YOUNGSTOWN JEWRY'S RESPONSE TO NAZISM AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS

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ABSTRACT

Claurence J. Strouss's convening of a meeting on 21 August 1935 at the Tod House in Youngstown (Ohio) ushered in a new organizational era for the city's disparate Jewish communities. Strouss – president and general manager of the local Strouss-Hirshberg Company – embodied the social advancements and successful assimilation over the past century of the city's earliest German Jewish immigrant families. The drastic influx of eastern European Jewish immigrants to Youngstown from 1880 to 1924 transformed the city's demographics, and altered specifically the German Jewish community's cultural, religious, and political traditions. Severe reversals in American immigration policy following World War I reduced the once-constant flow of new immigrant laborers to the burgeoning industrial city of Youngstown. National and international Jewish organizations' innumerable demands for monetary assistance – in response to immigration restrictions, an economic depression, and the development of totalitarian governments in Europe – placed excessive burdens on Youngstown's fractured Jewish communities.

The twenty-six men and women who met at the Tod House responded to these demands by creating a central Jewish organization aimed at merging local, national, and overseas appeals into a single united effort. The Jewish Federation of Youngstown's annual fundraising campaigns from 1935 to 1941 marked Youngstown Jewry's first unified response to the evils of Nazism and the subsequent refugee crisis. The following essay will chronicle the development of Jewish communities throughout Youngstown and detail how external pressures following World War I transformed the city's diverse Jewish communities into a unified organizational body.

For my parents Paul and Cynthia and my brother Robert, their support and patience is incalculable.

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Introduction

Much research into America's response to Nazism, the refugee crisis, and the Holocaust focuses exclusively on either the inept decisions of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and those within his administration, or the inactions of the major leaders of national Jewish organizations. Analyses focused on the role and actions of national Jewish organizations do not account for or appreciate the nuances of each organization's vast constituency at the local level across the nation. Decisions and policy making by national organization leaders do not necessarily conform to the ideologies of all of their members at each regional (branch) office. Thus, insight into a mid-sized midwestern Jewish community's response to Nazism and the refugee crisis, as compared to the American government's and national Jewish organizations' responses, offers new scholarly insight previously excluded by academics and historians.

The following work details the formation of the Jewish Federation of Youngstown in 1935 and its fundraising efforts in response to Nazism and the refugee crisis in the years preceding America's entry into World War II. A description of the development of Jewish communities throughout Youngstown, focusing on the religious, political, and socio-cultural differences between the German Jewish community and the various eastern European Jewish communities is included in order to appreciate fully the Federation's efforts. Insight into the development of Youngstown's diverse Jewish communities allows for a comparison of the societal position, the rapidity or slowness of Jewish assimilation, and the relations between German and eastern European congregations in Youngstown with other midwestern Jewish communities leading up to

the 1930s. The first chapter will add to the historiography of Jewish community studies by placing Youngstown's fractured Jewish communities in relation to Jewish communal developments in Columbus, Cleveland, and Detroit.

The second chapter chronicles America's interwar immigration restriction and Youngstown's response to the drastic influx of eastern and southern Europeans from 1880 to 1924. An in-depth discussion of the impenetrable barriers established by interwar immigration policy allows for a better understanding of the countless difficulties and obstacles faced by refugee relief efforts during the 1930s. Increased efforts in the wake of immigration restriction by national Jewish organizations – such as B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish Committee, and other newly organized agencies – placed greater financial burdens upon unorganized Jewish communities throughout the United States. The development of Jewish Federations and Welfare Agencies throughout the United States is the focus of the third chapter.

The remaining chapters will place the actions and policies of the Jewish Federation of Youngstown within the context of American Jewry's responses, or lack thereof, to the rise of Nazism and the subsequent refugee crisis. The fourth chapter describes the historiography of American and American Jewish responses to Nazism and the refugee crisis. The fifth chapter chronicles how immigration restriction, increased demands from numerous national organizations, and the barbarism of Nazi Germany created the impetus for Youngstown Jewry to act as a united community, despite deeply embedded religious, political, and socio-cultural differences. Those selected to lead the Federation in 1935 represent a socio-religious cross-section of the various Jewish communities indicating a coalescing of the disparate communities. The Federation's

guest speakers, community rallies, interfaith dialogues, and annual fundraising campaigns all demonstrate an awareness of the evils of Nazism and the dire conditions of refugees displaced by the Third Reich. Detailed analysis of fundraising campaigns from 1935 to 1941, and how these totals compare to fundraising efforts by Ohio's eight most populated Jewish cities, illustrates a community's active and continued effort to relocate European refugees amidst continued immigration restriction and public apathy. The following work expands upon the historiography of America's response to the Holocaust by detailing how a relatively small midwestern Jewish community of approximately eight thousand made a difference in rescuing refugees in the years preceding America's entry into World War II.

Chapter I

The Development of Jewish Communities throughout Youngstown

The First Jewish Immigrants: 1830 – 1880

Youngstown's population during the nineteenth century, similar to other newly developing midwestern communities, burgeoned with the arrival of western European immigrants. The arrival of Irish, Welsh, Germans, and other ethnic groups during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century coincided with Youngstown's development from an agricultural outpost to an iron-producing center of commerce. By 1860, foreign-born immigrants accounted for approximately forty-five percent of the community's population, with Germans numbering ten percent of the residents of Youngstown township and borough. Continued advancements in transportation, industry, and public services led to Youngstown's designation as a city in 1870 with a population of eight thousand.[1] The high number of German immigrants within the flourishing community included a handful of Jewish settlers who participated in and contributed to the city's socio-economic development.

The first recorded Jewish immigrants to Youngstown, the Jacob Spiegel family, arrived at the frontier landscape in 1837 after emigrating from Alsace-Lorraine. By the 1850s, a sparse number of German Jewish immigrants settled in neighboring Girard and Briar Hill, and in the center of downtown Youngstown. Over the next two decades, the

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[1] Frederick J. Blue and others, *Mahoning Memories: A History of Youngstown and Mahoning County* (Virginia Beach: Donning Co. Publishers, 1995), 25-61.

number of Jewish immigrants from Bavaria, Austria, and Hungary increased slowly, and by 1867, several Jewish immigrant merchants lined Federal Street - the main thoroughfare in downtown Youngstown. The earliest German Jewish businesses included a Ladies and Gents Furnishing Store, a Merchant Taylor Establishment, a Watchmaker and Jewelry Establishment, a Cabinet Ware, and other storefront businesses.[2] The pace at which these new immigrants organized businesses within the center of the city indicates a familiarity with middle-class mores and parallels the communal developments of German Jewish immigrants in Cleveland, Columbus, and Detroit during the nineteenth century.[3] For Irving E. Ozer, local Jewish historian and former director of the Youngstown Area Jewish Archives, the early Jewish immigrant families were "comparatively well-educated" and desirous "to assimilate and acculturate" to American society.[4] After establishing successfully an economic niche within the developing community, the now identifiable Jewish immigrants arranged to organize a minyan.[5]

On the evening of 12 May 1867, fifteen Jewish immigrant storekeepers met at the home of Abraham Waldrun and formally organized a constitution and by-laws for the first Jewish congregation in the city of Youngstown. The fifteen charter members divided themselves into "three classes" and collected four hundred and ninety-five dollars

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[2] Irving Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names: The History of the Jews of Greater Youngstown, Ohio 1865 to 1990* (Youngstown: 1994), 15-18.

[3] Marc Lee Raphael, *Jews and Judaism in a Midwestern Community, Columbus, Ohio 1840-1975* (Columbus: Ohio Historical Society, 1979), 40; Lloyd P. Gartner, *History of the Jews of Cleveland*, 2nd ed. (Cleveland: Western Reserve Historical Society, 1987), 15; Robert A. Rockaway, *The Jews of Detroit: From the Beginning, 1762-1914* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1986).

[4] "Valley Jews Have Historian – Center's Archivist Knows About Their European Origins and Local Affiliations," *Warren Tribune Chronicle*, undated clipping, Mahoning Valley Historical Society Jewish Archives Collection.

[5] According to Orthodox tradition, ten Hebrew males over the age of thirteen (a minyan) are required for official communal services. Non-Orthodox congregations include women when establishing a minyan, Irving Cutler, *The Jews of Chicago: From Shtetl to Suburb* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996).

as freewill offerings. At a second meeting a week later, the fifteen charter members collected another ninety-five dollars, elected officers, and named their assembly Congregation Rodef Sholom (Pursuers of Peace).[6] The members initially assembled at congregants' residences until they secured funds to rent a room atop Abraham Walbrun's Woolen Factory Store in the Porter Block of West Federal Street for both worship and educational instruction. Although organized during the German Reform Movement, "the annals of the Temple indicate that, in comparison with the late twentieth century Judaic standards, the congregation ***at its inception*** was actually much more orthodox than reform."[7] During the first two years, the small congregation purchased a Sefer Torah[8] from Germany for sixty dollars in gold and appointed their first Rabbi - Lippman Liebman, a native of Karlsruhe, Baden, Germany. A formally recognized German Jewish community now existed in Youngstown.

David Theobald's leadership as the first president of Congregation Rodef Sholom and his socio-economic position within the developing city provides invaluable insight into the early social dynamics between Youngstown's Gentile populace and the small German Jewish immigrant community. Theobald, a native of Ibesheim, Germany, emigrated in 1849 to avoid military conscription and arrived in Youngstown after working for several years in New Castle, Pennsylvania, as a clerk in a dry goods and clothing firm. The twenty-seven year old immigrant quickly partnered with Ferdinand Ritter and established the clothing firm of David Theobald & Co. on Federal Street in 1852. Theobald's position as a member of the Board of Trustees of the Municipal Water

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[6] Charles I. Cooper, "The Story of the Jews of Youngstown," *The Jewish Criterion* (29 October 1918), 5-6.

[7] Ibid.

[8] A Sefer Torah includes scrolls containing the five books of Moses, which are then read in synagogue every Sabbath.

Works, the Youngstown Board of Education, the Board of the Youngstown Hospital, Director of the Mahoning National Bank, and as an aide-de-camp for Ohio Governor Headley indicates clearly the young immigrant's success and prominence within the city of Youngstown.[9] The community's acceptance of Theobald and his fellow German Jewish brethren within commercial, civic, and philanthropic affairs suggest amicable relations between the early Jewish settlers and the Gentile majority throughout the city.

Early histories focusing on the development of Youngstown during the nineteenth century include references to the social dynamics among the divergent nationalities, religions, and races throughout the Mahoning Valley. Colonel Thomas W. Sanderson, author of *A 20th Century History of Youngstown and Mahoning County, Ohio* (1907), noted, "The best of relations have always existed in this community between Christians and Jews...."[10] In July 1870, the *American Israelite* observed that in Youngstown:

> ...The Israelites as a class are very much respected by the community at large; they take quite an interest in all public affairs. As proof we have a Mr. Strouss as a Justice of the Peace for quite a number of years, and Mr. Jos. Stettheimer as a member of the Board of Public Schools.[11]

Communal relations influenced undoubtedly the manner in which immigrant groups assimilated to American society. Acceptance rates of liberal-minded German Jewish immigrant entrepreneurs during the last three decades of the nineteenth century produced differing degrees of assimilation to American society throughout midwestern communities.

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[9] Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives, JA-660-P, Rodef Sholom Permanent Category; Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 17-18.

[10] Colonel Thomas S. Sanderson, *A Twentieth Century History of Youngstown and Mahoning County, Ohio* (Chicago, 1907).

[11] Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 33.

Scholarly research and analysis of the early German Jewish communities in Columbus, Detroit, and Cleveland provide information necessary for comparing degrees of assimilation and communal relations evident within Youngstown. German Jewish immigrants in Columbus consciously organized their religious and social life around American tenets. In 1868, these Jewish immigrants incorporated Protestant traditions within the Reform synagogue of B'nai Israel, hoping to appeal to both business-minded Jewish immigrants and Columbus Gentiles.[12] Marc Lee Raphael contends, "As Columbus' German Jews entered the last two decades of the nineteenth century, they had been acculturated socially, and religiously; economically they had adjusted quite comfortably to America."[13] Cordial relations between German Jewish immigrants and the native populace, which prevailed in Columbus, never occurred widely in Detroit. Anti-Semitic diatribes appeared in the Detroit press during the Civil War era and frequently reappeared during economic crises. The city's virulent anti-Semitism persisted unabated and eventually erupted in a Yom Kippur Day Riot. For Robert Rockaway, "Despite a foreign population of almost forty percent by 1880, late nineteenth century Detroit remained an anti-Semitic stronghold with ethnic penetration of the city's social elite kept at a minimum."[14] Divisions between moderate and radical forms of American Reform Judaism also influenced the development of the German Jewish community in Detroit. The conversion of the Orthodox congregation of Beth El to a moderate form of Reform Judaism in the 1860s demonstrated the congregants' desires for social acceptance. Yet, the Gentile citizenry of Detroit never fully accepted the German Jewish community as equals despite their increased secularization and overall desire for

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[12] Raphael, *Jews and Judaism in a Midwestern Community, Columbus, Ohio*, 40.
[13] Ibid., 85.
[14] Rockaway, *The Jews of Detroit: From the Beginning, 1762-1914*, 28.

Americanization and cultural assimilation. Tenuous economic and cultural relations between German Jewish immigrants and the native populace never occurred widely in Cleveland. In fact, little evidence of friction or discrimination in the daily life occurred and evidence suggests that the Jewish immigrants had full equality. Lloyd P. Gartner believes that native Clevelanders' acceptance of the German Jewish immigrants allowed "them [the new immigrants] to feel that they were persons of moral and economic worth in their adopted city."[15]

For those of Congregation Rodef Sholom, the non-Jewish citizenry of Youngstown, for the most part, respected the Jewish immigrants' social, cultural, and religious traditions.[16] In fact, evidence indicates that without monetary assistance from their non-Jewish friends the early German Jewish immigrants would have been unable to establish their first temple.[17] Rodef Sholom's decision to identify itself as an American Reform temple in the late 1870s, a mere decade after its inception as an Orthodox congregation, reflects an appreciation and acceptance of American social mores. As a Reform temple, Rodef Sholom no longer required "the wearing of kepahs, replaced Hebrew with English during services, removed dietary restrictions concerning kosher foods, and even Sabbath keeping."[18] Youngstown's German Jewish immigrants, similar to those in Columbus, Cleveland, and Detroit, accepted readily American socio-economic ideals by adapting their old world religious traditions. Fortunately, the direct

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[15] Gartner, *History of the Jews of Cleveland*, 28.

[16] Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 33-34; The mostly harmonious relations, however, did not thwart all acts of prejudice or anti-Semitism. An incident in the fall of 1873 consisted of a gang of youth beating and attempting to burn a young Jewish boy.

[17] Youngstown Area Jewish Federation - Jewish Archives JA-660-P, Rodef Sholom Permanent Category.

[18] "Valley Jews Have Historian – Center's Archivist Knows About Their European Origins and Local Affiliations," *Warren Tribune Chronicle*, undated clipping, Mahoning Valley Historical Society Jewish Archives Collection.

discrimination toward German Jews in Detroit was not prevalent in late nineteenth century Youngstown.

Eastern European Jewish Communities: 1880-1924

The drastic influx of eastern and southern European immigrants from 1880 to 1924 altered significantly the dynamics of communities throughout America – including Youngstown. These new immigrants' arrival and rapid industrialization and urbanization during the last three decades of the nineteenth century increased Youngstown's city population from just over fifteen thousand in 1880 to nearly forty-five thousand at the turn of the century.[19] The paving of Federal and Market Streets, the lighting of downtown with electricity in lieu of gas lamps, the construction of a sewer system, and the annexation of neighboring Brier Hill, Haselton, Lansingville, and Crab Creek from Coitsville Township epitomized the urbanization of Youngstown in the 1880s.[20] A growing membership in Congregation Rodef Sholom led to the 4 June 1886 dedication of a formal temple on the corner of Fifth and Lincoln Avenues, a mere four city blocks northwest of West Federal Street.[21] Tsarist Russia's punitive military draft decrees, state-sponsored pogroms throughout the Pale of Settlement, and severe socio-economic upheavals throughout all of eastern Europe forced Hungarian, Polish, Lithuanian, Romanian, and Russian Jews to emigrate en-masse to the industrialized city of Youngstown. Despite their common Orthodox religious affiliation, each of the new eastern European Jewish ethnic groups transported its own specific religious and cultural traditions to distinct areas of the city.

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[19] *Tenth Census of the United States*, 1880 Table VI; *Twelfth Census of the United States*, 1900 Table XIII.

[20] Blue and others, *Mahoning Memories: A History of Youngstown and Mahoning County*, 63-76.

[21] Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives JA-660-P, Rodef Sholom Permanent Category; Ozer and others, eds. *These Are The Names*, 31.

Newly arriving Hungarian Jewish immigrants united with their brethren of earlier generations and convened just east of downtown. The Lithuanian Jewish immigrants abutted the Hungarian Jewish neighborhood on the lower east side toward East Youngstown (Campbell). The Russian Jewish immigrants settled in the city's lower north side in the area of Smoky Hollow, a neighborhood containing a mix of several different newly arriving eastern and southern European ethnicities.[22] The ever-increasing arrival of eastern European Jewish immigrants to Youngstown led to dissatisfaction with Rodef Sholom's lessening of "traditional ritual and customs of orthodox Judaism," and compelled those unsympathetic with Reform temple services to form their own traditional Orthodox congregation. A group of mostly Hungarian Jewish immigrants, after meeting informally since 1870, assembled in a rented hall in the Porter Block of West Federal Street on 10 February 1883 and officially organized B'nai Israel Congregation (Children of Israel).[23] This organizational meeting marked the first of many splinter congregations established by divergent eastern European Jewish ethnic groups over the next several decades. The success of each new congregation rested on the degree to which the immigrants retained old world religious traditions and or accepted American socio-economic mores.

Differing views toward religious education, Orthodox teachings, cultural traditions, acceptance of American social traditions, and political ideologies fueled each of the successive splits within the Youngstown Jewish community. The new Orthodox Children of Israel Congregation erected a place of worship on Summit Avenue between

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[22] "Valley Jews Have Historian – Center's Archivist Knows About Their European Origins and Local Affiliations," *Warren Tribune Chronicle*, undated clipping, Mahoning Valley Historical Society Jewish Archives Collection.

[23] Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 41.

Watt Street and Walnut Street in 1893, adjoining the Hungarian neighborhood. After deeming Rodef Sholom's butcher unsatisfactory, Children of Israel imported kosher meats from Cleveland, thus allowing for strict adherence to dietary laws and assuring access to kosher foods for all its members. Children of Israel's new location also included a Hebrew School that remained productive for many years. The dominance of the Hungarian Jewish immigrants within the Orthodox congregation led many within the city, both Jew and Gentile, to refer to Children of Israel as "The Ungarishe Shul" - Yiddish for Hungarian temple.[24] The Hungarian Jews' dominance and political ideology created points of friction among its diverse Orthodox constituency.

The divergent ideologies of German Reform, Messianism, and Zionism within Judaism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created schisms throughout American Jewish communities. The Hungarian Jewish majority within Children of Israel adhered to Messianic Judaism, which advocated the praying and waiting for a prophetic messiah to appear and establish salvation for the Jewish people. This ideology conflicted significantly with the philosophy espoused by Russian, Polish, and Romanian immigrants who continued to arrive from the pogrom-ravaged areas of eastern Europe. For the Russian Jewish immigrants, mostly Orthodox in background, Zionism offered the only practical answer to the centuries-old Jewish Diaspora. Zionists believed ardently that Jews were obligated to take matters into their own hands in establishing a homeland for world Jewry in Palestine.[25] Accusations of disloyalty due to

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[24] Ibid., 41-43; Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives JA-600-P, Children of Israel Temple Permanent Category.

[25] Ibid., 43-44; Arthur Hertzberg, ed. *The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader* (Athenaeum, New York: A Temple Book, 1959); "Valley Jews Have Historian – Center's Archivist Knows About Their European Origins and Local Affiliations," *Warren Tribune Chronicle*, undated clipping, Mahoning Valley Historical Society Jewish Archives Collection;

advocacy of a "Jewish nationalism" did not deter American Zionists. As the only Orthodox temple in Youngstown, Children of Israel consisted of a tenuous mix of members adhering to the vastly divergent principles of Messianism and Zionism.

