My Kingdom for a Valley: The Valtelline Episode and Richelieu's
Raison d'Etat
By
John Pietkiewicz
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment ofthe Requirements
for the Degree of
Master ofArts
in the
History
Program
Youngstown State University
December 2004
My Kingdom for a Valley: The Valtelline Episode and Richelieu's Raison d'Etat
John Pietkiewicz
I hereby release this thesis to the public. I understand that this thesis will be made
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Abstract
Cardinal Richelieu, the First Minister ofKing Louis XIII's council, spent his
entire career strengthening the position ofFrance in seventeenth century Europe.
Coming to power in 1624 during the Thirty Years' War, several major internal and
external threats confronted his administration. The French Calvinists, or Huguenots,
prepared to launch more revolts against the king; despite the rights and protection they
received under the Edict ofNantes. The Catholic nobility also resisted the authority of
Louis XIII, attempting to maintain their autonomy and prevent the establishment of
absolute monarchy. The House ofHapsburg, the ruling family ofthe Holy Roman
Empire and Spain, presented a constant danger to the borders ofFrance. Their efforts to
eliminate Protestant resistance in Germany and the Netherlands insinuated the
development ofHapsburg hegemony across the continent. Recognizing the imminent
threat posed by their recent military successes, Richelieu decided to make the Hapsburgs
his first priority. Returning to the foreign policy ofKing Henry IV two decades earlier,
the new First Minister occupied the Valtelline, a crucial valley in the Alps necessary for
Spain to reinforce its army in the Spanish Netherlands.
Catholics in Europe were outraged by the Cardinal's actions, claiming he declared
war on his own religion. The ultramontane French Catholics, or devots, felt personally
betrayed, since they supported his rise to power. However, he defended his policy in the
French Court and in public, asserting that as a faithful Catholic kingdom, the growth of
France coincided with the strengthening ofthe Church. This belief, formed during the
Valtelline episode, established Cardinal Richelieu's raison d'etat and the justification for
his actions throughout the Thirty Years' War.
Table ofContents
Acknowledgements
Introduction 1
Chapter One 10
Chapter Two 28
Chapter Three 49
Chapter Four 64
Chapter Five 79
Conclusion 90
Bibliography 94
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Dr. David Lockhart at Wright State University for
introducing me to the study ofthe Thirty Years' War. My appreciation and awe continue
for the History Department at Youngstown State University, especially Dr. Martha
Pallante and Dr. Eleanor Congdon, who graciously suffered through my procrastination
and last-minute requests to support my efforts. My deepest gratitude is extended to Dr.
Anne York, my mentor, friend and intellectual surrogate mother, whose guidance and
constant encouragement helped sustain my work in early modem Europe. I am honored
to be your "first" in the department. Finally, my love and appreciation go out to my
family and friends, who never understood what I was doing, but were behind me all the
way. This is an important steppingstone in my occupational ambitions. To all those that
steadied the rock for me, I offer my thanks and my promise that because ofyou, I will
achieve my goals.
Introduction
The Transformation ofEurope
The development ofEuropean civilization spans several millennia ofhuman
history. Although every century made some mark upon the European continent, only a
few periods define pivotal moments in the shaping ofthe Western world. More than any
other recent century, the seventeenth century represented the entrance ofEurope into the
modem era ofhistory. A large portion ofthis transformation included the continuing
shift from the dominant and controlling presence ofreligion to the growth ofmonarchs
functioning without papal influence. People slowly began to see themselves as
inhabitants ofa distinct culture instead ofthe subjects ofan empire or the adherents to the
Roman Catholic Church. The wars fought for religious unification that plagued
European soil the previous century were replaced by the struggle to define a country or
resist political hegemony.
Europe's transformation was not a peaceful process. The entire continent was
plunged into a conflict that lasted nearly haIfa century. Known as the Thirty Years' War,
the conflict tore apart old alliances and the political boundaries that held Europe together
in the past. Provinces ofthe Holy Roman Empire in Germany and Italy turned against
each other, battling for political and religious freedom from the emperor. The northern
halfofthe Netherlands, known as the United Provinces, also revolted against the colonial
rule ofthe Spanish throne. These conflicts formed the initial causes ofthe Thirty Years'
War, and were supported by their Protestant neighbors, including England, Denmark and
I
Sweden. Another major country that supported a war against Spain and the Holy Roman
Empire was the Catholic state ofFrance.
King Louis XIII, the Bourbon ruler ofFrance, was only sixteen years ofage when
the Thirty Years' War officially erupted. During his adolescence, the authority ofthe
French crown was held under the regency ofthe Queen mother Marie de Medici, whose
foreign policy promoted an alliance between France and Spain. In 1624, after numerous
royal advisors were dismissed for corruption and inefficient policies, Louis XIII
appointed a member ofthe Catholic clergy as his First Minister, Armand du Plessis,
Cardinal Duke ofRichelieu. Under his leadership, France began an active campaign to
subvert the power ofthe House ofHapsburg, the ruling family ofSpain, Austria, and the
Holy Roman Empire in Germany. The Cardinal recognized this dynastic family as a
serious threat to the sovereignty ofthe French crown. Therefore, he used the authority of
his office to weaken the influence ofSpain in the Netherlands and keep the Empire
politically unstable until France was strong enough to directly intervene in the Thirty
Years' War in 1635. This included the subsidization ofseveral Protestant countries to
maintain an armed conflict against the Catholic Hapsburgs.1
Richelieu also directed military intervention against Spain for the protection of
French allies in strategic locations. His first confrontation with the Hapsburgs occurred
in the Northern Italian province ofthe Valtelline. Primarily ofCatholic Italian heritage,
the Alpine valley was under the lordship ofthe Protestant Grisons, an ally ofFrance. The
passes formed bythe Adda River were also a key land route for Spain's lines of
communication between the port city ofGenoa and the Netherlands, where the United
Provinces continued their revolt against Madrid. In 1620, the joint efforts ofSpain and
I Robin Briggs, Early Modern France 1560-1715. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),89-90.
2
Milan forced the Protestants from the province and erected Spanish garrisons along the
border. After several failed attempts at negotiation, the papacy intervened, placing the
valley under the protection oftroops from Rome. When Richelieu came to power, his
first priority was to sever Spain's link to Austria and the Netherlands by returning the
Valtelline to the Grisons. In November 1624, a small French army expelled the papal
garrisons from the province and blocked reinforcements from Milan. The plans ofthe
First Minister positioned France against Spain, beginning a new era ofFrench diplomacy
in Europe.2
To those outside ofthe French court, Richelieu's foreign policy was an attack on
his own religion. A Cardinal conspired with Protestant rulers to destroy the other major
Catholic countries, particularly Spain and the Holy Roman Empire. Some historians
claim that the actions ofthe First Minister ofFrance portray a greedy, power-hungry man
willing to sacrifice his own religion and morality to advance his status in the realm of
international politics. Rumors even existed that the Cardinal was plotting to overthrow
King Louis XIII and place himselfupon the throne ofFrance.3 However, an examination
ofRichelieu's policy and actions during the Thirty Years' War, as well as the
corroboration ofhis state papers and personal Memoires, showed an ambitious man
dedicated to restoring the glory ofFrance in the eyes ofEurope.
Although his talents gravitated toward the political, his clerical duties were never
neglected, as he remained a devout Catholic. Many believed his support ofProtestant
countries and his subversion ofthe Catholic Hapsburgs in Spain and Austria to be a
2 David Maland, Europe at War 1600-1650. (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980),74,101.
3 James Breck Perkins, France Under Mazarin, With a Review ofthe Administration ofRichelieu. vol. 1.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1886), 103-104; Jacques Boulenger, The Seventeenth Century. (New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1933),34-35.
3
betrayal ofhis own religion. This conflict never existed in Richelieu's mind. To him, the
House ofHapsburg was a corrupt and degenerate family that continued to use the
authority ofthe Catholic Church to further their own power. France, Richelieu believed,
was the true defender ofChristianity and representedthe best hope for the future ofthe
Church. This belief, developed during Valtelline Episode, formed the basis ofthe foreign
policy used throughout his career and his theory ofreason ofstate.4
Chapter One discusses the situation in Europe from the beginning ofthe sixteenth
century to Cardinal Richelieu's rise to power in 1624. The roots ofRichelieu's political
and religious philosophy were buried deep in the century ofhis birth. In 1519, the power
ofthe Spanish and Holy Roman Empires was combined under Emperor Charles V,
representing the height ofHapsburg dominance in Europe. The unification ofthe two
family lines in Madrid and Vienna created an enormous threat to the sovereignty of
France. With the Hapsburgs surrounding the country on every border, the sanctity ofthe
French crown was jeopardized.5
One factor that prevented Emperor Charles V from contemplating such an
invasion was the advent ofthe Protestant Reformation. This division eventually spread
outside the realm ofreligion, and the Holy Roman Empire was divided between
Protestant and Catholic princes. Rejecting this heretical movement, both for its challenge
to the Catholic Church and the power ofthe Emperor, Germany was enveloped in war
among the imperial provinces. The Treaty ofAugsburg, signed in 1555, provided a
temporary reprieve from religious fighting inside the Empire. However, the stage was set
for a future conflict to arise. After the slow disintegration ofreligious toleration in
4 D. P. O'Connell, Richelieu. (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1968),43-45.
51. H. Elliott, Spain and Its World 1500-1700. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 7-8.
4
Germany, the Protestants ignited the conflict again with the Bohemian Revolt in May
1618. This uprising in the heart ofthe Holy Roman Empire set in motion the events that
carried Germany into hostilities lasting another thirty years.6
Spain was also fighting for religious and political unity among its external
provinces. Calvinism made considerable progress in establishing a foothold in Western
Europe, including the northern provinces ofthe Spanish-controlled Netherlands. Being
in open revolt against Madrid since the 1570's, the United Provinces battled the
combined forces ofthe loyal provinces in the south and the Spanish army ofKing Philip
II. With either side unable to conquer the other, Spain and the United Provinces agreed
toa Twelve Years' Truce in 1609. Though this temporary cessation ofhostilities offered
no real hope ofa peaceful resolution, it gave Spain the time needed to reinforce their
supply lines and prepare for a quick end to the northern rebels.7
The Protestant Reformation and, in particular, the spread ofCalvinism also
created problems for France. Members ofthe nobility, who already struggled against the
power ofthe French crown, supported the growth ofthe French Calvinists, or Huguenots.
The French Wars ofReligion, which consumed a large portion ofthe sixteenth century
for France, kept the country divided and weakened against their foreign enemies. In
1598, King Henry IV ofFrance, a former Huguenot turned Catholic, accepted another
temporary peace with the Protestants by signing the Edict ofNantes. This gave religious
toleration to the Huguenots and allowed France a moment ofdomestic peace.
Unfortunately, as every other leader in Europe learned, these briefcease-fires only
6 Geoffrey Parker, The Thirty Years' War. (New York: Military Heritage Press, 1987), 14-24,48-49.
7 Ibid, 2-4.
5
inflamed the animosity ofthe two religious parties and increased the violence and
damage when their conflicts inevitably resumed.8
Chapter Two follows the early life ofCardinal Richelieu prior to his appointment
as First Minister to King Louis XIII ofFrance in 1624. Born into a small noble family in
1585, Armand du Plessis was originally destined for a career in the military. However,
circumstances within his family forced him to abandon his life as a promising young
officer and enter the seminary. Armand was made bishop ofLUyon and quickly applied
his growing ambition to the improvement ofhis diocese. However, his desire for
greatness could not be contained to his bishopric and expanded toward the French court.
Armand began with letters offealty and devotion to the Queen mother that earned him a
place among her personal council. This led to his early appointment as a royal advisor to
the adolescent King Louis XIII.9
The situation at court took an unfortunate tum for the bishop ofLUyon when the
King's Council was dismissed on charges ofcorruption and he was exiled back to his
diocese. Despite this setback, Armand's connection to the regent ofthe French throne
aided in diffusing his shame at court. The Queen mother influenced her son to petition
the pope to ordain Armand a cardinal. Armand maintained a strong presence in the court,
acting as a liaison between Marie de Medici and Louis XIII. Finally, in 1624, after the
disgrace and arrest ofthe king's advisor La Vieuville, Richelieu regained the trust ofthe
young king and was made First Minister. Much ofhis desires and ambitions during this
period ofhis life were visible in his personal Memoires and his state and private Lettres.10
8 Briggs, 29-34.
9 C. V. Wedgwood, Richelieu and the French Monarchy. (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 12-28.
10 Ibid.
6
Chapter Three details the international maneuvers made by Richelieu during the
opening years ofhis administration. From his initial moments in office, the First Minister
changed the direction ofFrance's foreign policy. The actions ofthe Queen mother were
leading France into an alliance with Spain and Austria, seeking to diminish the power and
autonomy ofthe French crown. Richelieu recognized the threat this policy held for his
country and immediately shifted focus. A French army was dispatched to the Valtelline in
1624. The Grisons, a Protestant family aligned with France, originally controlled this
strip ofland in Northern Italy. In 1620, the Spanish expelled the Grisons from the
Valtelline and manned the forts with papal troops, allowing them a direct line of
communication with Austria and a potential overland supply line to the Netherlands.
