

MOBILITY, VIGILANCE, JUSTICE: THE U.S. CONSTABULARY
AND LAW AND ORDER OPERATIONS IN OCCUPIED GERMANY,
1945-1947

by

Brian K. Brennan

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Martin G. 17. Aug 1988
Adviser Date

Sally M. Hotchkiss August 26, 1988
Dean of the Graduate School Date

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis deals with the role of the United States Constabulary in Occupied Germany with regard to law and order operations from V-E Day to the end of 1947, when the Constabulary began reverting to a combat role and its law enforcement duties fell upon the reconstituted German civil police forces. As a security arm with authority over both civilian and soldier alike, the Constabulary contributed significantly in bringing order to Germany, but sometimes at the cost of individual rights and human dignity.

Chapter One examines the ways in which historians have viewed the Occupation and the Constabulary. Chapter Two delves into the organization's establishment, while Chapter Three brings into light the unit's leadership and training aspects. Chapter Four views police jurisdiction, while Five deals with Constabulary methods of enforcing Military Government laws.

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Brian K. Brennan

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INTRODUCTION

The author of this study became intrigued with the United States Constabulary after reading Franklin M. Davis, Jr.'s book on the American Occupation of Germany, Come as a Conqueror: The United States Army's Occupation of Germany, 1945-49. Chapter Eleven of the book provides the reader with an excellent sketch of the organization and responsibilities of the Constabulary, as well as a portrait of its colorful first commander, Major General Ernest N. Harmon.¹ As this researcher holds a commission in the U.S. Army Military Police Corps and has a partiality toward modern European history, the subject of the Constabulary promised to be the perfect topic for a master's thesis.

Simply put, the U.S. Constabulary was a collection of combat units, drawn from the Cavalry, the Armored Force, the Field Artillery, and the Infantry, which, after sufficient training in police and security subjects, were given the task

¹Franklin M. Davis, Jr., Come as a Conqueror: The United States Army's Occupation of Germany, 1945-49 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), pp. 162-174.

of patrolling the American Zone of Germany. Their purpose was to serve much in the same way as highway patrols and state police organizations did in the United States. While having original jurisdiction over Allied military personnel, the Constabulary, as an agency of the American Military Government, also had the power to apprehend German nationals and other civilians if such persons posed a potential threat to security and order. Finally, it was the intention of the Constabulary to establish high standards of dress and conduct, in order to set a proper example for the American occupation troops and to impress the German population. In order to determine the validity of the formation of this unique military organization, this paper examines the Constabulary by way of the circumstances behind its inception, its training, and its leadership. Coming under particular scrutiny are the methods utilized by Constabulary Troopers in performing their official duties and the necessity of such.

Research on this particular study of the Constabulary began in the summer of 1986. The methodology used was quite simple. All available monographs dealing with the Allied Occupation were scanned for background material and for specific Constabulary information. Some of these included works by John Gimbel, Earl F. Ziemke, and Harold Zink. Also

consulted were the memoirs of Generals Lucius D. Clay and Ernest N. Harmon. As for documents, the records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (on microfilm) were consulted. Then, a trip to the National Archives Military Field Branch in Suitland, Maryland became a necessity. There, the author sifted through eighteen large cardboard cartons of Constabulary records, some of which were still classified as "secret," awaiting to be downgraded. Further bibliographic assistance was provided by Dr. Roger K. Zeimet, Regimental Historian for the U.S. Army Military Police Corps and School, Fort McClellan, Alabama, and the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

The scope of this thesis encompasses several areas. It begins with a brief review of how historians have treated the Occupation and the Constabulary, followed by an overview of conditions in Germany after the Nazi collapse and prior to the Constabulary's formation. The actual establishment of that law enforcement agency and its leadership and composition are next examined. The Constabulary's response to the various situations in the American Zone and overall conclusions complete the discussion.

Overall, the purpose of this paper is to explain the need for the Constabulary, that of filling the law enforcement vacuum that existed in Germany after Hitler's

defeat, and to describe the methods employed by that organization. Even though the author possesses a military background, this does not deter him from openly criticizing some aspects of Constabulary methodology, which was, in many cases, more reminiscent of that employed by the Nazis than that utilized by typical American state police bodies upon which the Constabulary was modelled.

It must be understood that this paper is not a definitive study of the U.S. Constabulary. The time frame of discussion has been limited to the period from Hitler's defeat in May 1945 to the end of 1947, as, after that time, the Constabulary began reverting back into a combat organization, with most of its law enforcement and security responsibilities having been assumed by the new German civil authorities. Also omitted are detailed discussion on the Constabulary's social activities, such as its support of the German Youth Activities (GYA), as concentration is given to the Constabulary's role as a police and security body.

CHAPTER I

HISTORIANS, THE OCCUPATION, AND THE CONSTABULARY

When they deal with the subject of the American Occupation of Germany, historians generally fall into two camps. In one group, there are those who tend to view the Occupation from a social-political-economic vantage point. Such historians concentrate on the intrigues, the maneuverings, and the bureaucratic mayhem that resulted in an occupation via improvisation. They also limit themselves to discussions on the economic and social order as it evolved in postwar Germany. Authors in this category include John Gimbel, Professor of History at Humboldt State University in California and a former American Military Government Officer,² and Harold Zink, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University and former Chief Historian, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.³

² Robert Wolfe, ed Americans as Proconsuls: The United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952 (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984).

³ Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1957), p. 1.

The other group deals with the Occupation from a primarily military angle. These authors are usually former military men, eyewitnesses, journalists, and/or official historians accredited to the military or one of its organizations. These include memoirs by General Lucius D. Clay, the former American Military Governor of Germany,⁴ Brigadier General Franklin M. Davis, Jr.,⁵ Douglas Botting, a British writer and military historian,⁶ and James M. Snyder, formerly of the Historical Sub-Section of the U.S. Constabulary.⁷

In all due fairness, though, there also exists a smaller school that "straddles the fence" between the socio-economic and political aspects. Of the authors consulted during the

⁴Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany, 1944-1955 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1950).

⁵Davis.

⁶Douglas Botting, From the Ruins of the Reich: Germany 1945-49 (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1985)

⁷James M. Snyder, The Establishment and Operation of the United States Constabulary, 3 October 1945-30 September 1947 (Historical Sub-Section, G-3, United States Constabulary, 1947).

course of this study, the best historian of this type is Earl F. Ziemke, who achieves a decent balance, but, nevertheless, leans toward the military side. This should not come as a great surprise, seeing that Ziemke has been associated with the Army's Center of Military History, for which his study on the Occupation was written.⁸

When it comes to dealing with the U.S. Constabulary, most works are severely deficient. This is probably due to the urge most historians have for trying to "paint the big picture." In other words, strategic issues take precedence over tactical ones. For example, most Occupation historians concern themselves with the advent of the Cold War and the Soviet menace, rather than everyday life in Germany. Denazification and the sensation of the Nuremburg Trials overshadow the simple measures of keeping Displaced Persons in line, the maintenance of safe vehicle speeds on the Autobahnen, or the raiding of a penny-ante black market operation. Yet, these simple "tactical" aspects of the Occupation--the daily effects they had on the American GI's, the Germans, and the Displaced Persons (DP's)--were what the Military Government was all about. Even so complex an entity

⁸ Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1975).

as a human being is forever influenced by microscopic activity within itself. So it was with the organism that was postwar Germany. Historians, though, often prefer the macrocosmic view over the microcosmic.⁹

The U.S. Constabulary, when mentioned, is done so in the military group of works, as well as in Ziemke's, while the other camp give it no attention at all. Even the military historians, unfortunately, provide scant reference to that law enforcement arm. Ziemke devotes only three pages, but seems chiefly interested with organization, weapons, and the colorful Constabulary uniform.¹⁰ Botting implies, incorrectly, that the Constabulary was formed hurriedly to curb the trend of decline in American soldierly discipline,¹¹ then says nothing further, even after a discourse on the misbehavior of Allied troops and DP's.¹² General Clay does no

⁹ One notable exception is Gimbel's excellent study of the town of Marburg. However, he, too, fails to mention the Constabulary's role in law and order. John Gimbel, A German Community under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945-52 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961)

¹⁰ Ziemke, pp. 341, 425, 443.

¹¹ Botting, p. 221.

¹² Ibid., pp. 193-227.

better, as he barely acknowledges the role of the Constabulary, and then only in a general, if laudatory, fashion.¹³

Of all the monographs used in the preparation of this study, only two contained enough substance for one to determine the exact character and mission of the Constabulary. Davis's Come as a Conqueror uniquely dedicates an entire chapter to Harmon's elite organization. The other, Snyder's The Establishment and Operations of the United States Constabulary, provides a thorough, detailed examination of the organization, from its embryonic stages in the minds of Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower to its full-scale activities in the American Zone. One should also mention that General Harmon's memoirs, Combat Commander, provide one of the only first-hand accounts of the Constabulary and the motivations behind it.¹⁴

In summary, Occupation chroniclers have relegated the U.S. Constabulary to the backwaters of history, if that much. This is unfair, as the Constabulary played an

¹³ Clay, pp. 65, 230, 242.

¹⁴ E.N. Harmon, with Milton MacKaye and William Ross MacKaye, Combat Commander: Autobiography of a Soldier (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 279-294.

important part in the maintenance of order and security in the American Zone of Germany. Before examining this role, it is necessary to obtain at least a brief overview of the situation as it existed in Germany prior to the Constabulary's operational date of 1 July 1946. Such a picture illustrates the problems faced by the American Military Government and its police force, the Constabulary.

CHAPTER II

CONDITIONS IN GERMANY AFTER V-E DAY

On 9 May 1945, Nazi Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. The once mighty Reich now lay before her conquerors, prostrate and shattered, her cities pulverized into ruins and her people stunned and dazed. It was into this surrealistic world that the Americans Army, in its zone of occupation, was assigned the task of setting up a military government so that a "respectable" Germany might arise out of the ashes of Nazism. Yet, did the Americans know what to do?

Demaree Bess, an editor for the Saturday Evening Post, argued that the answer to this question was "No." Bess claimed that, everywhere he travelled in Germany, he ran into Americans, ranging from privates to generals, who did not understand the role of the United States in the Occupation. Neither did the people back in "the States." Why was this? Bess states that:

The answer can be expressed, I believe, in one word--secrecy. American plans for the occupation of Germany were prepared in secrecy from the beginning. During the war, secrecy was justified as military security, but this concealment then became an established practice maintained for months after the fighting ended in Europe...

We find that not one American political leader

fully realized at the outset how formidable our German commitments would prove to be...¹⁵

Bess went on to blame cabinet-level infighting as another reason for "failure" in Germany. On the one hand were Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, with both favoring a benevolent American-German rule. On the other hand was Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., with his draconian plan of complete German deindustrialization. Bess contends that, out of this, came the directive that was the basis of the Occupation, JCS 1067, one that forbade fraternization between Americans and Germans, limited monetary relief to Germany, and sought the "decentralization, deindustrialization, and denazification" of the country.¹⁶ JCS 1067, though, proved durable and many of its clauses were eventually incorporated into the Potsdam Protocol,¹⁷ while some aspects, such as complete deindustrialization and non-fraternization, came to be

¹⁵Demaree Bess, "How We Botched the German Occupation," Saturday Evening Post, 218, 26 January 1946, p. 9.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 10, 34.

¹⁷Earl F. Ziemke, "The Formation and Initial Implementation of U.S. Occupation Policy in Germany," U.S. Occupation in Europe After World War II, ed. Hans A. Schmidt (Lawrence, Kan.: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1978), p. 34.

relaxed.¹⁸

The Americans came to experience a variety of problems as they assumed their jobs as occupiers. Many of these could never have been foreseen by Washington, while some could have been easily forecasted.

THE CONDUCT OF U.S. TROOPS

In its issue of 13 December 1946, United States News published an article on a report submitted to Congress by George Meader, the chief counsel of the Senate War Investigating Committee. The report dealt with the conduct of the American Occupation of Germany.¹⁹ After a trip to that nation, Meader's findings proved most unflattering to the U.S. Army then in the former Reich. For example:

We were told by General McNarney's staff that U.S.

¹⁸ JCS 1067 was superseded by JCS 1779 on 11 July 1947. The new directive reaffirmed some of the missions given to the U.S. Military Governor of Germany in the previous policy, but added new ones that stressed German economic unification. Ibid., p. 39.

¹⁹ George Meader, a lawyer from Michigan and a Republican, won the election of 1940 for prosecutor of Washtenau Co., Michigan, and was re-elected in 1942. He resigned after six months to work in Washington, D.C., with Hugh Fulton, chief counsel of the Special Senate Committee to Investigate Contracts under the National Defense Program. In 1945, Meader became chief counsel and, in 1950, was elected to Congress. "Meader, George," Current Biography 1956 (New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1956-57), pp. 426-428.

forces were presently incapable of any combat or defensive mission...