The development of Jewish landsmanshaftn - immigrant hometown associations – throughout American cities at the turn of the twentieth century provided means for eastern European Jewish immigrants to adapt to American society. Early twentieth century American immigration historiography consists of two central themes; the immigrants' ongoing balance between preserving old-world traditions versus adapting to American society; and the presence or degree of immigrant agency during the process of assimilation, acculturation, and Americanization. For Daniel Soyer, the landsmanshaftn epitomize eastern European Jews' ongoing societal adjustments and illustrates their purposeful desire to adapt to American society. According to Soyer, "The degree to which the landsmanshaftn served as vehicles for their members' integration into American life indicates the importance of the active participation by the immigrants in defining their group identities."[26] The arrival and subsequent work of the Ozersky Brothers in 1895 epitomizes the experiences of many Russian Zionists who struggled in establishing communal networks for their landslayt. Nathan, Louis, and Emanuel Ozersky worked feverishly toward bringing over their oppressed Russian landslayt with the objective of creating a budding Russian Jewish community in Youngstown grounded in Zionism. The Ozersky Brothers remained in constant communication with their landslayt, provided financial assistance for travel, housed the new arrivals, and offered employment at their bakery on Federal Street. Although the Ozerskys were not the only

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[26] Daniel Soyer, *Jewish Immigrant Associations and American Identity in New York 1880-1939* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997), 8.

group of eastern Europeans who worked to transport landslayt to Youngstown, no other family or organization matched the Ozerskys' fervor and success in the assimilation of immigrants. The families that the Ozersky Brothers aided and directed to Youngstown consisted of individuals who would later lead all of Youngstown Jewry during crucial decades of the twentieth century. [27]

By 1904, the Ozersky Brothers efforts led to the formation of a second Orthodox congregation with a membership of twenty-six families. The new congregation, Emanu-El (God is With Us), centered their initial concerns toward Theodore Herzl's Zionist vision of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The congregants of Emanu-El supported Herzlian Zionism despite being "laughed at by the non-religious elements and frowned upon by their pious brethren."[28] The leaders of Emanu-El, also in 1904, established the first Zionist organization in Youngstown, Degel Tzion (Flag of Zion). Headed by Meyer Altschuler, an erudite Russian Zionist, Degel Tzion promoted Jewish National Trust and Colonial Trust campaigns for Jewish colonization of Palestine. Within two years Emanu-El organized a Ladies Zionist Society and a Sons and Daughters of Zion chapters. After successfully establishing budding Zionist organizations, Emanu-El turned to the religious and educational needs of their congregants, and erected a Talmud Torah in 1908. Often referred to as the Youngstown Hebrew Institute, the school developed quickly, and by 1920, enrolled over one hundred and fifty students at a schoolhouse on Wood Street. Emanu-El's leaders, confident in the school's progress and the congregation's continued advancements in the cause of Zionism, constructed a permanent place of worship in 1912

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[27] Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 43-45. A few of the more prominent families the Ozersky's assisted included the Schwebel, Itskovits, Friedkan, Eidelman, and Brandlyn families to name just a few.

[28] *Temple Emanu-El Dedication Journal*, Jewish Archives Collection, JA90-650-P23, Mahoning Valley Historical Society Youngstown, Ohio.

on East Rayen Avenue, just south of Smoky Hollow, with a seating capacity of eight hundred.[29] Emanu-El's advocacy of Zionism and strong emphasis toward an Orthodox religious education illustrates their desire to retain certain old-world religious traditions and political ideologies, which they viewed as essential components of Jewish life.

Disagreements concerning Children of Israel's strict retention of all Orthodox traditions and new administrative policies regarding the religious education program commenced soon after the establishment of Emanu-El's Talmud Torah. As eastern European Jewish immigrants assimilated eagerly to American society, they soon resisted several Orthodox traditions still prevalent within Children of Israel's weekly services and High Holiday celebrations. Divisions within Children of Israel during the early decades of the twentieth century demonstrate the internal organizational battles concerning degrees of retention and assimilation evident throughout established congregations. For many, Rodef Sholom's Reform services dismissed too many religious traditions while Children of Israel retained too strict an interpretation of primitive old-world customs. Thus, a group of eastern European Jewish immigrants yearned for a balance that the newly organized, Zionist-dominated, Emanu-El Congregation did not meet.[30]

The Orthodox custom of separate seating for men and women during temple services (mechitzah) frustrated many within Children Israel who argued that the practice had "no real foundation in the Talmud or the Torah."[31] For newly assimilated Jewish immigrants, ethnic traditions and old-world religious customs needed to be removed in order to accommodate to their new liberal and democratic society. The fact that the

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[29] Ibid; Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names,* 67-76.

[30] "The Jews As Part of Youngstown History..." Jewish Archives, JA89.133, Mahoning Valley Historical Society.

[31] Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names,* 93.

assimilated Jewish immigrants were coincidentally the more affluent members of the congregation created another point of contention. Congregants who relocated to the north side of the city near Wick and Crandal Parks argued for a relocation of the temple due to the continued "deterioration" of the neighborhoods near the shul on Summit Avenue. Children of Israel's support of Emanu-El's Talmud Torah (Hebrew Institute) in place of its own religious program provided the final reason for a second split from Children of Israel within a fifteen-year span.[32]

On 1 October 1919, the Fish, Frankle, Schwartz, Rand, Feldman, Shagrin, Friedman, and Isenberg families met and organized a new congregation "orthodox in ritual but conservative in nature."[33] Eleven days later the group selected the name Anshe Emeth Congregation (Men of Truth) and affiliated with the United Synagogue of America. By January 1920, the new congregation purchased property north of downtown at the intersection of Park and Elm Streets at the southeastern corner of Wick Park. Almon Max Fish, the first president of Anshe Emeth, led the congregation's thirty-seven families in fundraising efforts aimed at the construction of a school, social rooms, and a sanctuary. A community center constructed in 1922 served as a temporary synagogue until the completion and dedication of the Anshe Emeth Temple in March 1928. The location of the Anshe Emeth Temple away from the center of the city paralleled Rodef Sholom's move from Fifth and Lincoln Avenues to Elm and Woodbine directly across from Wick Park in 1915.[34] The location of new congregations and the relocation of older

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[32] Ibid., 93.

[33] *50th Anniversary Journal: Past, Present, and Future of Anshe Emeth*, Jewish Archives, JA-560P, Mahoning Valley Historical Society Youngstown.

[34] Ibid.; *The Dedication of Anshe Emeth Youngstown Ohio March Sixteenth to Eighteenth 1928*, Jewish Archives, JA-560P, Mahoning Valley Historical Society Youngstown; Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 88-92.

ones illustrate changes in the demographic composition of Youngstown's disparate Jewish communities.

As the Hungarian and Russian Jewish immigrants continued to coalesce with each other and then disband over religious and political issues, the approximately one hundred and fifty Lithuanian Jewish immigrants on the far east side of the city remained distinct and separate from Children of Israel, Emanu-El, and Anshe Emeth. Around the same time as the founding of Emanu-El, the Lithuanian Jewish immigrants organized an Orthodox congregation, named Shaareh Torah Congregation.[35] The congregants purchased, remodeled, and utilized a home on South Hine Street as a shul. Dissention and internal quarrels, so evident within Children of Israel, soon surfaced within Shaareh Torah. By 1912, the issue of a "relaxed ritual" in place of traditional Orthodox practices polarized a majority of the members within the "Hine Street Shul." As a result, a "splinter group" under the leadership of Samuel Levy disaffiliated with Shaareh Torah in 1913 and formed another congregation - Shaareh Torah Anshe Chessid Shel Emes. The splinter Shaareh Torah, referred to as the "big" Shaareh Torah, purchased a former Presbyterian Church at the corner of Prospect Street and Himrod Avenue and prospered initially with the addition of newly arriving Hungarian and "Litvak" immigrants. The original Shaareh Torah, or "little" Shaareh Torah, disbanded in 1920 because of decreased membership and poor management.[36]

The divergent group of Jewish immigrants in the northern and eastern sections of Youngstown did not account for all of the city's Jewish inhabitants. Completion of the Market Street Viaduct spanning the Mahoning River and railroad grades at the turn of the

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[35] A discrepancy in the spelling of this congregation appears as Shaarei and Shaareh throughout many different sources.

[36] Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 97-98.

twentieth century resulted in further developments south of the city. Continued city annexations into Youngstown Township in 1913, and into Boardman and Coitsville Townships in the late 1920s incorporated several burgeoning neighborhoods, including a Jewish immigrant neighborhood several blocks southeast of the Oak Hill Cemetery near Mill Creek Park.[37] Jewish immigrants living south of the Mahoning River accounted for approximately forty percent of Youngstown's total Jewish population. Prior to city annexation south of the Mahoning River, south side Jews attended temple services at congregations located in the near north side of the city. Growing difficulties and inconveniences resulting from the lengthy walk from the south side to services held at Emanu-El Congregation on the near north side provided the impetus for "south-sider Jews" to organize their own Orthodox temple "on the other side of the Viaduct."[38]

Congregation Ohev Tzedek, Youngstown's sixth Jewish congregation, formed in 1920 and received its official charter in 1922 as an Orthodox synagogue. The small group of south side Jewish immigrants initially convened at congregants' residences. For several years thereafter, the congregants celebrated Sabbath and High Holiday Services in various locations, including a second-floor hall atop a cabaret at the intersection of Market and Falls Streets, and in rooms above the Youngstown Sanitary Milk Company on Erie Street, east of Market Street.[39] By 1925, "a persevering little band of workers...through small donations... accumulated enough to purchase" property at 93 East Myrtle Avenue.[40] At an estimated cost of $25,000 Ohev Tzedek's seventy members

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[37] Blue and others, *Mahoning Memories*, 93.

[38] Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 98.

[39] *50th Anniversary of Congregation Ohev Tzedek Booklet*, Jewish Archives, JA-90-670-P17, Mahoning Valley Historical Society, Youngstown.

[40] "New Temple Ohev Tzedek to be Dedicated Sunday," *The Youngstown Vindicator* 20 March 1926, 2.

dedicated its building in grand style in the spring of 1926. For the *Youngstown Vindicator* "...this new Temple, marking the beginning of a new era is regarded as the initial step toward further congregational development south of the viaduct."[41] For Irving Ozer, "the East Myrtle Avenue Shul's families appear to be much poorer than their brethren closer to the city."[42] Financial difficulties including unpaid utility bills and piecemeal payment of annual membership dues resulted in repeated threats of foreclosure for nearly a decade.[43] Despite several years of financial hardships and geographical exclusion from the more numerous and prosperous north side congregations, Ohev Tzedek maintained a religious school, sponsored summer community picnics, and eventually acquired its first Rabbi in 1943.

Communal Acceptance of Eastern European Jews

The development of Youngstown Jewry from two congregations, one Orthodox and one Reform, at the end of the nineteenth century to six separate communities at the conclusion of the second decade of the twentieth century illustrates the effects of eastern European Jewish immigration to the city and reveals the deeply rooted socio-cultural and religious differences inherent within each ethnic group. Comparison of the communal relations between established German Jewish families and newly arriving eastern European Jewish immigrants in Detroit and Cleveland presents useful information concerning the degree of Jewish assimilation within midwestern industrial cities similar to Youngstown. Detroiters initially expressed sympathy for the pogrom victims, but apprehension quickly surfaced when the number of new arrivals continued at a consistent

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[41] Ibid., 2.
[42] Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 99-100.
[43] *50th Anniversary of Congregation Ohev Tzedek Booklet*, Jewish Archives, JA-90-670-P17, Mahoning Valley Historical Society, Youngstown.

rate. At the turn of the century, the local press started to reprint nativistic and anti-Semitic articles, which created the idea that the new Jewish immigrants were spreading cholera and the plague throughout the city.

The established German Jewish community of Detroit consciously remained religiously, politically, and demographically separate from the east European Jews. German Jews viewed Orthodox Judaism as slavish, superstitious, and incompatible with American traditions. Beth El distanced itself from the fifteen Orthodox congregations throughout the city and offered little guidance to the newly developing east European neighborhood. Conversely, the Orthodox eastern European Jews looked at Reform Judaism as a form of moral decay that destroyed congregants' spiritual identity. Eastern European Jews' advocacy of Zionism aroused concern and opposition from German Jewry and the greater city populace. The German Jews of Detroit feared Zionism endangered their position as "loyal" Americans. The German Jews' Phoenix Social Club provides the best illustration of Detroit's unharmonious atmosphere. The German Jews established the elite club due to exclusion from the native elite in the mid-nineteenth century and then deliberately excluded their own Jewish brethren during the early twentieth century. The social club, which intended to provide an avenue for social acceptance, illustrated just one of the numerous barriers between Detroit Jewry. Class, cultural, and religious differences permitted disunity to permeate Detroit Jewry.[44]

The arrival of persecuted eastern European Jews increased Cleveland's Jewish population from three thousand five hundred in 1880 to approximately seventy-five thousand by 1920. The Cleveland press, unlike Detroit's, openly criticized Tsarist policies of persecution and continually welcomed the arrival of Russian Jewish refugees.

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[44] Rockaway, *The Jews of Detroit: From the Beginning, 1762-1914.*

Editorial complaints concerning the new arrivals remained "mild" throughout the local press. Lloyd Gartner argues, "in general Cleveland was an unlikely center of anti-immigration feelings despite maintaining one of the higher proportions of foreign-born and foreign-stock populations."[45] The creation of a local branch of the American Committee for the Amelioration of the Russian Refugees (later the Jewish Alliance of America) in 1890, and participation in a large protest following the Kishinev pogrom in 1903 point to the German Jewish community's compassion and deep concern for their eastern European brethren.[46]

At the turn of the twentieth century, Youngstown's established German Jewish families greeted their eastern European immigrant brethren with a mix of concern and embarrassment. Such concern led the Youngstown Section of the National Council of Jewish Women in 1911 to sponsor and administer night school classes intended specifically to quicken "the Americanization and assimilation" of the new immigrants. Within four years, the Council of Jewish Women expanded their efforts from instructing the attendees in rented storerooms along Federal Street to a more aesthetic setting in a house on Wood Street, named the "Council Cottage." The Council of Jewish Women instructed the immigrants in sewing, cooking, English lessons, and other domestic customs needed to increase their rate of assimilation to American society. By the 1920s, the Council initiated a campaign to raise funds for a permanent settlement house, but new immigration restrictions reduced the number of immigrants entering the city and ultimately quelled the Council's efforts.[47] Similar to the acceptance of earlier German

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[45] Gartner, *History of the Jews of Cleveland*, 112.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives, JA-820-P, National Council of Jewish Women Permanent Category; Ozer and other eds., *These Are The Names*, 63-105.

Jewish immigrants, relations between German Jewish citizens and newly arriving eastern European Jewish immigrants in Youngstown appear to be less cordial than Cleveland Jews' response and much more amicable compared to Detroit's divisive communal arrangement.

Limited acceptance and assistance toward the new arrivals, however, did not create a more united Jewish community in Youngstown. By the mid 1920s, the majority of Youngstown Jews, including the more affluent, were members of Rodef Sholom, Emanu-El, and Anshe Emeth. The leaders and members of these three congregations attained the greatest degree of assimilation and acceptance in the local community. The successes of the Ozersky and Schwebel Bakeries (Emanu-El), Itts Extrusion Works (Anshe Emeth), and Strouss-Hirshberg Department Store (Rodef Sholom) epitomizes each of the congregations' socio-economic achievements. Rodef Sholom's Reform services continued to attract new members to their sanctuary adjacent to Wick Park. Emanu-El's determined efforts toward Zionism, although secluding the congregation from other religious affiliations, remained the largest Orthodox congregation within the city.[48] In fact, Emanu-El's staunch advocacy of Zionism made Youngstown a valuable stop for Zionist speakers traveling the nation during major fundraising campaigns. Anshe Emeth's Conservative practices continued to attract Jewish citizens dissatisfied with strict Orthodox services. The city's three other congregations, all of which remained Orthodox, witnessed decreasing attendance numbers. Children of Israel's, Shaareh Torah's, and the newly organized Ohev Tzedek's decisions not to relax Orthodox rituals and services differed greatly from the Reform-minded and Conservative-leaning majority of Youngstown Jewry. Children of Israel and Shaareh Torah members continued to

[48] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 15 March 1935 vol. 1 No. 1, 5:1.

cluster near family-operated grocery stores, butcher shops, and clothing firms abutting east Federal Street. West Federal Street continued to be the location of well-established half-century-old German Jewish firms. Distinct religious, political, socio-economic, and geographic differences permeated Youngstown Jewry well into the twentieth century. Only external pressures caused by unimaginable international events during the course of the 1920s and 1930s could transform these disparate communities into a united Jewish community. The first external pressure, severe immigration restriction legislation, commenced after America's victory in World War I.

Chapter II

American Interwar Immigration Restriction

From 1880 to 1924, approximately twenty-three and half million immigrants entered the United States - a nation revered for its acceptance of the world's impoverished and displaced. Despite virulent anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic movements in the 1840s and 1850s, American legislative policy continued to permit unrestrained immigration. Construction of an extensive railroad network, calls for settling the vast areas of the American West, and continued advancements in industrialization increased demands for unskilled immigrant workers, ultimately quelling mid-nineteenth century anti-foreign agitation. Yet, the quantity and "types" of immigrants who arrived at American ports during the massive transnational migration of the late nineteenth century altered America's century long policy toward foreigners, described poetically by Emma Lazarus in 1883. Immigrant neighborhoods throughout industrial urban centers that retained ethnic languages, cultural mores, religious customs, and old world garb distressed many "old stock" Americans. The fact that the vast majority of the new immigrants were Catholic, Jewish, and Eastern Orthodox Christians exacerbated the fears of America's predominately-Protestant populace. The influx of "new" immigrants awakened America's latent restrictive ideology, which led to new anti-immigrant rhetoric and restrictive demands on American immigration policy.[1]

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[1] Robert A. Divine, *American Immigration Policy 1924 - 1952* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 1-20; Alan M. Kraut, *The Huddled Masses: The Immigrant in American Society, 1880-1921* (Wheeling, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 2001); Michael C. LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door: An Analysis of U.S. Immigration Policy Since 1820* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987), 1-19.

American Immigration Policy up to the Literacy Act of 1917

The arrival of approximately nine million immigrants between 1880 and 1900, coupled with economic depressions during the 1890s, enlivened the public's xenophobia and propelled Congress to curtail the admission of European and Chinese immigrants.[2] Following Congressional prohibition of prostitutes and convicts in 1875, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The Act, the first decisive piece of restrictive immigration policy in American history, banned Chinese immigration for ten years, excluded the admission of convicts, lunatics, and idiots, placed a head tax on each immigrant, and implemented a crucial exclusionary tactic – the "likely to become a public charge" (LPC) requirement.[3] The formation and eventual popularity of the American Protective Association in the 1890s epitomized the public's emotional appeals for further restrictions.[4] The Immigration Restriction League of Boston, organized by John Friske, Nathaniel Shaler, and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge in 1894, championed similar restrictive causes by emphasizing the need for intellectual and educational requirements for potential immigrants. For Robert A. Divine, "For the first time in American history responsible men were leading a serious campaign to limit European immigration."[5] The large following that these organizations created indicates the public's disappointment with the Exclusion Act of 1882 and continued uneasiness with the "new" immigrants.[6]

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[2] LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door*, 38-41.
[3] Ibid., 17.
[4] The American Protective Association maintained a chapter in Youngstown during the 1890s.
[5] Divine, *American Immigration Policy 1924 – 1952*, 3-4.
[6] Arthur D. Morse, *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy* (New York: The Overlook Press, 1998), 132.

Congressional immigration bills containing literacy requirements as a condition for immigration arrived on the desk of the Executive Office in 1895, 1906, 1912, and 1915. Although Presidents Cleveland, Taft, and Wilson vetoed passage of these literacy requirements, the restrictive bills succeeded in acquiring passage of an English language test before final naturalization certification and permitted the creation of a joint commission aimed at investigating the impact of current immigration trends.[7] Formed in 1907, the Dillingham Commission consisted of three Senators, three Representatives, and three presidential appointees with the sole objective of evaluating immigration policy in the United States. With a staff of approximately three hundred workers and at a cost of nearly one million dollars over the span of four years, the Commission presented its findings in a forty two-volume report.[8] The Commission concluded "restriction of immigration was demanded by economic, moral, and social considerations and recommended the enactment of a literacy test."[9] The Dillingham Commission's influence, grounded in "psuedo-scientific" studies, led to the passage of the Literacy Act of 1917 following an override of President Wilson's veto, thus making literacy an entrance requirement.

Post-War American Society

The perceived failures of the Literacy Act of 1917, economic distresses throughout Europe following the Treaty of Versailles, and the increasing popularity of xenophobic isolationism and racial nationalism shaped American immigration policy in the years following World War I. Congressional and public advocates of immigration restriction viewed the 1917 Literacy Act as an insufficient and unsatisfactory measure

[7] LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door*, 53-74.
[8] Morse, *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy*, 134.
[9] Divine, *American Immigration Policy 1924 – 1952*, 4.

that ineffectively thwarted the constant flow of immigrants. Educational and intellectual requirements, embodied in previous Congressional Acts, no longer appeased restrictionists' stringent demands for reducing the overall number of those permitted to enter the country from eastern and southern Europe. The basic principle of American immigration policy following World War I thus changed drastically from admission according to individual intellectual qualifications to a selection process based on national or racial origins.

