to New York did not apply for naturalization, their purchasing of land violated the Navigation Act since Aliens could only purchase land for the Crown and not for themselves. Northey's opinion given on January 2, 1718 was not followed by the Crown giving Hunter a chance to keep his part of the political deal.<sup>82</sup>

Having obtained the Supply he desired in exchange for his assent to the Naturalization Act, Hunter consented to an Act appointing an Agent for the colony. Under the terms of this act, 500 Ounces of Plate per year were allotted to John Champante to represent the Assembly at the Court of

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<sup>82</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, July 25, 1715, Ibid., p. 417; Board of Trade to Hunter, Whitehall, September 7, 1715, Ibid., p. 435; Knittel, pp. 214-215; Attorney-General Northey to Board of Trade, N.P., January 2, 1718, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 495-497.



St. James. According to Hunter, the Assembly persisted in sending up a bill for this agency which excluded the Governor and Council from any contact with the Agent.

This act was described to the Lords of Trade as an encroachment on the prerogatives of the Crown which Hunter insisted he could not assent to. In reality, Hunter must have worried less about the encroachment on the Crown's prerogative than the encroachment on his own authority. The last thing that the governor wanted was the Assembly having its own personal tattle-tale in the Court. He had enough problems generated by the nature of the legislation passed and the influential people, such as the Earl of Clarendon, who drew attention to the rough spots in his administration. As deeply as the Assembly felt about the matter, the adamant governor insisted that they would have to concede on this point. Hunter agreed that the man finally chosen for the position was in "every way qualify'd for that office." Thus, the New York Assembly finally got its private agent in London.<sup>83</sup>

As a suitable reward for Lewis Morris's services in the Assembly, Hunter awarded him the post of Chief Justice of New York. Protesting Morris's appointment, Colonel Charles Lodwick wrote to the Board of Trade in late August, 1715 complaining that Morris was not a lawyer and

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<sup>83</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, July 25, 1715, Ibid., p. 418; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, August 13, 1715, Ibid., pp.419-420.

thus liable to "commit some indiscretions which may have a fatal consequence." Through the efforts of Morris and other members of his faction in the Assembly, Hunter's relations with the Assembly improved.<sup>84</sup>

At the opening of the legislative session which met on June 5, 1716 at Fort George, Hunter asked that the garrisons of the colony's forts be strengthened against the activities of the "Enemies" or French. On the Seventeenth Assembly's final meeting date, September 1, 1716, Hunter assented to seven acts, one of which provided for the fortifying of Albany. Another act which Hunter assented to provided for an agent to represent the colony in London since the act passed last year had run out.<sup>85</sup>

Secretary Popple had written to Hunter in mid-April asking the governor to appoint an agent to represent the colony's affairs. Hunter was told by Popple that any private acts referred either to Attorney-General or Solicitor-General would not be processed by these men

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<sup>84</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, July 25, 1715, Ibid., p. 419. Said Hunter of Morris, "...And he having by his labours and industry in the Assemblies, deserved well of the Government and to that it is in a great measure we owe our present settlement."; Lodwick to Board of Trade, London, August 23, 1715, Ibid., pp. 422-423.

<sup>85</sup>Entry of June 5, 1716, Council Journal, I, p. 397. Hunter's reference to "enemies" meant the French with whom the English had recently signed peace treaties with. He referred to "The vast preparations in France for Settlements behind you along ye Mesapi...."; Donomi, p. 302; Entry of September 1, 1716, Assembly Journal, I, p. 390.

unless their fees were paid and an agent was there to press the issue to completion. This letter convinced both Hunter and the Assembly. The Assembly passed an act to create an agency in London which Hunter assented to on the last day of the second session. Popple also advised Hunter to procure legislation involving the vacating of lands in the colony; however, this legislation would not be easy to obtain.<sup>86</sup>

Unaware of the conditions under which Hunter obtained his long-term support for the government in 1715, the Board of Trade sought to help Hunter solve the problems of scarce public lands in the colony by suggesting that perhaps the frontiers might be extended if a fort were built near the Great Lakes and people were induced to settle in the area. To accomplish this, the Board of Trade naively reminded Hunter of the action taken by Bellomont in breaking the extravagant grants and wondered if he might not do the same by getting the Assembly to pass similar legislation. Hunter did not try to do this and in October, while commenting about the sparse population of the colony, he still reported to the Board of Trade that the extravagant grants held by lone individuals continued to be the stumbling blocks to increasing New York's population. Over two-

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<sup>86</sup>Popple to Hunter, Whitehall, April 16, 1716, CSP Col. XXIX, #121 also found in NY Col Doc., V, pp. 472-473; Entry of September 1, 1716, Assembly Journal, I, p. 390.

hundred and twenty years later, the historian Walter Allen Knittel laid the blame for the continuation of the land problem at Hunter's feet, citing the granting of the Schoharie patent to the Seven Partners. After six years of governing the colony, five years of which had been spent battling the landed interests and merchants for a reasonable support, Hunter was weary. Problems with Samuel Mulford added to the governor's weariness.<sup>87</sup>

While carrying the responsibility for managing the Crown's colony of New York, Hunter had to endure the slanderous accusations of Samuel Mulford. This troublemaker had written a petition to the Crown on behalf of himself and the whale-fishermen of New York, in which he protested the 1711 enforcement of laws forbidding the catching of these mammals. On August 21, the General Assembly asked Hunter to dismiss the suit pending in the Supreme Court against Mulford, citing his age and the distance of habitation from New York of the old rebel as sufficient reasons for doing this. Despite his ill-health, the death of his wife during the summer and the need to deal once more with the unpredictable Mulford, the governor agreed that if Mulford threw himself on Hunter's mercy it would be granted. This was a clever move on

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<sup>87</sup>Board of Trade to Hunter, Whitehall, March 15, 1716, CSP Col., XXIX, #96 also found in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 470-472; Knittel, p. 212.

Hunter's part for it showed that he knew his man well. A strong proponent of independence and liberty, the old Suffolkman refused to demean himself in this manner. Subsequently, Mulford was found guilty by the Supreme Court of "...publishing a false scandalous and malicious libel..." against the government and he fled to London. Although Mulford was gotten rid of, others spread stories about the governor speculating on the good life he led.<sup>88</sup>

During 1716, Hunter had applied for leave to return to England to mend his health and attend to his personal affairs. Permission for this leave was granted by the Crown on October 10, 1716. However, the governor stayed on for three more years defending the legislation he had obtained from the Assembly. During this time period, news of the governor's permission to return home was "leaked" by his Council and this information was communicated to Charles Delafaye by John and Francis Riggs in a letter

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<sup>88</sup> Petition of Samuel Mulford, et al, to Crown, N.P., N.D. [1716?], NY Col Doc., V, pp. 474-475. In this petition, Mulford asked for a stay to the prosecution of his failing to buy a fishing license. Until Clarendon arrived in New York in 1696, no such license fee existed; Entry of August 21, 1716, Council Journal, I, p. 401; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, October 2, 1716, CSP Col., XXIX, #348; Entry of August 18, 1716, Assembly Journal, I, p. 387. The Assembly sat between the 5th and 30th of June without mention of Hunter's wife's death and the Assembly met again on August 7th. It is probable that she died in the summer of 1716 but whether she had gone to America with Hunter is unclear; Entry of August 21, 1716, Council Journal, I, p. 406; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, October 2, 1716, CSP Col., XXIX, #348 and Samuel Mulford's Speech to New York Assembly, New York, April 2, 1714, Ibid., #348i.

dated November 26, 1716. John Riggs was a friend of General Francis Nicholson, the former Lieutenant-Governor of New York, who was an opponent of Hunter's. According to the Riggs's, Hunter's leave-of absence was effective in the spring when the governor would return to England to "...secure himself, in ye Government, of mony can do itt, for he has too sweet a post heare, to part with...." The brothers Riggs described the New York government as "...an esaye, happy Government, and at noe greatt charge to him, he has a noble house in ye Fort, with fine gardins round itt, twoo of the fore compenies all wayes posted heare...." Delafaye was urged to try and get this post since as the Riggs brothers computed it, the governor earned about £9010 per year. Had Hunter read this letter describing the paradise he lived in and speculating on the fabulous sum of money he was supposed to have been making he would have laughed the writers to scorn. Even if all that had been written by the Riggs was true it would not have made Hunter's remaining years in New York any less difficult.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Secretary Metheun to Hunter, Whitehall, October 10, 1716, Ibid., #353 and Warrant of King George I, Hampton Court, October 9, 1716, Ibid., #383i. Hunter was allowed eight months leave due to his ill-health and personal affairs; John and Francis Riggs to [Charles Delafaye?] New York, November 26, 1716, Ibid., #405 and John and Francis Riggs to Charles Delafaye, New York, October 10, 1716, Ibid., 405i. Delafaye was at one time Lord Lietuenant-Governor of Ireland.

The next three years were almost as trying to Hunter as were the first six. Although he had obtained the much needed long-term support for the government, Hunter's efforts were being scrutinized by the Board of Trade which reviewed the laws passed by the Assembly and made comments on those laws. Along with the scrutiny, review and commentary from the Board of Trade, Hunter faced attacks aimed at the legislation passed in New York by Mulford and London Merchants. Defending himself laid claim to much of his time and energy.

Acts passed in the colonies were reviewed by the Board of Trade to determine if they conformed to the laws of England, particularly the Navigation Acts. On October 11, 1717, the Board of Trade drafted a circular letter to governors of all plantations, in which they were forbidden to draft or pass any acts which would affect the trade and shipping of the colonies in an adverse manner. This instruction, dated September 27, 1717, informed each governor that they were "...Required not to pass any Law of Extraordinary or unusual Nature and Importance whereby our prerogative or the property of our Subjects may be precluded without having either first transmitted unto us the Draught of such a Bill or Bills, and our having signified our Royal pleasure thereupon...." Further, the governors were not to pass any act which would affect the "...Trade or Shipping" of the kingdom without "...a clause expressly Declaring that the said act shall not be in force

until it be approved and confirmed by us..." Hunter communicated this instruction to his Council on July 1, 1718 and to his Assembly on July 3, 1718.<sup>90</sup>

More than four months before Hunter informed his Council and Assembly of this latest instruction, the governor was aware of its existence. In February, 1718, the Board of Trade had written to him expressing their dissatisfaction with the Revenue Act. The Revenue Act was an important part of the Support Act. Its disallowance would have been disastrous to Hunter. However, the Board of Trade informed Hunter that it would not as yet ask for its disallowance but would allow him time to get the act passed anew. At the beginning of the sixth session of the Seventeenth Assembly, September 24, 1718, Hunter communicated this information to his law makers at a joint session of the legislature. He made no explanation concerning his delay in advising both the Council and Assembly about the Board of Trade's dissatisfaction over the Revenue Act. It is not unlikely that ill-health and pre-occupation with other affairs of the Colony as well as those of New Jersey may

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<sup>90</sup>Circular Letter of Board of Trade to Governors of Plantations, Whitehall, October 11, 1717, ibid., #142 and Entry of July 1, 1718, Council Journal, I, pp. 428-429; Entry of July 3, 1718, Assembly Journal, I, p. 419.

<sup>91</sup>Board of Trade to Hunter, Whitehall, February 25, 1718, OP Col., III, #402; Entry of September 24, 1718, Assembly Journal, I, p. 420.



have kept Hunter from bringing this matter up before he did. Once he had advised the legislators of the problem, their answer was not long in forthcoming.<sup>91</sup>

Framed by the Assembly, the reply to the Board of Trade's objections over the Support Act centered around two points. The Duty under examination in the Support Act was the one which was levied on ships trading in or out of New York. Specifically, this duty was one which was placed on British ships. According to the Tonnage Duty portion of the Supply Act, only ships and other vessels built in New York or totally owned by New Yorkers were exempt from the tax of seven and half penny-weight of plate on each ton of cargo. On October 9, the Assembly spoke for the entire legislature in its reply to the Board of Trade's objections. They informed the Board that the duty collected in the past two years only amounted to £200, hardly enough to harm British trade. Moreover, the Assembly of the province had passed a Duty on Tonnage act in 1709 which was paid without any objection. The most important reply and most valid was, "That the Instruction their Lordships mention, was not communicated till long after the Act they object against, was passed." One other portion of the reply also mentioned that Virginia and other colonies levied a similar

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<sup>91</sup>Board of Trade to Hunter, Whitehall, February 25, 1718, CSP Col., XXX, #402; Entry of September 24, 1718, Assembly Journal, I, p. 420.

duty on British shipping. The other Duty which was not approved by the Board of Trade concerned the Duty on Negroes.<sup>92</sup>

Negroes imported into New York were to have a duty of five ounces of plate levied on them, if they came directly from Africa and in ships owned by New Yorkers. Negroes imported from the West Indies (with no qualification about vessel registry) were to have a duty of twelve and a half ounces of plate levied upon them. In their reply, the Assembly agreed to change the act, but they would still reserve the right to differentiate between ships built in the colony and those built elsewhere. Aside from this, the Assembly explained, they had passed this law primarily to stop other colonies from dumping their aged and ill Negroes in New York.<sup>93</sup>

A few days later, Hunter wrote to the Secretary of the Board of Trade, Mr. Popple, and informed him that the Assembly had passed an act which remedied the defective clauses in the Support Acts. Despite legislation by the Assembly to bring the Support Act into conformity with the desires of the Board of Trade, as late as July 1719 the Treasury in London questioned the entire support Act, not from a financial point of view, but from a political one.

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<sup>92</sup>Entry of October 9, 1718, Ibid., pp. 421-425 also see entry of October 9, 1718, Council Journal, I, pp. 433-436.

<sup>93</sup>Entry of October 9, 1718, Assembly Journal, I, pp. 421-425.

Secretary Stanhope complained to the Board of Trade that it appeared that the Crown officials in the colony had been by-passed and the popular government had assumed more power than it had a right to. Even after Hunter had returned to England, he was required at one meeting to discuss the settlement of the Revenue of 1715 with the Board of Trade.<sup>94</sup>

Another act which caused problems for Hunter was passed in late 1717 for the payment of the remaining public debts. It was intended to include individuals not previously paid during the enactment of the original bill in 1714. Prior to the passage of this act, the New York Grand Jury addressed Hunter asking him not to pass this proposed legislation on the grounds that the Assembly intended to fund the act by issuing bills of credit which would endanger the economy of the colony. Some of the signers of this petition were Stephen De Lancey, Philip Van Cortlandt, William Smith, Phillip Schuyler and Henry Cuyler among the others. After this act was passed, English merchants sought to have it disallowed basing their arguments on the petition of the New York Grand Jury for supporting evidence. In their memorial to the Board of

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<sup>94</sup>Hunter to Popple, New York, October 13, 1718, CSP Col., XXX, # 718 also found in NY Col.Doc., V, p. 518; Secretary Stanhope to Board of Trade, Treasury Chambers, July 2, 1719, Ibid., pp. 527-528; Minutes of meeting between Hunter and Board of Trade, Whitehall, July 20, 1720, Ibid., pp. 551-552

Trade, the merchants gave a number of reasons why the act should be disallowed. They insisted that some of the claims were the same ones which had been disallowed by the Commissioners five years ago. Worse, if all the claims were allowed, fully one-third of the money would go to government officials. According to the merchants, passage of this act would allow corruption, would endanger the Excise by its unlimited use, would diminish the value of the credit and force merchants to accept less actual money for their goods. Other objections were made by the merchants in this petition to the Board of Trade. The multiplicity of paper money would make silver or gold scarce, thus making it harder to use the precious metals for payment of bills. Further, goods would cost ten per-cent more if silver or gold were used. Not all the paper money expected to be printed was allocated for instant use, but was to be stored for future use which violated the title of the act itself. Even as the merchants were bringing their arguments to the Board of Trade, Hunter sought to have them hear his side of the story.<sup>95</sup>

On May 3, Hunter wrote to the Board of Trade informing them about the worthiness of the claimants and their

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<sup>95</sup>Hunter to Popple, New York, December 3, 1717, CSP Col., XXX, # 236 also NY Col Doc., V, pp. 494-495; Representation of the Grand Jury of City and County of New York to Hunter, N.P., November 29, 1717, CSP Col., XXX, # 516i; Merchants to Board of Trade, N.P., May 2, 1718, Ibid., # 516.

claims. He also reminded the Board of the difficulty in trying to make the Assembly pass any other act opposed to the payment of the debt. On the same day, the governor informed his agent in London, Ambrose Philips, that any mention of money due to him in this latest bill to pay the public debts was actually to reimburse him for either extraordinary or incidental expenses for which no money had been subsequently appropriated. He warned Philips that "These bills, however, are new current all over these Provinces; and without a general ruin cannot be damned." Again, in July, Hunter warned Secretary Popple that if this bill were disallowed, it would become very difficult to obtain funds again to pay for the public debts. Hunter advised the Board of Trade in August that a merchant in London, "...one Baker a merchant there has had a sum of money remitted him from hence to enable him to oppose some or all our money bills at home. If we guesse at his employers by his correspondents they are the same persons who have dureing all my time strenuously opposed all publick settlement and support of Government, and if I had not had the good luck to have them left out in the last elections for City members there never had been any settlement, and I am afraid if ever they get themselves chosen again there will be no further." Baker was acting as an agent for Stephen De Lancey and a number of New York merchants. The men whom Hunter was referring to were Stephen De Lancey (re-elected to the Seventeenth Assembly),

Jacobus Van Cortlandt, Lawrence Reade and Samuel Bayard.

Hunter also wrote to Philips on the same day informing him of the funds sent to Baker. In that letter to Philips, he also admitted that he would soon have to return to England since he could not answer the objections to the new bill for settling the remaining debts and he could not instruct any one to do so for him. Having listened to both sides concerning the bill, the Board of Trade prepared to make their recommendations on the act.<sup>96</sup>

Seeking an opinion on the act to pay the remaining debts and an opinion concerning the merchant's objections to that act, the Board of Trade requested Richard West to examine the matter and advise them upon it. West sent them his findings on August 20, 1718 in which he disagreed with all objections to the bill except the one which claimed that the manner in which the debts would be paid would be detrimental to the trade of England. However, he was forced to conclude that Governor Hunter was correct in believing that disallowance of the bill would shatter the economy of the colony since the bills of credit were not current. Having been apprised of the opinion of Mr. West, the Board turned the matter over to the Lords Justices on June 4, 1719.

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<sup>96</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, N.P. May 3, 1718, Ibid., #518; Hunter to Philips, New York, May 3, 1718, Ibid., #519; Hunter to Popple, New York, July 7, 1718, Ibid., #602; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, August 7, 1718, Ibid., #650 also found in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 514-515; Hunter to Philips, New York, August 15, 1718, Ibid., p. 516.

After discussing the ramifications of the act, they had to recommend its affirmation out of expediency. They further agreed that if the act were disallowed the colony would be plunged into ruin or at least be placed at a serious trade disadvantage. Hunter's efforts met with success when the Board of Trade's approval of the act persuaded King George I to assent to the act on May 19, 1720. The governor's success in having this legislation retained by the Crown not only signaled his good fortune at keeping New York's government operating successfully, but it also indicated a triumph against his enemies in the colony. Of particular significance here is that the act was allowed by the Crown, after a three year examination, on the grounds of simple expediency. The Crown simply was faced with a choice of either passing the act or seeing the colony ruined. The fact that colonial politics were of secondary importance in England worked to Hunter's advantage. Despite this victory however, the governor had to face Samuel Mulford's charges of improper behavior and arbitrary rule.<sup>97</sup>

After his flight to England in 1716, Mulford continued his protests against having to buy a whale-fishing license and having had his business seized. He stated this

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<sup>97</sup>Mr. West to Board of Trade, N.P., August 20, 1718, CSP Col., XXX, # 663; Board of Trade to Lords Justices, Whitehall, June 5, 1719, Ibid., XXXI, # 218 also found in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 522-526; Order in Council, St. James, May 19, 1720, Ibid., pp. 539-540.

in a letter to the Board of Trade reiterating his belief about the freedom of whale-fishing in New York's waters. George Bampfieid, Hunter's personal agent during 1717, became aware of Mulford's papers to the Board of Trade and he requested them for Hunter's examination and reply. After having been advised by Hunter concerning Mulford's activities, the General Assembly composed an address to the Governor in which they repudiated Mulford's actions. In this address, dated October 4, 1717, the Assembly denied that taxes were arbitrarily imposed on the people, but were instead imposed by the Assembly with the consent of the people. Mulford had been prosecuted for making and publishing speeches which libelled the government of New York. In the eyes of the Assembly, Mulford was more loyal to Connecticut than New York and he did everything possible to block the settlement of a revenue there. In an effort to destroy Mulford's credibility, the Assembly emphasized his changeable values when they advised the governor that "Tis a little odd in a Memorialist who talks so warmly for liberty and property and represents the province to be miserably distress'd, if not vassal'd, by the raising of £30,000 for a Canada Expedition, £27,000 for the paying of their debts and about £4000 a year to support the Government, to propose and Expedition against the Indians at ye expence of half our personal estates at once for the pious purpose of cutting their throats and possessing their lands...." Although the evidence here has been inconclusive, it appears that the



Assembly rushed to Hunter's defence from motives connected to their own self-preservation. Mulford's charges of alleged tyranny in the New York government were circulated around the colony and the strong statements which they contained about supposed white intentions to steal Indian lands were grist for the French propaganda mills. In the hands of the French activists on the Canadian-New York border, these statements would have probably resulted in a disruption of the profitable Indian fur trade at the very least and most likely, a terrifying war with the Five Nations at the worse. In any event, this address was forwarded to the Board of Trade by the provincial agent, Mr. Ambrose Philips and it was read by the Board on February 12, 1719. In late November, 1717, Hunter informed Secretary Popple that Mulford had now sent blank petitions around the colony seeking signatures for them.<sup>98</sup>

Aware that the situation concerning Mulford and his accusations was getting serious, Hunter sent a long letter dated January 20, 1718, to the Board of Trade in which he gave his version of the affair. He reiterated his belief

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<sup>98</sup>Mulford to Board of Trade, N.P., July 31, 1717, CSP Col., XXIX, #686; George Bampfieid to Mr Popple, London, August 15, 1717, Ibid., XXX, #14; Address of New York Assembly to Hunter, New York, October 4, 1717, Ibid., #126; Extract from entry of September 13, 1717, Assembly Journal, I, p. 401; Hunter to Popple, New York, November 22, 1717, CSP Col., XXX, #223 also found in NY Col Doc., V, pp. 493-494.

<sup>99</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, January 20, 1718, CSP Col., XXX, #317 also found in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 497-500.

that by custom he was authorized to license whale-fishery. Others paid for their licenses, but only Mulford disputed the matter. The situation had been tried in a court of law which had found Mr. Mulford guilty and this same Mr. Mulford had not even bothered to file an appeal. With this summation of the Mulford affair, Hunter hoped that it would be quietly settled. Unfortunately, the governor was to be disappointed.<sup>99</sup>

Hunter must have been dismayed when he received a letter from the Board of Trade dated February 25, 1718 which notified him that they did not find any clause in his Commission recognizing whale-fishery as a right reserved to him for granting. Therefore, he was to reply to Mulford's petition with an explanation of the affair and a statement of fees derived from the sale of these licenses. On June 3, 1718, Hunter informed the Board of Trade that he believed that they had not received his latest answer on the matter yet (this would be his letter of January 20th). He did not know what more he could tell them now; if they did not believe what he had told them up to now, they were not likely to believe anything he would say at this point. Writing on July 7, 1718, the governor advised the Board of Trade that they were wrong about whale-fishery not being a perquisite of the New York government and he quoted from

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<sup>99</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, January 20, 1718, CSP Col., XXX, #317 also found in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 497-500.

his Commission for their benefit. Although the perquisite was not profitable, Hunter refused to surrender on this point to Mulford since he did not want to be accused of yielding a more important prerogative four years earlier by allowing the Treasurer to disburse the colony's funds. Rather than indicating inconsistency on the part of Hunter, contrasting of the two events shows that the governor was an intelligent practical man who would concede a point if it brought him a substantial return. In any event, after all the concern caused by Mulford's activities, this matter subsequently died out.<sup>100</sup>

During the last years of Hunter's reign, he rewarded an old ally and assisted a young friend. These men were Robert Livingston Sr., and Cadwallader Colden. Livingston had notified the Assembly on May 10, 1717 that he would now represent Livingston Manor; accordingly, he was seated on May 11. Later in the month, legislation was passed annexing Livingston Manor into Albany County and Hunter gave his assent to it on May 27, 1717. Annexation of the Manor into Albany County added to the senior Livingston's political power and prestige while at the same time it gave him greater political "availability". That "availability" was utilized

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<sup>100</sup>Board of Trade to Hunter, Whitehall, February 25, 1718, CSP Col., XXX, #402 also found in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 500-502; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, June 3, 1718, CSP Col., XXX, #554 also found in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 505-506; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, July 7, 1718, CSP Col., XXX, #600 also found in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 507-511.

when William Nicoll pleaded ill-health in stepping down from the speakership of the Assembly. Hunter was pleased to assent, on May 27, 1718, to the election of the elder Livingston to the speakership. Livingston served for the next seven years in that position.<sup>101</sup>

Cadwallader Colden had gone to New York on a visit during which he met Governor Hunter in 1718. The two men became friends and two weeks after Colden returned to Philadelphia, Hunter wrote to him offering a job which Colden accepted. Two years later, after Hunter had returned to England, he used his influence to have Colden appointed Surveyor-General in place of the late Augustine Graham. Through Hunter's assistance, Colden was started on a long career in colonial politics.<sup>102</sup>

Just as one young man's career in politics was just beginning in New York, another man's political tenure was approaching an end. Secretary Metheun had notified

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<sup>101</sup>Entry of May 10, 1717, Assembly Journal, I, p. 395; Bonomi, p. 302; Entry of May 27, 1717, Assembly Journal, I, p. 398; Entry of May 21, 1718, Ibid., p. 413. William Nicoll wrote the Assembly pleading ill health as his reason for being allowed to resign as Speaker; Entry of May 27, 1718, Ibid., pp. 413-414.

<sup>102</sup>Cadwallader Colden to Peter Kalm, N.P., N.D., /1751/, Collection of the New York Historical Society for the Year 1917. The John Watts De Peyster Publication Fund Series. (36 Vols. New York: Printed for the Society, 1868-19--), IV, pp. 258-261. Hereafter cited as NY HS Coll.; Secretary Craggs to Hunter, Whitehall, February 2, 1720, CSP Col., XXXI, # 538.