Richelieu removed the papal troops and restored the Grisons to power. Although France
was unable to permanently keep the Spain out ofthe Valtelline, this maneuver clearly
showed Richelieu's intent to weaken the influence ofSpain throughout Europe.I I
Chapter Four examines the individuals and organizations within France that
opposed the Cardinal's renewed anti-Hapsburg policy began by Henry IV. The major
antagonist for Richelieu was the same group that championed his rise to power: the
Catholic devot party. Led primarily by influential members ofthe clergy, the devots
supported an alliance with all Catholic kingdoms against the growth ofthe Protestant
Reformation, particularly the Huguenots. They also pressed the French court for a
Franco-Spanish treaty, hoping to end the hostilities between the two countries and allow
King Philip IV to continue his efforts against the rebellion in the Netherlands. Leading
the charge for the devots at court were Father Berulle, Richelieu's advisor and close
friend, and Marie de Medici, the Cardinal's greatest patron. Because oftheir sponsorship
II R. 1. Knecht, Richelieu. (London: Pearson Education Limited, 1991), 31-32, 88-90.
7
ofthe First Minister, the ultramontane Catholics in France felt betrayed by his assault on
the Valtelline.12
Other groups in France also strived for peace between the Catholic states, though
their own interests mitigated their opposition to Richelieu. Pope Urban VIII, who was
forced to step between France and Spain by occupying the Valtelline with papal troops,
abhorred the attack by Creurves in November 1624. However, like Richelieu in France,
the papacy feared the possibility ofHapsburg hegemony across Europe, endangering the
authority ofthe Holy See. The Society ofJesus, or Jesuits, was also tom by the events of
the Valtelline episode. Their allegiance to Rome and Urban VIII prevented the
condoning ofRichelieu's foreign policy. But the French Jesuits' reliance on the support
and protection ofLouis XIII made them unwilling to openly chastise the actions ofthe
King's Council. These groups contributed to the difficulties the Cardinal fought against
in the early years ofhis administration.13
Chapter Five describes the involvement ofpolitical propaganda and
pamphleteering on the Valtelline episode. Pamphlet campaigns were a common form of
social influence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, manipulating the opinions of
the Third Estate during periods ofconflict. The invasion ofthe Adda River valley incited
a major paper war between the advisors ofLouis XIII and the outraged devol party. The
ultramontane Catholics sought to denounce Richelieu's actions against the papacy and
Spain, turning popular opinion from the First Minister. Understanding the importance of
maintaining a respected public image, the Cardinal responded to their accusations with
his own loyal pamphleteers, including Fancan, Father Joseph and Father Berulle. Along
12G. R. R. Treasure, Cardinal Richelieu and the Development ofAbsolutism. (London: Adam & Charles
Black, 1972), 13-16, 27-31.
13 Ibid, 88-89, 218-219.
8
with providing an adequate defense ofLouis XIII's foreign policy on political and
religious grounds, these pamphlets established Richelieu's reason ofstate. This
justification ofthe king's authority formed the basis ofhis plans against the House of
Hapsburg.14
Cardinal Richelieu made these alliances with Protestant states not to support their
cause, but to keep the enemies ofFrance weak until the armies ofLouis XIII were strong
enough to directly act against the Hapsburgs. With its enemies defeated, France could
finally take up the banner ofCatholicism and promote a Europe unified under a single
Christian Church. It must be understood that the House ofHapsburg in Spain and Austria
was, in a similar fashion, using the same methods as France. However, Richelieu's skill
and ambition with domestic and foreign diplomacy made his country as the leading
power ofthe continent long after the end ofthe Thirty Years' War.
14Anthony Levi, Cardinal Richelieu and the Making ofFrance. (London: Constable & Robinson, 2001),
66,88.
9
Chapter One
The Opening of the Seventeenth Century
To study the history ofa single European country in the seventeenth century is to
study the history ofthe entire continent. The complex system ofmarriage alliances and
non-aggression treaties wove the politics ofEurope tighter than a medieval tapestry. By
1624, France was in the process ofmarrying into the English court and already
contemplating a marriage alliance with Spain. The United Provinces, in an effort to
remain protected from Spain, signed treaties offriendship with England, France, Sweden,
the German Protestant princes, and even the Ottoman Turks. The princes ofthe Holy
Roman Empire also sought protection from threats to their sovereignty outside the empire
and from within, forming the Protestant Union in 1608 and the Catholic League a year
later. This interconnectedness produced a tension that made the continent ofEurope ripe
for conflict.15
Germany
In many ways, empires are similar to puzzles. They require skill, discipline,
patience, and sometimes, physical violence to assemble. When they are close to
completion, the builders bask in the glory oftheir creations. When they are as finished as
possible, they are quickly disassembled and tom apart. By the beginning ofthe sixteenth
century, the Holy Roman Empire neared completion. The House ofHapsburg established
themselves as the dynastic rulers ofthe Empire and controlled the election ofthe Holy
Roman Emperor for centuries. They ruled all ofGermany, Austria, Hungary, and
15 Parker, 2-4, 70-71.
10
portions ofNorthern Italy. A separate branch ofthe Hapsburgs also sat upon the throne
ofSpain, commanding its own empire that was slowly stretching across the Atlantic
Ocean. This European puzzle was completed in 1519 when both empires were combined
under a single ruler.
King Carlos I had been ruler ofthe Spanish Empire, including its possessions in
the Netherlands and Franche-Comte, since the death ofhis father, Philip the Handsome,
in 1506 and his maternal grandfather, Ferdinand ofAragon, in 1516. The new king of
Spain barely had time to realize the power ofhis newly acquired throne when another
crown was presented to him. On January 11, 1519, while on his way to Barcelona, King
Carlos I learned ofthe death ofhis paternal grandfather, Emperor Maximilian I. As the
grandson ofthe Emperor, Carlos I held the greatest hereditary claim to the throne ofthe
empire. However, the title ofHoly Roman Emperor required an election held by the
seven German electors ofthe empire: the king ofBohemia, the archbishops ofCologne,
Mainz, and Trier, and the princes ofBrandenburg, Saxony and the Palatinate.16
King Carlos I ofSpain never visited Germany, nor did he know the language of
any ofthe subjects in the Holy Roman Empire. King Francis I, the monarch ofFrance
and another contender to the throne, was well known throughout the empire and widely
considered the most powerful ruler ofChristendom. Despite the early successes of
Francis I and several other candidates, the diplomats ofCarlos I carefully outmaneuvered
and outspent his rivals in the election, nearly bankrupting the Spanish government in the
16 Manuel Fernandez Alvarez, Charles V: Elected Emperor and Hereditary Ruler. (London: Thames and
Hudson, 1975), 15-17,28-33.
11
process. On June 28, 1519, King Carlos I ofSpain was unanimously elected Emperor of
the Holy Roman Empire and crowned Charles V. I ?
For the first time, all ofthe Hapsburg lands from the Spanish and Austrian
branches ofthe family were united under a single ruler. Charles V, the king of
Burgundy, Spain, and Holy Roman Empire, held dominion over three quarters ofthe
European continent. This speedy acquisition ofpower also brought forth a groundswell
ofproblems for the new emperor. The Austrian Hapsburgs were seeking to expand their
control into Eastern Europe. Ferdinand ofAustria, the younger brother ofCharles V, was
prepared to take the leadership ofthe eastern branch. In an agreement reached at the Diet
ofWorms in 1521, Ferdinand was granted Austria, Styria, Carinthia and Carniola. This
allowed Charles V to retain direct control ofGermany, the provinces in Northern Italy,
the Netherlands, and Spain.ls
The other major issue to be resolved at Worms was not a simple family matter.
The German priest Martin Luther was summoned to the Diet to discuss his controversial
teachings against the papacy and the Catholic clergy. Beginning with his famous posting
ofthe Ninety-Five Theses on the door ofSt. Augustine's Cathedral at the University of
Wittenberg in 1517, Luther developed considerable popular support for his cause,
especially among several important princes. He appeared before the Diet ofWorms on
April 17, 1521, expecting to engage religious leaders from the Vatican in a scholarly
discussion on the problems weakening the Church and his concerns for the future of
Christianity. Instead, the assembly and the emperor demanded Luther to recant his
heresy or face exile from the lands ofthe Holy Roman Empire. The following day,
17 Ibid.
18 Otto von Hapsburg, Charles V. trans. Michael Ross. (New York: Praeger Publishers, ]969), 80-8].
12
Martin Luther stood by his convictions and was subsequently excommunicated by Pope
Leo X. The events and decisions made by the princes and religious leaders at the Diet of
Worms helped to determine the course ofEuropean politics and diplomacy for the next
150 years.19
The next three decades witnessed the rapid decay ofEmperor Charles V's power
and influence over his kingdoms in Europe. The teachings ofMartin Luther spread
across Germany like a virus, gaining support among both the peasantry and nobles,
including the influential elector ofSaxony, Frederick the Wise. The increasing
persecution ofa growing Protestant Germany forced these heretical provinces to band
together against an incensed Catholic empire. Another attempt was made to create a
peaceful resolution between the two religions at the Diet ofAugsburg in 1530. However,
neither side budged. Both Catholic and Protestant princes in Germany prepared for armed
conflict. Directly after the diet, a coalition ofProtestant princes, led by the elector of
Saxony, formed the Schmalkaldic League for mutual protection against the Holy Roman
Emperor. Although the League dissolved long before the start ofthe Thirty Years' War,
many ofits members remained in military alliances throughout the early modem period.2o
Along with growing internal problems, Charles V also faced threats from outside
the empire. King Francis I ofFrance recognized the growing danger ofHapsburg
hegemony across Europe and was engaged in a continuous war with Spain throughout the
first halfofthe sixteenth century. With the advent ofthe Protestant Reformation and the
accession ofEmperor Charles V, France was given another handful ofallies to tum
19 James D. Tracy. Europe's Reformations, 1450-1650. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield,
1999),52-53; Gordon Rupp. Luther's Progress to the Diet ofWorms. (New York: Harper and Row,
1964), 93-98.
20 Alvarez, 90-97.
13
against the Hapsburgs. Francis I quickly made alliances with the Lutheran princes in
Germany and secured a treaty with England. France even secretly supported the Turkish
invasion ofSpain by Sulieman the Magnificent. To place the cherry on top ofthe
emperor's woes, the papacy pulled its support from Charles V and used papal troops to
assist the French army. All these circumstances pressed the emperor into a dangerous
. 21compromIse.
At the Diet ofRegensburg in 1532, Charles V gave temporary concessions to the
Lutheran princes, allowing them to practice their religion in private and granting the
political autonomy necessary to govern their provinces. In return, the Lutheran armies
joined the rest ofthe Imperial forces and drove the Ottoman Turks from Austria and Italy.
With the Turkish threat sufficiently quelled, the emperor again turned his attention to the
internal problems in Germany. Emperor Charles V, having the full support ofthe
Hapsburgs and the Catholic princes, began the assault against the Schmalkaldic League
ofLutheran princes. Neither side gained a considerable advantage over the other, and the
German princes began to seriously consider a peaceful end to the wars.22
The religious convictions and personal honor ofCharles V made him unwilling to
accept a permanent toleration ofLutheranism. In 1554, he officially relinquished the
power ofthe Imperial crown to his brother, Ferdinand ofAustria. It was now the
responsibility offuture Emperor Ferdinand I to resolve the German conflict. Ferdinand
called for a new diet at Augsburg in 1555, attended by all the Catholic and Lutheran
princes ofGermany. The Peace ofAugsburg finally gave religious toleration to the
Lutherans and the ability ofthe princes to determine the religion oftheir own provinces.
21 Alvarez, 40-48, 78; Hapsburg, 105-107, 135.
22 Alvarez, 97-100, 130-135, 160.
14
However, Lutherans could not openly worship their religion and build churches in their
own lands. Over the next fifty years, tensions grew between Catholics and Protestants in
Germany, as both groups fought for their place within the Empire. Members ofthe
clergy and princes loyal to Rome regularly appealed to the pope and the emperor
concerning the threat posed by the legality ofthe Lutheran religion. Protestants rulers
complained about continued harassment by local Catholics and slowly banded together
for mutual protection against a future conflict they knew was imminent. The Peace of
Augsburg did not offer rights to the Calvinists, who were more numerous than Lutherans
III some areas. This uneasy truce among the religions in the Holy Roman Empire was
short-lived.23
The beginning ofthe seventeenth century brought fresh leadership and renewed
tempers over the Protestant issue in Germany. Beginning with the takeover ofthe
strategic Protestant town ofDonauworth in 1606 by the Catholic prince Maximilian of
Bavaria, concerns resurrected about an open breach ofthe Peace ofAugsburg. This fear
led the Lutheran princes ofthe empire to seek a military alliance with each other in 1608,
known collectively as the Protestant Union. The Catholic princes, under Maximilian of
Bavaria, quickly followed suit and formed the Catholic League in 1609. Once again, the
Catholic and Protestant elements ofthe Holy Roman Empire prepared for war.24
The conflict officially began with the Bohemian Revolt in 1618. The current
Holy Roman Emperor, Matthias I, was ill and sought to make his cousin, Ferdinand of
Styria, the heir to all his titles. This included the crown ofBohemia. Although the title
had stayed along hereditary lines, the noble estates ofthe kingdom elected their
23 Ibid, 160-162.
24 Maland, Europe at War, 12-17.
15
sovereIgn. Through the Peace ofAusgburg, Bohemia was designated a Catholic state by
its ruler, despite the fact that a majority ofits population adhered to one ofseveral
Protestant faiths. Emperor Matthias I kept Protestant support through his promise ofthe
Letter ofMajesty, guaranteeing religious toleration for Lutherans and their churches. The
Hapsburgs feared that the Bohemian nobility might elect a Protestant prince to succeed
Matthias, causing them to not only lose a valuable strategic and economic province, but
also give a majority vote to Protestants in the election ofthe Holy Roman Emperor.
