Ohio's Bully Seventh

The Pride of the Western Reserve

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Contents

Abstract

Modern scholars have written a great many unit histories describing the formation, daily existence and military accomplishments of Civil War regiments. Enough that some might question the need for another. But that need will continue to exist, independent of the merits of the specific regiment under consideration for two important reasons. Regimental histories humanize the Civil War. They reduce the panorama and spectacle of this watershed event in American History to a focus that is more comfortable for the reader. The War is viewed from the perspective of its least common denominator, the individual foot soldier. The emphasis is on the performance of troops rather than the strategies of commanding generals. Epic battles are shown to be the combined result of multiple smaller contests. Smaller engagements, often overlooked in more comprehensive studies of the war, take on a greater significance as the reader realizes that they required the same courage and fighting mettle as their more famous counterparts. The examination of the daily demands that a soldier's life placed on the volunteers and how they coped with them allows a greater appreciation of the fortitude, persistence and resiliency of the men who fought this war.

A second important reason to examine an individual Civil War regiment is that it expands the local history of the area from which the regiment was formed. Unit histories not only offer an assessment of the contribution made by the volunteers from a given area but also provide a glimpse at the civilian population of that area during the course of the war. This expansion of local history also provides an additional avenue that can be used to begin a more comprehensive study of the Civil War.

The benefits of examining a Civil War regiment are increased if that particular unit made a greater contribution than most. Allowing this, the Seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry deserves the consideration of this study. Answering Lincoln's initial call for troops, the volunteers from the Western Reserve earned a reputation as one of the better regiments in the Union Army. Ordered into the field in western Virginia in June 1861, the

Seventh endured the daily hardships of soldiering long before most eastern regiments were required to do so. In August, at Cross Lanes, the regiment suffered an initial battlefield setback before its officers and men successfully made the transition from citizen to soldier. During the next two and one-half years, in both theaters of the War, the Seventh fought in over a dozen major battles. Involved in engagements against the armies of Stonewall Jackson and Robert E. Lee when both were at the high point of their success, the men of the Seventh consistently proved themselves to be the fighting equals of the best troops from the Confederacy.

In November 1863, the Seventh was terribly cut up in a battle at a ridge line in northern Georgia. Included among its casualties were the two officers who had been the dominant personalities in the regiment from the day it was formed. The severe loss marked a turning point in the attitudes of most surviving members of the Seventh. They would continue to fulfill their responsibilities as soldiers but they also began to look forward to the end of their term of service.

The majority of the regiment declined to veteranize and on July 6, 1864, the Seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry was mustered out of the Union Army. It left behind a record that placed it among the elite of both Civil War Armies and a reputation that lingered in the hearts and minds of the people of the Western Reserve.

Acknowledgments

Several people made significant contributions to the development of this thesis. Professor Hugh Earnhart, through his rare combination of enthusiasm and expertise, introduced me to the fascinating era of the Civil War and served as overall director of this project. Dr. Fred Blue was the first to encourage me to attempt a thesis. His insistence on clarity and continuity kept me focused when I tended to wander. Dr. Charles Darling graciously allowed me to intrude upon his well-deserved retirement to serve as a second reader for this project and also as a member of my master's examination committee. He made numerous suggestions that corrected and polished the final product.

A special thanks is reserved for my wife Patricia. Her computer skills assumed the burden of the technical preparation of the paper and allowed me to concentrate on the writing. Her patience and understanding allowed me to infringe upon her free time and our social life for the many months it took to complete this project.

Chapter One

The Western Reserve Goes to War

On the night of September 23, 1863, at a meeting called by Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and attended by President Abraham Lincoln, it was decided to send two corps from the Army of the Potomac in Virginia to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland in Tennessee. Stanton was concerned about the possible loss of Chattanooga after the recent defeat suffered by General William S. Rosecrans at nearby Chickamauga, Georgia.

In the Eastern theater, the pursuit of Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia following its defeat at the battle of Gettysburg had been lethargic and the likelihood of another significant engagement in Virginia before winter appeared slight. The two corps could, therefore, be spared. The next morning, the President directed that the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps be detached from the Army of the Potomac and sent to Tennessee. The combined corps would be under the command of Major General Joseph Hooker[1]

This transfer, which constituted the most ambitious movement of men and materiel by rail during the war, began immediately. The afternoon of the President's directive the Twelfth Corps was relieved from its position at Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan River and marched north to Bealeton Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad where it entrained on September 27-28. It would follow the Eleventh Corps over a route that passed through Washington D.C. and preceded west across West Virginia, Ohio and Indiana and south through Kentucky to Tennessee.[2]

Among the regiments then assigned to the First Brigade, Second Division, Twelfth Corps was the Seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry. As the men of the Seventh crossed the

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[1] . Frank J. Welcher, The Union Army, 1861-1865: Organization and Operations Vol 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 463.

[2] . Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 471-2.

Ohio River on the bridge that joined Benwood, West Virginia with Bellaire, Ohio, at least some of them must have reflected back to the first time they had crossed this same span. It was in late June 1861. The regiment was traveling in the opposite direction and, while the same bridge connected the same two towns, it now linked Ohio with the newly formed state of West Virginia, admitted to the Union on June 20, 1863. On the Seventh's earlier crossing, the town of Benwood marked the regiment's first steps onto enemy soil as it was then a part of secessionist Virginia. There were many other differences.[3]

The Seventh entered Virginia in 1861 numbering over a thousand strong. The men exuded the emotional enthusiasm that characterized the first regiments of both sides as they rushed to the defense of their flag. They harbored no doubts that their as yet untested officers would prove to be gallant and that all would follow them to "victory or death". They were young men, too young to have served in the Mexican War, and they brought with them to the enlistment camps only the romantic, moralistic notions of war that were rooted in the "heroic culture of the Victorian Era." They wore clean new uniforms and carried muskets they had yet to fire.[4]

The regiment that was traveling west in the fall of 1863 bore little resemblance to the one that had entered the field twenty-six months earlier. They numbered only one fourth of their original strength. Their faces were tanned, hair and beards largely unkempt and their uniforms had not been clean for a very long time. Their officers, for the most part, had proven to be gallant and more of the men than anyone could have imagined had indeed followed these gallant officers to their death. Their commitment to ultimate victory remained strong but they also began to think about the end of their term of service. Their romantic notions of war had been shattered by the monotony of camp life, the hardships of life on the march and the grotesque slaughter of the battlefield. They had endured

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[3] . Lawrence Wilson, ed., Itinerary of the Seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry 1861-1864 (New York: Neal Publishing Co., 1907), 38-9; Theodore Wilder, The History of Company C, Seventh Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry (Oberlin: J.B.T. Marsh, 1866), 11.

[4] . George L. Wood, The Seventh Regiment: A Record (New York: James Miller 1865), 184; Morris I. Holly, to Alec Holly, 14 June 1861, Manuscript Collection, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, hereinafter cited as Holly Letters; Joseph Allan Franks and George A. Reaves, "Seeing the Elephant" Raw Recruits at the Battle of Shiloh (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989) 3.

something and become someone they could not have imagined when they left their homes in The Western Reserve[5]

In 1662, as part of its charter, English King Charles II granted to the colony of Connecticut a long, narrow strip of land, as wide as Connecticut from north to south and extending westward from that colony all the way to the Pacific Ocean. After the Revolution, Connecticut surrendered its claim to most of this western land to the national government, reserving to itself a small segment along the southern shore of Lake Erie. Originally called The Western Reserve of Connecticut, the name was eventually shortened and the area became known as The Western Reserve. Connecticut's claim to the region ended and the Reserve attained its first political identity in 1800 when it was incorporated into the Northwest Territory as Trumbull County. Three years later it entered the Union as part of the newly formed state of Ohio.[6]

Geographically, The Western Reserve is a strip of land along the southern shore of Lake Erie that extends westward 120 miles from the Pennsylvania border and averages 50 miles in width north to south; an area slightly under 6,000 square miles. Cleveland is the unofficial capital of the Reserve which extends far enough south to include the cities of Youngstown and Akron. It includes all or part of fourteen Ohio counties. The ranks of the Seventh Ohio were filled by men from these counties who were among the first to answer their government's call to arms.[7]

On April 15, two days after the surrender of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, President Lincoln issued a proclamation calling on the loyal states to provide 75,000 militia to serve for ninety days. The people of the Reserve responded in kind with the overwhelming majority of the Northern population. There were some dissenting voices. The *Mahoning Sentinel*, published in Youngstown, blamed the war on "incompetent

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[5]. U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 130 Vols. in 4 Series (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 1985 reprint by the National Historical Society, Ser. 1, Vol 27, Part 1, 841. hereinafter to be cited as O.R. and all citations will be from Ser. 1 unless otherwise noted; Cleveland Morning Leader, 17 March 1863.

[6]. Earl R. Hoover, Cradle of Greatness: National and World Achievements of Ohio's Western Reserve (Cleveland: Shaker Savings Ass., 1977) 1-2; Harlan Hatcher, The Western Reserve: The Story of New Connecticut in Ohio (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1949) 11.

[7]. Hoover, Cradle of Greatness, 1-2.



THE WESTERN RESERVE

Republicans" and argued that the Negro was not sufficient cause "for destroying our great, our happy Republic." It concluded that "the people are in favor of Union and compromise, not coercion and dissolution. They want no Civil War." The news reported in the following issue of the same weekly paper soundly rejected this prediction. The *Sentinel* reported that "war fever" had consumed the entire county and that war meetings had already been held in the communities of Poland, Coitsville, Canfield and Youngstown. The Youngstown meeting was held outdoors as the attendance was too large for even two halls to accommodate. Throughout Mahoning County companies of volunteers were forming and money was being raised to aid and support the families of those who would serve.[8]

The few dissenting voices that were raised were quickly silenced. The *Painesville Telegraph* reported the reaction of Lake County and the North in general. It concluded that the political, religious and economic issues that normally divided the people of the North were "sunk beneath the common sentiment that the Union must be preserved." The paper felt that the "universal swell of emotion" in support of the national government was the strongest in the history of the county. The *Telegraph* praised this response and called the people to arms with the admonition that government "by the people" must not be permitted to fail because they are "unfit to govern themselves." The entire state of Ohio agreed. Governor William Dennison, faced with a response of volunteers that far exceeded the quota apportioned to his state, pleaded with then Secretary of War Simon Cameron to accept additional men. "Without seriously repressing the ardor of the people, I can hardly stop short of sending twenty regiments."[9]

A week after William D. Shepherd joined the Painesville Union Guards (later Company D of the Seventh Ohio) he wrote a letter to the local paper explaining why he and his comrades had volunteered. The heart of his explanation is contained in one short phrase. They volunteered because it was their "duty as Americans and men." The writings of the men of the Seventh reflect the strongly held belief that theirs was the "best government on the face of the earth." They were convinced that the political and moral

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[8]. Mahoning Sentinel, 17 April 1861, 24 April 1861.
[9]. Painesville Telegraph, 23 April 1861; O.R., Ser 3, 1: 101.

principles of republican government set the United States apart from other nations. This was their government. They had elected it. Secession was a challenge to the authority of that government and therefore an attack on the personal liberties of the citizens who elected it. This challenge could not go unanswered.[10]

The government was worth preserving and the men of the Seventh felt they had a "duty as men", not just citizens to fight for it. In the mid-nineteenth century, manhood was defined in simple, moralistic terms. A "good" man had the courage to fight for his convictions. Convinced that the cause was just, it would not do to let others do the fighting.

Undoubtedly, some of the men of this regiment were caught up in the passion of the moment and their enlistment was based on pure emotion and a sense of adventure. It is also true that virtually no one expected the war to be as long and bloody as it was. This, however, does not minimize the sacrifice of those who volunteered. Even unrealistic, romantic visions of war must allow for the possibility of death. These men were willing to severely interrupt their lives, leave the comforts of home and family and risk serious injury and death. They did not have to be drafted or enticed with a bounty for their service. Like so many others who answered Lincoln's initial call for troops, the men of the Seventh were living up to their "duty as Americans and men."

A maximum strength regiment in the Union Army consisted of ten companies of 101 men each and fifteen regimental field and staff officers not attached to company formations, 1025 men total. The ten companies that formed the Seventh Ohio represented seven different counties of the Western Reserve. Three companies were from Cuyahoga County, two from Portage and one each from Lorain, Huron, Lake, Mahoning and Trumbull. They reported to the enlistment camp in Cleveland proudly announcing their local identity. Defending the country made "Guards" popular in choosing a company name. There were five "Guard" companies in the Seventh. The National Guards and the Zouave Light Guards of Cleveland were united with the Union Guards of both Youngstown and Painesville and the Tyler Guards of Ravenna. The remaining half of the regiment consisted of the Sprague Zouave Cadets (Cleveland), Monroe Rifles (Oberlin),

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[10] . Painesville Telegraph, 2 May 1861; Mahoning Register, 27 June 1861; Wood, A Record, 6.

Huron Infantry (Huron), Franklin Rifles (Franklin Mills) and Company A of Warren. When formed into the Seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry the colorful company names were exchanged for the letters of the alphabet A through K, J being omitted because it looked too much like I in handwriting and would create confusion in the writing of orders and official reports. At muster in, company identity was greatly reduced and while Civil War soldiers always retained pride in their company, once formed, their greatest allegiance was to their regiment.[11]

Two of the companies of the Seventh had unique bonds of unity. Company K, the National Guards from Cleveland, were all of German nationality; most having served as regulars in the state militia. The *Cleveland Morning Leader* noted that they were "fine athletic men - many expert gymnasts" and predicted that they would be "one of the best companies in the field."[12]

Company C, the Monroe Rifles from Oberlin, was composed entirely of students from Oberlin College. Oberlin, almost from its founding in 1833, was the first United States college to admit students without regard to sex or race. A private nondenominational college it offered degrees in law, medicine, music and theology. Before the war it was known as a center of anti-slavery activities. In just two days the company was filled to maximum strength; some students being turned away. There is little evidence that Company C was especially vocal with regards to slavery but they were strongly committed to their religious beliefs and conducted daily prayer meetings whenever possible throughout their service.[13]

The typical soldier of the Seventh Ohio was 5'7 $^{3}/_{4}$" tall and 24 $^{1}/_{2}$ years old. This average age reflects the impact of the older men of the regiment and may be deceiving. It is perhaps more representative to note that almost 60% were included in the group ages 18 through 23. *The Official Roster of the Soldiers of the State of Ohio in the War of*

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[11] . William F. Fox, Regimental Losses in the American Civil War 1861-1865 2d ed (Albany: Albany Publishing Co. 1898), 3; Wilson, Itinerary, 27-8; Wood, A Record, 20; James I. Robertson, Soldiers Blue and Grey (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 21.

[12] . Cleveland Morning Leader, 18 April 1861.

[13] . James H. Fairchild, Oberlin: The Colony and the College 1833-1883 (Oberlin: E.J. Goodrich, 1883), 107-8, 176: Hatcher, New Connecticut, 182-3; Wilder, Company C, 2,3,6; Judson N. Cross, "The Campaign of West Virginia of 1861." In Glimpses of the Nation's Struggle, 2d series, ed. Edward D. Neil (St. Paul: St. Paul Book and Stationery Co., 1890), 148.

Rebellion, 1861-1865 lists the youngest man to serve in the regiment as 15 year old Herbert L. Smalley and the oldest as Nicholas Gaffett, age 64. As best can be determined from incomplete records it appears that approximately one in four of the men of the Seventh were foreign born.[14]

The agrarian character of mid nineteenth century America was reflected in the makeup of the regiment. One third of the men of the Seventh listed their occupation as farmer. Various tradesmen made up the next largest general category. These included the men who worked in heavy construction: carpenters, stone cutters, blacksmiths, machinists and mechanics, those involved in the more intricate trades: tinsmith, carriage maker, cabinet maker and watchmaker, and those whose skill was related to Lake Erie commerce: ship's carpenter, sailmaker, steamboatsman and sailor. Those who provided life's necessities: the shoemaker, tailor and butcher and those who provided some of life's pleasures: the cigar maker and saloon keeper were also represented. The business community was present in merchants, clerks and book-keepers and professional men made up a significant portion of the regiment if the students from Oberlin (future professionals) are included with the doctors, lawyers and teachers among the volunteers. The occupations of the men of the Seventh offer a good illustration of the economic life of the Western Reserve in 1861.[15]

The personality of the regiment was described by Major George L. Wood, an original member of Company A from Warren. Wood believed the men constituted "the right material for a fighting regiment." Representing all economic and social classes they were fond of adventure and possessed a surprising amount of military talent. "Many of its officers and privates were skilled in tactics; and those who were not, immediately set themselves about acquiring the information; rather by practice than study; for, with some exceptions, it was not a scholarly regiment." The regiment was dominated by men of

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[14] . Roster Commission, Official Roster of the Soldiers of the State of Ohio in the War of Rebellion, 1861-1866, Vol 2 (Cincinnati: Wilstach, Baldwin & Co., 1886), 200-35; Muster Roll 153 Recruits, Manuscript Collection, Ohio Historical Society; Mervin Clark Papers, William P. Palmer Collection, Western Reserve Historical Society. Age calculations were made from the Official Roster. Height and percentage of foreign born estimated from 153 recruits (1862) and 101 original members of Co. B.

[15] . Occupations listed taken from original roster Co. B. in Clark Papers and Muster Roll of 153 Recruits listed in note 17; Cleveland Morning Leader, 11 May 1861.

practical skills and common sense and adopted the discipline pattern of most Civil War units. "It readily acquired discipline while on duty; but while off duty, its members were not over-nice in their conduct." Wood argues that the men of the Seventh seldom "indulged in sports that were absolutely wrong" but were characterized by "a propensity for fun" throughout their career. "The regiment contained no drones; there was no companionship in it for such."[16]

If not drones, the men of Company C from Oberlin certainly displayed less of a "propensity for fun", at least in some of its more colorful practices, than the rest of the regiment. Among its members, profanity, tobacco and alcohol were severely disapproved of. They were conscientious about their daily prayer meetings and even a little snobbish concerning their value to others pointing out "the great moral influence upon the army, which such a company must exert." The remainder of the regiment, while occasionally teasing the members of "the praying company", respected their convictions and said so. "The Oberlin Company has prayer meetings every night, and good ones too."[17]

It was during the last ten days of April 1861 that the ten companies that would be formed into the Seventh Ohio reported to Camp Taylor in Cleveland. Prior to April 22, Camp Taylor had been the fairgrounds of the Cuyahoga County Agricultural Society on Kinsman Street. The existing buildings at the fairgrounds were converted to barracks and offices and additional buildings were added to accommodate the 4000-5000 men that would arrive in the next two weeks. The new barracks were crudely constructed 80' x 16' buildings lined with tiers of bunks on both sides and "packed to overflowing" almost immediately. While their accommodations were minimal, the volunteers understood the problems involved in so quickly concentrating such a large number of men and generally agreed that they were "as comfortable as could be expected." The meals at Camp Taylor were contracted out and considered by the men to be more than adequate, "we have an abundance to eat and the quality is good." Most companies also received food sent by their local communities to supplement what the state provided. At least at the very

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[16] . Wood, A Record, 20.

[17] . Wilder, Company C, 7-8; Cleveland Morning Leader, 27 May 1861, 15 August 1861; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 4 June 1861; Mahoning Register, 23 May 1861.

beginning, the men of the Seventh ate well.[18]

The men were mustered in and the Seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry was officially organized on April 28, 1861. They remained at Camp Taylor for a week "enjoying themselves first rate" and drilling just enough to work up an appetite. The camp was bursting with activity. Men drilled on the fairground turned parade grounds, new companies arrived daily and delegations of visitors from local communities mingled with the volunteers.[19]

From the very beginning, both the men of the Seventh and visitors to the camp singled out a particular company and especially its captain for special praise; the Zouave Light Guards (Co. A) and Captain William R. Creighton. "Captain Creighton has a splendidly drilled company, and keeps them to the mark the whole time. He is working his men hard but in this he does not spare himself." "The drill of Captain Creighton's company is universally commended." Everyone agreed that while Creighton was there, his company was "easily the best at Camp Taylor."[20]

William R. Creighton was born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in June 1837. At age thirteen he entered the apprenticeship program at McMillin Printing in Pittsburgh and four years later completed the program and was employed as a journeyman printer. In 1855, at age eighteen, he moved to Cleveland, Ohio, and was hired by the *Cleveland Herald.* Creighton was a physically active man who was a "zealous" member of fire companies in both Pittsburgh and Cleveland. In 1858 he joined a military organization known as the Cleveland Light Guards in which he was a First Lieutenant when the war broke out. He organized a company in only a few days and was drilling them at the fairgrounds before it was Camp Taylor. On April 22, the day the camp opened, Creighton's company marched in.[21]

Although Creighton worked his men harder than most captains, he was also very attentive to their needs. He was liked and respected by the entire Seventh and "looked

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[18] . Wood, A Record, 13; Wilson, Itinerary, 27,30; Painesville Telegraph, 2 May 1861, 9 May 1861; Cleveland Morning Leader, 4 May 1861.
[19] . Wilson, Itinerary, 27; Painesville Telegraph, 2 May 1861.
[20] . Cleveland Morning Leader, 26 April 1861, 22 April 1861; Wood, A Record, 236; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 25 April 1861.
[21] . Wilson, Itinerary, 366-7; Wood, A Record, 235.

upon by all as the future leader of the regiment." A reported "favorite with the ladies" he must have saddened a few hearts when on May 2, he married Eleanor Quirk. Three days later, the Seventh left Cleveland for Camp Dennison in southern Ohio.[22]

Almost immediately after the regiment was organized, George B. McClellan, then commander of all Ohio troops, ordered that ten men from each company be sent to Camp Dennison to construct barracks for the regiment. The detail left under the command of Lieutenant Orrin Crane of Company A. The majority of the regiment was scheduled to depart Cleveland on May 5.[23]

The 5th dawned a beautiful, sunny Sunday morning. The Seventh prepared for the march from Camp Taylor to the depot of the Cleveland, Columbus and Cincinnati Railroad. They had not yet chosen regimental officers. They would be under the command of William Creighton. The regiment was preceded by Leland's band and escorted by several Cleveland fire companies. They marched down streets that were "thronged with citizens." All along the route, "yards, doorways and windows" were crowded with people who wanted to show their support for the first regiment from the Western Reserve to march off to war.[24]

It was not much of a military spectacle but an Oberlin professor felt that all who were there would remember it. "There was no pageant. There were no arms, no banners. There was not even a uniform. . . . But for all that the display was profoundly impressive." Then Lieutenant George L. Wood remembered it the same way. "Each member was dressed in his citizen's garb, and there was no attempt at military evolutions. It was a simple march of determined men to the defense of their country." Wood describes the occasion as being marked with "solemnity and a becoming absence of unnecessary enthusiasm."[25]

A crowd estimated to be between 5,000 and 8,000 people assembled at the depot. Final farewells with relatives and friends and the loading process took about an hour. The

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[22]. Cleveland Morning Leader, 26 April 1861; Wood, A Record, 236; Wilson, Itinerary, 366-7.
[23]. Cleveland Morning Leader, 4 May 1861.
[24]. Wood, A Record, 21; Wilson, Itinerary, 34-5; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 6 May 1861; Cleveland Morning Leader, 4 May 1861.
[25]. Mahoning Register, 24 December 1863; Wood, A Record, 21; Evolutions here defined as "a movement executed by troops in formation".

men of the Seventh filled seventeen passenger cars. At 9:00 A.M., engineer William Kimball eased the locomotive *Alabama* out of the station. At every stop on the trip to Cincinnati, bands and crowds turned out to cheer the troops; "the enthusiasm appeared irresistibly contagious throughout the journey." The men especially remembered the large baskets of food they received at Grafton. The crowds usually included a large number of women who often passed out small bouquets of flowers and anonymous letters of support and admiration. The train passed through La Grange at 11:00 A.M. and received three cheers from an entire congregation who had waited in front of their church to acknowledge the Seventh. In addition to the town receptions, small groups of people gathered at isolated spots along the route to watch the regiment pass. At one bend in the tracks the locals fired a salute from an old cannon.[26]

The men were impressed by the magnitude of their send off. They began to express the conviction that they could not disappoint the large number of people who had turned out to see the "Gallant Seventh" pass. They were not just fighting for something but for someone. The cause was important as was their need to confirm their own personal courage. But it was equally important to live up to the expectations of relatives, friends and neighbors. The men of the Seventh began to feel the sense of accountability to the homefront that would remain with them throughout their service. They took seriously the responsibility to live up to the lofty expectations of these cheering crowds. They promised in advance that "the Seventh will give a good account of itself when the occasion offers, you can depend on it."[27]

The regiment spent the night at Camp Jackson in Columbus, reboarded the passenger cars the next day and arrived at its destination at mid morning. Camp Dennison, named after the sitting Governor, was a 500 acre site located seventeen miles north of Cincinnati. Situated in a valley between two substantial hills, it was bordered by the Little Miami River and bisected by the tracks of the Little Miami Railroad. Designed to accommodate up to 30,000 men, the location was selected because of its proximity to

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[26]. Cleveland Morning Leader, 6 May 1861; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 6 May 1861.
[27]. Mahoning Register, 27 June 1861.

the Kentucky and Virginia borders. In the first days of the war there was genuine fear among Ohio officials of a Confederate incursion into their state.[28]

The advance party under Lt. Crane had made little progress toward the construction of barracks. It was not their fault. It had rained constantly since their arrival and despite the presence of the railroad they had to carry material over a mile to the construction site. It continued to rain when the remainder of the Seventh arrived. The mud churned up by a thousand pairs of feet created more problems than the rain but the sheer size of the work force and the desire for a dry place to sleep led to the completion of the job. The regiment built a total of seventy-two buildings at Camp Dennison; six barracks and a cook house per company and a headquarters building and hospital. The barracks were small, 18' x 12', and often customized by the occupants with "arbors, gravel sidewalks and other methods of adornment."[29]

Within a week of their arrival at Camp Dennison, the thirty company officers of the Seventh elected the regimental field officers. The contest for colonel was between Erastus B. Tyler, a Brigadier General in the Ohio Militia and future president of the United States James A. Garfield. Both men actively campaigned for the position though Garfield had to rely more on his friends in the Seventh to advance his cause as he was in Illinois on a mission for Governor Dennison during the time immediately preceding the election. Tyler won a narrow victory. Garfield was unwilling to serve in a lesser capacity and left the regiment to eventually become the colonel of the Forty-Second Ohio. Though he did not seek it, William Creighton was unanimously elected lieutenant colonel. John S. Casement was elected major.[30]

Erastus Tyler was forty-two years old when he assumed command of the Seventh. He was a native of New York who had moved to Ravenna, Ohio, at age eight. From 1845 onward he was employed as a buyer by the American Fur Company. His rise to brigadier

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[28] .Wilson, Itinerary, 34; Wood, A Record, 24; O.R., Vol 19, Part 1 Supplement, 371.

[29] .Cleveland Morning Leader, 11 May 1861; Speech of Capt. J.B. Molyneaux, 2 April 1913, Mervin Clark Papers; Wilder, Company C, 6.