Reports of the deplorable economic situation throughout Europe and the dire conditions of those preparing to emigrate exacerbated American citizens' fears of an uncontrollable flood of war-torn immigrants. Restrictionists within Congress, aware of these trepidations, argued that the United States needed to protect itself from a potential transfer of European economic and social disorder via unrestrained immigration. Such fears, referred to as the "Flood Concept", espoused the belief that "the supposed American melting pot would boil over too quickly" if immigration rates continued "because there had to be a breathing spell during which aliens were cleansed of their foreign customs and languages."[10] A minor American economic depression in 1920 solidified these fears and led to Congressional demands for complete cessation of immigration. Although the demand for a complete end to immigration failed, several representatives and senators advocating further immigration restrictions accepted high-ranking committee positions within both houses of Congress. The fact that many prominent restrictionists within Congress represented different regions of the country - for example Ohio, California, Massachusetts, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Iowa, Louisiana, and South Carolina - indicates local fears and suspicions, rather than

[10] Divine, *American Immigration Policy 1924 – 1952*, 7-8.

uncertainties centered in particular geographic regions or policies advocated by specific political party affiliations. Over the course of several years, Senator Dillingham of Vermont, chairman of the Senate Immigration Committee, and Albert Johnson of Washington, chairman of the House Immigration Committee, directed Congressional proposals aimed at thwarting immigration.[11] The economic depression of 1920 also influenced prominent business and industrial lobbying interests in the Unites States. Slumps in industrial production and manufacturing sectors lessened the need for abundant and limitless immigrant laborers. Business leaders and industrial magnates who previously supported the continuation of an "open door" immigration policy moved toward advocating immigration restriction. The coalescing of business and industrial lobbying groups with prominent Congressional restrictionists assured passage of future immigration restrictions.[12]

America's arrival as a world power following World War I created an intense nationalism throughout the country, which influenced further demands for cultural unity and conformity. Innumerable patriotic, fraternal, and veteran groups, which advocated nativistic attitudes and pushed for one hundred percent Americanism, flourished during the early 1920s. These "nativistic nationalists" were concerned with preserving American resources for American citizens and viewed newly arriving foreigners as threats to American culture.[13] State legislatures in Oregon and California worked vigorously toward implementing laws that required all children to attend public schools and ordinances that forced foreign-born adult males to pay an annual ten-dollar poll tax.

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[11] LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door*, 74-77.
[12] Ibid., 78.
[13] David S. Wyman, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938-1941* (Amherst, Massachusetts, 1968); Samuel DiRocco, II, *Missed Opportunities*, Submitted to Dr. Martha I. Pallante, Fall 2003, Youngstown State University.

Advocates of immigration restriction throughout the Midwest supported enthusiastically Henry Ford's anti-Semitic *Dearborn Independent*. The American Federation of Labor continued advocating its four-decades-long demand for limits on "cheap immigrant labor," and the Ku Klux Klan, refounded by William J. Simmons in 1915, increased in popularity with its advocacy of fraternalism, nativism, and moralism.[14] The Red Scare in 1919, the Palmer Raids, the Sacco and Vanzetti case, and Congress' rejection of the League of Nations charter epitomized clearly the American public's xenophobic fears and growing advocacy of isolationism following World War I.

Economic justifications for immigration restriction weakened in 1921 and 1922 as the national economy rebounded from the post-war economic depression. With business and industrial leaders vacillating between support and opposition to immigration restriction due to changing economic cycles, the popularity of racial nationalism, embedded within several nativistic social organizations, soon became the primary justification for Congressional restrictions on immigration. Leading American intellectual authorities such as: Carl Brigham, a Princeton psychologist; William MacDougall, a Harvard Professor; Dr. Harry Laughlin, eugenicist and biological expert for the House Immigration Committee; and Gino Sperenza, an Italian-American promoting racial and cultural homogeneity, advocated an ethnic theory grounded in an American racial nationalism as the primary justification for severe immigration restriction.[15] Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race: The Racial Basis for European History* (1916) offered "scientific" explanations for maintaining racially pure societies. Grant, a New York lawyer, eugenicist, and conservationist, promoted

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[14] LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch* Door, 74; William D. Jenkins, *Steel Valley Klan: The Ku Klux Klan in Ohio's Mahoning Valley* (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1990).

[15] LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch* Door, 78-79.

nineteenth century racial philosophies that divided humans into three distinct races: Caucasoids (Europeans), Negroids (Africans), and Mongoloids (Asians). *The Passing of the Great Race* expanded upon these nineteenth century theories and subdivided the European races into three distinct tiers - Nordics, Alpines, and Mediterranean. Any "mixing" of the three distinct races resulted in a "mongrelization of society." For Grant, the "new" immigrants entering the United States

> ...contained a large and increasing number of the weak, the broken, and the mentally crippled of all races down from the lowest stratum of the Mediterranean basin and the Balkans, together with the hordes of the wretched, submerged populations of the Polish ghettos...The whole tone of American life, social, moral, and political has been lowered and vulgarized by them.[16]

Advocates of Grant's racial theories, therefore, demanded that immigration from Asia, Africa, and southern and eastern Europe to the United States be reduced drastically in order to preserve America's Nordic heritage.[17] The American public, press, and Congress prepared diligently to combat the "alien flood, barbarian hordes, and foreign tide"[18] advancing toward America's borders. American post-war xenophobia, isolationism, and advocacy of racial nationalism ushered in an era of unprecedented American immigration restriction that remained for the next four decades.

The Quota Act of 1921

Congressional debates focused on establishing a quota system as a way to limit immigration occurred prior to America's entry into World War I. In 1914, Dr. Sidney Gulick proposed an immigration quota system based in relation to the number of the

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[16] Morse, *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy*, 133-134.
[17] Ibid.
[18] LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door*, 77-78; Morse, *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy*, 134.

divergent foreign-born nationalities already within the United States. Gulick's proposal presented a moderate approach amidst the increasing demands and clamors in Congress for a complete cessation of all immigration.[19] Gulick "suggested that each nationality be assigned a quota proportionate to the number of naturalized citizens and their U.S. born children already drawn from that nationality...with a 10% fix of those first and second generation citizens."[20] The proposal, often referred to as the "percentage quota principle," garnered a wide-range of Congressional supporters whose only points of contention centered on the all-important total fixed percent and the quota distribution process for European countries. By 1921, the House of Representatives Committee on Immigration included staunch promoters of racial theory as a justification to curb immigration.[21] Undoubtedly, the objective of the percentage quota principle was to decrease the number of immigrants from eastern and southern Europe and from Asia.

The American Legion, American Federation of Labor, Immigration Restriction League, National Grange, Ku Klux Klan, Junior Order of the United Mechanics, Sons of the American Revolution, and several other nativistic organizations offered strong support for restrictive immigration policy based on the quota principle. The anti-National Origins Clause League, the New York Taxpaying Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Mining Congress, and Jewish leaders from throughout the nation opposed any changes that deviated from the 1917 Literacy Act.[22] These organizations unsuccessfully attempted to thwart the public's and Congress's determination in limiting immigration totals.

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[19] Divine, *American Immigration Policy 1924 – 1952*, 10-16.
[20] LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door*, 80.
[21] Ibid., 81; Morse, *While Six Million Died*, 134.
[22] Wyman, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938-1941*, 210.

A bill sponsored by Dillingham limiting European immigration to five percent of the total number of foreign-born of each nationality within the United States according to the 1910 census passed in the Senate with little opposition. Senators representing western and southern states opposed Dillingham's proposal only because the measure did not demand absolute restriction of immigration from all countries. The House of Representatives altered Dillingham's bill by reducing the percent of each foreign-born nationality from five percent to three percent according to the 1910 census. The House also limited the total annual immigration to the United States to approximately three hundred and fifty thousand. President Woodrow Wilson, despite strong Congressional support and public agitation for new restrictive immigration policy, pocket vetoed the bill during his final days in office. Following a special session of Congress, newly elected President Warren G. Harding signed the bill into law marking the first Congressional measure curbing immigration policy since the 1917 Literacy Act.[23]

The Quota Act of 1921, also known as the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921 or the Johnson Act, introduced the quota system in American immigration policy, symbolizing clearly the nation's prevailing demands for restrictionism and isolationism. The 1921 Act limited the number of potential immigrants to three percent for each foreign-born European nationality residing in the United States according to the 1910 census. The Act also limited the total annual admission of immigrants to 357,803. This numerical limit allocated approximately two hundred thousand quotas to western European immigrants, one hundred fifty-five thousand to eastern and southern European immigrants, and approximately one thousand for immigrants from Asia, Africa, and

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[23] Divine, *American Immigration Policy 1924 – 1952*, 8-10; LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door*, 81.

Oceania.[24] The restrictive measure reaffirmed earlier laws and policies barring mentally, physically, and morally flawed immigrants who posed the threat of becoming public charges to American society. Comparison of admission statistics associated with the total number of immigrants to enter the United States in the years preceding the Quota Act with those following its implementation illustrates the effectiveness of the quota principle system. In 1921, 805,228 immigrants entered the country - the highest number in over a decade. The following year, the first under the new quota system, witnessed the admission of a mere 309,556 immigrants – a reduction of nearly two thirds of the previous years admission number.[25] Statistically the Quota Act of 1921 accomplished its intended goal of limiting the total number of immigrants permitted to enter the country by specifically decreasing the permissible number of eastern and southern European immigrants.

The Immigration Act of 1924

The Quota Act of 1921, despite clear reductions in immigration admission rates in 1922, did little to quell Congressional and public demands for further restrictions. In fact, by 1924 the total admission of immigrants reached 706,896.[26] The number of European immigrants arriving at American ports lessened little as Europe's economic difficulties persisted. Reports of prevalent "administrative exemptions" carried out by immigration officials at Ellis Island and other ports along the east coast, permitting

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[24] Ibid., Table 4.2, 91.

[25] *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 17 September 1936 to 5 September 1937vol. 38 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1936), Table XIX, 572.

[26] Ibid., Table XIX, 572.

admission beyond the standard quota, only increased restrictionists' demands for further action.[27]

Within the first year of the Quota Act, Representative Johnson - supported by the American Federation of Labor, the American Legion, and Madison Grant, now serving as the vice president of the Immigration Restriction League – assured that the debate on immigration restriction was not over. Restrictionists within the House started promoting the idea of reducing the quota of every foreign-born nationality to two percent of each nationality according to the 1890 census rather than the 1910 census. For many, the 1890 census offered a more "accurate portrait" of America's demographic composition as compared to the 1910 census, which included a plethora of eastern and southern European foreign-born Americans. John D. Trevor, a New York attorney and Representative Johnson's "right-hand man," advanced the restrictionists' new proposal by arguing that quotas based on the 1910 census "did not reflect the racial status quo of the nation." Trevor, along with various nativist groups, lobbied during Congressional sub-committee hearings in 1923 and 1924 for the "preservation of America's racial purity."[28] Anti-Restrictionists argued that any Congressional debates centering on restricting immigration evidenced a betrayal of the nation's democratic concepts and traditional condemnation of discrimination. Opponents of Johnson's proposal detested Congress's unabashed prejudices against eastern and southern Europeans, and argued that such an approach would only disrupt rather than strengthen American national solidarity. Jewish leaders and representatives from heavily populated immigrant Congressional districts asserted before the sub-committee hearings that any laws establishing

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[27] LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door*, 82.
[28] Ibid., 82-84.

distinctions between northern Europeans and southern and eastern Europeans assured further divisions and disunity throughout the United States. Despite these sound arguments, Trevor's lobbying efforts, a Ku Klux Klan letter-writing campaign, and unwavering support from advocates of the Nordic Racial Theory assured enactment of Johnson's severe quota legislation.[29]

Johnson's proposal passed convincingly with the Senate voting sixty-two to six and the House favoring the measure three hundred twenty-three to seventy-one.[30] Congressional support of the restrictive measure crossed political and geographical boundaries, once again demonstrating sweeping approval from the vast majority of the American public. For Robert A. Divine "there can be little question that the restrictive law was a popular measure reflecting a triumph of the Nordic majority in the nation over the minority of Americans of southeastern European descent."[31] In May 1924, exactly three years to the month of President Harding's signing of the Quota Act of 1921, President Calvin Coolidge signed into law the Immigration Act of 1924. The Act, also referred to as the Johnson-Reed Act, broadened principles included within the Literacy Act of 1917 and The Quota Act of 1921. The 1924 Law preserved all of the qualitative restrictions associated with intellectual and educational requirements found within the Literacy Act. The Law also permitted more frequent usage of the "likely to become a public charge" clause (LPC) assuring a more accurate selection and admission process. The Immigration Act of 1924 retained a numerical limitation formula, but reduced the 1921 total quota limit from 357,803 to 164,667, and reduced the annual quota from three percent to two percent according to the 1890 census rather than the 1910 census. These

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[29] Divine, *American Immigration Policy 1924 – 1952*, 1-25.
[30] Ibid., 17.
[31] Ibid.

two crucial alterations to The Quota Law of 1921 acted as temporary provisions in place of a permanent national origins formula intended for completion by 1927.[32]

The 1924 Act also included provisions that altered significantly the actual application and admission process for hopeful immigrants. American immigration policy, hoping to reduce inaccuracies produced by "administrative exemptions" at American ports, now required immigrants to obtain a visa from United States consulates abroad. The visa requirement led to greater organization concerning the availability of specific nationality quotas and created greater administrative authority for American overseas bureaucrats. The policy that potential immigrants now had to prove their admissibility rather than consular officers also reduced administrative confusion. The new restrictive law also provided clear definitions of the terms immigrant, quota, and non-quota immigrant, and specified that the term nationality referred to one's county of birth.[33]

The restrictive measures inherent within the Immigration Act of 1924 reduced admission totals immediately, specifically those from southern and eastern Europe. Of the 164,667 available quotas, only 20,423 were allocated to eastern and southern European immigrants, a severe reduction from the 155,585 quotas available under the 1921 Quota Act. The Immigration Act of 1924 actually increased quota allocations for Asian, African, and Oceanic immigrants from approximately 851 available quotas in 1921 to 3,245 under the 1924 Act. Germany and Great Britain retained the two largest quota allocations, 51,227 and 34,007 respectively, while the Austrian, Italian, Portuguese,

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[32] LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door*, 86-87.

[33] Ibid., 87; *The Statutes at Large of the United States of America, from December 1923 to March 1925*, Vol. XLII, Part 1, 153-169, Sixty-Eighth Congress: Sessions I, 1924.

Polish, Romanian, and Russian (USSR) quotas decreased the greatest.[34] Percentage distribution based on the immigrants' place of birth indicates explicitly the successes of The Quota Act of 1921 and the Immigration Act of 1924. During the first decade of the twentieth century, eastern and southern Europeans accounted for just under seventy-one percent of the total number of immigrants admitted while northern and western Europeans accounted for approximately twenty-two percent. Following America's three postwar immigration acts, admission rates between the two geographical distinct regions of Europe equaled out. Thus, from 1920 to 1930 admission of southern and eastern European immigrants totaled twenty-nine percent, with northern and western European immigrants equaling thirty-one percent of admitted European immigrants.[35] The Immigration Act of 1924 established permanent precedents in American immigration policy that ultimately inhibited American Jewry's ability to assist refugees during the 1930s.

Youngstown's Response to the Immigrant Influx

Youngstown's transition from iron production to steel manufacturing commenced during the last decade of the nineteenth century. The rapidity at which the local steel industry developed and the subsequent demand for thousands of unskilled immigrant laborers disrupted Youngstown's demographic composition.[36] For William D. Jenkins, author of the definitive study of the Youngtown Klan, "the advent of such a large number of newcomers was a disruptive force, partially because of the size of the immigration but also because of the cultural diversity of the immigrants."[37] Analysis of Youngstown's

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[34] Ibid., Table 4.2, 91.
[35] Ibid., Table 4.4, 96.
[36] Frederick J. Blue and others, *Mahoning Memories*, 93-96.
[37] Jenkins, *Steel Valley Klan: The Ku Klux Klan in Ohio's Mahoning Valley*, 18.

demographics and comparison of the city's ethnic populace with urban centers of industry throughout Ohio illustrates the extensive changes to the local populace. The response of local social organizations and religious groups to the drastic influx of eastern and southern European immigrants within Youngstown during the first two-decades of the twentieth century personifies the nation's xenophobia, nationalism, and isolationism.

Statistical data indicates that the second decade of the twentieth century, despite passage of the 1917 Literacy Act, included the second-highest total number of immigrants to enter the United States.[38] The continual flow of immigrant laborers to Youngstown during this decade increased the city's overall population from 79,066 to 132,358. Youngstown's three largest steel industries, Republic Steel, U.S. Steel, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube, employed the majority of the newly arriving immigrants. Eastern and southern European immigrants soon raised the number of foreign born within the city to 33,834, which equaled twenty-five percent of the total city population. By 1920, the number of southern and eastern European immigrants within Youngstown equaled approximately seventy percent of the city population.[39] Of Ohio's eight most populated cities – (in descending order) Cleveland, Cincinnati, Toledo, Columbus, Akron, Youngstown, and Canton – Youngstown ranked second according to the percent of foreign-born inhabitants behind only Cleveland, which boasted a total population of 796,841 with 239,538 foreign born. The number of foreign born and native white inhabitants with foreign-born parentage in Youngstown numbered fifty-nine percent second to Cleveland.[40]

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[38] LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door*, 73.
[39] *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, 1920; Jenkins, *Steel Valley Klan*, 20.
[40] *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, 1920 Tables X.

The successes of nativistic social organizations that permeated American society during the interwar years did not bypass Youngstown and its changing demographic composition. The eruption of tensions in 1916 between immigrant laborers and Youngstown Sheet & Tube management in East Youngstown (Campbell) resulted in the fiery destruction of the community's downtown district, and provided further justification for those already seething at the continual arrival of immigrants to Youngstown and the neighboring communities along the Mahoning River.[41] William D. Jenkins' *Steel Valley Klan: The Ku Klux Klan in Ohio's Mahoning Valley* chronicles the brief success of the Klan in Youngstown as an organization devoted to the defense of a pietistic Protestant moral code threatened by the "immoral and un-American" mores of eastern and southern European immigrants.

The reorganization of the Klan in 1915 posited the organization as a "protector" of American moral decency and advocate of laws prohibiting bootlegging, gambling, adultery and other social vices. The "new" Klan intended "to conserve, protect, and maintain the distinctive institutions, rights, privileges, principles, traditions, and ideals of pure Americans."[42] Such rhetoric resonated with Protestant Christians in Youngstown, where the demands for stringent law enforcement increased further following a second major labor strike in the fall of 1919. The Mahoning County Dry League, The Federated Council of Churches, and the Federation of Women's Clubs advocated Protestant moral reform and depicted immigrants as corrupt and lawless.[43] For Jenkins, pietistic Protestant

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[41] Blue and others, *Mahoning Memories,* 93-145. East Youngstown (Campbell) surpassed Youngstown's percent of foreign born with approximately seventy-eight percent in 1910 and fifty-one percent by 1920. The continued success of Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company led to the unprecedented mass of immigrants crowded into the small community abutting the Mahoning River.

[42] Jenkins, *Steel Valley Klan,* 2.

[43] Ibid., 25.

demands and Klan rhetoric first coalesced in Youngstown in late 1922. Speeches and sermons by Reverend A.C. Archibald of the First Baptist Church during late 1922 and early 1923 epitomized local Protestants' belief that new arrivals to the city were "riff-raff, infidels, anarchists, and nihilists."[44] The formation of the Civic League following a rally of some ten thousand people in Wick Park demanding proper enforcement of vice laws, and continued demands for moral reform published in the *Citizen*, a weekly newspaper, presented two local organizations friendly to Klan objectives.[45]

Acute disruptions to Youngstown's demographics, city government's inept enforcement of prohibition and vice laws, continued fears of Catholic and Jewish educational and religious practices, and the outlawing of organized political party support for local offices allowed the Ku Klux Klan to gain wide-ranging support in the 1923 Youngstown mayoral election.[46] The Klan's "defense of moral decency" resonated with Protestant ministers' desire for action against immigrant lawlessness. Professor Jenkins noted:

> What Catholics and Jews might view as Protestant culture in America was viewed by Protestants as a universal moral code...Thus failure to obey these laws was not a cultural difference, then, but disobedience to the law of the country...requiring punishment by legal authorities.[47]

The Klan-backed mayoral candidate Charles Scheible garnered just over fifty percent of a record voter turnout in a field of six candidates. The Klan also won five of the seven City Council seats and gained a majority on the Youngstown city school board. Scheible's

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[44] Ibid., 32.
[45] Ibid., 25-32.
[46] Ibid., 36-38.
[47] Ibid., 48-49.

broad base of support denotes Youngstown citizenry as eager and prepared to "defend their Protestant culture and preserve a moral society."[48]

Difficulties implementing the proposed promises of reform and law and order resulted in the Klan's rapid decline in Youngstown and the Mahoning Valley. Organizational in-fighting between Klan leaders, violent riots between Klan operatives and Catholics in nearby Niles, and questions concerning Klan finances assured the Klan's demise in local politics. The emergence of the Ku Klux Klan in Youngstown amidst the increasing national clamor for immigration restriction in the years immediately following World War I illustrates the tenuous societal position of eastern and southern Europeans, especially Yiddish-speaking eastern European Jewish immigrants.

The National Origins Act of 1929 and President Hoover's Executive Order

A permanent national-origins formula, intended for completion by 1927, went into effect on 1 July 1929. The measure reduced the total available quotas to 153,774, with 83,575 reserved exclusively for Great Britain and Ireland. The following graph indicates the American government's continued progression toward more severe legislative policies.

	Quota Act 1921	1924 Quota Act	National Origins Act 1929
Total	**357,803**	**164,667**	**153,774**
Asia	**492**	**1,424**	**1,423**
Northern & Western Europe	**197,630**	**140,999**	**127,266**

[48] Ibid., 49-54.