After considerable political maneuvering, as well as threats ofrevoking the Letter of
Majesty, the nobles agreed to crown Ferdinand as heir to the kingdom ofBohemia.25
The new king ofBohemia quickly went to work subverting the Protestants in his
country. Royal judges were now required at all council meetings. The press was brought
under government and Church censure. The most damning ofall the changes was the
appointment by Ferdinand offive deputy-governors, all fervent Catholics, to rule
Bohemia in his absence. The new deputy-governors immediately imprisoned several
members ofthe Protestant lower nobility. This enraged the people and set offcries of
religious persecution. The leader ofthe Protestant movement in Bohemia, Count
Heinrich Matthias ofThurn, called for a meeting ofthe nobles and the governors in May
1618 at Prague. When the deputy-governors refused to hear the complaints ofthe
Protestant nobles, Thurn organized a siege ofthe royal castle ofHradschin, found two of
the deputy-governors, Martinitz and Slavata, and threw them out ofthe second-story
25 Maland, Europe at War, 60-62; C. V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War. (London: Penguin Books,
1961), 65-71.
16
window. Although the pile ofrefuge they fell on saved both men, Bohemia was now
officially declared in open revolt against the empire.26
The Protestant nobles invalidated the election ofFerdinand and subsequently
chose the young Frederick V, elector ofthe Palatinate, as king ofBohemia. However, the
support ofthe Protestant Union, which Frederick V counted on for protection against the
Hapsburgs, was rejected. Many ofthe members, including John George the elector of
Saxony, disagreed with Frederick V's hasty acceptance ofthe Bohemian crown and
refused to support him. Frederick V even lost the favor ofhis father-in-law, King James I
ofEngland. The armies ofthe Catholic League, under Maximilian ofBavaria, made
short work ofthe Bohemian and Palatine forces. The revolt ofBohemia was suppressed
in November of 1620, and the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II placed Frederick V
under an Imperial ban, stripping him ofhis lands and titles. The Catholic League
subsequently took control ofthe Upper Palatinate in 1622, and in January ofthe
following year Maximilian was made Elector Palatine.27
With the loss ofBohemia and the Palatinate by the Protestants, the Catholic
House ofHapsburg appeared stronger than ever. They strengthened the Catholic
majority among the electors ofthe Holy Roman Emperor. The kingdom ofBohemia, a
central state within the Empire, remained under the dominion ofthe Hapsburgs. Finally,
control ofthe Palatinate, a strategic location that contained a key section ofthe Rhine
River, transferred to the authority ofthe leader ofthe Catholic League. The Holy Roman
Empire and its Catholic princes appeared ready to stamp out the flames ofthe Protestant
Reformation and unify Europe under a single Catholic Church.
26 Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War, 71-74.
27 Maland, 65-77.
17
Spain and the Netherlands
During most ofthe reign ofEmperor Charles V, the Netherlands, or Low
Countries, was not a unified country. The seventeen provinces that constituted the Low
Countries each had their own governments, culture, languages, and personal animosities
toward one another. In a final effort to consolidate his power and focus the revenues
from the Low Countries into the Hapsburg effort against the revolting German princes
and France, Charles V unified all the provinces in 1549 into a single, autonomous
political unit.28
At first, the proposition ofa unified Netherlands was not completely undesirable.
A large portion ofCharles V's reign as king ofSpain and Holy Roman Emperor was
spent in his birthplace ofBrussels, as was his son and heir Philip II. When Philip II
became king ofSpain in 1555, after the abdication ofhis father, he moved to Spain and
left control ofthe Netherlands in the regency ofhis Catholic sister, Margaret ofParma.
Pope Pius IV also established fourteen new bishoprics in the Low Countries, including
the creation ofthe archbishopric ofMechelen that held the same political power as the
greatest nobles in the Low Countries. The most powerful nobles in the Netherlands,
including Count Egmont and William ofOrange, persuaded the rest ofthe nobility ofthe
States-General to resist the political and financial demands ofKing Philip II and his
regency.29
Another blow to the authority ofSpanish rule in the Low Countries was the
teachings ofthe Protestant reformer John Calvin. Although Lutheran churches already
existed in the Netherlands during the 1550's, Calvinism possessed several advantages
28 Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch Revolt. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 30-42.
29 Ibid, 44-48.
18
that allowed the faith to spread quickly through the Low Countries. The close proximity
ofthe French Calvinists, or Huguenots, near the southern border gave the Dutch easy
access to the teachings and practices ofthe religion. The Calvinist preachers were also
more convincing and passionate in their conversion ofpeople already seeking an
alternative to the corrupt Catholic dioceses. After the bloody persecution ofthe
Huguenots in France in 1562, hundreds ofHuguenots fled north to seek refuge in the
Netherlands, making Calvinists almost as numerous as the Catholics.3o
In an effort to ease the increasing political problems for Protestants, the States-
General sent Count Egmont to Spain to plead their case. King Philip II gave Egmont
every courtesy and informed him that he would reconsider the current policies in the
Netherlands. Believing he won the king's favor, Egmont returned to the Low Countries
extremely confident. However, not long after his return, Philip II sent instructions to the
governor and the bishops to intensify the inquisition and execution ofthe Protestants.
The problems in the Netherlands began to rapidly increase. The nobles, led by William
ofOrange, gathered considerable popular support against Philip II and openly threatened
to resign their families from government. This forced Margaret ofParma to give
undesirable concessions to the nobles and ease the heresy laws. But by 1565, the
brushfire was burning and showed no signs ofslowing down. The popular support raised
by the nobles grew outside their control and Calvinists took to the streets in revolt. They
broke into Catholic churches and destroyed statues and artwork that Calvinists considered
idolatry. King Philip II refused to accept open Calvinist worship in the Netherlands, and
the Low Countries were officially considered in rebellion. 31
30 Ibid, 57-59.
31 Ibid, 64-87.
19
The Low Countries remained in a state ofrebellion leading up to the start ofthe
Thirty Years' War. The first revolt of 1566 forced the members ofthe States-General
into exile, allowing the Spanish to enforce Catholic rule. After gathering the support of
England, the Protestant German princes, and the French Huguenots, the Dutch nobles
reclaimed towns in the northern provinces ofthe Netherlands, beginning with Breda in
1590. By 1609, most ofthe northern territory above the Rhine River was under the
occupation ofthe new States-General, called the United Provinces ofHolland. After the
death ofKing Philip II in 1598, his son Philip III renewed the attack against the Dutch to
no avail. The Spanish throne was on the verge ofyet another bankruptcy, and the United
Provinces were firmly planted. It was finally time to consider peace again.32
The reasoning behind the negotiating ofthe Twelve Years' Truce in 1609 was "a
direct consequence offinancial, economic and psychological exhaustion.,,33 The United
Provinces needed to refortify their defenses and European alliances. Spain, after almost
a century ofcontinuous warfare, required breathing space to refill their coffers and build
another army. The two parties gathered in 1621 to again discuss possible resolutions.
However, Spain had regained its strength and secured an alliance with the Catholic
League in Germany. The new Spanish monarch, King Philip IV, was prepared to resume
hostilities in the Netherlands.34
After the Bohemian revolt was crushed and Elector Frederick V driven into exile,
the fate ofthe United Provinces became extremely perilous. Catholic princes loyal to the
Holy Roman Empire or Spain occupied the Rhine River, as well as the provinces it ran
32 John Lynch, Spain Under the Hapsburgs, vol. 1. (New York: New York University Press, 1981),297 
313; Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 225-235.
33 Elliott, Spain and Its World, 116.
34 Lynch, vol. 2, 42-44.
20
through leading into the Netherlands. This gave the Spanish troops in the Loyal
Provinces an unhindered supply route between Genoa and Brussels. With Frederick V,
one ofthe United Provinces' greatest supporters, removed from power, Spain appeared
ready to end the armistice and crush the Dutch rebellion once and for all.
Northern Italy and Switzerland
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the lands collectively known as
Northern Italy were mainly held together by geographical boundaries. Along the north of
the peninsula was the Alpine Mountains, creating a natural barrier between the Italian
city-states and the German provinces ofthe Holy Roman Empire. Running down the
western side ofthe Alps and emptying into the Mediterranean Sea was the Rhone River.
This natural boundary separated France from Piedmont and Savoy. Compared to the rest
ofthe continent, Northern Italy was protected by its natural surroundings better than any
other kingdom in Europe.35
The political divisions ofthe area were considerably more complex and less easily
defined. Italy in the early modem period, particularly in the north, was not a unified
country. Many ofthe people living below the Alps were citizens ofone ofover a dozen
independent city-states, formed during the Roman Empire. Each province had different
governments, cultures, and alliances, sometimes putting them in direct conflict with each
other. Some states, like Venice and Genoa, were republics. They ruled through a council
ofnobles and followed a single constitution. Hereditary dukes controlled most others,
such as Savoy and Mantua. Either France or Spain usually supported the election or
35 Maland, Europe at War, 8; Gregory Hanlon, Early Modern Italy, 1550-1800. (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 2000), 2-7.
21
succession ofthese thrones. The fractured nature ofNorthern Italy made its lands a key
battleground at the start ofthe Thirty Years War.36
Northern Italy also held extreme importance in the foreign policy ofthe Spanish
Hapsburgs. The largest portion ofthe Holy Roman Empire, which consisted ofGermany
and the Hapsburg hereditary lands in Austria, ran adjacent to each other. This allowed
the emperor direct contact with the provinces and rulers under his control, without having
to pass through other sovereign kingdoms. Spain was separated from the rest ofEurope,
both politically and geographically. The Pyrenees Mountains ran along the northern
border ofthe peninsula, making ground travel north slow and difficult. On the other side
ofthe mountains was France, who remained hostile to Spanish attempts at spreading into
other parts ofEurope. The waters ofthe Atlantic Ocean were also a danger from English
pirates.37
In order to maintain contact with the Hapsburg hereditary lands and its interests in
the Netherlands, Spain made alliances with or took control ofkey Italian provinces. The
Spanish. Hapsburgs owned the duchy ofMilan, Finale, and the island kingdoms of
Sardinia and Sicily. They were also allied with and built garrisons in the port city of
Genoa, where the Spanish lines ofcommunication began in Italy, and the duchy of
Savoy-Piedmont, Mantua, and the kingdom ofTuscany. With these assets firmly under
the control ofthe king ofSpain, both branches ofthe House ofHapsburg kept a complex
connection.38
The lands above the Alpine Mountains also held critical importance in the events
ofthe seventeenth century. The Swiss Confederation consisted ofthirteen independent
36 Hanlon, 47-51,55-59.
37 Hanlon, 48, 62-75; Maland, Europe at War, 7-9.
38 Ibid.
22
cantons. Each canton had its own, government, laws, coinage, culture, and language,
dependent on the country the individual it bordered. The thirteen cantons were loosely
bound together under a federal constitution that offered minimal interference with the
local assemblies. The Swiss Confederation was usually grouped with its close neighbors
and allies, including the two republics ofGeneva and Mulhouse, the Diocese ofBasel,
and the lands ofthe Grisons, who controlled the Valtelline pass.39
Switzerland differed from Italy in its relations to Europe and the religious
composition ofthe cantons. Despite some groups being allied to either France or Spain,
the governments ofthe Swiss Confederation were free ofoutside control. This kept the
cantons away from the large disputes ofthe European powers. Because each government
was independent ofeach other, the cantons also decided what religions were tolerated
among their people. Four ofthem were exclusively Protestant and forbade Catholic
worship, seven only allowed Catholicism, and the remaining two tolerated all forms of
Christianity. These aspects made Switzerland a true anomaly among the other countries
. E 40III urope.
In 1618, as the Thirty Years' War was about to erupt in Europe, Spain grew
nervous. The Twelve Years' Truce between the United Provinces and the Spanish
Netherlands expired in 1621, where both groups reconvened to discuss terms ofpeace.
King Philip IV ofSpain had no desire for a resolution that did not involve the complete
submission ofthe rebellion and the removal ofthe Calvinists. Spain used the time during
Twelve Years' Truce to fortify and supply the garrisons in the Spanish Netherlands for a
39 Georges Pages, The Thirty Years War 1618-1648, trans. David Maland and John Hooper. (New York:
Harper & Row, 1970),21-22.