[30] .Wilson, Itinerary, 36-7; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 9 May 1861; Wood, A Record, 22; Allan Peskin, Garfield (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1978), 89-90.

general in the state militia had been accompanied by enough of a military reputation that when Ravenna sent its first company to war they went as the Tyler Guards.[31]

John Casement came to the Seventh from Painesville, Ohio. He had spent the years prior to the war first as a laborer and then a supervisor in the railroad construction industry. He was small in stature but "of iron frame and for endurance he had few equals." His railroad experience provided the know how to supervise and care for large bodies of men. He became that officer who took care of all the little details that were really no one's responsibility but that made life in camp and on the march as good as it could be for the men.[32]

Orrin J. Crane began his military career as a first lieutenant in Company A and was promoted to captain when Creighton was elected lieutenant colonel. Born in New York in 1829, his father died when he was age three. He moved frequently, often living with relatives, until he settled in Cleveland in 1853. He learned the trade of a ship's carpenter and was employed as such when he volunteered. His mechanical talents were of great value to the regiment in the construction of bridges, barracks and corduroy roads. He would eventually rise to the rank of lieutenant colonel. Crane and Casement provided the Seventh with an abundance of practical knowledge that improved its efficiency and comfort. Both men possessed the poise and would develop the military skills to be quality battlefield officers.[33]

From the very beginning the Seventh profited from the caliber of its field officers. For the most part, Civil War officers at the regimental level were "inexperienced and poorly trained for the responsibilities they bore." Tyler and Creighton were exceptions to this rule. Their considerable military backgrounds were a great advantage. "In an army of wholly untrained volunteers, even slight military training counted for something." Creighton was especially insistent that his men drill at marching and fighting maneuvers until they were second nature. His persistence continued throughout the Seventh's time in the field. The work paid off. The regiment won praise for how it looked on the parade

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[31] .Wilson, Itinerary, 365.
[32] .Wood, A Record, 189-90.
[33] .Wilson, Itinerary, 390; Wood, A Record, 245-6.

ground and, more importantly, how it performed on the battlefield. Courage is enhanced when it is supported by competence.[34]

In general, Civil War soldiers complained about their officers more than anything else with the exception of food. In fact, "disrespect for authority was the first and most prevalent offense" committed by the men of both armies. In this respect the Seventh appears to be atypical. The men who served as field officers during the Seventh's term of service were competent militarily and displayed a genuine concern for the comfort of the men. The men recognized this and appreciated it. Their comments on and evaluations of the men who led them were, for the most part, very positive.[35]

The daily routine at Camp Dennison was more demanding for the officers than for the men of the ranks. Once they answered roll call at 6:00 A.M., the men were free until two in the afternoon unless they were assigned guard duty or to a special detail. The commissioned and non-commissioned officers, on the other hand, went through a "severe drill" each day between 9:00 A.M. and 11:00 A.M. This was immediately followed by pistol shooting until 2:00 P.M. From 2:00 P.M. to 4:00 P.M. there was company drill led by the commissioned officers. Regimental drill commenced at 5:00 P.M. and ended with the evening roll call at 6:00 P.M. Tattoo was sounded at 9:00 P.M. when all who were not on duty were required to be in their bunks.[36]

If the men of the Seventh were reluctant to criticize their officers they did not show the same restraint when it came to the food. Letters to hometown newspapers during their seven week stay at Camp Dennison contain constant complaints about the quantity and quality of the food. "We must get more to eat or we cannot drill" and "It is hard to become good soldiers on patriotism alone" were typical responses to the quantity provided. They were even more upset with the quality. They reported that almost every day "companies and parts of companies refuse to drill until they get more and better food." To dramatize their grievance, a company in the Fourth Ohio held a death march through the center of camp to bury tainted meat. A member of the Seventh related that

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[34] .Robertson, Soldiers, 53; Alan T. Nolan, The Iron Brigade: A Military History (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1975) 33; Wood, A Record, 237; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 9 May 1861.
[35] .Robertson, Soldiers, 124; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 5 June 1861.
[36] .Mahoning Register, 23 May 1861.

"in full view of the whole camp the putrid stuff was buried with all the honors of war." The men expected to endure some hardships concerning food once the regiment entered the field but not while in camp in their home state. They were convinced that a wealthy state like Ohio could do a much better job of providing for those who stepped forward to fulfill the state's obligation to the national government. In their minds, their plight was the result of neglect and incompetence on the part of state officials and they were not bashful about stating it.[37]

A long delay in the issuance of uniforms created another problem that upset the men. They had entered the service with only the clothes they were wearing. There was no need to take additional civilian clothes with them. Soldiers wear uniforms. But uniforms were not issued until June 22, which meant that most of them had been wearing the same clothes for almost eight weeks. They had become a very "ragged lot." By the first of June, most in the Seventh were "sadly in need of clothing" and many were "too ashamed to leave their quarters" except for required drill. The daily drilling also wore out many pairs of civilian shoes so that barefooted soldiers were "very numerous." One private wore nothing but a shirt, putting his legs through the arm holes and pulling the tail up over his chest as far as he could.[38]

The inadequacy of food and clothing bothered some more than others. First Sergeant William Shepherd, who appears to have complained about almost everything, claimed that "the men have born privations in camp and been treated in a manner disgraceful to any civilized and prosperous country, until their patience has almost given way. . . ." This is probably an overstatement but it is fair to say that in general, the men of the Seventh were disappointed with many of the conditions at the camp. For some, this would have an impact in their decision of whether or not remain with the regiment.[39]

In early June, the regiment was asked by the governor to re-enlist for a three year term of service. The men who agreed understood it to mean that this new, three year enlistment was considered to have started on the same date as their ninety day enlistment,

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[37] .Cleveland Morning Leader, 21 May 1861; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 12 June 1861; Painesville Telegraph, 23 May 1861.

[38] .Cleveland Plain Dealer, 10 May 1861, 12 June 1861; Molyneaux Speech, Clark Papers.

[39] .Painesville Telegraph, 20 June 1861.

meaning they had already served two months of the new term. This stipulation, however, was not completely resolved and the issue would later cause a heated confrontation.[40]

Three out of four members of the original regiment agreed to the three year enlistment. Those that did received a ten day furlough. Many returned to their hometowns and helped their company officers secure enough additional recruits to maintain all companies at maxim strength. The obvious reason why twenty-five percent of the men declined to re-enlist was the increased time period. But some argued that it was the "poor treatment" at Camp Dennison concerning food and clothes that caused many of the ninety day volunteers to refuse the extended enlistment. The Seventh was officially reorganized for a three year term of service on June 16.[41]

Arms were issued to the various companies of the regiment gradually during a three week period ending June 22. The ordnance reports of Lieutenant Colonel Creighton indicate that the vast majority of the regiment was issued U.S. Flintlock Musket Model 1835. Over thirty thousand of this smooth bore musket were manufactured at the United States Armory at Springfield, Massachusetts between 1839 and 1844. Five years later those still in storage, over twenty-six thousand, were converted from flintlocks to the more reliable percussion cap ignition system. It was these unused, converted flintlocks that were issued to most of the men of the Seventh.[42]

The regiment was never in the situation where every member carried the same weapon. This was not unusual. During the course of the war the United States Army recognized as official seventy-nine different models of rifles and muskets. Creighton's ordnance reports indicate that a small percentage of his men were initially issued British made Enfield Rifles. The accounts of various members of the regiment also suggest that other makes and models of muskets were distributed.[43]

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[40] .Wilder, Company C, 8; Wilson, Itinerary, 56; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 15 June 1861.

[41] .Wilson, Itinerary, 36; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 15 June 1861; Frederick H. Dyer, A Compendium of the War of Rebellion Vol 3 (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959) 1499.

[42] . Wilson, Itinerary, 36; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 12 June 1861; William R. Creighton Papers, William P. Palmer Collection, Western Reserve Historical Society; Arcadi Gluckman, United States Muskets, Rifles and Carbines (Buffalo: Otto Ulbrich Co., Inc., 1948), 159-60.

[43] .Harold L Peterson, Notes on Ordnance of the American Civil War (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1959), 2; Creighton Papers; Molyneaux Speech, Clark Papers.

The issuance of muskets added the manual of arms to the daily drilling routine but as the weeks went by the men began to express their frustrations with the monotony of camp life. The food was bad, their clothes were shabby and it became increasingly more difficult to find something to do with their spare time. As with all Civil War soldiers, their main diversion from boredom was letter writing. Conversely, "the arrival of letters and packages from home made bright spots in the otherwise monotonous life at Camp Dennison." The letters were important for morale and the packages helped ease their "want of necessities." Packages from family were always welcomed but the donations of clothes and medical supplies from clubs and citizens groups may have done even more to convince the men that the homefront appreciated their sacrifices and would try to help. The bond between the Seventh and the Western Reserve remained strong throughout the regiment's term of service.[44]

The abundance of free time sometimes led to mischief or the "propensity for fun" that George Wood alluded too. The members of Company D took advantage of one opportunity to relieve their boredom and also do something about the caliber of their meals. A peddler pulled his wagon in front of their barracks one morning, hoping to do some business. While several members of the company browsed merchandise and held the peddlers attention at the rear of the wagon, others began stealing from the front. "Chickens, sausages and eggs were liberally secured. One fellow had a yard of sausages down his pantaloon leg, another his bosom full of eggs, another a couple of chickens under his blanket. . . ." While this was taking place, other members of the company unhitched the peddler's horses. When he finally realized what was going on and tried to escape, the horses ran off and left the wagon at the mercy of the company. The merchant retrieved and rehitched his horses but while he was doing this someone pulled the pin from one of the wagon wheels. A participant described what happened when the peddler tried to flee a second time. "Down came his wagon and the boys were about to make another attack upon his property, what little he had left, when the officials came to his relief. Our boys fared pretty well today on stolen provisions."[45]

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[44] .Wilder, Company C, 6; Cleveland Morning Leader, 3 June 1861, 15 June 1861.
[45] .Painesville Telegraph, 23 May 1861.

Such excitement was rare, however, and the regiment was extremely anxious to enter the field. "They chafe in the meshes which still hold them in Camp Life." On June 22 the regiment was finally issued uniforms and the men were told that they would be leaving for Virginia soon. They wanted the chance to prove to themselves and to others that they were a quality regiment. The men of the Seventh had created an image of themselves that they felt bound to live up to. "We are highly commended upon as a regiment by all that have seen our drill, an they assert that we are *the* Ohio regiment. You can rest assured that all our boys feel proud and will do all to sustain this reputation."[46]

[46] .Painesville Telegraph, 20 June 1861; Wilson, Itinerary, 36; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 9 May 1861.

Chapter Two

Perils and Privations

In May, 1861, the United States War Department created the Department of Ohio consisting of the states of Indiana, Illinois, Ohio and most of western Virginia. George B. McClellan assumed command of the department on May 13. The northwest border of the state of Virginia was the only portion of all the seceding territory that bordered on the free states. Approximately 200 miles of the Virginia border from western Maryland to eastern Kentucky was contiguous with southwest Pennsylvania and southeast Ohio and could, therefore, be considered the initial "front" of the war. McClellan's first effort to roll back this front was to send General Jacob D. Cox from Camp Dennison with a combined regiment of Kentucky and Ohio volunteers to move against Confederate Brigadier General Henry A. Wise. Wise, who had been Governor of Virginia at the time of the John Brown raid in 1859, had occupied the valley of the Kanawha River which flowed into the Ohio near Point Pleasant, Virginia. Cox crossed the Ohio at Point Pleasant on July 11 and during the next eighteen days pushed Wise up the valley and approximately 110 miles to the southeast where he halted his advance and occupied the town of Gauley Bridge. This was the initial campaign of what came to be referred to as The Army of Occupation of Western Virginia.[1]

The second thrust along the western Virginia front would be made by the Seventh Ohio. Their initial destination was Clarksburg, Virginia which was 100 miles north and slightly east of Gauley Bridge. The journey would be entirely by rail. The regiment was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William R. Creighton as Colonel Erastus B. Tyler had gone ahead earlier with General McClellan. The Seventh departed Camp Dennison on June 26. The men traveled northeast to Columbus and then east through Zanesville to the town of Bellaire on the Ohio River. They crossed the river to Benwood,

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[1] .Welcher, Union Army, 1056-61.

Virginia at 3:00 P.M. on the 27th, grateful "to get out of peaceful Ohio and into enemy territory." Private Theodore Wilder reported that at 9:00 P.M. that evening, as they approached the town of Wheeling, "the first ten rounds of the mysterious cartridges were distributed and the first loading was practiced." Others in the regiment disagreed as to the exact number of cartridges issued but they did confirm that the men of the Seventh were not issued ammunition and did not load or fire a musket until they were in enemy territory. This is not as unusual as it might first seem. Civil War soldiers in general did not practice much with live ammunition. Most, however, had some experience at loading and firing their weapon before they entered the field. The Seventh's rather unique situation was caused by the logistical problems of an unprepared War Department trying to feed, clothe, arm and transport the first wave of volunteers combined with the pressure on the government to quickly take the initiative and put regiments in the field along this common border with the Confederacy. The men themselves did not appear to be surprised by this turn of events. They mentioned the first ammunition more as a milestone "marking progress in the great transition from the pursuits of peace to those of war" than as a criticism of their training or, in this case, the lack of it.[2]

The regiment reached Clarksburg at 2:00 P.M. on the 28th and encamped on the outskirts of town. Their education continued as that afternoon they learned how to pitch a Sibley tent. Named for its designer, future Confederate Brigadier General Henry H. Sibley, the tent was a conical structure eighteen feet in diameter and twelve feet tall at the center pole. If the tent was crowded with fifteen to twenty men, they slept with their feet at the center pole and the heads along the outside perimeter, resembling the spokes of a wheel. Apparently the ratio of men per tent was less for the Seventh at Clarksburg as the tents were "looked upon with much more favor than the densely crowded barracks." The practical lessons of soldiering came quickly. In the same twenty-four hours, the men of the Seventh had learned how to load a musket and pitch a tent, basic skills to protect themselves from the enemy and the elements.[3]

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[2] .Wood, A Record, 24-5; Wilder, Company C, 11; Wilson, Itinerary, 38-9; National Tribune, 14 January 1904; Robertson, Soldiers, 57; Morris I. Holly to brother and sister, 25 June 1861, Holly Letters.
[3] .Wilder, Company C, 11; Robertson, Soldiers, 44; Wood, A Record, 25.

A bank in the town of Weston, twenty-five miles southwest of Clarksburg had on deposit $30,000 in Virginia state funds. The Seventh was ordered to secure these funds and prevent their return to Richmond. At 4:00 P.M. on June 29, still under the command of William Creighton, the regiment set out on its first forced march, which many would later consider "one of the most severe marches of the war." As the miles passed, the combined weight of knapsack, cartridge box and musket became unmanageable for many and they began to lighten their load. Books, razor straps, extra clothes and other once prized personal possessions were discarded in an effort to deal with the "almost unendurable fatigue." Some of the volunteers did not bother to sort through their knapsacks but discarded them entirely. Thirst and blisters caused additional misery. Those who had been fortunate enough not to throw away their soap found out it offered some relief when applied to the blisters. Captain J. B. Molyneaux recalled the scene as the night wore on. "On the last ten miles of the march you might have picked up by the side of the road most anything you wanted and a great variety of things you never would want, also a few very badly played out and discouraged soldiers."[4]

The Seventh reached Weston at 5:00 A.M. and took possession of the town while the civilian population was still asleep. Creighton, who was fond of military pageantry, assembled the regimental band in a park in the center of town and woke the citizens and announced the presence of Union troops with several performances of the national anthem. The state funds, which were scheduled to be sent to Richmond that morning, were secured. As was the case with most of western Virginia, the population of Weston was predominatley pro Union and they welcomed the regiment by preparing the men breakfast. A few disloyal citizens were arrested, but for the most part the Seventh's stay in Weston was pleasant. Corporal Morris Holly claimed that the hardships of the first march were quickly forgotten and that "we all arose after a good night's sleep all exclaiming who would not be a soldier." It is doubtful that this sentiment was unanimous as Holly suggests. Creighton ordered a military parade through the streets of Weston to celebrate the Fourth of July but Private Theodore Wilder felt even this celebration of

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[4] .Wilder, Company C, 12; Wilson, Itinerary, 40; Wood, A Record, 25; Cross, Glimpses, 155; Molyneaux Speech, Clark Papers.

Independence Day was an undue hardship. "This practice that soldiers fall into, of displaying their officers on every fine occasion, has proved one of the intolerable bores of military service; and it is hoped that in the next war, privates will be more economical in the expenditure of their strength."[5]

There was one significant exception to the Seventh's enjoyment of its stay in Weston. It was here that the troops had their first military funeral, one of the men having died of measles. The event was sobering beyond their grief for the lost comrade. For the first time they came to realize that life in the army involved threats to their health not limited to the battlefield. Most Civil War soldiers had to endure two "onslaughts of sickness" before they faced the perils of battle. The first was the threat from childhood maladies such as measles and smallpox that was greatly enhanced when large numbers of men from varied backgrounds were so densely concentrated. The second was caused by the exposure, poor food and general unsanitary conditions that were so much a part of camp life. Diseases such as typhoid fever, malaria, diarrhea and dysentery were, in fact, the "principal killers of the Civil War." It was two and a half times more likely that a Union soldier would die of disease than from battlefield wounds. As it turned out the Seventh would lose fewer men to sickness than most regiments but the lesson of the present was still difficult to accept. "I had thought little indeed of death in the service, except in battle or from wounds received in battle. To now be impressed by the fact that I might die from a simple distemper, like measles was appalling."[6]

On July 8, Colonel Tyler having rejoined the regiment, the Seventh moved its encampment twenty-eight miles southeast to Glenville, a small village on the Little Kanawha River. The regiment remained there fifteen days during which time Lieutenant Colonel Creighton drilled it daily. First Sergeant Lawrence Wilson implied that Creighton was all business. "Drill was constant when we were not on the march; squad, platoon, company and regimental drill --- in manual of arms and in evolutions and discipline was vigorously enforced." George Wood felt that the regiment acquired "most of the proficiency it possessed" during its first six weeks in Virginia. Other than drill, the main

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[5] .Wilder, Company C, 12; Wood, A Record, 26; Morris I. Holly to brother and sister, 30 June 1861, Holly Letters.

[6] .National Tribune, 14 January 1904; Robertson, Soldiers, 148.

burden on the men at Glenville was picket duty and it was here that they suffered their first enemy induced casualty. Corporal Theron E.W. Adams of Company C was shot and wounded while on picket.[7]

Elsewhere in western Virginia Jacob Cox had pushed Henry Wise away from the Ohio border but the Confederate general was still operating in the Kanawha River Valley and held the numerical advantage over the Union forces. McClellan decided to send a regiment through the heart of western Virginia to support Cox. He chose the Seventh Ohio because of its colonel's extensive first hand knowledge of the area. For the previous twenty years, Tyler had spent every winter and spring riding among these same Virginia hills collecting furs. His familiarity with this rugged terrain would be a decided advantage to the speed and safety of a regiment marching through it.[8]

On July 23, the same day the Seventh began its march southeast to support Cox, Brigadier General William S. Rosecrans succeeded McCellan as Commander of the Department of Ohio and the Army of Occupation of Western Virginia. On the preceding day, McClellan had been ordered to Washington to assume command of the newly created Army of the Potomac. Since its arrival in the field, the Seventh had been operating independently, unattached to any other unit. On the 24th, Rosecrans reorganized the Army of Occupation into three brigades. The Seventh was placed in the Second Brigade along with the Tenth, Thirteenth and Seventeenth Ohio, Mack's Battery and Schambeck's Cavalry. They would, however, continue to operate independently for the most part as no commander was assigned to the Second Brigade.[9]

As Cox was in no immediate danger, the march from Glenville to Gauley Bridge, a distance of less than one hundred miles was made over a period of three weeks. The route was through beautiful but difficult terrain. The regiment traveled winding, narrow roads over rugged mountains and through deep ravines, both of which were densely wooded and frequently bisected by creeks and rivers. The hardships caused by the landscape were

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[7] .Wood, A Record, 27, 237; National Tribune, 14 January 1904; Wilder, Company C, 12; Fox, Regimental Losses, 49; Picket duty was the practice of placing a soldier or group of soldiers forward of an army position or encampment in order to warn against an enemy advance.

[8] .Cross, Glimpses, 154; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 22 June 1861; Wood, A Record, 187.

[9] .O.R., Vol 2, 762; Welcher, Union Army, 1061-62.

magnified by the summer heat to the point that on many days the Seventh would travel but a few miles, stragglers wandering in hours after the regiment stopped for the night.[10]

The Seventh reached Cross Lanes on August 15. Cross Lanes was the intersection of the two primary roads of the region, hence the name, but was more important as the location at which the Carnifex Ferry crossed the Gauley River. McClellan and Rosecrans had established a string of outposts extending southeast from Grafton through the heart of western Virginia. The main Union force was in northwest Virginia, protecting the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between Baltimore and Wheeling and a branch line, the Northwestern Railroad connecting Grafton and Parkersburg. The outposts were to serve as a line of communications between Cox, who was the advance of the Union Army, and the main force in the north. Cross Lanes was the last of this string of outposts before Gauley Bridge. If rebel forces could gain control of Carnifex Ferry they could isolate Cox and destroy him. The Seventh was to remain at Cross Lanes to support Cox and protect his line of communications.[11]

On August 20, Wise made a strong demonstration toward Gauley Bridge and Cox called upon the Seventh for support. Tyler marched the regiment to Gauley Bridge the next day. The rebel threat never materialized and on August 22 Cox ordered the Seventh to return to Cross Lanes "immediately." The regiment remained at Gauley Bridge until the 24th and then used the better part of two days to complete the return march, arriving at the outskirts of Cross Lanes at dusk on August 25. They had experienced light skirmishing during that day's march but had brushed it aside easily. Still, it was enough to convince Tyler that it would be better to enter Cross Lanes at full light the next morning and to deploy a strong picket line that night. He assigned four companies to picket duty, two directly in his front along the main road running east from Gauley Bridge and one on each flank positioned on a small lane that ran north and south and crossed the main road just in front of where the regiment stopped for the night. The companies were ordered to divide the picket duty into three shifts.[12]

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[10] .Wood, A Record, 31-4.
[11] .Wilson, Itinerary, 60; Welcher, Union Army, 1063.
[12] .Jacob D. Cox, "McClellan in West Virginia." In Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol 1 (New York: The Century Co., 1884, 1887, 1888), 143; Wilder, Company C, 13; Wood, A Record, 45-7.

At sunrise on the 26th, as the men were preparing a breakfast of pork and green corn, they were surprised and attacked by Confederate General John B. Floyd. Floyd, another former Governor of Virginia who had also served as Secretary of War during the Buchanan administration, had occupied Cross Lanes during Tyler's absence with a force of 2,600 men, crossing the river by raising two flat boats Tyler had sunk. Despite their extensive picket lines the Seventh was taken by complete surprise in front and on both flanks. By the time the main body could form and move in support, the pickets were falling back everywhere. Individual companies attempted to reform and rally but were quickly overwhelmed. The field officers failed to organize the regiment for a consolidated defense. "The main strategy seemed to be for each company to take care of itself and to do what its discretion advised." The official reports of the engagement fail to mention the exact amount of time the Seventh remained on the field but all accounts indicate their resistance was brief. In a letter to Rosecrans, Cox explained that "the regiment did not get in good shape for defense at any time and was soon broken up and scattered."[13]

Lieutenant George Wood admitted the regiment fled the field quickly but characterized it as a "systematic retreat." It was not. In his official report Floyd correctly claimed that "the force of the enemy was completely routed and dispersed in every direction." Independent post war accounts of the affair also concluded that the regiment "fled the field in disorder." Henry Wise not only confirmed the rout but also took the opportunity to ridicule the Seventh. The Confederate general characterized the regiment as "a set of lubberly Dutchmen," the adjective implying a big, clumsy, stupid person; a lout.[14]

The Seventh was not well served by its top two field officers in its first major engagement. Tyler and Creighton appeared on the field briefly and then "dashed up the Gauley Road and made their escape to the bridge." They both escorted the supply train back to Gauley Bridge, apparently feeling a greater responsibility toward the materiel than the men. Afterward, neither man spoke of the incident in detail. The one field officer who performed well in this initial trial was Major Jack Casement. Unable to curb the rout, he

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[13] .O.R., Vol 5, 118; O.R., Vol 5, 157; Cox, Battles and Leaders, 143; Wood, A Record, 48-9; Wilder, Company C, 13; O.R., Vol 51, Part 1 Supp., 460.

[14] .Wood, A Record, 50; O.R., Vol 5, 809; Welcher, Union Army, 1063; O.R., Vol 5, 158.

did what he could to organize the retreat. Many of the regiment had followed the lead of their officers and fled in small groups in all directions. After his superiors had left, Casement remained "as calm as if in drill" and organized that part of the regiment still on the field, about 400 men, and led them on a three day journey to safety. The road to Gauley Bridge was now controlled by the rebels. Casement, with the help of two locals who acted as guides, marched the men to Charleston, eighty miles to the northeast. The party stayed off the roads as much as possible to avoid detection. The dense woods of the mountains was so dark at night that the group literally held hands to prevent each other from falling down the mountainside, or into a river or from just getting lost. Many smaller groups faced the same problems as they tried to find their way back to Gauley Bridge, the lucky ones being aided by pro Union civilians. Twenty-nine members of Company C had no luck at all. They wandered in the woods for two hours and then stumbled directly into a Confederate regiment and were captured. By August 29, all those not captured had made it to safety, the regiment being about equally divided between Charleston and Gauley Bridge. The Seventh's casualties at Cross Lanes were substantial. It lost 5 killed, 40 wounded and 200 were taken prisoner.[15]

The Seventh had made a "sorry mess" of their first significant engagement and would later admit that "the affair was not without humiliation for us." But their initial reaction was to emphasize their perils of their escape and ignore their performance on the field. Their accounts of future battles would include detailed descriptions of the sights, sounds and emotions of battle. These details are lacking in their references to Cross Lanes. They speak in generalities of forming or rallying or holding. Their attempts to conceal the fact that they panicked and ran are unconvincing.[16]

Three themes appear consistently when the members of the regiment describe the affair. They are quick to point out that Tyler and Creighton were among the first to leave the field. Their criticisms go no farther than this observation but it is clear they felt they were abandoned and were disappointed in what they had previously referred to as their "gallant officers." The second theme was that they had been overwhelmed by vastly

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[15] .Painesville Telegraph, 12 September 1861; Wood, A Record, 51-5, 190; Wilson, Itinerary, 92; Wilder, Company C, 14-15; Dyer, Compendium, Vol 2, 970.