Hunter, in a letter dated October 10, 1716, that the King had approved his request for leave. Although that leave was granted, the governor still remained in New York, engaged in answering the charges hurled by Mulford and defending legislation which was pending disallowance. During this time, rumors of Hunter's replacement were being circulated often with little or no basis in fact. These rumors were effectively squelched when Secretary Addison informed the Board of Trade in late August 1717 that the King was pleased with Hunter's performance and the Board was to notify the governor of this. On September 4, 1717, Addison's message to the Board of Trade was relayed to the governor along with a covering letter by the Board itself. The Board officially notified Hunter that he was not going to be replaced and that he was to publish this fact to dispel any rumors. Hunter may have been pleased to receive this news but it still did not change the fact that he had requested a much needed leave.<sup>103</sup>

During 1718, the situation caused by Mulford's campaign against Hunter's government had reached a point where the governor sorely needed a rest. He told this to Secretary Pople in a letter written in early June. The

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<sup>103</sup>Secretary Metheun to Hunter, Whitehall, October 10, 1716, Ibid., XXIX, # 353; Secretary Addison to Board of Trade, Whitehall, August 22, 1717, Ibid., XXX, # 22; Board of Trade to Hunter, Whitehall, September 4, 1717, Ibid., # 69.

only reason he had not sailed immediately was that he was awaiting a ship-of-war since pirates were active on the coast. In April, Hunter addressed a joint session of the legislature in which he called their attention to his poor health; obviously, he was preparing them for his impending departure. While discussing the last assembly held in New Jersey, Hunter confided his desire to return home in a letter sent in May to Popple. He had spent the entire session bed-ridden and even now was only partly recovered. The spa at Aix-la-Chappelle, he believed, was his only hope for recovery. Hunter indicated another reason that influenced him to return. New York's Assembly was now in session, having met about the revenue which was to expire next year. His fear was that the Assembly would only continue the next support for a short time despite any devices or subterfuges he might resort to. Certainly he did not desire a repetition of the difficult time he underwent in obtaining the present long-term support for the government. As he feared, on June 24, one day before the session ended, Hunter gave his assent to a one year supply for the government. He delivered another address repeating his excuse of ill-health and adding the excuse of personal reasons as his reasons for returning to England. Obviously, the knowledge of his return to England (perhaps never to come back to New York) finished any possibility of the Assembly voting another long-term support for the government. The merchants had put up a

good battle in England against the revenue act, and although they were unsuccessful, their effort caused Hunter a problem. Hunter's absence and possible replacement posed possibilities for them to enjoy success in making future changes in the support act which would make the future governor dependent upon the good graces of the Assembly. However, in his speech Hunter conveyed his satisfaction concerning the state of affairs in the colony. Immediately prior to his sailing, he addressed the Assembly of New York on July 2, 1719, conveying his desire to return to New York if the Crown should allow it, but if not, he would act to always "...promote the interest and welfare of this country...." In it's reply the Assembly judged that Hunter had "...governed well, and wisely, like a prudent magistrate, like an affectionate parent...." Somewhere around July 10, 1719, Hunter sailed for England.<sup>104</sup>

His ship arrived at Hamoose near Plymouth on or about September 24, 1719 but contrary winds interfered with his speedy return to London. He must have been quite ill, for he remarked that "Untill we came within 100 leagues of

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<sup>104</sup>Hunter to Popple, New York, June 3, 1718, Ibid., #553, also found in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 504-505; Entry of April 28, 1719, Assembly Journal, I, pp. 427-428; Hunter to Popple, New York, May 18, 1719, CSP Col., XXXI, # 192 also found in NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 521-522; Entry of June 24, 1719, Assembly Journal, I, p. 437; Address from Hunter to New York Assembly, N.P., July 2, 1719, CSP Col., XXXI, 286i; Address from Assembly to Hunter, N.P., July 2, 1719, Ibid., # 286i.

land I could not stir off my bed..." He sought to get to the baths at Aix as soon as possible to make a complete recovery. On November 19, Hunter wrote to Popple explaining that he was as yet ill, taking "...a most violent medecine..." and as soon as he could get rid of his "intolerable pain" he would confer with him. Ten days later, Hunter wrote to another member of the Board of Trade, Paul Doeminique, concerning his comments on two New York Assemblymen who were being mentioned as possible Councillors. These men, Samuel Bayard and Jacobus Van Cortlandt were described by Hunter as having "...been the principal instruments in all ye trouble I met with on that side and will never change their nature..." He would add more, he said, when he would be able to attend the Board. As a politician, Hunter was not wasting time in failing to keep up with his political homework.<sup>105</sup>

Letters from New York to Hunter informed him that the President of Council, Peter Schuyler, was making changes in the government of the colony. With Hunter absent, the merchants of the colony were bent on assuming political control there and in the Assembly. Eager to stop this movement, Hunter sent a memorial dated December 22, 1719 to the

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<sup>105</sup>Hunter to Popple, Hamoose near Plimouth, October 4, 1719, Ibid., #405 also found in NY Col. Doc., V, p. 531; Hunter to Popple, London, November 19, 1719, CSP Col., XXXI, #456; Hunter to Paul Doeminique, N.P., November 29, 1719, Ibid., #467.



Board of Trade, informing the Board of Schuyler's activities and expressing his fear that Schuyler was seriously attempting to dissolve the present Assembly. He asked that Schuyler be advised by the Crown not to make any further changes in the government apart from those dictated by extreme necessity. On the next day, the Board sent this memorial along with their recommendations for its implementation to the King. Secretary Craggs conveyed the Crown's express commands that no alterations be made to the government of the colony and that the Assembly not be dissolved, in a letter dated December 26, 1719. Hunter's governorship in absentia ended with the appointment of William Burnett to become governor of New York and New Jersey dated April 19, 1720.<sup>106</sup>

During the nine years Hunter had spent in New York, he had obtained sorely needed legislation and justified it to the Crown. His enemies were found on both sides of the Atlantic. Those who opposed him in New York either did so as members of an interest group such as De Lancey, Van Cortlandt and Bayard or as members of a sectional group such

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<sup>106</sup>Memorial from Hunter to Board of Trade, London, December 22, 1719, Ibid., #488 also found in NY Col. Doc., V, p. 534; Board of Trade to Secretary Craggs, Whitehall, December 23, 1719, Ibid., p. 535; Secretary Craggs to President of Council, Peter Schuyler, Whitehall, December 26, 1719, CSP Col., XXXI, #496; Secretary Craggs to Board of Trade, Whitehall, April 19, 1720, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 536-537.

as Mulford from Suffolk. There is no evidence of a split along Leislerian or anti-Leislerian lines in being for or against Hunter's interest. Opponents of Hunter who were in England were aided by and gave assistance to his enemies in New York. However, Hunter persevered in New York and was successful because of support he received from the Board of Trade. Although the Board was composed of political appointees, they placed the good of the colony above any other considerations and supported Hunter at crucial times. With the death of the Leislerian struggle, support from the Board of Trade, crucial assistance from Lewis Morris's interest in the Assembly and his own considerable skill, Robert Hunter was an effective administrator. If there was one area where Hunter appeared to be less than successful in both carrying out his assignment and retaining the allegiance of the people he governed, it was in his relations with an unfortunate people which he brought with him to New York. The Palatine German emigrants provided Hunter with one more headache during his tenure in office.

Having become a sea-power, England was concerned that difficulties be encountered in obtaining naval stores such as tar, pitch, resin, hemp, masts, other ships timbers of all kinds and even certain types of ships iron. Around 1689, the principal producer of these items, Sweden, embarked on a campaign to eliminate the Dutch as the leading carrier of maritime cargoes. In retaliation, the Dutch

## CHAPTER IV

## HUNTER AND THE PALATINES

Prompted by an urgent need to locate its own uninterrupted sources of material with which to maintain a powerful navy and merchant fleet, the English government conceived a scheme to employ about twenty-five hundred German refugees to that end in New York. Through political influence, Robert Hunter was chosen to put this scheme into effect. Unfortunately, this venture proved unsuccessful to the Crown and turned into a financial disaster for Hunter. For the Palatines who sought a land in which they could live in peace the end result provided precious little peace and brought them to dislike the man who had led them to America. Yet, in his unsuccessful attempts to enforce the Palatine's compliance with the contract they had signed, Hunter continued to perform his duty as a faithful government servant.

Having become a sea-power, England was concerned lest difficulties be encountered in obtaining naval stores such as tar, pitch, resin, hemp, masts, other ships timbers of all kinds and even certain types of ships iron. Around 1689, the principal producer of these items, Sweden, embarked on a campaign to eliminate the Dutch as the leading carrier of maritime cargoes. In retaliation, the Dutch

encouraged manufacture of naval stores in both Norway and Muscovy. The Swedes benefitted however, when the Northern War (1700-21) broke out between Finland and Russia. Finland was invaded by Russia on numerous occasions and Finland contained the best and largest quantities of raw materials for the production of naval stores. With both producers of this valuable material warring against each other, only Sweden was able to manufacture this important commodity in any great quantity. After 1701, the English merchants had difficulty in obtaining naval stores in the amounts required by the Royal Navy, paying the Swedish manufacturers an exorbitant price for them. Concern was felt in England lest the kingdom would be prevented from maintaining a strong merchant fleet because of a lack of tar, resins, masts and other materials used in ship building. This concern felt by the Crown prompted consideration of using its colonial properties to provide the ships stores.<sup>107</sup>

As early as 1687, interest grew in utilizing the colonies to provide England's naval supplies. This interest was heightened by the August, 1693 report from Benjamin Fletcher, then governor of New York, which informed the Crown that tar had been produced in that colony for £12 per last (equal to 12 barrels). Since the Navy Board was used

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<sup>107</sup>Knittel, pp. 111-113. Knittel wrote of the Palatines from an economic viewpoint which painted a less than laudatory picture of Hunter. Knittel's work is none-the-less a masterpiece.

to obtaining tar for £11, 12 s, 6 d per last, they rejected the idea at the time. In late January, 1694, the Privy Council asked for bids on the importation of naval stores from the colonies, but nothing came of the request. In 1696, the Navy Board sent John Bridger, William Partridge and Benjamin Jackson to investigate the possibility of manufacturing naval stores and to instruct the colonists in this project. Of the three men, Bridger was the best qualified.<sup>108</sup>

Bridger convinced Governor Bellomont that naval stores could be manufactured in New York. Bellomont then made an impressive presentation to the Board of Trade which in turn approached the Privy Council about the feasibility of the project in October, 1700. Samples of the material produced in New York were sent to England by Bridger and were certified as being acceptable by the naval inspectors. During 1703, proposals by various entrepreneurs for the production of naval stores were studied by the Board of Trade, but an important impediment to allowing them a contract was their insistence on a monopoly with governmental financing of the project, for which they could give no guarantees in return. Instead of accepting this situation, in 1704, the Board agreed to pay a bounty on naval stores produced in America. Bridger was appointed Surveyor of Woods in the colonies in 1704 and in the following years,

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<sup>108</sup>Ibid., pp. 115-117.

he sent back reports that New York had sufficient pines to provide Great Britain with pitch and tar. By 1709, a favorable situation had been created for the employment of the Palatines.<sup>109</sup>

The implementation of the plan to produce naval stores required people. William Partridge, one of the Navy Board's agents sent along with James Bridger to investigate possible production of ship timber in the colonies, advised the Naval Board of the scarcity of labor in the colonies and of the high labor wages. Concurring with Benjamin Jackson, Partridge recommended that poor families be sent to settle in the colonies and produce naval stores. This recommendation that poor people be shipped to the colonies for employment in such an enterprise was not lost on Crown officials. The Palatines became the unlucky people chosen by fate to participate in London's grand design.<sup>110</sup>

Natives of an area along the Rhine River and its tributaries, the Main and Neckar, the Palatines lived as far north as the junction of the Moselle and Rhine and were found as far south as Basle, Switzerland. They came from Bayreuth in the west and Zwiebrucken in the east with the districts of the Palatinate itself, Darmstadt, Hanau, Franconia, Nuremburg, Wurzburg, Mayence, Treves, Spires and Worms included in the area. Estimated at numbers between

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<sup>109</sup>Ibid., pp. 118, 122-123.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., pp. 117-118.

two thousand and thirty-two thousand, the Palatines left these areas during much of 1709 for a combination of many reasons such as: The devastation of the Hundred Years War, the levying of oppressive taxes, the ravages of an extremely severe winter, the heat of religious quarrels, the desire to own land or participate in adventure, the spread of effective propaganda by colonial proprietors, and the encouragement with assistance from the British government. These immigrants, motivated by any or all of the aforementioned reasons, made their long journey which was to end in New York for about three thousand of them.<sup>111</sup>

Just after the severe winter eased in February, 1709, the first of the Palatines began the four to six week journey down the Rhine to Holland. Sympathetic countrymen provided them with food and money as they made their way down-river, perhaps themselves wishing they had the courage to make this journey. Upon their arrival at Rotterdam, the Palatines sought further assistance from the British. They were not disappointed.<sup>112</sup>

James Dayrolle, the British Resident at the Hague, had been approached in late December, 1708 by an un-named person who had apparent foreknowledge of the impending Palatine migration. This person's memorial was forwarded to London on Christmas Eve, 1708. Officially the English

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<sup>111</sup>Ibid., pp. 1-2, 31.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

government did not allow its representatives to give encouragement, money or passes to the emigrants from Germany. However, Dayrolle did not appear to be under any restrictions and in late March 1709, this zealous official began to grant passes to as many as one hundred families at a time. He was acting with the tacit approval of the Crown.<sup>113</sup>

Eager to channel as many of the Palatines into England as he could, Dayrolle sought aid from Marlborough. Dayrolle advised Secretary of State Boyle that he had "... acquainted the Duke of Marlborough with it, and his Grace is likewise informed of that poor people's circumstances wanting some assistance to get over, and he has promised to move Her Majesty in their behalf." Marlborough's influence was responsible for the Crown's official approval, which came on May 24, 1709 to assist the Palatines. With this assistance approximately 13,146 Palatines were sent to England although recent writers believe the number may have been closer to 13,500.<sup>114</sup>

Of more than 13,000 Palatines shipped to England during 1709, over 2,200 of them who were Roman Catholics were sent back in September of that year and in January, 1710 about 900 more Palatines returned of their own volition

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<sup>113</sup>Ibid., pp. 50-51.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid., pp. 51, 56, 65.



to Germany. In all, about 10,000 of these impoverished people were left in England and it was from their numbers that the New York bound Palatines were drawn.<sup>115</sup>

During their stay in England, the Palatines became a serious problem to the English for London was hard-put to accommodate the over ten thousand immigrants. They were encamped at Blackheath, Greenwich, and Camberwell, with others being lodged at Wapping, Nightingale Lane, or in quarters near the Tower, in barns and houses at Kensington, Walworth, Stockwell and Bristol Cansey. Even the large rope houses at Deptford were utilized. Their encampments drew attention to their poverty and provided a spectacle for the British people.<sup>116</sup>

Forced to beg for food and money, the Palatines vied with local beggars for whatever charity was doled out. A tight economic situation changed the mood of the English people toward them from one of curiosity to one of hostility. The labor rate for workers fell from 18 pence to 15 pence per day in areas where the Palatines were living. English shopkeepers disliked them, fearing that the Palatines might give them unlicensed competition. This general dislike led to attacks on Palatine camps in and around London. Before long, the newly arrived Germans returned the native Englishman's hostile feelings. Combined with

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<sup>115</sup>Ibid., p. 66.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid., pp. 66-67.

minimal opportunities for employment of the Palatines and their subsistence cost to the government, dislike of them became another serious problem for the Whig regime.<sup>117</sup>

The greatest number of Palatines who had left their homeland had been farmers and vine-dressers. The balance of them represented 35 other trades of which about 90 were carpenters while 75 were textile workers. Others included about 12 schoolmasters and 3 surgeons. Primarily being unskilled workers, the vast majority of the Palatines were dependent upon charity for their survival.<sup>118</sup>

Subsistence was provided for them by the government. By June 14, 1709 the Crown was paying out £80 daily to support them. During that same month the Ministry decided to ask for money by a public subscription. A board of commissioners was formed among the many dignitaries of the realm to administer this fund while the collection was made through the Anglican Church. About £20,000 was raised but the measure was considered a stop-gap. By August 6, 1709 the Lord Treasurer asked the Board of Trade to find a way to get rid of the Palatines in order to lessen the cost of their subsistence. A number of proposals were discussed that would send them either to Ireland, Carolina or New-York.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>117</sup>Ibid., pp. 70-72.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid., pp. 68-69, 74, 81.

Charles Montagu, Lord Halifax, recommended a plan that would put the Palatines to work producing Naval Stores. In this plan, persons would invest money at an allowance of 8% per year interest while the Palatines would invest their hard labor for a wage of 3 shillings a day per person. This 3 shillings per day was to pay for the Palatine's provisions with the remainder being remitted to the workers. All naval stores produced by them would be purchased by the Navy Board for the next seven years. Profits made by the project were to be split according to the number of shares held by the subscribers. On November 10, 1709 the Board of Trade decided that the Palatines were to be settled in New York.<sup>120</sup>

Accordingly, the President of the Council of New York, Peter Schuyler, was notified in a letter dated November 10, 1709 that 3,000 Palatines were being shipped to that colony within a month and that the cost of the settlement would be paid for in England. Sunderland, the First Minister, arrived at the scheme of settling the Palatines in New York to make naval stores from Montagu's idea and asked the newly appointed governor, Robert Hunter to introduce it to the Board of Trade on November 30. In that proposal, Hunter asked for four men to teach and supervise the Palatines in the art of making naval stores. He also requested all necessary equipment for them such as "...a

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<sup>120</sup>Ibid., pp. 124, 126-127.

requisite Number of Cauldrons and such other utensils..." that they would need to carry on their work. For temporary housing, Hunter believed, "...it was necessary that there be 600 tents at least sent along with them" and to protect them on the frontiers, "...it will be absolutely necessary they be armed with 600 Firelocks and Bayonetts at least...." Meeting with the Board again on December 1, Hunter informed them that he did not yet have the required estimates of the cost of the operation but he would obtain them as soon as possible. In his opinion, Mr. Bridger and those he could induce to join in the venture would be sufficient for instructing the Palatines. Since shipping charges were so high and ships had to make many calls to numerous ports for a full cargo on the return voyage, he believed that a store house and commissary were necessities. Hunter also requested the Board to decide on which basis the lands would be granted to the Palatines while they worked off their indebtedness to the Crown. After having heard Hunter's reports, the Board issued its opinion on this subject.<sup>121</sup>

Based on the reports received from Hunter, the Board of Trade issued its reply on December 5. They estimated that with 600 men employed in the project, 7,000

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., pp. 127-130; Col. Hunter to Board of Trade, London, November 30, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 112-113; Hunter to Board of Trade, London, December 1, 1709, Ibid., pp. 113-114.

Tuns (equal to 9,310 barrels) of naval stores could be produced per year. Since the Commissioners sent by the Navy Board in 1696 had reported that tar could be procured in New England at £5 per ton, the Board concluded that the government premium of £4 per ton would cover the freight charge. They recommended that Bridger be sent along with three or four men at £200 per year (colonial currency) as supervisors and instructors. A factor was to be appointed by the government to keep accounts in London and be paid the appropriate fees.<sup>122</sup>

Fearing that the Palatines might abandon the project or might flee to one of the neighboring proprietary colonies, Hunter suggested to the Board that it draw up a contract with which to bind the German immigrants to the project. On December 20, 1709, the Board received Sunderland's letter informing them of the Queen's desire to have such a contract drawn up by the Attorney-General. This contract became highly un-popular with the Palatines and served as a source of tension and misunderstanding between Hunter and the Palatines.<sup>123</sup>

Attorney-General Montague sent his version of the contract, "Convenants for the Palatines Residence and

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<sup>122</sup>Knittel, pp. 136-137.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid., p. 130; Sunderland to Board of Trade, Whitehall, December 19, 1709, CSP Col., XXIV, #915.

Employment in New York", dated December 21, 1709 to the Board of Trade's Mr. Popple. Palatines signing this instrument acknowledged "the great and Christian Charity of Her Majesty the Queen" who had "been graciously pleased to order and advance a Loan for us, & on our behalf of several considerable sums towards the transporting maintaining & settling of us" in New York to manufacture naval stores. Upon repayment of these loans from the produce of this venture, the governor would grant each Palatine 40 acres of land "free from all taxes, Quit Rents, or other manner of services for seven years, from the date of such grant." Each signatory promised not to absent himself or his family from the province without the governor's permission and they further promised to apply not only themselves, but their family in the production of pine tar until the full amount was paid back. One important element was missing from this contract: Its duration. Because no time limit was specified for this instrument, the Palatines were signed into voluntary serfdom.<sup>124</sup>

Along with contractual considerations, financial arrangements had to be concluded to set the venture into operation. The Queen's approval of the project was received by the Board of Trade on January 11, 1710 in a letter from

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<sup>124</sup>Attorney-General Montague to Popple, N.P. December 21, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 121-122; Knittel, pp. 140-142.

Sunderland. This royal approval was necessary to legitimize a number of preceeding financial expemitures which had been made. One month earlier, Hunter had urged Sunderland to obtain 600 tents and firearms for the Palatine's use. On December 12, 1709 Sunderland requested that Marlborough, the Master General of Ordnance, advise him of the cost of the weapons and tentage. Within a week, the Board of Ordnance complied with Sunderland's request, estimating their cost at £1479, 12s. When the actual value of all equipment issued for the Palatine's use was computed it amounted to £9348. In addition to the outlay for arms, tentage and other equipment, Hunter got the Lord Treasurer to send £8000 to New York for maintaining the Palatines after they arrived. Their transportation to New York was arranged by one Henry Bendysh, Secretary to the Commissioners for Collecting and Settling of the Palatines, who informed Lord Godolphin that he had contracted for the shipment of 3,300 at £5, 5s per person or about £19,000. Unfortunately, this cost of transportation was increased when 11s, 6d demurrage was charged for the period from January 2, 1710 to April 10. Although the refugees were loaded aboard ship between December 25-29, 1709 and the ships were ready on January 2, for some unexplained reason the convoy refused to sail until early April. Therefore, the cost of transporting the Palatines rose from the expected £19,000 to

£ 25,854 , 15 s , 8d. Moreover, the cost of the voyage was not only counted in pounds Sterling, but was also counted in lives.<sup>125</sup>

During the three month voyage, the Palatines were cramped aboard ship and subsisted on inadequate rations. These conditions contributed to the effectiveness of the typhus ("Palatine Fever") which claimed 446 of them, many of whom were children. The death-toll amounted to 16% of the 2814 travelers (or one in approximately six persons) and was off-set slightly by the thirty recorded births aboard ship.<sup>126</sup>

On June 13, 1710 the Lyon was first to arrive, followed on June 14 by several others, including Hunter's ship. The remaining vessels, separated from the convoy by foul weather, continued to straggle in as late as August 2nd. Although the Palatines must have been relieved to have their ordeal at sea end, it was not with open arms that the Germans were welcomed by the New Yorkers. At that time, New York City numbered around 4,846 freemen and about 970 slaves. An influx of approximately 2500 typhus-ridden foreigners posed a serious threat to the city and colony. For this reason, Nutten Island (now Governor's Island) was

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid., pp. 134, 142-144.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., p. 147



chosen as the isolated port of debarkation and refugee camp for the Palatines. Weakened by illness, these people were very slow to regain their health and a number of them died of typhus.<sup>127</sup>

During these first few weeks in New York, a number of children were orphaned. In order to provide for these children, the practice of apprenticing them began. Between the years 1710-14, seventy-four were known to have been apprenticed, among them being John Peter Zenger. Walter Allen Knittel, in his book Palatine Emigration, accused Hunter of having apprenticed-out children of living parents. This was one of the chief grievances in the Palatines' petition of 1720 and if true, this was one important reason that the Palatines formed an intense dislike of Hunter. Providing for the orphaned children was one step in taking care of the Germans. Hunter had still to provide a settlement site for the immigrant families which had come to produce naval stores.<sup>128</sup>

Shortly after his arrival, Hunter sent the Surveyor-General of the Woods, James Bridger, and a few men to examine the Schoharie Tract as a possible settlement place for the Palatines. However, since it was already owned by the Bayard family, had few pines and was a considerable distance from New York City, Hunter rejected it.

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p. 147-148.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., p. 148.

He spent time from late July to early October searching for suitable land on which to settle his "wards". In early October, Hunter advised the Board of Trade that he had bought "...a tract of land on Hudson's River from Mr. Liviston [Livingston] consisting of 6000 Acres...for £400 this country Money that is £266 English...a place where ships of 15 ft water may go without difficulty." Most of the Palatines were settled on this plot of ground and Hunter found a neighboring tract of acreage on the other side of the Hudson for the remainder of them. According to Hunter, Bridger had chosen the first site and had approved the second one.<sup>129</sup>

October found the Palatines settling in on the properties purchased for them, at a cost of £200 to accomplish this purpose. By June 1711 there were seven villages established. On the east side of the Hudson were Hunterstown, 105 families; Queensbury, 102 families; Annsbury, 76 families; and Haysbury, 59 families. Across the Hudson, were Elizabeth Town, 42 families; Georgetown, 40 families; and New Town, 103 families. All seven villages contained a combined total of 1874 Palatines. New York City attracted 350 of the remaining emigrants with a few of these employed by Hunter in his gardens. During the winter of 1710-11, those who settled on Livingston's

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<sup>129</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, July 24, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #317.

property and across the river spent their time erecting their huts and building their crude furniture. This delayed the actual operations of cutting the pines and processing them until the spring of 1711.<sup>130</sup>

Political events in England made the year 1711 a water-shed in the attempt to manufacture naval stores and led to the failure of the project. In England, contempt directed at the Palatines themselves and dissatisfaction at the expense of their subsistence helped in the downfall of Marlborough's son-in-law, Sunderland. On June 14, 1710 the date on which Hunter landed in New York with the Palatines, Sunderland was dismissed. During most of 1710, the Tories kept alive the issues of the Palatine's importation to England and the expense involved in maintaining them. With the help of these issues among others, the Tories won the election of 1711 and ended support for the project in New York. Indeed, their investigation revealed that up to April 14, 1711, over £100,000 had been spent on the Palatines in various ways without tangible returns. Hunter first suspected his loss of support as early as October, 1710 when he complained that the £8000 subsistence money was about expended and yet his agent, Micijah Perry, was not advanced more money to continue the project. The worried

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<sup>130</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, N.P. October 3, 1710, *Ibid.*, #414; Knittle, pp. 158-159; Hunter to Board of Trade New York, November 14, 1710, *CSP Col.*, XXV, #487.

governor hoped that what "...Mr. Perry has heard from the officers of the Treasury was the effect of some mistake in them, or some difficultys in the Treasury at that time." If more money were not advanced, he would not be able to subsist the Palatines at the rate of 6 s per adult and 4 s per child per day for very long. Hunter's pleas were to no avail. Aid had been cut-off in England, with no apparent opportunity for restoration. Along with the political problems which originated from England, he was harassed by problems within New York which made his association with the Palatines a trying one.<sup>131</sup>

James Bridger, who was expected to teach the Palatines the art of processing naval stores, spent the winter of 1710 in New England. He incurred Hunter's anger when he refused to return to New York in the spring of 1711. Hunter suspected that Bridger had been influenced to do this by the former Lieutenant-Governor of New York, Francis Nicholson an enemy who capitalized on Bridger's reluctance to help the governor get the naval stores project underway. After all, Bridger had suggested the plan of manufacturing these supplies to the Board of Trade prior to 1700 and it must have hurt him when Hunter presented the idea to the Board, got it approved and was commissioned to lead the venture. With Bridger's help the project might

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<sup>131</sup>Knittel, pp. 181-184; Hunter to Board of Trade, N.P., October 3, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #414.

have had a chance to succeed; without his availability, Hunter had to appoint Richard Sackett, a local farmer to take charge.<sup>132</sup>

Unfamiliar with the method of extracting pine tar for making naval stores, Hunter had to rely on Sackett to obtain results. In preparation for this venture, about 100,000 pines were girdled, a foot-bridge was built near Robert Livingston's gristmill on Roeloff Jansen's Kill (creek), storehouses were erected and barrels were built. In addition to receiving these gratuitous improvements made to his property, Livingston paid the carpenters at a rate of 2 s per day and rented teams and wagons to Sackett for hauling the pine knots from the forest. The Palatines also supplied thirty-six men to expedite making barrels. Despite this energetic activity under Sackett's direction, the production of naval stores did not proceed to the expectations of the Board of Trade and therefore drew its attention.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>132</sup>Knittel, pp. 170-172; Lords of Trade to Queen Anne, N.P., N.D., NY Col. Doc., V, p. 190. This letter was written between February 8, 1711 and March 1, 1711; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, May 7, 1711, CSP Col., XXV, #832. Hunter informed the Board that Sackett had lived in the eastern countries where naval stores were manufactured.

<sup>133</sup>Knittel, pp. 173-174. Also see letter from Popple to Bridger, Whitehall, February 19, 1711, CSP Col., XXV, #660 in which Popple requested Bridger to advise the Palatines about making tar.

At the request of the Board of Trade, one Mr. C. Witworth, the British Resident in Russia obtained information on the Russian method of making naval stores and communicated it to the Board in April, 1712. Both Sackett and the Russians followed the same method with one important difference which the Board immediately noticed. Where Sackett had the pine trees girdled a quarter-section each season, the Russians girdled their pines almost completely in October, leaving a narrow untouched strip on the north side of the tree. Sackett's method had failed to take into account the flow of the sap to the roots and appears to have allowed the improper removal of the inner bark of the tree. Although the Russian method and Sackett's method were identical in the cutting, splitting and sweating of the cords, the New Yorker's system produced only about 200 barrels of tar. Hunter was unwilling to admit he had chosen the wrong man to supervise the production of the supplies. At first he did admit that the trees had been improperly rinded, but in 1714 Hunter felt that the trees had also been barked by untrained workers. It also appears that tar was obtained from fallen trees and pine knots. This tar would have had a high burning ability and probably accounted for the batches which were considered unacceptable by the Navy Board. As a working operation, the naval project was an unqualified failure.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>134</sup>Knittel, pp. 176-177, 180.