40 Ibid.
23
second assault, along with replenishing the king's war coffers. However, the opening of
the Thirty Years' War disrupted their lines ofcommunication.41
Charles Emmanuel, duke ofSavoy-Piedmont, an aggressive opportunist, used the
current distractions ofSpain and France to expand his own lands. In 1613, Savoy broke
his alliance with Spain and invaded the Italian province ofMontferrat. Philip IV
responded by sending an army from Milan to crush the Savoyard army. France, which
was slowly turning pro-Hapsburg under the regency ofMarie de Medici, also sent troops
into Piedmont. Although Charles Emmanuel's ambitions were suppressed by 1617,
Spain no longer trusted Savoy as a stable ally in their lines ofcommunication to the
Netherlands. Another connection to the Rhine River needed to be established.42
Switzerland and Northern Italy became the crossroads between the European
powers and their provinces. With the ceasefire in the Netherlands about to end, Spain
redirected its supply line from the unpredictable Savoy to the Alpine passes in the Swiss
Confederation and Northern Italy. Utilizing the revolt ofthe Catholics in the Valtelline
against their Protestant lords, the Grisons, Philip IV acquired a new route linking Genoa
and Brussels. Unfortunately, the invasion ofthe valley by Spain drew France, the ally of
the Grisons and the ancient enemy ofthe Hapsburgs, into the Thirty Years' War.
France
In many ways, the kingdom ofFrance faced problems very similar to their
Spanish and German counterparts. King Francis I and his successor, Henry II, were both
strong, willful rulers that forcefully guided the policy ofFrance during the sixteenth
41 Maland, Europe at War, 37-39.
42 Maland, Europe at War, 9; Domenico Sella, Italy in the Seventeenth Century. (London: Longman,
1997),3-4.
24
century. However, the continuous conflicts engaged in by Francis I against Spain and the
Holy Roman Empire exhausted the economic and military strength ofthe country. The
tide ofthe Protestant Reformation also struck the core ofFrance, as Calvinism quickly
spread through the middle classes and the nobility. Both rulers violently persecuted the
Calvinists during the 1540's and 1550's, but the new religion was already integrated into
French culture. The result was a series ofcivil wars known as the Wars ofReligion.43
Because ofthe division in the nobility, the French crown found it extremely
difficult to gain support for a decisive action against the Huguenots. Many ofthe
Catholic noble families, including the Guises, wanted an immediate purging ofthe
Protestants from France. The regent ofthe adolescent King Charles IX, the Queen-
Mother Catherine de Medici, sought a more diplomatic route and attempted to negotiate a
compromise with the Huguenots. However, King Charles IX displayed his inept
domestic strategy in 1572 when improper intelligence from advisors led to the execution
ofseveral prominent Calvinist leaders and the subsequent killing ofnearly 2,000
Protestant rioters in Paris. The St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre was the final
persecution needed to bind the Calvinists together in active resistance to the crown.44
The Wars ofReligion ended in 1593 with the accession ofKing Henry IV, the
first Bourbon ruler ofFrance. The death ofthe previous ruler, King Henry III, in 1589
and his lack ofa direct heir gave the throne to the Huguenot prince ofNavarre. It took
the nobles ofthe French Catholic League another four years before they accepted Henry
IV as the king ofFrance. The year 1593 also witnessed the conversion ofHenry IV to
Catholicism. Although he supposedly planned the change ofreligion since his accession
43 Robin Briggs, 4-6, 11-13.
44 Ibid, 17-24.
25
in 1589, the Huguenots considered the conversion a great betrayal from the man they
helped place on the throne.45
To help ease the fears ofthe Huguenots and gain their support for the coming
conflict with Spain, Henry IV created the Edict ofNantes in 1598. This edict granted the
Huguenots religious toleration and freedom, hoping the Calvinist revolts against the
throne would cease. The Edict angered Catholics at first, even though Henry IV appeared
to have no interest in making the Huguenots a permanent fixture on French soil. All
evidence suggests that the new Catholic king ofFrance converted for true religious
conviction. However, as many rulers before in Europe felt necessary, a temporary peace
with the Protestants was beneficial to advance greater national interests. For Henry IV,
the more imminent threat to France came from Spain and Germany.46
The ambitions ofthe great French king were never fulfilled. On the eve ofwar
with Germany in 1610, a radical Catholic zealot, believing the anti-Hapsburg policy was
a direct affront to the pope and the Catholic Church, assassinated King Henry IV in his
own carriage. The death ofthe first Bourbon king ofFrance was a terrible blow to the
renewed unity ofthe country. The leadership ofHenry IV bound the fragile peace
established under the Edict ofNantes. With his passing, the throne ofFrance was held in
the regency ofthe Queen Mother, Marie de Medici, until her eldest son, the nine-year-old
Louis XIII, reached the age ofmajority. The regent and her extensive list ofadvisors
45 Henry M. Baird, The Huguenots and Henry ofNavarre. vol. 2. (New York: AMS Press, 1970), 326 
327; Briggs, 29-31; Ronald S. Love, Blood and Religion: The Conscience ofHenri IV 1553-1593.
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 303.
46 Baird, vol. 2, 414-419; Briggs, 77-79.
26
spent the next fourteen years entangling France into the web ofEuropean diplomacy,
marrying the royal family into the courts ofSpain and Austria.47
The events in France, Spain, Italy, and the Holy Roman Empire aligned the
countries ofEurope for a major conflict. With the suppression ofthe revolt in Bohemia
and capture ofthe Palatinate by the Catholic League, Emperor Ferdinand II prepared to
join forces with the Spanish army to deal a crushing blow to Protestantism in the
Netherlands. The inconsistent nature ofthe duke ofSavoy destabilized Spain's initial
line ofcommunication to their troops in the Loyal Provinces. The Adda River valley in
the Valtelline was the next best option.
France, one ofthe Protestant states' greatest allies under King Henry IV,
abandoned its support ofthe United Provinces and the Lutheran princes in Germany.
After her husband's assassination, Marie de Medici actively pressed a pro-Hapsburg
foreign policy and guided France into a position in Europe submissive to Spain and the
Empire. Once King Louis XIII wrestled control ofthe French throne from the Queen
regent, his advisors maintained a weak foreign policy, refusing to involve the kingdom in
the escalating European war. In 1624, at the insistence ofhis mother, Louis XIII
appointed Cardinal Armand-Jean du Plessis de Richelieu as the First Minister ofthe
King's Council. His administration returned France to the anti-Hapsburg strategy of
Henry IV and made France the dominant power in seventeenth century Europe.
47 Baird, 488-489; Briggs, 86-89.
27
Chapter Two
The Early Years ofRichelieu
Armand-Jean du Plessis was born on September 9, 1585, probably in Paris. His
father was Franyois du Plessis, the lord ofa small noble family from Poitou. His mother,
Suzanne de la Porte, was the daughter ofa successful Parisian lawyer in the service of
King Charles IX. Together they produced five children: Armand-Jean, his two older
brothers Henry and Alphonse, and his two sisters Franyoise and Nicole. Along with
membership in the nobility ofPoitou, the marriage ofFranyois and Suzanne also brought
together the estates ofLe Chillou and Richelieu.48
Franyois du Plessis was born in 1548, one offive children ofa lieutenant in the
French army. As the second son, Franyois was initially destined to become a member of
the clergy. However, the untimely murder ofhis elder brother Louis in 1565 forced
Franyois to abandon his prior ambitions and assume the position as head ofthe family.49
He negotiated his marriage with Suzanne de La Porte in 1566 and was finally married in
1569. Joseph Bergin suggested that Franyois du Plessis avenged the murder ofhis
brother by ambushing and killing his assassin, the lord ofBrichetieres, though no formal
charges were ever brought against him. Possibly to escape personal or legal retribution,
he gained a position in the party ofHenry duc d'Guise, who was elected the king of
Poland in 1573. The Guises, a powerful and zealous noble Catholic family, were avid
proponents ofthe Counterreformation and the removal ofCalvinism in France. Their
48 Knecht, 1; Levi, 11.
49 This quality was certainly passed on to Armand, as the he also changed the course ofhis life and career
for the sake ofhis family.
28
early ties to Spain also created early support for a French alliance with the House of
Hapsburg.50
After the death ofhis brother King Charles IX in May 1574, Henry ofGuise
returned from Poland and was crowned Henry III ofFrance. Franc;ois remained in the
service ofHenry III, first as pn?v6t de I'h6tel du roi, and eventually granted the title of
grandpn?v6t de France. This position forced him to remain in Paris for most ofhis
career, accounting for the beliefthat Armand-Jean was born there and not in Poitou.
Although the exact nature ofhis duties and responsibilities are vague, the grandprev6t
was responsible for all matters relating to the safety and peace ofthe court. Franc;ois du
Plessis held jurisdiction over the legal cases concerning the members ofthe court. He
was also responsible for fixing the prices and supervising the sale ofgoods bought for the
court, including food and services. Members ofthe House ofGuise maintained authority
above the grandprev6t. However, King Henry III clearly wanted a loyal servant to act as
a buffer between the hostile elements ofCatholic and Protestant nobles. By all accounts,
Franc;ois du Plessis filled this position admirably.51
In a time when loyalty to a particular noble house or group ofnobles was more
advantageous, Franc;ois du Plessis placed his trust in the laws ofFrance and the traditions
ofthe throne. The assassination ofHenry IlIon August 2, 1589 created an immense
power struggle for the French crown, since his successor was the Huguenot noble Henry
ofNavarre. Several armed conflicts broke out between the new court ofKing Henry IV
and the Catholic League ofFrance, led by the Guise family. Franc;ois du Plessis was one
ofthe first in the court to recognize Henry IV as king ofFrance and fought along side his
50 Joseph Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 16-20.
51 Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 24-32; Levi, 13-16.
29
new master during the conflicts of 1589 and 1590. Henry IV also sent du Plessis on
several secret diplomatic missions on his behalf. However, his honored career was cut
short when he suddenly died on July 10, 1590. Fran<;ois' children, particularly Armand,
followed his father in a life ofservice and devotion to the throne ofFrance.52
The widow, Suzanne de La Porte, was now responsible for raising her five
children alone. Fran<;ois du Plessis left the family finances in considerable disarray. The
du Plessis estate held major debts that Fran<;ois was only able to begin paying offprior to
his death. These debts were so severe they forced the family to sell Fran<;ois' medal of
the Order ofthe Holy Ghost, an honor bestowed on him by Henry III toward the end of
his life. Despite receiving some monetary support from her family, Suzanne's superior
business mind and practical knowledge allowed her to provide for her children and
smooth out their financial problems until her eldest son, Henry, came ofage. Although
Fran<;ois was quite competent, the knowledge Suzanne gained from her father, a
prominent Parisian lawyer and member ofthe growing middle class, better served their
financial distress. This practical knowledge offinance and organization appears to be
one ofher greatest gifts taught to the young Armand, as the future First Minister required
such skills in the recovery ofFrance.53
His early education began in Poitou, where he lived until he was nine-years-old.
His uncle, Amador de La Porte, brought him to Paris in 1594 and enrolled him in the
Jesuit College ofNavarre. He focused his studies on grammar and the arts, preparing for
a career in the military. Armand's studies at the College de Navarre also gave him time
52 Levi, 16-17.
53 Philippe Erlanger, Richelieu: The Thrustfor Power. trans. Patricia Wolf. (New York: Stein and Day,
1968), 19-20; Elizabeth Wirth Marvick, The Young Richelieu: A Psychoanalytic Approach to Leadership.
(Chicago: The University ofChicago Press, 1983),48-62.
30
to work through his adolescence. Along with rumors ofgeneral unruliness common to
youth, he reportedly addressed himselfby the fictitious title ofthe marquis ofChillou.
Despite this early arrogance and flamboyant behavior, family problems soon required the
young Armand-Jean du Plessis to mature ahead ofschedule and display qualities that led
him to the king's council.54
During Fran<;ois' service as grandpn!v6t, King Henry III rewarded his loyal
servant by granting him the privilege ofnominating the next candidate for the bishop of
Lu<;on, effectively giving control ofthe see to the du Plessis family. After the death of
Jacques du Plessis, the first bishop ofLu<;on under Fran<;ois, the bishop's hat was to be
passed to Suzanne's second son, Alphonse. Once he completed his studies in the
seminary, Alphonse shocked his family by rejecting his nomination and became a
Carthusian monk at La Grande Chartreuse. This placed the fate ofLu<;on, and its
revenues to the du Plessis family, in a state ofuncertainty. Only one possible option
existed for Suzanne: Armand must take the nomination in his brother's place.55
Despite the possible disruption this caused to his life, Armand gladly accepted his
new course in the assistance ofhis family. He wrote to his uncle, saying, "Let God's will
be done! I shall accept everything for the good ofthe church and the glory ofour
name!,,56 This portion ofArmand's life was a strange parallel with his father's: Fran<;ois
left the seminary to save his family, and Armand willingly entered the clergy for the same
reason. Armand's enthusiasm to trade an officer's uniform for a robe and cap also
display Armand's devotion to the Catholic Church.
54 Knecht, 2; Levi, 22-23.
55 Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 58-63; O'Connell, 11-13.