[16] .Molyneaux Speech, Clark Papers; National Tribune, 14 January 1904.

superior numbers. Floyd's numerical advantage had been two and one-half to one but members of the regiment offered estimates that began at four and culminated at ten to one. The third theme consistent in their accounts of Cross Lanes is closely related to the question of numerical superiority. They argued that, surrounded by superior numbers and forced to "cut their way through enemy lines in three directions" and then deal with the unforgiving terrain, "it is a wonder that any got out alive." There is no evidence that any part of the regiment rescued itself by fighting its way through enemy lines. Henry Wise reported Floyd's victory was accomplished "without losing a man." They escaped by fleeing from the rebels, not by charging through them. The perils of the Virginia countryside were legitimate and it was this phase of the episode that dominated most of the first hand accounts. In a letter to his wife, Captain William R. Sterling of Company I, exaggerating these themes to the maximum, actually proclaimed Cross Lanes a "glorious victory." In fact, the regiment that had considered itself to be *the* Ohio regiment and had predicted that it would "give a good account of itself" when the occasion offered had performed badly and had not at all lived up to its own expectations.[17]

The less than accurate accounts of the engagement at Cross Lanes that reached the homefront were enough to maintain the Seventh's as yet unearned reputation as "the crack regiment of Ohio." On October 3rd the *Cleveland Morning Leader* announced that Captain J. F. Aspen of Company H would be in the city to recruit for the regiment. The paper went on to "strongly recommend" the Seventh to young men as it "has proved itself the brave and bully regiment of Ohio." This was not true but it did not matter. From the day it left Cleveland, the Seventh was always considered something special by the people of the Western Reserve.[18]

The Seventh spent the next seven weeks divided, five companies under Tyler at Gauley Bridge and five under Creighton at Charleston. Some of the men taken prisoner at Cross Lanes were rescued and returned to the regiment when Rosecrans resecured both Gauley Bridge and Cross Lanes by defeating Floyd in an engagement at Carnifex Ferry on September 10. The men at Gauley Bridge considered it a "comparatively pleasant place to

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[17] .Mahoning Register, 5 September 1861; Painesville Telegraph, 12 September 1861; Cleveland Morning Leader, 4 September 1861; Wilson, Itinerary, 82-100.

[18] .Cleveland Morning Leader, 3 October 1861.

do soldier duty." Picket duty was limited to every other day and their only other responsibility was to help unload river boats when supplies arrived. The Gauley River was great for swimming, boating and bathing but there were also some problems here. The food was limited to army rations of which the men quickly tired. "Hard crackers and river water for lunch and for supper we will likely have river water and crackers." There was a considerable amount of sickness among these five companies during this time and several deaths. It is not clear exactly what caused the fatalities although diarrhea and typhoid fever are mentioned in one account. There is also the first indication that some of those who had gone to war because it seemed like an adventure were beginning to have second thoughts. "While here we have had a good time. But I tell you this soldiering at the best of times has played out. That is for the pleasure of the thing but when we think of the reason that brought us here we feel like going into the field again to avenge the deaths of those of our numbers who are gone."[19]

The regiment was reunited at Charleston on October 19, Colonel Tyler assuming command of the Union post there. The former commander had been Colonel James Guthrie of the First Kentucky. Discipline had been slack and confrontations between soldiers and civilians frequent. "Drunkenness was common, while marauding parties were free to patrol the streets on their errands of mischief." One incident involved an assault by a group of Kentucky soldiers upon a storekeeper who, in compliance with existing military policy, refused to sell them beer. The merchant's son, fearing for his father's safety, shot and killed one of the soldiers. In the confused legal atmosphere that exists under an army of occupation, the civilian was brought before a military court-marital which rendered a "prejudged opinion" and sent him to the gallows. Upon assuming command Tyler moved quickly to bring order and quiet to the situation. He moved Camp Warren further from town and required that anyone leaving camp for any reason other than assigned duty be required to obtain a pass which would only be granted at his headquarters. Commissioned and non-commissioned officers were to be held "personally responsible for any violation of this rule by members of their companies" and guards were stationed in Charleston to

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[19] .Wood, A Record, 63,69; Welcher, Union Army, Vol 1, 1064; Cross, Glimpses, 164; Wilson, Itinerary, 102; Morris I. Holly to brother and sister, 9 September 1861, Holly Letters.

inspect passes. In addition, he issued a proclamation stating that "the sale of intoxicating liquors, directly or indirectly, to those in service of the United States, is positively and emphatically prohibited ..." and called upon the populace to help him detect those who violated this policy, for their own personal safety and the protection of their property. Tyler's initiatives had the desired effect. Discipline at the post was significantly increased and relations between the military and civilian population improved.[20]

While the men of the Seventh generally agreed that law abiding civilians should not be indiscriminately harassed, they also felt that the government's policy toward Southern civilians, especially those that were belligerent and aggressive toward Union troops, was too lenient. Several complained that armed civilians risked little by approaching Union lines because if they were caught they had only to repeat an oath of allegiance to be released. There was a guerrilla aspect to the war in western Virginia that especially upset many in the regiment. In their letters they denounce the "bushwhackers" that were regularly ambushing Union men. They wanted war by the rules, a "fair fight" and if the rebels continued this cowardly conduct they felt that "a lot of them should be strung up or shot as an example and a warning." Author Reid Mitchell found this attitude common in his study of Civil War soldiers. Union soldiers' concepts of honor and pride demanded a "uniformed army in line of battle." Trading shots with civilian snipers did nothing to embellish their self image as a soldier but it was something to fear and this made them angry. Many of the regiment also felt that government policies tended to make rebel property sacred at the expense of the comfort and needs of Union troops. They saw it as the government trying to win the war with kindness and a show of strength rather than the use of the latter. The sentiment existed that the government was far too "willing to put our soldiers on half rations, rather than incur the ill-will of traitors." George Wood's claim that Union soldiers, "if they stole but an onion to make a piece of hard bread palatable, were subjective to the severest punishments" is surely exaggerated, but it is very

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[20] . Wilson, Itinerary, 102; Wood, A Record, 65-9; Adjutant Generals Office, Official Army Register of the Volunteer Force of the United States Army 1861-1865 Vol 4, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1865), 1244.

clear that most of the regiment considered the policy of extreme protection of civilian property misguided and unfair to Union troops.[21]

Although Rosecrans had taken back the town, Floyd continued to harass Gauley Bridge and the surrounding area with artillery. On November 4, 500 men from the Seventh, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Creighton joined with other Union forces under the command of Brigadier General Henry W. Benham in a reconnaissance in force directed at driving the Confederate general from the region. Floyd retreated steadily before the Union column but as much because of the almost constant rain as from any military threat Benham represented. The rain was causing serious flooding in the area and there were few roads. The end result was to force Floyd south toward his base of supplies. Benham caught up with the tail end of Floyd's force at McCoy's Mill near Fayetteville and in a minor skirmish inflicted a few casualties on the fleeing Confederates. As minor as the affair was, Benham praised Creighton and the Seventh's contribution stating that they "executed the maneuver from our right flank which decided the rout at McCoy's Mill in most gallant style." Though the fighting was minimal the kind words were not easily earned. Throughout the two week operation the men were wet and cold and without their cooking supplies. The pack trains struggled to keep up as any low lying area was converted into a running stream. The accounts of this march are the first that produced references to foraging on the part of the Seventh as the men sought to supplement their short rations. "... It would not be strange if the soldiers could relate tales of their descent on poultry yards and bee hives. True it is that some first-class honey found its way into camp." The entire time the men were without tents. Clothes and blankets were both soaked but the march was so exhausting that the men still slept, one morning waking to find themselves blanketed with four inches of snow. The pursuit was ended on the 14th and, making part of the return trip by steamer, the detachment of the Seventh returned to Charleston on November 18.[22]

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[21] . Painesville Telegraph, 15 August 1861; Morris I. Holly to brother and sister, 26 November 1861, Holly Letters; Reid Mitchell, Civil War Soldiers: Their Expectations and Their Experiences (New York: Viking Penguin Inc, 1988), 136; Wood, A Record, 37.

[22] . National Tribune, 21 January 1904; Wood, A Record, 70-6; Wilder, Company C, 18; O.R., Vol 5, 281.

The returning members of the Seventh had a new appreciation for Camp Warren, "a canvas tent was a palace." After a three week rest, the entire regiment was ordered to Romney, on the south branch of the Potomac River in north central Virginia. On December 10, the Seventh boarded the steamers *Fort Wayne* and *Stephen Decatur* for the trip down the Kanawha and up the Ohio to Parkersburg. They went east by rail from Parkersburg to Green Spring Run and marched south the final sixteen miles to Romney, arriving December 16. The Seventh's summer campaign was over and while it had accomplished little of consequence on the battlefield it had been part of a necessary Union presence in western Virginia. Simply to live and function as a military unit in this difficult environment was a greater burden than most Union regiments were required to shoulder in these early months of the war. "... Perils had been braved, privations had been suffered and obstacles had been overcome. ..." The regiment's "patient suffering in that wild waste of hills" should not be overlooked.[23]

The Seventh joined three other Ohio regiments and one from Indiana and Virginia at the post of Romney. It was a comfortable camp on high, dry ground. The weather was good and "the health and spirits of the men improved rapidly." Throughout its service, taking into account what they were required to endure and comparing themselves to other regiments the men of the Seventh consistently reported that the health of the regiment was good, the sickness occurring at Gauley Bridge being the one exception. The consensus was that their early service was a form of conditioning, "our men having become so toughened by hard service as now to be able to endure almost any hardship or exposure." Whatever the reason, the regiment was an extreme example of a general trend of the war. William F. Fox, in his post war study *Regimental Losses in the American Civil War 1861-1865* writes that "the most striking feature of the mortuary statistics is that the regiments which incurred the greatest loss in battle are the ones which suffered least from disease. While, throughout the whole army, the deaths from disease were double those from bullets, the hard fighting regiments seldom lost even a like number." In the case of the

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[23] . Wilder, Company C, 20; Wood, A Record, 83.

Seventh the ratio was actually reversed; the deaths from disease totaling less than half the number of battlefield casualties.[24]

The regiment moved from good to bad when it left Romney on January 10 and moved fifteen miles north to Patterson Creek, a stop along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. "If all of Virginia had been canvassed, a worse place for a camp could not have been found." Private G. Byron Swisher of Company H labeled Camp Kelly a mud hole, "the entire winter quarters knee deep in mud" and complained it made the collection of firewood much more difficult because the use of a wagon was not possible. The quality of camp life varied greatly depending on the specific camp but the one constant was the soldiers ability to adapt to their circumstances. At Camp Kelly and other mud holes they would corduroy the ground in front of their tents with small branches and barrel staves and "carpet" the inside with twigs and boughs and, having made their home as pleasant as possible were still able to ask "Who would not be a soldier?"[25]

Often the problem with tents was simply having one. Sibley tents, the primary form for shelter during the first year of the war were heavy and had to be transported by wagon. For many reasons the regiment often became separated from the wagons containing its tents and suffered because of it. While encamped at Patterson Creek the Seventh was ordered ten miles east to a wind swept mountain plateau known as the Levels, where it spent a week without tents or cooking utensils. The ground was snow covered. The men constructed pine bough shanties and had but a single blanket as a cover, "very poor protection from the snow and cold." It was the worst week of the regiment's service in terms of exposure. One volunteer argued: "If the conductors of this war could be forced to endure what we now suffer, they would bring it to a speedy termination. ..." There were other occasions when the Seventh was forced to endure extended periods without shelter, at least once for as long as eighteen days. In an April, 1862, entry to his diary George Wood criticized Union generals for not looking more

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[24] . Wood, A Record, 84; Painesville Telegraph, 8 May 1862; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 27 February 1862; George D. Lockwood to brother, 29 September 1862, Manuscript Collection, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, hereinafter cited as Lockwood Family Papers; Fox, Regimental Losses, 49.

[25] . Wood, A Record, 86; Mahoning Register, 6 February, 1862; George Wood, Diary: February 10-July 14, 1862, 21 April 1862, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus.

toward the health of their men. "The boys should not be compelled to go so long without tents."[26]

The problem of transporting Sibley tents led to their replacement in the war's second year by the shelter tent. Each man was issued a piece of canvas four feet by six feet. When three pieces were combined they formed a low "A" shaped tent, closed on one end. The three owners were tentmates. It was an early manifestation of the "buddy system" that would characterize American army life in future wars. Small and with little head room they were unpopular with the men. The Seventh exchanged their Sibley for shelter tents in May 1862 to their "great indignation." The fact that the men carried their own tents did not necessarily guarantee shelter. Equipment could be lost or discarded in battle and difficult terrain or extreme heat caused many volunteers to lighten their load by discarding, among other things, the one third share of their intended housing.[27]

The quality and quantity of food also varied from camp to camp, the important factor being how close the particular camp was to a rail line. On the march and at the more isolated camps the basic diet of the Seventh was hardtack, salt pork and coffee. If the regiment was fortunate enough to be encamped on or near a rail line, its menu might be expanded to include fresh fruits and vegetables, dairy products, soft bread, beef and other meats. A small additional source of food was dried and canned fruits and vegetables received from home. Perhaps because the Seventh served primarily in the Eastern theater and was ordered home in June of 1864, foraging does not appear to have been widely practiced by the regiment. The accounts of their time in the field contain few references to it. While being near a rail line and away from the front enhanced the regiment's chance of receiving an expanded and more balanced diet, it did not guarantee it. The Seventh spent July of 1862 at Alexandria, Virginia in the Reserve Corps with little to do but rest and sightsee. Under these seemingly ideal conditions Corporal Morris I. Holly could still complain about his breakfast; "a tin cup of coffee and a piece of bread with a little pork gravy on it and a piece of salt something which we are compelled to call pork." Allowing

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[26] . Wilder, Company C, 23; Painesville Telegraph, 20 February 1862; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 27 February 1862; George D. Lockwood to mother, 11 November 1863, Lockwood Family Papers; Wood, Diary, (day not clear) April 1862.

[27] . Robertson, Soldiers, 45; National Tribune, 21 January, 1904.

for some exceptions, the Seventh's food was of poor quality, monotonous and often in small quantity. It makes the relative good health of the regiment even more remarkable.[28]

An aspect of army life about which the men of the Seventh did not complain was their pay. References to it are usually limited to the dates on which it was received and for the most part it appears that the regiment was paid on time. The only other significant discussion of money concerns the efforts and methods of some of the volunteers to save for themselves or send part of their pay home to their families. The personal papers of Lieutenant Mervin Clark contain an "allotment roll" of twelve members of Company B which lists the amount of their monthly pay and "the amount designated per month to be transmitted to Dr. R. Everett, of Cleveland, Ohio, for distribution to the persons respectfully indicated as assignees." Ten of the twelve soldiers had the money delivered to a family member, the remaining two had it deposited in a Cleveland bank. Out of a total of $150.00 received by the eleven, privates and one sergeant on November 3, 1861, $98.00 was sent home to the Western Reserve.[29]

In his diary entry of March 6, 1862, Captain George Wood recorded that his company (Company D) had sent over $4000.00 home since they were mustered in and that he personally had returned $500.00 to his hometown of Warren. "I intend to have something to show when I get home from the service." Wood's significant amount of savings reflects his status as an officer. His monthly pay as a first lieutenant and then captain was $108.50 and $118.50 respectively out of which he was responsible for his uniform, food, side arm (only the sword was issued) and forage for his horse. The most convenient place for officers to purchase food and personal items was from sutlers who would station themselves near army encampments and follow the troops when on the march. During the eight month period from August 1862 through April 1863, Lieutenant Clark purchased items from sutler Samuel Hatch totaling $526.26. Most of Clark's purchases were for canned food items, fresh fruit and tobacco products but the list also

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[28] . George D. Lockwood to unknown 24 September 1862, to mother 1 October 1862, to brother 14 November 1862, to mother 25 December 1862, to mother 11 November 1863, to mother 6 January 1863, to mother 27 January 1863, Lockwood Family Papers; Morris I. Holly to brother and sister, 12 July 1862, Holly Letters.

[29] . Clark Papers.

includes shoe polish, gloves, soap, boots and a camp stove. Hatch also provided Clark with cash on several occasions, the largest single amount appearing on Clark's itemized monthly statements being $20.00. Officers had more need of sutlers and more money to spend but $13.00 a month privates were equally welcome at the merchant's wagons.[30]

The word monotony shows up frequently when members of the regiment refer to camp life. They were young men who became bored easily when forced to remain in the same place and endure the same structured daily routine for an extended period of time. As the months passed they became increasingly impatient with spending "most of the time in tiresome drill or more tiresome inspections." Creighton's daily schedule when in camp allotted four hours to drill including dress parade before the evening meal. There is supporting evidence that whenever conditions permitted, this schedule was strictly adhered too. One of the requirements of drill being a large open area on which to maneuver, a new campsite was quickly judged by this criteria. "Our boys cast a regretful look at the stretch of green sward that remained after the tents were pitched for it was ominous of future drills."[31]

Another tiresome aspect of camp life that could be easily overlooked was the daily collection of wood and water. It has already been mentioned that when mud prevented the use of wagons to collect firewood the chore became much more difficult. Time also worked against the volunteers as the longer they remained in the same camp the farther they had to go to collect wood. Most long term encampments were chosen with a good supply of water nearby but often geography and strategic importance did not cooperate. Low lying Harpers Ferry, located at the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers was important as a river and rail junction but the town itself was not suitable for an encampment because of the heights that surrounded it on three sides: Bolivar Heights to the west, Maryland Heights to the east and Loudoun Heights to the south. The Seventh encamped at Harpers Ferry from September 20 to December 10, 1862, the time about equally divided between Loudoun and Bolivar Heights. Water had to be carried up steep

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[30] . Wood, Diary, 6 March 1962, Cleveland Morning Leader, 20 May 1861; Clark Papers; George D. Lockwood from mother, 10 July 1862, Lockwood Family Papers; A sutler was a merchant who followed an army or maintained a store on an army post to sell provisions to the soldiers.

[31] . Painesville Telegraph, 22 May 1862, 5 June 1862; Wood, Diary, 1 May 1862; Creighton Papers.

hills to both camps, Loudoun Heights causing the greatest hardship as the distance was one-half mile. The fact that Creighton's daily schedule allots two hours to these tasks points out the collection of wood and water could require a substantial amount of time and effort and must have become extremely tedious to the men.[32]

The one thing that could at least temporarily reduce the monotony of camp life was a letter from home. Historian James I. Robertson argues that the large number of letters written by Civil War soldiers reflect "youth's terrible capacity for loneliness," many of them young men away from home for the first time. While writing letters was the most popular past time of the volunteers, the greatest boost to morale and relief from boredom was to hear one's name at mail call. Members of the Seventh expected to receive at least as much as they wrote and were not shy about stating it. Morris I. Holly regularly complained about the number and length of the letters he received from his family, ending one letter to his brother and sister with a warning softened by a plea. "You owe me a letter now and don't forget it. Please!" George Lockwood tried various methods in an attempt to increase his mail from home. He used the direct approach. "Why don't I get more letters from home?" He attempted to make his mother feel guilty. "Although I have received no letters this week, not even from you, I will keep writing." He even tried to bribe his aunt, promising to send her the next battlefield trophy small enough to mail if only she would write. In the spring of 1863 Lockwood was sarcastically complaining to his mother that his sister's excuse for not writing, "I'm so busy," and his brother's justification for short letters, "the church bell is ringing," had been used so often that they had become hollow stereotypes. Both Lockwood and Holly desperately wanted regular contact with home, indeed pleaded for it, and were quick to state their dissatisfaction when they felt the folks at home were not doing their part.[33]

Holly is a good example of Robertson's theory, admitting that he was lonesome less than a month after the regiment entered the field. Convinced that it would be a short war, he ended early letters with the sincere belief that he would be home soon. His

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[32] . Creighton Papers; Wilder, Company C, 34; Wilson, Itinerary, 216-7.

[33] . Robertson, Soldiers, 104-7; Morris I. Holly to brother Alic, 24 September 1861, to brother Alic, 20 October 1861, to brother and sister, 22 November 1861, Holly Letters; George D. Lockwood to mother, 22 May 1863, to mother, 5 October 1862, to mother, 6 July 1862, Lockwood Family Papers.

homesickness is obvious in his letters as he dreams about the fruit on the family farm and constantly compares the people and products of Virginia to those of the Western Reserve. At one point, Holly's fading enthusiasm for army life and longing for home deteriorate into self pity and he also attempts to make his family feel guilty. "I suppose you are still enjoying yourselves in your comfortable homes with good dinners."[34]

Holly's attitude is easy to understand. Ignoring the horrors of battle, a Civil War soldier's daily existence was unrelenting test of his fortitude and persistence. Minimal standards of food, clothing, shelter and cleanliness combined with the tiresome physical requirements of marching, drilling and picket duty created an atmosphere that should have caused a greater discontent among the troops than it did. One modern scholar considered the ability of Civil War soldiers to accept what they could not change "one of their most notable characteristics." The complaints voiced by the men of the Seventh are mild compared to the conditions that caused them.[35]

The Seventh's primary function during the winter of 1861-62 was to assist in the protection of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in north central Virginia. While stationed at Romney during December the regiment participated in severe picket duty as a response to a Confederate force stationed at Winchester, forty miles to the southeast. Theodore Wilder blamed inexperienced officers for the policy of sending a dozen infantry men six or seven miles from camp ... "where they could not prevent their own capture nor communicate with the camp in case of a surprise. Many a cold tedious winter night was spent on these distant picket posts." During that same December a detachment from the Seventh joined troops from the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Ohio, First Virginia and Fourteenth Indiana, 2,000 men total, on an expedition against a small rebel force at Hanging Rock Pass, fifteen miles from Romney. The enemy was easily routed and the Union commander, Colonel Samuel H. Dunning of the Fifth Ohio, ordered a mill and hotel burned. Some of the troops went beyond the order and set fire to private homes. It is not clear if this group included any members of the Seventh, but those of the regiment who recounted the episode were outraged by it. George Wood considered the burning "a

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[34]. Morris I. Holly to brother Alic, 12 July 1862, to brother and sister, 9 September 1862, Holly Letters.
[35]. Robertson, Soldiers, 78.

lasting disgrace to all taking part in it. Lawrence Wilson condemned the action but was quick to point out it was an isolated incident. "I must say that I came nearer being ashamed of my uniform on this occasion than I ever did at any other time or place. I am glad to say that acts of pure vandalism that I saw perpetrated on this expedition I never saw repeated." The consensus of the regiment was that the government was overprotective of civilian property but they were not ready to embrace the concept of total war that would emerge in the Western theater in 1864.[36]

On September 19, 1861 the Seventh was assigned to the newly created Department of Western Virginia which the war department defined as Virginia west of the Blue Ridge Mountains. William Rosecrans was given command of the new department and remained as head of the Army of Occupation of Western Virginia. During the same month Brigadier General Benjamin Franklin Kelly assumed command of Second Brigade but the Seventh continued to operate, much of the time, either independently or in cooperation with regiments outside their brigade. A much greater degree of structure and organization began when the regiment was transferred to Lander's Division, Army of the Potomac created January 5, 1862. Frederick W. Lander was given command of three brigades organized from regiments of the Department of Western Virginia combined with newly formed regiments. Colonel Tyler received command of Lander's Third Brigade which included his former regiment and Lieutenant Colonel Creighton advanced to command of the Seventh.[37]

Lander prepared his division for a spring offensive against the Confederate force at Winchester but never got the chance to lead it. He died March 2, replaced in command by Brigadier General James Shields. On March 8, President Lincoln ordered the Army of the Potomac to be formed into corps. Five days later the divisions of Major General Nathaniel P. Banks and Brigadier General James Shields were designated as Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac under the command of Banks. The Seventh now resided in Third Brigade, Shields' (2nd) Division, Bank's Fifth Corps, brigaded with the Twenty-ninth Ohio, Seventh Indiana, First Virginia and One Hundred Tenth Pennsylvania Volunteers. It

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[36] . Wilder, Company C, 20; Roster Commission, Official Roster Vol 2, 123; National Tribune, 21 January 1904; Wood, A Record, 85.

[37] . Welcher, Union Army, 214, 249, 1064; Dyer, Compendium Vol 1, 204-5.

would cease to operate on its own or in brief temporary alliances with other units. Now functioning as an integral part of a larger force the Seventh was about to embark on a series of confrontations with Confederate Major General Thomas Jonathan Jackson.[38]

[38] . Wood, A Record, 90; Welcher, Union Army, 1009; O. R., Vol 5, 18, 22.

Chapter Three

Stonewall's Nemesis

During the summer of 1861, Confederate troops had done considerable damage to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in the area of the Shenandoah Valley. Federal work crews had begun to repair the road in October but were halted by winter weather before the job could be completed. The Seventh had helped to prevent further damage to the railroad during the winter but a more permanent solution to the problem became a priority. When Edwin M. Stanton replaced Simon Cameron as Secretary of War on January 20, 1862, he directed that the Baltimore and Ohio be reopened. George B. McClellan, Commander of the Army of the Potomac, felt that the rail line would remain vulnerable to Confederate raids unless Federal troops occupied the valley towns of Winchester and Strasburg. To this end, during the first week of March, McClellan ordered the division of Major General Nathaniel Banks, then at Harpers Ferry and that of Brigadier General James Shields, encamped at Paw Paw Station to move against the Confederate force at Winchester.[1]

Shields' Division left Paw Paw Station by rail on March 8, traveling east to Sleepy Run where the troops departed the cars and marched south to Martinsburg. The march provided William Creighton with the opportunity once again to indulge his fondness for military pageantry. "Lieutenant Colonel Creighton, who always took pride in his regiment, never omitted an opportunity to parade the streets with band playing and colors flying, and this was done at Martinsburg, with fine effect, when the Seventh passed through. ..." As Shields' Division continued to march south toward Winchester, Bank's Division was also closing in on the common objective from the northeast. On March 11, confronted by an approaching Federal force that substantially outnumbered his own, Confederate Major General Thomas Jonathan Jackson evacuated Winchester. Both Banks and Shields entered the town the next day. On the 13th the two divisions were officially designated Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac; Nathaniel P. Banks commanding. The

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[1] .Welcher, Union Army, Vol 1, 1008-9; Wood, A Record, 90.