Organization of the enterprise was broadly based on military lines since Hunter was a Colonel in the Royal Army at the time of the scheme's adoption. He appointed George Clarke, the Secretary of the Province, to both positions of the Treasurer and Commissary of Stores in the Palatine venture. James Du Pre was appointed Commissary in New York at a salary of £250 and had two assistants stationed among the Palatines. One assistant was the Frenchman, Jean Cast, who had charge of those located on the east side of the Hudson (Livingston Manor) and the other assistant was Andrew Bagge, a Scot who had identical responsibility for the Palatines on the west side of the river. Both assistants were paid £60 in New York currency while the doctor secured to treat the Palatines, John Arnoldi, was paid £100 in New York money. Other positions were provided for but were left unfilled except for the "listmasters" or deputies of which one was appointed for each of the seven villages.

Despite this hurried preparation and thorough organization the Palatine naval stores project still did not get into high-gear. No one, least of all Hunter, anticipated an interruption in the form of a rebellion just when production was about to get underway.<sup>135</sup>

Hunter informed the Board of Trade, in a letter dated May 7, 1711, of the rebellion by the Palatines. His account was both brief and bland. "I have met with great

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<sup>135</sup>Ibid., pp. 162-163.

opposition from many of the ill-disposed inhabitants, who dayly insinuated that there were better lands for them on ye fronteers, and that they were ill used in being planted there, being informed from all hands that these suggestions had beene of force enough to make ye people idle and backward and something worse..." was Hunter's understated introduction of the revolt to the Lords of Trade. Returning from the Jerseys, he stopped to see the Palatines again and stayed for a few days trying to convince "...them of the ill intentions of those that had misled them, that they cold not follow the work destin'd for, there being noe pine on these lands on ye fronteers which they had a mind to, besides they must lay their account of labouring there as the Israelites did of old with a sword in one hand and the axe in the other." According to his account, Hunter believed he had "quieted them" but soon after leaving the Palatines he was forced to return because they had refused to accept his reasoning. In his letter to the Board, Hunter continued, "Upon which I return'd and ordered them to send deputies from each village next morning with their demands, but they then came in a body, and when I found I cold prevaile little with reasoning and was thinking of some more effectual method to keep them to their duty, I ordered the contract which they signed to be read to them in high Dutch, and asked them whether they were resolved to keep ye termes thereof or noe, that I might take my measures accordingly. After some small



deliberation they returned me for answer that they were resolved to keep their contract, and would for ye future be directed intirely by me, soe wee parted good friends." Further on in his letter, he criticized Bridger for not returning to New York in the spring. Hunter also informed the Board that he had found a letter to Bellomont dated February 16, 1699/1700 expressly forbidding the granting of letters of denization, therefore, he desired instructions concerning the Palatines in this matter. Finally, he ended this letter with a request for subsistence money for these people. Hunter's account was understandably confined to an outline of the rebellion. As a Whig appointed politician forced to operate under a Tory administration, he would have wanted to minimize this incident to keep the naval stores project from being terminated by the hostile party. Although it was not his own idea, this project had been assigned to Hunter, linking his name and fortune to its success or failure. Certainly its failure was not in his interest. However, with a jealous Jim Bridger then present in Boston, it was unlikely that the rebellion could be kept a secret for very long. Therefore, it devolved upon George Clarke, the Secretary of the Province to supply whatever details the board desired.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>136</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, May 7, 1711 CSP Col., XXV, #832. Hunter indicated in this letter that he was not "...convinced of his ability by accounts I have since had from New England...."

Clarke's letter to the Board of Trade, dated May 30, 1711, placed the rebellion as having happened "...About a fortnight ago..." yet Hunter's letter describing the event was dated May 7, 1711. Allowing three days to travel from the scene of the incident, it appears that the rebellion might have taken place as late as May 4 or possibly at the end of April. According to Clarke, the Palatines had resolved to cease work and were stopping the surveyors from laying out more lots, having been "...strengthening each other in these resolutions by a secret association...." Reacting to this threat, Hunter "...was forced to send for a detachment of 60 men from the Garrison of Albany to meet with him at the Manner of Levingston, which is about two miles from their settlement on the west side of the river...." After having demanded to know why the Palatines were acting in disobedience to their instructions, Hunter was told that the lands being laid out for them by the surveyors were worthless and they would rather have "...the lands of Schohary, which the Queen had order'd them by their contract." At that point, Hunter explained the reasons why the Palatines could not be settled in Schoharie, shamed them for their ingratitude after so much had been done for them and informed them "...he was come to require and inforce the execution..." of their contract. The deputies were to retire to their villages, inform their people of this conversation and return by 4 P.M. the next evening with their reply. A few minutes

after the deputies had gone, "...H(is) E(xcellency) was informed that a body of three or four hundred..." Palatines were seen passing a nearby brook, their deputies among them. Hunter confronted the group, asked them why they had appeared armed before him, and received their reply that they had "...wanted to pay their compliment to him...." The governor dismissed them, sending them back to their villages. After they had gone about a mile, the Palatines discharged their pieces and continued on. The reason they had come armed, according to Clarke, was "...only a pretence for they told two of their officers as they were going home that they came to releive their deputies in case they had been confin'd." On the next day, the deputies arrived as ordered and began the conversation by asking to be settled in Schoharie. Before long, they demanded to be settled at the place, further stating, "...that they are cheated by the contract, it not being the same that was read to them in England, there they say it run thus, that 7 years after they had 40 acres a head given them they were to repay the Queen by hemp mast trees tarr and pitch or anything else... upon these terms they will perform the contract, but to be forc'd by another contract to remain on these lands all their lives, and work for H(er) M(ajesty) for the ships' use, they will never doe." Here in Clarke's own words was the Palatine's reason for their strike. Aware that they were being exploited, the Palatines were trying to

force a new contract. This refusal of Hunter's to recognize the Palatine's attempt at trying to gain a time limit for the contract was the only reprehensible aspect of his dealing with the rebellion. In dispersing and later disarming the Palatines, Hunter reacted in the only way he could, considering his military background and the present position he held. According to Clarke, the Palatines insisted, "...they will have the promise kept that Mr. Cast read to them in High Dutch in England...." Hunter was also informed by the Palatine's deputies that they wanted to send three or four men to England and lay their case before the Queen. This was a demand which Hunter could not afford to allow because of the unfavorable political situation in England. Lastly, the Palatine deputies complained about the lack of clothing, household goods and the threat made to them when "...Mr. Cast told them he'd make them slaves, and therefore desire H(is) E(xcellency) to appoint another in his room." At this point the discussion broke down.<sup>137</sup>

While the parley was still in progress, Hunter was informed that a large number of Palatines had gathered on the other side of the brook. Having received 70 more men as reinforcements, Hunter broke off the talk, deployed his

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<sup>137</sup>George Clark to Board of Trade, New York, May 30, 1711, Ibid., #863. Clarke's name occasionally appears spelled without the final "e".

troops and advanced toward them. Having scattered them, he marched to the first village and demanded that all weapons be turned in. Nightfall stopped him at this village whereupon the next morning he sent word to the other three villages to also surrender their arms. Returning to Livingston's manor house, he issued orders for the villages on the other side of the river to disarm. Sloops were prepared to carry his men across if the orders were not obeyed. After disarming the Palatines, Hunter published "...a declaration revokeing all military commissions and putting them intirely under the command of their overseers and directors as the Queen's hired servants...." Clarke's detailed letter covering the Palatine's strike and rebellion did shed more light on the events than did Hunter's letter. As the treasurer of the project, Clarke would have been expected to give a more elaborate account of the incident. Both Clarke and Hunter agreed in their accounts that the Palatine's desire to move to Schoharie was the dominant reason for the rebellion.<sup>138</sup>

An answer to the question why the Palatines wanted to settle at Schoharie was provided in Knittel's book, Palatine Emigration. Knittel believed that a few Palatines anticipated being exploited in New York and they formulated the belief that they were intended to be settled at Schoharie as a panacea for their situation. One Palatine, (John)

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<sup>138</sup>Ibid.

Conrad Weiser, kept a journal in which he alleged that the Schoharie land was given to the Queen by visiting Indians for use by the Palatines upon whom the Indians took pity. According to Knittel's book, five Indians were taken to England by Albany Mayor Peter Schuyler in 1710. However, the Indians sailed in February arriving at London in April. It has already been established that the Palatines were all aboard ship from late December 1709 while the convoy slowly moved around the southern coast of England preparatory to sailing on April 10. There simply was no opportunity for the Indians or Palatines to have met! Further, the Schoharie land was given to Hunter by the Indians at Albany, August 22, 1710. No instructions had been issued to Hunter for settling the Palatines at Schoharie although the area had been under consideration for that purpose. James Bridger had surveyed Schoharie and although he found it to be good land, he also found that it did not contain enough pitch pine for the project. Thus it is certain that a combination of wishful thinking, confusion and dissatisfaction with the land they were settled on may have planted the idea of settling at Schoharie in the Palatine's minds. The dissatisfaction with the land may have been the basic underlying cause of this situation. Predominantly farmers, the Palatines might have feared that once they had harvested all the pines for tar they would have been given that land for their own rather than choice land which would raise

bountiful crops and of course, delight any farmer. Certainly, these people had their contracts misrepresented to them or at least did not have misunderstandings of the contract cleared up for them. After the treatment they had received in the spring of 1711, it was a wonder that as many as 300 of them joined in the Second Canadian Expedition. Interestingly, for all their interest in Schoharie, the Palatines did not leave Livingston Manor for their "promised land" until their subsistence ended.<sup>139</sup>

Settled 100 miles up the Hudson River on the 6,000 acre lot acquired from Robert Livingston, the Palatines cleared the ground and erected their huts. Until the actual work of producing naval stores paid off, Hunter had to subsidize them at the rate of 6 s per adult and 4 s per child per day. About three or four hundred of the Palatines obtained permission during 1711 to hire-out so that they could augment their subsistence. Nonetheless, Hunter advised the Board of Trade that £15,000 per year for the next two years would be required to keep the project going until it became profitable.<sup>140</sup>

Subsistence for the Palatines was poor if the study made by Knittel was accurate. They were issued supplies irregularly, often with two to five days subsistence given as one item. Distribution of the goods was not uniform and did

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<sup>139</sup>Knittel, pp. 150-151, 153.

<sup>140</sup>Ibid., pp. 166-170, 188.

not always amount to either the 6s for adults or 4s for children, since Hunter himself admitted that the officers' salaries came out of the Palatine's subsistence money. During the first year in New York, Hunter spent £21,700 with £19,200 going to subsist the Palatines at the rate of £1600 per month. Yet the New York officials described the subsistence given the Palatine's as better than it actually was.<sup>141</sup>

George Clarke, in his May 31, 1711 letter describing the Palatine's rebellion, maintained that the Germans were well off. In Clarke's words, "...they have by their own choice three flesh and four flower days a week, a pound of beef a head or equivalent in pork and pease as long as they liked them, besides three quarters of a pound of the finest or a pound of a courser sort of bread, which they please, and as good beer as any man in the Province drinks of at his table, or flower they have a pound a head with bread and beer...." Ostensibly, Hunter was taking good care of the Palatines. He sent James Du Pre to England in an attempt to obtain the needed £15,000 per year but the Earl of Clarendon politically attacked Hunter and Robert Livingston. By his efforts, Clarendon stymied

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<sup>141</sup> Ibid., pp. 166-167, 169.



Du Pre's attempts to obtain the needed advance. Hunter's association with Livingston earned for him some of Clarendon's dislike that had previously been Livingston's alone.<sup>142</sup>

Like Hunter, Livingston was a Scot. He had amassed wealth and property that drew some criticism from colonial officials. In 1701 Bellomont was quoted as saying, "Mr. Livingston has in his great grant of 16 miles along and 24 broad, but 4 or 5 cottages as I am told, men that live in vassalage under him and work for him are too poor to be farmers...." It appears that his deeds only called for 2600 acres of property but the sale of 6000 acres was explained for the benefit of the Crown. Whatever the actual size of his property, as of October 20, 1714 Livingston was found to be paying only 28 s quit rent. In 1700 this man had also been accused of fraud while he was Collector of Excise at Albany but he was acquitted. Another rumor accused Livingston of having been connected with Captain Kidd, the pirate. Livingston's nemesis, Clarendon was able to raise questions about the Palatine venture which the Board of Trade required Du Pre to answer at some length.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>142</sup>George Clarke to Board of Trade, New York, May 30, 1711, CSP Col., XXV, #863; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, May 7, 1711, Ibid., #832; Micajah Perry, John Keill and James Du Pre to Board of Trade, London, December 11, 1711, Ibid., XXVI, #210. In this letter they answered Clarendon's arguments of November 26, 1711. Also see Knittel, pp. 169-170.

<sup>143</sup>Knittel, pp. 156-157.

In reply to Clarendon's questions, Du Pre and his associates, Micijah Perry and John Keill supplied the Board of Trade these answers in December, 1711:

(1) While others could raise naval stores, the Palatines were hired for this task, the other people in the colonies having their own occupations; (2) Hunter did desire to settle the Palatines at Schoharie in the beginning, but he considered the title unclear, believed the site was too exposed to the French and their Indians and found it was situated 20 miles from the river with a nearby 60 foot high waterfall making river navigation hazardous; (3) Livingston was a prudent, intelligent and industrious man who had acquired an estate. Although he had been accused of fraud in subsisting military forces at Albany, Livingston had been cleared by the Assembly. Hunter dealt with him because, "Livingston made most reasonable and fair offers, and because he was capable of making the largest advances, and had most conveniencies for that purpose, as brew house and bake house." Even, so Hunter had the contract drawn up by Chief Justice Roger Mompesson and if the Palatines had a grievance with Livingston, he would have to satisfy them; (4) The Palatines could not hire out for day labor without disbanding which would have violated their instructions. "Moreover, no more than 500 or 600 could

24-Micajah Perry, James Keill and James Du Pre to  
Board of Trade, London, December 11, 1711, CSP Col., XLVI,

have gotten a job at all. After having answered the objections raised by Clarendon, Du Pre and his associates proceeded to answer the Board's own questions.<sup>144</sup>

It was Hunter's belief they said, that the Palatines could support themselves after Christmas, 1712. The amount of tar they could process would be about 60 barrels per man per year or about 30,000 barrels after 1713. A Barrel sold for about 8s or a total of £12,000 for the year's production. Based on this figure, if the Crown allowed them £6000 out of the £12,000 and if the expense came to £40,000 after 1713, the Queen might be repaid in seven years. Hunter hoped his representatives in London could convince the administration to continue supporting the venture. Unfortunately, the "if" attached to the expense after 1713 indicated that the amount might be more. As events proved later, the Board was not able to be of much help.<sup>145</sup>

On January 1, 1712, Hunter wrote the Board of Trade that the Palatines had returned from the Canadian expedition and had 10,000 trees ready for the spring as well as 100,000 ready for the fall. He requested more troops to station near the Palatines to maintain control over them and after having criticized Bridger, he defended Sackett's efforts at producing naval stores. Seeking financial assistance

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<sup>144</sup>Micajah Perry, James Keill and James Du Pre to Board of Trade, London, December 11, 1711, CSP Col., XXVI, #210.

<sup>145</sup>Ibid.

with which to continue the project, he told the Board that "I have as yet noe notice of the payment of any of my bills for the subsistance of that people notwithstanding which I proceed to imploy all ye creditt I am master of for that purpose in the manner that I am directed by H(er) M(ajesty) instructions judging it impossible that this soe universaly beneficiall project should be dropt when it is carryed on soe farr and in soe fair a way." The last part of Hunter's statement could only have been wishful thinking for the project was then in its last stages of demise.<sup>146</sup>

Due to the change of ministry from Whig to Tory in 1711, reluctance in England to appropriate more money in the now unpopular cause of the Palatines, meager results obtained from using Sackett's methods and finally, the Palatine's rebellion which indicated either a lack of sincerity on their part to perform the contract or insincerity on the part of those who signed them to their contract, this project was allowed to die. Hunter's bills of credit were often returned with attached legal protests requiring either the Lord Treasurer's authority or his directions to have them fulfilled. Naturally the Lord Treasurer was often unavailable. In the meantime, the governor continued to subsist

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<sup>146</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, January 1, 1712, *Ibid.*, #251. He "...had imployed 300 fo them in the land service under Col. Nicholson's command by H. M. Order."

the Palatines on his own credit until September 12, 1712 although he had told Jean Cast six days earlier that the Palatines must be prepared to subsist themselves by hiring out. However, hiring out would require the government's permission and the Palatines would be required to return to their homes at a moment's notice if they were summoned. Widows and orphans were subsisted until September 23, 1712, when Hunter's credit finally ran out. By that time, £32,144, 17 s 2 d had been expended on the Palatines. Of this amount, £10,000 had been appropriated in 1709 and Hunter sold some of the various supplies left over from the venture in 1715 for £1,375, reducing Hunter's debt to £20,769. Although no evidence exists in this matter, it is possible that Hunter's large debt contracted while subsisting the Palatines may have served as a deterrent to some politicians who sought the New York governorship.<sup>147</sup>

Hunter never stopped trying to obtain support for the naval stores project. In March, 1713, he wrote to the Board of Trade trying to get their support in reopening the operation. If he could get credit or funds at home he would resume in the spring. Instead of asking for £15,000 per year or even £6,000 per year for two years, he now asked for £5,000 per year for two years, proposing to subsist the Palatines only while they were employed at making the naval stores. Furthermore, Hunter tried to obtain even partial

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<sup>147</sup>Knittel, pp. 181, 184-185, 188.

reimbursement for the debts he had contracted on behalf of the English government. Two years later, in October, 1715, Hunter sent a letter to Popple summarizing the entire venture up to that time, hoping to recoup something from the effort. He emphasized his economy of operation reminding Popple that in February 1712, the Lords of Trade had informed the Lord Treasurer they found no mismanagement with respect to administration of funds. Because he had cattle and fish salted for preservation and bargained for beer and bread, he was able to keep under the daily per diem allowances of 6 s and 4 s. By this efficient method of procuring supplies, Hunter was able to save enough to pay the £1,500 costs including both commissioner's and officer's salaries. Unfortunately, intense opposition was interfering with a project of great national importance but he would still try to keep it alive. Bridger again came in for considerable denunciation as a selfseeking "craving" man who had interfered with this important endeavor. The governor reminded Popple that he had asked the Lords to compel Bridger to reveal to them who had influenced him to act as he had. Hunter also informed Popple that he was aware of Francis Nicholson's part in this but he would ignore the man. Even so, as important as this project was he could not understand why he received no help. Sackett was going up to the pine woods to have some trees felled; indeed,

Hunter boasted he would have one of the logs burned before the entire world to prove that he was right. Hunter proved to be unsuccessful in his efforts to get the project started again. Only Robert Livingston profitted from the naval stores project. However, he implied that the whole venture had been an imposition to him.<sup>148</sup>

Five years after Hunter returned to England, Robert Livingston commented about the Palatines, probably to Governor Burnet. Livingston had accepted the Palatines on his property on terms which no one else would take them for. They were allowed to cut pine trees anywhere except those located three or less miles from his sawmills; also, the Palatines were forbidden to cut any trees fit for lumber. To his misfortune, he found that 70,000 of his best pines had been cut by the Germans. He was also irritated about the issue made of the 6000 acres sold to Hunter. It was the governor who supplied the surveyors, not he. If there was a shortage in the sale, he would make-up the 231 acres that were missing on the south or back side, whichever the Palatines desired. Livingston closed out the letter by reminding its reader about the forty or fifty years he had spent developing the land, having had to

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<sup>148</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, March 14, 1713, CSP Col., XXVII, #293; Hunter to Popple, New York, October 10, 1715, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 447-450.

contend with Palatines, unruly soldiers, two wars and Indians. His complaints to the contrary, Livingston did obtain improvements to his property and could not insist that he had suffered.<sup>149</sup>

Since a little has been said about the physical subsistence of the Palatines it would be appropriate to briefly mention the provisions made for their religious welfare. While the Palatines were still in England, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts located a preacher, John Frederick Haeger to look after their religious needs. An ordained Lutheran clergyman, he accepted ordination in the Anglican faith and was assigned a salary of £50 per year along with a book allowance of £15. Haeger was expected to convert the Palatines to the Church of England but he did not succeed since the Lutherans and Reformed Church entered into a dispute which appealed to the feelings of the Germans in the colonies. He did get a schoolhouse built in Queensbury in 1711 and in 1715 he requested permission to build a church for which permission was granted in 1717. Evidently he was very active, for Knittel's research of Haeger's records indicated that the Pfarrer baptised 61 children and married 101

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<sup>149</sup>Robert Livingston to Governor Burnett [?], Manor of Livingston, November 17, 17, 1724, NY HS Coll., VIII, pp. 175-177.

<sup>150</sup>Knittel, pp. 142, 143, 161, 162.

<sup>151</sup>ibid., p. 189.



couples between July 1710 and July 1712. To be sure, the English made an effort to assimilate the Germans on a religious basis but after September 1712 it was futile.<sup>150</sup>

With the end of the Palatine's subsistence, they acted on their intention to move to Schoharie. During the winter of 1712/1713, while suffering terribly, they made their plans to leave the 6000 acre tract they were settled on. Not only did they flee to Schoharie, but during the next five years they also left for the areas of Hackensack, New Jersey; Rhinebeck, New York; the colony of Pennsylvania; New York City itself and also to Livingston Manor where they became deeply indebted to Robert Livingston.<sup>151</sup>

By late October, 1712, Hunter had to inform the Board of Trade that he gave permission to the Palatines to hire-out in order to support themselves. After receiving his permission, he told the Board, "...some hundreds of them took a resolution of possessing the lands of Schoharie and are accordingly marched thither, have been buissy in cutting a road from Schenectady to that place and have purchased or procured a quantity of Indian corn toward their winter subsistence. It being impossible for me to prevent this, I have been ye easier under it upon these considerations that by these means the body of that people is kept together within ye Province...." Making light of this

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<sup>150</sup>Knittel, pp. 142, 143, 161, 162.

<sup>151</sup>Ibid., p. 189.

defection of the Palatines, Hunter insisted that as soon as the Crown prepared to resume the production of naval stores, "...that body at Schoharee may be imploy'd in working in the vast pine-woods near to Albany, which they must be obliged to be haveing noe manner of pretence to ye possession of any lands...." Moreover, they would populate the frontier of Albany and Schenectady.<sup>152</sup>

During the autumn of 1712, the Indians had been persuaded by the Palatines to sell the Schoharie lands to them. Relations between the Palatines and the Indians were good due to Conrad Weiser's having become the intermediary between them. As a child, Weiser had lived with Chief Quaynant and learned the Indian's language. Having earned the Indian's trust, he served as a negotiator and interpreter. Despite their amicable relationship however, the Palatines and Indians did not appear to have inter-married.<sup>153</sup>

Having obtained the land from the Indians and being on good terms with them, about 150 Palatine families moved to Albany and Schenectady in the fall of 1712. During the winter, approximately 50 families began to cut a road from Schenectady into the Schoharie country, finishing the task in about two weeks. With the help of the

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<sup>152</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, October 31, 1712, CSP Col., XXVII, #122.

<sup>153</sup>Knittel, pp. 192-193, 218-219.

Indians, these first families survived the winter and were joined by the rest of the 150 families who left for Schoharie in March, 1713, despite Hunter's prohibition against this. They settled in seven villages named for the deputies or list-masters. Kniskerndorf was the most northern village; Gerlachsdorf was two miles further south; Fuchsendorf was another two miles further south, followed by Schmidsdorf, Brunendorf (near Watertown) and two and a half miles further south was Hartsmansdorf. Another two miles further south was Weiserdorf and later Oberweiserdorf was established about three miles further from its parent town. In October, 1713, Hunter informed Francis Nicholson that 1008 Palatines lived on the Hudson, divided into 724 on the east side and 284 on the west side of the river. He also advised Nicholson that 500 Palatines were spread among the manors and about 500 were in Schoharie. Palatine ministers reported in 1718 that 224 families comprising 1021 people lived on the Hudson River with 170 families totaling 580 people at Schoharie. Life was extremely difficult for the pioneers at Schoharie.<sup>154</sup>

Early life at Schoharie, particularly in 1713 was very difficult being composed of hunger and poverty. Schenectady, thirty-five or forty miles away, was the nearest source of supplies while Albany was about three or four days away. Through out 1713, the sympathetic Dutch citizens of

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<sup>154</sup>Ibid., pp. 192, 193, 195.

Schenectady sent food to the Palatines. Unable to buy tools, the Palatines built crude huts and even more crude furniture for the minimal shelter and comfort they afforded. Their cheap flannel and kersey clothing wore out to be replaced by deerskins and beaverskins. Just as their homes and clothing were austere, the makeup of the village governments was rudimentary. In the absence of any other authority, the listmasters ran the villages.<sup>155</sup>

Individual families were often large with twenty or more children not being unusual. Within these villages, the girls married young although preachers were rare. Often young couples simply took up housekeeping without having a religious ceremony performed; however, these couples remained monogamous, considering themselves to be married without or with the presence of a clergyman.<sup>156</sup>

Having obtained their land from the Indians, built their cabins and continued with the everyday business of living, the Palatines were unprepared for the events which occurred in 1714 and 1715. Although they had purchased the land of schharie from the Indians, the Palatines were unaware that they had only performed an intermediate step in the procedure of obtaining land. In their ignorance of the process of buying land, they had omitted the important first step of applying to the governor in council for a

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<sup>155</sup>Ibid., pp. 195-199.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid., pp. 198-199.

license to purchase land from the Indians and they had also failed to comply with the third step which was the obtaining of a patent. Application to the governor in council for a license to buy Indian land required that the following fees had to be paid: To the Governor, 20 s; to the Clerk of Council, 6 s and 1 s, 6 d for reading the application in Council as well as 6 d to file it. After the land deal was closed with the Indians, the purchaser applied to the governor and council for a Survey of the Grant which was 6 s. At this point the purchaser applied for a patent from the governor and council at the following fees: To the Clerk of Council, 3 s for drawing up the warrant (order) for a patent; Attorney General, 10 s for drafting the Patent; Secretary of the Province, 30 s for the engrossment, sealing and recording of the Patent, and finally the governor received varying amounts for granting it, usually depending on the size of the grant. Obviously the Palatines did not know the procedure and could not have afforded it if they had. Moreover, the Palatine's compliance with the procedure would have been to no avail since the governor's good will was also required. Undoubtedly the Palatine's rebellion in 1711 and flight to Schoharie in 1712 had dissipated whatever good will Hunter ever had for them. In any event, the Palatines had failed to follow the accepted procedure for buying land and kept a number of

was issued by Hunter but the attempt to serve it met with resistance at Weiserdorf where the sheriff trying to arrest the dupty was beaten, humiliated and ridden out of town on a fence rail. Hunter had succeeded in arousing the Palatines anger and prodded them into active resistance.<sup>159</sup>

Between 1715 and 1717, Hunter did not have much contact with the Palatines at Schoharie. He had obtained his support in 1715 but found himself in 1716 being forced to reply to the Board of Trade's inquiries concerning the funding of the act. It is likely that this involvement with the support act kept Hunter from taking measures against the Palatines at that time. Eventually, however, Hunter sent for Weiser and three men from each village to meet with him in 1717. The governor notified them that unless they came to an agreement with the legal owners of Schoharie, he would evict and relocate them. Unwilling to lose the value of their land, its improvements and the fruits of their labor, the Palatines refused to obey the governor. Hunter finally agreed to have their improvements appraised and to reimburse them for any that they may have made. However, he forbade the Palatines to plow the land or plant on it, pending the outcome of this matter. From necessity, the Palatines disregarded the governor's order and proceeded to plow and plant as before.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>159</sup>Ibid., pp. 202, 203.