Southern & Eastern Europe	155,585	20,423	23,235 [49]

Congressional proposals by restrictionists continued in the years following the 1929 enactment of the National Origins Act. In fact, Senator Hugo Black of Alabama sponsored a bill in 1930 aimed at suspending immigration completely for five years. The Senate narrowly defeated the measure thirty-seven to twenty-nine. Continued Congressional agitation and the economic upheavals caused by the great depression resulted in executive action concerning the admission of immigrants.[50]

President Hoover's 8 September 1930 re-interpretation of the "likely to become a public charge" clause (LPC), contained within all three pieces of interwar immigration legislation, created the final barrier for potential immigrants. Hoover's analysis permitted individual consular officers to determine the necessary requirements each potential applicant needed to meet before admission within the already reduced quota allocation system. The new interpretation of the LPC clause even permitted consular officers to refuse an applicant based on any inclination that they might become "a public charge at anytime long after their arrival."[51] The affects of Hoover's re-interpretation were stunning. From 1930 to 1931, consular officers' ardent application of the re-interpreted LPC clause resulted in a sixty-two percent decrease of approved quotas.[52] In 1932, immigration admission totals to the United States were the lowest since the

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[49] LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door: An Analysis of U.S. Immigration Policy Since 1820*, 91 reprinted from William S. Bernard, ed. *Immigration Policy: A Reappraisal* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950); Wyman, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938-1941*; Morse, *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy*.

[50] LeMay, 92, Morse, 134, Divine, 77.

[51] Morse, 135-136.

[52] LeMay, 92.

1830s.[53] The net increase of immigration in 1930 equaled 191,039, and in 1931, this plummeted to a net increase of only 35,257.[54]

Thus, the 1929 National Origins Plan and Hoover's reinterpretation of the LPC clause presented a culmination of decades long demands for further immigration restrictions. America's interwar immigration restriction produced immigration totals significantly below the acceptable maximum totals in the years preceding Hitler's rise to power and the Nazis' subsequent implementation of the Final Solution. As events continued to deteriorate in central Europe in the 1930s, American Jewish communities' ability to assist in the migration of their persecuted European brethren to the United States declined rapidly. American Jewish organizations responded by creating new organizational bodies aimed at assisting their European brethren.

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[53] Divine, 87.

[54] *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 17 September 1936 to 5 September 1937vol. 38 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1936), Table XIX, 572.

Chapter III

Development of Jewish Federations throughout the United States and the Formation of the Jewish Federation of Youngstown

Of the approximately fifteen million Jews worldwide at the start of World War I, ten million resided in the warring eastern European nations of Russia, Austro-Hungary, Germany, and Romania.[1] Drastic decreases in available immigration quotas coupled with the devastating affects of World War I throughout eastern Europe altered significantly American Jewish communities' philanthropic objectives. Deep rooted social, political, and religious schisms inherent throughout American Jewry started to dissipate slowly at the local level during the 1920s. The estimated eight and a half million eastern Europeans displaced by the war redirected American Jewish communal efforts toward distributing assistance for their displaced war-ravaged brethren.[2] Before the start of the war, Jewish landsmanshaftn provided the primary means of assistance for newly arriving Jewish immigrants. These fraternal organizations directed Jewish welfare programs and preceded the development of national Jewish agencies for overseas relief. The formation of the American Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) and the American Jewish Congress during the course of the war illustrates American Jewry's concerted effort to assist European Jews while adhering to the crucial religious concept of charity (Tzedakah),

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[1] Yehuda Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper: A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 1929-1939* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1974), 6.

[2] Harry L. Lurie, *A Heritage Affirmed: The Jewish Federation Movement in America* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1961), 91.

derived from Talmudic Law.[3] The objectives and organizational efforts of these two bodies and those of the American Jewish Committee, the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), and B'nai B'rith's Anti-Defamation League unintentionally created financial burdens for unorganized Jewish communities. As a result, Jewish communities throughout the United States perceptively created Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds as a way to establish better organizational unity by combining communal activities previously separated by religious, social, or political differences.

Development of Jewish Federations throughout the United States

During the first three decades of the twentieth century, American Jews established three forms of community wide organizations: Jewish Federations, Jewish Welfare Funds, and Jewish Community Councils. Each body worked toward alleviating Jewish social welfare problems and needs at the local level. In many communities, the Federation developed as the primary agency to assist local Jewish concerns.[4] Harry L. Lurie, executive director of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds from 1935 to 1954, defined a Federation as a "Jewish group philanthropy organized and operated by Jews, raising funds primarily from Jewish contributors, and serving Jews and Jewish group objectives."[5] In 1920, approximately fifty-two Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds existed throughout the United States, mostly in "large centers of Jewish

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[3] Ibid., 6.

[4] "Directory of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds," *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 17 September 1936 to 5 September 1937, vol. 38 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1936), 513-537.

[5] Lurie, *A Heritage Affirmed*, 4. Lurie received his undergraduate and graduate training at the University of Michigan, and later taught economics and sociology at Michigan. He was also involved with Jewish philanthropic organizations in Buffalo, Detroit, and Chicago, and with the Bureau of Jewish Social Research in New York.

population."[6] These early Federations centered their efforts on communal social service programs, such as reducing poverty, assisting in immigrant adjustment, and providing health services for the young and aged.[7] Annual drives attempted to raise money for the construction of cultural centers, religious schools, homes for the aged, and hospitals. As the American economy prospered during the 1920s, the majority of American Jews continued to adapt to American society suggesting more amicable relations between diverse Jewish immigrant generations.[8]

For Lurie, "there was a slow but gradual improvement in relations as the cultural differences between the children of the old and new immigrants began to narrow" at the local level.[9] More harmonious interaction between American Jews led to stronger relationships regarding communal philanthropy. The establishment of an additional forty Federations and Welfare Funds from 1921 to 1930 denotes American Jewry's concerted efforts toward extending social services.[10] Yehuda Bauer's *My Brother's Keeper: A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 1929-1939* detailed how national Jewish organizations remained visibly divided between assimilated German Jews, middle and upper class eastern Europeans who arrived during the last four decades, and the most recent Orthodox, socialist, and antireligious Jewish immigrants.[11] National Jewish organizations' divisiveness, despite the coalescing of numerous Jewish

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[6] "Directory of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds," *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 26 September 1938 to 13 September 1939, vol. 40, 481-516.

[7] Lurie, *A Heritage Affirmed*, 111; "Directory of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds," *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 17 September 1936 to 5 September 1937, vol. 38, 513-537.

[8] Refer to Andrew R. Heinze's *Adapting to Abundance: Jewish Immigrants, Mass Consumption, and the Search for American Identity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) for a detailed analysis of Jewish immigrants' conscious decision to assimilate to American society through acceptance of American consumer culture.

[9] Lurie, *A Heritage Affirmed*, 90.

[10] "Directory of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds," *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 26 September 1938 to 13 September 1939, vol. 40, 481-516.

[11] Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper*, 6.

communities via Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, resulted in continued pressures on local Jewish communities during fundraising efforts. The devastating affects of the Depression, resulting in an estimated ten to fifteen million unemployed Americans, merely heightened competition among national Jewish organizations and ultimately forced Federations across the nation to work in cooperation with each other.[12]

Development of Jewish charitable organizations following World War I paralleled the development of philanthropic efforts in the greater community. In the early 1920s, several communities transformed temporary emergency "war chests" and "patriotic funds" into permanent community chest campaigns.[13] Youngstown entrepreneurs, such as Asael Adams - president of the Union National Bank - donated money toward community health and welfare programs and helped establish War Chest Campaigns during World War I. The success of wartime drives led to the permanent creation in 1919 of a Youngstown Community Chest, which by 1931 trebled its collection totals equaling approximately $1 million.[14] The organizational benefits and financial successes of community chest campaigns during the 1920s influenced directly Jewish communities' decisions to either join campaigns conducted by the greater community or establish their own welfare organizations. As Lurie noted "by 1924, there were seventeen Jewish federations in community chests in cities of more than three hundred thousand general populations."[15] Jewish Federations that united with community chest campaigns soon

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[12] Lurie, *A Heritage Affirmed*, 112.

[13] Ibid., 94.

[14] Blue and others, *Mahoning Memories*, 98-99. In the years immediately following the 1929 stock market crash, "residents of Youngstown continued to look toward the Community Chest for charitable assistance. Despite increase collection totals in 1930 and 1931, decreased collections in the 1932 campaign forced residents to demand action by the local government." Ibid., 148.

[15] Lurie, *A Heritage Affirmed: The Jewish Federation Movement in America*, 94. By 1930, Jewish Federations in forty cities affiliated with local community chests, and by 1936, the number increased to sixty-two. Ibid., 98.

realized that campaigns conducted by the greater community did not include allocations for religious agencies or congregational needs. In addition, following the Treaty of Versailles, many community chest campaigns discontinued raising money for overseas relief, which many Jewish philanthropic bodies deemed absolutely necessary for those affected by the war.[16] As a result several Jewish communities throughout the country in the 1930s disaffiliated with community chest campaigns while retaining their own social welfare programs. Smaller Jewish communities, such as Youngstown, Akron, Toledo, and Canton, started their own united welfare programs, which mirrored the organizational characteristics of nationwide community chest campaigns. The increase in number of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds during the development of numerous nationwide community chest campaigns suggests American Jewry's purposeful decision to organize welfare programs resembling the organizational structure of American social welfare organizations.

The objectives and fundraising efforts of Jewish Federations changed drastically during the 1930s. The permanence of the Depression led to the creation in 1932 of the National Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds. The Council assisted in the development of welfare services for communities, and in 1935 merged with the Bureau of Jewish Social Research to form the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (CJFWF).[17] Development of new Federations did not dissipate, but rather continued at a steady pace with twenty-eight organized from 1931 to 1934 - increasing the national total to one hundred twenty.[18] With growing demands for assistance and new Federations

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[16] Ibid., 98.

[17] Ibid., 115-117.

[18] "Directory of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds," *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 26 September 1938 to 13 September 1939, vol. 40, 481-516.

appearing rapidly, the Council established a committee to delineate clearly the "programs and policies federations should adopt as the basis for shaping their new programs."[19] Dr. Ben Selekman, executive director of the Boston Jewish Federation, chaired the newly formed committee and offered three proposals for Jewish Federations. In short, the proposals urged each Federation to:

> (1) Broaden fundraising and campaign methods to inform all elements of the Jewish community to the growing needs of national and overseas programs dealing with anti-Semitism.
>
> (2) Shift focus of interest from emphasis on local charitable efforts to broader issues of national Jewish welfare and increased funding for overseas needs.
>
> (3) Change the structure of Jewish communal organizations with the intent of bringing wider segments of local Jewish populations into Federation's cooperative work.[20]

Each of these suggestions diverged clearly from Jewish Federations' organizational objectives during the years preceding the economic depression, which remained insular and dedicated to each community's specific needs. As the situation in Europe deteriorated, Jewish communities throughout the United States became better organized and more aware of the need for systematic communal fundraising for overseas relief. In 1935, Federations and Welfare Funds contributed twenty percent of the money raised by the thirty-two national and overseas agencies. By the end of the war, this total increased to eighty percent.[21] As Hitler's Third Reich exerted its military prowess in 1938 and 1939, approximately two hundred and fifteen Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds

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[19] Lurie, *A Heritage Affirmed*, 118.

[20] Ibid., 120; A complete listing of Dr. Selekman's proposals is included within *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 1934-1935, vol. 36.

[21] Ibid., 125.

existed throughout America, including the newly formed Jewish Federation of Youngstown.

The significance of Jewish Federations rest on their success in bringing together divergent Jewish groups throughout individual communities into a single cooperative organizational body. The steps leading up to the development of a Jewish Federation in Youngstown diverges from the typical process Jewish communities followed when establishing communal organizations. As Louis B. Greenberg noted, "In most cities the Federation comes into the picture after the development of a Center, a social service program, and various agencies of communal life. Here [Youngstown] we have reversed the process, and the Jewish Federation is the instrument through which all other phases of the program are to come into existence."[22] Despite forming several years after Jewish Federations in Ohio's larger cities, the Jewish Federation of Youngstown's annual fundraising totals compare favorably to the efforts of larger Jewish communities with well-established Federations.

Formation of the Jewish Federation of Youngstown

Following Hitler's ascension to power in 1933, Youngstown remained the only large city in Ohio without a functioning Jewish Federation or Welfare Fund. Prolonged economic hardships created by the Depression and demands of support from various national Jewish organizations thwarted united fundraising campaigns by local Jewish community leaders.[23] Functioning Jewish organizations in Youngstown that appealed for funds in separate annual campaigns included Youngstown Section National Council of Jewish Women, Pioneer Women, Zionist Organization of America, Hadassah, Junior

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[22] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 30 July 1937, vol. 4 no. 3, 7.
[23] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 26 September 1935, vol. 1 no. 7, 31.

Hadassah, Young Judea, Kadimah, Jewish War Veterans, Jewish National Workers' Alliance, American Jewish Committee, Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society, American Jewish Congress, ORT Federation, B'nai B'rith, B'nai B'rith Women, Junior B'nai B'rith, Dovray Ivrit Club, Masada, Jewish Labor Committee, in addition to individual temple organizations and numerous national Jewish fraternities and sororities.[24] Each organization's annual appeals for support required local leadership to organize, staff, and collect subscriptions for each fundraising drive. The same group of Jewish community leaders managed repeatedly the innumerable annual campaigns, which overlapped with each other and created confusion for potential donors regarding each organization's objectives.

The Youngstown Jewish community did attempt united fundraising campaigns for local, national, and overseas relief in 1928, 1929, and in 1931. Each drive, however, included only a few local organizations and concluded with minimal success. The lack of proper leadership, failure to organize a broad base of support, the inability to realize the gravity of the situation in Europe, and continued difficulties with economic conditions thwarted these early efforts.[25] In the fall of 1933, a thousand Youngstown Jews packed the Idora Park Theatre to listen to Samuel Untermyer's impassioned request for further local support for the economic boycott on German goods. Calls for united action by Jews toward the advent of Hitlerism echoed in local newspaper editorials in the days following Untermyer's speech.[26] Joint dances sponsored by Rodef Sholom, Emanu-El, and Anshe Emeth in the early 1930s, and a Union Service held in December 1934 where Rabbis

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[24] Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 154-155.

[25] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 15 November 1935, vol. 1 no. 9, 4.

[26] *Youngstown Vindicator*, 16 August 1933, 16. The Vindicator reprinted Untermyer's forty-five-minute speech, which the local radio station WKBN broadcast on a national hookup.

Philo, Manello, and Kollin – religious leaders of Rodef Sholom, Emanu-El, and Anshe Emeth – shared the same pulpit illustrate initial attempts to unite.[27] A visit from Jerome Levy, field representative of the United Jewish Appeal, in the summer of 1935 aroused local Jewish leaders to renew their earlier efforts at a united communal drive. For Levy, Youngstown Jewry's earlier attempts at united drives failed because "they lacked a leader who devoted their skill full-time and energy in a manner similar to those leading Community Chest fundraising campaigns throughout the country."[28] Following the meeting with Levy, the local Jewish leadership selected Clarence J. Strouss – Jewish communal leader who embodied the social advancements and successful assimilation of the city's earliest German Jewish immigrant families – as temporary chairman of several preliminary sub-committees. The sub-committees communicated with neighboring Jewish Federations in order to appreciate the organizational steps needed in establishing a successful Jewish Federation in Youngstown.

Discussions concerning the viability of organizing a Jewish Federation in Youngstown took place throughout the fall of 1935. By early October, the personnel committee invited Hyman Peretz to visit the city to discuss his views toward communal activities. Accordingly, a meeting at Anshe Emeth Social Hall on 31 October 1935 officially established the Jewish Federation of Youngstown, hired Mr. Peretz as executive director, passed a constitution and bylaws, and elected Federation officers and a board of directors. Those selected to lead the Federation represented a socio-religious cross-section of the various Jewish communities indicating a coalescing of the disparate communities. The following graph illustrates this crucial theme while demonstrating the

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[27] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 15 March 1935, vol. 1 no. 1, 4.
[28] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 15 November 1935, vol. 1 no. 9, 4.

absence of congregants from the city's three orthodox temples within the new Federation's leadership hierarchy.

Individual	Federation Position	Occupation	Temple Affiliation
C.J. Strouss	President	Owner Dept. Store	Rodef Sholom
Hyman Peretz	Executive Director		
Harry Levinson	1st Vice President	Jeweler	Rodef Sholom
Mrs. Mose K. Frankle	2nd Vice President	Frankle Bros. Tobacco & Cigars	Anshe Emeth
Morris Tamarkin	3rd Vice President	Owner Wholesale Grocery	Emanu-El
I. Harry Meyer	Treasurer	Business partner with Strouss	Rodef Sholom
Myron H. Broida	Secretary		
Oscar Altshuler	Board of Directors	Pickling Co. Owner	Emanu-El
Nathan Darsky	Board of Directors	Golden Age Bottling Co. Owner	Emanu-El
David I. Fish	Board of Directors	Dry Cleaning Business Owner	Anshe Emeth
Harry Friedman	Board of Directors	Attorney	
Roy L. Hartzell	Board of Directors	Insurance Salesman	Rodef Sholom
Bertram B. Lustig	Board of Directors	Owner Lustig Shore Store	Anshe Emeth
Murray A. Nadler	Board of Directors	Lawyer	Anshe Emeth

Louis A. Ozersky	Board of Directors	Bakery Owner	Emanu-El
Bert H. Printz	Board of Directors	Owner Men's Clothing Store	Rodef Sholom [29]

Clearly, the most successful and affluent members of the city's three largest Jewish congregations dominated the new Federation. Despite the absence of congregants from Children of Israel, Shaareh Torah, and Ohev Tzedek within the leadership of the new organization, the Federation did not exclude their involvement or communal welfare needs from their organizational objectives.

The 1935-1936 Federation Campaign – "Three Million Jews Look to You"

A mere week after formally being established, the Jewish Federation of Youngstown set its inaugural fundraising goal at $30,100 with the hope of exceeding this total with little difficulty. Weekly editions of the *Youngstown Jewish Times* in October, November, and December described to the community how "the new Federation would eliminate that constant digging down into the pockets that has heretofore characterized the giving season…and eliminate the spasmodic and periodic attempts of individual organizations to obtain contributions."[30] The city's first united Jewish campaign encompassed twenty-five separate local, national, and overseas organizational appeals. C.J. Strouss, general chairman of the inaugural campaign, proclaimed to the community that participation in the campaign was a sacred duty of every Jew.[31] Youngstown Jewry responded to Strouss's and other Federation leaders' request with 1,386 donations amounting to $36,654.56. Youngstown Jewry's ability to donate this sum of money,

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[29] Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives, JA-800-P, Jewish Federation Permanent Category; Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names,* 132, 307-403; *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 29 November 1935, vol. 1 no. 10, 5.

[30] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 15 October 1935, Front Page.

[31] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 15 November 1935, vol. 1 no. 9, 4.

despite the continued economic depression and the infancy of the Federation, reveals an ethnic community prepared to respond to the needs of their local and international brethren. In order to appreciate fully Youngstown Jewry's fundraising efforts from 1936 to 1941 the following chapter discusses the historiography of American and American Jewish responses to Nazism and the refugee crisis.

Chapter IV

Historiography of American and American Jewish Responses to Nazism and the Refugee Crisis

The historiography of America's response to Nazism, the refugee crisis, and the Holocaust consists of works focused primarily on the federal government's actions or national Jewish organizations' divisiveness, with scant analysis into individual Jewish community fundraising relief efforts. Numerous monographs focusing on the causes for the Roosevelt administration's inept response toward the rescue of persecuted European Jewry dominate this field of scholarship. Several scholarly articles and essays do chronicle the social, political, and economic schisms inherent within American national Jewish organizations during the interwar years. The divisiveness among prominent Jewish leaders and their ineffective efforts in lobbying the federal government to rescue their brethren permeate these informative analyses. Yet, these works do not take into account fundraising and relief efforts conducted by individual Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds throughout the country. The absence of in-depth histories focusing on how individual Jewish communities responded during the crucial prewar years creates an incomplete historiography of American Jewry's response to the Nazis' Final Solution.

The Roosevelt Administration's Response

After forty years of scholarly debate and writing, historical monographs and popular works continue to examine the Roosevelt administration's policy toward the prewar refugee crisis and its reaction to reports of the extermination of European Jewry.

Contemporary works such as *FDR and the Holocaust*, edited by Verne W. Newton, defend President Roosevelt's attempts to rescue persecuted European Jewry and cast favorable light on his administration's diplomatic policies. Other works, such as Monty Noam Penkower's *The Holocaust and Israel Reborn*, contend that the Roosevelt administration and American Jewish leaders could have made a more concerted humanitarian effort to aid those affected by Hitler's Final Solution.[1] Rafael Medoff's "New Perspectives on How America, and American Jewry, Responded to the Holocaust" reviewed each of these works, and presented a superb historiographical survey of historians' divergent conclusions for the American government's lack of assistance during the Holocaust.[2] Holocaust scholars concur that:

> U.S policy was a product of several variables: pre-existing restrictive immigration laws and regulations; an entrenched State Department bureaucracy committed to a narrow interpretation of its function; the American public's opposition to an increase in immigration; and the reluctance of F.D.R. to accept the inherent political risks of humanitarian measures on behalf of European Jews.[3]

Historians, however, disagree over which variable provided the main reason for American indifference. Arthur Morse's *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy*, David S. Wyman's *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941*, Henry Feingold's *The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945*, Saul S. Friedman's *No Haven for the Oppressed: United*

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[1] Three articles concerning Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Holocaust can be found in *Hakirah – A Journal of Jewish and Ethnic Studies*, 2 (2006). The articles include Rafael Medoff's "Forcing FDR's Hand: Jewish Activists, the Holocaust, and the Creation of the War Refugee Board," Leonard Dinnerstein's "FDR and the Jews of Europe During World War II," and Laura Leff's "News of the Holocaust: Why FDR Didn't Tell and the Press Didn't Ask."