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PENNSYLVANIA
Chambersburg
Cashtown
York
Gettysburg
Hanover
Susquehanna River
Cumberland
Potomac River
Williamsport
Hagerstown
Emmitsburg
Falling Waters
Martinsburg
Shepherdstown
Harpers Ferry
Frederick
Baltimore
Ellicott City
Point of Rocks
Winchester
Kernstown
Poolesville
Leesburg
Potomac River
Strasburg
Front Royal
Aldie
Chantilly
Falls Church
Annapolis
WASHINGTON
Fairfax C.H.
Centerville
Alexandria
Bull Run
Groveton
Manassas Junction
Bristoe
Warrenton
Mt. Jackson
New Market
Luray
Occoquan
Catlett Station
Dumfries
Brandy Station
Rappahannock Station
Culpeper
Kelly's Ford
Harrisonburg
Cross Keys
Port Republic
Conrad's Store
Germanna Ford
Stanardsville
Fredericksburg
Chancellorsville
Verdiersville
Orange C.H.
Staunton
Spotsylvania
Guiney's
Gordonsville
Mechum River Station
Waynesboro
Louisa C.H.
Charlottesville
Fredericks Hall
Beaver Dam
Hanover Junction
Hanover C.H.
Ashland
Mechanicsville
White House
Cold Harbor
RICHMOND
West Point
Lynchburg
Drewry's Bluff
Malvern Hill
Harrison's Landing
Bermuda Hundred
City Point
Charles City C.H.
Williamsburg
Petersburg
Yorktown
Big Bethel
Fortress Monroe
Norfolk
Portsmouth
Suffolk
Dismal Swamp
CHESAPEAKE
VIRGINIA, MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA
1862–1863
MILES
NORTH CAROLINA
Weldon
Drawn under the supervision of DOUGLAS SOUTHALL FREEMAN

Seventh Ohio resided in Third Brigade, Shields' Second Division, Bank's Fifth Corps. Colonel E.B. Tyler of the Seventh commanded Third Brigade which placed Lieutenant Colonel Creighton in charge of the regiment.[2]

The Fifth Corps continued its advance up the Shenandoah Valley pursuing Jackson through Strasburg, Woodstock and Mt. Jackson before it was halted because of developing concerns in Washington for the safety of the Capital. McClellan was in the process of transferring his Army of the Potomac to the York-James Peninsula for his long awaited advance on Richmond. In order to provide for the defense of Washington he ordered Banks to move most of his command to the vicinity of Manassas, leaving a brigade at Strasburg and two regiments at Winchester to maintain a Federal presence in the lower Shenandoah Valley. On March 20, Banks' First Division began the march to Manassas while Shields' Second Division returned to Winchester until the determination of which regiments were to remain in the Valley was made and to await additional instructions from McClellan.[3]

When Shields returned to Winchester, Jackson also made an abrupt about face and followed the Union troops. General Joseph Eggleston Johnston, Commander of the Confederate Army of the Potomac, had instructed Jackson to do whatever possible to keep McClellan from pulling troops out of the Shenandoah Valley and using them to support his assault on Richmond. Jackson's hope was to strike a blow against Shields' rear guard that would be severe enough to force the entire Fifth Corps to return to the Valley. Colonel Turner Ashby, Jackson's chief cavalry officer, was a source of information the general praised as "remarkable for its reliability." On this occasion, Ashby failed to live up to Jackson's high opinion of him when he reported that the number of Union troops at Winchester did not exceed four regiments. Jackson's own force numbered just over 3,000 men and he rushed to do battle with what be believed to be an equal number of enemy troops, not Shields' entire 9,000 man division.[4]

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[2] . National Tribune, 21 January 1904; Wilson, Itinerary, 125; Welcher, Union Army, Vol 1,1009.
[3] . Welcher, Union Army, Vol 1, 1010; Nathan Kimball, "Fighting Jackson at Kernstown," In Battles and Leaders in the Civil War, Vol 2, ed. Robert Underwood and Clarence Clough Buel (New York: The Century Co., 1884, 87, 88), 302.
[4] . O.R., Vol 12, P1, 379-85.



MAP OF THE BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN, VA., MARCH 23, 1862.

At 4:00 P.M. on Saturday, March 22, Ashby, at the head of Jackson's column, made contact with Colonel Nathan Kimball's First Brigade of Shields' Division on the Valley Pike, one mile south of Winchester. Ashby's cavalry and Kimball's pickets exchanged fire but this evening's skirmish was primarily an artillery duel, the major consequence of which was the wounding of Shields. As Ashby retired south two and one-half miles on the Valley Pike to Kernstown, Kimball assumed command of Second Division as well as First Brigade. The following morning Kimball advanced Second Division south, halting one-half mile north of Kernstown where a ridge of high ground commanded the approach to the road. He deployed to receive Jackson by placing his own First Brigade west of the Valley Pike on his right and Jeremiah Sullivan's Second Brigade east of the turnpike on his left. Erastus B. Tyler's Third Brigade was held in reserve on the Pike, one-half mile to the rear of the others, standing in support of John Jenk's First West Virginia Light Artillery.[5]

Jackson's troops began appearing in front of Kimball at 10:00 A.M. but the early action was limited to light skirmishing until all three Confederate brigades were in position. In the early afternoon, Jackson applied pressure all along Kimball's front but after a short time halted the attack. Leaving only a skeleton force to occupy the attention of the Union troops, he sent most of his men to attempt to overwhelm the Union right. An artillery battery had preceded the Confederate infantry to their left and was punishing Jenk's Battery and Tyler's Third Brigade. For some of the men of the Seventh, this was the hardest part of what was to prove to be a very difficult day. Corporal Seldon A. Dey of Company C remembered the "terrible strain of waiting and inaction;" of being shelled but doing nothing to avoid it or respond to it. Despite a wooded area that served to conceal the Confederate troop transfer, Kimball observed Jackson's flanking movement and at approximately 4:00 P.M. he ordered Third Brigade to meet it and to silence the damaging rebel battery.[6]

Third Brigade marched west through an open field for a mile before wheeling left, forming in two lines of battle and entering a dense woods. From right to left the first

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[5] . Kimball, Battles and Leaders, 303-4; Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 1010; O.R., Vol 12, P1, 339, 359-61.

[6] . Kimball, Battles and Leaders, 304-6; Wilson, Itinerary, 134; O.R., Vol 12, P1, 339-40, 359-60.

battle line consisted of the Seventh Ohio, First Virginia and Twenty-ninth Ohio. The One Hundred Tenth Pennsylvania on the right and the Seventh Indiana on the left formed the second line. The thick woods alone were enough to preclude the maintenance of orderly ranks and all semblance of formation collapsed when Tyler's front line collided with the leading regiments of the Confederate flanking force. Third Brigade lost order but not momentum. After halting only briefly upon initial contact with the rebels, it continued forward. Tyler's men drove the enemy through the woods for a half mile until the Confederates were pushed out into the open. Retreating up a slight eminence Jackson's men reformed in front of their battery, behind the protection of a long, winding stone wall.[7]

Third Brigade, the Seventh Ohio on the right front, continued its attack once out of the woods and onto open ground. The Union troops advanced to within fifteen yards of the stone wall but the two six pound Confederate guns changed from solid shot to grape and canister and drove them back to the edge of the woods. The protection from the rebel artillery offered by the woods was minimal and the position was too great a distance from the stone wall to allow the Union troops to threaten Jackson's infantry seriously. On their own initiative, the men of the Seventh Ohio and others from Third Brigade moved forward to gain the defensive advantage of a slight eminence eighty yards in front of the stone wall. This slight undulation in the otherwise flat terrain was just enough to afford the Union troops protection from the rebel grape and canister. They loaded their muskets lying flat on their backs and would then roll over and rise up just enough to take quick aim and fire at the rebel heads visible above the stone wall. As the number of men at the eminence increased and the ranks deepened it became difficult for those in the rear to fire safely over the heads of those in front without recklessly exposing themselves to enemy fire. Corporal Dey was fighting alongside a sergeant from Company H and was quite sure that the shot that went through the sergeant's neck and killed him had come from the rear[8].

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[7] . Wilder, Company C, 25; O.R., Vol 12, P1, 341, 376; Wood, A Record, 100; Wilson, Itinerary, 136.

[8] . O.R., Vol 12, P1, 350; Wood, Diary, 28 March 1862; Wilson, Itinerary, 136; There were four basic types of projectiles used by Civil War Field Artillery. Solid shot, usually referred to simply as *shot* were projectiles of solid iron. *Shells* were hollow iron projectiles filled with a black powder bursting charge

The confusion initiated by Third Brigade's charge through the woods continued throughout the engagement. The combination of the unfavorable terrain and the unrelenting rebel musket and artillery fire made it impossible for the troops to reform into organized ranks. The roar of battle made communication difficult. "Soon all military order was lost, the commands of the officers were scarcely heard or heeded, and every man set to work fighting on his own responsibility." Creighton's horse was shot out from under him almost immediately. Unable to have his orders heard he lead by example, grabbing a musket and fighting in the ranks for the entire battle.[9]

Third Brigade remained in the precarious position for an hour before Kimball became convinced that Jackson had committed virtually his entire force to the flank attack. Gradually during the next hour Kimball sent all of his own and most of Sullivan's brigade to reinforce Tyler. The rebels still had the defensive advantage of the stone wall and superior artillery support but the increasing weight of Union numbers and a shortage of Confederate ammunition finally produced a turning point in the "desperate" fighting of the "hotly contested" stalemate. Just before nightfall, Brigadier General Richard B. Garnett, commander of Jackson's former brigade which occupied the center of Jackson's line ordered a retreat. Many of his men were out of ammunition and leaving the field, while the remainder had only a few rounds left. With the Confederate center in retreat, thus exposing the flanks of the remaining two brigades, Kimball ordered a charge across the entire front. Led by Major John Casement, the Seventh Ohio charged over the stone wall in front of them and continued on to capture the rebel battery that had punished them throughout the afternoon. The rebel retreat quickly deteriorated into a rout but the weary Union troops "had no disposition to follow."[10]

The Seventh Ohio had performed badly at the engagement at Cross Lanes but in their first full scale battle they more than redeemed themselves. At Kernstown, the

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designed to break into many ragged fragments. Shells could be detonated by time or impact fuses. *Canister* gave field artillery the effect of a huge shotgun blast. Large iron balls were packed with sawdust in a tinned iron cylinder. When fired the tin disintegrated and the balls fanned out. *Grape* shot was similar to canister in effect but used fewer and larger iron balls which were also packed differently.

[9] . Painesville Telegraph, 10 April 1862; Mahoning Register, 3 April 1862; Cleveland Morning Leader, 31 March 1862.

[10] . O.R., Vol 12, P1, 361, 394; Welcher, Union Army, Vol 1, 1011; Wilson, Itinerary, 136; Wood, Diary, 28 March 1862.

Seventh participated in more hard fighting than any other regiment in Second Division and accorded themselves extremely well. They suffered sixteen percent of the entire division's casualties (92 out of a total of 590), almost twice as many as any other regiment in their brigade. The Seventh's 20 killed, 62 wounded and 10 missing totaled almost 19 percent of the 500 men the regiment had taken into the battle. They had been under a deadly, unrelenting enemy fire for over three hours and while their line "wavered a little" on a couple of occasions, they stubbornly refused to concede their ground. In direct contrast to their reaction after Cross Lanes the men had nothing but praise for their officers following Kernstown. Colonel Tyler and Captain George Wood were lauded for their coolness under fire and their tireless efforts to organize the confusion and maintain the morale of the men. Lieutenant Colonel Creighton and Major Casement gained the respect of the entire regiment when they took up muskets and fought as common soldiers. Any doubts the ranks had formed about their officers following Cross Lanes were erased by the strong performance of these same officers at Kernstown.[11]

Kernstown, however, was much more significant for the men of the Seventh than the officers who led them. It was here that almost to a man, they took the final step in the transition from citizen to soldier. Circumstances of the battle prevented the officers from exercising significant control over the actions of their men. "After the fight commenced few orders were given . . . it was every man for himself." Each individual member of the Seventh had to make the decision to leave the shelter of the woods and move forward to a position where they were at greater risk but where they could also do the work of a soldier and damage the enemy. Once a few in the ranks took the initiative, peer pressure undoubtedly played some part in the decision of others to follow. But they were not under orders to move forward and to endure the prolonged punishment they did on that March afternoon required a commitment stronger than not wanting to disappoint others. Another regiment in their Brigade, the One Hundred-Tenth Pennsylvania was faced with the same options and broke and ran into the safety of the dense woods in what one officer later described as a "shameful rout." Having been abandoned by most of their field

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[11] . Dyer, Compendium Vol 2, 897; O.R., Vol 12, P1, 346; Wood, Diary, 28 March 1862; Morris I. Holly to brother Alic, 26 March 1862, Holly Letters; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 8 April 1862; Painesville Telegraph, 10 April 1862.

officers at Cross Lanes the men of the Seventh had fled the field in disorder. At Kernstown, again without the benefit of comprehensive leadership (albeit for very different reasons), these same men refused to leave the field on their own or to allow some of the South's finest fighters to force them from it.[12]

Kernstown was the first large scale carnage for the Seventh Ohio. The fighting on their front was severe throughout the battle. The Seventh's national colors were struck by twenty-eight balls, one carrying away the crescent of the spear head, another breaking the shaft. Though they were severely damaged, First Sergeant William Landerwasser of Company K made sure the Stars and Stripes remained at the very front of the ranks. It cost him his life. Eight days later, on July 30, 1862, Landerwasser died as the result of wounds he suffered at Kernstown. Captain George Wood reported that even before the final charge "the dying and dead were lying thick on the hillside." Private Morris Holly described tripping over the dead bodies of his friends and having their "life's blood" splattered on his clothes as they fell against him on their way to the ground. "It was an awful sight and one I never want to see again . . . ." Kernstown did much to eliminate any lingering romantic notions of battle the men of the regiment might have still harbored. It also introduced attributes of being an effective soldier that they did not know they were capable of and that caused them some concern. Private Holly wrote numerous letters to his family and friends describing the battle but it was only to his brother Alic that he admitted that the desperateness of the battle brought out a "savage" quality in the fighting of the regiment. He found it even more difficult to admit that he was one of many who shot at the backs of the rebels as they retreated. "You might have thought it was too bad to shoot them down so bad but if you had taken all we had all day you might have done the same as we did." Holly and the rest of the Seventh Ohio realized that shooting a man in the back as he ran from you would be difficult for most civilians to accept. It was probably something most members of the regiment believed themselves incapable of before the Battle of Kernstown. The horrors of the battlefield and what one would do to survive there were not easily accepted.[13]

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[12] . O.R., Vol 12, P1, 347-8.

[13] . O.R., Vol 12, P1, 374, 376; Mahoning Register, 3 April 1862; Wood, A Record, 101; Morris I. Holly to brother Alic, 26 March 1862, Holly Letters; Wilson, Itinerary, 636.

As was a common practice of both sides during the war, the officers and men of the Seventh Ohio greatly overestimated the size of the enemy force they faced at Kernstown. Division Commander Kimball incorrectly felt that Jackson's force was greater than his own despite the actual three to one advantage enjoyed by Union forces. Jackson's official report of the battle lists his total force at just over 3,000 men. Most estimates by members of the regiment are at least three times that number. Private Holly writes that the enemy force they "licked" numbered between 13,000 and 15,000 and that Jackson was assisted in the battle by Confederate Generals James Longstreet and Kirby Smith. It appears that the passage of time and the availability of accurate information did little to alter their misconceptions. Speaking at a veterans reunion in Cleveland, Ohio, fifty-one years after the battle, Captain J. B. Molyneaux told his audience that Jackson was defeated at Kernstown "although he greatly outnumbered us."[14]

Immediately following the Battle of Kernstown, on March 24, Banks returned to the Shenandoah Valley with his other division and his entire command took up the pursuit of Jackson. Banks followed Jackson south along the north branch of the Shenandoah River through Strasburg, Woodstock, Edinburg and Mount Jackson until ending the pursuit just beyond New Market on April 24. During this operation, on April 4, Banks' Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac, was merged into the newly created Department of the Shenandoah and Banks was assigned command. Less than a month later, on May 1, Shields' Division was transferred to the Department of the Rappahannock and the First Corps, under the command of Major General Irvin McDowell.[15]

Shields' Division remained in Rockingham County Virginia, south of New Market for three weeks, the ranks spending most of the time in "tiresome drill or more tiresome inspections." On May 12, the division was ordered to join McDowell's Army at Fredericksburg. It left immediately, covering the 132 miles in ten days. The Seventh made up the division's rear guard and suffered the consequences of extreme weather combined with the problems caused by two brigades of soldiers marching in front of them. During the first days of the march the problems were humidity and dust. "The day was

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[14] . Kimball, Battles and Leaders, 305; O.R., Vol 12, P1, 383; Wood, A Record, 106; Wilder, Company C, 25; Morris I. Holly to brother Alic, 26 March 1862, Holly Letters; Molyneaux Speech, Clark Papers.
[15] . Kimball, Battles and Leaders, 308; Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 1011.

very sultry, the atmosphere heavy and oppressive and the cloud of dust was so oppressive we could barely see our file leaders." One volunteer, a sheep farmer before the war, compared it to following his flock over a dusty road, on a hot day with the wind in his face. By the mid point of the march a steady rain solved the dust problem but created another. The troops comprising First and Second Brigades churned up the softening road surfaces to the extent that by the time the Seventh brought up the rear they were slogging through "mud the consistency of creme and over our shoes in depth."[16]

When the Seventh and the rest of Shields' Division arrived at Fredericksburg on May 22, they found the troops of First Corps to be very different from themselves. To this point in the war McDowell's Army had done little more than train and stand for inspections. They did look very much like an army. ". . . quartered in large tents in perfectly arranged camps, with neat clean uniforms and guns and accouterments upon which no storm ever beat." By contrast, the regiments comprising Shields' Division had seen difficult service almost from the day they entered the field and they looked the part. "Our men, prevented by their hard and constantly active service from paying much attention to their personal appearance, looked very rough, with sunburnt, unshaven faces, ragged blouses and worn out shoes. Covered with dust from head to foot." One member of the soon to be famous Iron Brigade thought Shields' men were "the dirtiest ragamuffins he had ever seen." The Iron Brigade had just been issued new distinctive uniforms complete with white gloves, leggings and black felt hats. At first, some members of Second Division were self-conscious about their "weather beaten and worn condition" but as McDowell's men began to ridicule their appearance their reaction quickly changed to anger. Unwilling to suffer insults from as yet untested troops there ensued "many pugilistic encounters" between "Paddy Shields' Roughs" and McDowell's "band box soldiers."[17]

Second Division's stay at Fredericksburg was brief. Cleaned up a little, it participated in a review staged for President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton on May 23, the day after its arrival. The next day Shields was ordered to return to the

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[16]. Painesville Telegraph, 5 June 1862.

[17]. Wilson, Itinerary, 151; Painesville Telegraph, 26 June 1862; Alan T. Nolan, The Iron Brigade: A Military History (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1975), 54-5.

Shenandoah Valley. When Jackson realized Banks had been reduced to a single division, he began yet another march down The Valley to threaten Washington. By the time Shields received the order to return, Stonewall had already chased Banks across the Potomac River into Maryland. McDowell had attempted to reoutfit Shields' badly used up troops with clothes, supplies and ammunition but their stay at Fredericksburg was not long enough to allow much to be accomplished. As it left Fredericksburg with the rest of the division, Erastus Tyler's Third Brigade was reorganized. Tyler was promoted to Brigadier General (effective May 14) and his brigade was now totally comprised of Ohio regiments; The Fifth, Seventh, Twenty-ninth and Sixty-sixth Ohio Volunteers[18].

The return march to The Valley was even more difficult than the earlier trip to Fredericksburg. It was certainly longer. The division first marched northeast to Front Royal in an unsuccessful attempt to trap Jackson at Winchester. Having failed to accomplish this McDowell then ordered Shields to move south, "up the valley of the South Fork of the Shenandoah River in an attempt to intercept Jackson's retreat." The march was a part of Lincoln and Stanton's three prong attempt to trap Jackson before he could flee The Valley; employing the forces of Banks and McDowell along with those of Major General John C. Fremont's newly created Mountain Department.[19]

Shields' Division was short of just about everything including wagons. As a result, its trains had room to transport only enough tents to accommodate the officers. Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign continued to make life miserable for the men of the Seventh; ". . . marching and counter marching, lying out in the rain without shelter, subsisting on nothing but bread and coffee." Private David A. Ward of Company C was one of the fortunate ones who received "a nice looking pair of brogans" during the regiment's stop at Fredericksburg. The shoes were of such poor quality, however, that they did not survive their initial test, leaving Ward to make the balance of the march with bare, bleeding feet and "lacerated sentiments toward the rascally contractor who furnished such stock to the government." Ward, who was a member of the Seventh throughout its entire existence considered this march his hardest service. "In crossing Manassas Gap, it will be

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[18]. Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 1013; Nolan, Iron Brigade, 54-5; Wilson, Itinerary, 150.
[19]. Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 1014.

remembered, the column jerked along, with sort halts and starts, all night long; a manner of marching that often tested the endurance, and even the patriotism, of the weary soldier more than fierce battle."[20]

First Brigade commander Nathan Kimball, who like Tyler had been promoted to Brigadier General after the Battle of Kernstown recalled the toll the recent weeks had taken upon the men. "Shields' Division reached Luray June 4 after having marched 1140 miles in 43 days, fighting one severe battle and many lesser engagements. 40% of the command were without shoes, 2% without trousers and other clothing was deficient. And now, without any supplies, officers and men were well-nigh worn out." Commanding officer of the Seventh, William Creighton, promoted to colonel after Kernstown, presented the same evaluation specific to his regiment just prior to their second confrontation with Stonewall Jackson. "I could have brought onto the field a much larger number of men, but for want of clothing and shoes I was obliged to leave many behind. The men were in poor condition to fight, being worn out by continual marching and reduced by improper and insufficient rations."[21]

Shields' Division, at least a part of it, finally managed to intercept Jackson's withdrawal up the Shenandoah Valley at Port Republic, a small village situated in the angle formed by the North and South Rivers as they merged into the South Fork of the Shenandoah River. Port Republic was of strategic value because two important roads met here and it lay just west of Brown's Gap through the Blue Ridge Mountains. A respected Jackson scholar writes that "... In essence, control of the village meant control of the upper valley." The immediate importance of Port Republic to Union forces was that Jackson's wagon trains had already passed through the village to the south. His army, however, was still north of Port Republic. If Shields' forces, approaching from the east, could occupy Port Republic they could separate Jackson from his supplies and at least temporarily block his escape route until Banks and Fremont could close in on him from the north and west respectively.[22]

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[20] . Painesville Telegraph, 26 June 1862; Wilson, Itinerary, 154-5.
[21] . Kimball, Battles and Leaders, 312; Mahoning Register, 26 June 1862.
[22] . O.R., Vol 12, P1, 714; James I. Robertson, The Stonewall Brigade (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 105.

On June 8, Colonel Samuel S. Carroll, commanding Shields' Fourth Brigade moved into Port Republic with 150 cavalry and four pieces of artillery. Observing this threat to his escape route from the heights above the village Jackson, employing artillery and infantry, quickly forced Carroll to fall back upon his own infantry which had halted two miles north of Port Republic on the road running parallel to the South Fork of the Shenandoah River. Carroll was joined later that evening by Erastus Tyler's Third Brigade. Tyler, as senior officer, assumed command of both brigades whose combined strength was less than 3,000. That same evening Jackson made the decision to attack this advance force before the other half of Shields' Division joined it. Jackson's Army was presently divided, one division with him on the ridges west of Port Republic and another five miles away at Cross Keys under the command of Major General Richard Stoddent Ewell. Ewell defeated John C. Ferment on June 8 in a battle that was essentially a long range artillery duel, Fremont refusing to take advantage of his two to one infantry superiority. Jackson instructed Ewell to leave one brigade to monitor Fremont's movements and, at first light, to march his remaining two to Port Republic to assist in the attack on June 9. With most of his army once again united, Stonewall would have 9,000 troops at his disposal[23].

Jackson had his troops in motion by dawn on June 9. Their trip down from the heights overlooking Port Republic and across the North and South Rivers took more than enough time to allow Tyler to learn of their approach and prepare to meet them. In his official report of the battle Jackson acknowledged that Tyler "judiciously selected his position for defense." Third and Fourth Brigades formed in line of battle at the top of a wooded plateau that commanded the road from Port Republic as well as the mile and one-half of open ground that extended from the village to the base of the plateau. On the left of the federal line was a clearing in the woods, the result of the operation of a charcoal kiln. It was a perfect artillery position on which Tyler placed six guns which commanded the entire open area in their front and even the lower portion of the plateau itself. Tyler's force was small but the site he chose for this day's battle was a definite advantage for the Union troops.[24]

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[23] . Welcher, Union Army, Vol 1, 1015-16; Robertson, Stonewall Brigade, 107; O.R., Vol 12, P1, 713.
[24] . O.R., Vol 12, P1, 714; Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction. In The Blue and the Grey, ed. Henry Steele Commanger (New York: The Fairfax Press, 1982), 161.

Jackson did not wait for Ewell's brigades to arrive before initiating the attack. As usual, the Stonewall Brigade was at the head of Jackson's column, Brigadier General Charles S. Winder having replaced Richard Garnett in command following the Battle of Kernstown. Winder encountered Tyler's pickets as he entered the open area which extended form the base of the plateau the federals occupied. He brushed them aside and continued to march his 1,334 rank and file through a field of ankle high wheat toward the enemy. Not long after the Stonewall Brigade started across the field Tyler opened his guns with devastating effect. Winder later conceding that "the enemy here opened a rapid fire of shell with great accuracy on the road and vicinity." Jackson, believing it to be the only way to silence the battery, ordered Winder to charge Tyler's guns. A frontal assault against veteran troops with such a decided geographic advantage was a mistake Jackson himself would later admit. Winder's Brigade "advanced with great boldness for some distance but encountered such a heavy fire of artillery and small arms as greatly to disorganize his command, which fell back in disorder. The enemy advanced across the field, and by heavy musketry-fire forced back our infantry supports . . . forcing our guns to retire." Modern scholars who usually defend Jackson's generalship suggest that in this instance he underestimated his enemy; "hardy men as resolute in their fighting skills as the veterans of The Valley." "Once more, as at Kernstown against these same men, Jackson's old brigade had to pay in blood for his rashness."[25]

The Seventh Ohio participated in the countercharge that drove Winder over one-half mile but returned to its original position in support of the battery while other regiments under Samuel Carroll kept the pressure on the Stonewall Brigade. His attack on Tyler's center having failed, Jackson sent two fresh regiments through the woods on his right in an attempt to capture the federal battery through a flank attack. Advancing to within 100 yards of the guns undetected, the rebels unleashed a concentrated volley that killed several gunners and sent the remainder running for cover. Jackson's men scrambled to take possession of the guns. Seeing his battery abandoned Tyler ordered an immediate countercharge by the Fifth and Seventh Ohio. He later reported that "these two last

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[25] . O.R., Vol 12, P1, 714, 740; Robertson, Stonewall Brigade, 108; Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative - Fort Sumter to Perryville (New York: Random House, 1958), 462.

named regiments moved forward and engaged the enemy in a style that commanded the admiration of every beholder." The Fifth and Seventh had to advance across ninety yards of open field against the steady and accurate fire of the rebels in order to retake their guns. These yards were dearly paid for. Five color bearers of the Seventh went down in the assault. The sixth, Second Lieutenant Leicester King of Company I picked up the flag and led his regiment into the works, a feat for which he would later be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. Confused by the successful counterattack, the Confederate regiments fell back down the hill in disorganization, the Seventh sending "volley after volley after the fugitives, the firing ceasing only when the rebels were covered by a friendly hill."[26]

Jackson's flank attack had failed and Winder was still being pressed by Carroll in the center of the field. Tyler's guns in the "coaling" were back in action; once again ripping holes in the ranks of the Stonewall Brigade. Individual Confederate soldiers out of ammunition were retreating on their own. Winder's line was very close to breaking. A senior Confederate cavalry officer admitted that at 9:00 A.M., two hours after the attack began, "matters began to look very serious for us." Author Shelby Foote, noting that Tyler's men "made up in fury and grit what they lacked in numbers" characterized the early hours of the Battle of Port Republic as a "rout worse than Kernstown."[27]

Confederate fortunes changed with the arrival of Ewell's forces form Cross Keys. Jackson ordered Brigadier General Richard Taylor's Eighth Louisiana Brigade to mount a second flank attack on the federal battery. Taylor would succeed but only after three bloody assaults. Taylor conceded that surprise aided his first assault "but the enemy's infantry rallied in a moment and drove us out. We returned to be driven out a second time." Jackson described the Union counterattacks as "vigorous and well conducted." The Seventh had remained with the battery after repulsing Jackson's initial flank attack and was involved in all the "desperate efforts" to capture and recover it. "The fighting in and around the battery was hand to hand, and many fell from bayonet wounds." Taylor's

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[26] . Robertson, Stonewall Brigade, 110; O.R., Vol 12, P1, 696; Wood, A Record, 118.