<sup>160</sup>Ibid., pp. 202-204.

officials including the governor from collecting fees for services rendered.<sup>157</sup>

Therefore, when Hunter granted a 10,000 acre patent for land in the Schoharie region which included the Palatine's settlements to Myndert Schuyler, Peter Van Brugh, Robert Livingston, Jr., John Schuyler and Peter Wileman on November 3, 1714, it was not done so just for friendship with the purchasers. Officially, the Palatines had failed to comply with the proper procedure in buying land and therefore did not legally own it. This land sale to the Albany Five placed the Palatines at the mercy of the Governor since it would force the Germans to return to the site of the naval stores project upon Hunter's notification to them that the project had resumed. Then too, the governor and his officials would not have turned down the official fees for granting the land.<sup>158</sup>

Although Hunter would not admit Schoharie belonged to the Palatines this did not mean that the Germans did not believe it was theirs. When a Schenectady farmer named Adam Vrooman moved into the Schoharie country, the Palatines pulled his house and fences down in 1715. Vrooman informed Hunter of the incident and also advised Hunter that John Conrad Weiser and others intended to sail for England from Boston. A warrant for Weiser's arrest

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<sup>157</sup>Ibid., p. 192.

<sup>158</sup>Ibid., pp. 201, 202.

was issued by Hunter but the attempt to serve it met with resistance at Weiserdorf where the sheriff trying to arrest the dupty was beaten, humiliated and ridden out of town on a fence rail. Hunter had succeeded in arousing the Palatines anger and prodded them into active resistance.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>159</sup>Ibid., pp. 202, 203.

<sup>160</sup>Ibid., pp. 202-204.



At this same time Samuel Mulford, the former Assemblyman from Long Island, was in England petitioning the Crown on behalf of his whale fishing rights and denouncing Hunter in the process. Although the author has found no link between Mulford and the Palatines, it is possible that Mulford's opposition to Hunter may have encouraged the Palatines to petition the King in their own behalf. In any case, during 1718, John Conrad Weiser, William Scheff and Gerhart Walrath left for London to lay their case before King George I. Their journey to London was not uneventful, for they were robbed by pirates, were delayed for almost a year on the trip and after arriving in London, were jailed for debts. By the time the Palatine emissaries had arrived in England, Hunter had also arrived. Weiser remained in England until 1723 fighting for the Palatine's cause, but by the end of 1720 the entire matter had been decided by the Crown. The financially disadvantaged Palatines were unable to raise sufficient money to effectively combat Hunter and his political influence which had increased after the Whigs returned to power. In the end the Palatines lost the right to stay in Schoharie and with the Crown's assistance, were relocated.<sup>161</sup>

Even if they had the money with which to offset Hunter's political influence, the Palatines still might not

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<sup>161</sup>Petition of Samuel Mulford, et al, to Crown, N. P., N.D., NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 474-475; Knittel, p. 204.

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have won. The emphasis on their rebellion of 1711 had cast them in an unfavorable light. As late as 1720, the new governor of New York, William Burnet wrote to Delafaye, the Secretary to the Lords Justices, of his desire for more troops "...to prevent disorder in the province. Such have happened already in the case of the Palatines who once took up arms and refused to obey the Government, but were dispersed on the troops advancing." Used as an example of disobedience to the Crown, the Palatines must have encountered prejudice which worked against them.<sup>162</sup>

Aware that Hunter had been replaced as governor, John Conrad Weiser and John William Scheff petitioned the Lords Justices that they and the 3000 Germans in New York might be resettled on land still at the disposal of the Crown by the new governor, Burnet. Five days after this petition was presented, Popple wrote to Hunter on July 25, 1720 asking for the former governor's opinion on it. Hunter replied the next day informing Popple that he had prevailed upon the proprietors of Schoharie to give the Palatines ten years occupancy free of quit-rents and only charge them a moderate sum after that. "The Majority accepted the conditions but durst not or could not execute the agreemt for fear of the rest who had been tampering with the Indians who had resigned their claims to

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<sup>162</sup>Governor Burnet to Mr. Delafay, N.P., July 8, 1720, CSP Col., XXXII, #140.

their Lands to the Crown...", said Hunter. Godfrey Dellius owned land up on the frontier which the government could still grant to the Palatines, but Hunter feared that the refugees' proximity to the Indians might lead to trouble.<sup>163</sup>

Not content to just petition the Lords Justices, Weiser sent a petition to the Lords of Trade dated August 2, 1720. Basically, this petition set out the Palatine's understanding of the terms under which they were indentured and the subsequent events which occurred to them. Hunter had received a copy of this petition and had returned it to the Board of Trade with his notations to some statements made by the Palatines. In their petition, they stated that they were promised forty acres of land, £ 5 per person, tools clothing and goods. The former governor's reply to the Palatine's contention they were to receive forty acres of land and other goods was "Not true vide contract". After the Palatines landed, they were divided into six companies and quartered in tents. Each company had its own German Captain who was promised £ 15 to command it. Hunter's comment to this was "No promise but allowance made." Both Hunter and the Palatines agreed that the latter had lived on Livingston

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<sup>163</sup>Petition of John Conrad Weiser and John William Schef, to the Lords Justices, N.P., N.D., Ibid., # 155i. This petition was written prior to July 20, 1720; Popple to Brigadier Hunter, Whitehall, July 25, 1720, Ibid., #162; Hunter to Popple, London, July 26, 1720, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 552-553.

Manor and had worked for two years on the naval stores project, yet the Palatines could have been contradicted by Hunter when they said, "But the country not being fit to raise any considerable quantity of Naval Stores, They were commanded to Build, to clear, & improve the ground, belonging to a private person." Perhaps it was only an oversight on Hunter's part to miss the first part of that sentence for the land on which Hunter settled them had sufficient pine to process naval stores. It is possible that he did not want to attract attention to the latter half of the sentence which mentioned making improvements to a private person's property. The Palatines went on to inform the Lords that in the spring of 1713 all the rest of the families had joined the 50 families that had fled to Schoharie, to which Hunter replied, "utterlie False". He made the notation "agt Acts not knowen it" where the Palatines stated that they had purchased more lands from the Indians for three hundred pieces of eight. They next recounted the effort to move them off the Schoharie land and the visit of the sheriff to "...seize one of their Captains...", followed by an account of the 1717 confrontation between Hunter, Weiser and the village deputies. However, when the Palatines maintained that they were forced to fertilize and plant their fields because Hunter re-neged on his promise to appraise and recompense them for

their lands, Hunter labeled this as "Fictions of Proprietors." According to the Palatines, for having planted their fields they had one man and woman imprisoned by "...the Gentlemen of Albani..." to which Hunter answered that he "Knows not." He did agree by marking "true" next to their statement that they had supplied 300 men to serve in the Canadian expedition and had sent men to protect Albany. Hunter noted as "not true," the Palatine contention that not one of their soldiers received the £5 per man nor did their leaders receive the £15 per year they were promised. After having professed their loyalty to the Crown, the Palatines prayed "...to be secured in the Land they now do inhabit or in some near adjoining lands remaining in the right of the Crown...."<sup>164</sup>

Within three months, William Schef again petitioned the Board of Trade, this time asking that a previous petition of Conrad Weiser for an unidentified peice of land called "Chettery" would not be given the Lord's consideration because it was "utterly contrary to their instructions and the inclinations of their people...."

By now the Palatine emissaries must have seen that they had lost, or at least Schef had, for he reminded the Lords of Trade that the Palatines had suffered heavily in being transported to America. If they again had to be removed,

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<sup>164</sup>Petition of the New-York Palatines to the Lords of Trade, N.P. August 2, 1720, Ibid., pp. 553-555.

he hoped that they would be compensated first. He ended this petition by stating that the sale of the Schoharie land to other people after they had obtained it first was illegal and not in keeping with colonial law.<sup>165</sup>

In late November 1720, Secretary Popple was moved sufficiently by these petitions to enclose copies of them along with copies of Hunter's letters to Governor Burnet and requested the new governor to investigate the condition of the Palatines. Those Palatines loyal and submissive to the Crown were to be moved to convenient lands not already disposed of. During 1721, Burnet gave some Palatines the right to buy land from the Mohawks about forty miles above Fort Hunter and eighty miles from Albany in order to extend the frontier. Later, in October 1723, Burnet issued the Stone Arabia patent to twenty-seven Palatines, from which patent came the towns of Palatine Bridge and Palatine Town. Two years later, Burnet issued the Burnetsfield Patent on April 13, 1725 in which ninety people bought one hundred acre lots south of the Mohawk River in the area later known as "German Flats". But resettlement in New York was not the only solution to the problem of the Palatines.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>165</sup>Petition of William Schef /Schaff/ to the Board of Trade, N.P. [November 1, 1720], CSP Col., XXXII, #282, also in NY Col. Doc., V, p. 574.

<sup>166</sup>Popple to Governor Burnet, Whitehall, November 29, 1720, CSP Col., XXXII, #305; Knittel, pp. 204-207, 209.

After 1717, Germans began to settle in Pennsylvania because it was a widely advertised colony which offered liberal terms, religious toleration and contained some German settlers. In 1723, fifteen families of Palatines left New York, moving to Tulpehoecken in Pennsylvania and were followed by others. From 1725, the mainstream of German immigration avoided New York and instead went to Pennsylvania.<sup>167</sup>

From the above account it is evident that the naval stores project failed due to lack of financial support from London which coincided with the change of ministry in 1711. Hunter had been sent over with the Palatines to start the naval stores operation and his recall to England was assisted in part by the lack of results and his failure to control the Palatines. While the Albany land-owner, Robert Livingston, profitted from the endeavor, Hunter's personal fortune was almost depleted. As an appointed colonial governor, Hunter's treatment of the Palatines, aside from saddling them with a contract that placed them in practical serfdom, was neither unusual nor cruel by that day's standards. Actually, the contract was never fully enforced; in fact, after 1712 the Palatines were never totally under Hunter's control and could not be held to it. The one occasion he used force in dealing with them was during their rebellion where he reacted no differently than any other English governor would have done. There were no indications

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<sup>167</sup>Ibid., pp. 205, 209-211.



in the records that Hunter's confrontation with the Palatines was bloody. Punitive measures that he instituted against them such as disarming them, revoking their commissions and the like could not have meant much to people who were principally farmers. True, in selling Schoharie out from under the Palatines to the Albany Five, he might have acted out of vindictiveness and greed. But it was also true that the Palatines had not complied with prevalent colonial law for buying land; to have made an exception for them, particularly after land had been initially provided for their naval stores operation, would have set an un-wanted precedent and raised questions about the nature and validity of land ownership in the colony. Finally Hunter did subsidize the Palatines on his own credit after the government's money ran out. He did cut corners in feeding them, probably allowing much cheating of the Palatines by Cast and Bagge, but he did not abandon them. Under the circumstances then, hampered by a lack of financial support at home, hindered by an unqualified instructor in naval stores manufacture and plagued by discontent and rebellion, Hunter could not but have failed in the naval stores project. At least, he was more successful in his dealings with the Indians of New York, particularly the Five Nations.

## CHAPTER V

## HUNTER AND THE NEW YORK FRONTIER

Although Hunter's relationship with the Palatines had not been cordial, in the vitally important area of relations with the Indians (including the Five Nations) he was more successful. His efforts to keep the Indians loyal to the English were aided by the Five Nations plan to remain independent of both the English and French. The Iroquois depended upon their own superiority in battle and their effect on the fur trade to maintain this independence. While Hunter did not sway the Iroquois to completely submit to the English, at least he did not drive them to the French.

So important were the Indians that the Crown included them in Hunter's Instructions. Number One Hundred admonished him that:

You are to encourage the Indians upon all occasions, so as to induce them to trade with our Subjects, rather than any others of Europe; and you are to call before you the five nations or Cantons of Indians, vizt The Maqua's, Seneca's, Cayouges, Oneydes, and Onondages, and upon their renewing their Submission to our Government You are to assure them in our name that we will protect them as our subjects against the French King and all his Subjects and you are to give the like assurances to the Schacook or River Indians, and to such other Indians in that neighbourhood as by their union and friendship with the five nations aforesaid, and in conjunction with them shall submit themselves in the same manner to our Government; and when any opportunity shall offer for purchasing great tracts of land for us from the Indians for small sums, You are to use your discretion

therein as you Judge for the convenience or advantage which may arise unto us by the same; And you are to inform us and our Commissrs for Trade and Plantations as aforesaid, what has been the consequence of the Treaty of Neutrality agreed between the said Five Nations and French Indians.

To insure that Hunter did not forget his responsibility for keeping the Indians in the English interest, the Board of Trade also advised the governor in their letter of October 1710 that they doubted not "...but by your ability and prudent management of them, they will be kept steady in their duty to the Crown and as Frontier against the French" Thus the burden of Indian affairs occupied a high priority among Hunter's duties.<sup>168</sup>

Within the confines of New York the Indians were divided into two linguistic stocks: The Algonquian and Iroquoian. The largest one was the Algonquian which occupied the largest territory and was most numerous. They numbered about eighteen bands between the Hudson and Connecticut Rivers and about seven bands from Manhattan Island north to Dutchess County.<sup>169</sup>

Algonquian bands were governed by a chief or Sachem and a council of lesser chiefs who held their offices through a combination of hereditary descent and appointment. More often, the lesser chiefs appear to have

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<sup>168</sup>"Hunter's Instructions," N.P., December 27, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 140-141; Board of Trade to Hunter, Whitehall, October 26, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #448.

<sup>169</sup>release, pp. 1, 4.

been chosen by their age, experience or deeds in combat. They had to lead by persuasion, for they did not set up any machinery for compelling their tribesmen to accept commands. In the absence of formal political ties, the Algonquian bands emphasized membership in the clan which transcended membership in the community or band.<sup>170</sup>

Governor Hunter described the nature of Indian Leadership in an early letter of March 1713, believed to have been written to the Earl of Dartmouth. Speaking specifically of the Iroquois, although this applied equally well to the Algonquians, he said "...I humbly conceive you have been kept in the dark, to say no worse of it, as to the nature of the Government of the five Indian nations as they are called, which by experience and the information of all those I have had any conversation with amongst them I am convinc'd is now and has in all times been no other than this. Such numbers as for the convenienciys of hunting and fighting, all the businesse of their lives, herd together live in a pefect state of nature every man his own master free from all rules or regulations, or any constraint from custom itself, only in the two important affairs mentioned the younger sort are readily advised by such of the elder as have by the common vogue the reputation of the wisest, neither are they under any obligation to follow such advice...." Hunter also informed

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<sup>170</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

his reader that at meetings between himself and the Iroquois they would meet to hear his propositions, retire to deliberate over their reply and have an especially eloquent brave deliver their answer. In the case of proposing a war, the one planning that war would invite the other members of his nation to feast and through a war dance would give his reasons for engaging in war. Those joining his feast would enlist in the cause, electing the planner a war chief for that adventure. Hunter cautioned his reader that applying European terms such as Prince to these leaders could be dangerous because acquisition of absolute power by such people would put the English at the mercy of the Indian leader's whims. These leaders "...haveing little to doe at home and commanding a people who have less will probably be for makeing war where they propose to doe it with most ease and profit and may be easily bribed to disturb us by our enemys...." As an example of this, Hunter cited Hendrick who had previously visited England. This Indian was a resident of the Mohawk village called Schoharie although he himself was a River Indian who made trouble for the English, "...and had he had the hundredth part of that power which was ascribed to him we must have been in actual war with them at this time." Hunter's candid assessment of the nature of Indian government was the product of his European familiarity with institutionalized

government although he did not hesitate to exploit the influence of friendly sachems when it was necessary.<sup>171</sup>

All Indians, whether Algonquian or Iroquoian were usually sedentary. While the Coastal Indians relied more on fishing than the others, all tribes depended heavily on raising crops for their food supply. With the coming of winter, the tribes moved their villages upstream and hunted game further inland. From all aspects the Indians had a self-sufficient economy.<sup>172</sup>

The most important Indians Hunter was concerned with were the Five Nations or Iroquois. After 1664 the Coastal tribes declined in power and by 1680 the Iroquois achieved great importance in New York. From 1700 they were able to maintain their independency by being important to both the English and French.<sup>173</sup>

During Hunter's administration the Iroquois were the most powerful Indian confederacy east of the Mississippi River. Up-state New York was their home territory but their war and hunting parties ranged an area bounded by Illinois, Maine and South Carolina. Up to 1712, the Five Nations were comprised of the Mohawks, Oneidas,

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<sup>171</sup>Hunter to Dartmouth [?], New York, March 14, 1713, CSP Col., XXVII, #295.

<sup>172</sup>Trelease, p. 11.

<sup>173</sup>Ibid., p. IX.

Onondagas, Cayugas and Senecas when they also added the Tuscaroras. Inhabitants of the Albany area, the Mohawks were the farthest eastern of the Five Nations. They lived between Lake Champlain on the east and Schenectady on the west, but they roamed north to the St. Lawrence River and south to Minisink. Within this area they had between three to seven villages, usually close to the Mohawk River. The Mohawks bordered the Oneidas who were concentrated in the area around Oneida Lake but who also could be found on the St. Lawrence or south on the Susquehanna River. They were the smallest of the Five Nations. Occupying the middle position among the Iroquois were the Onodagas whose lone village was the capital of the Confederacy and of vital strategic importance to the Indians. Immediately to the west of the Onondagas were the Cayugas whose lands were between Owasco Lake on the west and Lake Ontario on the north and east. At the far western end of the Confederacy, the Senecas occupied the area around Niagara although some Seneca settlements were found on the Allegheny River. The name Seneca was variation of the Dutch term "Sinnedens" which was first applied to the Mohawks and subsequently applied to all the tribes of the west until it finally settled with the Nation which inhabited the Niagara area. Occupying a strategic location which helped them channelize the passage of western Indians into their territory

17 Ibid., pp. 10-10; Deputy-Governor Keith to:  
People, Philadelphia, February 17, 1719, OSP, Col., 111.

and thence to Albany gave the Iroquois an advantage in controlling the fur trade and thus maintaining their independence.<sup>174</sup>

Estimates made of the Iroquois fighting strength indicate that they were never able to field a force larger than 2,500 men. A 1660 estimate which examined their comparative strengths by Nations found that the Mohawk had no more than 500 warriors, the Oneida had less than 100, the Onondaga had around 300 and the Seneca had no more than 1,000. In 1719, their fighting strength was estimated at less than 2,000 effectives. Warfare and disease took hundreds of their lives yearly which forced the Iroquois to resort to individual or mass-tribal adoptions to maintain their numbers.<sup>175</sup>

By contemporary standards the quantity of Iroquois warriors seems pitifully small. However, when compared to the population of early eighteenth century New York, they constituted a sizeable potent force. For this reason Iroquois policy was aggressive in nature. Their confederacy had originally been formed to apparently seek peace and to afford protection to its members. Better organized than its neighbors, the confederacy was able to

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<sup>174</sup>Ibid., pp. 1, 4, 14-16. In 1712, the Iroquois Confederacy expanded from Five to Six Nations by adding the Tuscaroras.

<sup>175</sup>Ibid., pp. 16-16; Deputy-Governor Keith to Popple, Philadelphia, February 17, 1719, CSP Col., XXXI, #61.



pursue courses of aggression at will. Within its ranks, the Mohawk, Onondaga and Seneca were the most powerful nations yet all five members had equality in council. Since Onondaga was centrally located within the confederation, it was the usual meeting place for the Iroquois with the Onodagas also providing the permanent moderator.<sup>176</sup>

Undoubtedly the Iroquois spent much time in their councils at Onondaga (or elsewhere) concerned about English and French activities. During Hunter's administration the Iroquois were usually amenable to English direction. The inability of sachems to enforce a uniform policy toward the English often led to inconsistent Iroquois actions. These fluctuated between nearly total submission to the English demands and swung over to occasional clandestine co-operation with the French. Generally, the Iroquois attempted to use the French as a counter-balance to keep the English from dominating their confederacy.<sup>177</sup>

Iroquois reaction to the French and English was determined by the way these European nations looked upon the Indians. Whereas the French believed they had to be on good terms with the Indians for commercial, religious and political reasons, the English saw the Iroquois as fearsome savages who occupied much desired land. Accepted as a commercial partner by the French, the Iroquois may

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<sup>176</sup>Release, pp. 20-22.

<sup>177</sup>Ibid., pp. 341-343, 363.

have believed that the French needed them "more" than the English and they may have equated French policy moves dictated by dependence with weakness. It was not unreasonable to expect that more respect was shown by the Indians to the European nation which appeared to be the strongest. This also explained why the Indians wavered occasionally in their allegiance to the English if that European power received a set-back to its plans.<sup>178</sup>

French policy toward the Iroquois from the time of Comte de Frontenac had been one of persuasion rather than force, but French expansion into the Illinois country during the 1670's antagonized both the Indians and English. Motivated by their own designs of conquest, the Iroquois themselves invaded the Illinois country in 1680. By 1682, they had confrontations with the French which the latter believed were instigated by the English although there is no evidence to substantiate this. One reason that the Indians invaded Illinois was that most peltry entering into the trade markets was coming from the Great Lakes and they intended to channelize it into Albany where they could control it. Under French governors De La Barre and De Nonville, the Canadians struck back at the Iroquois causing a break between them which never did

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<sup>178</sup>W. J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 5, 10, Eccles study of the frontier provided invaluable information concerning French activity in Canada.

heal and which also resulted in the later expense of defending New York during the Indian wars. In the following years the Iroquois fought often against the French.<sup>179</sup>

During 1702, the French and English again went to war in Europe. A number of reckless French-Canadians urged the Governor-General to launch an all-out assault against both New York and New England. Fortunately, wiser counsel prevailed which sought and made a treaty of neutrality with the English in America. The Governor-General at Quebec, Philippe de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil, believed that invasion of the English colonies would stir up a hornets nest and probably bring in the Iroquois on the English side. His respect for the Five Nations fighting ability was genuine and prompted his sober assessment that great suffering would be the result. Therefore, Vaudreuil solemnly informed the Iroquois that he would not attack them but if they or the Anglo-American forces attacked first, he would hurl every available man against the Indians. A practical man, Vaudreuil was aware that the English could raise a force far in excess of the 3,350 men available to him in New France which decided him to depend on fortifications and tactical maneuvers. By the time Hunter arrived

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<sup>179</sup>Trelease, pp. 247-248, 260-261; Lovejoy, Glorious Revolution, p. 217.

in New York in mid-1710, this neutrality had been in effect for about eight years. It had an impact on Hunter's dealings with the Five Nations.<sup>180</sup>

About a month after arriving in New York, Hunter assured the Board of Trade that the Senecas who had been suspected of being under French influence and the Waganhas who had actually been in league with the French were now safely back in the English camp. He further notified the Board of Trade that he intended to meet with the Five Nations in mid-August at Albany. This meeting, representative of others he would face in the future gave an insight into the form of Indian-white negotiations.<sup>181</sup>

Hunter's first official conference with the Indians was representative of the others that followed. Members of the Indian Commission who attended included Colonel Peter Schuyler, Colonel Killian Van Renselaer, Captain Myndert Schuyler, Evert Banker, Doctor James Van Brugh, Colonel John Schuyler and the Secretary of Indian Affairs, Robert Livingston, Senior. The official interpreters, either Jean Baptiste Van Eps or more often, Lawrence Claessen were also in attendance at these meetings.

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<sup>180</sup>Eccles, Canadian Frontier, p. 133. Born in 1650, Vaudreuil was Governor-General of New France from 1703 until his death in 1725. The Iroquois referred to all Governors-General of New France as either "Otontio" or "Yonodio".

<sup>181</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, July 24, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #317.

Often two or more weeks in length, these conferences were composed of separate daily sessions attended either by the Five Nations or by the River Indians. On rare occasions, both the Five Nations and River Indians might attend a joint session when the issue being discussed was of sufficient importance to involve both groups. Most often, however, colonial officials dealt separately with the Iroquois, treating them as a special case. During these daily conferences, the Indians advanced proposals which they accompanied with a token gift or a pelt to indicate their sincerity. When out of furs, the Indians substituted a stick in lieu of the fur with a promise to redeem the stick with a suitable fur at the next opportunity. In his turn, Hunter (or one of his agents) would listen to the Indian's propositions, reply briefly and a day or two later, would give their official reply. Although Hunter also made proposals to the Iroquois, he did not accompany them with token gifts on each occasion. Instead he usually made one grand gift to the Indians at the end of the conference period.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>182</sup>Minutes of meetings between Hunter and Indian tribes, August 7, 1710 through August 20, 1710, Ibid., #834i. All commissioners did not attend every meeting nor was it uncommon to find their names omitted from the minutes of daily meetings. This was probably an oversight on the part of Secretary Livingston; Trelease, p. 212. Claessen's name is found in various sources as Claws, Claesse or Clace.

Within Hunter's One Hundredth Instruction were the elements of his Indian policy. This instruction emphasized trade first and then submission regarding the Indian. Obviously the Iroquois were aware of the important position they held astride the trade routes that Western tribes had to travel when they wished to trade at Albany. The importance of trade with England was as vital to Hunter as the need for him to obtain the Iroquois' submission. Linking the concept of submission to protection and friendship was expected to make it more palatable to the Indians while it strengthened good relations and trade between the Five Nations and the English.<sup>183</sup>

At his first meeting in Albany, Hunter was exposed to the most important elements which related to his over-all Indian policy. His primary concern was to keep the Iroquois from being won-over by the French although available documents indicate that the Indians had no intention of "belonging" to anyone. Hunter required the Iroquois to again acknowledge their alliance with the English, keeping the "Covenant Chain bright" as they called it. This obliged the Five Nations to allow the distant western tribes passage to Albany, to expell the French Jesuits among them, to keep themselves under restraint in New York, to avoid fighting against the Flathead Indians

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<sup>183</sup>"Hunter's Instructions", N.P., December 27, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 140-141. No. 100.

in North Carolina and to help restrain other Indian tribes fighting in New England. The Indians demands'were fewer but were equally important to the maintenance of good Anglo-Indian relations.<sup>184</sup>

In their turn, the Five Nations and other tribes practiced a well refined diplomacy when making their own proposals to Hunter. They informed the governor that they desired better trade advantages, wanted the sale of liquor to the braves halted because of the "many mischieffs" that it caused, would accept the forts and chapels in their country along with the missionaries that the Queen would be pleased to send them and they finally informed "Corlaer" (the name given to all English governors) that they could not control the fighting in New England where French Indians were attacking friendly Indians. Rather, they believed this was a matter which the governor could solve better. Thus the Indians had issued their own policy which the intended to have kept by the English.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>184</sup>Minutes of meetings between Hunter and Indian tribes, August 7, 1710, through August 20, 1710, CSP, Col., XXV, #8341. The meeting of August 16th was when Hunter delivered his official statement of policy which is summed up in this paragraph; Trelease, Indian Affairs, pp. IX, 11, 249-250.

<sup>185</sup>Minutes of meetings between Hunter and Indian tribes, August 7, 1710 through August 20, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #8341; Trelease, pp. 115-116. Arent Van Curler, founder of Schenectady, was the Dutch Commissary for the elder Van Rensselaer and served as trading agent among the Mohawks. Well liked and trusted by them, the Indian's pronunciation of his name was bestowed on all English governors after his death.

Surely Hunter must have been impressed with the complexity of Indian affairs during his administration. Inter-related factors were often inseparable from each other and had an effect on different aspects of English Indian policy. However, one event during Hunter's administration was significant since it kept the Iroquois more loyal to the English than to the French. That event was the Canadian Expedition of 1711.

England was at war with France until 1712 when the Treaty of Utrecht ended it. In North America however, the war had resulted in an uneasy truce which was marred by two unsuccessful invasion attempts against Canada. Both expeditions, in 1709 and 1711, were in retaliation against Vaudreuil's attacks against New England in the middle of the first decade of the eighteenth century. Convinced that the Five Nations would not assist the colonists of New England, Vaudreuil had unleashed his own Indians against that hapless colony. With the failure of the first expedition in 1709, the English planned this second invasion of New France.<sup>186</sup>

Hunter, a military man, had served at Blenheim as a battalion commander. Subsequent to his being commissioned governor he was also made the Captain of the Independent Company at Fort Anne, New York and in 1712 he was promoted to Brigadier with the help of Lord Bolingbroke's

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<sup>186</sup>Eccles, pp. 139-141.



influence. As the governor of a colony on the Canadian border, he participated in the 1711 expedition against Canada.<sup>187</sup>

Plans for the expedition were formalized at the council of war held at New London, Connecticut during June, 1711. Attending the council with Hunter were Francis Nicholson, Governors J. Dudley, G. Saltonstall and Samuel Cranston. Hunter was to raise and support this diversionary force. Originally scheduled to leave from New York with 600 men from that colony, 360 from Connecticut, 180 from East Jersey, 180 from West Jersey and 240 from Pennsylvania the diversionary force never received the troop quotas from the other colonies. Hunter was also detailed to obtain the services of the Mohawks as guides, which he succeeded in doing.<sup>188</sup>

Failure to obtain the required manpower altered the plan to allow 100 Englishmen and 300 Indians to move out from Albany under the command of Major Robert Livingston, accompanied by General Francis Nicholson, while a Royal Navy fleet transported over three thousand regulars from Boston to the St. Lawrence River under the joint

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<sup>187</sup>Chichester, "Hunter, Robert", D.N.B., X, p. 299; Royal Warrant from Crown to Robert Hunter, St. James, May 7, 1709, CSP Col., XXIV, # 493; Hunter to Bolingbroke, New York, October 31, 1712, Ibid., XXVII, # 124.