The lawless behavior of American troops has now reached such proportions as to constitute one of the most serious problems--if not the most serious problem--facing occupation authorities. The constantly rising number of disorders...are conclusive evidence that the situation has not been improving.²⁰

Meader went further by alleging that, in many instances, officers of various units failed to accept their command responsibilities for military discipline, by failing to take proper corrective action, by authorizing illegal activities on the part of the enlisted men and civilian personnel, and by accepting low standards of military discipline and courtesy.²¹

Meader's contention that American troop morale in Europe was low was borne out in January 1946, when four thousand U.S. soldiers, in a mutinous mood, staged a demonstration outside the Headquarters of the United States Forces in the European Theater (USFET). They hoped to confront the USFET commander and Eisenhower's successor, General Joseph T. McNarney, in order to seek a way home. The scene was ugly,

²⁰ "Test of U.S. Army in Reich: Charges of Confusion, Laxity," United States News, 21, 13 December 1946, p. 27.

²¹ Ibid. Interestingly, the Senate regarded Meader's report as highly controversial and his committee voted to reject its earlier plan to send a subcommittee to Europe to develop Meader's preliminary study. "Meader, George," Current Biography 1956, p. 427.

with the mob howling down speakers and deriding officers.²² The GI's tried again the next night in a repeat performance,²³ but, by the third night, the demonstrations fizzled out, as no one was willing to concede to the soldiers' demands.²⁴

The wrath of the GI's was not vented against their superiors alone. In his study of the city of Marburg during the American Occupation, John Gimbel states that troop behavior tended to fall short of what the German populace expected. Looking forward to a "liberating influence," the Germans believed that American soldiers would behave in a "correct" manner. Instead, U.S. troops who entered Marburg helped themselves to watches, cameras, radios, and furniture. They also opened the doors of the local prison and released criminals along with political prisoners. During most of 1945, when Marburg was particularly crowded with Americans awaiting redeployment to the Pacific Theater, the Germans experienced an agonizing fear of walking the streets at night. Reports of attacks on German nationals by American

²²"Bayonets Disperse GI's in Frankfort," New York Times, 10 January 1946, p. 4.

²³Kathleen McLaughlin, "GI's in Frankfort Deride McNarney," New York Times, 11 January 1946, p. 4.

²⁴"Demonstration Fizzles Out," New York Times, 12 January 1946, p. 6.

servicemen were commonplace. Even more disgusting was an American survey which disclosed that even cripples and those blinded in the war were not exempt from Yankee discourtesy. Gimbel cites one instance where a girl suffered a fractured vertebra when she attempted to flee from the advances of a group of GI's who had pursued her into her dwelling. At about the same time, two other Germans were "liberated" in like fashion--from their eyesight, by way of American battery.²⁵

Why did American soldiers act in such an unbridled and barbaric manner? General Harmon offers an explanation in his memoirs. According to Harmon, at war's end, the Army believed that virtually every voter back home wanted "the boys" brought back home as soon as possible. The U.S. Congress recognized such a desire amongst the American people, so the War Department acted accordingly, but demobilization did not prove to be fast enough to satisfy the demand. This resulted in the onset of inactivity and malaise within the American ranks in Europe.²⁶

Harmon further states that, after the First World War's end in 1918, General John J. Pershing, the Commander of the

²⁵ Gimbel, A German Town..., p. 69.

²⁶ Harmon, p. 279.

American Expeditionary Forces, insisted on morning drills and organized athletics, with the idea of ensuring that his force remained an army and did not degenerate into a rabble. In 1945, things were different. General Eisenhower spent most of his last days in Germany tinkering with the complex "point system," which determined who got to go home and when, with such points based upon one's time in service, rank, and actions in which a soldier participated. Eisenhower issued no orders for mandatory drill, which resulted in a situation where over two million men were roaming around Europe as they pleased.²⁷

As for the officer corps, Drew Middleton of the New York Times observed that junior officers (lieutenants and captains) in the European Theater failed to see to the welfare of their troops and to keep them busy while explaining to them the necessity of their Occupation duties. Middleton further stated that the junior officers he met possessed a negligent attitude toward their jobs and devoted an inordinate amount of time pursuing "Frauleins" and drinking "Schnapps." As for the senior officers, Middleton observed that these (majors and higher) suffered from ignorance of Occupation objectives and an overabundance of

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 279-281.

paperwork.²⁸

Such was the chaos in the American Army of Occupation. There were, however, other ills that threatened the stability of the U.S. Zone. The greatest of these was the deplorable economic state of postwar Germany, in which a black market thrived amidst human misfortune and misery.

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE BLACK MARKET

As a result of the war, Germany was an economic wreck. Her industries were demolished by aerial and artillery bombardments. The land was ravaged by retreating Wehrmacht and advancing Allied forces. Governmental control over the economy ceased, as government itself disappeared. The Reichsmark became worthless and once-common foodstuffs and other commodities became luxuries to some, mere dreams to most. With this picture in mind, it should not be surprising that the dark spectre of the black market arrived with the Allied victory and became a threat to law and order and to the stabilization of the German economy.

The basic cause of the black market activity that flourished in Germany after May 1945 was the inability of

²⁸ Drew Middleton, "U.S. Prestige Drops After GI Protests," New York Times, 13 January 1946, p. 1.

ordinary Germans or Displaced Persons to obtain the things they desired through legal channels. The currency in effect was regarded as worthless and, thus, could hardly be used to procure scarce items. As a result, a barter economy ensued, with the seller of scarcities demanding such things as foodstuffs or cigarettes in exchange. Initially, the motive for engaging in the black market was to raise one's personal standard of living above that which was possible through legitimate means. Therefore, participating in the black market was almost universal, the degrees of activity differing among individuals.²⁹

Apart from the greed that is usually associated with black marketeers, the chief reason for one to indulge in such an enterprise was the need for food. In the U.S. Zone, the German populace received a food ration of 1275 calories per day. The nutrition committee of the Allied Control Council found an alarming general situation in the larger German towns because of the caloric intake. The Committee found that a greater part of the urban population fell into a "danger zone" since the reduction from a previous daily ration of 1550 calories. Rickets was becoming prevalent in children up

²⁹ Snyder, p. 184.

to six years of age and the growth rate in those between six and eighteen years was retarded or arrested, with a corresponding and continuing reduction in weight. Signs of malnutrition and anemia were common, as was famine edema, in many urban areas.³⁰ The American Military Government believed that this trouble was due to the failure of quadripartite (Allied) action to achieve the centralization of German administrative departments, resulting in the progressive depletion of commodities on hand. This, according to the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), led to a noted loss of popular confidence in the Allied currency and a tendency toward the hoarding of commodities. Such a state greatly aggravated the problem of maintaining established caloric rations.³¹ In terms of agricultural production, General McNarney feared that the "prospects of the harvest are now such that every German can be furnished only a daily 900 calory ration."³² With such a

³⁰Jean Edward Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945-1949 (Bloomington, Ind.: University Press, 1974), p. 212.

³¹Summary of February Report of the Military Governor, No. 8, U.S. Zone, Germany, 20 March 1946, p. 75.

³²Troop Information Program, U.S. Constabulary, Know Your Job (Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary, 1947), p. 52.

situation in existence, one need not wonder why many Germans resorted to the black market in order to obtain the necessities of life.

James M. Snyder asserts that it was possible to distinguish three distinct groups of black marketeers. The first group consisted of Germans interested in improving their lot or in obtaining materials necessary in which to carry on their businesses. The second group included the Displaced Person or German who dealt in black market commodities for reasons of personal gain, usually as a means of acquiring the funds required to provide him or her with documents for emigration or to obtain items of stable value, such as jewels. Lastly, there were Allied Occupation personnel, who provided much of the exchange media, including coffee, cigarettes, and other hard-to-get items. In return, these soldiers sought novelties, such as artwork, jewelry, Leica cameras, or personal services. From an economic point of view, this type of economy could be seen as normal in a nation which had been blasted into humility and, as a result, lacked the ability to satisfy demands.³³ A stable currency would have helped tremendously in alleviating this situation.

In terms of currency, the Allies utilized the same

³³ Snyder, p. 184.

military marks. The Russians agreed to use them as well, but only if they were provided with a duplicate set of plates for printing their own supply. In return, the Soviets promised to strictly account for all marks put into circulation. The Russians, though, never provided this accounting. Instead, they printed a virtually unlimited quantity of this currency and, when they paid their troops with it (sometimes as much as three to four years' back pay), Soviet authorities told them they could only spend it in Germany, as these marks were valueless in the U.S.S.R. What came about was a fantastic traffic in goods and services between the American GI's and the Russian troops.³⁴

The Americans also had access to post exchange (PX) goods, which could be purchased cheaply and sold for military marks at a high profit. When a GI received these marks, through his base pay and/or side dealings, he tended to convert these into "Yankee greenbacks" and send his money home, a policy which was legal in the early days of the Occupation. Severe problems were also caused by this

³⁴ Walter Rundell, Jr., Black Market Money: The Collapse of U.S. Military Currency Control in World War II (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), pp. 41-54. See also Clay, p. 63, and Davis, p. 150.

activity.³⁵ For example, during the month of July 1945, U.S. garrison troops in Berlin were given very close to \$1 million in Allied currency at the pay tables (at a rate of four marks to the dollar). Yet, the Army postal offices shipped home close to \$3 million in hard currency dollars.³⁶ Eventually, a \$300 million deficit materialized, for which OMGUS was responsible to the U.S. Treasury.³⁷

To combat this problem, new regulations were promulgated in July 1945, which simply stated that a person in the service could convert only his or her base pay into dollars. This failed, though, to control the black market, as troops could still sell PX goods for enough Allied marks to meet their needs and still keep their base pay intact. Coupon books, the contents of which were, for a time, the only currency accepted by Allied installations, proved to be too cumbersome a method and the situation continued to fester until 16 December 1946, when American Forces obtained military scrip, printed in the United States, for pay purposes and adequate currency control.³⁸

³⁵ Clay, p. 63.

³⁶ Davis, pp. 150-151.

³⁷ Clay, p. 63.

³⁸ Ibid.

Black market prices themselves, although exorbitant, were generally stable, increasing approximately thirty percent during the fiscal year 1 July 1946-30 June 1947. The following table of prices is an indication of the general value of commodities on the black market:³⁹

TABLE 1
BLACK MARKET PRICES
JUNE 1947

Pound of Coffee	300-400 RM
Pound of Tea	300
Pound of Butter	200-240
Carton of Cigarettes	800
German Food Ration Card	350
U.S. Army Raincoat	250-350
Pair of U.S. Army Shoes	725
Pair of U.S. Ladies Shoes	675
U.S. Dollar (Currency)	180-200
U.S. Dollar (Scrip)	100-120
100 Pounds of Coal	80- 90
Pound of Pork	45
Pound of Beef	15
Dozen of Eggs	60- 85
Bottle of German Wine	250-300
Bar of Chocolate	40- 50
Bar of Soap	35- 40
Pound of Wheat Flour	4- 5
5 Gallons of Gasoline	250

NOTE: The average German wage varied between 200-300 RM per month.

³⁹ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 53, 13-19 June 1947, p. 4.

Indeed, the economic problems facing the American Military Government were extraordinary. Of equal importance was the actual governing of the people in the U.S. Zone. Along with the native German population and the occupying GI's, there was a large number of individuals displaced by the conduct of the war. In its dealings with these diverse peoples, OMGUS faced a challenge of great magnitude.

PEOPLE IN THE U.S. ZONE

A school teacher in Munich asked her pupils what foreign language they would like to learn. A boy named Hans said that he wanted to learn French, because he expected to go to France to study music. Another boy, Johann, said that he wished to study English, as he aspired to take up poetry and literature. Finally, a third student, named Georg, sought to master Russian, as he desired to stay in Germany.⁴⁰

Such was the spirit amongst much of the German populace during the early days of the Occupation. Even so, disorders involving the German people were relatively few, with most stimulated by the desire to obtain additional food.

This was reflected in the fact that most offenses involved

⁴⁰ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 8, 25-31 July 1946, p. 2.

the black market.⁴¹

The Americans also had to deal with the ugly remnant of National Socialism in addition to the actions of the average German. Subversive activities and sabotage took many forms. These included the possession of Nazi literature and insignia, staging covert meetings of pro-Nazi formations, the writing of threatening letters, the painting of swastikas on walls and streets, wire cutting, and assaults against Allied military personnel.⁴²

On the whole, though, the Germans, expecting a wave of liberation, were disillusioned, a state of mind that often led to resentment. The Germans were angry about hunger, the black market, the requisitioning of their homes, the dismantling of their industry as "reparations," and, particularly, about the American denazification procedures, which they considered as being worthy of the Gestapo.⁴³

There were also problems between the indigenous German population and the Displaced Persons (DP's). Wartime Germany contained an alien labor force of about six to seven million

⁴¹ Snyder, p. 191.

⁴² Ibid., p. 182.

⁴³ Botting, pp. 220-221.

(excluding prisoners of war). Allied policy after the Nazi defeat demanded the repatriation of this population. These people, including political prisoners as well as slave laborers, were assigned to camps under Military Government control and granted certain priorities over the Germans as to food and medical care pending repatriation. In 1945, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) took over the camps and supervised the care of these individuals thereafter. Of the DP's, the Poles were the largest ethnic group represented, with 150,500, closely followed by about 150,250 Jews.⁴⁴ By 1 June 1946, 2,834,242 DP's had been repatriated, with a half million left on hand, seventy of whom were non-repatriable.⁴⁵

In addition to these aliens, the Allies had to contend with some fifteen million "Volksdeutsche." These were ethnic Germans, many of whom took part in the massive exodus from

⁴⁴ United States, Department of State, Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945-46 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1947), p. 26.