[27] . John D. Imboden, "Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah." In Battles and Leaders in the Civil War, Vol 2, ed. Richard Underwood and Clarence Clough Buel (New York: The Century Co., 1884, 87, 88), 295; Foote, A Narrative, 462.

brigade strength forced Tyler to recall most of the troops pressing Winder in order to save his guns. Taylor captured the battery for a third time and was finally able to hold it. With his artillery captured and Ewell's other brigade joining Winder in a renewed attack on his center Tyler had no choice but to withdraw from the field. By this time Jackson had committed 9,000 men to the fighting; outnumbering his opponent by three to one. Tyler's men left the field in good order. The Fifth and Seventh Ohio regiments continued to play a dominant role as they covered the Union retreat. Richard Taylor was impressed. "Though rapid the retreat never became a rout. Fortune had refused his smiles but Shields brave boys preserved their organization and were formidable to the last . . . ." The Brigadier General's generous comments were typical of virtually all Confederate official reports on the Battle of Port Republic.[28]

The Seventh entered the field at Port Republic with nine companies (Company B was on detached duty) totaling but 327 men; the number being seriously reduced by weeks of hard marching and a lack of clothing and shoes. (The average Union regiment in April 1862 numbered 562.) The regiment sustained casualties of 10 killed, 55 wounded and 10 missing, 23 percent of those involved. Though substantial, the Seventh's losses were less, by percentage, than the Union force as a whole which totaled 1018 casualties, or 33 percent. It had been a very difficult day. William Creighton noted that the necessity of his regiment to "move back and forth from the flanks to the center to meet each new enemy attack" not only fatigued his men but also often exposed them to an enemy crossfire. Creighton, who wrote short, factual reports about the Seventh's engagements went as far as he ever did in praising his men when he stated that they all "behaved like veterans." The fighting mettle the Seventh had established at Kernstown was displayed again at Port Republic. It was a standard these men would maintain for the remainder of their service. First Sergeant Laurance Wilson of Company D, the self-appointed regimental historian of the Seventh wrote a very flattering account of his regiment's performance at Port Republic. ". . . Although confronted and largely out-numbered by the acknowledged champion fighters of their day, our little command, for 4 1/2 hours, . . . made a record for gallant fighting in the open not excelled in any contest of that great war." Wilson's boast

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[28] . Taylor, Blue and Grey, 161-62; O.R., Vol 12, P1, 698, 715, 786; Wilder, Company C, 28-9.

is probably not true but even modern scholar James I. Robertson, author of *The Stonewall Brigade* (1963) and a man one must assume respects the battlefield prowess of his subject, conceded that for four hours Tyler's Army waged a "masterful struggle." Confederate casualty figures support praise for the Union performance. Jackson's total loss of over 800 was the highest he suffered in any engagement throughout his famed Valley Campaign.[29]

The difficult morning of fighting at Port Republic was followed by an eighteen mile afternoon march before the Seventh and the rest of Tyler's force bivouacked for the night. Third Brigade returned to its camp near Luray for the remainder of the month to rest and be resupplied. In July, the brigade was assigned to Samuel D. Sturgis' Reserve Corps stationed at Camp Wade near Alexandria, Virginia. It was a month of rest and relaxation for the Seventh, "the only soft snap of its entire service." The wives of Colonel Creighton and Major Crane spent two weeks in camp with their husbands. Morris Holly wrote his family telling of liberal passes to Washington and unencumbered free time. ". . . We have been permitted to rest and roam the hills of Dixie at our ease. No drill or any other duty to perform except to answer roll call twice a day." It appears that in addition to roll call the only other requirement of the men was to participate in a couple of reviews.[30]

The reviews should not have taken long. The ranks of the Seventh and all the regiments of Third Brigade were very thin. A reporter for the *Cleveland Morning Leader* visiting Camp Wade on the Fourth of July wrote that while "the boys are in good spirits" some companies of the Seventh could only muster fourteen men. The entire brigade numbered just over 1,000. In a letter to his aunt, George Lockwood confirms the newspaper account noting that "... There are now only 30 fighting men left of the 110 we had in Company D. The other companies in the regiment are in the same condition." As these reports of the Seventh's condition reached The Reserve, some of its more prominent citizens petitioned the government to allow the regiment be sent home to recruit. Their answer came from newly appointed General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States

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[29] . O.R., Vol 12, P1, 690; Mahoning Register, 26 June 1862; Robertson, Soldiers, 21, 112-13; Wilson, Itinerary, 169-70.

[30] . Wood, A Record, 119; Wilson, Itinerary, 170; Morris I. Holly to brother and sister, 12 July 1862, Holly Letters.

Henry W. Halleck. "No, not so long as there is a lame drummer left; not if you will send us a whole new regiment in place of this handful. We know these men, they are just such as we want."[31]

The Seventh was issued new clothes and equipment while at Alexandria and most importantly new muskets. On July 5, the men turned their smoothbore flintlock conversions over to the quartermaster in exchange for United States Rifle Musket Model 1861. Commonly referred to as the Springfield Rifle Musket, its rifled barrel greatly enhanced accuracy and significantly extended the effective range of the infantry. As was the case when they were initially issued arms, a small portion of the regiment was issued a different weapon; the English Enfield Rifle Musket. Creighton's ordnance receipts confirm the regiment received cartridges and accouterments for both weapons in the months following the exchange. In addition to the technological advances the new rifles were lighter than the old smooth bores, an attribute that pleased the men who would have to carry them.[32]

The Seventh would use their new muskets fighting in a new army under the leadership of a new brigade commander. Hoping that a more unified federal command would enjoy greater success against Stonewall Jackson, President Lincoln, on June 26, directed that the troops of the Department of Shenandoah, the Department of the Rappahannock and the Mountain Department be consolidated into a single command, the Army of Virginia. He assigned Major General John Pope to be in command. Banks' Department of the Shenandoah became the Second Corps, Army of Virginia, Banks remaining in command. On August 2, Tyler's Brigade joined Banks at Sperryville, Virginia and was assigned to Second Corps. It was immediately combined with the brigade of Brigadier General John W. Geary. The resulting new brigade was designated First Brigade Second Division and command was assigned to Geary. This brigade would remain unchanged through the completion of the Seventh's term of service. It was comprised of the Fifth, Seventh, Twenty-ninth and Sixty-sixth Ohio Infantry, the Twenty-

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[31] . Cleveland Morning Leader, 9 July 1862; Mahoning Register, 24 December 1863; Wood, A Record, 167.

[32] . Wilson, Itinerary, 174; Gluckman, U.S. Muskets, 229; Peterson, Notes on Ordnance, 2; Creighton Papers; George D. Lockwood to mother, 6 July 1862, Lookwood Family Papers.

eighth Pennsylvania Infantry and Joseph M. Knaps Pennsylvania Light Artillery. Erastus Tyler was ordered to return to Alexandria to organize a new brigade. Tyler had been somewhat removed from the Seventh serving as brigade commander for five months, but the ties between the regiment and its first colonel remained strong. "It was with many tears of his own and of the Seventh that he bade adieu. . . ."[33]

In early August, 1862, George McClellan was in the process of withdrawing his Army of the Potomac from the York-James Peninsula after the completion of the Seven Days Battle. McClellan had taken his army to the peninsula in mid March and by early June he had methodically advanced to within ten miles of Richmond. He was unable to take the last step. Even though they did not decisively defeat him, the Confederates completely stalled McClellan's offensive and convinced the War Department to order him back to northern Virginia. The first objective of John Pope was to prevent the concentration of Confederate forces against McClellan. To accomplish this, Pope decided to threaten the important rail center of Gordonsville. Perhaps anticipating the Union strategy, General Robert E. Lee, having replaced the wounded Joseph E. Johnston as Commander of the Confederate forces protecting Richmond, ordered Stonewall Jackson to move north from the Confederate capital. Jackson occupied Gordonsville on July 19 with two divisions and was joined there ten days later by the division of Major General Ambrose Powell Hill. While Jackson was moving north, Pope was attempting to concentrate his widely spread out Army of Virginia at Culpeper Court House, twenty-seven miles northeast of Gordonsville. By August 7, only Banks' Second Corps had arrived. Jackson decided to attack and destroy Banks before the rest of Pope's Army could be assembled.[34]

By the morning of August 9, Jackson had advanced twenty miles northeast on the Culpeper Road to a point just beyond a lone peak, Cedar Mountain (also known as Slaughter's Mountain). He used the natural advantage of the mountain as an artillery placement and anchored the right of his infantry line at its base. From Cedar Mountain his battle line extended northward along a slight plateau, crossed Culpeper Road and

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[33] . Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 342, 913; Wilson, Itinerary, 175; Wilder, Company C, 31.
[34] . Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 914-15; O.R., Vol 12, P2, 177-8, 182.



Battle of Cedar Mountain August 9, 1862

terminated with his left situated in a dense woods north of the road. Slight undulations and ridge lines in the terrain provided for good artillery placements all along the line. It was a very strong defensive position comprised of two divisions. Jackson's third, under Hill, was still on the road from Gordonsville.[35]

Banks' Second Corps was also on the march that hot August morning. The Seventh left Culpeper Court House at 8:00 A.M. Due to the extreme heat and an unexplained scarcity of water, the Union troops "suffered greatly" during the eight mile march to the eventual battlefield. Many cases of sunstroke terminated fatally including "a number" of the men in the Seventh. Banks arrived in front of Jackson's line about noon and positioned four of his five brigades to roughly mirror Jackson's deployment. He did not, however, extend his left so far as to confront the Confederate infantry at the base of Cedar Mountain directly. Banks kept one brigade in reserve. The Union line was formed along a plateau that was almost completely open with little natural protection from the sun's rays or rebel artillery.[36]

From noon to 4:00 P.M. the battle was an artillery duel in which Jackson's gunners had the decided advantage. The rebel battery on Cedar Mountain commanded the entire field. Banks had positioned his artillery directly in front of his infantry line. Both were "seriously damaged" when "the enemy opened up with six batteries and poured a constant shower of solid and shell into our batteries and troops, in plain view, in the open fields." As was the case at Kernstown, many in the Seventh felt that the hardest part of the day was to "lay quietly behind the batteries before you engage the infantry." The heat was suffocating (98° in Washington at 2:00 P.M.) and the rebel gunners accurate. Several members of the regiment were killed and many more were wounded. "Men gave up their lives so gently that it was almost impossible to tell the living from the dead. The fatal missile struck its victim, leaving the lifeless clay in the same attitude which the living body but just before occupied."[37]

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[35] . O.R., Vol 12, P2, 178; Welcher, Union Army Vol 1 915-16.
[36] . O.R., Vol 12, P2, 160, 163; Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 915.
[37] . Edward J. Stackpole, From Cedar Mountain to Antietam: August - September, 1862 (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Co., 1959), 60; O.R., Vol 12, P2, 164, 183; Wilson, Itinerary, 180; George D. Lockwood to mother, 18 August 1862, Lockwood Family Papers; Wood, A Record, 126.

At 4:00 P.M. Banks ordered an attack. He wanted to pressure Jackson's center and then turn the Confederate left anchored in the woods north of Culpeper Road. Geary's Brigade, just south of the road would initiate the attack on Jackson's center. It would attack through a tall cornfield; the Seventh Ohio followed by the Twenty-ninth on the right, the Sixty-sixth Ohio followed by the Fifth on the left. The Seventh would occupy the "post of honor, the advance of the entire command." The men of Geary's Brigade had their misery compounded by the attack route. "Every man on the field suffered from the heat but none of them more so than the troops moving through the close, dusty corn rows." One member of the Sixty-sixth Ohio claimed he "never knew troops to suffer more for water."[38]

As soon as the Seventh emerged from the cornfield into the open it came under fire on its right flank from the rebel infantry in the woods across Culpeper Road. The battery on Cedar Mountain continued its barrage from the left and the men soon collided with the enemy directly in their front who were advancing to meet them. Geary witnessed his front line being severely punished as it stubbornly moved forward. "The Seventh and Sixty-sixth Ohio, under the destructive fire of at least five times their number, were being terribly cut up, but retained their ground, closing up their decimated ranks, and still pressing toward the enemy. "The men of the Seventh fell by "tens and twenties." Later, Sergeant George Lockwood wrote that "It seemed as if a whole division of infantry was firing upon us at once." Geary ordered his second line forward to relieve the pressure on his first but the Seventh benefited only modestly from this. Its immediate support, the Twenty-ninth Ohio, did not perform well that day. Under the command of a new, inexperienced ranking officer, who would afterward be accused of cowardice by some of his subordinates, the Twenty-ninth did not move especially quickly nor fight with a great deal of enthusiasm. It would suffer the fewest casualties of the four regiments of First Brigade that day, barely one third of those suffered by the Seventh.[39]

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[38] . George D. Lockwood to mother, 18 August 1862, Lockwood Family Papers; Robert K. Krik, Stonewall Jackson at Cedar Mountain (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 121, 123.
[39] . Cleveland Morning Leader, 19 August 1862; O.R., Vol 12, P2, 160-1; George D. Lockwood to mother, 13 August 1862, Lockwood Family Papers; Krik, Stonewall, 123, 373.

Despite the fact that he was seriously outnumbered, Banks' attack enjoyed initial success. He was able to turn Jackson's left and begin rolling the Confederate line back on its center. But the arrival of Hill's Division on the field swelled Jackson's numerical advantage to almost three to one (23,000 Confederates vs. 8,000 Union) and the sheer weight of numbers finally decided the issue. Jackson pushed Banks backward for two miles and had control of the field when darkness ended the fighting.[40]

The long day was not yet over for the Seventh. At 9:00 P.M. the regiment moved forward on picket duty. The advance was strongly challenged. The regiment received musket volleys from three sides and was forced to fall back, under the cover of woods, for almost a mile before it was able to bivouac for the night. Additional killed and wounded were added to the day's already staggering total.[41]

Bank's Corps suffered 2,381 casualties at Cedar Mountain; 30 percent of his total force. Confederate casualties were about half the Union total in real numbers but their much larger force reduced the percentage to 5 percent. For the Seventh Ohio, August 9, 1862 was the bloodiest single day of its service. Of the 302 officers and men the regiment took into battle, 31 were killed, 149 wounded and 2 were taken prisoner or otherwise missing. All regimental field officers were wounded. The 182 total casualties represents 60 percent of the Seventh regiment and 40 percent of the casualties suffered by First Brigade. The regiment suffered more killed and wounded in this battle than any other regiment engaged there on either side.[42]

The lofty casualty numbers were partially the result of the almost constant enemy crossfire the Seventh endured throughout the battle. The poor performance of the Twenty-ninth Ohio which was sent to its support was another factor. But it also appears that the men of the Seventh were even more tenacious in their fighting at Cedar Mountain than they had been at Port Republic or Kernstown. In an open meadow, greatly outnumbered by infantry in their front and on their right flank and being relentlessly pounded by artillery, they continued to fire, dress their lines and advance; "the line

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[40] . O.R., Vol 12, P2, 183.
[41] . O.R., Vol 12, P2, 164; Wilder, Company C, 32.
[42] . Dyer, Compendium Vol 2, 906; Foote, A Narrative, 602; O.R., Vol 12, P2, 137; Wilson, Itinerary, 193; George D. Lockwood to mother, 13 August 1862, Lockwood Family Papers.

wavered not." The advance was led by William Creighton who "recklessly sat on his nag as if inviting the aim of multitudes of concealed marksmen on any hand." He was eventually wounded in both his left side and arm but he remained on the field. The Seventh fought with an urgency and stubbornness that went beyond courage and caused concern among some of its members. George Wood worried that his regiment could possibly be becoming too casual about the dangers of war, characterizing the attack as "daring warmed to rashness and bravery into recklessness." The increased tenacity might have been because many in the regiment still felt that the war could be ended with one great effort in one great battle. In a letter dated August 8, 1862, Sergeant C.P. Bowler of Company C wrote "The men are in good spirits, cheerful and as contented as it is possible to be in the army, anxiously awaiting the proper time to strike *the* effectual blow. . . ." Bowler was one of the thirty-one members of the Seventh killed the next day.[43]

On August 10 and 11 the two armies "fraternized upon the battlefield where the burial of the dead and the caring for the wounded was mutually carried on." Cedar Mountain is one of only two references by members of the Seventh concerning fraternization with enemy troops. This supports the argument that fraternization between the armies "was not as popular as post war myth would have it." The burying process required two days because of "the heat being so terrible that severe work was not possible." The extreme August heat did not slow-down the killing, just the digging of graves. Both sides claimed victory at Cedar Mountain. Jackson inflicted greater casualties and controlled the field when the fighting stopped but he also retreated south on August 11 after Pope heavily reinforced Banks. Stonewall felt that to continue his assault would be "imprudent."[44]

After the Battle of Cedar Mountain, Banks' Second Corps marched to Warrenton where it was assigned the duty of guarding the supply trains of the Army of Virginia. Eventually Second Corps relocated inside the defenses of Washington at Alexandria. It did not participate in Pope's disastrous defeat by Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia at Second Manassas on August 30. Pope's failure caused President Lincoln once

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[43] . Wilder, Company C, 32; Wood, A Record, 126-7; Cleveland Morning Leader, 15 August 1862.
[44] . Wilson, Itinerary, 190; Mitchell, Civil War Soldiers, 37; O.R., Vol 12, P2, 134, 179.

again to turn to George McClellan to counteract Lee's unfolding Maryland campaign. Banks' Corps was assigned to the Army of the Potomac and marched with McClellan to Frederick, Maryland. On September 12, when the Army of Virginia was officially discontinued and merged into the Army of the Potomac, the designation of Second Corps Army of Virginia was changed to Twelfth Corps Army of the Potomac. Brigadier General Joseph K.F. Mansfield was assigned command which he assumed when he joined the Twelfth at South Mountain on September 15. The Seventh Ohio now resided in First Brigade, Brigadier General George Green's Second Division, Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac.[45]

Twelfth Corps did not participate in the fighting at South Mountain on September 14 but joined in McClellan's pursuit of the retreating Confederates the next day. As McClellan deployed his troops to attack Lee at Antietam Creek the Twelfth Corps was positioned on the Union right in support of Major General Joseph Hooker's First Corps. At 1:00 A.M. September 17, the Seventh Ohio and the rest of Mansfield's Corps bivouacked for the night one mile north of Hooker's position.[46]

It was a short night. At 5:00 A.M. the Seventh was "awakened by a volley of musketry, succeeded by another, and yet another, which were soon so continuous as to be blended into one unremitent roll." Hooker had initiated McClellan's battle plan by attacking the Confederate left. Twelfth Corps moved forward to within easy supporting distance of Hooker and was given thirty minutes to make coffee. Hooker was unable to dislodge the Confederate troops from the East and West Woods, generic names that would assume lasting significance after this morning's fighting. The sounds of battle were getting louder and closer, indications that the rebels were driving First Corps before them. At 6:30 A.M. McClellan ordered Twelfth Corps forward as his second wave against Lee's left.[47]

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[45] . Welcher, Union Army, Vol 1, 343, 464; O.R., Vol 19, P2, 279; O.R., Vol 19, P1, 504; Billed as "The corps that never lost a color or a gun," Twelfth Corps was the smallest in the Army of the Potomac containing fewer than 30 regiments and 13,000 men at its peak. In addition to its fighting prowess it gained additional recognition by the red and white star badges worn by the men of its two divisions. The Twelfth was small but comprised of many crack regiments including the Seventh Ohio. In April 1864 the designation of the Twelfth was changed to Twentieth Corps.

[46] . O.R., Vol 19, P1, 475; Wood, A Record, 137.

[47] . Wood, A Record, 137; O.R., Vol 19, P1, 505.



Battle of Antietam September 17, 1862

Twelfth Corps advanced south along the east side of the Hagerstown Road. It collided with the northward charge of three brigades of Confederate Lieutenant General D.H. Hill's Division. The First and Second Brigades of George Green's Second Division, about 1,700 men total, comprised the left side of Twelfth Corps attack. Green moved into the East Woods and, after an hour of hard fighting, was able to drive the enemy out of the woods into an open field. Hill's men retreated south to the protection of a sunken road and west across Hagerstown Road into the safety of the West Woods. Green advanced into the open field south of the East Woods and gained a "precarious foothold" just north of the Dunker Church. From this position Green's men beat back several Confederate assaults from the West Woods. At 10:00 A.M. they counterattacked across the road and occupied the woods themselves. This was the high water mark of the Union attack on Lee's left. At noon Confederate pressure finally pushed Green out of the West Woods and by 1:30 P.M. he was forced to abandon his position near the Dunker Church. For most of the morning, Second Division had been the advance of the Union attack and had stubbornly held its position while the tide of battle shifted back and forth all around it.[48]

The Seventh Ohio fought the battle with only 140 men, the smallest number the regiment ever took into an engagement. According to Private I.C. Jones of Company C, the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania was the featured fighting unit for First Brigade at Antietam. "The 5th, 7th and 66th Ohio regiments backed the 28th Pennsylvania in the battle and I must say they were worthy of the backing. They went in with 800 men fit for duty and came out with 300 less. Lieutenant Colonel Tyndale, of the 28th Pennsylvania, who commanded the brigade did bully. . . ." Hector Tyndale was commanding First Brigade and Major Orrin J. Crane commanding the Seventh Ohio due to the wounding of John Geary and William Creighton at Cedar Mountain. Tyndale would be wounded himself at Antietam requiring Crane to assume brigade command and Captain Fred A. Seymour of Company G to take charge of the Seventh.[49]

Crane was in command of First Brigade when it successfully entered the West Woods. He concealed the brigade behind a slight eminence near the Dunker Church to

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[48] . Stackpole, From Cedar Mountain, 388, 396; O.R., Vol 19, P1, 476.
[49] . Cleveland Morning Leader, 2 October 1862; O.R., Vol 19, P1, 508.

receive yet another of the almost continuous Confederate assaults. Waiting until the rebels were within 70 yards, he ordered his men to the top to fire into the advancing lines. "So terrific was the fire from our men that the enemy fell like grass before the mower. . . ." Crane took advantage of the panic his surprise had caused to press the fleeing Confederates and gain control of the West Woods.[50]

Twelfth Corps was the second wave of three that McClellan sent against Lee's left. It suffered modest casualties (17 percent) compared to First Corps (27 percent) which preceded it and Second Corps (33 percent) which followed it into battle. Within Twelfth Corps, First Division, which fought in the soon to be famous "corn field," suffered heavier losses than did Green. It appears that Second Division operated in a pocket of relative quiet compared to the fighting that surrounded it. The quiet was only relative. The men of the Seventh expended 140 rounds of ammunition apiece in the seven hours they were on the field that morning. The six killed and thirty-four wounded that the regiment suffered constituted 28 percent of those involved. They did not know that they had just participated in the bloodiest single day of the war but they could see that the slaughter at Antietam had been extreme. "The next day after the battle we marched over the part of the field on which we fought between the East Wood and Dunker Church. The dead had not yet been buried or the horses burned. The men had become blackened and many of them so swollen that they burst their clothes, the sight was horrible."[51]

Two days after the Battle of Antietam, Twelfth Corps was ordered to Harper's Ferry, arriving there on September 21. In the following weeks the corps would undergo an extensive reorganization. Major General Henry W. Slocum was assigned command of the Twelfth replacing Mansfield who had been mortally wounded at Antietam. John Geary advanced to command of Second Division and Colonel Charles Candy of the Sixty-sixth Ohio replaced Geary at the head of First Brigade. Second Division remained at Harper's Ferry until December 9, encamping on both Loudon and Bolivar Heights.[52]

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[50]. O.R., Vol 19, P1, 506.

[51]. Stackpole, From Cedar Mountain, 458-9; Wilson, Itinerary, 211, 640-1; Molyneaux Speech, Clark Papers.

[52]. Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 465-7; Wilson, Itinerary, 216.

While at Harper's Ferry the strength of the Seventh Ohio was greatly enhanced by the arrival of the only sizable contingent of recruits the regiment would ever receive. Reports of the Seventh's decimated condition after the Battle of Cedar Mountain produced a response in the Western Reserve. On October 11, 153 men who had enlisted specifically to serve in the Seventh Ohio joined the regiment. The recruits were desperately needed and the veterans accepted them more readily than one might expect. The ranks were also increased by the return of a number of men who had been hospitalized. In its next engagement the regiment would field 312 men, more than twice the number that fought at Antietam but still substantially less than the average Union regiment at this stage of the war. Equally as important as the additional men was the return of the Seventh's Colonel on October 31. William Creighton was the unquestioned leader of this regiment and his return after his wounding at Cedar Mountain was greatly anticipated and met with "rousing cheers."[53]

While at Harper's Ferry the Seventh performed what several members considered to be the "toughest picket duty the regiment ever had." Normal picket lines were extended to several miles in length, a considerable journey in the rugged country of western Virginia. Those on night duty endured an additional hardship as fires were not permitted from sunset to sunup. The duty was difficult, monotonous and unrewarding. It is difficult to appreciate the unrelenting drudgery of a Civil War soldier's daily existence. Sergeant Morris Holly was referring to much more than fighting when he told his brother that "working for Uncle Samuel is earning your 13 dollars a month in good earnest."[54]

On December 9, Slocum was ordered to march Twelfth Corps southeast toward Dumfries, Virginia to help guard the Washington front during the Fredericksburg Campaign. In addition to protecting the ports around the Capital from Confederate cavalry attacks, the corps was to guard the line of communications of the Army of the Potomac. On December 18, the Seventh Ohio and the rest of Charles Candy's First

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[53] . Muster Roll - Recruits - Ohio Historical Society; George D. Lockwood to mother, 17 October 1862, 12 November 1862, Lockwood Family Papers; Wilson, Itinerary, 215-6, 227; Robertson, Soldiers, 21; In April 1862 the average Union regiment numbered 562 men. By July 1863, the number was reduced to 375. (Source: Robertson, Soldiers, 21.)

[54] . George D. Lockwood to mother, 8 November 1862, Lockwood Family Papers; Wilson, Itinerary, 216; Morris I. Holly to brother Alic, 3 October 1862, Holly Letters.