[2] Rafael Medoff, "New Perspectives on How America, and American Jewry, Responded to the Holocaust." *American Jewish History Journal*, 84 (September, 1996), 253-256.

[3] Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut, *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 3.

States Policy Toward Jewish Refugees 1938-1945, and Richard Breitman's and Alan Kraut's *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1941* each place the ultimate burden of responsibility on a different variable. These historians' theses and conclusions establish the historiogrpahical foundation for all subsequent works examining the Roosevelt administration's response to Nazism and the refugee crisis.

Arthur Morse's *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy*, the first full-length study on the subject, revealed the untold story of American and British indifference and deliberate policies to thwart assistance to the millions of Europeans persecuted during the Nazi regime. The work concentrated on two fundamental questions: what did the United States and Great Britain know about Nazi plans for the annihilation of the Jews and what was their reaction to this knowledge? Morse's findings detailed how the American government was aware of Hitler's ultimate objective several years before Gerhart Riegner relayed the Nazi order for "Ausrottung" (extermination) in 1942 to the State Department. Riegner's information merely confirmed that Nazi intentions were not temporary but rather long-term plans with clear objectives. Morse chronicled numerous events during the 1930s in order to illustrate America's opportunities either to condemn Nazi policy forcefully or assist fleeing refugees. The American government throughout the 1930s believed that specific intervention relating to German acts of aggression would only aggravate a situation that would "diffuse over time." Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated, "outside intercession has rarely produced the results desired and has frequently aggravated the situation."[4] Morse provided an array of examples of American intervention during humanitarian crises that did not directly involve or affect American citizens in order to refute Hull's advocacy of

[4] Morse, *While Six Million Died*, 110.

isolationism. Historically the United States offered assistance in Damascus, Tangier, Swiss cantons, and even in Tsarist Russia. The lack of governmental protest or concern toward Nazi barbarisms provided a clear example of American "inaction." Morse contended, "It was one thing to avoid interference in Germany's domestic policies, quite another to deny asylum to its victims."[5]

For Morse, rampant anti-Semitism among government officials, especially those in the State Department, resulted in America's failure to aid Jewish refugees.[6] The author reserved his greatest condemnation for Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long. Long's dual position as head of the visa division, which administered the entrance of aliens into the country, and director of the special division, which supervised the transmission of American funds overseas, influenced directly the admission rates of fleeing refugees.[7] Morse's journalistic background and writing style, exclusion of proper footnote techniques, "simplistic analysis, emotionalism, and failure to examine relevant archival sources"[8] lead many historians to consider David Wyman's *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis* the first true scholarly treatment of American policy during the rise of Nazism.

Wyman's monograph analyzed how the attitudes of the American public influenced and affected the inactions of the Roosevelt administration, Congress, diplomats abroad, and humanitarian groups. Wyman believed, "viewed within the context of its times, American refugee policy was essentially what the American people

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[5] Ibid., 129.

[6] Robert A. Rockaway, "The Roosevelt Administration, The Holocaust, and the Jewish Refugees." *Reviews in American History*, 3:1 (March, 1975), 113.

[7] Selig Adler, Review of *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy*, by Arthur Morse. *The American Historical Review*, 74:1 (October, 1968), 328.

[8] Rockaway, "The Roosevelt Administration, The Holocaust, and the Jewish Refugees," 113.

wanted."[9] Throughout his survey, Wyman continually referred to public polls in order to indicate the public's aversion to new legislation intended to increase immigration quotas. Wyman noted:

> An Opinion Research Corporation poll in March of 1938, the month of the Austrian *Anschluss*, found only seventeen percent agreeable to admission of a larger number of Jewish exiles from Germany, seventy-five percent opposed, eight percent had no opinion.[10]

For the author, the emergence of nativist and restrictionist groups encouraged Congress to act slowly in assisting persecuted Europeans. Therefore, "the congressional response to the refugee problem paralleled that of a majority of the American people."[11] However, the impact and influence of the American public was not exclusive to Congress.

President Roosevelt's timidity toward the refugee crisis was only partially due to his preoccupation with military movements and diplomatic planning with European leaders. Wyman believed that Roosevelt never advocated strong diplomatic or legislative measures to ensure the safety of European Jews because he did not want to alienate the American public. Wyman concluded, "One may level a finger of accusation at F.D.R for having done so little and at Congress for having done nothing. But the accuser will find himself simultaneously pointing at the society which gave American refugee policy its fundamental shape."[12] According to Wyman, therefore, the ultimate burden of responsibility for the lack of American assistance is clearly a product of America's xenophobic society, not the prevalence of anti-Semitism throughout the federal

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[9] David S. Wyman, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938-1941* (Amherst, Massachusetts: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1968), 213.

[10] Ibid., 210.

[11] Ibid., 211.

[12] Ibid., 213.

government. Wyman's work illustrated the social and political realities that the Roosevelt administration contended with when planning both domestic and foreign policies.

In *Politics of Rescue*, Henry Feingold expanded upon Morse's and Wyman's works by attempting "to move beyond the moral aspect and examine the political context in which America's response was conceived."[13] Feingold asserted that those who believe Long's anti-Semitism provided the major impetus for administrative inaction are merely simplifying a much more complicated problem.[14] For Feingold, historians must take into account "domestic, political, and social considerations, and a fear for America's security"[15] as secondary and tertiary reasons for administrative inaction. Domestic issues such as restrictionists' Congressional lobbying dominance, the permanence of domestic uneasiness toward refugees, and continued societal tensions caused by the Depression undoubtedly affected the administration. Feingold concluded, "The villain...in the last analysis may not be the State Department or even certain officials but the nature of the nation-state itself."[16]

Saul Friedman's *No Haven for the Oppressed* examined more closely a theme Feingold covered insufficiently, the American Jewish leaders' relationship with the Roosevelt administration.[17] Friedman chronicled how American Jewish leaders attempted to express their "100 Percent Americanism" by advocating "discreet diplomacy" rather than endorsing forceful mass meetings that demanded immediate

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[13] Henry Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue: the Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1970), ix.
[14] Ibid., 298.
[15] Rockaway, "The Roosevelt Administration, The Holocaust, and the Jewish Refugees," 113.
[16] Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue*, xiii.
[17] Rockaway, "The Roosevelt Administration, The Holocaust, and the Jewish Refugees," 114.

government intervention.[18] The monograph included scathing condemnations of Rabbi Stephen S. Wise's decision to conceal confirmed reports of the Nazi's extermination policy.[19] Friedman's analysis articulated successfully Wise's and other Jewish leaders' fear that public advocacy for organized rescue efforts would lead many to view such efforts as un-American and ultimately create anti-Semitic backlash throughout the country.[20] The theme of fear appears throughout Friedman's monograph. In fact, American "fears" included "the fear of complicating the domestic employment situation, fear of arousing nativists and neo-Nazis, and fear of allowing foreign agents intent on wrecking the industrial capacity of America to filter into the country."[21] For Friedman, therefore, national self-interest, not necessarily anti-Semitism, motivated government leaders to do very little for the refugees. *No Haven for the Oppressed* also blamed the divisiveness inherent within national Jewish organizations as a cause for administrative indifference. Friedman's research broadened the historiography of America's response by providing "additional information on the pressures on Roosevelt, the inaction of the American Jewish community, and the lack of a sense of urgency and callousness on the part of administration officials."[22]

Richard Breitman's and Alan Kraut's *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry* contended the delay and insufficient response of the American government in regards to the Holocaust is due primarily to bureaucratic ineptness - not rampant

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[18] Arnold A. Offner, Review of *No Haven For the Oppressed: United States Policy Toward Jewish Refugees, 1938-1945* by Saul S. Friedman. *The Journal of American History*, 61:1 (June, 1974), 247.

[19] Rockaway, "The Roosevelt Administration, The Holocaust, and the Jewish Refugees," 116.

[20] Saul S. Friedman, *No Haven For the Oppressed: United States Policy Toward Jewish Refugees, 1938-1945* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973), 129-155, chapter title "A Partnership of Silence"

[21] Ibid., 225.

[22] Rockaway, "The Roosevelt Administration, The Holocaust, and the Jewish Refugees," 118.

administrative anti-Semitism, societal pressures, national security concerns, or inept Jewish leadership. These two authors, unlike Morse, Wyman, Feingold, and Friedman, believe "an extended State Department bureaucracy committed to a narrow interpretation of its functions and to the protection of American interests alone"[23] led to the lack of American assistance toward European Jews. The tensions between humanitarian principles and national interests provide the foundation for Breitman's and Kraut's historiographic approach. According to Breitman and Kraut, the State Department and other federal agencies were only concerned with two objectives - economic recovery and all-out protection from fascist coalitions or communist spies. Washington bureaucrats, thus, did not see the rescue of persecuted Jews as a primary objective.

Breitman and Kraut, similar to other Holocaust historians, do admit to and acknowledge the possibility and existence of prejudiced State Department officials and anti-Semitic Congressmen. Despite these acknowledgements the authors believe, "bureaucratic indifference to moral and humanitarian concerns was a more important obstacle to an active refugee policy."[24] Although President Roosevelt was capable of altering the outcomes or decisions of the bureaucratic agencies, he rarely did and instead engulfed himself within the war preparation and planning. For Breitman and Kraut, the delayed decisions of the bureaucracy and the administration's apathetic refugee policy supersede any existence of anti-Semitic ideology that existed within either the public or the administration.

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[23] Breitman & Kraut, *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945*, 3.
[24] Ibid., 9.

Divisions throughout American Jewry and National Jewish Organizations

The historiography of American Jewish responses to Nazism and the refugee crisis consists of studies focusing on American Jewry's social, political, and economic schisms evidenced within national organizations. Each organization's ideology and policy, espoused by identifiable leaders, represented distinct segments of the American Jewish populace. The American Jewish Committee - organized in 1906 for the purpose of safeguarding the civil and religious rights of Jews in the wake of Russian pogroms - represented the wealthier segments of the American Jewish community. Successful German Jewish professionals led the Committee's efforts to aid war-ravaged eastern European Jews and established precedents that directed the Committee's efforts during the rise of Nazism.[25] Frederick A. Lazin's critique of Naomi Cohen's *Not Free to Desist* articulated how the American Jewish Committee's staunch advocacy of "quiet diplomacy" inhibited the organization from employing an effective response to Nazism and the refugee crisis. The actions and decisions of Committee president Cyrus Adler and vice president Judge Irving Lehman epitomized the Committee's support of the Roosevelt administration during the 1930s, despite growing criticism by other national Jewish organizations. Committee leaders went so far as to criticize other national Jewish organizations' condemnations of the Roosevelt administration's lethargy. For Adler and Lehman, public protests, harsh criticisms of government inaction, and demands for increased immigration quotas would only heighten anti-Semitic rhetoric within Germany

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[25] Friedman, *No Haven For The Oppressed*, 236; "Jewish National Organizations in the United States," *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 17 September 1937 to 5 September 1937, vol. 38, 481; Henry Cohen, "Crisis and Reaction: A Study in Jewish Group Attitudes 1929-1939," *American Jewish Archives* (June 1953), 91-96; David Brody, "American Jewry, the Refugees, and Immigration Restriction 1932-1942," *American Jewish Historical Society* (June, 1956), 232.

and throughout the United States. For the American Jewish Committee, "quiet diplomacy" provided an opportunity to influence the federal government while simultaneously maintaining the appearance of loyal American citizens.[26]

The American Jewish Committee distributed educational literature, informative pamphlets, and advertisements promoting civil liberties in order to inform the American public of the evils of Nazism and combat American anti-Semitism. For the Committee, a more informed American public resulted in a greater chance of decreased anti-immigrant rhetoric. The Committee's opposition to public demonstrations and the formation of a World Jewish Congress placed the organization at odds with several other national Jewish organizations. For Lazin, despite the Committee's wealthy membership and close personal contacts within the Roosevelt administration

> ...the rescue of German Jewry was not the first duty of most of the Committee members...Professional and business careers, family, health, and other activities in Jewish life and organizational work including the struggle against domestic anti-Semitism often took precedence..."[27]

The American Jewish Committee's ideology represented only one of several positions held by national Jewish organizations throughout the United States.[28]

The American Jewish Congress, organized in 1915 and present at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, represented middle-class American Jewish professionals. Eastern European immigrants of the last half-century who advocated Zionist ideologies made up a sizeable portion of the Congress's membership. The Congress's members

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[26] Frederick A. Lazin, "The Response of the American Jewish Committee to the Crisis of German Jewry, 1933-1939," *American Jewish History* LXVIII: 3 (March, 1979), 283-290.

[27] Lazin, "The Response of the American Jewish Committee to the Crisis of German Jewry, 1933-1939," 304.

[28] For further explanations of the history of the American Jewish Committee, refer to: Nathan Schachner's, *The Price of Liberty: A History of the American Jewish Committee* (New York, 1948) and Naomi Cohen's *Not Free to Desist* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1972).

advocated a more aggressive approach to the deteriorating conditions in Europe following Hitler's ascension to power. Led by Stephen S. Wise, the American Jewish Congress supported strongly the economic boycott of German economic goods organized by Samuel Untermyer under the auspices of the anti-Nazi League to Champion Human Rights. An impressive rally of approximately fifty-five thousand people organized by the American Jewish Congress, the anti-Nazi League, and the Jewish War Veterans crowded into Madison Square Garden on 21 March 1933 to protest the Nazis anti-Semitic decrees.[29] The American Jewish Committee, the Joint Distribution Committee, and B'nai B'rith opposed the meeting and encouraged members to persuade fellow Jews to disassociate with organizations supporting public protests.[30] The clear divisions among national Jewish organizations concerning the 1933 mass protest at Madison Square Garden offers a profound example of national Jewish leaders' divisiveness, which ultimately hindered cooperative attempts toward saving Jewish refugees.

The Jewish Labor Committee, organized on 25 February 1934, represented the estimated half million Yiddish-speaking Jewish working masses. Under the direction of

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[29] Friedman, *No Haven For The Oppressed*, 236; "Jewish National Organizations in the United States," *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 17 September 1937 to 5 September 1937, vol. 38, 456; Henry Cohen, "Crisis and Reaction: A Study in Jewish Group Attitudes 1929-1939," *American Jewish Archives* (June 1953), 96-100; David Brody, "American Jewry, the Refugees, and Immigration Restriction 1932-1942," *American Jewish Historical Society* (June, 1956), 232.

[30] For a complete assessment of the anti-Nazi Boycott Movement please refer to; Hans G. Reissner's, "The American Anti-Nazi Boycott." *Jubilee Volume Dedicated to Curt C. Silverman* (New York: American Federation of Jews from Central Europe, 1969), 60-79; Joseph Tenenbaum's, "The Anti-Nazi Boycott Movement in the United States." *Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance* (1959), 141-161; and the following articles by Moshe Gottlieb, "The Anti-Nazi Boycott Movement in the United States: An Ideological and Sociological Appreciation." *Jewish Social Studies* (July-October, 1973), 198-228; "The Berlin Riots of 1935 and Their Repercussions in America." *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* (March, 1970): 302-331; "Boycott, Rescue, and Ransom: The Threefold Dilemma of American Jewry in 1938-1939." *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* (1974): 235-279; The First of April (1933) Boycott and the Reaction of the American Jewish Community." *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* (June, 1968): 516-556 and "In the Shadow of War: The American Nazi Boycott Movement in 1939-1941." *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* (December, 1972): 146-162.

Baruch Vladeck, the Labor Committee positioned itself as the American wing of the worldwide Jewish socialist movement. The Labor Committee's association with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) prohibited the Committee from demanding any alterations to America's restrictive immigration policies.[31] The Labor Committee made no efforts toward rescuing refugees until after the Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939. For George L. Berlin, "the fact that Poland was the major center of the Jewish labor movement explains the immediate concerns of the JLC. The fact that forty-five percent of Polish Jews worked in industries and trades compared to only eighteen percent of German Jews" led to the Committee's immediate efforts to save Polish Jewish refugees.[32] Although eventually working closely with the American Jewish Congress in boycotting German exports, the Labor Committee remained anti-Zionist, similar to the American Jewish Committee.

These three national Jewish organizations reacted to Hitlerism in ways that conveyed their constituents' divergent social, political, and economic dispositions. Continued economic distress, fears of arousing American anti-Semitism, the public's prevailing mood of isolationism, and disagreements over Zionism created clear divisions throughout American national Jewish organizations. The three hundred and fifty Jews who successfully escaped the Nazis terror via emigration from 1933 to 1939 represent only a small portion of the millions of refugees who could have been saved if American national Jewish organizations' assuaged their differences and worked toward a cooperative humanitarian relief program.

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[31] Friedman, *No Haven For The Oppressed*, 238; "Jewish National Organizations in the United States," *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 17 September 1937 to 5 September 1937, vol. 38, 477; George L. Berlin, "The Jewish Labor Committee and American Immigration Policy in the 1930s," in *Studies in Jewish Bibliography History and Literature in Honor of I. Edward Kiev* (New York: KTAV, 1971).

[32] Berlin, "The Jewish Labor Committee and American Immigration Policy in the 1930s," 51-54.

Research into Jewish Communal Responses

Few historical accounts examine thoroughly individual American Jewish communities' knowledge of Nazi barbarism during the 1930s and their subsequent communal responses to the refugee crisis during the prewar years. Two works, Rabbi Haskel Lookstein's *Were We Our Brothers' Keepers? The Public Response of American Jews to the Holocaust 1938-1944* and Rafael Medoff's *The Deafening Silence, American Jewish Leaders and the Holocaust* move toward a greater appreciation of local Jewish reactions. Each author analyzed local newspaper coverage of European events in order to see how local Jewish organizations' reacted to news of the Holocaust. Rabbi Lookstein referenced, almost exclusively, *New York Times* articles and the Yiddish American Press to examine the reactions of major Jewish organizations in New York to news of Nazi barbarism. Medoff's monograph detailed national Jewish organizational leaders' inability to unite American Jewish communities in a concerted and well-organized rescue effort. Both *Were We Our Brothers' Keepers?* and *The Deafening Silence* maintained that American Jewry in New York and Pittsburgh, despite being aware of Nazi objectives and developing events in Europe, "failed" in their efforts to assist their European brethren. Lookstein's and Medoff's conclusions, however, do not take into account how Jewish organizational leaders' divisiveness affected the rescue efforts within small Jewish communities. Kenneth Wolk's Ph.D. dissertation, "New Haven and Waterbury, Connecticut Jewish Communities' Public Response to the Holocaust 1938-1944: An Examination Based on Accounts in the Public Printed Press and Local Jewish

Organizational Documents," (1995) explained how "small-town" or mid-sized Jewish communities responded to the reports of Hitler's extermination policy.[33]

Wolk's dissertation attempted "to trace the sources and flow of information in two Connecticut Jewish communities and point out the communal reactions to Holocaust news and communal responses the local organizations developed."[34] Local newspaper reports, primary sources from the Waterbury and New Haven Jewish communal organizations, oral histories, and documents located at the New Haven, Connecticut Jewish Historical Society establish the foundation for Wolk's research. Wolk mirrored Lookstein's and Medoff's research methodology when assessing how local Jewish leaders organized the national Jewish organizations' local branches in these two small Connecticut cities.[35] For Wolk, the observations and conclusions within *Were We Our Brothers' Keepers* and *The Deafening Silence* "appear valid [despite excluding] the many personal priorities that prevented everyday Jewish citizens from being more involved in Holocaust affairs."[36] Wolk's analysis, therefore, indicated as Medoff described, "a business as usual attitude in small-town Jewish communities...comparable to what has been documented about American Jewry on a national scale."[37]

The following portion of this work details how the Jewish Federation of Youngstown was not "oblivious" to the growing Nazi threat and did not "fail" in their

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[33] Kenneth Wolk, "New Haven and Waterbury, Connecticut Jewish Communities' Public Response to the Holocaust, 1938-1944" (Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1995), 1-23; *ProQuest* Dissertation and Theses Database, Abstract Document Summary, Publication # 9603205, *ProQuest* Document ID: 741358641.

[34] Wolk, "New Haven and Waterbury," 14.

[35] New Haven's population numbered 162,655 in 1930 while Waterbury's population contained 99,902 residents. The two Connecticut cities included 24.6% and 27.8% foreign-born white populations respectively. *Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930* Table XV, 358.

[36] *ProQuest* Dissertation and Theses Database, Abstract Document Summary, Publication # 9603205, *ProQuest* Document ID: 741358641.

[37] Rafael Medoff, "New Perspectives on How America, and American Jewry, Responded to the Holocaust." *American Jewish History Journal*, 84 (September, 1996), 266.

efforts to assist fleeing Jewish refugees. The *Youngstown Vindicator* covered Hitler's horrific reign starting with articles describing his ominous ascension to power in early 1933. Each edition of the *Youngstown Jewish Times* contained "Telegraphic and Cablegram Flashes," "Domestic News Flashes," and "News of the World in Brief" columns informing the Jewish community of military advancements, anti-Semitic persecutions throughout Europe, and the growing subversive efforts of the Bund, Silver Shirts, and other racist organizations throughout America. The Jewish Federation of Youngstown's annual fundraising efforts from 1935-1941 demonstrate clearly that Youngstown Jewry, despite its relatively small size, actively worked to save their European brethren despite Jewish organizational leaders' divisiveness at the national level. Such research into mid-sized Jewish communities' responses to news of Nazi atrocities allows for much needed comparison of the ideological pulse of various American Jewish communities during the prewar years.