⁴⁵ Ibid. The U.S. Government considered a person non-repatriable if unacceptable to their country of origin or if unwilling to be repatriated. Though the above source claims that the U.S. did not officially sanction compulsory repatriation, the U.S. did forcibly return all Soviet subjects (POW's, forced laborers, and such) to Russian control, where they were either executed or sent to a gulag, as Stalin considered any Soviet captured or forced outside the USSR during the war a traitor. Botting, pp. 155-170.

the former Nazi-occupied eastern areas of Europe to the Reich during the latter stages of the war. Others were expellees from areas beyond the Oder-Neisse demarcation line, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic areas, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.⁴⁶

The conditions of the DP camps varied throughout Germany. I.F. Stone, a columnist for the newspaper PM, visited some of these in May 1946. Stone found that camp conditions ranged from that of a well-run kibbutz to that of stinking transit camps in bombed-out factories and air raid bunkers.⁴⁷ Previously, on 17 September 1945, Generals Eisenhower and George S. Patton, Jr., themselves inspected a Jewish DP camp. While there, the two visited a makeshift synagogue, where Yom Kippur was being observed. Patton wrote in his diary:

We entered the synagogue, which was packed with the greatest sinking bunch of humanity I have ever seen...the smell was so terrible that I almost fainted and actually, about three hours later, lost my lunch as

⁴⁶ The Oder-Neisse Line came out of the Potsdam Conference of 1945, where it was agreed that all German territories east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers would come under either Polish administration (Pomerania, Silesia, and the southern half of East Prussia) or Soviet rule (northern East Prussia). Ibid., pp. 25-26.

⁴⁷ Botting, p. 174.

the result of remembering it.⁴⁸

On 21 September 1945, General Louis Craig inspected another Jewish DP center. There, he found men and women using adjacent toilets, which were uncovered (though the Americans, it was claimed, had provided screens). Craig found the conditions and the filth in the camp to be unspeakable and also discovered that ten people--six men and four women--occupied four double beds in one room.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, in Washington, George Meader shared a similarly negative view of the DP's and was unsympathetic to their plight, especially if they were Jews. According to Meader:

These persons (the Jews) are, for the most part, penniless and do not desire to work, but expect to be cared for...The lack of employment opportunities for displaced persons contribute in part to the general security problem...Black market activities have offered a convenient substitute for regular employment, and certain criminal elements have committed numerous crimes of violence...⁵⁰

Meader obviously had never served in a concentration camp nor had he ever been forcibly conscripted into a battalion of slave laborers. Therefore, he was ignorant of

⁴⁸ Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940-1945 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1974), p. 754.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 759.

⁵⁰ "Test of U.S. Army in Reich...", pp. 27-28.

the debilitating effects that such servitude has on an individual. Nevertheless, there were people in Germany who respected the DP's and were disgusted by their treatment. In its 1 March 1946 issue, the Commonweal printed a letter that bore the signatures of fifty U.S. servicemen. It had also been distributed to all Representatives and Senators on Capitol Hill. In this letter, the soldiers complained bitterly that the DP's dream of American liberation had been shattered. Their food was of poor quality, the local Germans were inhospitable, and American officials were unsympathetic, with few kind words to spare. "SS officers lined them up against the wall and mowed them down with bullets. U.S. officers line them up against the wall and order them mowed down with words." The authors of the letter also cited instances where DP's were denied health care by some Army medical personnel, as the DP's were civilians.⁵¹

With such conditions in mind, one cannot wonder why some DP's indulged in acts contrary to good order. Such behavior became widespread throughout the Zone, as DP's sought to better their conditions and to exact their pounds of flesh from their former Nazi overlords. The Office of the Military

⁵¹ "Displaced Persons," Commonweal, 43, 1 March 1946, pp. 502-504.

Governor reported that

Lawless acts by displaced persons and individuals posing as displaced persons continued. On 28 April (1946), Landsberg, Bavaria was the scene of a riot involving from 5,000 to 6,000 Jews. Twenty-five...were arrested...⁵²

As such, the DP's represented a potential risk to the security of the U.S. Zone. This, as well as the other problems mentioned, faced the new U.S. Constabulary when it became operational in July 1946.

⁵² Summary of April Report of the Military Governor,
No. 10, U.S. Zone, Germany, 20 May 1946, p. 88.

CHAPTER III

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTABULARY

The seed for the United States Constabulary was sown before the Second World War had ended. During the conflict, Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) announced the establishment of the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT), whose purpose was to administer territories coming under Allied occupation in accordance with international law.⁵³ A part of the AMGOT's creed were sixteen "General Administrative Instructions" (GAI), which were published on 1 May 1943. These instructions were issued to field personnel and dealt with general policy and attitudes toward civilians and the immediated duties of civil affairs officers upon entering occupied areas.⁵⁴ AMGOT GAI Number One, Section Four specifically addressed the subject of law and order:

⁵³ Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg. Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964), pp. 181-182.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 184.

You must learn to disregard the nationalities of the people whom you are administering, if you are going to be a good administrator. The principles of good administration are the same in all countries and for all people. They are the preservation of law and order and justice, the prevention of disease and distress, the removal of fear, and the creation of economic well-being. To these, for a military governor, is added as the first duty, to assist in the prosecution of the war by enabling the high command to reduce garrison troops for use elsewhere...⁵⁵

With the end of hostilities in Europe, the problem of providing a permanent occupational force in Germany arose together with the problems incident to redeploying units to the Pacific Theater, as well as the problem of deactivating surplus units in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). When Japan surrendered in August 1945, the problem of redeployment ended, but that of demobilization became paramount, being accelerated by the War Department until the U.S. Army in Europe was "falling apart at the seams."⁵⁶

The United States Zone of Occupation encompassed over 40,000 square miles, with nearly 1,400 miles of frontier or interzonal boundaries extending from Austria in the south to the Soviet and British Zones to the north, and from Czechoslovakia in the east to the Rhine River and the French Zone in the west. Approximately sixteen million Germans and

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 186.

⁵⁶Snyder, p. 11.

more than a half million Displaced Persons lived in the area, as well as several hundred thousand American troops. Most of these soldiers were on their first tour of duty away from home. The German civilian police establishment was just beginning to be reorganized and a static American force large enough to patrol so extensive an area would have to be disproportionately large. Thus, a small, but highly mobile, force for such duties was favored by U.S. military authorities.⁵⁷

The constantly dwindling occupation troop basis in the European Theater pointed toward the eventual establishment of a police-type occupation. The central idea of this kind of operation was that the principal security force would remain small, but highly mobile, and would be composed of carefully selected and highly-trained personnel. As the planning progressed, Headquarters, U.S. Forces in the European Theater (USFET) became convinced that such a security element would be efficient and practical in maintaining control of the conquered nation. In addition, such a scheme would be more economical in terms of manpower and funding, as compared with

⁵⁷ U.S. European Command, "United States Constabulary," Occupational Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946 (Frankfurt: Office of the Chief Historian, 1947), p. 2.

the requirements for maintaining a large occupation force.⁵⁸

The concept of an occupation based upon a super-military police organization for the maintenance of security, law, and order cannot be credited to one individual, group, or agency. The three most probable sources were the experiences of certain tactical units which had performed previous occupation (such as the XXII Corps in the Rhineland); the War Department, which was concerned with both the occupation of Germany and of Japan; and the G-2 (intelligence) section of Headquarters, USFET.⁵⁹

In November, 1944, the Fifteenth United States Army staff, under the command of Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, undertook a study to determine a basis for the troops and organization required for the occupation of the Rhineland. As a result, recommendations were made to divide troops into "city garrison" and "frontier command" troops, with the latter intended for the control of personnel movement across the border of western Germany (through fixed posts, road blocks, and road patrols). Hence, on 15 April 1945, the Fifteenth Army established Frontier Command, the

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 1.

⁵⁹ Snyder, pp. 11-12.

embryonic prototype of the United States Constabulary.⁶⁰

On 12 July 1945, the Third United States Army, then under Patton, recommended the inclusion of a small mobile force to each infantry division earmarked for permanent occupation duty. The Third Army's higher headquarters, the Twelfth Army Group (General Omar Bradley's command), concurred and further recommended a theater-wide reorganization along such lines. While no formal action was taken on these recommendations, many divisions affected local changes and created small, mobile reaction units for use in outlying areas or as reserve tactical forces.⁶¹

Meanwhile, in Japan, General Douglas MacArthur's command developed a plan in which the Japanese home islands, Korea, and the Ryukyus would be controlled through a super-military police organization, manned by natives (with American personnel holding key positions). Such a force would be backed up by tactical units on the order of regimental combat teams.⁶² General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 12.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid. A regimental combat team is an infantry regiment that is reinforced by a battalion of artillery and an engineer unit of adequate size, usually a company. Frank Gaynor, ed., New Military and Naval Dictionary (New York: Greenwood Press, 1951), p. 214.

Staff, asked the commanding general of the American forces in Europe, Eisenhower, for his comments on such a plan. Eisenhower replied that the basic concept was applicable to Germany, but that modifications would be necessary, due to the lack of a German governmental structure, the existence of a four-power occupation, the presence of Displaced Persons and refugees, and the shifting of the native population. Eisenhower also feared adverse public reaction, at home and in Europe, concerning the use of native Germans in key positions of the Zone security force. Marshall then suggested that other nationalities be utilized, such as Poles, Dutchmen, Norwegians, and Danes, but the expense and language problems prevented such an endeavor.⁶³

On 16 October 1945, Marshall and the War Department, after considering the views of Eisenhower, directed that plans of more detail be prepared for the operation of a police-type occupational force in Germany and Austria, with an operational date of 1 July 1946. On 24 October, Eisenhower informed the major commanders in Europe that control of Germany and Austria would eventually be exercised through a U.S. "constabulary" that would be organized along the lines

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 12-13. See also Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany..., pp. 340-341.

of American state police. In this manner, the constabulary would operate above the German police, providing assistance when called upon. Such a force would be responsible for overall Zone security and would be supported by specified combat units. This constabulary would come under the control of the American Military Governor and the combat outfits would be directed through USFET command channels. On 1 November, a brief, tentative plan was submitted to Marshall, along with a manpower requirement estimate at 38,000 personnel.⁶⁴

The term "constabulary" actually made its first appearance in September, 1945, when it was recommended by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USFET, Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, that a military District Constabulary (DC) be constituted. These "DC" units would be composed of cavalry-type troops and command would be exercised by the District of Enclave Commander.⁶⁵ The DC units were not to

⁶⁴ U.S. European Command, p. 15.

⁶⁵ Snyder, pp. 13-14. The U.S. Zone consisted of two military districts. The Eastern Military District coincided with Bavaria, while the Western encompassed the Prussian provinces of Kurhessen and Hessen-Nassau, Hesse, and the northern portion of Baden and Wuerttemberg. Across these stretched a "SHAEF enclave," the administrative center of the Military Government, which was located in Frankfurt. Berlin and the Bremen Enclave were districts of their own. Zimeke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany..., p. 311.

compromise the jurisdiction of local Counter Intelligence Corp (CIC), Military Police (MP), or German civil police units. They would, instead, act with these bodies, but could act independently if no one else was available. The DC would be intended for use as a fast-acting, mobile reserve force, through patrolling, searches for wanted persons and contraband items, and certain counterintelligence missions. By 30 November 1945, the DC was operational and continued to function until it was absorbed by the U.S. Constabulary on 19 April 1945.⁶⁶

With regard to the problem of manpower requirements, Sibert and the Public Safety Section of OMGUS estimated patrol strengths on the basis of Zone population. OMGUS suggested a norm of one Constabulary Trooper for each 450 Germans. With the population of the American Zone being estimated at seventeen million, a manpower figure of 38,000 was determined. Sibert proposed that a Constabulary unit of 140 men, organized according to the table of organization and equipment for a cavalry reconnaissance troop, would be able to patrol a rural area of 225 square miles. The 43,000 square miles of the U.S. Zone would, therefore, require 192 Troops (a Troop being the cavalry equivalent of an infantry

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 14-18.

company), or 26,800 soldiers. It was agreed, however, that the remaining 11,200 of the original estimate would be needed for administrative support. Air reconnaissance would also be provided, with 1,000 personnel and sixty-four light aircraft.⁶⁷

On 1 November 1945, Eisenhower dispatched the Theater plan summary to the War Department.⁶⁸ Two days later, a memorandum was distributed to the staff of Headquarters, USFET. The memorandum said, in part:

State police-type units (preferably called "state constabulary") will amount to 38,000 and the individual units will be organized similarly to cavalry reconnaissance squadrons but specially trained for police duties. They will be highly mobile units and they will co-ordinate closely with the local city and country German police, through military government detachments. This requires that units be scattered throughout Germany...however, their mobility will permit them to aid a neighboring unit in case of an emergency.⁶⁹

In a further planning directive, dated 24 November 1945, USFET changed the designation from "state" to "zone" constabulary⁷⁰ and also fixed the date for organization at 1 April 1946. The force would become operational no later

⁶⁷ U.S. European Command, pp. 16-17.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 17.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 19.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 20

than 1 July 1946.⁷¹

Eisenhower submitted the final plan to Marshall on 22 December 1945, which called for the establishment of a Zone Constabulary headquarters, modeled on that of a corps, with three brigade headquarters at "Land" (state) levels. Each brigade would include an air reconnaissance squadron and would command a varying number of mechanized cavalry units. Twelve Constabulary group headquarters would coordinate affairs with German civil authorities, and forty-eight squadrons, assigned in accordance with population density, would do the actual patrolling.⁷² Each squadron would have three mechanized and two motorized troops (companies), with thirteen men per troop. These troops would be equipped with M-5 armored cars mounting 37-mm cannons (mechanized troops only), quarter- and half-ton trucks, .30 caliber light machine guns, Thompson sub-machine guns, rifles, pistols, and code and voice radios.⁷³

Early in January, 1946, the Zone (U.S.) Constabulary planning group reviewed this scheme of organization and

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 22.