Brigade established winter quarters at Dumfries. Picket duty was not as severe as at Harper's Ferry but it was more extensive as the regiment's exclusive responsibility that winter was guard duty. The winter passed quietly with one exception.[55]

On December 27, Major General James E.B. (Jeb) Stuart, chief cavalry officer of the Army of Northern Virginia, attacked Dumfires with 1800 men and four pieces of artillery. "As usual the 7th did a little more than their share of the fighting." Stuart forced the Union pickets from a pine woods located beyond a large open field south of Dumfires and began shelling the camp. As the pickets retreated across the field they fell in with the Seventh Ohio already advancing in line of battle toward the enemy. Post Commander Candy had anticipated the attack and responded quickly. Once again the Seventh enjoyed the "post of honor," leading the attack. The Union force moved steadily across the open field and ousted Stuart's dismounted cavalry from the woods.[56]

William Creighton was the general officer of the day leaving Major Orrin Crane in charge of the Seventh. When his regiment was ordered forward, Creighton assumed his usual position in front of his men. The wounds he suffered at Cedar Mountain did not produce any increased caution on the battlefield on his part. Candy reported Creighton "displayed great coolness and bravery in the discharge of his duties." Theodore Wilder, in his history of Company C, implies his colonel went beyond leading his own men to challenge the enemy openly. "Putting himself out in full view and range of the rebels, with his loud voice, he dared them on." In the romantic language of the times, George Wood wondered how anyone in the regiment could falter "when the noble form of their leader was thus bared to the bullets of the enemy." The regiment did not falter nor did its other field officer. Candy also reported, "The Seventh Ohio, commanded by Major Crane, moved forward in splendid order and great coolness under a galling fire of grape. . . ." First Brigade held the woods overnight and were reinforced the next day. Stuart did not renew his attack. Casualties were light for the Seventh, 1 killed, 8 wounded and 11 taken prisoner of the 312 men involved.[57]

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[55] . Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 466-7; Wilson, Itinerary, 217.
[56] . O.R., Vol 21, 724-5; George D. Lockwood to mother, 28 December 1862, Lockwood Family Papers.
[57] . O.R., Vol 21, 724-5; Wilder, Company C, 35; Wood, A Record, 147, 149.

The winter months of 1863 were relatively pleasant for the men of the regiment. Their diet was expanded to include soft bread, vegetables and even an occasional feast of Potomac oysters. A liberal furlough policy was in effect allowing many to return to the Western Reserve for a visit. Those who had been sick or wounded continued to return to the regiment and on March 20 there was a special homecoming. Many of those taken prisoner at Cross Lanes (August 26, 1861), "having been duly exchanged; rejoined their companies."[58]

Near the middle of April, First Brigade marched south along the Potomac River and set up camp at Aquia Landing. Major General Joseph Hooker, now in command of the Army of the Potomac, was consolidating his forces for a spring offensive against Robert E. Lee. The two armies had spent the winter on opposite sides of the Potomac at Fredericksburg after the failed Union assault there in mid December. Hooker proposed a massive flanking movement to force the Army of Northern Virginia from the heights and entrenchments that had proven so impervious to the frontal assaults attempted by his predecessor. In an impressive logistical operation, on the last three days of April he successfully moved half his army (60,000 men) to Lee's side of the river, twelve miles west of Fredericksburg. By the afternoon of April 30, the Fifth, Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were deployed at the intersection of the Orange Turnpike and Plank Road where "one stately mansion with out-buildings and a blacksmith shop" was known as Chancellorsville.[59]

Twelfth Corps assumed a position along the turnpike facing southeast with its left anchored at the Chancellorsville intersection. John Geary's Second Division was on the left of the Corps. First Brigade, the extreme left of Geary's line straddled the Plank Road, 250 yards south of the Chancellorsville house which was to serve as Hooker's headquarters for most of the battle. The Seventh Ohio and Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, supporting Knap's and Hampton's batteries were on the left of Plank Road while Candy's remaining three regiments deployed to the right. Geary ordered his men to entrench and construct breastworks across the entire length of his line.[60]

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[58] . Wilson, Itinerary, 228-9.
[59] . Wood, A Record, 150; Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 660-61; Wilson, Itinerary, 230.
[60] . O.R., Vol 25, P1, 728.



Battle of Chancellorsville May 1-4, 1863

The Seventh Ohio was not seriously involved in the fighting during the first two days of the Battle of Chancellorsville. On both days Hooker sent Geary's Division forward but quickly ordered it to return to its entrenchments as soon as Geary reported significant enemy resistance. This was the pattern Hooker displayed during the initial stages of the battle. Despite the fact that his army was precisely where he wanted it and that he also enjoyed the element of surprise, he became tentative. Eventually he lost his nerve completely and squandered away a very good opportunity for a badly needed Union victory. On the evening of May 1, during an artillery duel, Private Charles H. Cheney was killed and two other members of Company A were seriously wounded when they were struck by a careless shot fired by a battery of the Fifth United States Artillery. The battery of regulars had been posted along side Candy's artillery and had simply fired too low to clear the breastworks of the Seventh Ohio stationed in front on it.[61]

By the morning of May 3 Lee had seized the initiative from Hooker and was attacking in force from the west and south. Jeb Stuart, replacing the wounded Stonewall Jackson, was leading the Confederate assault from the west while Richard A. Anderson's Division of James Longstreet's First Corps was moving against Hooker from the south. Geary's Division was the immediate objective of Anderson's attack. At 6:45 A.M. Geary's men came under the shelling of thirty-one pieces of artillery Lee had moved forward in anticipation of Anderson's assault. The Confederate guns were positioned at Hazel Grove, just far enough southwest of Second Division to allow them to enfilade most of Geary's line. Additional enemy artillery directly in their front produced a deadly cross fire that severely punished Candy's Brigade. Shortly after 8:00 A.M. Anderson's infantry began to advance against Geary's entire front. Advised of this Hooker ordered Second Division to retire and form a new line of battle running north from the Chancellorsville House.[62]

Geary's Division had not yet completed the redeployment when Hooker, continuing the pattern he had shown throughout battle, reversed himself and ordered Second Division to "resume their original position and hold it at all hazards." In the

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[61] . O.R., Vol 25, P1, 728-30, 737; Cleveland Morning Leader, 15 May 1863.
[62] . Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 676-78; O.R., Vol 25, P1, 729-31.

confusion caused by the rapidly changing orders Second and Third Brigades "became separated" from Second Division and Geary attempted to retake his trenches with only Candy's First Brigade. Two New York regiments from Third Brigade, having never received the order to retire in the first place, were attempting to hold the line when First Brigade returned. The situation was desperate. The lead elements of Anderson's infantry had already occupied some of Geary's abandoned works and the remainder of his division was advancing in mass to claim the entire line. All Candy's men could do was delay the inevitable but in the process they displayed the "coolness and courage" that was now expected of them. Again witnesses noticed a special urgency in the way these men fought. Geary reported First Brigade "seemed animated by a desire to contest single-handed the possession of the field." Candy, noting that his men were falling fast, claimed that they were "punishing the enemy as severely as we were suffering." While "rank after rank of the rebel infantry went down," there was always another to continue the attack. Finally bowing to superior numbers, at 11:00 A.M. Slocum ordered Candy to retire by the left flank. "I immediately placed the Seventh Ohio in position to support the remainder of the brigade, and cover them until such time as they could reform, which was done gallantly." The brigade fell back slowly, allowing its batteries to safely move to the rear ahead of it. Geary was impressed with the way Candy's men left the field " . . . even at that time the parting volleys of this brigade were given with an earnestness of will and purpose that showed their determination to avenge the death of their comrades if they could not avert the issue of the day."[63]

That afternoon Twelfth Corps was ordered to the extreme left of Hooker's army to protect the road leading to United States Ford. The Battle of Chancellorsville was over. Although only involved in the serious fighting on the final morning, the Seventh suffered substantial casualties. The regiment suffered sixteen killed, sixty-two wounded and twenty-one missing, numbers very similar to those of the other four regiments of First Brigade. A reputation for "coolness and courage" was paid for over and over again. On

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[63] . O.R., Vol 25, P1, 731, 735, 738.

May 6 the Seventh crossed the Rappahannock at United States Ford. The following day it arrived back at its former camp at Aquia Landing.[64]

As was the case at Chancellorsville, Twelfth Corps' contribution to the serious fighting at Gettysburg was limited to the final day of the battle. The weeks immediately before and after Gettysburg were as difficult for Slocum's men as was the battle itself. The corps left its camp at Aquia Landing on June 13 as part of the Union pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia through Maryland and into Pennsylvania. Daily marches of twenty-five to thirty miles in the extreme summer heat were common and took their toll on the long blue column. One member of the Seventh attributed fifteen deaths to "fatigue and sunstroke" in Geary's Division alone. The situation was much the same for the Seventh after the battle. Twelfth Corps was involved in the pursuit of Lee as his defeated army limped back to Virginia. While Union generals have been justly criticized for failing to press and attack Lee before he recrossed the Potomac, this does not mean the rank and file soldier was relaxing after the battle. Geary's Division marched over 200 miles in the three hot weeks following Gettysburg. During the first week they were in a constant state of alert, maintaining a steady, heavy contact with enemy pickets. The construction of breastworks became standard procedure when the division stopped for the night. Slocum pointed out that his men were constantly in the presence of the enemy from June 13 through July 26. They "could not rest or relax even if they remained in camp a couple of days." He maintains that "the complete ration allowed a soldier was not issued to him a single day. . ." during this time period and that the officers and men of Twelfth Corps were "exhausted" by the end of July.[65]

Regarding the Battle of Gettysburg itself the Seventh Ohio was little involved in the fighting during the first two days. Twelfth Corps arrived on the field at 5:00 P.M. on July 1, too late to participate in that day's fighting. It was ordered to a position on the left of the Federal line on high ground just north of Little Round Top. At 5:00 A.M. the next morning the corps was moved to Culp's Hill on the extreme right of the battlefield. Geary's Division made up the left of Slocum's line. Substantial breastworks and trenches

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[64] . Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 679; O.R., Vol 25, P1, 184; Wood, A Record, 153.
[65] . O.R., Vol 27, P1, 762, 835; Wilson, Itinerary, 250.



Battle of Gettysburg July 1-3, 1863

were constructed by Second and Third Brigades while Candy's First Brigade formed in a second line of battle to act as a reserve. From this reserve position the Seventh Ohio came under a heavy artillery fire during the afternoon but did not suffer any serious loss from it. Late that afternoon Slocum was ordered to send both his divisions to the southern part of the battlefield to reinforce the troops resisting General James Longstreet's attack on the Union left. Brigadier General Alpheus Williams' First Division left Culp's Hill thirty minutes ahead of Geary. Leaving George Green's Third Brigade to cover, "as best he could", Twelfth Corps position, Geary set out with his remaining two brigades for the vicinity of Little Round Top on the Union left. Unable to directly follow Williams, Geary, "by some unfortunate and unaccountable mistake" got lost and simply marched away from the battlefield. He eventually realized his error and was retracing his route when a messenger found him late that evening with orders to return to his previous position. Both Williams and Geary returned to Culp's Hill at 1:30 A.M. on July 3 to find that Green had been attacked and was unable to prevent the enemy from occupying most of the empty Twelfth Corps entrenchments.[66]

Three hours later, at daybreak, Twelfth Corps launched an attack to reclaim its works. Candy's Brigade served as the reserve during the assault and was not directly involved in evicting the Confederates. The Seventh Ohio relieved a regiment of Third Brigade in the trenches "soon after day light", was relieved themselves at 8:00 A.M. and then returned to the front line at 9:30 A.M. where they would remain for the next twelve hours. The Seventh was in the trenches at 10:30 A.M. during the final enemy charge against Slocum's line. The quality of their entrenchments enabled them to "terribly punish" an attacking force of "overwhelmingly superior numbers" while sustaining only very modest casualties. Lawrence Wilson felt the breastworks were so good that it was actually safer to be in the front line than situated somewhere in the rear. Enjoying such protection and having served as part of the reserve during a portion of the fighting the Seventh suffered only 1 killed and 17 wounded out of 265 enlisted men involved in the battle.[67]

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[66] . Welcher, Union Army Vol 1, 729, 735; O.R., Vol 27, P1, 759, 826-7, 836.
[67] . O.R., Vol 27, P1, 761, 828-9, 831-2, 837, 841; National Tribune, 21 January 1904.

Early the next morning, July 4, Corporal John Pollock of Company H "advanced over the entrenchments and captured the battle flag of the 14th Virginia Regiment." It almost seems inappropriate that the regiment should claim such a trophy in a battle in which its contribution to the fighting was relatively modest. On many other fields it had fought much harder and suffered much more without the satisfaction of acquiring an enemy flag. What does seem fitting is that in the final Confederate assault on Culp's Hill, seventy-eight members of the old Stonewall Brigade surrendered to the Seventh Ohio. It was against these very men, their renowned brigade and their storied leader that the men of the Seventh had done their finest fighting and suffered their most severe losses. At Kernstown, Port Republic and Cedar Mountain the volunteers from the Western Reserve had proven themselves to be every bit the equals of Stonewall's famed Valley Army. Jackson's Valley Campaign suffered few setbacks. But on the rare occasions when things did not go his way Jackson often found the Seventh Ohio among the Union troops in front of him. In the later, larger battles of Antietam and Gettysburg, the regiment again performed well against Jackson or his former corps. The Seventh had been a nemesis to Jackson during his glory days and continued to thwart his men even after his death. It does then seem appropriate that in its final fighting in the Eastern Theater the Seventh Ohio accepted the surrender of many members of Jackson's former brigade.[68]

The regiment was soon to join the Union armies in the West where the Confederate commanding generals were definitely inferior to Jackson and Lee. But the Army of Tennessee had one very good division commander who would severely test the Seventh's mettle at a ridge line in northern Georgia.

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[68] . O.R., Vol 27, P1, 830, 841; National Tribune, 21 January 1904.

Chapter Four

The Hard Road Home

The men of the Seventh received an unexpected week off before transferring their war efforts to the Western Theater. All of the Ohio regiments of Charles Candy's Brigade were selected to be among those dispatched to New York to quell the rioting that erupted in that city when the Federal government began to implement the first military draft in United States history. On August 16, the regiment was issued three days rations for the journey from its position along the Rappahannock River south of Warrenton to Alexandria. The men would make this first part of the trip "by boat but not by water." The only train available to transport the Seventh north consisted of flat cars already loaded with pontoon boats. The Ohio volunteers were loaded into the boats and the strange looking train departed. The spectacle became more bizarre as the journey continued. Being completely unprotected from the summer sun, at the train's first stop, some of the members of the regiment cut down small trees and bushes to use for shade. The idea caught on and soon the entire train assumed the appearance of a "traveling nursery." From Alexandria the Seventh took the ocean liner *Baltic* to Governor's Island, located just south of New York City in New York Harbor. The regiment would not be among those involved in actually suppressing the rioting and instead spent a "pleasant week" on the island before returning to Alexandria on September 11.[1]

On September 25, Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were detached from the Army of the Potomac, placed under the command of Major General Joseph Hooker and sent to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga. Eleventh Corps went directly to

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[1] .National Tribune, 21 January 1904; O.R., Vol 29, P2, 53, 94, 111; Mahoning Register, 21 September 1863; Passed on March 3, 1863, it was the first conscription law in U.S. history but not the first draft on American soil. The Confederate Congress enacted a conscription law almost a full year earlier on April 16, 1862. In the weeks preceding the initiation of the draft, Democratic politicians opposed to conscription had hammered at the theme that the draft would force white working men to fight for the freedom of Blacks who would then come North and take away their jobs. These appeals inflamed the fears and passions of the predominately Irish population of the working class neighborhoods of New York City. When the draft began these neighborhoods erupted in rioting that targeted Federal property, Black owned property and Republican newspapers and spilled over into wealthier neighborhoods along their perimeter. One hundred five people, mostly Blacks, were killed in the four days of rioting that was finally controlled by the arrival of troops from the Army of the Potomac.

Bridgeport, Alabama, thirty-five miles west of Chattanooga. Twelfth Corps followed as far as Nashville, but spent the month of October deployed along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad in Central Tennessee. It was a time of reorganization of Federal forces in the Western Theater. After the Union defeat at Chickamauga, Georgia, in mid-September, 1863, the War Department decided that "to insure better cooperation among the various Union commands in the West," these commands should be combined into a single new organization, the Military Division of the Mississippi. On October 16, Major General Ulysses S. Grant was assigned command of this division. His forces would include the Army of the Tennessee, the Army of the Cumberland and the recently arrived Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac.[2]

The Army of the Cumberland had fallen back to Chattanooga after being chased from the field at nearby Chickamauga. Confederate General Braxton Bragg and the victorious Army of Tennessee had followed the retreating Federals and occupied Raccoon Mountain to the west, Lookout Mountain to the south and Missionary Ridge to the east of the city. Commanding Chattanooga from these three dominating heights, Bragg was able to cut off virtually all rail and river communications to the city. Grant's first priority was to reopen supply routes into Chattanooga in order to sustain the Army of the Cumberland. Afterward, with the additional forces of Major General William Tecumseh Sherman's Army of the Tennessee and Hooker's troops from the Army of the Potomac, he would assume the offensive against Bragg.

Near the end of October, Geary's Division boarded a train at Wartrace along the Nashville and Chattanooga and traveled to Bridgeport where they were reunited with Hooker and the Eleventh Corps. On October 27-28, Hooker marched this force into Lookout Valley as part of Grant's initiative to drive the Confederates from Raccoon Mountain and open a new supply line between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. This being accomplished, Geary's Division was stationed at Wauhatchie on the west side of Lookout

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[2] .Welcher, Union Army, Vol 2, 166-7. In what constituted the most ambitious transfer of men and material of the war, Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac made the move West in four days. By contrast, Longstreet's two divisions, blocked by the Union occupation of east Tennessee and forced to take a roundabout route over eight or ten different rail lines, required more than ten days to complete the journey.


159
TULLAHOMA TO ATLANTA
1863-1864
TENNESSEE
Knoxville
Clinch River
Kingston
Tennessee River
Loudon
Maryville
McMinnville
Manchester
Tullahoma
Nashville & Chattanooga
Athens
Hiwassee & Tennessee
Georgia R.R.
Sewanee
Decherd
Cleveland
Tyners Station
Chattanooga
Missionary Ridge
Rossville
Chickamauga
Ringgold
Tunnel Hill
Bridgeport
Stevenson
Tennessee River
Lookout Creek
Wauhatchee
Dalton
La Fayette
Ellijay
Resaca
Coosawattee
Calhoun
Oostenaula River
Adairsville
Gaylesville
Rome
Cassville
Canton
Etowah
Etowah River
Kingston
Cartersville
Allatoona
Ackworth
Big Wills Creek
Gadsden
Cedartown
Kennesaw Mt.
New Hope Church
Dallas
Marietta
Coosa
Peach Tree Creek
Stone Mt.
Lick Skillet
Decatur
ATLANTA
East Point
Ezra Church
Chattahoochee
Rough & Ready
Jonesboro
Lovejoy
MILES
5 0 10 20
Drawn under the supervision of THOMAS ROBSON HAY

Mountain. Its purpose was to guard the road to Kelly's Ferry, a vital Tennessee River crossing on the new Union supply line. For the next three weeks the main duties of the Seventh were scouting and picket duty. Union pickets lines were stationed along the west side of Lookout Creek while Confederate pickets controlled the opposite bank. The Confederates were old friends or, more appropriately, old enemies. They were members of James Longstreet's Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. Longstreet's men had also come west after the Battle of Gettysburg. They had played the pivotal roll in Bragg's victory at Chickamauga. A rapport developed between the opposing picket lines that produced an unofficial limited truce. The two sides agreed not to fire on one another unless they were involved in a larger advance. The relaxed atmosphere allowed a brisk commerce to develop across the creek. Members of the Seventh traded hardtack and coffee to the rebels in exchange for bacon, corn-pone and tobacco. Union soldiers were always glad to trade for southern tobacco but on this occasion the Seventh was equally happy to secure additional food. The weeks at Wauhatchie were one of those periods when the regiment was issued only the minimal soldier's ration of salt pork, hardtack and coffee. This made anything the rebels had to offer more desirable. It also produced one of the few references to foraging provided by the Ohio volunteers. "The men have scoured the country for five miles around and killed every hog, sheep, goat and beef they found."[3]

A month after the new supply line was opened, Grant was ready to force Bragg from the heights overlooking Chattanooga. His first objective was to occupy Lookout Mountain. Joseph Hooker, commanding a force made up of one division from each of the three Union armies present was assigned the task. Hooker would entrust the key role in the assault to his own troops. John Geary's Second Division would lead the attack on the morning of November 24. The terrain confronting Geary was the "dominant feature of the whole region." Lookout Mountain was steep, rugged and heavily timbered. Geary directed an oblique attack that began on the west side of the mountain and wound around to the north as it ascended. Members of the Seventh argued that even if they had been

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[3] .Welcher, Union Army, Vol 2, 168; Wilson, Itinerary, 267-9; George D. Lockwood to mother, 11 November 1863, Lockwood Family Papers.



Battle of Lookout Mountain November 24, 1863

unopposed the going would have been extremely difficult. Many of the deep ravines, ledges and boulders that covered the steep slope could only be overcome by "clambering with hands as well as feet."[4]

Mother nature and Union artillery greatly assisted the early part of the assault. Lookout Mountain would later be called "the battle above the clouds." A more accurate description would be the battle in the fog. The dense fog that hung over the mountain for most of the day prevented early detection of the attack. "So impenetrable was this gloom around the enemy's localities, that the movement was so favored as to become a complete surprise to him." Geary swept over the scattered rifle pits and redoubts on the lower part of the mountain and by noon was approaching the main Confederate line located on a plateau 400 yards up the northern slope. As the fog began to lift, Hooker's artillery on the west side of Lookout Creek unleashed a continuous, accurate barrage which "assisted in every way the advance of the infantry." Unable to depress their own artillery enough to damage the Union ranks, Confederate musket fire was not sufficient to keep Geary from securing a foothold on the plateau. The defenders abandoned their first line of log and stone breast works and dropped back to a second, 400 yards to the east. Geary followed and attacked again but the reinforced Confederates now offered "stubborn resistance." At 2:00 P.M., with both sides low on ammunition and the fog returning, the serious fighting ended.[5]

Candy's brigade had been on the left or lower end of Geary's line as it wound its way up the side of the mountain. As a result, the Seventh was slightly removed from the immediate front and met less resistance than did the right and center of the line. As the fighting subsided in mid-afternoon, the Seventh was part of a relief that moved forward to replace those regiments that had been the advance. The regiment was sporadically involved in heavy skirmishing until dusk when the fighting ended completely. Due to its limited involvement the Seventh's casualties were minimal, just seven wounded. The

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[4] .Welcher, Union Army, Vol 2, 515; James Lee McDonough, Chattanooga: A Death Grip on the Confederacy (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1984), 131; O.R., Vol 31, P2, 417; Wilson, Itinerary, 272.

[5] .O.R., Vol 31, P2, 390-1, 395-6; Welcher, Union Army, Vol 2, 516; Wilson, Itinerary, 271; McDonough, Chattanooga, 137.



Battle of Missionary Ridge November 25, 1863

toughest part of the day for the men might well have been from midnight till dawn. Remaining in the front lines on picket duty and damp from the light rain that fell during the day, they were not permitted fires and "suffered severely" from the bitter cold.[6]

The Seventh was rewarded for the miserable night it spent on the mountain by the departure of the enemy. In the early morning hours of November 25, Bragg withdrew all the Confederate forces on Lookout Mountain to help defend Missionary Ridge. He made the withdrawal just in time. That same morning Grant assaulted Missionary Ridge with three coordinated attacks. William Sherman's Army of the Tennessee was to deliver the main attack against the Confederate right. Units of George H. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland were to make a secondary attack against Bragg's center and Joseph Hooker's combined force on Lookout Mountain was to attack the Confederate left at the southern end of Missionary Ridge near Rossville Gap.[7]

Hooker had his divisions in motion early that morning. William Creighton led Geary's First Brigade replacing Charles Candy who had been injured by a fall on the rocks the previous day. As had been the case in the past when Creighton was absent, Orrin Crane assumed command of the Seventh. Hooker's progress was slow. Even an unopposed decent of Lookout Mountain was not something that could be done quickly. As they made their way east across Chattanooga Valley the troops had to rebuild the bridge across Chattanooga Creek. Once across the creek, they had to force the enemy from Rossville Gap but afterward marched up Missionary Ridge meeting little resistance. The Army of the Cumberland's attack against Bragg's center had driven the Confederates from the ridge before Hooker's troops arrived. The most that can be said for Hooker's advance was that it "provided a threat on the rebel flank and rear which aided their decision to run."[8]

The defeated Army of Tennessee retreated southeast toward Dalton, Georgia. Grant sent Hooker in pursuit. The Federals closed steadily on the demoralized grey column but they were unable to move their artillery across West Chickamauga Creek. Unwilling to wait until a pontoon bridge arrived from Chattanooga, Hooker crossed his

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[6] .O.R., Vol 31, P2, 397-8, 147-8; Wilson, Itinerary, 272.
[7] .Welcher, Union Army, Vol 2, 514, 518.
[8] .O.R., Vol 31, P2, 397, 400-01, 418.

infantry on a foot bridge and pressed on without his guns. By sunset he was very close to overtaking Bragg's Army. The Union troops stopped for the night four miles northwest of Ringgold, Georgia. It was Thursday, November 26, 1863, the first presidentially appointed Day of Thanksgiving in the United States. It is doubtful anyone in the Seventh was aware of Lincoln's proclamation. It is certain that at the end of the following day there would be few among the Ohio volunteers anxious to offer thanks.[9]

Ringgold, Georgia is located twenty miles southeast of Chattanooga at the point where a narrow gap intersects Taylor's Ridge. The ridge runs north and south with the town located at its base on the western side. The gap at Ringgold was a half mile deep and wide enough to allow the passage of the Western and Atlantic Railroad, a wagon road and a good sized branch of Chickamauga Creek. Bragg passed through Ringgold as he continued toward Dalton leaving Major General Pat Cleburne's Division to dispute Hooker's passage through the gap. Bragg desperately needed Cleburne to slow the Union pursuit until the artillery and immense wagon train of the Army of Tennessee were a safe distance away. Pat Cleburne was the best Confederate division commander in the West. Two days earlier he had successfully thwarted what was to have been Grant's primary attack at Missionary Ridge. He would prove to be equally unyielding at Ringgold.[10]

In this encounter Cleburne's skills were greatly enhanced by his position. Taylor's Ridge was both higher and steeper then Missionary Ridge. The hills on either side of Ringgold Gap were "thinly wooded" allowing defenders on the top a clear line of fire over most of the slope, including the very bottom. Cleburne camouflaged two pieces of artillery on the road at the western mouth of the gap and positioned his infantry on both sides at the summit. He placed a larger number of troops to his right, on the northern side of the gap where the slope was more gradual and an attack would have a greater chance of success. In absolute terms, both sides of the gap were steep and open making the summit a very difficult place from which to dislodge 4,000 veteran troops.[11]

The natural strength of the Confederate position was increased by the fact that the Union attack would be made without the benefit of artillery support. Hooker's guns had

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[9] .O.R., Vol 31, P2, 401, 403; National Tribune, 21 January 1904.
[10] .O.R., Vol 31, P2, 402-3, 754.
[11] .O.R., Vol 31, P2, 402-3, 754-5; McDonough, Chattanooga, 220.

been crucial to his success at Lookout Mountain but he was still without them on the morning of November 27. Though anxious to intercept Bragg's wagon train, Hooker was unwilling to order a general attack without his artillery. His solution to the dilemma was to gradually commit two of his three divisions in a series of uncoordinated, piecemeal attacks.[12]

The first to test the enemy's strength was First Division, Fifteenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee. Hooker ordered Major General Peter Osterhaus forward against the Confederate right. Cleburne had correctly anticipated the move. His camouflaged guns in the gap and hidden infantry on the summit suddenly opened on the blue line as it began to advance up the hill. Osterhaus kept his troops to the task but the rebel fire was so severe it was difficult for his men to maintain forward momentum. The attack repeatedly bogged down putting First Division in the unenviable position of exchanging gun fire with an enemy in a far superior position.[13]

Hoping that Osterhaus would keep Cleburne preoccupied, at 9:00 A.M. Hooker ordered John Geary to send a brigade to the extreme left to try to gain the summit undetected and attack the Confederate right flank. Geary selected First Brigade, still under the command of William Creighton and at this time comprised of only four regiments, the Twenty-Eighth and One Hundred Forty-Seventh Pennsylvania and the Seventh and Sixty-Sixth Ohio. Hooker's order was wishful thinking. It was impossible to scale the ridge undetected. Any attack made from the Union left would have to cross a large open field before it reached the foot of the ridge. First Brigade marched across the field quickly but it immediately came under a severe fire from the summit. At the base of the ridge Creighton deployed into a single line of battle and sent the brigade forward. Before stepping out with his own regiment he offered the Seventh some final encouragement. "Boy's, we are ordered to take that hill. I want to see you walk right up it." It was not something Creighton normally did. But he realized that it was obvious to

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[12] O.R., Vol 31, P2, 320-1; Welcher, Union Army, Vol 2, 523.
[13] O.R., Vol 31, P2, 403; McDonough, Chattanooga, 222.

these veterans that this charge, regardless of its outcome, would be costly. ". . . All saw we had a desperate thing on hand but up we went."[14]

Cleburne was aware of First Brigade's movements from the beginning and extended his right to contest the charge. At the outset Creighton instructed his men not to stop to return the rebel fire. He did not want his charge to immediately lose its momentum and suffer the fate of the first Union attack. Even without pausing to fire the brigade's ascent was "necessarily slow." At this point the ridge was 450-500 feet high and difficult to climb. ". . . It would have been a severe task to have mounted the abrupt acclivity even without opposition in front." Though the sharp and accurate fire from the summit "began to tell on his ranks," Creighton kept the brigade moving steadily up the side of the ridge.[15]

A little past the mid-point of the ascent Creighton ordered his line to open fire on the rebels. "Volley after volley was poured into the opposing hosts above, and a murderous fire swept back into our own lines." The exchange continued for half an hour, First Brigade delivering substantial punishment but absorbing much more. Geary saw his window of opportunity closing. "Observing the enemy to be massing in Creighton's front and reinforcements against us arriving, I directed him to make a final attempt to carry the point."[16]

This final push was disastrous for the Seventh. It was forced to move through a ravine which enabled the enemy to fire on it from both flanks as well as the front. The regiment lost heavily along its entire line. Despite this the Ohio volunteers continued to press forward behind Creighton and Lieutenant Colonel Orrin Crane. Their courage and grit would not be enough this day. They were up against veteran troops that not only substantially outnumbered them but also enjoyed "every advantage of position." It is impressive that the Seventh got as far as it did. "The regiment nearly gained the crest of the hill, within a few yards of the rebel breastworks, when their fire became too heavy for flesh and blood to withstand." The last desperate push ended at 10:30 A.M. when

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[14] .O.R., Vol 31, P2, 403; Wilder, Company C, 39; George D. Lockwood to mother, 28 November 1863, Lockwood Family Papers.
[15] .O.R., Vol 31, P2, 403, 418.
[16] .O.R., Vol 31, P2, 403.