Chapter V

A United Response to the Destruction of European Jewry – 1936 to 1941

The most informative primary source for accessing Youngstown Jewry during the years preceding America's entry into World War II is the *Youngstown Jewish Times*.[1] The *Jewish Times'* coverage of immigration restriction, American anti-Semitic activities, Nazi military advancements, and the refugee crisis proves without a doubt that Youngstown Jewry was aware of the grave situation and impending doom facing their European brethren. Weekly reprinting of syndicated columns by Ludwig Lewisohn, Pierre Van Paassen, and other prominent reporters kept the community informed of national and international Jewish concerns. The inclusion of an editorial section on the first page of each edition – most often written by Rabbis Philo, Manello, or Kollin – presented a forum for local Jewish leaders to express their opinions and encouragements for the greater community. The newly organized Federation utilized the *Jewish Times* as a way to inform, motivate, and rally the community to work together through one united fundraising campaign. In-depth examination of the *Jewish Times* uncovers crucial data needed in accessing the Jewish community's response to Nazism and the refugee crisis. The *Jewish Times'* detailed coverage of Federation fundraising campaigns from 1935 to 1941 indicates Youngstown Jewry's active and continued effort to relocate European refugees amidst continued immigration restriction and public apathy.[2]

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[1] On 15 March 1935 the first edition of the *Youngstown Jewish Times* was printed.

[2] The Jewish Federation of Youngstown's annual fundraising campaigns commenced during the latter months of each year, usually in November, and lasted seven to ten days. Therefore, the 1936

The 1936-37 Federation Campaign -"Give So That Jewish Life May Live"

As the Nazis celebrated Hitler's third anniversary as Chancellor of Germany on 30 January 1936, editorials throughout the *Jewish Times* detailed the dictator's threat to European society. Felix M. Warburg's article "German Jewry Today After Three Years" implored American Jews to realize that the Nuremberg Laws indicated that the German Jewish situation was no longer an emergency, but rather a permanent situation with grave consequences.[3] For the editors of the *Jewish Times*, "...persecution, starvation, and exile have been their [German Jews'] lot, and the immediate future offers little hope...the Nazi regime is still pursuing ruthlessly its determination to destroy German Jewry."[4] The *Jewish Times*, however, did not cover German Jewry's condition exclusively. Editorials and "News Flashes" throughout 1936 described the precarious position of Polish Jews, indicating an appreciation and awareness of the conditions of Jewish communities throughout various European nations. An editorial, titled "Danger Ahead," described how Polish Jewry lived under a regime that welcomed the elimination of one million Jews from the Polish population. The article encouraged American Jewish leadership not "to forget that there are over three million Jews in Poland and only five hundred thousand in Germany...and that anti-Semitic movements exist in practically every European country."[5] "Cablegram and Telegraphic Flashes" throughout the first four months of 1936 relayed news of anti-Semitic pogroms in Poland, Romania, Jugoslavia (Yugoslavia), and in Vienna, Austria.[6] Such reports informed Youngtown Jewry of the

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campaign started in late 1936 with the collection of subscriptions and the distribution of the money to local, national, and overseas agencies occurring during the 1937 calendar year.

[3] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 23 January 1936, vol. 1 no. 13, 14.

[4] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 30 January 1936, vol. 1 no. 14, 3.

[5] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 27 February 1936, vol. 1 no. 18, 3.

[6] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 26 March; 2 April; 9 April; 16 April 1936.

prevalence of European anti-Semitism and the possibility of increased anti-Jewish agitation in the United States.

Late spring and summer editions of the *Jewish Times* chronicled national Jewish organizations' views toward a World Jewish Congress, the possibility of another World War, and the proliferation of fascist groups throughout the United States. The Youngstown Jewish community elected Rabbi Carl Manello and Louis Ozersky, both of Temple Emanu-El, as delegates to the American Jewish Congress Convention in Washington D.C., where debate centered on the formation of a World Jewish Congress.[7] Editorials and opinion pieces indicate Youngstown Jewry's support of a World Jewish Congress and criticisms toward the American Jewish Committee's opposition toward the creation of a World Jewish Congress. Such a position suggests the community's advocacy of public opposition to Nazi persecutions of German Jews, rather than quiet protests and political discussions advocated by the American Jewish Committee.[8] A series of articles by Dr. Georg Bernhard, titled "Is War Imminent? – Political Under Currents in Present-Day Europe," appeared throughout the June and July editions of the publication. These revealing commentaries, reprinted from Seven Arts Publications, noted the similarities between the events leading up to World War I with the current situation in central Europe. Reverend Dr. L.M. Birkhead's articles, titled "Fascism at Our Gates," warned of American fascist groups' continued efforts to increase American xenophobia, isolationism, and anti-Semitism. The Jewish Federation, therefore, neared its one-year anniversary in the fall of 1936 with a Jewish populace thoroughly informed

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[7] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 11 June 1936, vol. 2 no. 6, 15; 19 June 1936, vol. 2 no. 7, 3.
[8] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 21 May 1936, vol. 2 no. 3, 3; 28 May 1936, vol. 2 no. 4, 5, 17.

of the unabated persecutions spreading throughout Europe and their communal obligations to assist in any manner possible.[9]

On 29 November 1936, the Jewish Federation of Youngstown launched its second annual fundraising campaign – "Give So That Jewish Life May Live." The minimum campaign goal of $42,500 equaled a forty-one percent increase compared to the Federation's 1935-1936 campaign and included the appeals of more than thirty-six local, national, and overseas Jewish agencies.[10] Louis B. Greenberg, the new executive director replacing H. Peretz, encouraged the Jewish community to support the united fundraising drive in editorial pieces and in articles titled "Federation Facts, Philosophy, and Figures." Greenberg's inspirational and informative articles revealed a need to persuade and motivate the Jewish community to support the infant Federation. Greenberg's "Federation Facts" column in mid-October reminded readers how the Federation "...replaced chaos with order, disunity with unity,[and] discord with harmony, by demonstrating that cooperation and tolerance is possible even in the face of fundamental differences of opinion."[11] Greenberg believed, "the Jewish Federation mark[ed] an important measure of progress of Youngstown Jewry culturally [because] where neighbors once may have regarded one another with suspicion they now entertain warm sympathy, friendship, and tolerance of each other."[12] For Greenberg, the success of the Federation during the last year demonstrated the most effective method for serving the Jewish communities' varied interests and created a "central pillar in the edifice of local

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[9] The cover of the *Jewish Times* boasted regularly, "more than 80% of the Jewry of Youngstown and surrounding vicinity read the Jewish Times." The high subscription rate clearly indicates an informed Jewish community.

[10] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 13 November 1936, vol. 3 no. 2, 12-14.

[11] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 16 October 1936, vol. 2 no. 24, 10.

[12] Ibid.,

Jewish life."[13] Praising the Federation's ability to bring the once disparate Jewish communities together as a more unified entity was not the only motivational theme appearing throughout the *Jewish Times* in the weeks leading up to the fundraising campaign.

Rabbi Philo's editorial "All for One, One For All" in late October referred to the Federation's efficiency as another example of its success. Philo reminded readers of how pre-Federation fundraising efforts "besieged the community with a new fund appeal appearing every few weeks."[14] Several other articles detailed how the Federation did not assess any new costs or organizational burdens to members of the community. In fact, the Federation allowed for "a far more efficient and economical instrument that assured more institutions readily received their quotas from the community."[15] In addition to bringing Youngstown Jewry together and professionally organizing fundraising efforts, Jewish communal leaders also argued that the Federation provided a platform for the Jewish community to contribute to American life. At the first Annual Meeting of the general membership on 28 October, C.J. Strouss - general chairman of the Annual Campaign - mentioned in his opening remarks how the Federation aided in protecting American civil liberties. Strouss stated, "In supporting our philanthropic, social, educational, and cultural organizations in America we are making an important contribution to American life."[16] Strouss continued by describing how Federation efforts:

> Demonstrate a full consciousness of our [Jews'] responsibility as citizens, building permanent structures to take their place in the

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[13] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 23 October 1936, vol. 2 no. 25, 6.
[14] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 30 October 1936, vol. 2 no. 26, 3.
[15] Ibid., 7.
[16] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 6 November 1936, vol. 3 no. 1, 9.

> cultural arch through which the future of American Jewish life will pass.[17]

Federation leaders, therefore, argued that Jewish citizens eager to demonstrate their assimilation and acceptance of American mores could do so by participating in Federation activities, especially in the annual Jewish appeal. Greenberg's, Philo's, and Strouss's appeals to the Jewish community reveal the Federation's initial task of selling the concept of a single united annual campaign to a Jewish community hesitant in discarding previous fundraising methods. Despite their hesitancy, Youngstown Jewry's fundraising effort in 1936 compares favorably to Federation campaigns in neighboring Ohio Jewish communities.

Despite raising $43,679.23, which surpassed the minimum quota of $42,500, the Jewish Federation of Youngstown did not reach its 1936-1937 campaign goal of at least ten thousand more than the prescribed minimum.[18] A net increase of only $7,024.67 from the Federation's inaugural 1935-1936 campaign, despite increased campaigning, advertisements, and editorial reminders within the *Jewish Times* over the course of a full calendar year, explains the leaders' initial disappointments. Description of Jewish fundraising efforts in Ohio's eight most populated cities as compared with Youngstown's efforts – while taking into account the size of the Jewish population, the age of each city's Federation or Welfare Fund, and the allocations of campaign subscriptions – allows for a more accurate analysis of Youngstown Jewry's initial successes or failures. The following graph lists Ohio's eight most populated cities in descending order according to the Jewish population. Division of annual Federation budgets into local and non-local

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[17] Ibid; *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 23 October 1936, vol. 2 no. 25, 3 Also discusses this theme.
[18] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 11 December 1936, vol. 3 no. 6, 3.

allocations assists in determining each city's organizational objectives and accomplishments.

1936 – 1937 Campaign Allocations as of Spring 1937

City	Jewish Pop. (Est.)	Non-Local Allocation	Local Allocations	TOTAL
Cleveland	85,000	not specified	not specified	$984,258
Cincinnati	23,500	$127,006	$184,242	$311,248
Toledo	10,000	$0	$3,604	$3,604
Columbus	8,500	$33,242	$25,772	$59,014
Youngstown	8,500	$21,250	$19,048	$40,298
Akron	6,500	$19,790	$21,975	$41,765
Dayton	5,000	$20,201	$11,041	$31,242
Canton	4,300	$10,834	$10,842	$21,676

[19]

Youngstown, Akron, Dayton, and Canton established Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds during the previous three years, Canton being the earliest of the four in 1933.

[19] "Directory of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, 1937" *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 6 September 1937 to 25 September 1938, vol. 39 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1936), 695-722, and "Statistics of Jews" Table VI, 748-749; "Second Annual Report Jewish Federation of Youngstown, October 1937," Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives, JA-800-P, Jewish Federation Permanent Category. In 1931 The Jewish Publication Society estimated Youngstown's Jewish population numbered 8,500. The Jewish Federation started a census to confirm this data on 12 March 1936. The census confirmed The Publication Society's estimation; *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 12 March 1936, vol. 1 no. 20.

Cleveland, Cincinnati, Toledo, and Columbus – cities with the highest number of Jewish inhabitants – organized Federations and Welfare Funds in 1904, 1929, 1926, and 1920 respectively.[20] The Jewish Federation of Youngstown's ability to raise campaign funds nearly equaling Columbus Jewry's totals, despite just over a year of communal organization compared to the state capitol's decade, illustrates the comparative success of the second annual campaign. The Jewish community of Toledo stands out as the real anomaly within the graph. Although organized for fifteen years and numbering ten thousand Jewish citizens, Toledo's Jewish Federation fundraising totals in 1936 pale in comparison to smaller Jewish communities which recently organized united communal fundraising bodies, such as Youngstown. Examination of the Jewish Federation of Youngstown's non-local budget allocations presents insight into the national and overseas agencies the organization entrusted with their communal subscriptions.

Jewish Federations divided their Non-Local Allocations during the interwar years into the six subcategories of regional, civic and protective, health and medical services, educational-cultural, co-ordination and research, and overseas. Youngstown Jewry's allocations to civic and protective agencies, and overseas agencies totaled $15,725. This amount accounted for approximately seventy-four percent of the non-local budget expenditures and thirty-nine percent of all Federation allocations for 1936-1937. Civic and protective organizations included the American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, the National Conference of Jews and Christians, and the Non-Sectarian anti-Nazi League. The Jewish Federation of

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[20] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 29 November 1935, vol. 1 no. 10, 5; "Directory of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, 1937" *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 6 September 1937 to 25 September 1938, vol. 39 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1936), 695-722, and "Statistics of Jews" Table VI, 748-749.

Youngstown allocated a total of $1,225 to these six agencies. The Federation's greatest allocation of campaign funds, both local and non-local, went to overseas agencies. The American Friends of the Hebrew University, the National Labor Committee, the ORT Federation, the Palestine Tree Fund, the United Palestine Appeal (UPA), and the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) received $14,500. The Federation's 1936-1937 budget expenditures illustrate undoubtedly Youngstown Jewry's awareness, concern, and response to non-local catastrophes.[21] After completing two united fundraising campaigns the Federation board of directors asserted proudly, "contrary what many 'friends' wish us to believe, we have proven that Jews can and do agree when there is a planned program and a purposeful goal to be attained."[22]

The 1937-38 Federation Campaign – "I'll Give More This Year!"

Federation leaders' dissatisfaction with the second annual campaign totals resulted in a plethora of articles explaining the importance of the Federation within nearly every 1937 edition of the *Jewish Times*.[23] "Federation Fact" columns appearing in January and early February sternly encouraged the Jewish community to pledge greater amounts toward the third united campaign. A brief delineation of subscription figures denotes Federation leaders' concerns. Of the 1,352 individual donors of the 1936-1937 campaign, three hundred nine people pledged $36,612.48 – equaling eighty-six percent of all the money collected. The remaining 1,212 contributors donated just $6,413.94, amounting to an average of five dollars per subscriber. For executive director Greenberg, in the years preceding the formation of the Federation the majority of local Jews donated

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[21] "Second Annual Report Jewish Federation of Youngstown, October 1937," Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives, JA-800-P, Jewish Federation Permanent Category, 10-13.

[22] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 23 April 1936, vol. 1 no. 26, 15.

[23] Federation leaders' concerns were well founded. The number of subscribers for annual campaigns decreased from 1,385 in 1935 to 1,352 in 1936.

on average five dollars to each of the thirty organizations now included within the Federation's annual appeal. Unless in personal distress, therefore, the twelve hundred subscribers traditionally donated between one hundred and two hundred dollars annually to various individual appeals by national Jewish organizations, local temple drives, and to B'nai B'rith or Zionist causes. Greenberg's assertion, "there are few subscribers who could not have doubled or trebled their subscriptions **without the slightest real sacrifice**"[24] appears well-founded and once again illustrates the difficult job of assuring the community that the Jewish Federation encompassed all previous local fundraising drives.

The Federation also utilized the pages of the *Jewish Times* to articulate clearly to the community that the Federation, although uniting disparate organizations into one fundraising entity, did not advocate a "uniformity" of Jewish ideology. Federation leaders reminded the community, "we are trying to do something towards the moulding [sic] of our own destiny...we are merely uniting our efforts, unifying our objectives, but retaining our variety of outlooks and approaches to Jewish life."[25] The amicable professional relationships exuded by the Federation board of directors, which consisted of individuals with divergent religious, political, and socio-economic views, demonstrated how the organization operated successfully. For Greenberg, the board of directors' ability to distribute campaign allocations justly to various organizations "made the Federation a true University of Jewish life...It is what breaks down narrow provincialisms, broadens a community, and increases the horizon of its individual

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[24] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 22 January 1937, vol. 3 no. 12, 12.
[25] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 12 February 1937, vol. 3 no. 15, 6.

members."[26] The Jewish Federation's appeals for cooperation and increased funding from the community continued throughout the year.

Affects of the American governments continued advocacy of immigration restriction amidst the developing refugee crisis in central Europe appeared regularly in *Jewish Times* editorials, syndicated articles, and "Cablegram and Telegraphic Flashes" during 1937.[27] Editorials titled "Another Door Closed" and "Refugee Problem" informed readers of the need for greater assistance for the thousands of German Jewish refugees stranded throughout Europe.[28] A reprinted Joint Distribution Committee report indicated that German refugees displaced by the Third Reich numbered thirty-five thousand, of which approximately twenty-nine thousand were Jews. The report noted that Nazi anti-Semitic directives scattered eight to ten thousand refugees into France, five to six thousand into England, four to five thousand into Holland, twelve hundred into Czechoslovakia, three thousand into Italy, and several hundred others into Switzerland, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Austria, and other nations.[29] From 1 June 1936 to 30 June 1937, the United States had a net increase of only 23,508 immigrants, indicating the continued success of interwar immigration restrictions. Jewish immigrants accounted for 11,120 of this total, or forty seven percent. Despite Ohio's ranking sixth behind New York, Illinois, California, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey as a destination of Jewish immigrants, only three hundred sixteen Jewish immigrants arrived in Ohio - equaling

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[26] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 29 January 1937, vol. 3 no. 13, 5.

[27] Other editorial pieces, titled "The Germ of Coughlinitis" and "War Breeders," criticized severely Father Charles Coughlin's anti-Semitic ideology and Hitler's and Mussolini's military machinations and anti-Jewish fervor. Columns also spurred Jewish readers to demand government investigation into the gaining popularity of international fascist propaganda within the United States. *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 4 June 1937, vol. 4 no. 5, 3; 11 June 1937, vol. 4 no. 6, 3; 2 July 1937, vol. 4 no. 9, 6.

[28] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 19 February 1937, vol. 3 no. 16, 3; 12 March 1937, vol. 3 no. 19, 3.

[29] "35,000 German Refugees Still Stranded in Europe," *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 28 May 1937, vol. 4 no. 4, 10.

nineteen percent of all immigrants entering the state.[30] The Federation's fall advertisements for the 1937-1938 annual campaign in the *Jewish Times* reflected an increased awareness of the refugee crisis, marking a transition in Federation objectives.

The refrain "I'll Give More This Year!" accompanied the Jewish Federation's third annual fundraising campaign. The weeklong campaign commenced on 31 October 1937 with an opening banquet at Anshe Emeth Social Hall with Maurice Samuels, world-renowned author and thinker, as the keynote speaker.[31] The Federation's minimum goal of $51,000 amounted to a twenty percent increase from the previous year's goal and a sixty-nine percent increase from the inaugural campaign goal in 1935. Multiple page announcements throughout the fall editions of the *Jewish Times* stating, "When You Say 'No' to the Jewish Federation Appeal, You Say 'Yes' to Hitler!" illustrated the Federation's aggressive campaigning in the hopes of arousing more contributions and in larger amounts.[32] An article titled "Bloody Figures" described for the Jewish community the true nature and horrific conditions created by the Nazis throughout Europe. The article provided the following statistics concerning the fate of three million Polish Jews:

> ...major and minor pogroms claimed the lives of 69 Jews in 1936...one thousand Jews were injured in 430 attacks in 179 communities in 1936...in the first 5 months of 1937, 111 attacks on Jews tolled 20 dead and 467 injured...unemployment among Jews is two and half times as high as among non-Jews...forty percent of the employable Jewish populace is jobless...350 towns in western Poland and Pomerania have barred Jews trading on market days...250 students were injured in university riots...826 establishments were liquidated in 1936 because of the

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[30] "Immigration of Jews to the United States" Tables XIV through XX, *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 26 September 1938 to 13 September 1939, vol. 40 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1938), 552-562.

[31] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 15 October 1937, vol. 4 no. 24; 22 October 1937, vol. 4 no. 25, 10.

[32] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 1 October 1937, vol. 4 no. 22, 6.

> boycott…damage to Jewish property from pogroms during 1936 is estimated at 15,000,000 zlotys…[33]

Numerous photos depicting the depraved conditions of "the wandering Jew" complemented graphic articles and created the image that Youngstown Jewry could make a difference as a "link in the chain of humanity" to assist Jewish refugees.[34] For the editors of the *Jewish Times*, "Youngstown Jews must carry this load, share in the responsibility…if we are to be worthy of our heritage as Jews, and citizens of this great free land."[35] The emotionalism evident throughout these appeals denotes the Federation's concerted efforts toward increasing Youngstown Jewry's awareness of the grave situation facing Jewish refugees.

Jerome Curtis of the Cleveland Welfare Fund; Dr. Joseph Dunner, an exile from Germany; Louis Platt of the Joint Distribution Committee; and Mendel N. Fisher of the United Palestine Appeal addressed Federation workers and donors at a Victory Dinner on 7 November at the Tod House. Federation officials totaled the results of the third annual united Jewish appeal in late December and announced that pledges toward the thirty-two combined participating agencies amounted to $52,024.45. The Non-Local allocations for the 1937-1938 drive totaled $30,590 - equaling fifty-nine percent of all Federation expenditures. The amount also equaled a forty-four percent increase compared to Non-Local allocations derived from the 1936-1937 campaign. Monetary allotments to overseas agencies once again received the vast majority of non-local expenditures. The Federation assigned $20,000 to the combined efforts of the UPA and JDC, exceeding the

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[33] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 3 September 1937, vol. 4 no. 18, 4.