56 Knecht, 3.
31
Armand returned to the College de Navarre for several more years, shifting his
studies to philosophy and theology for a career in the priesthood. Because he was under
the canonical age, a special dispensation was required from the pope to take over the
diocese ofLu~on. Although King Henry IV was more than willing to make the request
on behalfofhis former servant's son, the king's former Calvinist relations already
weakened his relations with the papacy. Armand decided to travel to Rome with the
French ambassador in an effort to expedite the dispensation. He reached the Holy City in
January 1607 and received several audiences with Pope Paul V. During these meetings,
Armand greatly impressed the pontiffwith his superior knowledge in political and
spiritual matters. The French ambassador later claimed that Armand's linguistic skills
were such that he not only received his dispensation, but also helped convince Pope Paul
V ofKing Henry IV's genuine conversion to Catholicism.57 The future bishop of
Lu~on's first and only visit to Rome was a great success. At twenty-two, Armand-Jean
du Plessis was ordained in Rome on April 17, 1607.58
He returned to Paris, continuing his education at Navarre. Armand received his
bachelors in theology on October 29, 1607. Several weeks ofsevere illness, including
fever and horrible migraines, followed the reception ofhis degree that winter, likely the
result ofhis extended efforts at Rome and in the College de Navarre. Armand recovered
from fever in spring 1608. He spent several months preaching at the court ofKing Henry
IV before deciding to accept his new position. With a small retinue ofpriests and a
57 Erlanger, Richelieu: The Thrust for Power, 29-31.
58 O'Connell, 13-14.
32
borrowed carriage, Armand arrived at his see in mid-December and performed mass as
bishop ofLU90n on Christmas Day 1608.59
The diocese ofLU90n was in a horrible condition when Armand officially took
control in December 1608. The problems confronting the young bishop were many,
primarily caused by its geographical location. The land was only a few miles from the
Atlantic coast and close to sea level, creating a dense marsh around the city. The roads
leading through the LU90n were in terrible disrepair and constantly flooded by the
overflowing drainage system. The peasants' huts were in a wretched state and the
farmlands and pastures were little more than "mazes ofmud." 60 The stench in the city
was almost unbearable from the large piles ofdried cow dung burned for heat, since most
firewood was too damp to light.61
The bishop's residence in LU90n was in no better condition than the rest ofthe
city. In a letter to Madame de Bourges, a friend ofthe du Plessis family, Armand
described his wretched surroundings. There was no garden and the grounds were as
muddy and water-flooded as the pastures. Much ofthe furniture inside the building was
warped and rotting. The house was bitterly cold and lighting a fire only filled the rooms
with smoke, since none ofthe chimneys functioned properly. The weather during the
winter and spring of 1608-09, combined with the poor heating ofthe residence, did little
to improve Armand's constant fever and migraines. His time in LU90n was extremely
humbling and resulted in his obsession with beauty and wealth later in life.62
59 Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 76-77; Knecht, 3-4; O'Connell, 13-15.
60 Erlanger, Richelieu: The Thrustfor Power, 38.
61 Ibid.
62 M. Avenel, Lettres, Instructions Diplomatique, et Papiers D'Etat du Cardinal de Richelieu. vol. I.
(Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1853), 23-25. His correspondences with Madame de Bourges, which were
quite frequent during his early years as bishop ofLu<;on, reveal Armand's ambitions inside and beyond the
diocese in a manner more straightforward than those to other nobles at that time.
33
The new bishop also faced a serious spiritual crisis in the diocese ofLu<;:on.
Located in the southern region ofPoitou, Lu<;:on operated dangerously close to the
provinces loyal to the Huguenots. The diocese was only three miles east ofthe seaport of
La Rochelle; one ofthe few fortified keeps granted to the Huguenots by Henry IV and
protected by the provisions in the Edict ofNantes. This forced Armand to confront a
populace not only burdened by over taxation from the crown, but also contained a large
minority ofCalvinists hostile to the Catholic clergy.63
Armand's first priority as bishop ofLu<;:on was to improve the physical conditions
ofhis residence. In order to reestablish order and affect the changes necessary in the
diocese, the bishop needed the conveniences and luxury ofa nobleman. He ordered new
furniture and bed linens, garments and clerical robes for himselfand his staff, and sets of
silver dinnerware. To ease the financial despair ofthe diocese, Armand successfully
requested a reexamination and subsequent lowering ofthe tax burden on the people and
parishes. Despite beipg one ofthe poorest dioceses in France, the bishop ofLu<;:on made
every effort to simultaneously appear as a "gentleman bishop" and reduce the poverty of
his flock. Armand understood early in his public career the importance ofappearance in
government.64
The spiritual crisis in the diocese ofLu<;:on required a solution beyond simple
noble imagery or the relinquishing ofmonetary burdens. Many in the Catholic clergy in
Lu<;:on were ignorant and undereducated. The bishop's agitation on this matter is evident
in his letters to the abbess ofSaint Croix, explaining his rejection ofseveral candidates
63 Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 100-101.
64 Avenel, vol. 1, 24-25; Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 81-84.
34
for pastors due to lack ofpractical and spiritual education.65 Armand had several
important manuals written about Christianity and the proper administration ofa parish
and services. He also established, with the assistance ofthe head ofthe French Oratory
Father Berulle, seminaries in Lu<;on to help educate the generally illiterate populace. The
bishop personally assisted in the education ofhis people with the writing ofthe
Instruction du Chretien ("Education ofa Christian") in 1609, a booklet designed to teach
the common peasants Christian doctrine in simplified terms. 66
Armand's handling ofthe Huguenots in Lu<;on required considerably more
subtlety and diplomacy. In his first public address at LUyon, he spoke ofpatience and
tolerance ofthose outside the Catholic faith and loyalty to the king:
Thank you for this evidence ofyour good wishes, which I shall try
to merit in carrying out my duties ... I know that among us there are some
who do not share our beliefs, but I hope that affection will bring us
together. I shall urge you in every possible way to embrace this purpose
which will benefit them as well as ourselves and will gratify the King
whose pleasure is our duty.67
His speech reflected the policy he used toward the Huguenots living in the diocese of
Luyon. Armand was a man that believed in the king's authority and sought to enforce the
tenets ofthe Edict ofNantes, despite his spiritual objections to their religion. He
believed the Calvinists in time could be peacefully returned to the folds ofthe Catholic
Church. However, the young bishop ofLUyon also supported the rights ofthe Catholics
in Poitou and protected them against Huguenot subversion. He prevented Huguenot
65 Avenel, vol. 1, 29-31.
66 Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 92-96; Erlanger, Richelieu: The Thrust for Power, 39-41.
67 Account ofa speech given by Armand du Plessis to a crowd upon his entrance into Lu<;on December
1608, reprinted in Erlanger, Richelieu: The Thrustfor Power, 38.
35
benefice-holders from collecting revenues from Catholic parishioners, and returned
Catholic worship to areas under Huguenot persecution.68
Armand's sixteen-year tenure as bishop ofLuyon was not the ideal beginning to
his political career. There is little doubt from his correspondences that he detested the
relatively poor conditions where he lived. However, LUyon represented an excellent
microcosm ofthe problems Armand faced later in his life as the First Minister ofKing
Louis XIII: government economics and finance, the nobility, and the Huguenots. The
young bishop also displayed some ofhis early methods ofrectifying those problems.
Only a small portion ofhis time as bishop ofLUyon was spent inside the borders ofhis
diocese. But that time certainly had a positive effect on the lands and its people southern
Poitou.
In all his actions to improve Luyon, Armand du Plessis never lost sight ofhis
higher goals. During his early years at the diocese, he wrote Instructions queje me suis
donnees pourparaitre d fa cour ("Instructions to myselfon how to appear at Court").
This list ofdetailed directions was a simple reminder to him on the behaviors and
mannerisms he witnessed in his short time at the court ofKing Henry IV. They included
when and how a person should speak in the king's presence, the tone any royal
correspondences should take, and how to recover from professional disasters. These
Instructions offer an interesting perspective on the ambitions ofthis twenty-three year old
bishop.69
Armand's political career was ignited by the events of 1610. The assassination of
King Henry IV and the regency ofMarie de Medici opened a window ofopportunity for
68 Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 100-102.
69 Erlanger, Richelieu: The Thrustfor Power, 42-43. Erlanger also highlighted several portions ofthe
Instructions in his book.
36
the young bishop ofLuyon. The king's untimely death had a profound effect upon
Armand, as he wrote extensively in his Memoires about the assassination and the events
that followed at Court.70 Although he was not personally in Paris in 1610, Sebastien
Bouthillier, the bishop's close friend and confidant, was in the city at the time ofHenry
IV's death and wrote to him about everything that transpired.7I
The first Bourbon king held the bishop ofLUyon in high esteem. But his death
gave Armand the chance to prove his abilities in the service ofthe regent, Marie de
Medici. He immediately wrote three copies ofa letter to the Queen Mother, swearing
"upon our promised share ofthe celestial heritage to bear allegiance to her.',n Armand
spoke in the plural, as he expected his fellow clergyman in LUyon to also sign his letters
ofobedience. However, the letters were never sent to the Queen-regent. His brother,
Henry de Richelieu, who was entrusted to deliver the letters at Court, considered their
flattery improper and ill timed. Though his enthusiasm almost proved to be his undoing,
the bishop ofLUyon clearly declared his desire to enter the direct service ofthe crown.73
Armand de LUyon spent the following six months in Paris, from July 1610 until
December ofthe same year. He arranged for Madame de Bourges to provide him a small
residence during his stay.74 The bishop expected to be received by some ofMarie de
Medici's advisors. Instead he received an audience with the Queen-regent herselfand her
son, the young King Louis XIII. Armand was extremely pleased with his first appearance
at Court under Marie de Medici, as he apparently made a powerful impression on the
70 Le Cardinal de Richelieu, Memoires, vol. 1. (France: Paleo, 2000), 5-22.
71 Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 119.
72 Avene!, vol. 1, 53-54.
73 Marvick, The Young Richelieu, 165-167.
74 Avenel, vol. 1, 55.
37
mother ofFrance's young king. Although he was forced to return to LUyon that winter,
this first move provided a necessary steppingstone for Armand's later ambitions.75
The year 1614 proved to be an important point in the life ofArmand de LUyon
and in the history ofFrance. The regency government under Marie de Medici favored
diversion and bribery instead ofactual solutions to the problems plaguing the throne.
Monetary gifts and titles were dispensed to maintain peace among the Catholic nobility,
and an alliance between France and Spain was imminent. To further complicate matters,
the Queen-regent's main advisors included members ofher Italian party, Leonora Galigai
and her husband Concino Concici. They repeatedly bought key titles in the French court,
including Concini's post as marshal de Ancre, and awarded themselves false pensions,
draining the royal coffers. The goals ofthese two advisors only served to strengthen their
own power and wealth in France.76
Many ofthe other nobles in France became incensed by the dangerous
misgovernment ofthe Queen-regent and her Italian "usurpers", particularly the
Huguenots. Led by the First Prince ofthe Blood, Hemy II de Bourbon, Prince de Conde,
the nobility demanded for a calling ofthe Estates-General. This organization consisted of
the three levels ofpower in France: the clergy, the nobility, and the professional middle
class. The Estates-General could only advise and petition the king on the interests ofthe
country. Marie de Medici and her advisors, hoping to avoid a direct conflict with the
nobility, agreed to convene the Estates-General in 1614. Armand made his opinion ofthe
matter and its participants known in his Memoires, believing that both sides were acting
75 Ibid, 56-57.
76 0' Connell, 25-28; James Breck Perkins, Richelieu and the Growth ofFrench Power. (Freeport: Books
for Libraries Press, 1971), 38-39.