Lieutenant Colonel Crane was shot and killed just short of the summit. Creighton ordered the entire brigade to retire. What remained of the Seventh "moved back slowly and sullenly, delivering its volleys with coolness, and bringing off as many of its wounded as possible." During the retreat, while standing at a fence waiting until his command reached the opposite side, William Creighton was mortally wounded. He died six hours later. When Geary received word of Creighton's wounding he ordered First Brigade back to the base of the ridge.[17]

At noon Hooker's artillery finally arrived but Cleburne had received word that the Confederate wagon train had reached a safe distance and he fell back from Taylor's Ridge and formed a new line to fight again if necessary. It would not be. Grant arrived on the field at 1:00 P.M. and ordered Hooker to discontinue the pursuit.[18]

The assault had been damaging to the entire brigade but for the other three regiments it was less costly. The Twenty-Eighth Pennsylvania and Sixty-Sixth Ohio, advancing on the Seventh's right were eventually well protected by a stone ledge forty yards below the summit. The One Hundred Forty-Seventh Pennsylvania, on the extreme left, remained slightly behind the Seventh and, like the other two, did not have to advance through the ravine and endure the deadly enemy crossfire. While these regiments were significantly damaged the Seventh was in shambles. Of the thirteen officers that made the charge, five were killed and seven wounded. The lone non-casualty, Captain Ernst Krieger of Company K was now in command. Total casualties for the regiment were 16 killed and 58 wounded out of 206 involved, a casualty rate of 36 percent.[19]

The high casualty numbers alone do not reflect the total impact of the Battle of Ringgold on the Seventh. The loss of their field officers was a blow even these resilient veterans would never fully recover from. "In the deaths of Colonel Creighton and Lieutenant Colonel Crane our loss is irreparable. They need no praise from us --- we cannot do their memory nor our feelings justice, but we will always hold them in remembrance for their efforts in our behalf and as our guides through a dozen battles." For many of the remaining members of the regiment Creighton and Crane were the

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[17] O.R., Vol 31, P2, 403-4, 418-9, 756; Wood, A Record, 244; Wilson, Itinerary, 286.
[18] O.R., Vol 31, P2, 320-1, 406.
[19] O.R., Vol 31, P2, 404; Fox, Regimental Losses, 312; Wilson, Itinerary, 290.

Seventh Ohio. "It seemed to these mourners that in their loss the regiment itself was blotted out --- that it would no more be known and honored --- that its sun had set forever."[20]

William Creighton was the dominant personality and unquestioned leader of the Seventh Ohio from the day it was formed. Though Erastus Tyler was the Seventh's first colonel, it was then Lieutenant Colonel Creighton that tirelessly drilled the regiment at marching and fighting maneuvers. The Ohio volunteers complained about the work but came to understand its importance to their performance and survival and to respect the man who would not accept anything but their best. He never sent them into battle, he led them. He made no attempt to strengthen his position with them by becoming "one of the boys." He was their leader, not their peer. If asked to describe Creighton, their typical response would be "he is a soldier, every inch." When he was promoted following the Battle of Kernstown the regiment made sure he knew they approved. "On the 25th the Seventh was called out to witness the presentation of a handsome and spirited horse, fully caparisoned with sword, shoulder straps (denoting the rank of colonel), sash, spurs and field glasses --- a present from the officers and men to Colonel William R. Creighton." When word was received that he was enroute to rejoin the regiment after recovering from the wounds he suffered at Cedar Mountain, members of the Seventh met every arriving train to make sure some of them were there to welcome him. George Lockwood described their anticipation to his mother, explaining in a later letter that "Bully" was the expression for "the supremest degree of excellence." "We all look anxiously for Creighton, he is our Bully man for the Bully Seventh . . . He is all military. All the men in the regiment like him." Some in the regiment realized that their colonel had impressed not only them but also his superiors. They wondered if a promotion to brigadier general was in his future. "If they want a fighting man they can not do better."[21]

Orrin Crane was William Creighton's understudy, filling each position Creighton left as he advanced up the ladder of command. The two men worked closely together, Crane assimilating Creighton's high standards for himself and for the regiment. Both men

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[20] .O.R., Vol 31, P2, 419; Wood, A Record, 249.

[21] .Wood, A Record, 273; Wilson, Itinerary, 173; George D. Lockwood to mother, 6 January 1863, 17 October 1862, 8 February 1863, Lockwood Family Papers.

were respected as much for their daily concern for their men as for their battlefield courage. The winter following their deaths was a time of inactivity but they were still missed. "It seems quite lonely here. There is a great vacancy which will take a long time to fill. Creighton and Crane were almost constantly with the regiment and studiously engaged finding something to remove the ennui of camp life." There was only one modest comfort the survivors allowed themselves. It was important to these men that in their final battle they had lived up to the expectations of their fallen leaders. "Our noble dead need no eulogy from us; others will do their memory justice. We were repulsed but not disgraced; handled but not humiliated. All that men could do against superior numbers and the advantageous position of the enemy was cheerfully done . . . . We had not dishonored our flag."[22]

Captain Ernst Krieger admitted that the Seventh was "stunned" by the loss of its colonels and correctly predicted that their deaths would produce strong reactions outside the regiment. "The loss will not be felt by us alone; it will be felt throughout the corps and at home." Joseph Hooker was commanding Twelfth Corps at the time. His immediate reaction to the news was "My God, are they dead? Two braver men never lived." Later, when acknowledging their deaths in his official report on the Battle of Ringgold he described the two Ohio officers as being among "the brightest names of the Army." Of all their superiors, division commander John Geary was probably in the best position to evaluate the two men. His respect for them as soldiers was unqualified. "Colonel W. R. Creighton and Lieutenant Colonel O. J. Crane, of the Seventh Ohio Volunteers, were two as brave men and thorough veterans as ever commanded men in the field. To speak of Creighton and Crane in command was at once to personify all that was gallant, brave, and daring."[23]

Krieger probably expected the high praise from Hooker and Geary. It is unlikely, however, that he anticipated the magnitude of the response to their deaths in Cleveland. A joint committee made up of public officials and private citizens was formed to decide upon the "appropriate manner" in which the bodies of Creighton and Crane were to be received

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[22] .George D. Lockwood to mother, ? December 1863, Lockwood Family Papers; O.R., Vol 31, P2, 419.
[23] .O.R., Vol 31, P2, 324, 407, 419; Cleveland Morning Leader, 8 December 1863.

upon their return home. There was a genuine desire at all levels of society, from blue collar workers to the city's first citizens, to pay proper tribute to these men and the regiment they led. "Never perhaps has this community been so deeply affected by the death of any of its prominent citizens as it is by that of these two soldiers; men who had grown to be idols in the popular heart, and who were everywhere regarded as our worthy representatives in the field." The committee dispatched eight former officers of the regiment to Cincinnati to join the five man party from the Seventh that was escorting the bodies to Cleveland. A subcommittee was appointed to raise money to pay off any debts which encumbered the dead officers property. Without having any idea of what sum this might require, one committee member nevertheless predicted that he "could raise all the money needed in one hour on Superior Street alone." City Council provided burial lots in Woodland Cemetery and the committee made financial arrangements for appropriate headstones.[24]

Over 3,000 people met the train carrying the bodies when it arrived in Cleveland at 10:00 P.M. on Sunday, December 6. The bodies were taken to their family homes in a horse drawn hearse escorted by an honor guard comprised of Ohio militia, former members of the Seventh, committee members and the general public. The following morning they were moved to Council Hall where they lay in state from 10:00 A.M. to 9:00 P.M. The hall was shrouded and "appropriately darkened for the mournful occasion." Former members of the Seventh stood guard over the remains. City officials estimated that over 20,000 people filed past the flag draped coffins upon which lay the sword and side arm of each fallen officer.[25]

The funeral was Tuesday, December 8. Government offices at all levels remained closed for the day. The committee requested that all places of business and public schools be closed during the ceremonies and most complied. "A Sabbath-like stillness reigned over the city." The funeral procession from Council Hall to the church and later to the cemetery was impressive. It was comprised of Ohio militia, former members of the Seventh including the first regimental band, the special escort of current members of the

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[24] .Cleveland Plain Dealer, 3 December 1863; Cleveland Morning Leader, 7 December 1863.
[25] .Cleveland Plain Dealer, 7 December 1863; Cleveland Morning Leader, 8 December 1863.

Seventh, city officials, the committee, city and county military units, members of the typographical union and ship's carpenters and private citizens. The band played funeral dirges. Eight former officers of the Seventh walked beside each of the horse drawn hearses as pall bearers. The crowds along the entire route were huge. *The Cleveland Morning Leader* estimated the turnout in tens of thousands. "All Cleveland was looking at the sad spectacle." The paper considered the procession "the most magnificent and imposing that ever passed through the streets of Cleveland."[26]

The huge response the deaths of William Creighton and Orrin Crane produced in Cleveland is dramatic evidence that the bond between the regiment and the homefront remained strong throughout the Seventh's entire term of service. Neither of the officers enjoyed economic or social status in the community before the war. The printer and ship's carpenter became celebrities because they were the commanding officers of the first regiment to go to war from the Western Reserve. The tribute the city paid to Creighton and Crane was in reality a tribute to the entire regiment. Letters from the front had extolled the personal qualities and military skills of the two officers. Their fame and stature grew with the reports of each new battle. But the greater part of their status as leaders derived from the men they led. Because the Seventh was the first to go to war and performed so consistently well on the battlefield, it always enjoyed a special place in the hearts and minds of those back home. The regiment was a great source of pride in the Western Reserve. The funerals of Creighton and Crane allowed the city of Cleveland the opportunity to honor all those from the regiment who had died and to show its gratitude to those who continued to serve.

On December 1, 1863, four days after the Battle of Ringgold, the Seventh returned to Second Division's camp at Wauhatchie in Lookout Valley. At the beginning of January, Candy's Brigade moved to Bridgeport where the Seventh remained until William Sherman began his spring offensive. As far as physical comforts were concerned, the men of the Seventh enjoyed a pleasant winter. Their quarters were good, supplies were

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[26] .Wood, A Record, 225; Cleveland Morning Leader, 7 December 1863, 9 December 1863; Cleveland Plain Dealer, 8 December 1863.

sufficient and they were required to perform only light duty. As far as their mental attitude and morale were concerned, it was a period of reappraisal and reconciliation.[27]

The immediate response of the majority of the regiment to the severe loss they suffered at Ringgold was anger. They were upset that the entire command had not been used in the assaults and especially angry that they had been sent forward without artillery support. "It was impossible to carry the position without it and hazardous to attempt it with it." It seemed to many of them that the regiment had been sacrificed and deprived of its leadership in an operation that was doomed to failure from its inception. It was the first time during their service that these men seriously questioned their usage and the competence of those giving the orders. Their disenchantment came at a bad time for the army. The three year terms of enlistment of those who had responded to Lincoln's initial call for troops were scheduled to expire in the spring and early summer of 1864. The War Department spent the winter months lobbying these men to reenlist for an additional three years, appealing first to their patriotism but also offering cash bounties and month long furloughs as additional inducements. In general, the government's efforts were successful. Over 140,000 Union rank and file reenlisted or "veteranized." In the army of the Potomac, slightly over half of those eligible to reenlist did so. The War Department required that seventy-five percent of the men in a regiment reenlist in order for that regiment to maintain its organizational identity. In the case of the Seventh, only twenty-five percent (60 out of a possible 228) of the regiment agreed to veteranize.[28]

The fact that the question was posed to the Seventh in the aftermath of Ringgold made the response predictable. Morale was low. A general state of depression lingered over the regiment. The men had begun to have doubts about their high command and they were without William Creighton and Orrin Crane to help them sort things out. There is no way of knowing if the former leaders of the regiment would have actively tried to persuade their men to reenlist. There is also no doubt that they would have remained in

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[27] .Wilson, Itinerary, 290.

[28] .Wood, A Record, 167; Wilson, Itinerary, 287; Gerald Fl Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 262; Bruce Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1953), 40; National Tribune, 21 January 1904; O.R., Vol 38, P2, 178.

the army and that their example would have influenced many in the Seventh to do the same.

The negative impact of Ringgold was not the only reason the majority of the regiment declined to reenlist. There was a sincere conviction among these men that they had done their part and could "return to their homes with clear consciences." They were keenly aware that many men had remained home in comfort and prospered during their nearly three years of hardship and sacrifice. Some members of the regiment were obsessed with "the sneaks and cowards who are at home" but most based their decision on the contribution they had made rather than what others had failed to do. The very real threat of serious injury or death was only part of their sacrifice. George Lockwood wrote ". . . It is a hard, uncomfortable and tedious business to be a soldier." Most in his regiment agreed with him and felt that by completing their original term of service they had done their share.[29]

Having chosen not to reenlist, the majority of the regiment began to anticipate going home in the spring. They hoped to avoid being ordered into any more severe battles but if so "would not let down those who already sacrificed life and limb." Their final months in uniform would not be without controversy. A serious disagreement arose concerning the date the Seventh's term of service was to expire. The Seventh Ohio was officially mustered in on April 28, 1861, in response to President Lincoln's call for ninety-day volunteers. In late June, while at Camp Dennison, the regiment was approached by state officials to extend its term of enlistment to three years. To a man, the members of the regiment who agreed to the longer term of service believed that its starting date was retroactive to April 28. They were adamant that recruiting officials had assured them of this. As a result, to a man, they considered their term of service over as of April 28, 1864. The federal government disagreed. On March 8, at dress parade, an order from the War Department was read stating that the regiment's term of service would officially expire June 20. The men were convinced that Ohio recruiting officials had intentionally misled

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[29] .Wilder, Company C, 41; George D. Lockwood to brother Jim, 11 August 1862, Lockwood Family Papers; George D. Lockwood to mother, 14 February 1863, Lockwood Family Papers.

them to encourage them to enlist for three years. They were angry and felt betrayed but also understood there was nothing they could do about it.[30]

The winter months of 1863-4 were mentally difficult for the 240 men fit for duty with the Seventh. Ringgold had devastated the ranks and taken an even heavier toll on the officers. There were now only eleven commissioned officers in the entire regiment. The idle hours of winter camp allowed ample time for doubt and discontent to erode the confidence and commitment that had carried them through previous hard times. A series of concerns, how they had been used, the question of veteranization and the dispute over when their term of service expired made it difficult for the members of the Seventh to relax. The change of seasons and a new commanding officer brought a dramatic improvement in morale. Samuel M. McClelland, who would participate in every engagement the Seventh had, was Captain of Company H when he was wounded at Taylor's Ridge. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel while recovering and returned to Bridgeport to assume command of the regiment in mid March. The new commanding officer had learned from his predecessors. Writing a month after McClelland took over, a Cleveland reporter was impressed by the results. "(Lieutenant) Colonel McClelland had wrought wonderful changes in the general appearance of things since his return, resuscitating good feelings and discipline to its former high standard." It would be unfair to the rank and file to allow McClelland all of the credit. The men of the Seventh had always been resilient. It had taken them longer to bounce back this time and they were approaching this spring's offensive with less enthusiasm than they had shown in the past, but they were ready to return to the work of soldiering. The reporter acknowledged that "the gloom and sorrow which hung pall-like over them during all those dark days of last winter has melted away."[31]

As the war entered its third year there were significant organizational changes in the Union armies in the Western Theater. On March 9, 1864, Ulysses S. Grant was commissioned lieutenant general. Three days later he was placed in command of the Armies of the United States. William Sherman replaced Grant in command of the Military

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[30] . George D. Lockwood to mother, ? December 1863, Lockwood Family Papers; Wilder, Company C, 8; Cleveland Morning Leader, 21 March 1864.

[31] .O.R., Vol 38, P2, 178; Wilson, Itinerary, 371; Cleveland Morning Leader, 12 April 1864.

District of the Mississippi. Among additional changes, on April 4, Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, detached from the Army of the Potomac were combined to form Twentieth Corps, Army of the Cumberland. Joseph Hooker remained in command of the new corps. Now in complete control of the Union war effort, Grant was determined to take full advantage of the North's manpower superiority by applying continuous pressure to Confederate forces on several fronts simultaneously. In the West he ordered Sherman to march against the vital Confederate manufacturing and rail center at Atlanta. Grant's hope was to force Joseph Johnston, Braxton Bragg's replacement as commander of the Army of Tennessee, into a conclusive confrontation and to destroy his army.[32]

Hooker's Twentieth Corps was at or near the front of the Army of the Cumberland as Sherman set out on his Atlanta campaign during the first week of May. The evidence suggests that initially, Second Division commander John Geary, probably in deference to the severe loss it suffered at Ringgold, made some effort to keep the Seventh Ohio away from the hard fighting. In an engagement at Rocky Face Ridge on May 8, Charles Candy's First Brigade was involved but the Seventh was held in reserve, supporting an artillery battery and also acting as Geary's bodyguard. A week later, in an engagement at Resaca, Georgia, Geary again held the Seventh in reserve, deploying three companies on the crest of a hill to stop the retreat of stragglers from the front. It would be interesting to know how diligently the men of the Seventh performed this duty. They sincerely believed their own term of service had rightfully expired in April and that they should now be out of harms way. They must have had mixed emotions about returning other men to the front[33].

The business of war would not allow Geary to shelter the Seventh for long. The relative safety of being part of the reserve ended abruptly on May 25 when the Seventh "received orders to take the advance of the brigade, which had the advance of the division and the entire column." The Seventh formed the skirmish line for the Army of the Cumberland as it advanced toward Dallas, Georgia. At New Hope Church, four miles northwest of Dallas, the Seventh ran into and promptly bounced off of John Bell Hood's

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[32] O.R., Vol 32, P1, 5; Welcher, Union Army, 414; Fox, Regimental Losses, 89.
[33] O.R., Vol 38, P2, 178-9; Wilder, Company C, 41; Wilson, Itinerary, 293-4.

Corps of the Army of Tennessee. Hood deployed behind breastworks along a heavily wooded ridge. The remainder of Geary's Division came up quickly and formed along a second wooded ridge north of and parallel to Hood's position. Geary was seriously outnumbered but extended his skirmish line and ordered it to "keep up an aggressive fire to deceive the enemy as to our weakness by a show of strength." The Seventh moved forward as part of the deception and, as Geary would later report, showed that their winter of discontent had not diminished their fighting skills. "During this halt a charge made by a brigade of the enemy upon the part of my skirmish line occupied by the Seventh Ohio Volunteers was handsomely repulsed." Forming into nearly a right angle toward the enemy, the Seventh allowed the charging Confederates to advance deep into the angle before responding with a sharp fire in the enemy front and a devastating fire from their left flank. The Confederates "retreated in hasty disorder with considerable loss." Geary's deception bought enough time for Hooker's other two divisions to come to his support. Hooker attempted to break Hood's line by concentrating his attack against the Confederate center. The Union commander ordered each of his three divisions to form in a column of brigades for the attack. Tightly bunched, Hooker sent his entire corps forward against the single Confederate division anchoring the center of Hood's line. Despite three hours of trying, the last hour in a severe thunderstorm, the Union attack was unsuccessful.[34]

During the assault, Candy's brigade was the second of the three comprising Geary's column, placing the Seventh Ohio in the middle of the attacking force. In his history of Company C, Private Theodore Wilder states that his regiment, "hesitated" when Geary ordered a sunset charge. "The men did not hesitate from fear, but several good reasons were the cause of the hesitation. Their time had expired. They had already done more than their share of charging. They would have been cut to pieces by the rear regiments, and if they failed they would have received no more thanks than they did at Ringgold." A generous interpretation of Wilder's comments would be that the Seventh was slow to respond to Geary's order but eventually made the charge. But the precise wording of the private's statements and his lengthy attempts to justify the "hesitation"

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[34] .O.R., Vol 39, P2, 123, 179; Welcher, Union Army, 433-4.

clearly indicate that the Seventh either openly refused Geary's order or simply chose to ignore it. Wilder's justifications are legitimate. These veterans considered their term of service rightfully over and they had participated in enough charges against Confederate entrenchments to know this one would be very costly and had little chance of success. Hooker's subsequent defeat and high casualty figures would prove them right. For most of the day, functioning as the skirmish line for the entire column, the Seventh Ohio performed with the courage and coolness that was its trademark. These men would continue to do their duty but they would not allow themselves to be carelessly misused in the final days of their service.[35]

The engagement at New Hope Church was the Seventh Ohio's final appearance on the battlefield. Its casualties were modest compared to previous battles, four killed and twenty-eight wounded. Unfortunate enough to be the last battlefield fatalities of the regiment were Sergeant Isaac Stratton and Private Monroe Hazen, both from Franklin Mills along with Sergeant Robert McClelland from Youngstown and Private Bingham Tuttle from Painesville. On June 2, Geary's Division was ordered to Allatoona on the Western and Atlantic Railroad as Sherman moved to reestablish his supply line. Nine days later the Seventh was told to report to Cleveland to be mustered out. If John Geary was aware of the regiment's "hesitation" at New Hope Church it was not apparent in his remarks as the Seventh left his division. "On the 11th, the term of service of the Seventh Ohio Volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel McClelland, having expired, the regiment departed for the North. During its long connection with my division, this regiment, by gallant service upon many battlefields, on which it lost heavily, earned for itself a reputation of which Ohio may well be proud."[36]

The Fifth Ohio was also ordered home at this time. Those from the two Ohio regiments who had veteranized, along with those recruits whose terms of enlistment were not up, were consolidated under the banner of the Fifth. They would accompany Sherman through Georgia and the Carolinas and march with his army in the Grand Review in Washington, D.C. at the end of the war.[37]

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[35] .Wilder, Company C, 42.
[36] .O.R., Vol 38, P2, 126, 180; Wilson, Itinerary, 648-9.
[37] .Dyer, Compendium, Vol 3, 1499.

On June 14, what remained of the Seventh Ohio, 136 men, boarded passenger cars at Big Shanty Station on the Western and Atlantic Railroad for the trip home. The train passed through Chattanooga on its way to Nashville where the regiment transferred to the Steamer *Mercury* for the trip down the Cumberland and up the Ohio to Cincinnati. On June 21, near Preston, Kentucky, the Seventh engaged in its last shooting, exchanging fire with rebel guerrillas who managed to wound two of the returning volunteers. Three days later, as the *Mercury* steamed to within thirty miles of Cincinnati, Sergeant Oliver C. Trembly of Company C secured the distinction of having the worst luck in the regiment. Trembly was one of the few members of the Seventh never wounded despite participating in every one of its engagements. He was returning to civilian life unscathed when, while passing along an unguarded edge of the lower deck of the steamer, he slipped, fell overboard and drowned.[38]

At Cincinnati, the Seventh was asked to share in that city's welcome for the returning Fifth Ohio Volunteers. George Wood felt the gesture to be "eminently fitting" since the two regiments had been brigaded together for so long. "The history of one is the history of the other." The Seventh then boarded railroad cars for the final leg of its journey home.[39]

The Seventh arrived in Cleveland on June 26. It was a beautiful, sunny Sunday morning, just as it had been when it departed three years earlier. The regiment was over a thousand strong when it left Cleveland in 1861. The 136 men that left the front in Georgia picked up an additional 109 at camps and hospitals along the route to increase the number of officers and men returning to 245. News that the regiment would arrive on Sunday morning had spread through the city the previous day. When the fire bells throughout the city sounded a loud alarm at 7:30 A.M., everyone understood the signal and "people from every quarter headed for Union Depot." These men were special. "The Bully Seventh - The pride and glory of the Reserve was coming."[40]

Greetings with family and friends consumed an hour during which time periodic cannon fire added the appropriate military tone to the welcome and the crowd at the depot

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[38] .Wilson, Itinerary, 312, 430.
[39] .Wood, A Record, 173.
[40] .Wilson, Itinerary, 313; Cleveland Morning Leader, 27 June 1864.