⁷² Ibid., pp. 23-27.

⁷³ Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany..., p. 341.

recommended the elimination of the group headquarters. Rather, as things happened, the Constabulary was organized into echelons of brigades, regiments, squadrons, and troops. Later that month, General McNarney, now in command at USFET, approved the organization's establishment.⁷⁴ What was now needed was the man to head such a unique force and to develop it into a truly elite force.

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⁷⁴ U.S. European Command, p. 54.

CHAPTER IV

COMMAND, SELECTION, AND TRAINING

Shortly after New Year's Day, 1946, a stocky, gravel-voiced general arrived at the office of General McNarney in Frankfurt. The arriving officer, Major General Ernest N. Harmon, had just returned from a Christmas leave in the United States. Since his previous command, that of XXII Corps in Czechoslovakia, had been disbanded, he had come to Germany to receive re-assignment. Harmon knew nothing of the nature of his new job until he was ushered into McNarney's presence.

"Harmon," McNarney said, "You are going to be the head of the Constabulary."

"What's that?" replied Harmon.⁷⁵

McNarney went on to explain that Harmon was to develop an elite force of about 38,000 men that would exercise broad police powers over the German populace and Allied military and civil personnel. While doing so, these troops would set an example of soldierly dress, bearing, and discipline, as

⁷⁵ Harmon, p. 280.

the state of U.S. troop behavior had reached a low ebb.⁷⁶

Harmon proved to be an excellent choice for the top Constabulary command. Approaching his fifty-second birthday at the time of his appointment, Harmon, a native of Lowell, Massachusetts, had received his commission from West Point just in time for World War I. During this conflict, Harmon served with distinction as an officer in one of the few American cavalry units to see action in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) and participated in such battles as the St. Mihiel Offensive and the Meuse-Argonne Campaign. In World War II, Harmon distinguished himself as a fine tank commander. Leading the Second Armored Division in North Africa, he fought at Kasserine Pass and, later, received the surrender of nine German generals and 42,000 men near Bizerte, Tunisia. Harmon also fought at Cassino and Anzio and was part of the force that captured Rome. In France, Harmon defeated the German Second Panzer Division, as well as the Ninth Panzer and the 130 Panzer Lehr Divisions, during the Battle of the Bulge.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 280-281.

⁷⁷ United States Constabulary (Heidelberg: Public Relations Section, U.S. Constabulary, 1947), pp. 4-5.

General Harmon had experience in military government in addition to that of the battlefield. Upon the cessation of hostilities, Harmon became military governor of the Rhineland provinces of Germany, which then included the Ruhr basin, where he commanded the XXII Corps. He and the XXII Corps remained in the Rhineland until the area was turned over to the British Army in June, 1945. Harmon and his command were then transferred to Pilzen, Czechoslovakia, where he headed the U.S. Army of Occupation in that country. On 1 December 1945, the XXII Corps was dissolved and the Americans withdrew from the Czech nation.⁷⁸

McNarney gave Harmon until 1 July 1946 to have the U.S. Constabulary operational. Therefore, Harmon immediately began his work, setting up his headquarters in Bad Toelz, where the Third Army was also established. Headquarters, Sixth Corps, which had participated in the amphibious operations at Salerno, Anzio, and Southern France, was taken over by Harmon and redesignated as "Headquarters, United States Constabulary."⁷⁹ Harmon further built up the nucleus of the new organization by acquiring the First Armored and Fourth Armored Divisions for Constabulary duties. He also

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 7.

obtained the services of Colonel Lawrence Dewey as operations officer, Colonel Harley Maddox as his Chief of Staff, and Colonel J.H. Harwood, who became a "technical advisor" to Harmon, as he had once served as the state police commissioner for Rhode Island.⁸⁰

In order to make his Constabulary Troopers stand out as an elite force, General Harmon and his staff set out immediately to design a distinctive uniform. Harmon was determined to dress his soldiers in a uniform that "bespoke a worthy soldier's pride in his appearance."⁸¹ According to the General:

The Constabulary uniform we came up with was a real eyecatcher. We designed a yellow and blue shoulder patch slashed by a red lightning bolt, drawing upon the distinctive colors of the cavalry, infantry, and artillery to signify the military backgrounds of our troopers. In addition to the shoulder patch, we modified the standard uniform of the day by prescribing smooth-sided paratrooper boots, a Sam Browne belt, a brilliant yellow neck scarf, and a helmet liner bearing the Constabulary insignia and striped in blue and yellow.⁸²

To train his personnel, a school was set up in January 1946 at a former Hitler Youth academy at Sonthofen, Bavaria. The Second Cavalry Squadron took over the "Kaserne"

⁸⁰ Harmon, p. 281.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 281-282.

⁸² Ibid., p. 282.

(barracks) from the Fourteenth Infantry Regiment and, as a matter of course, inherited the mission of organizing the "campus." The first group of instructors reported to Headquarters, Third Army (the Constabulary's reporting unit) in Bad Toelz on 22 January 1946, with the first course beginning on 4 March.⁸³ These initial instructors had received their credentials by way of previous on-the-job training and through special classes set up by the Third Army.⁸⁴

The Constabulary School was established in order to train officers and non-commissioned officers in the policies and procedures essential to the accomplishment of maintaining law, order and security in the American Zone. Upon returning to their own units, graduates were to pass on what knowledge they had acquired, as new instructors.

The curriculum itself was divided into six departments:

1. Geopolitics included studies in the history of German (sic) psychology, occupational policies, courts, and laws, the relationship between the Constabulary, the Military

⁸³U.S. Constabulary, Quarterly Report of Operations, July-September 1946, p. 21.

⁸⁴Snyder, pp. 62-70.

Government and the German Police, the roles of the War, Treasury, and State Departments, as well as the mission of the Counte Intelligence Corps, the Criminal Investigation Division, and the Constabulary itself.

2. Public Safety exposed students to police procedures, elements of crime, laws of arrest, rules of evidence, confessions and statements, courtroom demeanor and presenting evidence, crime scenes, passes and permits, and traffic and accident control.

3. Tactics covered tables of organization and equipment, guarding and caring of prisoners, and small unit maneuvering.

4. General Instruction included unarmed defense, map reading, written reports, and German geography.

5. Communications dealt with orientation, maintenance of equipment, radio nets and security, voice procedures, and message center operations.

6. Motors gave instruction in maintenance records and conducted driver selection and training.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ In addition, there were two other courses offered, these involving investigations and desk and records procedures. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

In addition to this formal instruction, the men of the Constabulary received constant on-the-job training and refresher courses. Constabulary Headquarters also maintained a "Troop Information Program," which published the Trooper Handbook and a guidebook entitled Know Your Job. Given to each Trooper and to those assigned to train him, Know Your Job provided lesson plans and advice on training aid for instructors. Furthermore, the book provided the individual Trooper with a background knowledge of his security mission by looking briefly at the history and people of Germany and his place in the scheme of the Occupation.⁸⁶

Harmon sought to establish high standards of quality amongst his elite soldiers. Physically, the Trooper had to possess soldierly bearing, with a weight of no less than 140 pounds. He had to have good vision without eyeglasses, well-knit muscular coordination, and a strong, erect, and well-proportioned physique capable of quick reactions. The Trooper had to have a stable mentality, one that encouraged sound judgment, tact, and the powers of observation. Finally, each soldier had to be of excellent moral character with personal honesty, loyalty, conscientiousness, and

⁸⁶ Know Your Job, pp. 1-180.

adaptability.⁸⁷ The reason for such demanding conditions of membership was that each Trooper would be exposed to potential danger and lucrative temptation as he performed his routine duties. Unfortunately, Harmon had difficulty obtaining "perfection," due to the manpower problem in the European Theater.

In order to eliminate the unfit (such as those who had records of criminal activity, were general troublemakers, or who easily could succumb to temptation, a Theater Placement Board was established. This board was charged with the responsibility of assigning personnel in order that the maximum benefit might be derived from the individual's prior training, aptitudes, and potential abilities. Similar boards were convened at squadron, regimental, and at Constabulary Headquarters. The Theater Board, though, only entered into the situation when all the efforts of one in finding a position failed. Later, by November 1946, the transferring and reassignment of illiterates, non-English speaking soldiers, men of low intelligence, and officers with poor efficiency rating, commenced.⁸⁸

Generally, Constabulary Troopers lived in former

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Snyder, pp. 48-49.

⁸⁸

Ibid., pp. 102-103.

Wehrmacht barracks or in buildings obtained by the Military Government. Initially, housing was not always available and some units lived in improvised "tent cities" until adequate housing became available.⁸⁹

Off-duty hours were spent much like any other soldier's in Germany, with trips into town on pass, activities in unit dayrooms, and such. By July 1947, with the rules on fraternization relaxed, Constabulary Troopers were permitted to bring one German each to their motion picture shows, provided through the courtesy of the War Department. "Jeep shows" were organized, which consisted of no more than six itinerant entertainers. As for spending accumulated leave time, Theater Rest Centers were set up, as were tours of neighboring countries.⁹⁰ The only special off-duty requirement was that each Constabulary Trooper had to wear his uniform at all times, both on and off duty.⁹¹

When the Constabulary commenced operations, Harmon insisted on the maintenance of strict discipline within the ranks of his command. In his words:

⁸⁹Ibid., pp. 57-59.

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 108-109.

⁹¹"New Constabulary Polices Germany," Life, 21(9), 26 August 1946, p. 21.

U.S.O. shows, canteens, and other "morale boosters" that became standard fixtures of the postwar Army are all very well. But I remain unconvinced that this kind of good "morale" contributes as much to building a well-knit military unit as does firm insistence on discipline and the provision of a set of principles for soldiers to live up to. With discipline and principles, a man acquires that sense of contentment that comes only after a hard job is well done.⁹²

With this doctrine firmly entrenched in his mind, Harmon assembled a well-oiled security machine. Some, though, probably viewed Harmon's tenure as commander as a "reign of terror." For example, Harmon was greatly opposed to his Troopers' sending their gripes to a regular column appearing in the Stars and Stripes, called "The B Bag." As he had established a commander's "open door policy" (whereby any soldier was entitled to send his complaints to his superiors), Harmon expressly forbade his subordinates from sending contributions to this column. Only one Trooper ever violated this command. Upon seeing the soldier's complaint in print, Harmon immediately traveled to where the man was stationed, called a company formation, and personally stripped the rank and Constabulary insignia from the GI's uniform. The man's formal dismissal from the Constabulary followed within minutes.⁹³ In another instance, Harmon

⁹² Harmon, pp. 282-283.

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 284-285.

threatened to relieve a colonel, who was in charge of a series of border posts. One of the colonel's posts did not conform to Harmon's standards. Grass had not been planted and a flagpole was missing. After being given an ultimatum by the general to have the post in shape within forty-eight hours or face relief, the colonel miraculously came through the ordeal by rectifying the post's omissions.⁹⁴

In order to be sure that discipline was being maintained and that all was going well, Harmon was a man constantly on the move, incessantly making inspection trips throughout the length and breadth of the U.S. Zone. The general was described by one eyewitness as being a "brilliant showman."

As his streamlined Diesel private train--formerly Herman Goering's--purred into the station, lines of immaculate troopers snapped to attention. The General looked them coldly up and down, returned their salute, and strode off. A few minutes later, his big automobile--flanked by motorcycle men with their sirens wide open--roared off across the city. Germans who have seen this spectacle refer to him simply as "Der General."⁹⁵

Harmon was well aware of the impact of his theatrics and was always careful about timing, making sure that his train--painted in the Constabulary colors--always arrived on time.

⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 291-292.

⁹⁵Frederic Sondern, Jr. "The U.S. Constabulary--A New Force in Germany," Reader's Digest, 50, 1947, p. 117.

He took particular delight in learning that the citizens of Munich referred to the arrival of his train as the "Second Coming." All of his ceremonial arrivals were designed largely to be "eyewash" for the German populace.⁹⁶

For all his bluster, Ernest Harmon was able to successfully forge a new law enforcement agency the like of which had never existed before. Though Harmon would retire in 1948, the Constabulary continued in its efforts to provide security support the the American Military Government and to win the respect of the German people. It would always bear Harmon's distinctive imprint throughout its existence.

⁹⁶ Harmon, pp. 286-287.