38
out ofgreed and personal power.77 This particular calling was also monumental in
French history, as it was the last time the group was convened until the French
Revolution erupted in 1789.78
Armand de Lw;on recognized the calling ofthe Estates-General in 1614 as the
proper time to enter the politics ofthe French Court. He understood that gaining a
position to affect change in France required the confidence and support ofthe Queen-
regent and her advisors, even ifhe personally opposed their decisions. The first step for
Armand was to further the recognition ofhis name at Court and gain the ear ofits key
players. On February 12,1614, the bishop ofLU90n sent a letter ofsupport to Concini,
pledging his loyalty to Marie de Medici and the policies set forth by the marshal ofAncre
and his wife.79 Armand then petitioned to be nominated as the representative for the
clergy ofPoitou. The support ofArmand's brother, Henry de Richelieu, and several
other noble families, as well as the bishop ofLU90n'S impressive oratory abilities, made
his election as delegate for the First Estate ofPoitou unanimous.8o
The Estates-General officially opened on October 26, 1614 in Paris. After the
initial ceremony and blessings by the archbishop ofParis, the three estates retired to the
Hotel Bourbon and began their deliberations on the issues. The first major concern for
the groups was the authority ofthe papacy and clergy over the office ofthe king. Despite
the best efforts ofthe First Estate and its figurehead, Cardinal Du Perron, neither the
nobility nor the Third Estate was willing to support a resolution acknowledging the
dominance ofthe Church. Armand de LU90n remained quiet during these deliberations,
77 Memoires, vol. 1, 173-179.
78 Ibid.
79 Avenel, vol. 1, 121-122.
80 G. R. R. Treasure, 22.
39
choosing not to wreck his standing among the clergy by supporting absolute monarchy,
which he later made his life's work.8l
The young bishop ofLUyon moved into the Court's confidence in December 1614
during the discussions about the Queen-regent and the Concinis. Several bishops openly
chastised the regency and the excessive power granted to her advisors before the First
Estate. To counter this verbal assault on Marie de Medici, Armand gave a speech before
the clergy, vehemently supporting the regent and eloquently justifying the actions ofthe
Concinis. The power and skill Armand displayed in defending the Queen-regent not only
won the opinions ofthe First Estate, but also captured the attention ofan extremely
pleased Marie de Medici. This speech before the clergy, though not particularly
important in the whole ofthe events discussed before the Estates-General in 1614, made
the throne ofFrance and Marie de Medici recognize the gifts ofthe talented and
ambitious young bishop.82
Armand gained some immediate distinction for his efforts on behalfofthe Queen-
regent. Marie de Medici personally requested Cardinal Du Perron to grant the bishop of
Lu<;on the honor ofdelivering the final declaration ofthe First Estate. On February 23,
1615, Armand de LUyon presented a speech before the three Estates, King Louis XIII,
and the Queen-regent and her advisors. Armand covered both ecclesiastical and secular
topics, supporting Church reform and the need for clergy to be exempted from taxes,
reinforcing the authority ofthe regency, the value ofthe Concinis, and the importance of
81 O'Connell, 31-35.
82 Ibid.
40
a marriage alliance with Spain. He received overwhelming applause from both the clergy
and the members ofthe Court at the conclusion ofhis speech.83
Armand briefly returned to Poitou while the French Court prepared for the double
marriage with Spain: Louis XIII ofFrance to Anne ofAustria and Philip IV ofSpain to
Elizabeth de Bourbon. Unfortunately, another uprising from Conde and the Huguenots
distracted Marie de Medici from her plans for alliance. The bishop ofLUyon provided
valuable information for the Queen-regent during this period, reporting on the
movements and actions ofthe rebels. When the Court traveled to Poitiers in September
1615, Armand again wrote a letter ofdevotion to the Queen-regent and personally paid
his respects before they continued on to Bordeaux. It was during this visit that Marie de
Medici approached Armand about becoming Chaplain to her new daughter-in-law, Anne
ofAustria. This was an extremely important position, as he would gain the direct ear of
the throne ofFrance. However, Armand was forced to wait another year before he finally
joined the hierarchy ofthe French Court.84
After the wedding ofKing Louis XIII and Anne ofAustria on November 28,
1615, Conde and the Huguenot leaders again revolted against the regency and the abuses
ofthe Concinis. Their small army took a particularly devastating toll on the province of
Poitou, resulting in the pillaging ofthe countryside and the destruction ofthe Richelieu
estate. The French Court maintained a defensive, conciliatory position, seeking to again
bribe the rebels into submission. Armand de LUyon and his brother Hemy de Richelieu
83 Knecht, 8-9. Richelieu's writers in Avenel, vol. 8, 140-142, also highlighted this speech.
84 Avenel, vol. 8,9; Erlanger, Richelieu: The Thrust/or Power, 79-82; Knecht, 10.
41
were limited to sending letters ofprotest to the Comte de Sault and the Duc de Nevers,
demanding the removal ofthe rebel armies from Poitou.85
The Treaty ofLoudon was signed on May 3,1616, silencing the threats ofthe
Huguenots with more monetary bribes and titles. Although Armand played little part in
the negotiations ofthe treaty, his diplomacy directly afterward furthered his standing at
Court. In an effort to peacefully expel the rebels from Poitou, he held a briefdialogue
with Conde, convincing him to remove his occupying forces from the province and return
to Court.86 Despite his continued suspicions ofthe Concinis, Conde apparently reacted
positively to these overtures, removing his army from Poitou and finally reappearing in
Paris by July 1616. Seeking to solidify his power, Concini, recently appointed lieutenant
general ofNormandy, arrested the Prince ofConde on September 1, 1616, and
restructured the royal council with his own supporters. Concini clearly wanted advisors
loyal to him and easily controlled, choosing people he felt possessed no threat to his
authority. Through the urging ofMarie de Medici, Armand de LUyon was appointed
secretary ofstate on November 25,1616.87
The new responsibilities ofthe bishop ofLUyon were considerably more
extensive than as a representative ofthe First Estate. He handled the foreign affairs of
France with other countries, primarily Spain, and was responsible for assembling an army
sufficient to counter the moves ofthe Huguenot princes. Despite the obvious importance
ofhis position, Armand's policies were weak and ineffective for several reasons. As a
simple bishop ofLUyon, it was difficult to command the respect ofthe princes leading the
fight against Conde's former allies. Although he improved army morale by ensuring the
85 Avenel, vol. 1, 163-164, 167; Knecht, 10.
86 Avenel, vol. 7, 319-320.
87 Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 137-140.
42
soldiers were paid on time, Armand was unable to suitably motivate their commanders
toward more aggressive military actions against the rebellious princes.88
The greatest threat to Armand's first term ofoffice was its brevity. By aligning
himselfwith the authority and prestige ofMarie de Medici and the Concinis, his fate was
irrevocably linked to theirs. During the early months of 1617, the sixteen-year-old Louis
XIII became obsessed with gaining control ofhis own throne and throwing offthe
corrupt policies ofConcini. However, he feared the Marshal de Ancre's power and
dismissed the possibility ofopen confrontation. The young king confided in Charles
Albert de Luynes, the captain ofthe Louvre. On April 24, 1617, Concini came to the
Louvre to speak with the king on the current unrest in Court. After entering the
courtyard, the gates ofthe palace were closed, trapping the Marshal de Ancre inside
without his armed escort. The captain ofthe king's guard, Baron de Vitry, ordered five
ofhis officers to open fire on Concini, who dropped dead instantly. The body ofthe
former Marshal de Ancre was unceremoniously stripped ofall valuables and left in the
courtyard until Concini's entourage claimed it later.89
The extent ofArmand de LUyon's prior knowledge ofthe assassination is
uncertain. Some historians claim that Armand was alerted by a message given to him just
before he retired to his bedchamber the night before. By not warning his patrons ofthe
plot against them, Armand decided to create distance from the regent and her advisors.9o
The bishop ofLUyon also explained the causes ofConcini's death in his Memoires,
though this was probably written in hindsight.91 Whatever Armand's understanding of
88 Knecht, I I.
89 Erlanger, Richelieu: The Thrustfor Power, 128-137.
90 Ibid, 135.
91 Memoires, vol. 2,104-105.
43
the situation, he could not escape the king's blame. When he arrived at the Louvre that
afternoon, he reportedly found Louis XIII dancing on a billiard table, proclaiming, "Now
at last, LU90n, I am free ofyour tyranny!,,92
Unwilling to allow his mother to share Concini's fate, King Louis XIII banished
Marie de Medici to Blois. Armand followed the Queen mother into exile as the head of
her personal council. For a time he stayed near Marie de Medici, sending letters to
Luynes about the movements and plots ofthe Queen. Armand wished to mitigate his
involvement with Concini and reenter the favor ofthe king.93 When he realized the
futility ofhis actions, he returned to LU90n to wait for another opportunity to gain the
confidence ofthe Court. His problems grew in April 1618 as Luynes was comfortably
slipping into Concini's shoes. After the assassination ofthe Marshal de Ancre, Luynes
was given most ofConcini's estates, wealth and titles. He later claimed Leonora
Galigai's possessions, after he had her arrested and executed on false charges of
witchcraft. Luynes' attempt to further strengthen his grasp on the king involved the
continued denouncement ofMarie de Medici's circle. On April 7, the bishop ofLU90n
was exiled from Poitou to the papal enclave ofAvignon to await the king's judgment.94
The Queen mother had no intention ofspending her remaining days in Blois.
With the assistance ofthe Duke d'Epernon, Marie de Medici escaped from her
confinement at the chateau du Blois and hid in Angouleme. Because there was no
evidence ofan escape plot, the flight ofthe Queen mother was declared a kidnapping.
This prevented Luynes from retrieving Marie de Medici by force and potentially crushing
his last major opposition to power. It is uncertain who pushed for his mediation, but in
92 Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 161.
93 Avenel, vol. 1,541-543.
94 Knecht, 13-14.
44
March 1619 King Louis XIII recalled Armand de Luc;:on from Avignon and requested he
negotiate with the Queen mother to end her opposition to the king and his ministers. He
gladly took the chance to prove his worth to Louis XIII and immediately left for
Angouleme on March 7, 1619.95
The negotiations between Marie de Medici, Epernon, and the king's embassy, led
by Philippe de Bethume and Father Berulle, took several months and a military skirmish
to finally settle. Armand's major concern was securing a safe location for the Queen
mother to reside, which was granted by giving her the governorship ofAnjou. The final
peace settlement was reached on August 10, 1619, and was seen as an enormous success
for the bishop ofLuc;:on. Both sides ofthe negotiation were intemperate and extremely
unskilled in the subtleties ofdiplomacy. Armand's calm demeanor and calculating
disposition kept the discussions on point and were eventually responsible for their
ultimate outcome. Although the king still distrusted him and Luynes continued to despise
him, his mediation between Louis XIII and his mother greatly improved his name at
Court and among Marie de Medici's circle.96
Armand de Luc;:on hoped his service in reuniting the royal family might earn him
another position in the king's council. Unfortunately, Louis XIII and Luynes had other
interests in their eyes. With Marie de Medici temporarily pacified, the Catholic king
decided to redirect his aggression at another recurring problem: the Huguenots. The
religious fire was again ignited when Louis XIII moved his army south to restore
Catholicism to the independent state ofBeam.97 As soon as the king left Paris with his
army on November 7, 1619, the Huguenot nobles gathered at La Rochelle and started
95 Memoires, vol. 3, 7-14.
96 Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 179-195.
97 Knecht, 15.
45
another revolt, beginning with the capture ofPrivas. Despite his position and title,
Luynes had little knowledge ofwarfare and strategy. The royal army gained early
victories at Saumur and St. Jean d'Ange1y, but Luynes decided to bypass the stronghold
ofLa Rochelle and moved on the other fortified Huguenot town ofMontauban. The
Constable ofFrance possessed the superior numbers, but paled against the well-trained
and extremely experienced nobility behind the city walls. The conflict lasted into the
winter of 1621, with many royal soldiers dying in battle or from a massive outbreak of
typhoid. When reinforcements arrived from Rohan to assist the Huguenots, Louis XIII
and Luynes withdrew the army and return to Paris. The failed siege ofMontauban left a
horrible scar on Luynes' mediocre political record, which followed him until his death
from Typhoid on December 15, 1621.98
Armand remained politically docile after negotiating the peace between Louis
XIII and Marie de Medici in August 1619, continuing his service with the Queen mother
at the court ofAngers but distancing himselffrom any discussions that might be
considered treason. Marie de Medici intensified her support for Armand's career in
1620, requesting that her son petition to Rome to make Armand a cardinal. He was
denied the red cap in September, partially from the king and Luynes secretly writing
Pope Paul V about the bishop ofLm;on's deceptiveness.99 This rejection magnified by
another personal disaster for Armand. On July 8, 1619, Henry de Riche1ieu died from
wounds suffered in a duel with the Marquis de Themines. His brother's death had a
98 Perkins, France Under Mazarin, 71; O'Connell, 67-69.
99 Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 216-222.
46
devastating impact on Armand, depriving the bishop ofLUyon ofa valuable political ally
and the head ofhis family. 100
The death ofLuynes at the end of 1621 provided Armand with his last best
opportunity to prove his worth to the king and enter the royal council. Louis XIII
realized that he was quickly running out ofcompetent and experienced advisors. The
king finally gave in to Marie de Medici's insistence and supported the candidacy of
Armand de LUyon for admission to the College ofCardinals. Armand was declared a
cardinal on September 5,1622 and was formally capped on December 12.101
Armand du Plessis, former bishop ofLUyon, now formally called the Cardinal de
Richelieu, slowly advanced in the hierarchy ofthe French Court. Throughout 1623,
Marie de Medici continuously badgered the king and his new First Minister, the Marquis
de La Vieuville, to place Richelieu in the royal council. Finally on April 29, 1624, the
king and La Vieuville conceded and Richelieu was given a seat among the king's
advisors. Realizing the same letters offlattery and oaths ofloyalty that endeared him to
the Queen mother were improper before Louis XIII, he bided his time and waited for the
opportunity to display his skill and devotion. Richelieu aided his advancement by
outwitting La Vieuville on his first day at the council. By giving a detailed explanation
on the privileges a cardinal should receive, he prodded the chiefminister to make an
incompetent retaliation that only angered the king. This tactic weakened La Vieuville's
position with Louis XIII and opened the door for Richelieu.102
On August 13, 1624, the king summoned his council, where Richelieu gave a long
speech on the problems ofthe French government and the new direction foreign policy
100 Avenel, vol. 1,603-616; Memoires, vol. 3, 38-42.
101 Bergin, The Rise ofRichelieu, 225-229; O'Connell, 70-72.
102 Avenel, vol. 2, 6; O'Connell, 71-76.
47
should take. Explained in his Memoires, he called for a more belligerent position against
the Spanish and the looming threat ofthe Holy Roman Empire. 103 This radical change in
foreign policy, returning to the days ofHenry IV, was exactly what Louis XIII wanted to
hear. Although he still distrusted the cleric, the king knew that Richelieu's plan held the
greatest chance to reclaim France's glory in the eyes ofEurope. He dismissed La
Vieuville and declared Cardinal Richelieu his new First Minister.104
Since his ordination as bishop ofLw;on in 1607, Cardinal Armand du Plessis de
Richelieu fought through the turbulent politics and personal intrigues ofthe Court, rising
to the title ofFirst Minister. He witnessed the glory and fall ofseveral chiefadvisors
during this period, making his new appointment far from secure. Richelieu also
personally opposed the policies and actions ofmany ofthe nobles and members ofthe
royal family he supported as bishop ofLuyon. However, he understood the need to
swallow his pride and gain the favor ofthose that best helped his advancement in Court.