<sup>188</sup>Minutes of a Council of War at New London by Her Majesty's Commanders, New London, June 21, 1711, Ibid., XXV, # 893.

command of General James Hill and Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker. Upon reaching Wood Creek, the overland force would await word that the fleet force was in position near Quebec and would then launch attacks to lure French forces from Trois Rivières preventing them from reinforcing the Capital of New France. However, due to inefficiency attributed to Nicholson as well as all the colonial commanders, the expedition was delayed long enough that poor seasonal weather caused its failure.<sup>189</sup>

After the New London conference ended, Hunter returned to New York to carry out his preparations. On June 20, he met with the Indians to explore the possibility of their participation in the overland expedition. Proceeding to New York City after having arranged a conference with the Indians at Albany to try and enlist them in the venture he made arrangements for procuring the needed supplies. On July 1, 1711, Colonel King, assistant to General Hill, received word from Hunter that the supplies were ready and now awaited the transports with their escorts to carry the supplies to Boston. By July 12, Captain Harrison, General Hill's Aide-de-Camp, was advised by Hunter that the New York contingent of men was now ready although all the remaining supplies along with their boats would not be ready until July 21. Hunter also advised Captain Harrison that he would

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<sup>189</sup>Col. King to Mr. Secretary St. John, Journal, Boston, July 25, 1711, Ibid., XXVI, #46.

be ready to move from Albany by the end of the month. Colonel King observed that on July 22, three Iroquois sachems arrived in Boston, were accorded the honors of their rank, were permitted to review the approximately 3500 troops of the fleet force and were shown the ships in an obvious effort to awe them with the power of the English. Hunter now prepared to attend the meeting of the Five Nations and River Indians at Albany in mid-August, 1711 to try and obtain their support.<sup>190</sup>

Hunter met with the Indians at Albany where he obtained their agreement to accompany the land invasion of Canada. But the Indian's decision to join the English was not lightly arrived at by them. Back during May, Colonel Peter Schuyler had met with the Five Nations at Onondaga where they informed him that a Monsieur Longuil had strongly advised them not to fight the French. According to the French agent, while the French and English were at war with each other now, they would one day end the war and compose their differences. If the Five Nations got involved in the war, they would be the only ones to suffer. Longuil then emphasized that the English wanted only the Indian's beaver and his help but they would not help the Indian in return. Already the English had given the hatchet to the River

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<sup>190</sup>Cadwallader Colden Papers, NY HS Coll., IX, pp. 402-403; Col. King to Mr. Secreatry St. John, Journal, Boston, July 25, 1711, CSP Col., XXVI, #46.

Indians but the French did not care because they had no respect for the River Indians. Colonel Schuyler was told that the Five Nation's reply to Longuil was one of disbelief. The Iroquois informed the Frenchman that if the French were so concerned about their fighting on either side, the French ought not to have allowed their own Canadian Indians to fight against the English while allowing the Christians to fight the Christians. For that reason, the Iroquois did not believe they could stay out of the fighting. None-the-less, cautioned by the French threat, the Iroquois agreement was not given lightly by De Canasora, the Onondaga sachem. What De Canasora did not inform Corlaer (Hunter), Annadagarriax (their name for Nicholson) and Quieder (Colonel Peter Schuyler) was that he had initially advised the Iroquois to stay neutral. As the Onondaga sachem understood the situation, neutrality was the only course to follow, no matter which European power finally won. However, when he saw that he could not stop the younger braves from entering into the fight, De Canasora reversed his stand and became their leader. The

Albany, August 17, 1711 through August 28, 1711, NY Col. MSS., V, pp. 265-277; Col. Peter Schuyler's Journal, Great [Onondaga] N. N., ESP Col., XIV, #8611; Conference between Hunter and Indian tribes, Albany, August 23, 1711, Albany Doc., V, pp. 268-269. De Canasora's name was spelled variously as Dekamissora, Gansora and De Kan-sora; Colden's account of Conference between Governor Hunter and De Canasora, N.P., 1721, NY HS Coll., IX, p. 129. Colden identified De Canasora as being a Seneca, ibid., pp. 43-46; Knittel, p. 173.

River Indians supplied 132 braves while the Iroquois supplied 682 fighting men which allowed Nicholson to take over 800 Indians and the 300 Palatines with him.<sup>191</sup>

Nicholson's force left from Albany on July 30 for Wood Creek. On the 25th of August, the same day the Iroquois agreed to join the English expedition, General Hill wrote from the transport Windsor to Hunter informing the New York governor of the tragedy that had befallen the fleet force. Shortly before midnight on the 22nd, in heavy fog, a rapidly running current in the St. Lawrence carried eight transports and one provision ship into the north shore with great loss of life. General Hill blamed this incident on the river pilots who were unfamiliar with the currents around Quebec, and called the disaster a "stroake of Providence." In a subsequent report, Hill advised Lord Dartmouth that the supply ships Hunter had sent to rendezvous with the fleet arrived on either September 5 or 6 but they had no provisions aboard. Hill

Although they used or were used by French activities while

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<sup>191</sup>Conference between Hunter and Indian tribes, Albany, August 17, 1711 through August 28, 1711, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 265-277; Col. Peter Schuyler's Journal, Onodat [Onodaga?] N.D., CSP Col., XXV, #864i; Conference between Hunter and Indian tribes, Albany, August 25, 1711, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 268-269. De Canasora's name was spelled variously as Dekannissore, Cansora and De Kanasora; Colden's account of Conference between Governor Burnet and De Canasora, N.P., 1721, NY HS Coll., IX, p. 129. Colden identified De Canasora as being a Seneca; Ibid., pp. 403-406; Knittel, p. 173.

also expected three more supply ships on September 8, but they did not arrive because Hunter had sent them the long way via New London. At this point, Admiral Walker, General Hill and the remaining ship's masters decided that the loss of 35 women, 740 officers and men from the infantry units in addition to not having received any further supplies was sufficient reason to call-off the expedition and return to Argentinia. Having received Hill's dreary message, Hunter had the Indians return to Albany, where they arrived on September 8, 1711.<sup>192</sup>

Although the Canadian expedition of 1711 failed, its importance regarding the Indians lay in Vaudreuils failure to launch his promised retaliatory attack against the Iroquois. By attempting the attack and by showing-off the fleet force located in Boston to the three visiting sachems, the English impressed the Iroquois with their intentions and abilities to act boldly. Within New York, this motivated the Five Nations to ally with the English although they used or were used by French activities while trying to maintain their independence.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>192</sup>Deputy-Governor Saltonstall to St. John, New Haven, September 10, 1711, CSP Col. XXVI, #93; General Hill to Governor Hunter, Aboard Windsor on the St. Lawrence, August 25, 1711, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 277-278; General Hill to Lord Dartmouth, Aboard Windsor at Spanish River, September 9, 1711, CSP Col., XXVI, #92 and 92i; Cadwallader Colden Papers, NY HY Coll., IX, p. 408.

<sup>193</sup>Eccles, p. 133.

French activity among the Five Nations was predicated on the need for controlling the Iroquois and therefore the fur trade in their area. Onondaga was the geographical center of the confederacy which made that village a strategic site for a fort. The French valued it as such in early 1711 when their agent, Longuil, started erecting a blockhouse which he abandoned uncompleted upon hearing of Peter Schuyler's approach on May 7th. During his meeting with the Indians Schuyler demanded that the blockhouse be torn down, and it was in mid-May. However, the politically astute Indians told Schuyler that they wished that they might have been allowed to retain the fort for defence. Now they needed powder and lead to defend themselves from the Far Indians. Unimpressed with the Iroquois argument, Schuyler assured them of English protection and ordered them not to allow French forts in their village.<sup>194</sup>

After the failure of the Canadian expedition, Hunter again met with the Five Nations in the presence of Nicholson and Peter Schuyler on October 9, 1711. De Canasora, the Five Nation's spokesman, urged Hunter to fortify Albany and Schenectady lest the French "...take the town with fifty men." Seeking to reassure the Iroquois, Hunter proposed to build a fort now in the Mohawk

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<sup>194</sup>Colonel Peter Schuyler's Journal, Onodate [Onodaga?], N.P., N.D., CSP Col., XXV, 864i.

country and one at Onondaga in the spring. He would also send a missionary to them after the forts were built. The governor took this occasion to criticize the Iroquois sachems for their horse stealing and cattle killing in New England, requiring them to control their young braves. At this same meeting, Hendrick (of the Mohawks) gave Hunter a letter for the Bishop of Canterbury requesting a missionary. Most importantly, however, the Indians withheld agreement about the forts especially the one proposed for Onondaga.<sup>195</sup>

Hunter was conscious of the need for forts in the Iroquois country. Yet in proposing construction of new forts, he was deviating slightly from his Instructions. His 97th Instruction advised Hunter that money had been previously given to Bellomont for construction of a fort at Onondaga, but construction of this fort had never been intended to interfere with the repair of the forts at Albany or Schenectady. The Board of Trade informed Secretary Stanhope in 1715 that £500 had been sent to Bellomont shortly before his death but after Cornbury took over the colony, nothing more was heard about either the fort or the money.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>195</sup>Conference between Hunter and Indian tribes, Albany, October 9, 1711, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 278-279.

<sup>196</sup>"Hunter's Instructions", N.P., December 27, 1709, Ibid., p. 140. Instruction no. 97; Board of Trade to Stanhope, London, November 18, 1715, Ibid., pp. 467-469.



Hunter and Nicholson together executed a contract with five men from Schenectady to erect a fort in Mohawk country complete with a chapel by the winter of 1711. Payment was £100 in ten days and £400 more when the fort was completed. The fort in Onondaga also was to cost £500 and was to be completed no later than July 1, 1713. Both forts were to be 150 feet square with four blockhouses, each 20 feet square, two stories high and able to hold 20 men each. Although the contract was made for two forts, a year later, Hunter reported to Dartmouth that the fort in Mohawk country had been built but there were difficulties in building the one at Onondaga. The governor did not elaborate upon the problem, but it is probable that the Iroquois were stalling the English about this fort.<sup>197</sup>

The Iroquois were extremely successful delaying the English plans to erect a fort at Onondaga. In July 1718, Hunter was still informing the Board of Trade that he would build a fort there as soon as he could obtain permission from the Five Nations. Moreover, the English were not the only ones seeking to fortify Onondaga. Hunter was advised in early July, 1715 by the merchant Caleb Heathcote that the French had returned to Onondaga in force with the intention to erect a fort there. Heathcote added

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<sup>197</sup>Contract to build Forts between Governor Hunter and General Nicholson and Garet Symonce, et al, Albany, October 11, 1711, *Ibid.*, pp. 279-281; Governor Hunter to Dartmouth, New York, October 31, 1712, *CSP Col.*, XXVII, #123.

his opinion, "...but it must be very plain that the French would not have come on that errand had they not first debauched the Indians and been sure of them." During his August 1715 meeting with the Five Nations, Hunter did not press the issue of alleged French attempts to fortify Onondaga. But two years later, in June, 1717, Hunter did insist that he be informed if the French had built a fort at Terondoquat in the Seneca country. De Canasora informed him that it was not a fort but a trading post whereupon Hunter demanded that the French be expelled from their trading post. Indeed, maneuvering did not just occur to build a fort at either Onondaga or Terondoquat. Both the French and English had similar designs at Niagara as a location for a military post. De Canasora met with the Indian Commissioners on or about the day in July, 1719 when Hunter was boarding ship for his return to England. The Onondaga sachem advised the commissioners that the French were building a fort at Niagara to block trade with the Far Western Tribes. But when the commissioners asked him to intercede with the Senecas to have them demolish the fort, De Canasora declined, claiming that he had come privately to tell the commissioners of this. In 1720, the English proposed putting up a fort at Niagara. At the same time, their French rivals dispatched Chabert de Joncaire to obtain the Senecas' permission to build at Niagara. Permission was given whereupon the French erected their fort on the east side of the Niagara River just below the falls. However, the

Indians counterbalanced this fort by allowing the English to erect a fort at Oswego in 1724, which precluded their being completely dominated by the French.<sup>198</sup>

This persistent effort by both European powers to place forts at either Onondaga or Niagara was linked to both trade with and control of the Indians. Just as the French openly sought peace with the Indians to encourage their trading with them, the English also desired trade with the Indians. The Iroquois, better than the other tribes, knew that trade was important to both the English and French and they used this knowledge in their dealings with the European nations. Since better prices were paid for furs at Albany than at Montreal, sitting astride an important route to New York gave the Iroquois a big advantage in dealing with the English. In effect, the Five Nations acted as middlemen permitting the Hurons, Miamis, Ottowas and other western tribes to trade much desired marten, otter, fox, weasel and bear skins as well as beaver pelts at Albany.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>198</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, July 7, 1718, Ibid., XXX, #600; Caleb Heathcote to Hunter, Scarsdale, July 8, 1715, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 430-431; Conference between Hunter and Five Nations, Albany, June 13, 1717, Ibid., pp. 485-486; Cadwallader Colden Papers, NY HS Coll., IX, p. 432; Eccles, pp. 142-143.

<sup>199</sup>Ibid., p. 135.

Between 1700 and 1714, the surplus of beaver pelts in French storehouses permitted them to encourage the Indians to trade these at Albany although they still sought the other furs which came from the Great Lakes region. In 1714, the French discovered that the stored beaver pelts had been ruined by vermin, which now brought them back into great demand. Therefore, hoping to trade more beaver skins while being aware that English trade goods were of better quality and more in demand by the Indians, Vaudreuil imported trade goods from England. He also looked the other way when English merchants from Albany traded at Montreal. But out of their own self-interest, the Iroquois could not allow either the French or English to trade directly with the far western tribes. Their refusal to allow English fortifications at Onondaga while permitting fortification of Niagara was intended to contain the English whom they believed more powerful than the French.<sup>200</sup>

Just as trade was important to the English, it was equally so to the Indians. During the August 1710 meetings with the Iroquois, Hunter was asked by them to provide better trading terms. The governor readily agreed to do the best he could. One year later, awareness of the continuing secret trade between merchants of Albany and Montreal with the French Indians elicited De Canasora's request that Hunter assign the fur traders to accompany the

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<sup>200</sup>Ibid., pp. 145, 135-137.

1711 expedition to Canada. Hunter parried this request by informing the Onondaga that the traders would accompany the expedition at their option. Although this did not satisfy the Indians, they did not press the issue. But the Five Nations were budding neophyte businessmen. They also became aware of an increased demand for beaver pelts as well as other furs after 1714. Therefore, at Albany in August, 1715 De Canasora confidentially advised Hunter that the Five Nations would never again join the English in a war against Canada since the price of trade goods had not been made cheaper to them. Hunter's reply was an attempt at a simplified explanation of the theory of price and demand to convince De Canasora that he alone had no control over market conditions. He agreed that the war was over but the peace was still new which had not yet given prices enough time to rise as they inevitably would. Meanwhile, if any Indians were being cheated, they had merely to complain to the commissioner who would investigate the case and punish the guilty. Evidently the English failed to correct this situation to the Iroquois satisfaction. In 1717, De Canasora informed Hunter that the so-called fort built by the French at Terondoquat was actually a trade house, allowed there by the Indians in an effort to control the illicit reselling of English goods to the Indians. At the same meeting, De Canasora reminded Hunter of the unfavorable trade dealings between the Five

Nations and traders to which the governor again reiterated his inability to control supply and demand factors. Guarded sarcasm tinged his advice to them that they could avoid the traders who intercepted the Indians two or three miles from Albany by setting up on a hillside and selling their pelts retail. A few months later, in November 1717, Cayenquarahte (Blue Beak) a loyal Seneca chief, likewise complained to Hunter about the prohibition on trade between the Indians and French while the whites openly traded with the French. This gave the English an unfair trade advantage over the Iroquois. During much of Hunter's administration, the Indians continued to complain about the high price of trade goods, blatant English trading with the French and outright cheating of Indians by plying them with alcoholic beverages. What the Indians had complained about touched the base of Hunter's political power-structure at Albany. Available records do not indicate his ever having enforced official promises to deal fairly with the Indians. Indeed, as long as Hunter's aggression was revived and hurled at the English with

201 Minutes of meetings between Hunter and Indian tribes, August 7, 1710 through August 20, 1710, *OSP Col.*, 224, 231-2; Meeting between Hunter and Five Nations, Albany, August 25, 1711, *NY Col. Doc.*, V, pp. 369-270; Meeting between Hunter and De Cansora, Albany, August 28, 1715, *ibid.*, pp. 436, 442; Private Conference between Hunter and De Cansora, Albany, June 13, 1717, *ibid.*, p. 486; Private conference between Hunter and De Cansora, Albany, June 15, 1717, *ibid.*, pp. 488-489; *Golden Papers, NY HS Coll.*, II, p. 430.

concerned himself merely with the official correctness of relations with the Iroquois and other tribes, the Albany merchants continued to have a free hand.<sup>201</sup>

Indian dissatisfaction stemming from unfair trade dealings at Albany was accompanied by the French planted suspicion that the English planned to exterminate them. This recurring rumor had become a tool used by the Iroquois to conclude yearly renewals of the Covenant Chain to obtain their yearly gifts from Hunter. Their suspicion of being annihilated by the English occasionally put the English on the defensive whenever this subject came up, since there undoubtedly were some whites who had this desire. Hunter first encountered this obsession on the part of the Iroquois after Peter Schuyler returned from Onondaga [Onondaga] in May, 1711. At the time, French agents had spread rumors among the Five Nations that following the expedition against Canada, the English would exterminate them. Apparently De Canasora talked a number of angry braves out of rising against the whites but this grim accusation was revived and hurled at the English with

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<sup>201</sup>Minutes of meetings between Hunter and Indian tribes, August 7, 1710 through August 20, 1710, CSP Col., XXV, #834i; Meeting between Hunter and Five Nations, Albany, August 25, 1711, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 369-270; Meeting between Hunter and De Canasora, Albany, August 28, 1715, Ibid., pp. 438, 442; Private Conference between Hunter and De Canasora, Albany, June 13, 1717, Ibid., p. 486; Private conference between Hunter and De Canasora, Albany, June 15, 1717, Ibid., pp. 488-489; Colden Papers, NY HS Coll., IX, p. 430.

monotonous regularity almost yearly. According to Cadwallader Colden's Papers, the September, 1713 conference held at Albany was called to calm down the Iroquois after the French stirred-up this suspicion that they would be overwhelmed by the English. The French used circumstantial evidence to convince them of this. They emphasized the conflict between the Flatheads and whites in Carolina now that the Tuscaroras had been defeated, hinted that Nicholson's troops were now available for a take-over of Indian lands, made much over the dearness of powder for Indians and thought it strange that the English were now neglecting their former Indian allies. Unable to attend this conference because of the Assembly's sitting, Hunter sent Hendrick Hansen to Onondaga to reassure the Iroquois. Although Hansen did not refute the French arguments point-by-point, he did try to convey the idea to the Indians that the English did desire to renew the Covenant Chain and were indeed still their friends. Between the years 1713 and 1717, Hunter and his Indian Commissioners were able to keep the Iroquois reasonably satisfied to be under English protection and friendship.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>202</sup>Colonel Peter Schuyler's Journal, Onondaga [Onondaga?], N.P., N.D., CSP Col., XXIV, #864i; Cadwallader Colden Papers, NY HS Coll., IX, p. 410; *Ibid.*, p. 416; Journal of Hendrick Hansen, meeting with Iroquois, Onondaga, September 20, 1713, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 374.



However when Hunter met with the Iroquois in June, 1717, he was again forced to deny that the English had designs of attacking them. De Canasora disbelieved Hunter, informing him of the ever persistent rumor that all Christians were planning to destroy the Indians in North America. According to this rumor, the King of England with the Regent of France had become partners in such a scheme. For now the Indians would suspend belief in the rumor but De Canasora warned that if the whites tried to exterminate them, the Iroquois would resist to the last man. During the conference, Hunter changed the subject by informing De Canasora that he had received word from the Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia, Spotswood, that last April the Iroquois had attacked a band of Catawbas who had surrendered and had come to Fort Christiana to return their captives. In the attack five Catawbas were killed and two were wounded. Their chief, Willmannantanghkee was captured and taken to New York with five other prisoners. Governor Spotswood called this attack a violation of the peace treaty signed over thirty-two years ago between the Five Nations and Virginia at Albany. He demanded both reparations and a conference in Virginia to resolve the incident. The Five Nations readily admitted that they had indeed attacked the Catawbas [or Toderichroone], citing their treacherous attack upon a Cayuga war party in 1714 as their reason. Since the Catawbas were friends of the

English, they would not attack them again but neither would they go to Virginia where they feared further ambush. Albany was the original treaty site between the Iroquois and Virginians, therefore it was only proper that the Virginia governor come to Albany.<sup>203</sup>

Concern about the state of Indian affairs at this time caused the New York Assembly to forward their address to Hunter denouncing Samuel Mulford's ill-advised memorial which proposed an English takeover of Indian lands. The Assembly rightly feared that the Indians would be informed of Mulford's memorial's contents by the French if it fell into their hands. Worse, the French could make the memorial appear to be a proposal before the Parliament and fear of the Iroquois reaction to this misinformation was why the Assembly, as well as Hunter, demanded Mulford's punishment. At this same time, Lieutenant-Governor Spotswood arrived at New York to meet with the governors of New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland while the colonies were at peace with the Indians to plan how to deal with them in the future. Hunter was un-able to meet with the governors because the New York Assembly was in session. Therefore Spotswood left his written comments concerning the Indians with Hunter and since winter was approaching,

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<sup>203</sup>Conference between Hunter and Five Nations, Albany, June 13, 1717 through June 17, 1717, *Ibid.*, pp. 484-487, 490-492.

he returned to Virginia without meeting with the Iroquois. According to Colden's account of this incident, in the summer of the following year, a number of sachems referred to this attempted meeting of the governors at Albany. They alleged that the 1717 meeting was a council designed to plan the Indian's destruction. At his September, 1718 meeting with the Iroquois at Albany, Hunter reassured them that their allegation was false. These repeated accusations by the Indians, hinting of their impending destruction, continued to plague Hunter until he left for England. Dealing with the Indians was difficult enough at best but it was almost impossible while the French kept reminding them about the English intention to destroy the Five Nations.<sup>204</sup>

Not just the French, but the Dutch and Palatines provided some measure of irritation to the Iroquois. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts assigned a minister, one Mr. Andrews to Fort Hunter in the Mohawk country. Arriving at Albany in November, 1712, the Missionary was soon sent forward to Fort Hunter at Tion-andarogue. Displaying an intense animosity for the English, the Dutch settlers around Albany told the Mohawks that the

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<sup>204</sup>Address of Assembly of New York to Governor Hunter, New York, October 4, 1717, CSP Col., XXX, #126; Spotswood to Board of Trade, Virginia, February 25, 1718, Ibid., #406; Cadwallader Colden Papers, NY HS Coll., IX, p. 430.

missionary was greedy and would soon take the Indian's land. The other source of irritation inadvertently came from the Palatines. While each individual Indian family held a garden plot in severality with other families, the hunting lands were owned and used by the Nation as a whole. Studies of available records have failed to discover whether any one individual Indian actually owned or pretended to own any of the land they inhabited. Therefore, all tribes were concerned when individuals ostensibly "sold" land to whites. Both the "seller" and buyer pretended that the transaction was consummated on behalf of the tribe while in reality the sachems sought to have the deals nullified. As directed in Instruction Number One Hundred, Hunter himself tried to obtain land from the Indians. He succeeded in reobtaining the Schoharie grant from Hendrick, the "Mohawk", at Fort Hunter on August 22, 1710. When this land was later "sold" to the Palatines and Five Partners, the Indians were unhappy about this. Although the Mohawks tolerated the Palatines on their land, their presence was not desired.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>205</sup>Col. Nicholson's Memorandum to Earl of Dartmouth, N.P., March 25, 1712, CSP Col., XXVI, #359; Earl of Dartmouth to Hunter, Whitehall, March 27, 1712, Ibid., #361; Knittel, pp. 152-153; Trelease, pp. 17-18.

<sup>206</sup>Dartmouth to All Governors, Whitehall, August 21, 1712, CSP Col., XXVII, #50; Dartmouth to all Governors, Whitehall, August 28, 1712, Ibid., #66.

Persistent agitation by French activists, combined with occasional irritations by the Dutch and Palatines seriously hindered Hunter in controlling the Indians. Although he did obtain their participation in the 1711 expedition against Canada, the governor found it difficult to make the Iroquois conform to his immediate needs. Part of the problem was caused by the sudden policy shift toward France after 1712 when Dartmouth ordered all colonial governors to implement a truce with France by September 8 of that year. In both his letters of late August, 1712 to the governors, Dartmouth impressed upon them the Queen's orders that under no circumstances were there to be any incidents to mar this truce. Hunter was able to obtain compliance with the Indians regarding the truce, but outside circumstances made his task difficult.<sup>206</sup>

Not having received their yearly present for renewal of the Covenant Chain, the Iroquois again felt ignored by the English. Constantly reminded by the French that the English were now at war with the Tuscaroras in the Carolinas, while being angered by the ever-present rum trading which degraded and cheated the Indians, the Five Nations defiantly offered sanctuary to some 600 warriors and 400 old men and boys of the Tuscaroras in the spring of

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<sup>206</sup>Dartmouth to All Governors, Whitehall, August 21, 1712, CSP Col., XXVII, #50; Dartmouth to all Governors, Whitehall, August 28, 1712, ibid., #66.