CHAPTER V

THE CONSTABULARY'S LAW AND ORDER MISSION

During the years of the Weimar Republic the German police had been decentralized under the jurisdiction of the individual "Laender," or states. The Third Reich changed this when in 1936 Heinrich Himmler, the chief of the "Schutzstaffel" (SS), assumed control of the German police. By permeating the law enforcement system with Nazis and members of both the SS and the "Sturmabteilung" (the SA, Hitler's Storm Troops), the police quickly evolved a centralized character, taking its orders from Berlin and becoming a key instrument in the foundation of Hitler's totalitarian state.⁹⁷ The extent of this situation became apparent through the merger of the SS and the police into a "consolidated State Protection Corps of the National Socialist Reich" on 23 June 1938. In simple terms, the police were now part of the "Reichssicherheitshauptamt"

⁹⁷Clay, p. 255.

(RSHA), the Reich Security Main Office. The RSHA was an SS corporate headquarters whose members not only brought order to the Fatherland, but also carried out Nazi racial and genocidal policies.⁹⁸

Prior to the Allied Occupation, the Americans had made plans to disband this centralized organization in order to free it from the influence of the Nazi Party and its affiliated formations. However, upon the German surrender in May, 1945, the Americans found that there was no need to break up the central German police organization, as it had already ceased to exist. Its leaders were either dead, imprisoned, or in flight.⁹⁹ Immediate efforts were made to reconstitute the police forces throughout the U.S. Zone for the preservation of order under the Military Government.

With the many groups of people residing within the frontiers of the American Zone, the enforcement of Military Government laws proved difficult. Anything resembling a German police force could not obtain adequate respect from the native population, nor from the multitudes of Displaced Persons roaming the countryside and in the UNRRA camps. This

⁹⁸ Heinz Hoehne, The Order of the Death's Head (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969, 1971), pp. 285-286.


⁹⁹ Clay, p. 255.

was due chiefly to the odious reputation the police had under Hitler and the SS. The thousands of American soldiers in the Zone also presented problems, as many were fresh from "the States" and had matured during the war in a spirit of anti-German feeling. "Kicking the Krauts" would not have been an adequate standard for restoring order in Germany. Hence the Military Police were preoccupied most of the time with handling recalcitrant GI's. This led to the Military Government establishing the U.S. Constabulary as a super-military police agency to assist in rectifying the situation.

In very elementary terms, the U.S. Constabulary acted much in the same way a state police force would have in the United States. It served in support of local law enforcement agencies and acted on their behalf when local authority was not available. Military Police were responsible for security within military communities (or installations), while the German civil police formations provided law and order for towns, "Kreise" (counties) and/or "Laender" (states). In other words, the MP's worked for base commanders, the German police maintained order for the local civil administration, and the Constabulary could assist both, with concurrent jurisdiction. Table 2 illustrates this partnership.

TABLE 2

MODEL OF POLICE JURISDICTION IN THE U.S. ZONE



Specifically, the Constabulary was assigned the mission of maintaining general military and civil security and assisting in the accomplishment of the Military Government objectives (exclusive of the Bremen Enclave and Berlin, which had their own security forces). Utilizing an effective patrol system, the Troopers would be prepared to take prompt and effective action in forestalling and suppressing riots, rebellions, and acts prejudicial to the security of the American Occupation and its policies. They would maintain control of the borders encompassing the Zone, as well.¹⁰⁰ In doing so, the Constabulary would be employed in several ways. Horse patrols would be used in those areas particularly

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Constabulary, Operational Directive, No. 1, Sec. II, 13 June 1946.

adapted to mounted patrolling and in populated centers. Dismounted patrols would be assigned to border control duties when vehicular reconnaissance would not be practical. These would also be used in policing populated areas. Air patrols would supplement border and area patrol systems and to expedite communications. River patrols would also be utilized, when deemed necessary by the Military Government.¹⁰¹

On the whole, the Constabulary did its job through vehicular patrols. These would be used on the Autobahnen for convoys, escorts, and police work, and would be the mainstay of area security throughout the American Zone. They would also be alert for indications of subversive activity, non-compliance by Allied personnel and civilians with existing military and Military Government regulations, while hoping to impress the natives with their presence, bearing, and martial manner.¹⁰²

Prior to becoming operational, the Constabulary's areas of original (or direct) jurisdiction in the enforcement of regulations were specified. These were: (1) U.S. military personnel and their dependents, (2) U.S. civilians and their dependents, (3) Allied civilians employed by the U.S.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., Sec. III, Para. c.

¹⁰² Ibid., Sec. III, Para. h.

Government and their dependents, (5) Allied civilian personnel, and (6) Displaced Persons. It was also decided that the Constabulary would not take original jurisdiction in cases properly the function of the German police, forestry police, or other reconstituted German law enforcement agencies responsible for the enforcement of native fish and game laws. Licensing, though, was to be done through the local Military Government officials in any particular location.¹⁰³

Generally, the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order would fall on the shoulders of Constabulary commanders in areas exclusive of military bases, as these would come under Military Police protection. They would apprehend wanted persons and detain these or provide them with transportation to places of confinement or internment. In areas where either the Constabulary or a military installation (and, thus, MP commander) would seek to arrest an individual residing in an area under the jurisdiction of the other agency, a request would be made to the commander who had original jurisdiction. In cases of "hot pursuit," it was decided by all concerned law enforcement bodies that

¹⁰³ U.S. Constabulary, Report of Operations, June 1946, p. 22.

areas of jurisdiction would be disregarded.¹⁰⁴

There were other areas, as well, that would require close attention by Constabulary commanders and their Troopers. During a conference held at Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary on 24 May 1946, attended by all Constabulary brigade and regimental staff intelligence officers, instructions were issued for all to become acquainted with "hot spots" within unit areas of responsibility. It was pointed out at this meeting that these developed under the following circumstances:¹⁰⁵

1. Where large numbers of Displaced Persons were situated;
2. Where Classes I, II, III, IV, and V supply depots were located;¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴U.S. Constabulary, Operational Directive, No. 1, Sec. III, Para. 2(a).

¹⁰⁵U.S. Constabulary, Report of Operations, May 1946, p.3.

¹⁰⁶U.S. Army classes of supply are as follows:

- Class I: Subsistence rations.
- Class II: Clothing, tentage, organizational and individual equipment, administrative housekeeping supplies and equipment.
- Class III: Petroleum products.
- Class IV: Construction materials.
- Class V: Ammunition of all types.

Guide for the Battalion S-4 (FM 10-14-2) (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1981), pp. 2-5.

3. Locations where discharged German prisoners of war, who resented the fraternization of German women with American soldiers, resided;
4. Locations where there were large concentrations of both white and "colored" American troops;
5. Localities where groups of young Germans were living without employment;
6. Areas of suspected black market activities; and
7. Establishments where excessive drinking of alcoholic beverages occurred.

It must be remembered, though, that the U.S. Constabulary was but one arm of law enforcement in the U.S. Zone. There were two other main bodies, these being the U.S. Army's Military Police and the postwar German police forces. An examination of the specific relationship each had with the Constabulary is necessary for a complete understanding of zonal law enforcement.

The Military Police was (and is) an agency of a military commander and, thus, acted in his name to maintain the peace among U.S. soldiers. In occupied territories, through martial law, the Military Police had the power of arrest and detention over all persons, and could act when necessary to control civilians, either with or in place of the civil

authorities.¹⁰⁷

In Germany, the Military Police were present in only a few key cities which supported American military establishments, such as Frankfurt and Munich. When the Military Police were not available, their function was assumed by the Constabulary. In a case of this nature, Troopers assisted the Military Police when directed by the Commanding General of the Third Army (or higher headquarters), or when called on for assistance by the Military Police in emergencies. Soldiers apprehended during such a time were turned over to their unit commanders or to the Military Police at the earliest opportunity. Conversely, the Military Police assisted the Constabulary on request in establishing or keeping order among all U.S. military personnel (including those assigned to the Constabulary). Troopers, in the course of performing their duties, took all measures to safeguard evidence and to insure that material witnesses were available pending the arrival of Criminal Investigation Division agents at the scene of incidents.¹⁰⁸

The German police, according to U.S. policy, were made responsible for enforcing the rules and regulations existing

¹⁰⁷ U.S. Constabulary, Operational Directive, No.1, Annex 3, Para. 1.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., Paras. 2-6.

under the American Military Government, with the Constabulary acting as a reserve force in support when needed. The Constabulary based its fundamental authority over the German people in the rules and laws of land warfare for an occupying power. In part, these say that

...subject to the restrictions imposed by international law, the (occupying powers) can demand and enforce from inhabitants of occupied territory such obedience as may be necessary for the security of its forces, for the maintenance of law and order, and for the proper administration of the country.¹⁰⁹

Since both the German police and the Constabulary had the responsibility of maintaining security, law, and order, active cooperation between the two forces was essential. Constabulary unit headquarters kept in constant touch with Military Government Public Safety Officers and with police chiefs at the corresponding levels, as these were the links between the Constabulary Trooper and the German police. The Native patrolmen had access to Constabulary radio and wire communications in emergencies and telephone contact was maintained. In this same light, German police were kept abreast of the locations of Constabulary patrols when such information affected police operations.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Davis, pp. 168-169.

¹¹⁰ Know Your Job, p. 99.

The main function of the German police, decentralized amongst the Laender by the Military Government, was to cooperate with the Americans in the upkeep of civil order. When necessary, the local Provost Marshal and Security Troop Commander cooperated with and assisted the German police by providing the needed personnel to ensure the effective enforcement of Zone regulations. All requests from the German police had to be made in writing through a Military Government officer, who, in turn, coordinated arrangements with the nearest Constabulary or other Army unit to furnish armed assistance. A further provision allowed for verbal requests in emergency situations, but such a plea had to be confirmed in writing as soon as was possible.¹¹¹

All Constabulary units were instructed to conform to political boundaries, as the German police were guided in their activities by such borders. As a result, English-speaking German policemen who were assigned to accompany Constabulary patrols were not permitted to go with these into areas that fell outside their geographical jurisdiction, unless permission was previously obtained through the Military Government. It was also possible for German

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 98.

policemen to be billeted in the same areas as Constabulary units, in order to provide more efficient operations. However, in such circumstances, when the Constabulary units moved on, their German colleagues remained where originally assigned.¹¹²

In large urban areas, where concentrations of U.S. soldiers were located, Military Police and Constabulary Troopers were accompanied by English-speaking German policemen. In addition, a Constabulary Trooper was placed in each main German police station in such areas, except where English-speaking native police were present. Such a situation provided efficiency in arrest and apprehension when both Germans and Americans were involved. It must be understood, though, that the native force had authority only over German nationals and not over Allied troops, so the Constabulary had standing orders to provide assistance to their native counterparts when called upon.¹¹³

In order for the Constabulary to be able to accomplish its mission of general and civil security, it became necessary for a complete and efficient liaison system to be set up. Such liaison was needed between the Constabulary,

¹¹² Ibid., p. 99.

¹¹³ Ibid., pp. 99-100.

German and Austrian law enforcement agencies, the Military Government, the Military Police, the Criminal Investigation Division, and the Counter Intelligence Corps. A conference on such liaison activities was held at Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary on 30 July 1946, in response to a Third Army directive which called for monthly conferences of this nature. Since the U.S. Constabulary was delegated police responsibility for the entire American Zone, maximum cooperation with all other agencies was sought and did materialize.¹¹⁴ With such a united effort, the Constabulary was permitted to function efficiently, in the face of tremendous social, political, and economic disparities.

¹¹⁴ U.S. Constabulary, Quarterly Report of Operations, 1 July-30 September 1946, p. 5.

CHAPTER VI

THE CONSTABULARY'S RESPONSE TO ZONE PROBLEMS

Earlier in this study, the various troubles that existed in the U.S. Zone of Germany were examined. This chapter will bring to view the duties and responsibilities of the U.S. Constabulary, as well as the methods employed by it, in addressing these matters. As was done in Chapter III, Constabulary actions will be treated according to individual Zone problem.

THE CONSTABULARY AND THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION TROOPS

Prior to cracking down on his unruly brethren in olive drab, it was necessary for the individual Constabulary Trooper to understand the example he was to set. The Constabulary Troop Information Program explained it thus:

A good example, we know, is always effective. The well-dressed soldier, always personally neat, always courteous, both in his military duties and his civilian contacts, cannot fail to make a good impression upon the German people...

By and large, the Trooper is a good fellow...On the whole, he is generous, glad to give away his chocolate bars, free with his cigarettes, casual with all his possessions...

The Trooper can be the best soldier in the world. He must be, for he is the first--sometimes the only--contact the Germans have with the U.S. He must not be

careless of externals. It's the little things--lounging against a wall while waiting for a bus, letting the hands stray into the pockets--that loom so large in German eyes...