"swelled to thousands." After being served breakfast the regiment was escorted to the square in front of the United States Building by an honor guard of police and a company of forty-five discharged members of the Seventh. The former members of the regiment carried the second of the Seventh's three regimental flags. The first had been deposited at the State House in Columbus and the "tattered and torn" third was being proudly carried by the returning veterans. The march was a "continuous ovation" for the Seventh from people crowded onto sidewalks, in windows and doorways and even on roof tops. Thousands more surrounded the square where the formal reception was to be held.[41]

When the Seventh reached the square, Colonel McClelland, who along with Captain Arthur T. Wilcox of Company E were the only two officers to hold commissions in the regiment through its entire term of service, formed the men into a solid square. City Prosecutor J.C. Grannis, standing in for the mayor, summarized the Seventh's history and spoke of its lofty position in the hearts and minds of the people of the Reserve. But Governor John Brough offered the comments that most would remember from the occasion. "Standing as I do, in the position of father to all the regiments of the State, I cannot discriminate between my children. But without disparagement I can say that no regiment has returned, or remains to come after you, bearing a more perfect and glorious record than the Seventh Ohio."[42]

The regiment stayed at Camp Cleveland in Cleveland Heights until it was officially mustered out of service. A liberal furlough policy was in effect and many of the men went home to await the final paperwork. On Sunday, July 3, those in camp escorted the remains of William Creighton and Orrin Crane from a temporary vault in Erie Cemetery to their final resting place in Woodland Cemetery, where a monument to the Seventh was subsequently erected. The men of the Seventh were discharged on July 6 and received their final pay two days later.[43]

Over 2,000 regiments fought in the Union Army during the Civil War. They had a great many characteristics in common and undoubtedly some had one or more attributes that were completely unique. But the better regiments, those that had an impact, were

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[41] .Cleveland Morning Leader, 27 June 1864; Wood, A Record, 178.
[42] .Cleveland Morning Leader, 27 June 1864, 28 June 1864.
[43] .Wilson, Itinerary, 314.

special not because of one unique characteristic but rather a unique combination of the characteristics found throughout the army. The Seventh was special, partly because it was presented with opportunities to make a difference, but mainly because it took advantage of those opportunities. The caliber of the officers and men, the fact that they were among the first to go, their attitude, their relationship to the homefront and where they served and who they fought all combined to make the Seventh special.[44]

The most common criteria by which Civil War regiments are evaluated are casualty numbers. It is not a foolproof method. Casualties could be caused by incompetence as well as bravery. A regiment's losses could be high simply from being at the wrong place at the wrong time, regardless of how well it fought. But despite these flaws it is also certain that the more combat a regiment saw and the harder it fought, the more likely it was to sustain high casualties. Of the 2,000 plus regiments in the Union Army only fifty-four had casualty rates higher than that of the Seventh Ohio. Total enrollment of the Seventh was 1,365. Of that number, 13.4 percent, 10 officers and 174 enlisted men were killed or mortally wounded. These numbers place the Seventh second among Ohio's 218 regiments in terms of both total number and percentage of casualties. Only the Forty-Ninth Ohio Volunteers (T.S. Wood's Division, Fourth Corps), with 202 total casualties and a percentage of 13.7, suffered a greater loss than the Seventh. In addition to its battlefield deaths, the regiment lost another 89 men to disease or accident, 15 of whom died in Confederate prisons. The Seventh's total loss was 273 men. Of the surviving members of the regiment 682 were wounded leaving only 410 men who completed their enlistment escaping death and wounds. Lawrence Wilson cautioned that even those who were apparently unhurt paid a price. " . . . A large percentage suffered in impairment of health and by degradation of vigor. No man goes to war and comes home unharmed."[45]

The Seventh's casualties were high because it was a fighting regiment. It participated in fourteen major engagements in both theaters of the war. Its regimental flags bore the names of some of the war's best known battles, Antietam, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg in the East, Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge in the West. But it

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[44] .Fox, Regimental Losses, 3.

[45] .Fox, Regimental Losses, 10-14, 312; Dyer, Compendium, Vol 3, 1499; National Tribune, 21 January 1904; Roster Commission, Official Roster, Vol 2, iv.

was in the lesser known but still important battles of Winchester, Port Republic, Cedar Mountain and Ringgold that the Seventh did its best fighting and suffered its most severe losses. The regiment usually carried more than its share of the load. Its colonels often assumed brigade command and Erastus Tyler, William Creighton and Orrin Crane always placed their own regiment in the middle of the most severe fighting. As important to the Seventh's final casualty numbers as the number of battles it fought was the quality of the opponents it was fighting against. Its finest hours in the East were at the expense of Stonewall Jackson and his highly regarded Valley Army. The regiment also did battle with Robert E. Lee during the high point in the history of the Army of Northern Virginia. In the West, the Seventh challenged the entrenched divisions of Pat Clerburne and John Bell Hood, two of the very best fighting officers the South put into the field. The volunteers from the Western Reserve were asked to prove themselves over and over again against the elite of the Confederate Army and they did not fail. In the process they suffered high casualties but so did those they fought against. Their record places them among the best fighting regiments of the war, on either side.

A consideration of its battles alone does not adequately convey the hardships of the Seventh's term of service. The regiment was among the first to operate in enemy territory, suffering from the mistakes and inadequacies of a national government trying to organize and deploy a large army quickly. During the first year of the war, many Union regiments in the East did little more than occupy large encampments in the Washington area and drill. The First Battle of Bull Run was the lone notable exception to the general pattern. The Seventh Ohio was among that smaller group of Eastern regiments that was charged with establishing and maintaining a Union presence in western Virginia. While the duty did not involve extensive combat, it did require a great deal of effort and sacrifice to function in this difficult environment. The government was still learning the requirements of maintaining an army in the field and often the regiment's logistical support was poor, leaving it at the mercy of the terrain and the elements. Although the Seventh's first nine months of service included only one battle (Cross Lanes), it was difficult duty that took a toll on the men.

The spring of 1862 marked the beginning of serious campaigning for all the Eastern Armies but the Seventh was again among those regiments that were ordered into action earlier than most. The regiment fought two major battles (Kernstown and Port Republic) and pursued Stonewall Jackson up and down the Shenandoah Valley for the better part of three months before the Army of the Potomac fought its first major engagements of the year, the Seven Days' Battles. The Seventh fought in every major battle in the East from the conclusion of the Peninsula Campaign through Gettysburg with the exception of the Battle of Fredericksburg. Following Gettysburg, the regiment was ordered West and fought at Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge and Ringgold while the vast majority of the Army of the Potomac had finished campaigning for the year. The final months of service brought no letup for the Seventh. Two weeks before it was to be sent home it formed the skirmish line for William Sherman's main column in his march on Atlanta. Theodore Wilder estimated that his regiment marched a total of 2,400 miles, traveled by rail and steamer about twice that far and set up camp 194 times. In terms of both fighting and marching the Seventh Ohio was an extremely active regiment throughout its term of service.[46]

Any attempt to explain why the Seventh was one of the best Ohio regiments must begin with the caliber of its men. The leadership skills of its officers and the support of the homefront would be immaterial if the ranks were not filled with men who would respond to both. At the time of the funerals of William Creighton and Orrin Crane, the *Cleveland Morning Leader* maintained that the Seventh was comprised of "material such as seldom answers at roll call." Relating occupations to counties, the paper praised ". . . the sturdy yeomen from Erie, Lake, Portage and Summit, the intelligent students from Lorain, the lithe mechanics and railroad men from Cuyahoga (and) the tough, stalwart miners and furnace men from Mahoning and Trumbull." To some degree this was a case of the hometown newspaper bragging about the local boys. But it also emphasized a point that might be so obvious that it could be overlooked or at least underemphasized. The main reason that the Seventh Ohio's record is so impressive is that it was comprised of quality men. The three year regiments that were formed in the summer of 1861 were the

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[46] .Wilder, Company C, 83.

backbone of the Union Army. Throughout the North, the men who answered Lincoln's initial call for troops were the best he would ever recruit. The volunteers from the Western Reserve were strong evidence of this. They answered the call out of a strong sense of patriotism and duty. They were leaders. They did not wait to see what others might do. It was not necessary to entice them with a bounty or coerce them through a draft. The men that became the Seventh were the "flower of the Reserve," the best of their generation. They were naive and untrained but possessed the character and capabilities to be something special.[47]

It was up to the officers of the Seventh to challenge this character and develop these capabilities. Many, if not most, Civil War officers at the regimental level were no older or wiser than the men they led. When both were novices it was often the case of "the ignorant leading the uneducated." It was a huge advantage to the Seventh that many of its field officers and company captains had previous military experience as officers in state militias or local military organizations. Colonel Erastus Tyler, Major Frederick Seymour and Captain William Sterling had served in state militias. Lieutenant Colonel William Creighton, Major Joseph Molyneaux, Captain Orrin Crane and Lieutenant Louis Deforest had all been active in private military organizations in Cleveland. In these men the regiment possessed a solid core of military expertise and practical experience upon which the other officers and men could draw. This leadership allowed the men of the Seventh to make the transition from citizen to soldier more quickly than was the case in many other regiments.[48]

Peacetime military experience, while valuable, was no assurance of battlefield competence. In terms of actual combat, the Seventh's officers were as untested as the men in the ranks. Both failed miserably at Cross Lanes. But it was the only time either failed. Beginning with Kernstown and lasting through New Hope Church, the field and company officers of the Seventh consistently distinguished themselves on the battlefield. They were regularly praised by both their superior officers and the men who served under them. Joseph Molyneaux, who was captain of Company E at Kernstown, recalled that the

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[47] .Cleveland Morning Leader, 7 December 1863; Mahoning Register, 24 December 1863.
[48] .Robertson, Soldiers, 49; Wood, A Record, 187, 196, 214, 216, 222, 235, 246.

night after the battle, steps were taken to weed out unfit officers. "A meeting of officers was called and five officers who had not shown sufficient courage and energy were requested to resign or have charges preferred against them. They all resigned and we never had occasion to call a meeting for that purpose again." Kernstown was the watershed for the Seventh, the battle at which its officers and men proved something to themselves and to each other. The men established that they were the fighting equals of the enemy's best. In terms of competence and courage, the officers proved themselves worthy of their troops. In time, several of them went on to leadership roles in other regiments. Major Jack Casement resigned from the Seventh in 1862 to accept a commission as colonel of the One Hundred Third Ohio Volunteers. After the regiment was mustered out of service, Captains Author Wilcox and Mervin Clark were granted commissions as colonels in other Ohio regiments while Captain Ernst Krieger reenlisted with the rank of major.[49]

In this regiment a mutual respect developed between the officers and the men. The officers were very attentive to the everyday needs of their men, something that earned them as much respect as their battlefield leadership. In an army where insubordination was the most common discipline problem, there was an exceptional amount of harmony within the Seventh Ohio. In his history of Company C, Theodore Wilder makes no attempt to disguise his contempt for officers in general, but has nothing but praise for those of his own regiment. Wilder's anti-officer attitude was not common. Most members of the Seventh, perhaps because they were so satisfied with their own, displayed a generally positive attitude toward all officers. Before Ulysses S. Grant began to oversee the operation of the Army of the Potomac, many in its ranks blamed their lack of success on the high ranking officers. But members of the Seventh were much less willing to point an accusing finger at the commanding generals. George Lockwood was sure that the constant meddling of politicians into the affairs of the army was the reason for its failures. George Wood blamed destiny. "A sort of fatality has settled on the Army of the Potomac. Some of the best generals have been summoned to its command, but to no purpose. The hand of fate rested upon it heavily. When about to seize upon victory, some stream would

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[49] .Wood, A Record, 191, 207-8, 216; Molyneaux Speech, Clark Papers; Wilson, Itinerary, 398.

rise at its rear, or some unseen accident happen to its communications or line of supplies, compelling it to let go its hold on victory, and in its stead to accept defeat." After the disaster at Ringgold the survivors seriously questioned the way the regiment had been used, but even then they did not assign personal blame to anyone in high command. Throughout their service the men of the Seventh were extremely satisfied with their own officers and willing to give others the benefit of the doubt.[50]

A third important factor in making the Seventh Ohio special, complimenting the high caliber of its officers and men was the consistently strong support it received from the homefront. At the beginning of the war all communities actively supported those who volunteered to represent them. But as the hostilities dragged on, in many cases a gradual estrangement developed between the soldiers and the civilian populations of their home communities. War turned out to be something entirely different from what the volunteers expected and while their attitude changed, the expectations of the homefront remained bound by the "death before dishonor" mentality of the Victorian Era. Most soldiers came to resent the "patriots" at home who were ignorant of the realities of combat but continued to remind them of the importance of doing their duty. The resentment of the soldiers was compounded by the growing indifference towards them by the civilian population as the war went on. The volunteers became alienated from their home communities who they felt did not understand or appreciate them.[51]

This estrangement did not occur between the Seventh Ohio and the people of the Western Reserve. The civilian populations in the communities that sent companies to the regiment actively supported and honored their boys in uniform throughout their entire term of service. Their constant attention would not allow the troops to feel unappreciated. Local newspapers regularly praised the regiment as Ohio's best, even before it had done anything at all to warrant the distinction. Community leaders saw to it that the general population was informed of the regiments activities. In Oberlin, a meeting was held to commemorate the first year's service of Company C of the Seventh Ohio.

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[50] .Wilder, Company C, 1-83; George D. Lockwood to mother, 12 November 1862, Lockwood Family Papers; Wood, A Record, 161-2.

[51] .Linderman, Embattled Courage, 92, 217; Mitchell, C.W. Soldiers, 55-6, 82.

Over 1,000 people stayed "to a late hour" to hear three different speakers relate the details and accomplishments of the company's first year of service.[52]

The huge response the deaths of William Creighton and Orrin Crane caused in the Western Reserve and the elaborate funeral ceremonies that were conducted in the city of Cleveland are the most dramatic evidence of the high esteem in which this regiment was always held at home. But countless smaller acts of appreciation did as much to convince the volunteers that their sacrifices were not being ignored or taken for granted. The men regularly received small packages of food from home, doing as much for their morale as for their diet. Young women organized letter writing campaigns to their hometown companies which the soldiers found to be "a source of much pleasure." The members of Company D expected "an armful" of Valentines from the girls of Painesville each February. In November, 1862, George Lockwood wrote his mother that he had received so many "nice little things" from friends and neighbors that he could not thank all them personally. He was not the only one in his family to be so well treated. The local communities not only looked after the volunteers but also the families they left behind. After Lockwood and his brother had both enlisted, his mother wrote explaining how the community had come to her aid. They harvested her crops, provided her with food and invited her to dinner so often that "a stranger would think she subsisted entirely on charity."[53]

Because the bond between the Seventh and the Western Reserve remained so consistently strong, its members retained a sense of accountability to the homefront much longer than many Civil War regiments. Even after two years of hard service and a dozen major battles it was still important to them that despite being terribly cut up in the ill conceived charge at Ringgold, they had not "dishonored" their flag. The prewar ideals of duty and honor faded very slowly in the Seventh Ohio. They were reinforced by the conduct its officers and the constant attention from the folks at home. Once the

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[52] .Cleveland Morning Leader, 3 October 1861, 22 April 1862.

[53] .George D. Lockwood from mother, 28 September 1862; George D. Lockwood to mother, 17 October 1862, 14 November 1862, 6 January 1863, 27 January 1863, 8 February 1863, Lockwood Family Papers.

volunteers had proven to themselves that they deserved the lofty reputation they had enjoyed almost from the regiment's inception, they were determined to maintain it.[54]

While the homefront reinforced the precepts of duty and honor within the regiment, the reverse was true concerning patriotism. The men of the Seventh volunteered to uphold "the noblest, freest Government that was ever given to man. Their commitment to defend their political liberties never wavered and they bristled when someone out of uniform suggested otherwise. ". . .As where men have been so long in the service it has grown to be the fashion to set down any expression of patriotism as an indication of greenness. But with this disinclination to talk patriotism, which is looked upon as sort of highfalutin, there is *no lack at all of the real article*, and people at home need not fear for soldiers so long as they are true to themselves." The soldiers were not always convinced that the civilian population was firm enough in its support of the war effort. In the spring of 1863, the Seventh joined the rest of the Ohio regiments in Candy's Brigade in issuing a statement that attacked political opposition to the war and lectured Ohio voters on patriotism.[55]

The immediate cause of their displeasure was the unofficial leader of the peace wing of the Democratic Party, Clement L. Vallandigham. The forty-two year old former congressman from Ohio, who had been "gerrymandered" into defeat by Republicans in the 1862 elections, was running for governor in 1863. Vallandigham's ideas became the unofficial platform of the "copperheads", as the political opposition to the war came to be known. He favored reunion through an armistice followed by negotiations, totally rejected emancipation and conscription and condemned the Lincoln administration's infringements on civil liberties in the name of the war effort. But what especially upset the soldiers was Vallandigham's claim that they had lost the desire to win the war. The apparent strength of his candidacy, combined with reports that secret societies supporting the peace movement were gaining strength in Ohio, prompted the strong reaction from the Ohio regiments.[56]

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[54] .O.R., Vol 31, P2, 419.

[55] .Cleveland Morning Leader, 12 March 1863.

[56] .James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 591-8.

In the lengthy published statement, the soldiers reminded those at home why they had volunteered in the first place. ". . . Our existence as a nation was threatened by armed rebel traitors, the consequence of whose success would be our political ruin . . ." The statement continued with a summary of the misinformation the peace movement was spreading about the Union Armies. "Pretending to be friends of the soldier, you have declared the army demoralized, the soldiers tired of the war, opposed to the administration, and desirous of compromise on almost any terms." After dismissing any sort of compromise as unthinkable, the Ohio volunteers made it clear that they considered the copperheads a more treacherous enemy than rebel soldiers. "In short you are black hearted traitors in comparison with whom, the deluded miscreants of Jeff Davis are honorable men."[57]

To publicly reaffirm their own patriotism and denounce the war opposition probably made the soldiers feel better but it did not completely allay their fears. Even though Vallandigham would eventually be easily defeated by his Republican opponent, the apparent strength of the war opposition in Ohio troubled many in the Seventh until the November elections. In a letter to his mother in late September, George Lockwood seemed both amazed and angered that he should still be concerned with the matter. ". . . Could it be possible that Vallandigham stands a chance of success? He would not stand the slightest chance of a natural demise if he were within the lines of this brigade." The Seventh's complete rejection of all copperhead appeals was shared by all Ohio regiments. Voting by absentee ballot, 94 percent of Ohio soldiers voted for Republican John Brough for governor. In the case of the Seventh, the vote was unanimous.[58]

The men of the Seventh did not hesitate to become vocal about patriotism when they felt it necessary but they remained curiously silent regarding the two major enactments of the Lincoln administration that profoundly influenced the war, the Emancipation Proclamation and the draft. There are very few references to slavery in the

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[57] .Cleveland Morning Leader, 17 March 1863.

[58] .George D. Lockwood to mother, 18 September 1863, Lockwood Family Papers; McPherson, Battle Cry, 688; Wilson, Itinerary, 267. Technically there was no Republican Party in Ohio at this time. In August 1861, Republicans, joined by a number of War Democrats, formed the Union Party which lasted through the end of the war. John Brough was elected governor as the Union Party candidate.

letters, diaries and histories left by members of the regiment. This is especially surprising with regard to Company C, which was composed entirely of students from Oberlin College, a center of anti-slavery activity before the war. Theodore Wilder wrote a short history of the company in which the only reference to slavery is a single sentence in the preface as he is describing the principle of "Christian benevolence" upon which the college was founded. Oberlin's students "saw slavery as a great crime and were bold to take a stand against it as one of their Christian duties." Slavery does not receive special attention, it is simply included among the "wrongs" when Wilder wrote that at Oberlin "all forms of virtue were cheerfully adopted while every system of wrong was deprecated." Wilder joined virtually the entire regiment by offering no comment at all on the announcement or enactment of the Emancipation Proclamation. The lone exception to this was George Wood who approved emancipation as both the "right" and "smart" thing to do. Wood devoted most of his attention to the smart aspect of freeing the slaves noting that "the slave was a great asset in keeping the Southern Army in the field." Other than the brief comments of Wood and Wilder, the questions of race, slavery and emancipation were ignored in the writings left by the men of the Seventh. Their silence is testimony that for them the war was always to preserve the Union and protect their political rights. It never became a war for freedom. They cared little about the rights of Blacks.[59]

There are no exceptions to the regiment's silence on conscription. Despite the fact that they were among the troops sent to suppress the draft riots in New York City, the men of the Seventh did not record their opinions of the draft or the rioters. In general, Northern soldiers favored conscription, feeling all should have to share the burden of the war effort. Perhaps the Ohio volunteers considered this too obvious to be worthy of discussion. But it is curious that they responded so strongly to the legitimately organized political dissent against the war and yet were totally silent when civilians rioted in the streets protesting the draft.

If the writings of this regiment were sometimes strangely silent, its actions consistently insured for it a lofty status at the conclusion of the war. As the regiment waited to be mustered out, the Cleveland newspapers regularly referred to the "Grand

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[59] .Wilder, Company C, 1; Wood, A Record, 82.

Seventh," the "Immortal Seventh." These were not extravagant claims. The Seventh's record, considering the length and difficulty of its service combined with its performance on the battlefield is impressive. The newspaper accolades, while justified, could be misleading because they ignore the human responses of these men to the difficulties of being a soldier. The men of the Seventh agreed to reenlist at a rate less than half that of the Army of the Potomac as a whole. Most of the regiment declined to veteranize because they felt they had done their share. They were not on a crusade. They had agreed to serve their country for three years and having done so were eager to return to civilian life. In the final weeks of their service, after fighting to their usual high standards throughout the day, they refused to make a sunset charge that experience told them would be very costly and was certain to fail. They would continue to do their job but would not allow themselves to be needlessly sacrificed. But what they declined to do, or refused to do, for very understandable human reasons, does not diminish what they accomplished and it did not damage their lofty position in the eyes of the public. That the regiment continued to be honored in the post war years can be inferred from remarks made in the preface of the unit history of Twenty-Ninth Ohio Volunteers. Comprised of companies from counties in the Western Reserve, the Twenty-Ninth was brigaded with the Seventh from January 1862 through June 1864. It apparently did not receive equal recognition with the Seventh after the war. Writing in 1883, regimental historian of the Twenty-Ninth John Hamilton SeCheverell felt it necessary to point out the parallel histories of the two regiments "for the benefit of those who imagine that only one regiment was recruited in Northern Ohio."[60]

Further evidence of the Seventh's lofty post war reputation is provided by a ladies society made up of a women born and raised in Ohio but living in New York City during the war. In order to draw attention to their booth at a fair to raise money for the United States Sanitary Commission in 1864, the ladies made and flew a large white banner which they announced would be inscribed and presented to the "most distinguished" Ohio regiment after the war. After a lengthy evaluation process, which included input from

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[60] .Cleveland Morning Leader, 7 December 1863; John Hamilton SeCheverell, Journal History of the Twenty-ninth Ohio Volunteers, 1861-1865 (Cleveland: 1883), 1.

Generals Henry Slocum, John Geary and Erastus Tyler among others, the ladies determined that the Seventh Ohio was most entitled to the flag. It was presented to an executive committee of the Seventh Regimental Association on February 3, 1870.[61]

While the flag is further proof of the regiment's post war reputation, it is not possible to determine one Civil War regiment to be the best from a given state. The vastly differing circumstances under which regiments served makes comparisons suspect. Methods of evaluating the severity of a regiment's service and its performance on the battlefield are imprecise and extremely subjective in nature. The main reason the white banner was presented to the Seventh was that the generals who most influenced the selection process were very familiar with the regiment. The Seventh might have been the best regiment from the State of Ohio, but there is simply no conclusive way to prove it.

Expanding the question, what can be fairly claimed is that Ohio's Bully Seventh was one of the best regiments to fight in the American Civil War, on either side.

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[61] .Wilson, Itinerary, 497-8.

Appendix A

List of Maps

Source

Appendix B

Daily Schedule

Headquarters 7th Regt O.V.I.
Camp Shields, Va March 17, 1862

General #22
Order

Reveille & Roll Call	6 O'Clock	A.M.
Police Duty	6 1/4 O'Clock	A.M.
Breakfast	7 O'Clock	A.M.
Surgeon's Call	7 1/2 O'Clock	A.M.
Rations	8 O'Clock	A.M.
1st Call Guard Mounting	8 1/4 O'Clock	A.M.
Guard Mounting	8 1/2 O'Clock	A.M.
Company Drill	9 O'Clock	A.M.
Re Call	10 1/2 O'Clock	A.M.
Water & Fuel	11 O'Clock	A.M.
Dinner & Roll Call	12 1/2 O'Clock	P.M.
Battalion Drill	2 O'Clock	P.M.
Re Call	4 O'Clock	P.M.
Wood & Water	4 1/2 O'Clock	P.M.
Adjutant's Call	5 O'Clock	P.M.
Retreat & Parade	5 1/2 O'Clock	P.M.
Supper	6 O'Clock	P.M.
Tattoo & Roll Call	8 O'Clock	P.M.
Tapps	8 1/2 O'Clock	P.M.

Lt. J.B. Molyneaux
Actg Adjt

By order of
W.R. Creighton Lt. Col.
Comndg Regt.

Appendix C

Organization

Seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry (3 Months)

Organized Cleveland April 22-25, 1861

July, 1861, Army of Occupation of Western Virginia

July 24, 1861 Mustered Out

Seventh Ohio Volunteer Infantry (3 Years)

June 1861: Organized at Cincinnati's Camp Dennison

July 1861: Unattached, Army of Occupation of Western Virginia

September 1861: Kelly's command, Army of Occupation of Western Virginia

January 1862: Third Brigade, Lander's Division, Army of the Potomac

March 1862: Third Brigade, Shield's Division, Banks' Fifth Corps

April 1862: Third Brigade, Shield's Division, Dept. of the Shenandoah

May 1862: Third Brigade, Shield's Division, Dept. of the Rappahannock

June 1862: Second Brigade, First Division, Second Corps, Army of Virginia

August 1862: First Brigade, Second Division, Second Corps, Army of Virginia

September 1862: First Brigade, Second Division, Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac

October 1863: First Brigade, Second Division, Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac detached.

April 1864: First Brigade, Second Division, Twentieth Corps, Army of the Cumberland

July 6, 1864: Mustered Out

Source: Dyer, Frederick H. A Compendium of the War of Rebellion, Vol 1., 204-05.

Appendix D

Engagements

Cross Lanes, W. Va.	August 26, 1861.
Kernstown, Va.	March 23 1862
Port Republic, Va.	June 9, 1862
Cedar Mountain, Va.	August 9, 1862
Antietam, Md.	September 17, 1862
Dumfires, Va.	December 27, 1862
Chancellorsville, Va.	May 1-4, 1863
Gettysburg, Pa.	July 1-3, 1863
Lookout Mountain, Tenn.	November 24, 1863
Missionary Ridge, Tenn.	November 25, 1863
Ringgold, Ga.	November 27, 1863
Rocky Face Ridge, Ga.	May 5-9, 1864
Resaca, Ga.	May 13-16, 1864

Source: Official Roster of the Soldiers of the State of Ohio in the War of Rebellion, 1861-1866, Vol 2., 200.

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