Richelieu kept this knowledge close and immediately set his plans in motion to elevate
France to the pinnacle ofEuropean power.
103 This is the first instance where Richelieu openly declares his opposition to Spain and the Hapsburgs,
though he clearly developed this ideology prior to 1624.
104 Memoires, vol. 4, 166-190.
48
Chapter Three
The First Move ofthe First Minister: Intervention in the Valtelline
In his Testament Politique, written near the end ofhis life as instructions to Louis
XIII, Cardinal Richelieu explained the three major objectives ofhis policy to strengthen
the French crown: the suppression ofthe Huguenot rebellions against the king, the
weakening and submission ofthe French nobility to the throne, and removing the
growing external threat to France from the House ofHapsburg. Through the Edict of
Nantes, Henry IV gave the Huguenots limited independent rule within the borders of
France. The Calvinist princes were permitted to maintain their own armies and fortify
the keeps under their control. They were granted the freedom to practice their religion, as
well as restrict the worship ofCatholics within their own lands. Worst ofall, prior
attempts to appease the Huguenots through bribes and titles only encouraged the use of
revolts to supply their greed, constantly distracting the French throne from other
important concerns and weakening the whole ofthe country.105
The Catholic nobility ofFrance also presented a serious obstacle to Richelieu and
Louis XIII. Along with receiving the same monetary bribes and titles as those given to
the Huguenot leaders, the nobles simultaneously enjoyed freedom from royal authority
and power to influence the king's decisions. Prior to Richelieu's appointment, the king
had no direct military at his command. Therefore, any conflict engaged in by the French
throne first required the support ofthe nobles and the acquisition oftheir armies. This
also gave nobles the power to influence the decisions ofthe king for their own ends,
105 Franyoise Hildesheimer, ed., Testament Politique de Richelieu. (Paris: Societe de \'Histoire de France,
1995),43-45; Victor-L. Tapie, France in the Age ofLouis XIII and Richelieu. trans. and ed. D. MeN.
Lockie. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975),25-27, 72.
49
sometimes to the detriment ofthe kingdom's welfare. Richelieu believed that ifthe king
ofFrance was to gain absolute control over his kingdom and initiate the necessary
domestic and foreign policies without interference, the French nobility must be made
subservient to and dependent on the power ofthe throne.106
The third major obstacle for the administration ofRichelieu was the growing
threat ofthe House ofHapsburg across Europe, particularly in Spain. The ruling families
ofAustria and Spain together controlled a large majority ofthe continent. This was a
serious danger for France, since three ofits borders were shared with Hapsburg
possessions: Spain to the south, the Spanish Netherlands to the north, and the Holy
Roman Empire to the east. The Huguenots controlled several ofthe major port cities,
including La Rochelle, on France's western border: the Atlantic Ocean. The trade wars
and pirate raids between England, Spain and the United Provinces also made the Atlantic
a continuous battleground. This further prevented France from reconstructing its
nonexistent navy. Ifleft unchecked, the Bourbon dynasty would be at the mercy ofthe
Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs.107
Richelieu recognized first two concerns were internal problems for France. The
Huguenots remained a constant aggravation since the middle ofthe sixteenth century,
revolting when their rights felt threatened or saw considerable weakness in the French
crown. Because ofthe large minority ofCalvinists in France and the popularity ofthe
Edict ofNantes, dealing with the Huguenots required a long-term solution. The Catholic
nobility in France were a necessary evil for Richelieu during the opening years ofhis
reign as First Minister. Without a standing royal army, controlled exclusively by the
106 Testament Politique, 149-153; Tapie, 16-19.
107 Wedgwood, Richelieu and the French Monarchy, 33-35.
50
king, to defend France from Spanish encroachment and the military uprisings ofthe
Huguenots, Louis XIII requisitioned the troops and commanders loyal to the nobles.
Richelieu tolerated their abuses because they currently served his interests. The only
problem that demanded immediate attention and was feasible to accomplish was the
disruption ofHapsburg dominance in the Thirty Years' War. The first step in the
Cardinal's plan was severing the Spanish lines ofcommunication through Northern Italy,
beginning in the Valtelline.108
The Grisons and the Valtelline
The ancient lands ofOld Upper Rhaetia, commonly known as the Grey Leagues
or Grisons, were unique to the rest ofthe European continent on a geographic, cultural,
political and religious level. The Grisons occupied a key portion ofthe Northern Alps,
running along the southeastern border ofthe Swiss Confederation. Like many countries
in Europe, natural geographical barriers defined the borders ofthis territory. In this case,
the Grey Leagues were protected by the almost impassable mountain ranges formed from
two major river valleys: the Rhine River in the north and the Adda River to the south.
Both river flatbeds provided one ofthe few areas in the Alps with good farmland for
grain and grape vineyards. The third major river valley, the Inn River, held steep grassy
cliffs capable ofsupporting extensive cattle farming. These mountain passes also
established a land route across the Alps, connecting Germany and Austria with Northern
108 Perkins, France Under Mazarin, 98-99.
51
Italy. The lands ofthe Grisons were strategically and economically appealing to many of
the European powers.109
The Grey Leagues were also a cultural crossroad for countries bordering the Alps.
Settlers and religious refugees from Germany swelled the population ofthe towns along
the Rhine River valley. By the middle ofthe sixteenth century, German became the
language spoken by the majority ofpeople living in the Grisons. As the valleys ofthe
Rhine and Adda rivers became increasingly popular trades routes, traders slowly
migrated from Northern Italy to secure their investments. Although their numbers were
far less than the German immigrants, the growing importance ofthe valley for the
business and communications ofItaly made the integration oftheir language and culture
unavoidable. The Rhaetians, the original occupants ofthis area ofthe Alps, represented
the third major group living in the Grey Leagues. Holding to the traditions ofthe old
Roman Empire, they spoke a vulgar form ofLatin that mixed with the Romance
languages from surrounding cultures. This produced a hybrid language known as
Romantsch. Adding to the complication ofthree cultures, the Grisons also had different
dialects for each town and valley region. Despite these divisions, the people ofthe
Grisons existed in peaceful cooperation. Except for traders and politicians, most people
did not leave their towns. Therefore, the need to learn multiple languages was only
required for those that traveled beyond their home.II 0
One ofthe most interesting and unique characteristics ofthe Grey Leagues was
the political structure that bound the separate provinces together. After the fall ofthe
Roman Empire, the individual towns began forming into governing communes. Each
109 Randolph C. Head, Early Modern Democracy in the Grisons. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995),36-37.
110 Ibid, 42-44.
52
year, the citizens ofthe communes met in the town to vote on important decisions and
elect a representative to speak for them in foreign affairs. The communes in a particular
area also established mutual assistance agreements with each other, offering military and
financial support in times ofneed. The representatives from each commune met
regularly to pass laws and settle land disputes. These alliances formed early democratic
governments in the Northern Alps.III
By the beginning ofthe sixteenth century, the communes had assembled into
three main associations: the Grey League, Chade, and the Ten Jurisdictions. The Grey
League controlled the western tributaries ofthe Rhine River and the Mesocco, including
the western arm ofthe Domleschg. Chade possessed the main portion ofthe Inn River
valley and the largest geographical area ofthe three associations. The Ten Jurisdictions,
recently severed from Hapsburg domination, held the land farthest north and the segment
ofthe Rhine flowing into Switzerland and Germany. The outbreak ofthe Swabian War
in 1499 between the Swiss Confederation and the Hapsburg dynasty pushed the
.c h . .. 112communes to lorm a stronger, co eSIve aSSOCIatIOn.
On September 23, 1524, the representative councils ofthe three Leagues signed
the Letter ofAlliance, binding all the communes into a single Rhaetian Freestate.
Although the individual communes still held power over their local governments, the
Letter now took precedence over all previous alliances. The noble and elected
representatives ofeach region made decisions that concerned the whole Freestate. The
Letter ofAlliance also held dominion over the former Italian territories ofMaienfeld,
Malans, Bormio, Chiavenna, and the Valtelline. The official title ofthe new Freestate
III Ibid,44-46.
112 Ibid, 47-57,63-65; a political map ofthe area is on p. 39.
53
was the Three Leagues, but the Grey Leagues (Grisons) became the popular name. The
political development in the Grisons represented the creation ofdemocratic government
in early modem Europe.I 13
The distinct government ofthe Grisons gave a unique amount ofreligious
freedom to its citizens. The constitution ofthe Freestate, designed as Christian reformers
and their teachings spread across Europe, offered protection to all faiths. The Protestant
Reformation deeply impacted the Grey Leagues, converting over halfofthe region to
alternative forms ofChristianity over the course ofthe sixteenth century, particularly
Anabaptism. Despite a large portion ofthe communes becoming Protestant, the First
Ilanz Articles ofthe constitution kept a steady balance between church liberty and the
responsibilities ofthe clergy to their parishioners. This semi-peaceful religious
coexistence, unattainable elsewhere in Europe, lasted unti11573, when the
counterreformation brought suspicion and resentment between the Catholic and
Protestant elements in the Grey Leagues. The Hapsburgs later used this religious friction
to invade the Grisons for their own political ends. 114
Spanish Occupation in the Grisons
Access to the trade routes ofthe Grey Leagues was extremely important to the
foreign policies ofFrance and Spain during the seventeenth century. In particular, the
Valtelline offered a necessary connection between Western and Eastern Europe across
the Alps and Northern Italy. For the French, the Adda River valley presented the only
overland link with its strongest Italian ally, the Republic ofVenice. With the Duchy of
113 Ibid.
114 Head, 65-72; Thomas M'Crie, History ofthe Progress and Suppression ofthe Reformation in Italy in
the Sixteenth Century. (New York: AMS Press, 1856), 190-192.
54
Milan and the Republic ofGenoa loyal to the Spanish monarchy, the Valtelline pass was
France's best way to remain in contact with Northern Italy. In 1603, King Henry IV
renewed the alliance between the Grisons and France, helping to protect the Freestate
from undesirable trade agreements and open hostility by Milan, Genoa, and Spain. As
long as they had access to the Valtelline, the French were a threat to Spain's interests in
Europe. I 15
For the House ofHapsburg, the Adda River valley held great importance in their
continued domination ofthe European mainland. Although the Hapsburgs controlled a
large portion ofNorthern Italy, the Republic ofVenice stretched from the Grisons and the
Swiss Confederation in the north to the Mediterranean Sea, preventing a direct link
between the two branches ofthe family in Madrid and Vienna. The only safe passage
from Spain to Austria involved traveling through the Stelvio pass in the Valtelline and
into the Duchy ofTyrol. Using this route became problematic, since it crossed the path
connecting France and Venice and required the permission ofthe primarily Protestant
Freestate.116
The other major need the Spanish Hapsburgs had for the Valtelline involved their
continuing efforts to suppress the Protestant rebellion in the Netherlands. The Twelve
Years' Truce ended in 1621, forcing Spain to either begin negotiations for peace or
reopen the campaign against the United Provinces. King Philip IV ofSpain, who
recently succeeded his father that same year, and his First Minister Don Gaspar, the
Count-Duke ofOlivares, refused to accept a compromise with the Dutch Protestants. To
115 A. D. Lublinskaya, French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-1629. trans. Brian Pearce.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 175-176.
116 Maland, Europe at War, 7-11, 24-27.
55
secure a victory in the Netherlands, Spain needed to maintain a safe route through Europe
for transporting supplies and troops to the Loyal Provinces.I 17
Through the latter part ofthe sixteenth century, Spain held an alliance with
Charles Emmanuel I ofSavoy. This allowed the Spanish lines ofcommunication to run
from Genoa, crossed the Rhone River in Savoy, moved north through the Spanish-
controlled Franche CornU: and Lorraine, and finally ended in Brussels. However, Charles
Emmanuel had his own ambitions that often disrupted the foreign policy ofthe Spanish
throne. The allegiance ofSavoy at any time in the early seventeenth century depended on
the fluctuating strength and weakness ofSpain and France. In 1600, he attempted to
default on his agreement with Henry IV ofFrance to relinquish control ofSaluzzo. After
the French army invaded Savoy and forced the duke to submit, Charles Emmanuel
considered France the greater threat and turned his desire for expansion on Spanish-
aligned Italian provinces.118 He removed all Spanish garrisons from Savoy in 1609 and
prevented the movement oftroops and supplies to the Netherlands. The duke also signed
the Treaty ofBrussolo with Hemy IV a year later, agreeing to invade Lombardy with
French support. Charles Emmanuel further threatened Spanish interests in Northern Italy
by claiming the Mantuan fortress ofMontferrat in 1612. Without access to Savoy and the
destabilization ofthe western Alpine region, Olivares and Philip IV sought another road
to reinforce their army battling the United Provinces.I 19
The opportunity for Spain to acquire an alternate supply route appeared just after
the start ofthe Bohemian Revolt and the Thirty Years' War. Since the beginning ofthe
117 J. H. Elliott, The Count-Duke ofOlivares: The Statesman in an Age ofDecline. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1986), 51-56.