You Troopers are not here [in Germany] to make the Germans love you. You are here to make them respect you and your way of life. To that end, your conduct is vitally important...¹¹⁵

Also in line with this "raison d'être," the people of the Constabulary saw that

... breaches of discipline, whether thoughtless or intended, undermine progress made by the Military Government in turing the Germans to democracy. The violation of codes, the actual commission of crimes, by soldiers and by [War Department] civilians, are a threat to the Germans' confidence in Americans, and in American democracy.¹¹⁶

Aside from this verbal "flag-waving," Harmon and his staff recognized that disorders involving American soldiers usually involved cases of assault, shootings, and theft, as well as numerous instances of drunkenness and the reckless use of weapons and vehicles. Most incidents involved U.S. troops attacking their own "comrades-in-arms" or German nationals, though there were also numerous cases where German civilians attacked their occupiers.¹¹⁷ It was this conduct, and not such vile behavior as one putting his or her

¹¹⁵ Know Your Job, pp. 29-30.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 65.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Constabulary, Report of Operations, June 1946, p. 24.

hands into pockets or failing to relinquish one's Hershey bar to a street urchin, that threatened to (and sometimes did) make an adverse impression on the German populace.

Possessing a creed, adequate training, and the backing of the United States Government (via the Military Government in Frankfurt), the Troopers of the Constabulary set out to tame the the soldiers of the American Occupation. It was quite a task. In Goeppingen, a Private T.R. Wilson was apprehended by a passing Constabulary patrol after he had impersonated a Military Policeman and propositioned two German girls--with a 9-mm. Luger pistol.¹¹⁸ In Herzegau, shortly after the midnight hour, a War Department civilian named Betty Diller was jumped by six GI's, who ordered her to undress. When she refused, Diller was knocked down and was raped by each soldier. These servicemen were soon captured by the Constabulary.¹¹⁹ In Bamberg, a corporal and a private-first-class engaged in fisticuffs, during which time the private produced a knife and used it on his opponent. The corporal was rushed to the hospital and the private to the

¹¹⁸ U.S. Constabulary, Intelligence Summary, No.4, 3 July 1946, pp. 7-8.

¹¹⁹ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 7, 18-24 July 1946, p. 11.

stockade.¹²⁰ Also, in Schabach, a GI stopped a German on the street and asked a question. When the German failed to answer to the American's satisfaction, the German received a blow to the face, an act which led, after Constabulary apprehension, to the soldier's court-martial.¹²¹

Such were typical encounters that faced Constabulary Troopers in their dealings with the American soldiery. In the course of their duties, though, the Troopers were instructed to pay particular attention to one group of soldiers--the U.S. Army's black troops, who still served in units segregated from their white counterparts. Distrust of the black soldier was widespread, a condition which reflected the bigoted attitudes of American society at large rather than the misdeeds of blacks in uniform. In his report to Congress, George Meader stated that

Negro troops have come to be used largely as service troops, principally as truck drivers. This has resulted in their moving freely and unsupervised among the population...[and] their physical access to Army supplies, which they could and did use¹²² for the purpose of gaining favor with German women...

Meader also seemed to take great delight in pointing out the

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 12.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² "Test of U.S. Army in Reich...", p. 27.

fact that the black troops' rates for venereal diseases, absences without leave, assaults, and robberies were, respectively, six, nineteen, six, and twenty-seven times as great as those of white soldiers.¹²³

The powers that were at Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary held a similar view, seeing the "colored soldier" as a potential security threat.¹²⁴

...Unorganized assaults on German civilians, the raping of German girls, interference in the carrying out of German justice, and the intimidation of German officials and police (are) very common in the areas surrounding locations of colored units. Furthermore...such...areas might well become the centers of revolt...should this state of lawlessness on the part of the negro continue...¹²⁵

In response, Constabulary commanders were ordered, with regard to patrols, to visit towns "off the beaten path" or having between 5,000 to 20,000 people, at least twice a week. However, in communities, regardless of size, where there were "negro" units, patrols "will operate three or four nights per week" from the hours of darkness until the "normal time when

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ As one might expect, the Constabulary's records never fail to differentiate between "soldiers" and "Negro soldiers." The author.

¹²⁵ U.S. Constabulary, Quarterly Report of Operations, 1 October-30 December 1946, pp. 1-2.

such persons will be off the street."¹²⁶ Such was the American military's reaction to home-grown racism, transferred to Europe and fed on the old, but popular, tales of blacks raping white women and of the "colored" man's inherent dishonesty and criminal cunning.

In spite of Harmon's bravado and desire for disciplined perfection, not all of the Constabulary's Troopers lived up to the general's expectations.¹²⁷ Many, in fact, succumbed to the same temptations of Occupation life that regular GI's experienced. For instance, in Bayreuth, an unidentified Constabulary Trooper assaulted and attempted to kill a German girl when she refused his attentions.¹²⁸ In Erlangen, a Trooper was caught in the act of attempted rape when the victim's screams attracted the notice of another soldier,¹²⁹ and, in Stuttgart, the Constabulary picked up one of their own who had been absent without leave for nine days.

¹²⁶ This was also the system of patrolling utilized in areas near Displaced Persons camps. Headquarters, U.S. Constabulary, Planning Directive for the Reduction of Gasoline Consumption, 27 November 1946.

¹²⁷ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 8, 25-31 July 1946, p. 9.

¹²⁸ Snyder, p. 188.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

Furthermore, during the period July through December 1946, Constabulary Troopers committed a higher rate of crimes, offenses, and serious incidents than did other soldiers (see Appendix B). Snyder blames this unfavorable statistical situation on the premise that the Constabulary had a much better reporting system than other units and, therefore, Trooper incident figures appear artificially higher.¹³⁰ Perhaps this is so, but another reason could have been that, during the aforementioned time period, the Constabulary was still in its infancy as an "elite" force, with its standards gradually maturing from the theoretical to the practical. The "weeding out" process of "undesirable elements" within the ranks of the Constabulary was, also, only beginning.

At any rate, all soldiers, black and white, Trooper or "regular Joe," once apprehended and charged, could face either local disciplinary actions by their unit commanders or, if the offense was of a serious nature, a court-martial.

There were two basic kinds of courts-martial in the U.S. Army. A "summary court-martial" consisted of one officer who could try any offense denounced by the Articles of War, except capital offenses. A sentence by a summary court could not exceed confinement for more than one month and a

¹³⁰ Ibid., pp. 188-189.

forfeiture of more than two-thirds of one month's pay.¹³¹

A "general court-martial" consisted of any number of officers, but fewer than five. This court had the power to try any offense denounced by the Articles of War, including those punishable by death and by dismissal of dishonorable discharge.¹³²

In addition, a "special court-martial" could be convened, if directed by an officer having general court-martial jurisdiction. A special court could consist of any number of officers, but not less than three, and could try any offense except those involving the death penalty, unless specifically directed to do so by higher authority. Sentences imposed usually could not exceed six months confinement and forfeiture of two-third pay per month for six months.¹³³

The Constabulary had another kind of court at its disposal, in addition to those previously mentioned. These were "summary courts for traffic violations." In a letter prescribing the operations of this kind of court, Harmon and Constabulary Headquarters directed each Constabulary brigade to establish, maintain, and supervise the operations of such

¹³¹ Know Your Job, p. 131.

¹³² Ibid., p. 132.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 131.

judicial bodies, which were used in conjunction with speed traps. These traffic courts were set up with a view to reducing vehicular accidents by providing on-the-spot punishment for apprehended violators of traffic regulations. Those cases in which the maximum punishment permissible by a summary court was deemed feasible were prosecuted. Other cases of a more serious nature were remanded to the concerned unit commander.¹³⁴

As if keeping American GI's in order was not enough, the Constabulary faced another challenge, only this one was more difficult to subdue, as it crossed all political and social barriers. While disruptive soldiers would usually stand out, this other enemy, the black market, was usually discreet in its operations. Thus, the Constabulary faced a difficult challenge in combatting it and in loosening its grasp on the German nation.

THE CONSTABULARY AND THE BLACK MARKET

The Constabulary's concern with black market activities was, as with its dealings with GI's, in the role of a law enforcement agency assigned the task of eliminating as much

¹³⁴ U.S. Constabulary, Quarterly Report of Operations, 1 July-30 September 1946, p. 14.

of the illicit traffic as possible. While doing so, Troopers would apprehend black market participants, especially those engaged in large-scale enterprises.¹³⁵

The Constabulary net was widespread. In Munich, a German civilian was arrested and the ensuing investigation showed that he possessed a large amount of money from the sale of foodstuffs and cartons of cigarettes.¹³⁶ A German national was taken into custody in Amberg for his involvement in the illegal selling of U.S. gasoline, whiskey, PX rations, cigarettes, and Allied marks.¹³⁷ One of the most significant actions, though, occurred in November, 1946, when, in the town of Hespellbrunn, elements of the 10th Constabulary Squadron uncovered a black market ring that had been operating since V-E Day. In this affair, twenty-three Germans made statements that led to the capture of another twelve. One statement admitted that the group illegally dealt in jewels, clothes, office equipment, sewing machines, and gasoline. It was also learned that the ringleaders of the organization had engaged in the practice of entertaining

¹³⁵ Snyder, p. 186.

¹³⁶ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 8, 25-31 July 1946, p. 4.

¹³⁷ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 9, 1-7 August 1946, p. 5.

American officers and enlisted men. In return, the black marketeers would receive chocolate bars, cigarettes, coffee, and soap. Both leaders admitted that gasoline was stolen from vehicles while these soldiers were being entertained.¹³⁸

Sadly, Constabulary activities sometimes took on an air of harassment. In Goeppingen, a German was arrested for "dealings" with the black market, as he had several candy bars in his possession.¹³⁹ Another German was picked up for wearing a pair of low cut shoes that he had obtained from an illegal "swap shop."¹⁴⁰ Nothing could be more tragic, though, than the case of a Rumanian Displaced Person, who was arrested for the possession of soap, cigars, and candy. He later hanged himself after making a statement to the Constabulary.¹⁴¹ No amount was considered insignificant, though the Americans themselves supplied much of the black market merchandise, as shown earlier in this study.

¹³⁸ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 24, 16-22 November 1946, p. 5.

¹³⁹ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 4, 27 June-3 July 1946, p. 3.

¹⁴⁰ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 26, 30 November-6 December 1946, p. 4.

¹⁴¹ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 19, 12-18 October 1946, p. 10.

In fighting the black market, Constabulary commanders recognized that an overabundance of money and a scarcity of goods prompted all classes to evade price controls and to seek items from illegal sources. It was also felt by the American authorities that the number of persons apprehended represented only a fraction of the total black market operation.¹⁴² Even so, the Constabulary, in spite of a sometimes intolerant eye, did what it could in helping Germany on its way to economic stability. Of course, the human element in the Occupation demanded the attention of Constabulary Troopers, such as the dilemma of the Displaced Persons in the U.S. Zone.

THE PROBLEM OF DISPLACED PERSONS

Due to incidents of rioting and generally unlawful behavior by many, as well as the open opportunity for them to vent their wrath on the Germans, the large Displaced Persons (DP's) population represented a potential threat to the security of the American Zone. Therefore, it fell upon the shoulders of the Constabulary to curtail unlawful activities by this group of people.

¹⁴² U.S. Constabulary, Quarterly Report of Operations, 1 October-31 December 1946, p. 18.

Displaced Persons arrested by the U.S. Constabulary or by the German police were detained or confined by American troops--either in local German jails under U.S. guard, in established American military stockades, or in Displaced Person detention areas--until tried by Military Government courts. DP's confined in Army stockades were segregated from other classes of prisoners and, after trial, convicted DP's were incarcerated in specially-established camps located at Straubing and Schwaebisch Hall.¹⁴³

Reports of operations from Constabulary units indicate numerous incidents involving DP's with the commission of crimes. For instance, the 15th Constabulary Regiment reported that DP's participated in every sort of crime, and patrols were continuously receiving complaints from local mayors and civil police on incidents involving DP's. Arrest reports show Displaced Persons listed for many violations, such as the wearing of undyed American military uniforms, black marketeering, murder, and rape. The 2nd Constabulary Brigade staff believed that such activity was caused by "the root of all evil in Germany," the shortages of foodstuffs, tobacco, and clothing.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ U.S. Constabulary, Report of Operations, June 1946.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 23.

The donation of large quantities of old U.S. Army uniforms to the Displaced Persons in the early stages of the Occupation was a constant source of irritation to the Constabulary. Displaced Persons carried out many acts of violence and disturbance in such clothing, including assault, burglary, robbery, rape, and murder.¹⁴⁵ To make matters worse, these stateless individuals sometimes acquired stolen weapons and military vehicles. Some DP's were said to believe themselves immune from Military Government control. Obviously, the Constabulary hierarchy viewed these people as a danger to security.¹⁴⁶

One tool of control utilized by the Constabulary was that of raids on Displaced Persons camps, when requested by the Military Government and/or the UNRRA. The Constabulary saw these raids and searches as productive in obtaining material, evidence, and persons suspected of crimes. The primary purpose of such raids, though, was to break up illegal activities. However, a secondary purpose was that it

¹⁴⁵This was a major reason why, in 1957, the Army adopted its current "Army Green" uniform, as the olive drab shade had lost much of its distinction as a military symbol, due to the free distribution of such uniforms. The author.