1713. Meeting secretly at Onondaga, the Iroquois sachems, in direct opposition to English desires, resolved to seek their own separate peace with France, to grant free access to the French traders, to seek easier passage to Canada, to demand more cheap powder, to communicate more often and truthfully with each other, to strive for closer friendship with each other and to avoid helping Hunter in further plans of war. Unfortunately for the Indians, this secret meeting's resolutions were divulged to the Indian Commissioners by a couple of Iroquois in league with the British. This treachery stifled their one large attempt at independent action. But the resolutions adopted at the secret meeting indicate that French propaganda combined with English abuses to alienate the Iroquois from the English at this time. Certainly the Indians were hesitant to take this step again after they had been betrayed and certainly they were not unaware that the recently concluded truce with the French gave the English a capability of combining against the Five Nations. It was also probable that French propaganda stressing English intentions to annihilate the Indians was originally intended to make the English look bad, but it also tacitly implied an available option to the French if they could not enjoy satisfactory relations with the Indians. During the September meetings at Onondaga with Hendrick Hansen, the Indians agreed not to fight against the Canadians or their Indian allies, not to hinder Indians

who sought to trade with the English and they even offered to mediate the conflict between the English in Carolina and their Tuscarora bretheren who had recently rejoined the Iroquois Confederacy.<sup>207</sup>

The Iroquois offer to mediate the conflict between the English and Tuscaroras was not accepted. Hunter had learned in April 1712 of the Tuscarora effort to enlist the Five Nations and he had tried to stop the Iroquois from joining while seeking to pacify the Tuscaroras. Citing the senseless killing of two Tuscaroras who had been caught stealing tobacco as the cause of the conflict, the Iroquois agreed to stay neutral if a few white New Yorkers accompanied them to Carolina to settle the matter. Despite Hunter's and the Iroquois efforts, in late August the Board of Trade notified Dartmouth that the Five Nations intended to ally themselves with the Tuscaroras in North Carolina, probably instigated by the French to do so. Sporadic combat took place making the situation grow worse. In September, 1714, Hunter was again forced to order the Five Nations to refrain from fighting against the French, the English colonists and any Indians protected by the Crown, particularly the Flatheads. The Iroquois agreed to try

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<sup>207</sup>Cadwallader Colden Papers, NY HS Coll., IX, pp. 413-416; Conference between Hendrick Hansen and Five Nations, Onondaga, September, 1713, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 372-376.

and observe this set of demands, but De Canasora notified the Indian Commissioners in February 1715 that the Flatheads were being attacked by war parties that had gone south before the sachems could stop them. Fearing an all-out Indian war in the colonies in July, 1715, Hunter advised Popple that he now wanted the Iroquois to fight any Indians who might attack them. Since their offer of mediation had been rejected last year, he doubted that he would have any luck but he would try to enlist the Iroquois to help the whites.<sup>208</sup>

At Albany during the late summer conference with the Indians, Hunter renewed the Covenant Chain and sought their cooperation in fighting against the Flatheads of South Carolina. The Iroquois price for their cooperation was favorable trade concessions by the whites and better arms to fight with. In a later September letter to the Board of Trade, Hunter referred to "...our Indian Traders who are more intent on their privat profit than the publick good..." as hard bargainers who drove a hard bargain. He justified sending arms to them by saying that "...For my part I can see no otherway of putting an end to

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<sup>208</sup>Cadwallader Colden Papers, NY HS Coll., IX, p. 409; Board of Trade to Dartmouth, Whitehall, August 27, 1712, CSP Col., XXVII, #64. The Board of Trade was notified of this by Hunter in a letter sent on June 23, 1712; Meeting between Hunter and Five Nations, Albany, September 23 and 25, 1714, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 383, 384; Cadwallader Colden Papers, NY HS Coll., IX, p. 418; Hunter to Popple, New York, July 2, 1715, CSP Col., XXVIII, #497.



the Carolina war and preventing a more general one but this...." This meeting in August was an example of English portrayal of their reasons for enlisting the Indians aid. On August 29, 1715, Hunter informed the Iroquois sachems that he was asking their help against the Flatheads who had begun attacking whites in Carolina. He reminded them that the Flatheads had asked the English to join them against the Five Nations but the English refused because the Iroquois are friends and in alliance with the Crown. Disagreeing with Hunter over his interpretation of events, the Iroquois advised the governor that theirs was the more accurate version of this affair. Rather, the English had induced the Flatheads to fight against the Tuscaroras, promising them better trade conditions. After the Tuscaroras were defeated, these trade advantages they had been promised were not given. When the Flatheads tried to collect them, the English turned on them. However, the Flatheads were old enemies, so the Iroquois would accept the Covenant Chain from King George I and go on the war path. Thus, in the letter of September 29, 1715, Hunter reminded the Board of Trade that the new monarch ought to send a present to the Indians. Secretary Stanhope also advised the Board of the great need for the King to send

a present to the Indians and urged the Board to prevail on the Crown to do this. After this September meeting at Albany, Indian activities picked up.<sup>209</sup>

During the fall of 1715, efforts on the part of the Five Nations obtained two prisoners and twenty Flat-head scalps, five of which were obtained by Mohawks. However, this fighting was hard on the Iroquois. By accident, a party of Mohawks blundered into a party of Onondagas and before each party recognized the other was an ally, two Onondagas were killed. When the spring of 1716 arrived, Hunter was indeed able to inform the Board of Trade that the Iroquois were effectively engaged with the opposing Indians in Carolina where they would again return to fight next year.<sup>210</sup>

During the three years following, the Iroquois were actively fighting in the south. Their war with the Catawbas has been noted above but urged by Virginia, Hunter prevailed upon them to renew their covenant with

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<sup>209</sup>Meeting between Hunter and Five Nations, Albany, August 27, 28, 31, 1715, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 437-439, 439-443, 443-445; Meeting between Five Nations and Livingston, Albany, September 2, 1715, ibid., pp. 446, 447; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, September 29, 1715, ibid., p. 436; Conference between Hunter and Iroquois, Albany, August 31, 1715, ibid., pp. 443-444; Stanhope to Board of Trade, Whitehall, November 9, 1715, CSP Col., XXVIII, #662i.

<sup>210</sup>Cadwallader Colden Papers, NY HS Coll., IX, p. 423; Hunter to Board of Trade, Amboy, New Jersey, April 30, 1716, CSP Col., XXIX, #133.

that colony. For a short time, it appeared that trouble had been averted but under continued pressure by the Canadian governor, a party of 400 or 500 braves again set out to fight in South Carolina. The Indian Commissioners, upon learning of this, rushed their interpreter to intercept the war party and persuade them to return to New York. He caught up with the warriors at the banks of the Susquehanna River on September 2, 1717 where their speaker, Canoquanie, informed the interpreter of their plan to attack Indians living 600 miles from any English settlements in order not to bring dishonor on Governor Hunter. The Indians believed that the governor of Virginia had been deceived and they offered their help to him in getting rid of the treacherous Catawbas. Although the records do not indicate this, it is probable that the large war party returned to New York.<sup>211</sup>

After Hunter sailed for England, the Five Nations were not officially engaged in sanctioned combat. President of Council Peter Schuyler advised the Board of Trade in late November, 1719 that the Indians were still eager to fight in the south and he warned the Lords of Trade that trouble was imminent. Trying to avert this trouble, the

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<sup>211</sup>Conference between Hunter and Five Nations, Albany, June 13, 1717 through June 17, 1717, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 484-495; Hunter to Board of Trade, N.P., July, 1717, CSP Col., XXIX, #690; Cadwallader Colden Papers, NY HS Coll., IX, pp. 428-429. The interpreter was not identified by Colden.

Indian Commissioners met at Albany with the Senecas between April 23 and June 3, 1720 to turn their attention to the French whose fort at Niagara was a more immediate threat to them. The Commissioners met with success in diverting the Indians from their plan to wage war further in the south. After 1720, the Iroquois met with increased French pressure to lure them away from the English, to involve them in war with other tribes and to obtain exclusive trade privileges with them.<sup>212</sup>

Hunter's orders to control the Indians, keep them trading with the English, obtain their support against the French and to induce them to part with their lands met with obstruction from the Iroquois themselves who did not "belong" to anyone. The Indians had been pursued by the French for much the same objectives as the English had and this gave the Iroquois some bargaining power. When the English needed the Five Nation's war prowess to oppose the French, this provided the Iroquois with even more bargaining power. But the most important area of Franco-Indian relations was certainly that of trade. Located at the gateway to the eastern trading posts through which the far western tribes had to come, while being resentful over the cheating of their

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<sup>212</sup>Peter Schuyler to Board of Trade, New York, November 21, 1719, CSP Col., XXXI, #460; Conference between Indian Commissioners and Indian tribes, Albany, April 23, 1720 through June 3, 1720, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 542-545. From this point on, the Iroquois were under great pressure from the French to ally with them.

fellow tribesmen by unscrupulous traders, the Iroquois connected trading rights with preferential treatment shown to other tribes. In the end, Hunter's realization of the Iroquois importance which lead to his deferential handling of them, coupled with Vaudreuil's failure to strike back decisively after the Anglo-Indian expedition of 1711 despite his threat of retaliatory action, were the two primary reasons for the ability and success of the English in retaining the loyalty of "their" Indians.

But the ever-present problems of civil life in the colony, profoundly affected by economic and religious events, continually required Hunter's time, skill and attention. Conditions in New York during Hunter's administration were violent and unsettled.

At least one historian specializing in the study of colonial New York has identified the lack of a hereditary aristocracy as one reason for the instability and faction there. However, in lieu of an aristocracy there were a few achievers who became moderately wealthy which inspired others to emulate them. These less successful people had made continual and determined efforts to succeed in trade, agriculture, politics and religion which created and increased faction. This constant drive to succeed in

## CHAPTER VI

## CIVIL LIFE, COMMERCE AND CHRISTIANITY

During the nine years Governor Robert Hunter administered New York, he dealt with conflicts involving the Indians on an irregular yet continuing basis. Although he could not escape these problems, Hunter was at least separated from them in both time and distance. But the ever-present problems of civil life in the colony, profoundly affected by economic and religious events, continually required Hunter's time, skill and attention. Conditions in New York during Hunter's administration were violent and unsettled.

At least one historian specializing in the study of colonial New York has identified the lack of a hereditary aristocracy as one reason for the instability and faction there. However, in lieu of an aristocracy there were a few achievers who became moderately wealthy which inspired others to emulate them. These less successful people had made continual and determined efforts to succeed in trade, agriculture, politics and religion which created and increased faction. This constant drive to succeed in

a chosen endeavor produced and maintained an indication that social mobility existed in New York.<sup>213</sup>

However the impression of unlimited social mobility in the colony was not quite accurate. There were individual protests against the system by those who aspired to higher status in the colony, but failed to achieve it. One man's resentment against Hunter and his friends, Lewis Morris and Robert Livingston, Senior, was expressed in 1716 by Thomas Clarke which resulted in Clarke's indictment for sedition by the New York Grand Jury. Among other statements, Clarke had declared that the best jobs in North America and the West Indies were held by Scotsmen like Hunter. Around this same time, criticisms voiced by Samuel Mulford were also current and had some effect.<sup>214</sup>

Conversely, while Governor Robert Hunter's New York was a factious and unsettled place it experienced a steady population growth. Hunter's Instructions required him to advise the Board of Trade concerning the province's population as well as its birth and deaths. On June 23,

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<sup>213</sup>Bonomi, pp. 7, 10-11.

<sup>214</sup>Bill of Indictment Found by Grand Jury of New York, Found Against Thomas Clarke, Merchant, N.P., N.D., CSP Col., XXIX, #133iii. Clarke also denounced the late King William as a foreigner who could not dispose of his property after his death. Mulford has already been discussed in Chapters II, III and IV.

1712, Hunter wrote the Board of Trade that he had undertaken their required census of New York, but he had only obtained replies from five counties for the moment. Returns indicated that in these reporting counties, the population had increased from 7, 767 Christians (white people) in 1703 to 10, 511 in 1712. The number of slaves had increased from 1,301 to 1,775 in the intervening nine years, which gave the colony a known total of 12,286 inhabitants. New York City and County combined had a total of 5,840 people as the largest entity whereas Orange County had 439 inhabitants to have the dubious distinction of being the smallest. "As to births and burials", Hunter advised the Board, "there has never beene any register kept that I can heare of, neither is there any possibility of doing it, untill such time as ye countyes are subdivided into parishes, great numbers remaineing unchristened for want of ministers...". Despite the shortage of accurate information concerning the colony's birth and death records, it was apparent that New York was increasing in population.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>215</sup>"Hunter's Instructions", N.P., December 27, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 133. Instruction No. 54 required the census be taken, not having been done since 1703 and Instruction No. 55 required the recording of births and burials; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, June 23, 1712, CSP Col., XXVI, # 454. The reporting counties in order of size were: New York City and County, 5,580; Westchester, 2,803; Kings County, 1,925; Richmond County, 1,279 and Orange County, 439. Counties not reporting in time for Hunter's report along with their 1703 populations were: Queens County, 4,392; Suffolk County, 3,346; Albany City and County, 2,273 and Ulster combined with Dutchess County, 1,669.



Along with the requirement that he supply the Board of Trade with census information, Hunter's Instructions Numbers 56 and 57 expected the governor to train "Christians" (or whites) in the militia under the proper officers, yet their training was not to be too much of an inconvenience to them. During these years of conflict with the French, the militia was occasionally pressed into service against the Canadians and Indians. However, within the first two years of Hunter's administration, units were also called out to suppress an unexpected Negro uprising.<sup>216</sup>

As he reported the incomplete census to the Board, Hunter also advised them that "...some slaves of this place had resolved to revenge themselves for some hard usage they apprehended to have received from their masters...." According to Hunter's version of the affair, around twenty-three Negroes armed with swords, hatchets and firearms met at one Mr. Crook's orchard on Long Island at midnight, April 6, 1712. An out building belonging to a Mr. Vantilburgh was burned by his slave named Coffee and this blaze aroused the alarmed citizenry. Understandably,

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<sup>216</sup>Hunter's Instructions, N.P., December 27, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 133. Instruction No. 56 stipulated that all "Christians" (whites) were to be in the Militia. Instruction No. 57 required reasonable drill hours; The Second Canadian Expedition in 1711 was discussed in Chapter IV.

and alarms of the people had subsided, the sheriff himself asked that the prisoners be acquitted. Hunter advised the Board that the Attorney General, Thomas Bickley, opposed releasing Mars on the official grounds that it would weaken the case he had against the guilty Negroes. However Hunter alleged that "This prosecution was carried on to gratify some private pique of Mr. Bickley's against Mr. Regnier, a gentleman of his own profession...." Unimpressed by the evidence against Mars the governor asked that the Board intercede to the Crown for the hapless wretch as well as for one Hosea, slave of a Mr. Wenham, and John, another slave of Vantilburgh's. Both Hosea and John had been brought into New York about six or seven years ago on a privateer from the West Indies. Hunter referred to these two as "Spanish Indians" although they claimed to be freemen and subjects of Spain. Due to their swarthy color along with their inability to prove their freeman status and Spanish citizenship these men had been made slaves. Regretably, Hunter said that it was "...not in my power to releive them." He argued that in the West Indies only a few slaves would have been executed for conspiracy whereas in New York twenty-one had already been executed and six had committed suicide. Accordingly, the governor had reprieved all these individuals including others such as Coffee, a Negro who belonged to Mr. Walton and Tom, a black who was owned by Rip Van Dam. Since the Crown had

to approve all such acts by the governor, Hunter could only temporarily reprieve these prisoners subject to royal approbation of his acts. He therefore asked the Board's intercession because the affair had already been too bloody. Despite the Board's compliance with Hunter's request, as late as September, 1713, the governor still hoped that Coffee and Tom would be pardoned, "...for there has been much blood shed already on that account, I'm afraid too much, and the people are now easy...." Although the people were "now easy" the lot of blacks was not improved but rather, made worse because of the rebellion.<sup>217</sup>

Ostensibly Negroes and other servants in New York were protected from cruel and inhuman treatment by Hunter's 89th Instruction which also called for execution of those who murdered or otherwise mistreated Indians or Negroes. Instruction Number 90 called for the conversion to Christianity of Negroes and Indians. To this end Anglican missionaries and the catechist, Elias Neau of New York opened schools to work with the blacks. Unfortunately, the riot of 1712 resulted in the closing of Neau's school

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<sup>217</sup>Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, June 23, 1712, CSP Col., #454; Board of Trade to Dartmouth, Whitehall, August 27, 1712, Ibid., XXVII, #64, also found in NY Col. Doc., V, p. 346; Hunter to Earl of Dartmouth, New York, June 23, 1712, CSP Col., XXVI, #456; Hunter to Popple, New York, September 10, 1713, Ibid., XXVII, #461.

for a while. Nor was the closing of the few religious schools for Negroes the lone result of the first racial disturbance in New York. Legislation was also enacted by the General Assembly which further imposed drastic limits upon Negro activities.<sup>218</sup>

Alarmed and angered by the slave rebellion, the General Assembly enacted and passed "An Act for preventing Suppressing and punishing the Conspiracy and Insurrection of Negroes and other Slaves" in mid December, 1712. Any minimal personal activities slaves had previously participated in were denied to them by this act. Buying, selling and otherwise trading with slaves without their owner's consent was outlawed, carrying an L5 fine for each offense along with confiscation of the goods. The guilty slave could be punished by the owner but this punishment could not include either loss of limb or life. To eliminate the danger of another insurrection, this act forbade assembly of three or more slaves without their master's permission if they were not together to perform some specified task. Violation of this part of the act was punishable by a maximum of forty lashes for each offender at the discretion of the Justice of the Peace of

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<sup>218</sup>"Hunter's Instructions", NP, December 27, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 138. Instruction No.89: Ibid., Instruction No. 90; Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century. (3 Vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1924), II, pp. 35, 20.

that community. Each town and manor was required to appoint "...a common Whipper for their Slaves..." whose fee was paid by the slave's master and which fee was not to exceed three shillings. Striking a "...Freeman or woman, professing Christianity..." would be punished by corporal punishment agreed upon by two justices of the peace but in no instance was life or limb to be taken. To make escape difficult for slaves and keep them under tight control, it became illegal to "...imploy, harbour, conceal or entertain..." another person's slaves without the owner's consent. Violations of this act were subject to a £5 fine for each day or night they harbored the slave. Anyone aiding a slave to escape had to repay the slave's value to the owner if the poor wretch was killed, lost or in some way managed to make good his escape. Teeth were put into this act through a clause which made showing mercy to a guilty slave a crime in its own right. Evidently some colonial slave owners had shown leniency in such cases for this clause was phrased "...whereas it often happens..." when it described the failure of some owners to prosecute either the slaves or their accomplices. For showing a willingness to be lenient, owners would now forfeit twice the sum the guilty party would have had to pay with half that sum going to the Crown and the other half going to the town or county of their residence. Those who had knowledge that this law had been broken yet did

not inform on the guilty or refused to testify against them were liable to a fine of £ 2. In the event one could not pay the fine, he would be "...committed to Gaole till he pay and satisfy the said Sum of forty Shillings and charges accruing thereon..." Sympathetic blacks, Indians and mulattoes who had been former slaves would be fined £ 10 for every night they harbored a slave. Further, blacks, Indians and mulattoes who were freed from the date of this act were forbidden to "...enjoy, hold or possess any Houses, Lands, Tenements or Heridatments within this Colony...". Any property they might have owned was now given in escheat to the Crown. "And Whereas it is found by Experience, that the free Negroes of the Colony are an Idle slothfull people prove very often a charge on the place where they are..." indicated the extent of racism in New York as the door to freedom via manumission was closed to slaves. Under the new act, an owner seeking to free his slave had to post a £ 200 bond with the Crown guaranteeing that he would pay his freed slave £ 200 per year for the duration of his life. Slaves being manumitted through a last will and testament were not exempt from this arrangement which meant that the owner had to make prior arrangements to comply with the law or else his executors had to do it. This part of the act seems to have caused problems since five years later an act to clarify this clause was adopted. The clause had been found "...to be very Inconvenient, prejudicial, and in a

manner, a prohibition to Liberty..." which must have discouraged Negroes from serving their masters well and faithfully "...as they ought to doe..." Instead of limiting the ability to manumit a slave to the owner or upon his death, to his executors, the new act was modified to allow the freed slave to be financially assisted by "...any other sufficient person..." Undoubtedly the colony was concerned with having to support these slaves whose masters did not make provision for their freedom. The act of 1712 also called for the death penalty for slaves found guilty of murder, rape, mayhem, insurrection or conspiracy. One lone qualification to this clause identified killing of both slaves and non-slaves by accident or in the pursuit of justice as being both non-criminal and thus non-punishable. Otherwise, offenders accused of such crimes would have a complaint lodged against them to the County Justice of the Peace. Upon receipt of the complaint, the Justice would issue a warrant to the constable for the apprehension of the offender. With the suspect in custody, the Justice would issue a call for two other Justices who then jointly summoned five principal freeholders of the county to constitute a body tribunal which then examined the suspect. If the offender confessed his guilt, he could be condemned to death if any seven of the eight committeemen concurred on the verdict. They had the authority to have the sentence carried out as rapidly as possible. A

suspect refusing to plead was presumed guilty and was sentenced to death whether actually guilty or not. Jury trials composed of twelve men sitting in judgement on a suspect who pled but did not admit guilt would be held only at the request of the owner who had to pay for the jury (not above 9 shillings, total). Along with a clause forbidding three blacks to meet together without their master's consent, the 1712 act also carried a clause which forbade Negro, Indian or mulatto slaves to possess any type of firearm except in their master's presence. Violation of this clause carried a maximum of twenty lashes for each offense. Just as private citizens might be reluctant to inform or testify against offenders of this law, it was believed that some public officials might be unduly sympathetic to the plight of the slave, refusing or delaying in its enforcement. Therefore, a fine of £ 2 would be levied against any Justice, constable or other officer who was derelict in his duty. No freeholder could refuse to serve on a jury under penalty of a twenty shilling fine. However, enforcement of this act was financially profitable to officials for they could collect as much as £ 3 for each conviction and execution. The severity of this act required Hunter to answer for it to the Board of Trade. In mid-March, 1713, the governor could only acknowledge the severity of the



legislation and could offer no excuses except that the revolt had put the people in such a mind that they would accept no less of a law.<sup>219</sup>

During Hunter's administration the Crown sought to curb an embarrassing legal abuse. Dartmouth informed the Board of Trade that the Queen was "...much surprised..." to find that several subjects were sent to England from the colonies having been charged with crimes but with no evidence being sent along to support those charges. The Board was ordered to notify all governors that this practice was considered by the Queen to be "...very derogatory to the honour of H(er) M(ajesty's) Government..." and was to be stopped. Although available documents do not discuss this matter nor do they list the official letter sent to Hunter, it was indicative of the unsettled conditions in the colony that such incidents could and probably did occur.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>219</sup>Colonial Laws of New York, I, pp. 761-767; Ibid., pp. 922-923. This act was entitled, "An Act for Explaining and Rendring more Effectual an Act of the General Assembly of this Colony, Entituled, An Act for Preventing, Suppressing and punishing the Conspiracy and Insurrection of Negroes and other Slaves" and it was passed on November 2, 1717; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, March 14, 1713, CSP Col., XXVII, # 293.

<sup>220</sup>Earl of Dartmouth to Board of Trade, Whitehall, August 21, 1712, Ibid., # 49.

Unsettled conditions in the colony were also illustrated by the competition between merchants and land-owners who dominated the economic life of New York. Trade both to and from New York doubled between 1691 and 1712, contributing to the merchants' growth in political power which they were forced to wield as more money was required during the Franco-Indian disputes. During this period, the land-owners often were able to avoid paying their quit-rents. Instead, revenues for this purpose were obtained from the more efficient collection of excises and duties on imported goods. This resulted in merchant opposition to the landed interest which intensified as Hunter began to depend on land-owners like Morris and Livingston for political support.<sup>221</sup>

Hunter's reliance on support from the landed interest automatically resulted in the merchant's creating great difficulty for the governor. Merchants who also became political enemies like Stephen De Lancey, Adolph Philips and Peter Schuyler came perilously close to wrecking Hunter's efforts at establishing financial responsibility and establishing economic stability in the colony. They attempted to block passage of the 1717 act to issue bills of credit with which to settle debts owed to those not included in the settlement of 1714. Hunter's anxiety for the fate of this bill was justifiable since its

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<sup>221</sup> Bonomi, p. 81.

disallowance by the Crown would have flooded New York with worthless money. The governor demonstrated his political astuteness in this matter by simply issuing the bills of credit which forced the Crown to either give its blessing to the act or upset the colony's monetary system. Having made the unavoidable decision to support Hunter's action, the Crown might well have been moved to ultimately replace him to avoid ever being placed in such a position again.<sup>222</sup>

Although Hunter had close ties to the landed proprietors, his instructions expected that he promote trade in the colonies. The 24th Instruction required that he enforce the Act for Encouragement of Trade to America and the 64th Instruction demanded quarterly reports of the value of imported and exported goods be sent to the Board of Trade and Treasury. The 65th Instruction authorized the governor to examine and regulate rates and duties for the improvement of trade while the 78th ordered him to suppress the engrossing of commodities. Additional powers to control

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<sup>222</sup>Letter of Merchants Trading to New York to Board of Trade, N.P. May 2, 1718, CSP Col., XXX, #516; Hunter to Board of Trade; New York, May 3, 1718, Ibid., #518; Hunter to Ambrose Philips, New York, May 3, 1718, Ibid., #519; Hunter to Popple, New York, July 7, 1718, Ibid., #602. Hunter cautioned Popple that the merchants would oppose this act by alleging it would ruin trade; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, August 7, 1718, Ibid., #650. Hunter assured the Board of Trade that New York's currency was 30% more valuable than Boston's. The act was given royal approbation in 1720.

the colony's trade were provided Hunter in the 79th Instruction which required him to encourage merchants to trade with the Royal African Company, in the 80th Instruction which expected the governor to enforce the punctual payment for slaves, in the 81st Instruction which demanded that trade to Africa be conducted in accordance with the Act of 1697 and in the 82nd Instruction which required Hunter to report the number of blacks imported and sold in the colony. Moreover, the 83rd Instruction sought Hunter's report concerning the status of the colony's trade while the 100th Instruction expected him to encourage the Indians to trade with the English and the 101st Instruction desired that he also encourage the production of naval stores. Additional Instructions demanded that Hunter both know and enforce the colony's trade laws.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> "Hunter's Instructions", N.P., December 27, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 128. Instruction No. 24; Ibid., p. 134. Instruction No. 64; Ibid., Instruction No. 65; Ibid., p. 136. Instructions No. 27, 79, 80, 81, 82 and 83; Ibid., p. 140. Instruction No. 100; Ibid., p. 141. Instruction No. 101; "Additional Instructions to Hunter's Instructions", Ibid., p. 144. Additional Instruction No. 1, Ibid., Additional Instruction No. 2 required all ships trading to the Colonies to be of English manufacture and registry. The Master and three-quarters of the crew had to be English on all ships bought after October 6, 1662, except privateers; Ibid., pp. 144-146. Additional Instruction No. 3 forbade shipping of cargoes after March 25, 1698 in any but English hulls; Ibid., pp. 146-147. Additional Instructions 4, 5 and 6 required that ships under 100 tons displacement post a bond of £ 1000 while those over 100 tons had to post a bond of £ 2000.

Examination of Hunter's Instructions also reveals that "trade" was a total concept. At first, a reader might suppose that the production of raw materials was differentiated from the shipment of those goods to England. In fact the Board of Trade concerned itself solely with the total tonnage of goods shipped to the mother country and did not unduly concern itself with production methods except in the case of naval stores where trade was endangered. Production and shipment as a whole made up the concept of trade.

Although records of trade concerning New York are incomplete, available American sources cite a few statistics which indicated that the number of ships sailing from that port of embarkation for the neighboring islands was quite high. Between 1710 and 1716, 609 vessels out of 1,194 (51%) sailed for the West Indies while 429 ships (36%) sailed for neighboring plantations as opposed to 156 ships (13%) that sailed for Europe and England. Comparison of available tonnage figures for those same years indicated that fewer but larger ships sailed for England and the Continent while smaller schooners and sloops engaged in the inter-colonial traffic. From the period between June 24, 1715 to June 24, 1718, 645 ships sailed from New York carrying a total of 22,392 tons of cargo. Of that number, 250 ships (38%) carried 8,776 tons (39.2%) of that total

tonnage to the English plantations in the nearby West Indies while only 63 ships (9.8%) carried 4,382 tons (19.6%) to England.<sup>224</sup>

Ships and tonnage were not the only indicators of an expanding trade entered into for the mother-country's benefit. The Board of Trade's examination of the three year period from Christmas 1714 to Christmas 1717 revealed that the value of imports to England from New York totaled £ 22,607 16s 4d while exports to New York amounted to £ 50,314 6s 6d although it was only carried in 64 ships of 4,330 tons which cleared for that colony. During the period from June 1715 to June 1718 inclusive, the Board of Trade verified exports averaging over £ 50,000 per year to New York while the average of imports from the colony did not exceed £ 25,000 for the entire period. Trade with New York was profitable since the balance of payments fluctuated between 200 and 300% in favor of the English merchants. Moreover, the trade imbalance between the mother-country and colony was indeed great when the difference in value between the Pound Sterling and New York Pound was taken into account.

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<sup>224</sup>List of Vessels Sailing from New York between 1705 to 1716, New York, February 13, 1717, CSP Col., XXIX, #470. This list was compiled by Thomas Byerly, the Collector of Customs; Board of Trade to King, Whitehall, September 8, 1721, Ibid., XXXII, # 656.

The London Pound was worth 33% more than the New York Pound. Clearly trade between England and New York was profitable for the Crown.<sup>225</sup>

How well did Hunter carry out his Instructions to encourage trade in the colony? A few remaining records indicate that from 1710 to 1716 the percentage of ships sailing for England and Continental Europe rose from 11% in 1710 to a high of 17% in 1711, which reflected some shipping of naval stores produced by the Palatines and then dropped to a low of 8% in 1713. However, by 1716 the percentage of ships sailing for England and Europe had increased to 14%. Trade with the West Indies steadily rose from 37% to a high of 57% between 1710 and 1716 while ships sailing for neighboring plantations declined from 52% in 1710 to a low of 29% in 1716. The number of sailings from New York in 1710 totaled 159, dropped to a low of 142 total sailings in 1713 and began a steady climb to a total of 218 sailings in 1716. Trade was increasing during this period in New York, restructuring itself to include more trade with the West Indies and less with England and the neighboring colonies.<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>225</sup>Board of Trade to King, Whitehall, September 8, 1721, Ibid., Hunter to Board of Trade, N.P., October 3, 1710, Ibid., XXV, #414.