[34] Some of the images included the following captions; "Youthful Refugees Enjoying Nourishing Food," "Once a Professional Man in German, He Builds New Future," "Displaced Jews – Bound For Unknown Destinations," " Escaped From Terrorism, They Must Start Life Anew," and "Refugee Children at Milk Center – Maintained by JDC." *Jewish Times*, 15 October 1937, vol. 4 no. 24 through 29 October 1937, vol. 4 no. 26.

[35] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 22 October 1937, vol. 4 no. 25, 2.

total amount of all non-local allocations for the 1935-1936 campaign by seven thousand dollars.[36] The board of directors' decision to increase spending for overseas agencies aimed at aiding Jewish refugees confirms the Federation's growing desire to assist refugees, and parallels neighboring Jewish communities' increased non-local expenditures.[37]

At a meeting on 14 December 1937, the Board of Directors unanimously elected C.J. Strouss to lead once again the Jewish community as president of the Federation. Strouss described to the board of directors that evening his concerns with continued immigration problems facing Jewish refugees. Strouss promoted the creation of a local branch of the Coordinating Committee for Aid to Refugees and Emigrants so Youngstown Jewry could provide greater organizational assistance to fleeing refugees.[38] Organized in October 1934, the National Coordinating Committee for Aid to Refugees and Emigrants Coming from Germany (NCC) provided aid to refugees of all faiths fleeing Europe. The Committee served as a "central registry and clearing bureau for all organizations interested in the refugee question and handled special cases that no other agency assumed responsibility for."[39] The organization secured information from relatives in both Germany and the United States in order to assist in the difficult process

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[36] "Second Annual Report Jewish Federation of Youngstown, October 1937," Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives, JA-800-P, Jewish Federation Permanent Category; "Jewish Federation of Youngstown Proposed Non-Local Budget for 1937-1938," Minutes of Board of Directors and Executive Committee, Files located in Sam Kooperman's office at the Youngstown Area Jewish Federation, Youngstown, Ohio.

[37] The Akron Jewish Welfare Fund allocated the same amount for non-local agencies as they did in 1936-37. The Canton Jewish Welfare Fund, Columbus United Jewish Fund, and Dayton United Jewish Council increased their non-local disbursements by 40%, 30%, and 73% respectively. "1938 Directory of Jewish Federations, Welfare Funds, and Community Councils," *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 26 September 1938 to 13 September 1939, vol. 40, 481-516.

[38] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 31 December 1937, vol. 5 no. 9, 4.

[39] John L. Bernstein, "The Migration of Jews in Recent Years," *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 17 September 1936 to 5 September 1937, vol. 38 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1938), 117-134.

of emigration, located employment opportunities for new arrivals, and offered legal advice concerning issues with passports, visas, and immigration procedures.[40] The National Coordinating Committee reorganized in 1939 as the National Refugee Service (NRS) and aided in the relocation of approximately 25,000 refugees by 1946.[41] The Jewish Federation's $500 allotment to the Youngstown Coordinating Committee following the 1937-1938 united campaign marked the first direct monetary assistance to the National Coordinating Committee and indicated the Jewish community's desire to assist in the relocation of refugees to Youngstown.[42]

The Evian Conference and Plans for Refugee Emigration

The Federation started 1938 by requesting that the community provide greater financial, medical, and occupational assistance toward the placement of German Jewish refugees in Youngstown.[43] Hitler's annexation (Anschluss) of Austria on 13 March 1938, which exacerbated European immigration patterns, provided further proof of the need for direct assistance for Jewish refugees. The Nazis immediately applied anti-Semitic decrees and initiated violent persecutions toward the approximately 180,000 to 200,000 Jews of Austria. Abhorrence regarding Hitler's uncontested "rape of Austria" appeared throughout international and national newspapers.[44] The 18 March 1938 cover

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[40] Ibid.

[41] Zosa Szajkowski, "The Attitude of American Jews to Refugees from Germany in the 1930s," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* LXI (December 1971), 117-122. Friedman, *No Haven For the Oppressed*, 236-240; *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 26 September 1938 to 13 September 1939, vol. 40 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1938), 451; Marc Lee Raphael, *A History of the United Jewish Appeal, 1932-1982* (Brown University: Scholars Press, 1982), 13-15.

[42] "Jewish Federation of Youngstown Proposed Non-Local Budget for 1937-1938," Minutes of Board of Directors and Executive Committee, Files located in Sam Kooperman's office at the Youngstown Area Jewish Federation, Youngstown, Ohio.

[43] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 14 January 1938, vol. 5 no. 11.

[44] Morse, *While Six Million Died*, 199-202; Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper*, 223-230; Friedman, *No Haven For the Oppressed*; Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue*, 17. *The New York Times*, *Youngstown Vindicator*, and *Youngstown Telegram* covered the international event thoroughly.

of the *Youngstown Jewish Times* contained a map of Austria with the headline: "We Mourn the Death of This Nation the Past Week." Innumerable articles in the 18 March edition described the dismissal of Jewish journalists from the country, the raiding of Jewish organization headquarters by Nazi Storm Troopers, the barring of Austrian Jewish citizens from government positions, and the initiation of an anti-Jewish boycott in Vienna. By the end of April more than fifteen percent of the entire Austrian Jewish population, or approximately thirty one thousand, applied for immigration visas to the United States.[45] The National Origins Quota of 1929, however, only allocated 1,413 annual quotas for Austria, thus trapping thousands of Austrian Jews desperately trying to exit an unimaginable nightmare of persecution.[46]

Within weeks of Hitler's annexation, the Roosevelt administration invited thirty-two European and Latin American governments to join in an international conference to aid European refugees. The administration selected the French resort town of Evian-les-Bains as the site for the summer gathering. Roosevelt extended invitations to nations unaffected by the massive influx of refugees caused by Nazi military aggressions, which the administration termed "receiver" nations. The international conference's main goal was only to "consider what steps could be taken to facilitate the settlement in other countries of political refugees from Germany and Austria."[47] Many Americans worried that participation at the Evian Conference suggested changes to America's two decades long restrictive immigration policy. Colorado Democrat Edward T. Taylor illustrated

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[45] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 22 April 1938, vol. 5 no. 25, 4.

[46] LeMay, *From Open Door to Dutch Door*, 91; John L. Bernstein, "The Migration of Jews in Recent Years," *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 17 September 1936 to 5 September 1937, vol. 38 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1938), 117-134.

[47] Eric Estorick, "The Evian Conference and the Intergovernmental Committee" *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science 203* (May 1939), 136.

these fears by demanding government assurances that American participation at the Conference did not imply changes to current quota laws. Taylor and other restrictionists, still present throughout Congress, eschewed any utterances that implied the United States would become a dumping ground for all of the persecuted people of Europe.[48] From the onset, however, the United States made it clear that private organizations, not the government, would finance any movement of refugees.

Opening on 6 July 1938, Conference attendees' agreed unanimously "to only consider immediate steps to be taken within the **existing** immigration laws and resolutions."[49] This resolution quelled the American public's worries of new liberal immigration policies. American Jewish leaders' reserved optimism toward the calling of the Conference soon ceased when the nations unanimously concluded, "that the refugee problem as a whole was too complex to be considered at the moment."[50] The only true accomplishment of the Conference was its choice to recognize the European refugee crisis as an international humanitarian concern.[51] Overall, the Evian Conference maintained a restrictive element, demonstrated the reluctance of many western democracies, and failed completely in the major objective of finding places for European refugees.[52] The Evian Conference established the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), which replaced the ineffective League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to coordinate international humanitarian efforts. The IGCR, stationed in London, focused on two main objectives: (1) to work with possible "receiver" nations to

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[48] Wyman, *Paper Walls*, 46.

[49] Estorick, "The Evian Conference and the Intergovernmental Committee," 136.

[50] Ibid., 137; Optimism toward the possible objectives of the Evian Conference appeared throughout the *Jewish Times*.

[51] Breitman & Kraut, *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry: 1933-1945* (Indiana University Press, 1987), 230.

[52] Wyman, *Paper Walls*, 51.

establish and develop the possibility of permanent settlements; and, (2) attempt to work with the German government in order to provide the most successful and organized process for fleeing German refugees.[53]

George Rublee, newly appointed director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, attempted to open diplomatic negotiations with the Nazi government concerning an orderly emigration of Jewish refugees from Nazi-occupied nations. By December 1938, Rublee met with Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank, in London whereupon Schacht presented an "oral plan consisting of certain general ideas" for Rublee to accept or reject with no negotiation or compromises.[54] The Schacht Plan divided German Jewry into three distinct classes - wage earners, dependents, and the aged. Over the course of the next few years, the Nazi regime would permit approximately fifty thousand wage earners to emigrate annually. After arriving in a new nation, the émigrés would then send money to their relatives in Nazi Germany to finance emigration expenses, while the aged remained. Schacht's plan also included a convoluted scheme for financing the wage earners' initial emigration through the creation of an international loan organized by world Jewry with German Jewish property providing financial security for the actual emigration process.[55] Thus, the Schacht Plan allowed for "the expansion of German foreign trade under existing treaties and clearing arrangements."[56] Schacht's Plan, a mere ransom of German Jewish emigrants for increased German exports and economic gains, received scant approval from the IGCR or

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[53] Ibid., 50.

[54] George L. Berlin, "The Jewish Labor Committee and American Immigration Policy in the 1930s," in *Studies in Jewish Bibliography History and Literature in Honor of I. Edward Kiev* (New York: KTAV, 1971), 54.

[55] Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper*, 273-275; Morse, *While Six Million Died*, 241; Berlin, "The Jewish Labor Committee and American Immigration Policy in the 1930s," 54-55.

[56] *The New York Times*, 11 January 1939, 1.

the American Jewish community. National Jewish organizations' disapproval of the Schacht Plan, however, varied greatly due to their divergent socio-political ideologies.

The World Jewish Congress refused to endorse any emigration plan that rewarded the Nazis through the expropriation or expulsion of German Jewish property, which created economic advantages for the anti-Semitic regime. The Joint Boycott Council, formed in 1938 by the American Jewish Congress and the Jewish Labor Committee, viewed any systematic removal or emigration of a large numbers of German Jews as an abandonment of their efforts to maintain a "distinct Jewish national cultural community" in Germany. Other national Jewish organizations feared that acceptance of the Schacht Plan amounted to an approval of diplomatic blackmail, which other anti-Semitic central European nations could easily implement. The prevalent fear that mass emigration of European Jewish refugees to any nation would increase anti-Semitic agitations throughout the world also weighed heavily on national Jewish leaders' endorsements and advocacy of the Plan.[57]

Negotiations between Rublee and Schacht's replacement, Helmuth Wohlthat, continued during the early months of 1939. A revised version of the original plan centered on the method of financing the emigration process. The Rublee-Wohlthat Plan eliminated the international loan and the export provision while maintaining several of the original provisions. Opposition from the Joint Boycott Council continued, as the new Plan presented no official guarantees of German sincerity of complicity to any of the negotiations. As George Berlin indicated, "Germany had never officially recognized the existence of the Intergovernmental Committee, and refused to make any agreement with foreign governments concerning the treatment of her Jews, which she considered a purely

[57] Berlin, "The Jewish Labor Committee and American Immigration Policy in the 1930s," 54-55.

internal affair."[58] By mid February, Rublee resigned his position as director believing he established a tangible agreement with the Nazis for the peaceful emigration of thousands of Jewish refugees. A 23 February decree by Hermann Goring demanding all "stateless" Jews to surrender their jewelry and other valuables proved Wohlthat's assurances of minimal persecutions toward Jews to be utterly false and baseless. Further anti-Semitic decrees thwarted future negotiations between the powerless and ineffective IGCR and the demonic Third Reich.[59] The Evian Conference's creation of the IGCR was simply a pious gesture of compassion toward the increasing cries for help from Europe's persecuted refugees. The Evian Conference and the IGCR merely silenced the critics of America's humanitarian lethargy and failed in saving the lives of thousands of European refugees.

Potential refugees faced innumerable restrictions and procedural barriers with or without enactment of the Schacht or Rublee-Wohlthat Plans. The permanence of the National Origins Plan and Hoover's 1930 reinterpretation of the likely to become a public charge clause (LPC) guaranteed the exclusion of a mass emigration of refugees to the shores of the United States. Despite increasing anti-Semitic decrees throughout central Europe and Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia in May 1939, refugees needed to meet the following requirements for an acceptable visa application. Immigrants and refugees alike:

> had to present an un-expired passport, a public certificate attesting good conduct in the past, a certificate from the Public Health Surgeon indicating that the applicant would not be an unhealthy public charge, duplicate records of all pertinent personal data, a thorough financial statement, as well as an affidavit filed by a

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[58] Ibid., 55-57.
[59] Morse, *While Six Million Died*, 241-251.

> relative or friend within the United States guaranteeing a specific percentage of support.[60]

An absence of any of these requirements resulted in delays or refusals, and prolonged the misery of fleeing refugees. The State Department's decision to allow individual consular officers to maintain the ultimate authority left few alternative options for refugees. The decision to issue visas was, by law, up to each individual consular officer.[61] The Visa Division in Washington D.C. was simply an advisory body and allowed the consular officers the power to revoke visas. Nazi directions for immigrants also included complex demands and excessive requirements. The directions included:

> Exit permits, entry permits, Spanish and Portuguese transit visas, a passport picture, three identifiable photos, French francs for food and drinks, American dollars for other expenses, railway and boat tickets, and baggage tickets and lists.[62]

The Nazis' demands, coupled with consular officers' excessive requirements, indicated a lack of humanitarian concern. Immigration policy and consular requirements during the prewar years established daunting obstructions for refugees fleeing Nazi Europe. From September 1938 to September 1939, delay was the order of the day, as consuls, aware of the unsympathetic attitudes of their superiors toward refugees, outdid themselves in an effort to keep acceptable applications to a minimum. The strict interpretation of the Immigration Act of 1924 and the LPC clause allowed consular officers to discontinue the

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[60] Friedman, *No Haven For the Oppressed*, 23. It is important to note that American immigration policy during the prewar years included no distinctions between potential immigrants and displaced refugees. Both refugees seeking political, religious, or societal asylum and immigrants each needed to meet the same restrictive immigration criteria established by the 1917, 1921, 1924, and 1929 Immigration Acts.

[61] "Strachey Barred Under Visa Law," *The New York Times* 16 October 1938, IV: 7:3.

[62] Berlin Migration Department. "Emigration from Germany." Berlin, Jan. 9, 1941; Reprinted in Documents Section, *Contemporary Jewish Record,* 4 (April, 1941), 195.

issuance of visitor visas and transit permits.[63] In November 1939, officers implemented new requirements in order to assure the validity of affidavits and authentic transportation tickets.[64] Consular officers without a doubt embodied America's xenophobia and purposefully complicated and exacerbated the already difficult struggle of refugees.

A statistical analysis of refugee admission rates and immigrant departures to and from German from 1933 to 1938 indicates the success of American immigration restriction.[65] From 1 July 1932 to 30 June 1938, a total of 241,962 immigrants and refugees entered the United States. During the same span, 246,449 individuals departed the country, equaling a net decrease of 4,487. American immigration laws permitted the admission of 922,644 individuals during this span. Therefore, during the Nazis' first five years of power only twenty-six percent of America's already restrictive immigration quotas filled. The 31,648 immigrants and refugees who did enter the country in 1938 amounted to less than 4/100 of one percent of America's total population.[66] Thus, "the safest course for a Jewish immigrant was to apply to a philanthropic agency."[67] Despite these legal barriers, Youngstown Jewry continued to place great emphasis on the rescue of refugees.

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[63] Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue*, 141 – 142.

[64] "Jewish Emigration from Reich Ceases," *The New York Times* 8 September 1939, 15:1.

[65] Approximately 129,000 Jewish refugees emigrated from Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1937. Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper*, 140; The number of German refugees that entered the United States from July 1932 through December 1938 equaled 65,404 with approximately 22,362 aliens returning to German occupied lands during this span. The net increase, therefore, of German refugees who entered America totaled 43,042, or 6,622 annually. "Refugee Facts: A Study of the German Refugee in America." American Friends Service Committee, 1938-1939.

[66] "Refugee Facts: A Study of the German Refugee in America." American Friends Service Committee, 1938-1939, 1-9.

[67] *The American Jewish Yearbook*, 17 September 1936 to 5 September 1937, vol. 38 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1936), 130-131.

The 1938-39 Federation Campaign – "Give and Be Glad You Can Give"

The Federation's fourth annual Jewish appeal opened on Sunday 6 November 1938 with a goal of $57,000 and thirty participating agencies. The fourth campaign included an organizational change with campaign workers divided into professional and occupational divisions to ensure greater collecting efficiency.[68] The week before the kickoff banquet, Marvin Lowenthal – historian and acclaimed scholar – addressed the First Union Sabbath Eve Service held by all Youngstown temples and under the direction of Rabbis Philo, Manello, and Kollin. Lowenthal and other speakers informed those in attendance that the campaign goal "must be raised to protect ourselves from the scourge of anti-Semitism exported by European despots, and strengthen cultural and philanthropic agencies in Youngstown and throughout the world."[69] For C. J. Strouss, the decision to set the campaign goal in early August rather than later in October resulted in an annual campaign quota significantly below the $75,000 needed from Youngstown Jewry in the wake of pogroms in the Sudetenland and in Italy.[70] Innumerable reports and articles describing the unrelenting destruction of European Jewry following Kristallnacht in early November continued to motivate Youngstown Jewry to assist in refugee resettlement projects.

A 16 December editorial in the *Jewish Times*, titled "Resettlement Our Problem" illustrated clearly Youngstown Jewry's emphasis on assisting fleeing Jewish refugees. The editorial informed readers, " this past year [1938] has been a year of destiny for German Jews…the only hope lies in emigration…it is for us [Youngstown Jewry] therefore to make every refugee resettlement project our own special project and to work

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[68] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 7 October 1938, vol. 6 no. 23, 10; 14 October, vol. 6 no. 24, 11.
[69] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 21 October 1938, vol. 6 no. 25, 11.
[70] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 28 October 1938, vol. 6 no. 26, 10-11.

toward that end with every ounce of strength at our command."[71] Addresses and speeches by Rabbi Julius Gordon of St. Louis and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver of Cleveland during the weeklong campaign described with great clarity the need to assist those displaced by Hitler. Local newspaper reporting and informative lectures by prominent national Jewish leaders resulted in greater communal involvement dealing with the coordination, organization, and subscription of funds. As a result, the 1938-1939 Jewish Federation campaign, although conducted during an acute local economic recession, resulted in 1,416 pledges and an oversubscription totaling $64,638.33.[72] Once again allocations for overseas and refugee resettlement equaled sixty-one percent ($39,900) of the money raised during the fourth campaign. The Federation's allocation of $26,200 toward the United Jewish Appeal (UJA), which included the United Palestine Appeal, Joint Distribution Committee, and the National Refugee Service, represented the largest Federation allocation since its inception in 1935.[73]

United Jewish Appeal

On 10 January 1939, Rabbi Jonah B. Wise of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver of the United Palestine Appeal (UPA), and William Rosenwald of the National Coordinating Committee for Aid to Refugees and Emigrants from Germany (NCC), met in New York and organized a "reconstituted" United Jewish Appeal (UJA). The three national Jewish organizations' decision to reunite their fundraising efforts in response to the unrelenting anti-Semitic

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[71] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 16 December 1938, vol. 7 no. 9, 3.

[72] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 4 November 1938, vol. 7 no. 1, 8-9; 11 November 1938, vol. 7 no. 2, 8-9; 18 November 1938, vol. 7 no. 3, 11.

[73] Minutes of Federation Board of Directors and Executive Committee Meetings. Youngstown Area Jewish Federation, Youngstown, Ohio; Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives, JA-805-P.

ravages throughout Europe positioned the United Jewish Appeal as the "single American Jewish fundraising organization for the work of relief and rehabilitation in Europe, for immigration and settlement in Palestine, and for refugee aid in the United States."[74] Despite the organizations' divergent ideologies and fundraising objectives, so evident during previous united fundraising attempts, the newly organized United Jewish Appeal represented three national Jewish organizations' united response to Nazism and the refugee crisis.

Organized in 1914, the Joint Distribution Committee offered overseas relief for displaced eastern European Jews and struggling Jewish settlements in Palestine. Ideologically, the Joint mirrored the American Jewish Committee's opposition to mass meetings that advocated an economic boycott of German goods.[75] Leaders of the Joint disagreed with Zionists' advocacy that Palestine offered the only viable solution to the "Jewish Problem," and believed that Jewish culture throughout Europe would prosper in the future. The Joint's efforts to rebuild Jewish culture in Europe included establishing soup kitchens, rebuilding hospitals, founding orphanages, distributing food, and organizing new schools throughout Germany and eastern Europe. The organization also aided Turkish Jews, provided medical provisions for Salonikan Jews, and assisted Jewish prisoners of war in Siberia.[76] The Joint Distribution Committee's ideology, therefore, consisted "of giving aid to all Jews – wherever they might be – including those in Palestine and those in countries both hostile and friendly to the United States."[77]

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[74] Marc Lee Raphael, *A History of the United Jewish Appeal, 1932-1982* (Brown University: Scholars Press, 1982), 1. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee is widely referred to as the 'Joint' by academics and Jewish citizens alike.

[75] Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper: A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 1929-1939*, 107.

[76] Ibid., 9-18.

[77] Raphael, *A History of the United Jewish Appeal*, 1.