¹⁴⁶U.S. Constabulary, Report of Operations, June 1946.

was believed that these had powerful influence on the German populace, as a display of strength.¹⁴⁷

Some Constabulary raids reaped dividends. In August, 1946, 395 enlisted men and ten officers of the Constabulary participated in a raid on the Polish DP camp at Flossenburg, a reputed harbor for disorder and vandalism. The raid was requested by both the UNRRA and the Military Government, on evidence that illegal weapons would be located. During the course of the raid, Constabulary Troopers uncovered black market activities in meat, considerable amounts of illegal currency (including American and British tender), quantities of U.S. Government goods, an individual suspected of murder, and six pistols. Seventeen people were detained, including the UNRRA camp commandant, who was arrested for assisting those in his charge by altering or destroying evidence.¹⁴⁸

In another case, 676 officers and men from the 870th Military Police Company, and the 10th, 13th, and 27th Constabulary Squadrons made a surprise raid on the Uhlanen Kaserne DP camp, near Bamberg. In the course of this action, known as "Operation Camel," 250 persons were screened, with

¹⁴⁷ U.S. Constabulary, Quarterly Report of Operations, 1 July-30 September 1946, p. 8.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

114 detained for further interrogation and eighty-four turned over to the Military Government for trial. \$45,000 worth of morphine, codein, and penicillin, as well as GI clothing, ammunition, and a small amount of black powder, were also discovered.¹⁴⁹

During the course of such raids, the Troopers were to follow Harmon's instructions in looking for refugee resentment. Harmon proudly exclaims in his memoirs that almost no resentment was found. In fact, one refugee shrugged off the raids by simply saying, "It's not the SS."¹⁵⁰ While there was truth in that refugee's statement, it was also true that the SS used similar tactics in their heyday. DP were surprised in the pre-dawn hours by helmeted soldiers of the Constabulary, armed and immaculate in appearance, taking full advantage of the weapon of suspense. Clearly, the Constabulary leadership (or, for that matter, that of the Military Government) did not take into consideration the potential psychological effects wrought upon the DP's, especially on those who had, until liberation, languished in

¹⁴⁹ U.S. Constabulary, Quarterly Report of Operations, 1 October-31 December 1946, p. 21.

¹⁵⁰ Harmon, p. 290.

Nazi camps. Surprise raids in the darkness of the night had to evoke terrifying memories of SS roll calls, selections, and the stench of death. Therefore, the Constabulary hierarchy demonstrated a glaring lack of understanding as to what many DP's had been through under the Third Reich. Even though DP's were the cause of many disturbances, the use of such tactics is questionable.

Other actions of the Constabulary toward the DP's were criticized. Following the use of Constabulary Troopers in the investigation of a crime in Landsberg on or about 13 December 1946, allegations were made in the press that several Jewish DP's had been mistreated during the course of the inquiry. In response, Harmon issued the following statement on 7 January 1947:

It is the policy of the Constabulary that all raids, seizures, arrests, and interrogations shall be accomplished with justice, decency, and fairness. In every case of alleged brutality and mistreatment, a thorough investigation is made and when such improper conduct has been found to exist, the wrongdoers are subjected to disciplinary action. On the other hand, it is my policy to thoroughly back up my officers and men when they have executed their duty in a proper manner.

Constabulary troops are continually being oriented and instructed in the proper handling of their difficult mission...the strict performance of the mission with justice is continually being stressed. The Constabulary will continue to carry on its mission without any prejudice to any particular race, creed, or color, without regard to whether its activities are correctly

or incorrectly reported...¹⁵¹

Steps, in addition to raids and patrols, were taken to curb the rate of crime on the part of Displaced Persons. In December, 1946, Harmon directed that periodic checks be made of all personnel entering and leaving DP camps, which sometimes served as havens for offenders in eluding arrest. Roadblocks were located outside the jurisdiction of the camps, preferably in concealed positions, as close to the exits as was possible. However, care was taken not to interfere unduly with the normal camp administration. A study of the results of these irregularly scheduled checks is revealing. During the quarter 1 October to 31 December 1946, a total of 516 such checks were made. In the 15th Constabulary Regiment area, 311 checks, or an average of eleven per day, resulted in an absence of incidents involving DP's during the month of December 1946. A total of eighty-eight incidents in and around all camps during November of that year was noticeably decreased to forty-eight in December.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ U.S. Constabulary, Quarterly Report of Operations, 1 January-31 March 1947, pp. 60-61.

¹⁵² U.S. Constabulary, Quarterly Report of Operations, 1 October-31 December 1946, pp. 17-18.

It cannot be denied that the Displaced Persons represented a potential threat to order in the U.S. Zone and that the Constabulary's presence was necessary and useful in combatting the malevolent portion of this group of individuals. Yet, the lack of empathy with the DP's experiences previous to the Occupation was a glaring defect in Constabulary (and Military Government) operations, one that must not be overlooked. Ends do not always justify the means.

THE CONSTABULARY AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE

The Constabulary's Troop Information Program stressed understanding as the key to "winning over" the Germans. The Program put it this way:

If the Trooper is to re-orient the Germans--sell them democracy--he must understand them. Instead of blindly hoping they will understand us and our political ideas, we should make an all-out effort to understand them...We may find ways to put some of our ideas into their heads.

It is a poor salesman who tries to peddle a product--democracy, in this case--without first trying to find out what sales resistance he is likely to run up against and then figuring out ways to break down that sales resistance.¹⁵³

The Trooper was taught that the German had five major

¹⁵³ Know Your Job, p. 3.

national characteristics: (1) Militarism; (2) Blind obedience to the State; (3) Desire for a strong leader; (4) Idea of superiority, a feeling that, even though beaten, the German people are better than anyone else; and (5) A persecution complex, a feeling that the rest of the world is "ganging up" on them.¹⁵⁴

William L. Shirer, a foreign correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System stationed in Berlin during the prewar years, echoed such sentiments earlier. In his diary entry for 27 August 1939, Shirer relates the tense feelings of the days just prior to the German invasion of Poland. While doing so, he quotes the Nazi Party organ, the Voelkischer Beobachter, as saying that the "individual, as well as the nation, can renounce only those things which are not vital." The diarist saw such a statement as portraying the "German character stripped to the bone. A German cannot renounce vital things, but expects the other fellow to."¹⁵⁵ A year later, John Gunther, another American journalist, stressed that Hitler himself was the actual reason for German conceit. According to Gunther, Hitler suggested to the

¹⁵⁴Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁵⁵William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent (New York: Bonanza Books, 1984), p. 186.

German people that they were "sick" and that he alone could make them "well," by way of exposing those who supposedly "stabbed" Germany "in the back" in 1918. By appealing to their emotions, Hitler was able to seize control of the Reich--and lead it to destruction.¹⁵⁶ On the other side of the coin, Carl Landauer, a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, brings to view the fact that the Germans had been humbled long before Hitler and the war and that these events only worsened their stations in life. Landauer holds that the Germans experienced a destructive inflation and a depression, then a war in which family, friends, home, and possessions were lost. To make matters more difficult, there was always the threat of running afoul of the Gestapo and ending up in a concentration camp--or worse.¹⁵⁷

Thus, the Constabulary Trooper faced complex social circumstances that could not be remedied overnight. Since

¹⁵⁶ John Gunther, Inside Europe, 1940 War Edition (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940), pp. 30-31. Years later, during the early 1960's, Gunther still observed the German desire for strong leadership. The object of their veneration was, in this case, Konrad Adenauer. John Gunther, Inside Europe Today (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), pp. 26-27.

¹⁵⁷ Carl Landauer, Germany: Illusions and Dilemmas (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1969), p. 3.

the Trooper was usually the only contact most Germans had with the Military Government, it was up to him to deal with the German mentality by setting a proper example in appearance and conduct. The Trooper was instructed to be firm, but fair, and, in performing his duties, picture what life would be like in the United States if it was under occupation. In doing so, the Trooper would be able to ask himself if he was being the kind of soldier that he could respect if the situation was reversed.¹⁵⁸

Generally speaking, disorders involving the German populace were few, with most stimulated by the desire to obtain additional food. This state of things was reflected in the fact that most offenses involved the black market. There were also problems between the indigenous population and the Displaced Persons, as well as with the American soldiery.¹⁵⁹

Unfortunately, the Constabulary also had to contend with the ugly remnant of National Socialism. For example, in the town of Fladungen, fifteen German youths marched through the streets singing the Horst Wessel Song and threw rocks at

¹⁵⁸ Know Your Job, pp. 21-36.

¹⁵⁹ Snyder, p. 191.

American establishments.¹⁶⁰ On the Autobahn near Hamburg, a wire of 110 gauge was found tied between two trees across the north-bound lanes,¹⁶¹ and, in Nuremburg, the "Spruchkammer" (denazification court) was bombed, partially destroying the building.¹⁶² On the whole, though, most incidents were minor and isolated.

In terms of community services, members of the Constabulary played a part in the Army's assistance to the German Youth Activities, an organization which encouraged the formation of voluntary groups of young people for cultural, religious, and recreational purposes.¹⁶³ By its engaging in such enterprises, and in its official security functions, the Constabulary did manage to gain respect from the Germans, but sometimes at the cost of many American ideals of liberty.

"NIGHTSTICK JUSTICE"

In the course of performing their duties, Troopers of

¹⁶⁰ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 17, 28 September-4 October 1946, p. 1.

¹⁶¹ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 25, 23-29 November 1946, p. 1.

¹⁶² Snyder, p. 183.

¹⁶³ United States Constabulary, p. 8.

the Constabulary sought the maintenance of law and order throughout the Zone. Sometimes, however, the methods they used in achieving these ends could have been seen as unethical and contrary to the "American Way." According to Harmon:

Driven by the urgencies of the time, the Constabulary did engage in procedures that probably are unacceptable in terms of American principles strictly construed. But the Constabulary was an American organization, staffed by men who all their lives had been steeped in democratic ideals and the understanding that government is a servant of the people, not the reverse.¹⁶⁴

Harmon's statement is disturbing, in that he implies that his Troopers, so "steeped in democratic ideals," openly and purposely violated the very tenets the Americans wished the Germans to adopt. This made for an interesting example to the Germans and, in many instances, led to a condition that can be termed "nightstick justice."

Some persons were apprehended in such a manner that negated the American concept of freedom of speech and expression. In the town of Hemsbach, the vicar of a local Protestant church delivered a eulogy during the funeral of a local child that had been killed by an American truck. In

¹⁶⁴ Harmon, pp. 290-291.

his address, the vicar included a few anti-American remarks. The vicar was arrested and, eventually, he lost his position as a minister and a teacher, due to U.S. pressure.¹⁶⁵ In Schweinfurt, a German civilian was apprehended for cursing the U.S. Army while speaking to some Military Policemen.¹⁶⁶ Still, another German was arrested for "displaying disrespect" to the American Flag.¹⁶⁷ Arbitrary arrests of this nature were common, according to the records of the Constabulary.

The favorite tool of the Constabulary command, though, was what Life called a "courteous show of force, one that Germans are learning to fear and respect."¹⁶⁸ In these spectacles, Constabulary units would parade through town thoroughfares, in full equipment and armed "to the teeth," so that the Germans would be sufficiently impressed and lulled into a state of complacency. While these parades may have obtained respect from the German people, they also undoubtedly caused resentment. What sane and thinking person

¹⁶⁵ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 11, 28 September-4 October 1946, p. 1.

¹⁶⁶ U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, No. 24, 16-22 November 1946, p. 15.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁶⁸ "New U.S. Constabulary Polices Germany...", p. 21.

would not resent being constantly reminded of their recent defeat and of who was "in charge"? Besides, such displays of power could only have retarded the German adoption of democracy. The populace would only see a reliance on force in lieu of reason. Such a measure did not (and does not) speak well of a democratic society. After all, even the Wehrmacht occasionally paraded down the Champs Elysee to remind the French of their occupied status following Compiegne.

Thus, this was how the U.S. Constabulary reacted to its various challenges in Germany. It responded well in combatting the deteriorating discipline situation as existed in the Army of Occupation, but tended to overreact when at large in Zone society. Many times, the organization demonstrated little comprehension of the emotional composition of the people in their charge. Might alone does not make right, especially when one is planting the seeds of democracy in soil that was once not so fertile.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

In summary, the postwar German Reich was a vast monument to the destruction of which mankind is capable. With her cities transformed into ruins and her people forced into a fight for survival, Germany was a potential breeding ground for discord, crime, and other varieties of civil strife. The American Military Government faced a terrific challenge in establishing and maintaining order in its respective zone of occupation under such conditions.

The U.S. Government, though, was not initially sure how to handle such a task. Henry Morgenthau wanted to transform the German nation from an industrial power into an agrarian economy, hoping that such a solution would forever break the back of Prussian militarism. Some, such as Henry L. Stimson, sought a more enlightened occupation, one that stressed German-American cooperation. Yet, in either case, there existed no means of avoiding some sort of military occupation, a prospect which troubled General George C. Marshall, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and a host of other martial thinkers.

Eisenhower and his successors opted for a "police-type occupation," whereby the Constabulary came into existence. This concept was the most feasible course anyone in authority could have devised. The massive trend of demobilizing the American armed forces following the end of World War II caused a strain in the Occupation, by siphoning off the necessary manpower for such an undertaking. By securing order in Germany through a small, but highly mobile "constabulary," the Military Government was able to have a sufficient organization to maintain the peace in the U.S. Zone cheaply and with a minimum number of personnel. The Constabulary, in this manner, came to support the policies of the Military Government and to keep up law enforcement activities by acting as a "state police" organization. As such, Constabulary Troopers provided training and support to other agencies, such as the Military Police and the reorganized German police forces.