<sup>226</sup>List of Vessels Sailing from New York between 1705 to 1716, New York, February 13, 1717, CSP Col., XXIX, # 470.

After Hunter returned to England in 1719, Secretary Popple of the Board of Trade posed questions about trade in New York which the governor answered. He informed his superior that "...Trade, shipping and mariners are considerably increased..." when referring to the "...Quantity and sorts of British manufactures..." taken out by the colonists. Exports included "...furs, tar and pitch, whale oil and bones for England; flour, pork and other provisions to the Southern Islands; horses to Surinam, Curacao and St. Thomas..." from whence gold and silver were obtained. Replying to the question requesting the items produced or manufactured, Hunter replied, "...corn, flour, tar, whale oil, pork. No sort of manufacture that deserves mention...." He also told the Board of Trade that the colony received new inhabitants from both New England and Northern Ireland. One year later, 1721, the Board of Trade reported to the King that New York could smelt iron and had both copper and lead veins in Indian territory as well as coal mines on Long Island. Thus the colony was known to possess a potential for economic development.<sup>227</sup>

New York's trade did not increase without some illegal practices and without danger from pirates. During 1710, the Board of Trade sent a circular letter to all

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<sup>227</sup>Hunter to Popple, London, August 11, 1720, Ibid., XXXII, #187 and 187i; Board of Trade to King, Whitehall, September 8, 1721, Ibid., #656.



governors which contained extracts from three memorials that condemned the illegal trade to the Carribean. Apparently, English sailors were willing to ship out for fourteen pieces-of-eight per month in the Triangular Trade between Curacao, St. Thomas and the colonies on the North American continent rather than sign on for voyages to England for £ 25 or £ 30 per month. This made it difficult to obtain sailors which also made it hard to ship certain goods from the Islands. Therefore, the prices of sugar, rum, cotton, tobacco, ginger and indigo were often twice as high as they might have been. Stealing English sailors with high wages had another effect on trade which involved its protection.<sup>228</sup>

For all its vaunted effectiveness, the Royal Navy was not as successful against pirates as it might have been. For example, some of its ships masters sailed for their winter stations in the West Indies with cargoes taken along for profitable sales. The merchants of New York sent a memorial to the Crown in early 1711 which complained that, "...Trade and navigation of this City was formerly very considerable...the same is now gradually reduced which we can't but attribute to...Your Ships of War loading themselves from this port to the West Indies with

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<sup>228</sup>Circular Letter from Board of Trade to Governors and Proprietors of Plantations, Whitehall, January 19, 1710, Ibid., XXV, #47 and 47i.

Beef Pork Flour, and bringing from thence Rum, sugar and the other produce of Your Majtys Islands...". Since this interfered with their trade, the merchants asked that Royal Navy ships be stopped from carrying cargo and instead be ordered to return from the West Indies in April to drive off pirates who reappeared at that time. Signed by the merchants Caleb Heathcote, Hendrick Cuyler, Rip Van Dam and Stephen De Lancey, this memorial was similar to another document written by William Polhampton who also criticized the military defences of the colony. Polhampton drew the Board of Trade's attention to his allegation that high wages paid to sailors whose ships were tied up for three or four winter months led them to desert. This made it difficult for the undermanned Navy to control French privateers in the spring. As a solution, Polhampton suggested that he be appointed Chief Muster-Master to ensure proper accounting of manpower. Although the Crown turned down Polhampton's offer, the Lords of Trade did request Dartmouth, the First Minister, to stop the Navy's carrying cargoes to the West Indies. Despite these hindrances to Trade in the colonies, shipping and tonnage did gradually increase during this decade.<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>229</sup>Memorial from Merchants of New York to Queen, New York, February 20, 1711, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 331-332; Memorial from William Polhampton to Lords of Trade, N.P., March 6, 1711, Ibid., pp. 193-195; Lords of Trade to Dartmouth, Whitehall, June 5, 1712, Ibid., p. 332.

Apart from illegal commerce and privateer raids against merchant ships, Hunter faced other problems concerning trade in his colony. Having increased after the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1712 and having received another boost after 1714 from the need for more beaver pelts, trade was expected to provide excises and duties to raise the much needed revenue. As had been previously discussed, Hunter's plan to print money with which to pay off the colony's debt ran contrary to the Parliamentary act which established the value of an ounce of plate at 6s 10-10/25d in contradiction to a New York act that fixed it at 8 shillings. After complying with the Board's instructions, Hunter had little serious trouble about finances in the colony until the Assembly passed an act to finally pay-off those individuals omitted from the settlement of 1714. Under heavy fire for having issued bills of credit for this purpose, Hunter advised the Board in early 1718 that he favored printing even more money. He pointed to the good condition of the colony, emphasized that New York's credit was at least 25% better than that of neighboring provinces and he argued that government expenses had been high. Among those expenses were almost £ 30,000 for the 1711 expedition against Canada, £ 27,000 to pay off long-standing debts along with the annual £ 4,000 required to operate the government with. When the merchants mounted their campaign to stop the issue of paper money, Hunter's concern that

they might succeed caused him to have the New York Grand Jury arrested on December 5, 1717. The Grand Jury had been appointed by the city and county of New York to determine the consequences of issuing paper money and had sent its findings to Hunter on November 29, 1717. Since those findings were unfavorable to Hunter's plans and also probably because Stephen De Lancey, Phillip Cortlandt and Phillip Schuyler had signed it, the governor had reacted by subjecting the Grand Jury to prosecution by his recently appointed Chief Justice, Lewis Morris. Although the final disposition of the prosecution was not mentioned in subsequent letters written either by or to Hunter, it may be presumed that the legal action was quietly dropped.<sup>230</sup>

Whether the colony underwent good economic times or bad, there was a widespread inflation. Previously cited comments about the high price of goods coming from the West Indies are one indication of this condition. Another was the use of "bills of credit" or paper money which was valued 10% less than the scarce gold or silver specie. Finally, references have already been made to Hunter's admission

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<sup>230</sup> See Chapter V which dealt with French and Indian affairs; Board of Trade to Hunter, Whitehall, September 7, 1715, NY Col., Doc., V, p. 435; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, January 20, 1718, CSP Col., XXX, #316; Representation of Grand Jury of the City and County of New York to Governor Hunter, N.P., November 29, 1717, Ibid., #516i; Merchants trading to New York to Board of Trade, N.P., May 2, 1718, Ibid., #516.

concerning the inflated value of colonial currency in relation to the Pound Sterling which was corroborated by the merchants as well. Since laborers were scarce in the colonies, it should not have been surprising to find that higher wages were paid them in New York than in England. Unfortunately, the pay scales of various occupations were not detailed for that mythical creature, the "average individual". However, English laborers received between 15 to 18 pence during this time whereas Robert Livingston hired carpenters for two shillings a day. Without exact data to identify the wages paid to all workers during this time, an educated guess might estimate that one shilling per day was a reasonable wage for such hire-labor as was employed. In any event, most transactions did not involve scarce cash but did consist of barter. It was a self-sufficient type of life for most people where they provided the largest amount of their needs.<sup>231</sup>

Along with civil and economic problems in New York, Hunter was confronted with difficulties from the religious community. Active unrest in both the civil and economic

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<sup>231</sup>Extracts from Three Memorials, N.P., N.D., Ibid., XXV, #47i; Merchants trading to New York to Board of Trade, New York, May 2, 1718, Ibid., XXX, #516; Knittel, p.71; Ibid., p. 174; At 20 shillings in a Pound, a wage earner could have earned slightly over a Pound per month or about £ 15 per year which sum would not have been excessive for non-skilled labor. Householders were normally self-sufficient having gardens which were augmented by plentiful game and fish.

conditions seemed to be mirrored in the religious strife which plagued him. In general terms, religious struggles involved the dissenters who opposed the established church while more specifically, the situation was concerned with Hunter's long standing difficulties with a certain Reverend William Vesey who opposed the governor's handling of ecclesiastical administrative affairs in New York.

As governor, Hunter was charged with the temporal administration of the colony's religious activities since there was no bishopric established in North America for the Anglican Church. Within his Instructions, Hunter was given wide responsibility for the welfare of the Anglican Church. Instruction Number 52 required that all public officials to be sworn in taking the prescribed oaths which upheld Protestant supremacy, while the following Instruction guaranteed liberty of conscience for all Christians except Catholics. Furthermore, Number 68 made the Church of England the official religion of the colony by requiring all religious services to be conducted from the Book of Common Prayer on Sundays and holydays with the sacraments also to be administered according to the rites of the Church of England. Moreover, the next Instruction required the governor to pay the ministers and maintain the churches. Instruction Number 70 directed Hunter to determine parish boundaries and see that they were properly settled. According to Number 71 all Anglican ministers

had to be approved by the Bishop of London while Number 72 demanded that they be of the vestry and Number 73 required that all ministers have orders from the Bishop of London. To prevent Hunter from acting as a religious leader, Instruction Number 74 distinctly identified the Bishop of London as having religious jurisdiction in New York. However, as governor, Hunter could collate the benefices, grant marriage licenses, probate wills and perform other acts which required civil approval. Control over the scholastic community remained in the hands of the Bishop of London who was authorized to license school teachers by virtue of authority granted him in Instruction 75. Instructions 76 and 77 required that banns of marriage be posted on the churches or as directed by the governor, barred men of poor character from public office and outlawed vice in the colony. Obviously, Hunter had legal authority to intervene in any religious matter even though he could not proclaim doctrines or alter religious rites.<sup>232</sup>

Despite official proclamation of the Anglican faith as the official religion of the colony, dissenters constituted a significant religious body in New York. An active and vocal majority, the dissenters strongly

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<sup>232</sup>"Hunter's Instructions", N.P., December 27, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 132, 135-136. Instructions Nos. 52, 53, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, and 77.

opposed the Anglican Church particularly the Society for Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts which they disapproved of as being overwhelmingly partisan and sectarian. Organized in 1701, the SPG was supervised by the Archbishop of Canterbury to "...settle the State of Religion as well as may be among our own people there...and then to proceed in the best methods they can towards the Conversion...." of all non-Anglicans in America. The Society immediately sent missionaries to New York City but it did not turn it's attention to the Indians until 1710. Dissenters living in New York were unhappy with the proselytizing missionaries and they began to oppose them as troublemakers which led to bad feelings on both sides. Hunter, a member of the SPG, as well as Lewis Morris and Caleb Heathcote among others, was placed in a difficult position of trying to administer the government with the help of dissenting Assemblymen while trying to uphold the SPG's interests.<sup>233</sup>

Even without interference from William Vesey, who made a difficult situation worse, Hunter's problems with the dissenters would have been burdensome enough. Moreover, Vesey who appears to have been on good terms with Cornbury, was the colony's religious Commissary. Since

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<sup>233</sup>Osgood, American Colonies, II, pp. 35-36, 30-31, 34-35; Hunter to John Chamberlayne, N.P., February 25, 1712, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 312-317.



New York did not have a resident Anglican bishop, the expedient of appointing a Commissary with some limited powers was resorted to. As Commissary, Vesey had authority to suspend non-orthodox ministers, subject to the Bishop of London's approval and to oversee ecclesiastical affairs of the colony which placed him in competition with Hunter regarding religious matters.<sup>234</sup>

Bad feeling between Hunter and Vesey emerged during the Poyer affair, apparently having had its beginning soon after Hunter arrived in New York. According to Lewis Morris, one of the governor's staunchest supporters, Vesey had asked for the living at the Queen's Farm which provided the maintenance and upkeep for the appointed rector of Trinity Church, the Anglican parish in New York City. Vesey had asked Hunter to petition the Crown for the farm despite Hunter's ready granting of the living and farm to Vesey. The implication of this was that Hunter supposedly had no right to grant the Farm to Vesey except by leave of the Crown. As Vesey represented the matter, Trinity Farm was the Church's property, having been granted to the parish by Governor Fletcher. Hunter

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<sup>234</sup>Reverend Vesey to Col. Riggs, New York, December 2, 1709, *Ibid.*, pp. 465-467. This letter proclaimed Vesey's fear of losing both the farm he lived on and his L 30 salary. Vesey evinced envy of other pastors receiving larger stipends than he and asked Riggs to help in obtaining a larger living; Osgood, American Colonies, II, pp. 22-23.

disagreed, since the Farm was one parcel of land among those included in the vacated land act passed by the Assembly in 1698. Certainly Hunter believed himself to be within his rights to grant this farm to Vesey without having to obtain permission from the Crown and he saw this as a direct challenge to his religious authority. According to Morris, Vesey seized upon this opportunity to denounce Hunter to the people as a non-churchman. At a later date, Vesey seized upon another event during Hunter's early years which he branded a "schism".<sup>235</sup>

Shortly after he arrived in New York, Hunter decided to reopen the Chapel at Fort Anne for his convenience as well as for the garrison's use. Morris described the chapel as having been used as "...Storehouse, Bearhouse and workhouse..." prior to its return to use as a chapel. Hunter advised the Secretary for the Society for Propagation of the Gospel, John Chamberlayne that he had informed Vesey of his intention to reopen the fort's chapel. One reason Hunter gave was logical, that of not having to march the garrison to Trinity Church which obviously was impractical since it left the fort unguarded and the other reason Hunter gave was to make the appointed chaplain of the fort earn his

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<sup>235</sup>Lewis Morris to John Chamberlayne, N.P., February 20, 1712, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 318-324. The incident concerning the farm is found on p. 320.

pay. Vesey's calling this move by Hunter "a schism" was merely a protest over the loss of influential parishioners who decided to worship at the same chapel as the governor did. In this frame of mind, Vesey interposed his opinions upon the Reverend Thomas Poyer who tried to obtain a small sum due him as the appointed rector of Jamaica Church.<sup>236</sup>

Hunter's instructions permitted him to appoint the pastors of Anglican parishes. During his first year as governor, he was made aware that a dissenting minister named Mackenzie had been called by the dissenting wardens and vestrymen to serve as rector of Jamaica Church on Long Island. Since the church's organization and erection in 1693, Mackenzie had not been the only dissenting clergyman to be its rector. According to Lewis Morris, dissenters had organized the parish who ran out of money while trying to erect the building. Seeking funds from the legislature, they tried to get an act of Assembly passed to finish the building, but Governor Fletecher and the Assembly Speaker, James Graham, attached conditions concerning the induction of a minister which in effect prescribed the calling of an Anglican priest for its rector. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, the

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<sup>236</sup>Ibid., pp. 320-321; Hunter to John Chamberlavne, New York, February 25, 1712, *ibid.*, pp. 312-317. Hunter expressed his opinion about the reopening of the chapel on page 315.

dissenters called one Reverend Hubbard to become their pastor in 1702 but he was turned out two years later when Governor Cornbury appointed Reverend Mr. Urquhart to the position. After Urquhart's death in 1710, his son-in-law, a dissenting minister named Mackenzie, took possession of the parish and held it in defiance of Hunter's appointment of Poyer to the pastorate. An ally of Hunter's, Lewis Morris, alleged that the governor supported Poyer in opposition to an Assembly almost totally comprised of dissenters intent upon enacting legislation which would have settled an Anglican parish with its salary upon a dissenting minister. This clearly violated Hunter's Instructions which he could not have tolerated under any circumstances.<sup>237</sup>

Poyer, urged by Hunter to take the case to court, sought to satisfy the governor by suing for three months wages or £ 5 New York currency. In a judgement handed down at Jamaica on October 9, 1710, Poyer was denied payment of the £ 5 which would have acknowledged his right to the pastorate of the church. The reasons the Churchwardens gave were that they had no money to pay the £ 5, because the Justices did not authorize this money to be paid and in any event, the Churchwardens did not consider Poyer

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<sup>237</sup>Statement of Church at Jamaica, N.P., N.D., [1712], Ibid., p. 328; Lewis Morris to John Chamberlayne, N.P., February 20, 1712, Ibid., pp. 321-322.

qualified to hold the pastorate. This judgement against Poyer was an insult to Hunter but the governor was also disappointed that Poyer had not pushed his cause more vigorously. Morris advised the Secretary of the SPG that Hunter informed Poyer he would pay the legal fees from his own pocket if Poyer lacked the funds to do so. However, Poyer was still timid in pressing his case.<sup>238</sup>

Shortly after Morris wrote to Chamberlayne, Hunter followed with his own account of the Poyer affair. While trying to get the church for Poyer, Hunter had asked Chief Justice Roger Mompesson whether the simple act of dispossessing the resident dissenting minister would be the best course, but Mompesson offered the opinion that it could not be done "...without a high crime of misdemeanor..." being proven against the incumbent. At this time, Poyer was then asked to sue for his pastorate. Later, Hunter visited Poyer on Long Island and again urged him to take legal action. Again, on a later occasion, Poyer visited the governor who offered to grant anything within reason to Poyer if he would proceed with the suit, but the minister told Hunter that he had turned the whole situation over to his superiors in England. In fact, Poyer advised Hunter in a letter dated January 30, 1712, that

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<sup>238</sup>Judgement; Poyer Versus Churchwardens of Jamaica, Queens County Sessions, October 9, 1710, Ibid., pp. 328-329; Lewis Morris to John Chamberlayne, N.P., February 20, 1712, Ibid., p. 322.

the only reason he had done nothing for the past fifteen months was due to the great consequences of the suit. He could not enter into it without "...the advice and directions of my Diocetian & of the venerable Society...." This reply indicated that Poyer had fallen under the influence of Vesey and his followers.<sup>239</sup>

Morris characterized Poyer as a "...poor weak man..." who was taken in by Vesey. The New York Commissary for the SPG was the author of a paper which was critical of Hunter and which was circulated within New York and New Jersey. According to Morris, Hunter convened the clergy of both colonies and explained the situation to them. Out of shame, continued Morris, they would not let either Hunter or Morris read the paper they had written. Morris must have been heartily seconded by Hunter when he wished that the Clergy would stay out of politics. Indeed, Hunter described the clergy as men of "...Piety and Industry..." as long as they stayed with their vocation of the ministry. Informed of the existence of the adverse reports written by the clergy about him, Hunter wrote Chamberlayne disclaiming knowledge for the basis of such a document. Both Heathcote and Morris had accused Rev. Vesey and the clergy of being the authors of

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<sup>239</sup>Hunter to John Chamberlayne, New York, February 25, 1712, Ibid., pp. 313-314; Reverend Poyer to Hunter, Jamaica, January 30, 1712, Ibid., p. 327.

this paper which they did not deny but rather showed consternation about being found out. Referring to the document, Hunter said, "...So I am to answer to accusations from Persons I know not who, of crimes I know nothing of, before judges I am not to know...". He affirmed his sincerity both in his religious beliefs and his conduct concerning the Poyer affair.<sup>240</sup>

Shortly after their confrontation with Morris and Hunter, the clergy of New York addressed the governor requesting him to petition the Queen for a settlement which would make the Church of England official in all colonies. They also told him that the paper circulated through the colony was not meant to demean his administration, for "...On the contrary, we gladly embrace this opportunity to return your Excellency our humble & hearty thanks for granting Mr. Poyer Induction...not withstanding the designs of the adversaries of the Church there to prevent it...". Hunter's attempts to obtain justice for Poyer and assist him financially was acknowledged by the clergy. However, they said, "...We are divided in our opinions about bringing the matter to a tryal at Law because some ...are still of opinion that it might not be brought to tryall till the Bishop of London...give his directions

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<sup>240</sup>Lewis Morris to John Chamberlayne, N.P., February 20, 1712, Ibid., p. 324; Hunter to John Chamberlayne, New York, February 25, 1712, Ibid., pp. 313-314.

within..." while others did agree with Hunter's method of solving the problem. Signed by William Vesey, Thomas Poyer and the other eight ministers, the address ended with the clergy's affirmation of the Anglican Church's principles.<sup>241</sup>

Showing concern about Vesey as the clergyman responsible for most of the religious controversy in New York, Hunter wrote the Bishop of London about his Commissary's actions. At the beginning of the letter, Hunter informed the Bishop that the Commissary was expected to control the clergy by his personality but instead Vesey drove them out of control. Vesey could be best described as full of "...Faction, Pride, Malice and blind Zeal..." which prompted him to join with Hunter's enemies in opposing the much needed revenue act to drive the governor out of the colony. Hunter resented Vesey's description of his conduct as "suspicious", his zeal "affected" and civilities "constrained". At the last convocation of the clergy, alleged Hunter, Vesey denied that he had ever imputed the governor's motives which was a comment met with disbelief by some of the clergymen. What grieved Hunter most was that Vesey had been regularly sending his poison-pen letters to Colonel Francis Nicholson and to the Earl of Clarendon (Cornbury). Although these letters could be damaging to

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<sup>241</sup>Address of New York Clergy to Hunter, New York, N.D., /1712/, Ibid., pp. 325-326.



his administration, Hunter insisted that he valued his good reputation more highly and would not allow it to be destroyed. However, despite Hunter's protestations to the Bishop of London about Vesey's attacks, he still continued to be the target of the Commissary's vindictive writings.<sup>242</sup>

Written abuse against Hunter continued to flow from the quills of those clerics sympathetic to Vesey. A Reverend Mr. Henderson wrote from Dover Hundred, Pennsylvania during early June, 1712 that the dissenters held the church at Jamaica due to Hunter's removing those justices who had supported the Church of England and appointing dissenters in their places. Morris was characterized as "...a profess'd churchman, but a man of noe principles or credit, a man who calls the service of the Church of England Pageantry...." Apparently the written hate campaign against Hunter had some effect for in late August, 1712 the SPG outlined the case of Poyer versus the Jamaica Churchwardens for the Queen and expressed its fear that the case might be tried in front of dissenting justices. A detrimental verdict in the case would weaken the hold of the Anglican Church in the colonies. Unfortunately, appeal could only be made to the governor when the sums involved amounted to £100 and appeals to the Queen required sums of £300 to be at stake.

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<sup>242</sup>Hunter to Bishop of London, New York, March 1, 1712, *Ibid.*, pp. 310-312.

However, the SPG believed that the Crown did not intend to exclude people from the right to appeal despite the lack of the £ 100 minimum, particularly since the case involved the Church. Early in 1713, the SPG's request was granted permitting Poyer to bring suit before the Supreme Court of New York which resulted in a legal decision in Poyer's favor.<sup>243</sup>

Undoubtedly Hunter's complaints concerning Vesey's activities must have impressed the Bishop of London. Unsettled civil conditions and religious strife exemplified by the desecration of Trinity Church in 1713, reflected the unrest among the Anglicans who supported Vesey when he returned to England in 1714. While Vesey was in London for a year, his salary was with-held as he continued his political activities against Hunter. Again, Hunter wrote the Board of Trade that Vesey sought to persecute him after having met with "...a very great man then at Boston...", a reference to Francis Nicholson, where Vesey was persuaded to go to England where he could "...cry out fire & church at all hazards..." However, the plot was not too successful although Vesey had informed his friends

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<sup>243</sup>Mr. Henderson's Short State of the Church of England in New York and New Jersey, Dover Hundred, Pennsylvania, June 2, 1712, CSP Col., XXVI, #436; Society for Propagation of the Gospel to the Queen, N.P., August 26, 1712, NY Col. Doc., V, pp. 345-346; Osgood, American Colonies, II, p. 21.

he would soon return to New York as Commissary, to which idea Hunter expressed his disbelief. Yet, six days later, the Crown did send Hunter a warrant directing him to pay Vesey's salary as Rector of Trinity Church. And despite Hunter's letter writing, Vesey did return as Commissary of New York.<sup>244</sup>

Every effort was made by Hunter and his supporters to discredit Vesey. Late in 1715, New York's Provincial Secretary, George Clarke, wrote to Secretary Popple informing him of a letter supposedly written by Vesey which was critical of the French and Dutch religions. After having been circulated among both congregations, the letter finally fell into the hands of the Bishop of London, who disregarding the sensitive nature of its contents, declined to replace Vesey and kept him in office because he was acquainted with the man. Clarke also enclosed another letter obtained from a military officer who had been offered a bribe by Vesey if that officer would exert his influence to obtain a religious stipend for him. This alleged act of Vesey's was branded as "simony" by Clarke. In 1716 Hunter wrote to the Board of Trade that Vesey had acknowledged his errors and promised to behave himself. Apparently Vesey told Hunter that it had been both

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<sup>244</sup>Ibid., pp. 20-22; Hunter to Board of Trade, New York, August 13, 1715, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 420; Warrant from Crown to Hunter, St. James, August 19, 1715, CSP Col., XXVIII, #576.

Nicholson's and Mompesson's ideas to have him return to England to lodge complaints against Hunter. In that same letter to the Board of Trade, Hunter included the potent indictment against William Vesey which apparently brought him to heel as it accused him of "...intending to break the harmony, peace and tranquillity..." of New York by publishing wild derogatory statements about the French and Dutch congregations in the city. As of 1709 the Dutch still comprised a sizeable number of people in New York City, worshipping in their native church as did a sizeable number of French Protestants. Both congregations had voluntarily contributed to the erection of the steeple for the Trinity Church and both got along well with their English neighbors. In his letter Vesey had gone about beseeching Colonel John Riggs to join with the Bishop of London in seeking the "favour and protection of the new Governour and that affectionately. Otherwise I fear wee shall sink under so great an oppression both from the French and Dutch...who maliciously seek our destruction...". However, after 1716, Vesey appears to have kept his word to behave and not cause further trouble for Hunter.<sup>245</sup>

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<sup>245</sup>Secretary Clarke to Secretary Popple, New York, November 15, 1715, NY Col. Doc., V, pp! 464-465; Hunter to Board of Trade, Amboy, New Jersey, April 30, 1716, CSP Col., XXIX,#133; Bill of Indictment found by Grand Jury of New York, N.P., N.D., Ibid., #133iv.

It is certain that Vesey performed his duties as Commissary in such a way that he infringed upon Hunter's prerogatives. By using every resource available to him, Vesey sought to offer effective opposition to Hunter which included alliances with Nicholson and Mompesson who had political connections in England. During Vesey's trip to England, he did not find it difficult to enlist Cornbury's aid in his cause. Yet, Vesey was not completely responsible for the colony's religious unrest; rather, he fed off it. The Crown had established the Episcopal Church as the official religion in a colony peopled by many dissenters. These people, as shown by the Poyer-Jamaica affair, both resented and resisted being made to support an "official Church". They found encouragement in the personal rivalry between Vesey and Hunter, having every reason to desire its continuation.<sup>246</sup>

Official anti-Catholicism was present from the days of Leisler's Rebellion. Hunter's Instructions referred to

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<sup>246</sup>See "Hunter's Instructions", N.P., December 27, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 135. Instruction No. 68 required Hunter to establish the Church of England in New York, Instruction No. 69 made Hunter responsible for the temporal and financial affairs of the Church, Instruction No. 70 delegated to Hunter the responsibility for laying out the boundaries of the parishes, Instructions Nos. 71-73 authorized Hunter to judge the fitness of ministers to practice in New York, both from moral and ecclesiastical viewpoints and Instruction No. 74 gave Hunter the rights to collate benefices, etc., which definitely infringed on Vesey's sphere of power.

"Christians" as white militia-men or in reference to a relationship between the races, but his Instructions also specifically excluded Catholics from having liberty of Conscience. Jewish people were not identified in the Instructions, not even in a derogatory way. In a sense, they were non-people although one circular letter to the governors from the Board of Trade in 1710 contained an excerpt from three memorials which alleged that Jews were at the bottom of illegal West Indian trade. Only Protestants, particularly Episcopalians (or Anglicans) had any official standing in New York.<sup>247</sup>

From the brief survey made of the civil conditions, trade and religious activities conducted in New York, the colony gives the impression of being in a state of flux. Conditions were dynamic, violent and factional, yet it was not a time of anarchy. During the years 1710 to

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<sup>247</sup>See Chapter I which discussed the Leislerian Rebellion, particularly Leisler's anti-Catholic feelings; "Hunter's Instructions", N.P., December 27, 1709, NY Col. Doc., V, p. 132. Instruction No. 53. This Instruction denied individual liberty of conscience to Catholics while it allowed other dissenters the right to form their own; Extracts from Three Memorials [by Peter Holt, et al?]. N.P., N.D., CSP Col., XXV, #471. The memorialists spoke of the West Indies Trade: "When two sail of our nothern vessels come in together with provision, the Jews will blow upon it, if not consigned to them. I cannot say that the Jews are owners of most of the vessels that supply that place...but they have that power over most of them when they are there, that they can turn out, or put in what Master they please."