The United Palestine Appeal, established in 1925, advocated exclusively a Zionist ideology. The Joint's fundraising successes and American Zionist leaders' desire for a single independent fundraising organization aimed at "the up building of Jewish life in Palestine" created the impetus for the formation of this body. The United Palestine Appeal brought together like-minded Zionist organizations such as the Jewish National Fund, The Palestine Foundation Fund, Mizrachi, and Hadassah. During the 1920s and early 1930s, the Joint Distribution Committee and the United Palestine Appeal quarreled over the issue of resettling displaced Russian Jewish families. The Joint advocated the creation of agricultural settlements in the Ukraine and in the Crimea region, which epitomized their hope of maintaining a Jewish cultural identity in Europe. The UPA maintained that any resettlement efforts of displaced Jewry needed to focus exclusively toward Palestine. Divisions between Zionist, non-Zionist, and anti-Zionist ideologies prevented any sustainable united fundraising campaigns by the Joint and the UPA during the 1920s and for much of the 1930s.[78]

Increasing pressure from local Jewish leaders throughout the country led to the creation of an ad hoc United Jewish Appeal of $3,200,000 in March 1934. Under the direction of Louis Lipsky of the UPA and Morris Rothenberg of the Joint, three hundred Jewish communities throughout the country participated in the fundraising, with Boston, Detroit, and St. Louis each agreeing to allocate forty-five percent of their campaign totals to the United Jewish Appeal. The 1934 Appeal raised just $2,200,000 with fifty-five percent, or $1,290,000, allocated to the Joint Distribution Committee. Despite Joint leaders' belief that they were capable of raising more money independently, the two organizations launched another joint appeal the following year. Of the approximately

[78] Ibid., 2-4.

seven hundred communities involved in the 1935 Appeal, only Cleveland reached its campaign goal. With the second United Jewish Appeal only netting $1,600,000, the Joint and the UPA dissolved their united fundraising efforts in the fall of 1935. The inability to meet campaign goals, arguments concerning the allocation of funds between the two organizations, and ideological differences concerning Zionism thwarted these early attempts to combine fundraising appeals.[79]

British restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine in 1937 and in 1938, and the Nazis' destruction of Jewish property in November 1938 "literally crystallized the growing realization by the leaders of American Jewry that in spite of their ideological differences only a centralized and harmonious fundraising body could fully mobilize" the resources needed to assist European Jewry.[80] The reconstitution of the United Jewish Appeal in January 1939 created an organization with the clear objectives of relocating European refugees and assisting Jews already relocated in Palestine and other western countries. The Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (CJFWF) played a crucial role in advocating the objectives and fundraising needs of a more unified organizational approach toward assisting refugees. Throughout 1939 and 1940, the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds conducted seminars and conferences throughout the nation advocating the potential effectiveness of the newly formed UJA.[81] The 1939 United Jewish Appeal raised $16,250,000 but failed to reach its goal of $20,000,000. The Jewish Federation of Youngstown's 1939-1940 annual appeal allocation to the United Jewish Appeal demonstrates their confidence in the three organizations' unity and objectives.

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[79] Ibid., 4-6.
[80] Ibid., 6.
[81] Ibid., 6-7.

The 1939-40 Federation Campaign

Nazi Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939 exacerbated further Youngstown Jewry's worriment and uncertainty toward the plight of their European brethren. An editorial, titled "Passover Message from Rabbi Philo," detailed to the community the author's difficulty in writing a "cheerful Passover message as paganism, persecution, prejudice, and privation – the four horsemen of Nazism – sweep over all of Europe."[82] The *Jewish Times* did not remain complacent during 1939 but rather championed the efforts of the United Jewish Appeal and informed Youngstown Jewry via editorials, articles, and photos that the "UJA represented America's Answer to the Plight of Jews Abroad."[83] Several articles argued that the Joint Distribution Committee's, United Palestine Appeal's, and National Coordinating Committee's ability to unite their rescue efforts, despite ideological differences, illustrated the "unity of all elements of the Jewish community," which Jewish Federation annual appeals embodied and implemented.[84] Louis Adamic's "America and the Refugees" and Nathan C. Belth's "The Refugee Problem" reiterated the grave status of the refugee crisis and propelled the Jewish Federation of Youngstown to launch its fifth annual appeal in the fall of 1939 with a $100,000 goal.[85]

Henry Montor, executive vice-president of the United Jewish Appeal, addressed an enthusiastic group of campaign workers and volunteers at a victory dinner at Anshe Emeth Temple on Sunday 5 November 1939. Despite a record 2,498 pledges, subscription totals equaled only $89,413.50. Montor's discussion offered a "vivid and

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[82] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 31 March 1939, vol. 7 no. 21, 3.
[83] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 17 February 1939, vol. 7 no. 15, 7.
[84] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 12 May 1939, vol. 8 no. 1, 2, 14.
[85] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 8 September 1939, vol. 8 no. 8, 36 -39, 62, 63, 66.

factual presentation to two hundred men, women, and youth" outlining the United Jewish Appeal's need for continued support from Youngstown Jewry. Montor's twelve-year tenure included many organizational and advertising changes within the United Jewish Appeal. For Marc Lee Raphael, "Montor's introduction of large scale advertising in the general press, the abundant use of the radio, unprecedented campaign goals, and numerous campaign solicitation tools" positioned the UJA as the foremost entity in the rescue of Jewish refugees.[86] The UJA's implementation of a coordinated system of field representatives assured that local Jewish Federations maximized proper campaign tactics. Rather than merely visiting certain communities, field representatives helped implement an efficient system of advertising and directed volunteers on proper collecting techniques during campaigns. Field representatives assisted in distributing and collecting pledge cards, compiled solicitation lists, and reported on each community's strengths or weaknesses within two days of their visit.[87] Montor's address at the fifth annual Jewish Federation appeal, and the Federation's allocation of $44,000 to the UJA, illustrates Youngstown Jewry's concerted attempt to maximize local funding toward refugee rescue efforts.[88]

The 1940-41 Federation Campaign - "Give For Their Sake-For Your Defense"

Although the United Jewish Appeal garnered wide-ranging financial support from Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds throughout the country, internal quarreling

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[86] Raphael, *A History of the United Jewish Appeal*, 18.
[87] Ibid., 18.
[88] The Jewish Federation of Youngstown's $44,000 allocation to the UJA equaled 81% of all non-local budget allocations or 57% of the total amount collected during the 1939-1940 campaign.

between leaders of the JDC, UPA, and NRS[89] persisted for several years. The 1940 United Jewish Appeal, which collected $14,250,000 from just over three thousand communities, assured $5,250,000 for the Joint Distribution Committee, $2,500,000 for the United Palestine Appeal, and $2,500,000 for the National Refugee Service. An allocation committee divided the excess funds between the three participating agencies.[90] Despite the successes of the 1939 and 1940 appeals, each of the three organizations demanded higher proportions of the prescribed allocations for upcoming appeals. Leaders of the United Palestine Appeal, consisting mostly of Zionists, argued that the twenty-three percent share they received should exceed the amount allocated to the National Refugee Service. For Zionists "the 'trickle' of refugees that came to America and were aided by the NRS could never be compared, either in number or need, to the thousands who fled to Palestine."[91] Tentative allocations for the 1941 appeal, which retained the 1940 percent distribution for the National Refugee Service, led the United Palestine Appeal to withdraw from the United Jewish Appeal.[92] The United Palestine Appeal's independent 1941 campaign goal of $12,000,000 equaled a fourfold increase compared to its 1940 United Jewish Appeal allocation. As a result, the National Refugee Service and the Joint Distribution Committee launched separate campaigns with goals of $4,340,000 and $11,250,000 respectively. Each organization's separate campaigns included goals that far exceeded the amounts prescribed by the United Palestine Appeal. After a temporary dissolution of the United Jewish Appeal for several months in early 1941, the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (CJFWF) worked

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[89] The National Coordinating Committee reorganized in 1939 as the National Refugee Service (NRS).

[90] Raphael, *A History of the United Jewish Appeal*, 7-8.

[91] Ibid., 8.

[92] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 10 January 1941, vol. 9 no. 20, 6.

successfully to reunite the three organizations.[93] On 9 March 1941, "in response to the overwhelming desire of American Jewry," the United Jewish Appeal launched its 1941 campaign, which included a new distribution formula of funds.[94] The following table illustrates the United Jewish Appeal's distribution of funds following the 1940 and 1941 campaigns.

	JDC	NRS	UPA
1940 UJA Allocations	48.6%	28.1%	23.3%
1941 UJA Allocations	48.5%	22.9%	28.6% [95]

The brief schism in early 1941 marked the final major disruption between the agencies, which remained dedicated to the rescue and relocation of European Jews during the course of World War II.

The Jewish Federation of Youngstown remained dedicated during the course of 1940 to the rescue and relocation of refugees. C.J. Strouss's annual Federation report in March 1940 described specifically the Federation's ongoing attempts to relocate refugees to Youngstown. The Youngstown Coordinating Committee for Resettlement of Refugees, headed by Mrs. Joseph Wilkoff, prepared in cooperation with local B'nai B'rith Lodge # 339 a program to secure signers of affidavits of support for German refugees wishing to come to the United States. The Youngstown Chapter of the Council for Jewish Women, under the direction of Mrs. Henry Weinberger, assisted in the housing and "hospitality" of the newcomers. Mrs. Paul Kaufman headed the Federation's

[93] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 14 March 1941, Vol. 9 No. 24, 5.
[94] Raphael, *A History of United Jewish Appeal*, 8-10.
[95] Ibid., 10-11.

Americanization and citizenship committee, and social worker Stanley Engel assisted in the resettlement process by working directly with the signers of affidavits.[96]

Informative articles throughout the *Jewish Times* asked Youngstown Jewry to support financially the Youngstown Coordinating Committee, Ohio State Refugee Resettlement Committee, German-Jewish Children's Aid-Council Project, and the National Refugee Service through the upcoming annual Federation appeal. Federation articles and editorials in the *Jewish Times* informed readers during the summer that "a total of 1,439 refugees settled outside of New York during the first six months of 1940," thus illustrating that the Jewish community's efforts were paying off.[97] The National Refugee Service's 1939 quota for refugees equaled 2,650 families for the entire country. Cleveland's Coordinating Committee maintained a quota of seventy-two persons annually while Detroit resettled approximately six refugees a month.[98] Youngstown's Coordinating Committee permitted one family per month in 1939, but after 1940, the quota increased to five families each month.[99] Youngstown Jewry's active involvement in the resettlement of refugees led the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (CJWF) to hold a district conference at Youngstown's Hotel Ohio on 15 September 1940. Attendees at the conference included Judge Morris Rothenberg, national co-chairmen of the United Jewish Appeal; Morris Leavitt, Joint Distribution Committee secretary; A.S.

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[96] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 8 March 1940, vol. 9 no. 10, 4; Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 164; "Youngstown Jewish Federation Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration 1935-1985 Program," Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives, JA-805-P, Federation Miscellany; "Jewish Federation of Youngstown Annual Report, 23 November 1980," Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives, JA-805-P.

[97] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 26 July 1940, vol. 9 no. 19, 14.

[98] Zosa Szajkowski, "The Attitude of American Jews to Refugees From Germany in the 1930s," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, LXI:2 (December, 1971), 130-133.

[99] Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 133, 164; "Youngstown Jewry Goes Forward - Chapter VI in the Continued Story of A United Jewish Community, Sixth Annual Report of Jewish Federation of Youngstown," October 1941, Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives, JA-805-P, Federation Miscellany.

Magida, United Jewish Appeal field director; Cecelia Razovsky, director of the National Refugee Service; and Dr. Horace Marston, Anti-Defamation League director.[100] The convergence of national Jewish organization leaders in Youngstown at the conference indicates the Federation's commitment toward informing the community of the refugee situation and its desire to demonstrate to national organizations Youngstown Jewry's united organizational successes.

The Federation selected C.J. Strouss general chairman of the 1940 annual Federation appeal for a sixth straight time on 25 October 1940. With opportunities to save refugees diminishing daily and with subscription totals increasing each year, the Federation set the campaign goal at $103,000, a near trebling compared to the Federation's inaugural campaign in 1935-36. Despite successfully relocating refugees, holding a district conference for the Council of Federations and Welfare Funds, and William Rosenwald – co-chairman of the UJA and president of the NRS – sending personal letters to several Jewish families,[101] the sixth annual campaign netted only $91,356.11. Although both the 1939-40 and 1940-41 campaigns failed to meet the prescribed goal, the Jewish Federation of Youngstown continued to allocate the largest sums of campaign money to the United Jewish Appeal. The 1940-41 allotment of $40,000 amounted to seventy-nine percent of the non-local budget, or fifty-three percent of the entire campaign subscriptions.[102] The Jewish Federation of Youngstown responded to the increase of refugee families permitted to relocate in the city (from one per month to five) by establishing a foster family care program under the auspices of the

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[100] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 13 September 1940, vol. 9 no. 22, 6.
[101] *Youngstown Jewish Times*, 22 November 1940, vol. 9 no. 18, 6-7.
[102] Refer to Appendices A and B.

Family Welfare Department following the 1940-41 campaign.[103] Federation efforts continued to focus primarily on the rescue and resettlement of refugees despite the widening parameters of World War II. Youngstown Jewry's efforts from 1935 - 1941, through a united Federation, assisted undoubtedly in the rescuing of refugees in the years preceding America's entry into World War II.

[103] Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 133, 165.

Conclusion

Youngstown Jewry's annual fundraising campaigns and refugee relief efforts resulted in approximately forty families resettling in the city by 1940, with some three hundred over the next decade.[1] From 1935 to 1941, the Jewish Federation of Youngstown raised $377,766.18 for local, national, and overseas relief efforts. The approximately $229,534.83, or sixty-one percent of all funds, the Federation allocated to non-local agencies illustrates Youngstown Jewry's emphasis on assisting those residing outside their own city limits. The Federation's organizational infancy and the socio-religious and political diversity of Youngstown's various Jewish communities did not inhibit the organization from successfully assisting their European brethren. The *Jewish Times'* relentless coverage of Nazi barbarism for Youngstown Jewry and the greater community quelled any references to a lack of knowledge of the impending Final Solution. Youngstown Jewry, despite its relatively small size, clearly worked to save their European brethren despite Jewish organizational leaders' divisiveness at the national level and virtually impenetrable immigration restrictions. The Jewish Federation of Youngstown's efforts are therefore commendable.[2] Further research into mid-sized Jewish communities' responses to news of Nazi atrocities is needed for further scholarly

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[1] The Youngstown Area Jewish Federation's Jewish Family and Children Services maintain records of approximately a dozen "resettler files." These documents illuminate the necessary steps the Federation implemented in order relocate refugees.

[2] The Federation's tradition of assisting world Jewry in times of crises surfaced again during the 1980s as Russian Jews fled the oppressive Communist regime. Youngstown Jewry participated vigorously in the 1988 "Operation Exodus." The Federation's efforts once again resulted in the resettlement of approximately thirty-eight families, or 103 persons by the end of the decade. The Jewish Family and Children Service Department and a Volunteer Resettlement Committee conducted the Federation's efforts to again rescue their oppressed brethren. Ozer and others, eds., *These Are The Names*, 252-253.

comparison of the ideological pulses of various American Jewish communities and their organizational efforts during the crucial prewar years.

Appendix A

The Jewish Federation of Youngstown's Non-Local Budget Allocations

	1935-36	1936-37	1937-38
Regional Agencies			
Cleveland Jewish Orphans Home Building Fund	400	600	600
Cleveland Jewish Orphans Home Maintenance Fund	1,080	1,300	1,400
Jewish Infants Home of Ohio (Columbus)	180	200	200
The Montefiore Home (Cleveland)	360	600	650
Orthodox Old Home (Cleveland)	83.33	450	500
Total	**$2,153.33**	**$3,150**	**$3,350**
National – Health			
Ex-Patients Tubercular Home (Denver)	135	100	100
Jewish Consumptive Relief Society(Denver)	270	250	250
Natl. Home for Jewish Children (Denver)	225	200	200
National Jewish Hospital (Denver)	540	500	500
Jewish Consumptives & Ex-Patients Relief Assoc. (Los Angeles)	135	175	175
Leo N. Levi Memorial Association (Hot Springs, Arkansas)	90	100	100
Total	**$1,395**	**$1.325**	**$1,400**
Educational – Cultural			
National Farm School	180	200	175
Jewish Teachers Seminary	135	----	---
Total	**$315**	**$200**	**$175**
Civic and Protective			
American Jewish Committee	180	225	300
American Jewish Congress	135	225	200
B'nai B'rith – 3 branches	450	550	600
Jewish Telegraphic Agency	25	50	50
National Conference of Jews and Christians	90	100	100
Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League	90	100	75
Total	**$970**	**$1,225**	**$1,300**

	1935-36	1936-37	1937-38
Co-ordination and Research			
Jewish Welfare Board	50	75	150
Natl. Conference of Jewish Social Service	25	25	50
Council of Jewish Federation & Welfare Funds	90	150	175
Total	**$165**	**$250**	**$375**
Immigration			
Hebrew Sheltering & Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS)	270	250	275
German-Jewish Children Aid	315	350	350
Total	**$585**	**$600**	**$625**
Overseas Agencies			
American Friends of the Hebrew University	180	225	225
National Labor Committee	450	600	625
The ORT Federation	225	200	250
Palestine Tree Fund	---	1,500	---
United Palestine Appeal (Consisting of Palestine Foundation Fund & Jewish National Fund)	2,970	4,400	10,000
Joint Distribution Committee	3,780	6,600	10,000
Youngstown Coordinating Committee	------	------	500
Total	**$7,605**	**$13,500**	**$21,600**
Miscellaneous National and Overseas	781.50	1,000	1,500
Reserve for Non-Local Contingencies	--------	250	265
Total	**$781.50**	**$1,250**	**$1,765**
NON-LOCAL ALLOCATION TOTALS			
	$13,969.83	**$21,500**	**$30,590**[1]

[1] "Second Annual Report Jewish Federation of Youngstown, October 1937," Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives, JA-800-P, Jewish Federation Permanent Category; "Jewish Federation of Youngstown Proposed Non-Local Budget for 1937-1938," Minutes of Board of Directors and Executive Committee, Files located in Sam Kooperman's office at the Youngstown Area Jewish Federation, Youngstown, Ohio; "Youngstown Jewry Goes Forward - Chapter VI in the Continued Story of A United Jewish Community, Sixth Annual Report of Jewish Federation of Youngstown," October 1941, Youngstown Area Jewish Federation – Jewish Archives, JA-805-P, Federation Miscellany.

Appendix B

The Jewish Federation of Youngstown's Non-Local Budget Allocations

	1938-39	1939-40	1940-41
Regional Agencies			
Cleveland Jewish Orphans Home Building Fund	600	600	600
Cleveland Jewish Orphans Home Maintenance Fund	1,500	1,600	1,600
Jewish Infants Home of Ohio (Columbus)	---	---	---
The Montefiore Home (Cleveland)	650	700	700
Orthodox Old Home (Cleveland)	500	600	650
Total	**$3,250**	**$3,500**	**$3,550**
National – Health			
Ex-Patients Tubercular Home (Denver)	100	100	100
Jewish Consumptive Relief Society(Denver)	250	300	300
Natl. Home for Jewish Children (Denver)	200	175	175
National Jewish Hospital (Denver)	450	400	400
Jewish Consumptives & Ex-Patients Relief Assoc. (Los Angeles)	175	205	250
Leo N. Levi Memorial Association (Hot Springs, Arkansas)	100	100	100
Total	**$1,275**	**$1,275**	**$1,325**
Educational – Cultural			
National Farm School	150	150	100
Jewish Teachers Seminary	---	----	---
Misc. U.S. Agencies	---	500	800
Total	**$150**	**$650**	**$900**
Civic and Protective			
Joint Defense Appeal	500	750	800
(a) American Jewish Committee			
(b) Anti-Defamation League			
American Jewish Committee	400	650	700
Jewish Labor Committee	---	150	350
Youngstown Community Relations Comm.	900	2,000	2,000

	1938-39	1939-40	1940-41
B'nai B'rith Wider Scope (Includes Hillel Foundation, AZA, and ADL)	600	350	400
Jewish Telegraphic Agency	100	150	175
National Conference of Jews and Christians	100	100	100
Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League	50	50	50
Total	**$2,750**	**$4,800**	**$5,275**
National Service Agencies / Co-ordination & Research			
(a) Jewish Welfare Board	200	250	275
(b) Jewish Welfare Board (Army and Navy Program)	---	---	125
National Conference of Jewish Social Work	50	50	50
Council of Jewish Federations & Welfare Funds	275	400	500
Council of East Central States Regional Conference	25	50	50
Total	**$550**	**$750**	**$1,000**
Overseas & Refugee Resettlement			
HIAS	450	800	800
American Friends Hebrew University	225	250	300
National Labor Com. for Palestine (Geverk)	1,000	700	700
American ORT Federation	350	700	700
United Jewish Appeal Agencies United Palestine Appeal Joint Distribution Committee National Refugee Service (formerly NCC)	26,200	44,000	40,000
Misc. European and Palestine Agencies	1,600	1,800	1,600
Youngstown Coordinating Committee	1,000	2,200	2,575
Ohio State Resettlement Committee	------	200	175
German-Jewish Children's Aid-Council Project	600	250	500
Reserve for Non-Local Contingencies	500	500	800
Total	**$31,425**	**$51,400**	**$47,850**
NON-LOCAL ALLOCATION TOTALS			
	$39,900	**$62,875**	**$60,700**[2]

[2] Ibid.

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