Just the presence of the Constabulary throughout the U.S. Zone fostered law and order. Local police had back-up, if needed, and unruly American GI's and Displaced Persons faced disciplinary action. The black market also had a formidable foe in the Constabulary, as the mobility of Trooper patrols threatened large-scale, open operations. Hence, through the efforts of the Constabulary, a certain

degree of order had been restored.

Yet, the price of such order was high, being paid for, on some occasions, by the sacrifice of American concepts of justice and civil rights. Arbitrary arrests were made for minor remarks and attitudes, thereby causing the Constabulary to resemble some Orwellian "thought police." The Constabulary's periodic "shows of force" and raids on Displaced Persons camps further demonstrated the ignorance (accidental or intended) of the Americans toward the feelings and experiences of some of the people under their control. In this light, the Military Government seemed to transform itself from a "police-type occupation" into a kind of "police state," an unfortunate state of affairs for a people brought up on the concepts of liberty and individual rights. Time was short, though, for the U.S. Constabulary.

By 1948, the law enforcement duties of Harmon's elite force had been assumed by the German police and the Military Police forces. The Constabulary itself began reverting back to a military unit, as Troopers began to exchange their leather police accouterments for infantry "web gear" and to experience protracted stretches of field duty. In 1952, with the occupation having been made obsolete with the emergence of the new Federal Republic of Germany, the Constabulary passed out of existence and was absorbed by the U.S. Seventh

Army.


In one respect, though, the spirit of the Constabulary lives on today. During the 1980's, the U.S. Army Military Police Corps went through a transformation, from writing speeding tickets and "hauling in" intoxicated servicemen on pass to maintaining the security of large areas of territory in time of war. Having been assigned the protection of the "rear area," the MP's are trained to carry out their missions by way of active and aggressive motor patrols and through the cooperation of local law enforcement and security agencies. During periods of emergency, the MP's would be responsible for maintaining law and order amongst the troops, for keeping the "main supply routes" (roads) open for traffic, for safeguarding key rear area installation and military bases, and for vigilance against possible covert threats to rear area security by "unfriendly" forces. With the emphasis being placed on the importance of mobility, by way of small, but highly-trained, teams of MP's patrolling large (sometimes huge) tracts of territory, the Military Police Corps has been designed to act as "cavalry," in much the same way as the old Constabulary. Thus, the Constabulary, in a manner of speaking, survives.

APPENDIX A

Maps

Allied Zones of Occupation

(Extracted from The West Point Atlas of American Wars. Vol. 2. Map 72
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1959).




Political Boundaries, U.S. Zone

(Extracted from U.S. Constabulary, Weekly Intelligence Summary, 25-31 July 1946).


— LEGEND —

- LANDER BOUNDARIES
- REGIERUNGSBEZIRKE BOUNDARIES
- - - LANDKREISE & STADTKREISE



Regimental and Brigade Areas, U.S. Zone

(Extracted from U.S. Constabulary. Weekly Intelligence Summary, 25-31 July 1946)



— LEGEND —

BRIGADE BOUNDARY ———

REGIMENTAL BOUNDARY ———

APPENDIX B

Statistical Data

(Extracted from Snyder, pp. 227-231, 234-235, 242-243)

TOTAL PATROLS AND TOTAL MILES

MONTH	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
TYPE:													
FOOT - No.	2,122	9,273	8,662	6,081	5,829	5,623	5,256	4,244	4,984	4,889	1,287	522	21,182
Miles Traveled	12,811	74,785	56,680	40,584	59,248	36,762	31,743	29,493	18,266	25,202	5,816	2,192	393,582
HORSE - No.	335	838	1,007	1,467	1,111	770	919	496	571	613	741	556	9,424
Miles Traveled	6,899	10,142	22,408	17,349	15,081	6,079	8,400	6,829	7,204	8,324	8,877	6,663	124,255
VEHICULAR - No.	16,944	23,144	23,132	20,770	20,213	16,542	12,955	7,950	11,984	12,389	6,413	3,730	176,166
Miles Traveled	934,147	1,055,907	1,109,345	926,046	849,886	733,444	481,128	293,653	490,265	530,153	340,947	259,552	8,005,473
MOTORCYCLE - No.	000	1,456	1,742	390	502	360	198	92	393	365	412	463	6,373
Miles Traveled	000	46,100	101,981	33,951	33,275	15,582	5,786	5,325	22,622	28,222	41,188	37,213	371,245
TOTAL PATROLS BY MONTH	19,401	34,711	34,543	28,708	27,655	23,295	19,328	12,782	17,932	18,256	8,853	5,271	250,755
TOTAL MILES BY MONTH	953,857	1,187,934	1,290,414	1,017,930	957,490	791,867	527,057	335,300	538,357	591,901	396,828	305,620	8,894,555

NUMBER OF INTERIOR PATROLS AND MILES TRAVELED

MONTH	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
TYPE:													
FOOT - No.	720	1,205	933	828	765	1,385	1,679	1,358	2,378	2,633	666	222	14,770
Miles Traveled	1,890	7,035	4,924	4,301	2,924	8,613	8,840	7,001	12,306	18,884	3,033	1,571	78,324
HORSE - No.	50	000	19	000	000	000	000	000	000	16	72	000	157
Miles Traveled	900	000	200	000	000	000	000	000	000	214	720	000	2,034
VEHICULAR - No.	11,517	13,835	15,789	13,185	12,203	11,872	8,252	5,045	8,218	7,982	4,742	2,866	115,506
Miles Traveled	767,842	928,578	874,236	683,433	587,596	549,833	331,442	205,063	371,250	397,445	273,050	233,022	6,199,818
MOTORCYCLE - No.	000	1,456	1,742	389	373	360	198	92	393	365	412	463	6,243
Miles Traveled	000	46,100	101,981	33,951	16,050	15,582	5,786	5,325	22,622	28,222	41,188	37,213	354,020
TOTAL PATROLS BY MONTH	12,287	16,496	18,453	14,442	13,341	13,618	10,129	6,495	10,989	10,996	5,892	3,551	136,649
TOTAL MILES BY MONTH	770,632	981,713	981,401	718,690	606,570	574,028	346,028	217,389	406,178	441,765	317,993	271,806	6,634,193

NUMBER OF BORDER PATROLS AND MILES TRAVELED

MONTH	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
TYPE:													
FOOT - No.	1,432	8,068	7,759	5,235	5,064	4,237	2,577	2,886	2,606	2,256	621	300	44,011
Miles Traveled	10,921	67,750	51,756	36,283	56,324	28,149	22,963	22,492	5,860	9,818	2,781	621	315,758
HORSE - No.	285	828	988	1,467	1,111	770	719	496	571	897	669	556	9,057
Miles Traveled	5,979	10,142	22,208	17,349	15,081	6,079	8,400	6,829	7,204	8,110	8,157	6,663	122,221
VEHICULAR - No.	5,427	9,309	7,343	7,585	8,010	4,670	4,703	2,905	3,766	4,407	1,671	1,327	61,123
Miles Traveled	166,306	128,329	235,049	245,008	282,290	185,011	149,726	88,590	119,016	182,708	67,897	68,748	1,842,871
MOTORCYCLE - No.	000	000	000	000	129	000	000	000	000	000	000	000	129
Miles Traveled	000	000	000	000	17,225	000	000	000	000	000	000	000	17,225
TOTAL PATROLS BY MONTH	7,114	18,205	16,090	14,287	14,314	9,677	8,999	6,287	6,943	7,260	2,961	2,183	114,320
TOTAL MILES BY MONTH	190,839	206,221	309,018	299,240	350,920	217,889	181,029	117,911	182,179	150,636	78,635	71,027	2,906,109

ESTABLISHMENT OF ROAD BLOCKS

MONTH	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
Number of Road Blocks Established	11,665	13,003	14,213	16,013	15,966	14,611	1,342	8,585	12,475	11,127	9,669	6,453	135,122
Number of Speed Traps Operated	517	1,755	1,406	1,137	770	633	310	411	498	1,352	1,145	546	10,480
Mobile Summary Court Martial:													
Number of Traffic Cases Tried	000	924	1,422	765	801	654	306	262	610	743	822	247	7,256
Number of Cases Referred to C. O.	000	270	685	174	282	255	186	146	647	1,554	1,283	495	5,977
Number of Cases Referred to M. C.	000	381	1,385	894	660	861	234	204	463	1,000	862	343	7,287

CHECK AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

MONTH	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	TOTAL
	1946	1946	1946	1946	1946	1946	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947	
Description of Operations:													
Number of Operations	11	11	18	13	10	8	3	1	1	1	0	0	77
Number of Troops Used	639	1,403	1,674	2,127	4,748	2,518	232	29	215	872	0	0	14,157
Number of Arrests Made	104	287	348	342	232	60	8	1	73	48	0	0	1,500

MINOR DELINQUENCIES AND TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS

MONTH	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	TOTAL
	1946	1946	1946	1946	1946	1946	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947	
Constabulary Troops	639						445	546	864	688	956	829	37,848
Other Troops	2,592	4,494	5,688	3,523	3,205	2,448	1,171	1,680	2,583	1,450	2,472	1,874	
Displaced Persons	513	946	847	891	1,299	1,592	151	353	880	1,513	522	255	9,462
German Civilians	3,528	5,644	4,967	4,399	6,114	5,449	2,129	2,127	5,083	7,390	3,419	1,922	52,371
Total Offenders Military & Civilian	7,272	11,084	11,502	8,513	10,618	9,489	3,896	4,706	9,410	11,241	7,370	4,580	99,681

CRIMES, OFFENSES AND SERIOUS INCIDENTS

MONTH	Jul 1946	Aug 1946	Sep 1946	Oct 1946	Nov 1946	Dec 1946	Jan 1947	Feb 1947	Mar 1947	Apr 1947	May 1947	Jun 1947	TOTAL
Conscriptory Troops	68	126	133	141	149	169	131	153	126	148	108	134	1,590
Other Troops	53	88	88	134	148	158	143	239	216	214	245	204	1,927
Allied Civilians	6	7	10	10	8	14	10	4	5	6	3	8	88
German Civilians	28	52	64	183	99	115	154	58	70	29	30	51	933
Displaced Persons	15	39	79	298	94	58	68	63	78	93	38	51	974
Unknowns	42	119	204	588	318	206	258	245	275	272	161	97	2,812
Total Offenders Military & Civilians	212	431	581	1,354	840	720	761	764	770	762	485	639	8,319

TURNOVER AMONG ENLISTED MEN
ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. CONSTABULARY

Month and Year	Strength	Losses	Gains	T/O Strength
30 June 1946	29,437	6,581	6,221	30,917
31 July 1946	31,730	1,439	3,732	30,917
31 August 1946	32,245	179	694	30,917
30 September 1946	30,005	3,431	1,191	30,917
31 October 1946	28,954	3,216	2,163	30,917
30 November 1946	28,795	675	516	30,917
31 December 1946	27,771	1,240	216	30,917
31 January 1947	24,397	2,978	396	30,917
28 February 1947	23,793	1,708	1,104	30,917
31 March 1947	23,067	3,775	3,049	30,185
30 April 1947	23,182	2,409	2,524	30,185
31 May 1947	22,274	1,840	932	30,185
30 June 1947	21,468	853	47	29,022
		30,324	22,787	

TURNOVER AMONG OFFICERS
ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. CONSTABULARY


Month and Year	Strength	Losses	Gains	T/O Strength
30 June 1946	1,433	334	64	1,863
31 July 1946	1,494	66	127	1,863
31 August 1946	1,945	99	541	1,871
30 September 1946	2,023	21	99	1,871
31 October 1946	2,025	82	90	1,871
30 November 1946	2,070	45	90	1,871
31 December 1946	1,868	304	102	1,871
31 January 1947	1,973	59	155	1,871
28 February 1947	1,855	63	45	1,871
31 March 1947	1,989	182	108	1,996
30 April 1947	1,993	62	66	1,996
31 May 1947	1,944	104	51	1,996
30 June 1947	1,906	108	70	1,735
		1,471	1,608	

APPENDIX C


Organizational Diagrams


(Extracted from Snyder, pp. 244-251)

Organization of US Constabulary Headquarters




Constabulary Brigade Headquarters






Constabulary Regimental Organization



Constabulary Squadron Organization Squadron Headquarters




Aggregate:
Hq and Hq Troop
12 OI
83 EM

Mechanized Troops:
13 OI
463 EM

Motorized Troops:
10 OI
310 EM


TOTAL: 37 OI and 770 EM

Constabulary Mechanized Troop



Aggregate Strength:
5 Off
153 EM
10 Cars Armored M-8
2 Tks 2 1/2 Ton
3 Tks 1 1/2 Ton
33 Tks 1/2 Ton
20 LMG Cal. .30
64 SMG Cal. .45
160 Pistols Cal. .45
86 Rifles Cal. .30 M-1

Constabulary Motorized Troop



Aggregate Strength:
5 Off
153 EM
1 Car Armored M-8
2 Tks 2 1/2 Ton
12 Tks 1 1/2 Ton
9 Tks 1/2 Ton
11 LMG Cal. .30
30 SMG Cal. .45
3 81 MM Mortars
160 Pistols Cal. .45
74 Rifles Cal. .30 M-1
3 Rifles 57 MM Recoilless

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