1719, there were two major revolts. The one involving the Palatines was bloodless while the slave uprising was contained to one day's duration with the punishments, severe as they were, meted out in accordance with the laws of the times. Trade expanded steadily during this time, leading the colony in new fiscal directions of economic decision making. Finally, while there was official religious intolerance, records do not indicate any anti-Catholic persecutions or anti-Semitic pogroms being conducted. Despite the unsettled conditions in these three areas of life, Robert Hunter's New York was at least no worse than any other colony and may certainly have been much better off than most.

## CHAPTER VII

## CONCLUSION

During Robert Hunter's nine years in office, New York witnessed the quiet demise of the Leislerian controversy, the assumption of some financial responsibility and economic stability, the failure of a government sponsored industry due to lack of support from London, the retention and exploitation of Indian allegiance, the first known racial violence in the colony and experienced social unrest, economic growth and religious partisanship which became characteristic of New York's atmosphere.

The historians Bernard Bailyn, Patricia U. Bonomi and Walter Allen Knittel have generally agreed that Hunter was politically associated with the "land-owners". Bailyn found that Lewis Morris set up a "Morris-Hunter" machine in New York while Bonomi emphasized the positive aspects of Hunter's administration. In contrast to these two scholars, Knittel condemned Hunter's cooperation with the landowners, alleging that it contributed to continuation of the colony's muddled land policy for another fifty years. None of these interpretations are wrong per se but they are only facets of a many-sided and complex governorship. The nature of Hunter's governorship, his appointment to the



position, and circumstances surrounding his administration should be examined as an integrated whole.

As an appointed official not responsible to the people over whom he ruled, Hunter was nonetheless forced to work more closely with their representatives than with his own superiors to whom he owed allegiance. His position in the colony was awkward since the General Assembly's actions had an effect on his ability to govern. Hunter's repeated failure to react in a manner expected by the Crown to the Assembly's activities would have resulted in his dismissal or would have contributed to it. Although Hunter was supposedly the most powerful political figure in New York, he was forced to depend upon the popular assembly to provide his salary and funds for the operation of the government. However, he was forbidden to yield royal prerogatives which this dependency on the local government for funds soon forced him to do. Hunter was sent into New York unprepared for the local political situation and was hampered by inflexible instructions which curtailed his courses of action. He also lacked the London based support of his Whig Party between 1710 and 1714 which was necessary to help him rule New York.

Court influence procured the governorship of New York for Hunter. He was sent from the Empire's political center at London into a smaller but no less active political area over 3,000 miles distant where local power was an

eagerly sought after prize. New York's politicians certainly recognized London's importance but they also were concerned with the colony's immediate problems. These problems were indebtedness, concern over potential trouble with the Indians, presence of French activists on the frontier and vigilance against attempts to limit popular government. Actions taken by their sovereign and Parliament diminished in importance when compared to these problems. Not that the colonists were disloyal. Indeed, their concern indicated a difference of priorities. Moreover, the new governor was not a "native" of New York and like most governors would leave for England after about five years leaving the colonists to contend with their troubles. As a politically appointed outsider thrust into a new political arena, the governor had to feel his way armed with the authority vested in him by his Commission and guided by his rigid Instructions. Hunter's success depended on the correctness of his reactions to moves made by his opponents. His greatest opposition came from the merchants who made Hunter's office a veritable hot-spot to hold.<sup>248</sup>

Another characteristic of Hunter's governorship was its propensity for attracting controversy. The troubled Scot had to contend with Cornbury's allies, ambitious politicians and those whom he had offended while trying to

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<sup>248</sup>Bailyn, Origins, pp. 59-105 treats in depth problems faced by colonial governors.

obtain legislation. New York's Commissary, the Reverend William Vesey, was a former ally of Cornbury's and was also responsible for the Anglican clergy to the Bishop of London. Yet Hunter also found himself required to assume responsibility for the temporal welfare of the same clergy which soon found the two men competing with each other instead of complementing their efforts. Samuel Mulford perceived Hunter as a tyrant as onerous as Cornbury and Hunter certainly alienated Peter Schuyler by setting up his own political machinery in the Albany area. Apparently governors were looked upon as intruders by the colonists who spent time getting used to them as they were replaced. Given the nature of the system, Hunter could not have avoided making enemies.

One important source of trouble for Hunter came from the merchant faction. Emerging from the shambles of the Leislerian uprising, this faction increased in strength as trade improved during this decade. Led by wealthy merchants such as Adolph Philipse, Jacobus Van Cortlandt and Stephen De Lancey, all prominent in the West Indies trade from New York City and aided by the Albany fur trader, Peter Schuyler, this group failed to defeat proposals which favored a more efficient collection of duties and excises. However, they fought an admirable delaying action for five years against Hunter by using their political influence in England while exploiting

made acceptable the terms "landowners" and "merchants", these labels were used by the author but it may be more correct to identify the combatants more simply as "Pro-Hunter" and "Anti-Hunter" for the lack of more accurate descriptions.

Most of the struggles in the New York legislature sprang from economic issues which surfaced as the adversaries began to polarize around issues and events. Under the system of government in New York, the Council, the Assembly and Hunter had to co-operate and interact with each other. For better or for worse they were "married" to each other. Yet by his presence in the government, Hunter was a disruptive factor. He had Instructions to implement as he administered the colony but upon losing his political support in England as soon as he arrived in New York, Hunter found himself having to accept aid from those who would offer it. Livingston opposed the Dutch fur traders at Albany who resented the aggressive policies of most governors which interfered with their trade and placed the frontier in danger. Profitting from government troop supply contracts placed Livingston on the governor's side while Morris embraced Hunter's cause in an effort to obtain political stature in New York. With Morris's help Hunter set up his political organization to implement his system of very limited patronage. Hunter's alliance with his two fellow Scots against his opponents contained strains

of ethnic preference since De Lancey was a French Huguenot and Van Cortlandt was a Dutchman. However, Hunter refrained from identifying his political friends and enemies to the Crown in these terms.

During the five years that the Whigs were out of power in England, Hunter fared badly in New York finding himself bedeviled by the problem of who would exercise "Home Rule" in the colony. In his reports home to the hostile Tory administration, the governor described his battles with the Assembly in terms of threatened encroachment on royal prerogatives and his efforts to retain them in the name of the Crown. Hunter also reported his struggles against the "merchants" but he identified the General Assembly which sought to control the purse strings as his main enemy. The Assembly's financial control was intended to be two-fold: First, the Assembly wanted the Treasurer to disburse funds rather than the Receiver-General which Hunter opposed since it would effectively cripple his efforts to maintain political control of the colony. However, until Hunter surrendered on this point in 1714, no substantial progress was made toward the long-term support. Second, not satisfied with this victory, the Assembly wanted to vote the appropriation on its own terms, a quid pro quo basis. The prize in question was the trade of a long term support for a naturalization act which would have legitimized the

trading and property rights of all emigrants to New York since 1689. In the end, this voting of a long-term support which led to New York's assuming economic responsibility and developing economic stability was influenced by a genuine fear of a possible inter-colonial Indian war during early and mid-1715 as well as an equally genuine fear that the new Whig administration in England might settle a support on the colony on its own terms. An imposed settlement of a support from England would have deprived the legislature of any initiatives it possessed and would probably have resulted in high duties, excises and quit-rents to repay it. Hunter also would not have wanted an imposed support by 1715 since it would have interfered with his political activities and lessened his freedom of action. Thus the Naturalization Act's importance may have rested more in its value to Hunter as a bargaining point and its value to the Assembly as a face-saving device to be accepted at the proper moment. It is also likely that Hunter received more cooperation from the Assembly's realization that persistent resistance to the governor would bring interference from the Crown. During his early years in New York, Hunter was plagued by many intrigues from the local politicians but his greatest personal problems came from the Palatines. Just as the colony itself was expected to be self-supporting, the Crown's attempt at using Palatine emigrants

for manufacturing naval stores was also expected to be a profitable undertaking. Unfortunately, Hunter chose Richard Sackett to oversee the operation which failed to obtain results. Hunter's poor relations with the Palatines did not help the governor, particularly after the Tory administration in England terminated their financial support for the venture. His insistence that they adhere to a no-time limit contract along with his indifference to their exploitation, his meager subsisting of them, his failure to understand their motives for emigrating to New York and his calloused apprenticing of some children as "orphans" who actually had families resulted in the Palatine revolt of 1711 and their ultimate flight to Schoharie in 1712.

Although Hunter failed in carrying out the naval stores project, he was successful in retaining the loyalty of the Indians. However, just as he allowed the administrators to exploit the Palatines, he also allowed the Albany traders to exploit the Indians, partly to keep the traders satisfied and partly to off-set the Indians, channelling the flow of peltry through the Great Lakes Region to Albany. The trader's activities at Albany angered the Indians but it kept them from increasing their power vis-a-vis the French. Hunter's failure to act in stopping the cheating of the Indians is understandable since he had built up a power base at Albany through

Robert Livingston and possibly Henry Van Rensselaer, which upset the one formed by Peter Schuyler thus explaining Schuyler's enmity for Hunter. The Indians had great respect for "Quidor" or Schuyler whereas their relations with Hunter were good but they might have been better. Repeated accusations were made by the Iroquois against the whites alleging that they were going to exterminate the tribes. Despite this, Hunter obtained their aid in the 1711 expedition against Canada and in the 1715 campaign against the Flatheads in the Carolinas. During the early months of 1715, some colonists held the belief that the Five Nations were on the verge of expanding their war-making activities in Carolina to such proportions that a general Indian war would spread through the colonies. The absence of documents from Hunter denying any possibility of this happening could be interpreted as one more effort on the part of a harrassed governor to obtain the much needed long-term support. Such an interpretation gains credence when it is remembered that Hunter was using Indians as double-agents among their own tribesmen to destroy their unity and thus control them.

Church Fear of Indian uprising was only one feeling prevalent among New Yorkers that kept them on edge. Basically a white society, the colony paid no attention to the plight of Negro slaves until they staged a brief one-day "uprising" in 1712. After severely punishing the



participants, the Assembly enacted a slave law of such severity that it might well have served as a model for the antebellum slave states of a century later. If Hunter permitted the exploitation of white Palatines, it was not unusual for him to have disregarded the exploitation of slaves and failed to have done more to stop the bloodshed in ending the "revolt". Racism and nativism contributed to the atmosphere of intolerance and righteousness which resulted in colonists being shipped back to England without proof that they had committed the crimes they were charged with. Nor was the religious community spared from controversy.

Without a bishop to oversee the colony's ecclesiastical affairs, Hunter ran into difficulties with the Commissary, William Vesey. This clergyman perceived Hunter's exercise of his gubernatorial powers to have been an infringement upon his own responsibilities. Arising from this feud between the governor and Commissary, faction scandalized the religious community of New York particularly regarding the Poyer-Jamaica Church affair. Vesey also did not ignore the French and Dutch Church congregations against whom he directed derogatory remarks which threatened the peace of the colony. Yet there was one further area of unrest in New York.

The population increase resulted in more people contending for the few elite positions available in the

colony. This place seeking was encouraged by the absence of an established hereditary aristocracy and was fed by the intense political interest manifested by those who had achieved success in politics. These conditions were complemented by the economic situation.

As trade with the West Indies increased, the number of seamen required increased. Goods arriving in New York were more expensive because the coastal vessels carried smaller cargoes and because of piracy on the seas during most of the year. Despite the increase in population, a shortage of certain labor skills remained which required a higher pay than in England. Thus, the scarcity of goods, high prices and high wages paid for certain skills were elements of the high inflation which affected New York.

Just as the private citizen had to cope with inflation, as it affected his self-sufficient state, scarcity and other un-desirable traits of the frontier economy, the government also had to face unpleasant economic tasks. It had to make good the unpaid debts of former governments, to pay the accruing interest, to operate with devalued currency and work to improve trade. Neither the private citizen nor the government accomplished their tasks in an easy manner.

Certainly the nature of this colony's governorship was not unlike that of throwing an unarmed lion tamer

among his hungry cats. Since governing was such a demanding task, one might ask what was the nature of the man who governed New York? This is difficult to answer since the minute details which emerged from this study allowed for general comments and these details could easily have been misinterpreted. However, Hunter probably developed some political ability, exercised caution in his activities and was faithful in performing his duties.

An example of Hunter's wit was his unpublished play, "Androborus" which was ribald, farcical and derogatory against the Assembly. It obviously reflected his hatred and frustration against them but his decision not to publish the play indicated that by 1714 Hunter developed some political acumen.

Through out the bulk of Hunter's writings, particularly to his superiors, he sought to minimize his difficulties with the Assembly, ascribing those problems to his enemies or to causes beyond his control. Hunter must have feared losing the governorship more for the disgrace it would bring than the punishment involved. Attacks on the governorship were depicted as disloyalty to the Crown, a good cover-up for his own errors of judgement. Hunter's caution was discernable in his reports to the Board of Trade and other officials.

Because Hunter showed intelligence, possessed good judgement and was cautious he was appalled by the bloodshed

in the race riot of 1712. Perhaps a cynic might ascribe Hunter's horror against the bloody repression of the rioters to fear for his job, yet it seems that in early 1711 he settled the Palatine incident without bloodshed and he did not pursue them to Schoharie after 1713. He made much of talking the Indians into fighting in 1711 and 1715 yet a study of available documents indicates he spent even more time dissuading the Indians from warlike policies on other occasions. As an intelligent military man, he appears to have disliked war and as a prudent man, he understood that excessive violence in New York attracted attention from London.

Beyond these scant generalizations, little more can be extracted without a more comprehensive study of this period. It must be agreed that Hunter was at first an intruder who lent his imprint to New York's government during that unsettled time. Robert Hunter was indeed, the "Official Intruder".

## COUNCILLORS IN HUNTER'S REIGN 1710 - 1719

Taken from Patrick O'Sullivan's Appendix A Partisan  
People, Appendix B, p. 314. Notes added by the author.

Councillors in Hunter's Reign 1710-1719Years

1692-1720	Peter Schuyler	M; O; A/L
1702-1720	Caleb Heathcote	M; F
1702-1729	Gerardus Beekman	m/a; J/L
1702-1735	Rip Van Dan	
1704-1719	Millian Van Rensselaer	M; O; A/P; l/a
1705-1715	Roger Momposon	Chief Justice, died in 1710
1705-1721	Adolph Philipse	M; O; A/L; l/a
1705-1728	John Barbarie	
1708-1711	David Provoost	F Entered Assembly in 1711
1710-1716	Samuel Staats	m/a; F; J/L
1710-1722	Abraham De Peyster	M; O; J/L Colonial Treasurer
1710-1731	Robert Walters	
1711-1725	Thomas Eyerly	Receiver General
1715-1722	John Johnston	New York Mayor, replaced Staats
1716-1730	George Clarke	Secretary of Col- ony, replaced Momposon

## CODE

M-Prominent Merchant  
 L-Prominent Landowner  
 m/a-Moderately successful merchant  
 O-Opposed Hunter

l/a-also owned  
 some land  
 A/L-Anti-Leislerian  
 J/L-Leislerian  
 F-Friendly to Hunter

## COUNCILLORS IN HUNTER'S REIGN 1710 - 1719

Taken from Patricia U. Bonomi's A Factious People, Appendix D, p. 314. Notes added by the author.

Years

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1692-1720	Peter Schuyler	M; O; A/L
1702-1720	Caleb Heathcote	M; F
1702-1723	Gerardus Beekman	m/m; J/L
1702-1735	Rip Van Dam	
1704-1719	Killian Van Rensslaer	M; O; A/F; 1/e
1705-1715	Roger Mompesson	Chief Justice, died in 1716
1705-1721	Adolph Philipse	M; O; A/L; 1/e
1705-1728	John Barbarie	
1708-1711	David Provoost	F Entered Assembly in 1711
1710-1716	Samuel Staats	m/m; F; J/L
1710-1722	Abraham De Peyster	M; O; J/L Colonial Treasurer
1710-1731	Robert Walters	
1711-1725	Thomas Byerly	Receiver General
1716-1722	John Johnston	New York Mayor, replaced Staats
1716-1736	George Clarke	Secretary of Col- ony, replaced Mompesson

## CODE

M-Prominent Merchant  
L-Prominent Landowner  
m/m-Moderately successful merchant  
O-Opposed Hunter

1/o-Also owned  
some land  
A/L-Anti-Leislerian  
J/L-Leislerian  
F-Friendly to Hunter

## ASSEMBLYMEN IN HUNTER'S REIGN 1710 - 1719

Taken from Patrick's Appendix B of People, Appendix C, pp. 30-33. Notes added by author.

Assemblymen in Hunter's Reign 1710 - 1719

1710-Sept. 1 to Nov. 20  
1711-April 12-20  
Dissolved Apr. 20

Speaker-William Nicoll  
Clark-Gabriel Ludlow  
Sct.-at-Arms- ?  
Door-keeper-Cornelius Post

Albany-3  
JOHANNIS CYLER  
JOHANNIS SCHUYLER  
ROBERT LIVINGSTON; SN, L; F; A/L

Richmond-2  
JOHN STILLWELL  
ABRAHAM LAKERMAN

Essex-2  
CORNELIUS BERRING  
CORNELIUS VAN BRUNT

Suffolk-2  
WILLIAM NICOLL Fr; O; A/L  
SAMUEL WILFORD n/a; O

New York-4  
LAWRENCE KNABE  
JACOBUS VAN CORTLANDT M; O; A/L  
STEPHEN DE LANCEY M; O; A/L  
JOHANNIS JANSSEN J/L

Ulster-2  
HENRY BREEMAN  
THOMAS GARTON

Orange-1  
HENDRICK TEN SYCK

Westchester-4  
LEWIS MORRIS L; F; X  
WILLIAM WILLET  
EDMUND WARD  
JOSIAH HUNT

Queens-2  
THOMAS WILLET A/L  
JOHN JACKSON

Westchester-1  
HENRY VAN WENSLAN M; F

## CODE

M-Prominent Merchant  
L-Prominent Landowner  
F-Friendly to Hunter  
O-Opponent of Hunter  
X-Expelled

Fr-Farmer  
l/o-Owned some land  
J/L-Leislerian  
A/L-Anti-Leislerian

## ASSEMBLYMEN IN HUNTER'S REIGN 1710 - 1719

Taken from Patricia U. Bonomi's A Factious People, Appendix C, pp. 301-303. Notes added by author.

## Thirteenth Assembly

1710-Sept. 1 to Nov. 20  
1711-April 12-20  
Dissolved Apr. 20

Speaker-William Nicoll  
Clerk-Gabriel Ludlow  
Sgt.-at-Arms- ?  
Door Keeper-Cornelius Post

Albany-3

JOHANNIS CUYLER  
JOHANNIS SCHUYLER  
ROBERT LIVINGSTON, SR. L; F; A/L

Richmond-2

JOHN STILLWELL  
ABRAHAM LAKERMAN

Kings-2

CORNELIUS SEBRING  
CORNELIUS VAN BRUNT

Suffolk-2

WILLIAM NICOLL Fr; O; A/L  
SAMUEL MULFORD m/m; O

New York-4

LAWRENCE READE  
JACOBUS VAN CORTLANDT M; O; A/L  
STEPHEN DE LANCEY M; O; A/L  
JOHANNIS JANSEN J/L

Ulster-2

HENRY BEEKMAN  
THOMAS GARTON

Orange-1

HENDRICK TEN EYCK

Westchester-4

LEWIS MORRIS L; F; X  
WILLIAM WILLET  
EDMUND WARD  
JOSIAH HUNT

Queens-2

THOMAS WILLET A/L  
JOHN JACKSON

Renesslaerswyck-1

HENRY VAN RENSSLAER M; F

## CODE

M-Prominent Merchant  
L-Prominent Landowner  
F-Friendly to Hunter  
O-Opponent of Hunter  
X-Expelled

Fr-Farmer  
l/o-Owned some land  
J/L-Leislerian  
A/L-Anti-Leislerian



## ASSEMBLYMEN IN HUNTER'S REIGN 1710-1719 (CONT.)

## Fifteenth Assembly

1713-May 27 to July 7;  
 Oct. 15 to Nov. 4  
 1714-Mar. 24 to Sept. 4  
 Dissolved by Death of  
 Queen Anne

Speaker-William Nicoll  
 Clerk-Gabriel Ludlow  
 Sgt-at-Arms-Robert Crannel  
 Door Keeper-Cornelius Post

Albany-3  
 Robert Livingston Jr. c; d  
 Myndert Schuyler c; d  
 Peter Van Brugh d

Richmond-2  
 JOHN STILLWELL  
 ABRAHAM LAKERMAN

Dutchess-1  
 Leonard Lewis b

Suffolk-2  
 WILLIAM NICOLL  
 SAMUEL MULFORD

Kings-2  
 CORNELIUS SEBRING  
 CORNELIUS VAN BRUNT

Ulster-2  
 HENRY BEEKMAN c  
 Jacob Rusten

New York-4  
 JACOBUS VAN CORTLANDT c  
 STEPHEN DE LANCEY c  
 LAWRENCE READE  
 Samuel Bayard c

Westchester-3  
 WILLIAM WILLETT  
 Joseph Drake  
 LEWIS MORRIS

Orange-1  
 Cornelius Haring

Rensselaerwyck-1  
 HENRY VAN RENSSELAER

## CODE

- b-Added to Assembly.  
 c-Among those mentioned in Debt Payment of 1714.  
 d-Received former 10,000 Acre grant of Nicholas Bayard  
 from Hunter, Nov. 3, 1714.

Capitalized names-Members of Thirteenth Assembly.

## ASSEMBLYMEN IN HUNTER'S REIGN 1710-1719 (CONT.)

## Sixteenth Assembly

1715-May 3 to July 21  
Dissolved Aug. 11, 1715

Same speaker as before.

Albany-3

JOHANNIS CUYLER c  
Hendrick Hansen c  
Karel Hansen

Kings-2

CORNELIUS SEBRING  
CORNELIUS VAN BRUNT

Dutchess-2

Leonard Lewis  
Baltus Van Kleeck b

New York-4

JACOBUS VAN CORTLANDT c  
STEPHEN De LANCY c  
Samuel Bayard c  
John reade

Orange-1

Cornelius Haring

Suffolk-2

WILLIAM NICOLL  
SAMUEL MULFORD x

Queens-2

THOMAS WILLETT  
JOHN JACKSON c

Ulster-2

HENRY BEEKMAN c  
Jacob Rutsen

Rensselaerswyck-1

Andries Coejemans

Westchester-3

Jonathan Odall  
JOSIAH HUNT  
LEWIS MORRIS e

Richmond-2

JOHN STILLWELL  
ABRAHAM LAKERMAN

## CODE

b-Added to Assembly.

c-Among those mentioned in Debt Payment of 1714.

e-Justice of Supreme Court 1715 in place of Rober Mompesson.

x-Expelled June 2, 1715.

Capitalized Names-Members of Thirteenth Assembly.

Capitalized Names-Members of Thirteenth Assembly.

## ASSEMBLYMEN IN HUNTER'S REIGN 1710-1719 (CONT.)

## Fourteenth Assembly

1711-July 2 to Aug. 4;  
 Oct. 2 to Nov. 24  
 1712-Apr. 30 to June 26;  
 Aug. 25 to Dec. 10

Albany-3  
 Robert Livingston Jr.  
 JOHANNIS CUYLER  
 JOHANNIS SCHUYLER

Kings-2  
 CORNELIUS SEBRING  
 CORNELIUS VAN BRUNT

New York-4  
 JACOBUS VAN CORTLANDT  
 LAWRENCE READE  
 STEPHEN DE LANCEY  
 David Provoost

Orange-1  
 HENDRICK TEN EYCK

Queens-2  
 THOMAS WILLETT  
 JOHN JACKSON

Renesselaerwyck-1  
 HENRY VAN RENSSELAER

Dissolved May 3, 1713  
 Officers same as in pre-  
 ceeding assembly

Richmond-2  
 ABRAHAM LAKERMAN  
 JOHN STILLWELL

Suffolk-2  
 WILLIAM NICOLL  
 SAMUEL MULFORD

Ulster-2  
 HENRY BEEKMAN  
 THOMAS GARTON

Westchester-3  
 WILLIAM WILLETT  
 EDMUND WARD  
 John Hoite a  
 LEWIS MORRIS

CODE

a-Replaced Ward, Dec'd., 1712.

Capitalized Names-Members of Thirteenth Assembly.

## ASSEMBLYMEN IN HUNTER'S REIGN 1710-1719 (CONT.)

## Seventeenth Assembly

1716-June 5-30; Aug. 7 to Sept. 1	1722-May 30 to Jul. 7; Oct. 3 to Nov. 1
1717-Apr. 9 to May 28; Aug. 27 to Dec. 23	1723-May 8 to Jul. 6
1718-May 21 to Jul. 3; Sept. 24 to Oct. 16	1724-May 12 to Jul. 24
1719-April 28 to June 25	1725-Aug. 31 to Nov. 10
1720-Oct. 13 to Nov. 19	1726-Apr. 6 to June 17; Dissolved Aug. 10, 1726
1721-May 16 to Jul. 27	

Speakers-William Nicoll f; Robert Livingston, Sr. g;  
Adolph Philipse h  
Clerk-Gabriel Ludlow  
Sgt-at-Arms-Robert Crannel  
Doorkeepers-Cornelius Post, Thomas Brasier j; Derrick  
Egbertson k

Albany-3

JOHN CUYLER  
Hendrick Hansen  
Karel Hansen  
Myndert Schuyler l

Dutchess-2

Leonard Lewis  
Baltus Van Kleeck  
Johannis Terbosch  
HENRY BEEKMAN n; p

New York-4

David Provoost  
John Jansen  
Jacobus Kipp  
Garret Van Horne  
STEPHEN DE LANCEY t

Orange-2

Peter Haring  
Cornelius Cuyler b

Kings-2

CORNELIUS SEBRING r  
Samuel Garretsen  
Joseph Hegeman s  
Richard Stillwell

Livingston-1

ROBERT LIVINGSTON, SR. b

Suffolk-2

WILLIAM NICOLL f  
SAMUEL MULFORD x  
Samuel Hutchinson y  
Epenetus Platt z

Ulster-2

Jacob Rutsen  
HENRY BEEKMAN  
Abraham Gaasbeck Chambers aa

Westchester-3

WILLIAM WILLETT  
Joseph Budd  
Adolph Philipse ab  
LEWIS MORRIS

## ASSEMBLYMEN IN HUNTER'S REIGN 1710-1719 (CONT.)

Rensselaerwyck-1

Andries Coejmans

Richmond-2

JOHN STILLWELL

ABRAHAM LAKERMAN

Richard Merrill v

## CODE

- b-Added to Assembly.
- f-Resigned, ill health, 1718.
- g-Elected May 27, 1718.
- h-Elected Aug. 31, 1725.
- j-Appointed Dec. 23, 1717.
- k-Appointed in 1722.
- l-Replaced K. Hansen, Dec'd., 1724.
- m-Replaced V. Kleeck, Dec'd., 1717.
- n-Replaced Terbosch, Dec'd., 1725.
- p.-Had also represented Ulster.
- r-Dec'd.-replaced by Hegeman, 1721.
- s-Dec'd.-replaced by Stillwell in 1725.
- t-Replaced Provoost, Dec'd., 1725.
- u-Replaced Willett, Dec'd., 1725.
- v-Replaced Stillwell, Dec'd., 1725.
- x-Expelled in 1720.
- y-Replaced Mulford in 1721.
- z-Admitted 1723.
- aa-Replaced Beekman, Dec'd., 1717.
- ab-Replaced Budd, Dec'd., 1722.

Capitalized Names-Members of Thirteenth Assembly.

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