118 Maland, Europe in the Seventeenth Century. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), 171-172.
119 Maland, Europe at War, 57-58.
56
seventeenth century, the peace ofthe Rhaetian Freestate quickly deteriorated into
religious and political tension between the communes. In the 1580's, the Republic of
Venice and the Duchy ofMilan both negotiated with the Grisons for trade access through
the Adda River valley in the Valtelline. Although they resisted the heavy bribes from the
Venetian ambassador Giovanni Battista Padavino and the military escalation along Lake
Como by the governor ofMilan, Don Gomez de Figueroa y Cordova (popularly known in
France as the duke ofFeria), the favorable position ofHenry IV in the Freestate led in
1603 to a ten-year alliance with Venice. The Grey Leagues' involvement in the politics
ofEurope created a rift between the Catholic and Protestant communes in the
Freestate.120
The gathering ofthe communal representatives, called a Bundestag, met in 1601
to discuss the growing disputes in the Grisons. The primary issues concerned the
encroachment ofProtestant settlers on land held by exclusively Catholic communes.
Some problems were resolved, but the leaders ofthe Bundestag took a strong Protestant
position. Several resolutions were passed to ease the spread ofProtestantism throughout
the Grisons and limit the objections ofCatholics. These disputes were magnified for the
communes in the Valtelline. After the Grey Leagues claimed the valley in 1513, the
communes along the Adda River remained fiercely Catholic and Italian in their traditions.
Protestant settlers began moving into the Catholic communes in the Valtelline, producing
numerous conflicts between the two faiths. The Grisons restricted the rights ofCatholics
by preventing the clergy and missionaries from entering the valley, prohibiting papal
bulls from being posted, and seizing Church lands for Protestant worship. The internal
religious problems in the Valtelline gained the attention ofadjacent Catholic states,
120 Head, 171-172, 179-180.
57
especially Milan, who shared the Italian see ofComo with the valley. Under the
direction ofSpain, the archbishops ofMilan actively encouraged Catholics in the
Valtelline to rise up against the oppression ofthe Protestant Grisons. This tension finally
exploded in 1620 when blood was spilled in the Valtelline.l2I
As early as 1617, small revolts from individual Catholic communes began in the
Rhaetian Freestate. Many were resolved through the execution ofthe rebel leaders,
including the death ofpriest Nicolai Rusca at Thursis in 1618. Protestants attempted to
open a Reformed Church in the village ofBoalzo in 1619, resulting in a riot that killed
the new minister. The larger Catholic clans in the Valtelline, supported by agents from
Milan, started planning for total rebellion across the Grey Leagues. On July 19, 1620, a
mob ofItalian Catholics, armed by the Milanese and led by the Spanish-aligned exiles
from the Grey Leagues, began an open revolt in the main city ofTirano. They swept
across the Valtelline, killing approximately 400 Protestants and driving the rest north into
Chade. The Thirty Years' War arrived at the doorstep ofthe Grisons.122
The Grisons attempted to retake the Valtelline from the Catholic rebels, but were
met instead by a well-trained army from Milan. By October 1620, Spanish troops
occupied the valley and fortified its borders, asserting the need to protect the rights of
Catholics living in the valley. Louis XIII and the French Court demanded the restoration
ofthe Grisons to power in the Valtelline. An agreement was reached on April 26, 1621,
giving the Valtelline back to the Protestant Grisons in return for Spanish access to the
valley route. The Treaty ofMadrid was never truly fulfilled by Olivares, and Spain
maintained their forts and troops in the valley. Incapable ofbacking up their threats with
J2J Ibid, 183-184.
122 Head, 191-193; O'Connell, 80.
58
military intervention, France continued to negotiate on behalfofthe Grisons. In February
1623, after France secured an alliance with a terrified Savoy and Venice, Olivares agreed
to replace the Spanish garrisons in the Valtelline with the papal troops ofPope Gregory
XV, who agreed to keep the pass available to both parties. The pope's garrison was to
remain in the Valtelline for only four months, after which the forts were to be razed and
control given to the Grisons. However, Gregory XV died in July 1623, and his successor
Maffeo Barberini, Pope Urban VIII, was persuaded by Olivares to extend the
. 123occupatIOn.
Spain lost official rule ofthe Valtelline, but kept their advantage in the supply
route to the Netherlands. Olivares was able to redirect the troops in the valley to other
fronts, believing France would never militarily challenge the pope and his army. In
November 1620, the combined forces ofMaximilian I ofBavaria and the Spanish army
in the Netherlands led by Ambrosio Spinola defeated Frederick V, the Elector Palatine
and elected King ofBohemia, at White Mountain. With the Lower Palatinate under the
control ofthe Hapsburgs, the lines ofcommunication from Genoa, up the Rhine River,
and into Spanish Netherlands were finally secured for reinstating the attack against the
United Provinces.124
Richelieu's First Move
Cardinal Richelieu became the First Minister ofFrance on August 13, 1624. He
witnessed the movements ofthe Hapsburgs in Spain and Austria to dominate the entire
123 Levi, 86-87; A. Lloyd Moote, Louis X/II, the Just. (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1989),
134-136.
124 Maland, Europe at War, 75-77; David Parrott, Richelieu 's Army: War, Government and Society in
France, /624-1642. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 85-86.
59
continent. Richelieu also recognized that reclaiming the Valtelline for their allies, the
Grisons, as a necessary first step to arresting the power ofSpain. Upon taking office, he
immediately sent his friend and advisor Father Joseph to attempt a final compromise with
the papal nuncio, Cardinal Spada. Although the Capuchin monk made a strong case for
the restoration ofthe Grisons, Spada was unwilling to recommend any treaty to Urban
VIII that involved Protestant control ofthe Valtelline.125
Joseph Franyois Ie Clerc du Tremblay, known across Europe as Father Joseph,
was an important supporter ofRichelieu's rise to power and a crucial instrument in
France's foreign policy. The Capuchin monk first met Richelieu as the new bishop of
Luyon, while attempting to reform the abbey ofFontevrault. He sought the advice ofthe
young Richelieu and both clerics became fast friends and religious allies. Like Richelieu,
Father Joseph was a political animal and pursued his own agendas for the good ofFrance
and the Catholic Church. He believed the greatest threat came from the Turkish invasion
ofthe European continent. The priest worked early to secure an alliance between the
Bourbons in France and the Hapsburgs in Spain, placing him in the favor ofMarie de
Medici. However, by the time Richelieu came to power in 1624, Father Joseph realized
the Hapsburgs would never agree to a unified crusade against the Turks. He abandoned
conciliation with Spain and fully supported Richelieu's foreign policy and political
ambitions for France.126
Richelieu never anticipated his peace offering to persuade the pope to remove his
troops from the Adda River valley. While Father Joseph distracted the papal troops and
the Spanish with empty diplomacy, Richelieu simultaneously sent the Marquis de
125 O'Connell, 86-87.
126 Aldous Huxley, Grey Eminence: A Study in Religion and Politics. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975),
111-115, 181; R. F. O'Conner, His Grey Eminence. (Philadelphia: Dolphin Press, 1912), 36-38.
60
Creuvres to raise an army among the Swiss Protestants. After levying 3,000 men in the
Swiss cantons and another 3,000 in the Grisons, Creurves moved south into Savoy in
November 1624. In a secret alliance between France, Savoy and Venice, the three
countries agreed to cut Spain's supply route in Northern Italy. On November 25,
Creuvres' army of9,000 soldiers, halfofthem Calvinists, launched an attack against the
papal garrisons in the Valtelline. Cannons from Venice were brought into the valley to
reinforce the French army. By the start of 1625, the Valtelline was cleared ofthe papal
soldiers and under French jurisdiction.127
Feria quickly reinforced the fortress ofRiva, the last defense between Creurves'
troops and Milan, which was besieged by the end ofJanuary. As part ofthe alliance,
Charles Emmanuel I took 23,000 soldiers, a large portion belonging to France, and began
an invasion ofGenoa. By keeping Spanish reinforcements blocked inside the port city,
the governor ofMilan could only hold the French army to a standstill. In just six months,
Richelieu transformed the foreign policy ofFrance from a pro-Hapsburg Catholic
alliance throughout Europe to severing the connection between the two branches ofthe
family. Although Spain and Austria still held considerably more power than France on
the continent, Cardinal Richelieu used the power ofhis office against the larger threat to
the Bourbon dynasty.128
The outraged reaction from Rome and Madrid could have evaporated the Rhine
River. Pope Urban VIII accused Richelieu ofsins against the Catholic Church and
demanded the immediate withdrawal ofFrench troops. To expedite the process, the pope
sent his nephew, Cardinal Francesco Barberini, to press the issue to Louis XIII in Paris.
127 Hilaire Belloc, Richelieu: A Study. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1929),216-217; Elliott, The Count 
Duke ofOlivares, 222-223.
128 Ibid.
61
Upon learning ofhis arrival in spring 1625, Richelieu instructed Father Joseph in Rome
to argue the French position directly to Urban VIII. Barberini arrived in Paris on May 21,
quickly drawing the ire ofLouis XIII and Richelieu. The papal legate was finn in his
resolution, rejecting any French compromises that involved the stationing ofFrench
troops in the valley or the restoration ofthe Grisons' lordship. Luckily, Father Joseph
learned from the pope that Barberini's trip to Paris was an empty gesture, never intending
to reach a successful agreement with Louis XIII. 129
The bigger headache for Richelieu came from the Spanish throne. Along with
preparing to launch a military assault to relieve Genoa from the anny ofCharles
Emmanuel I and crush Camvres in the Valtelline, Olivares began spreading rumors
across Europe about the evil ofthe alliance among France, Savoy and Venice. The battle
for the Valtelline was slowly drawing France and Spain closer to a direct war that neither
could currently afford. The French throne was barely able to feed and supply its anny
and all the available Spanish troops were committed to suppressing the revolt in the
Netherlands. Olivares and Philip IV employed similar tactics inside France and secretly
supported another Protestant uprising. In 1625, the Huguenots, led by the duke ofRohan,
began another revolt in southern France. Unable to maintain two conflicts on two
separate fronts, Richelieu was forced to recall the French troops from Italy and
commence serious negotiations with Spain and Rome.130
When Cardinal Richelieu came to power in 1624, several major problems
confronted the French throne that required immediate attention. The Huguenot princes
129 Avenel, vol. 3, 208; O'Connell, 87-90.
130 Elliott, The Count-Duke ofOlivares, 226-228; The History ofthe Government ofFrance, Under the
Administration ofthe Great Armand Du Plessis, Cardinal! and Duke ofRichlieu, and chiefMinister of
State in That Kingdome. trans. J. D. (London: J. Macock, 1657),52-79,110-117; Levi, 88-89.
62
still threatened loyal Catholic provinces and Louis XIII with rebellion. The French
nobility held enough influence to challenge the authority ofthe king and his laws.
Despite these internal issues, Richelieu changed the priorities ofgovernment to foreign
matters, which he perceived the greater menace to France. By reclaiming the Valtelline
from the Hapsburgs and restoring the Grisons to power, he severed the lines of
communication between Spain, Austria, and the Netherlands. The First Minister knew
that France was militarily and financially incapable ofsustaining a direct confrontation
with the Holy Roman Empire or Spain. However, the briefdisruption oftheir supply
route through Northern Italy revealed the heart ofRichelieu's policy and his vision for a
dominant France.
63
Chapter Four
Antagonistsfor Peace
Richelieu's sudden assault on the Spanish Hapsburgs in the Valtelline changed
the momentum ofFrance's involvement in the affairs ofEurope. Prior to the Cardinal
becoming the First Minister ofKing Louis XIII, the advisors to the French throne guided
foreign policy toward an alliance with the House ofHapsburg in both Spain and Austria.
The Protestant Reformation took a devastating toll on the Spanish and Holy Roman
Empires, creating religious division among the people, battles over the loss ofChurch
lands, and the ingredients for rebellion in the Netherlands and Bohemia. The separation
ofthe Christian faiths was irrevocably linked to the deterioration ofHapsburg control on
the continent. Fervent Catholics in France, particularly the clergy and the nobles with
strong ties to Rome, already suffered from the political and religious problems caused by
the Huguenots. Catholic Churches and provinces existing close to La Rochelle and the
Languedoc endured constant harassment and economic hardship from their Calvinist
neighbors. They actively pushed for an alliance with Spain and Austria.13l
The Hapsburg dynasty presented its own major threat to the Bourbon rulers. If
the Lutheran princes inside the Holy Roman Empire were removed, and the Spanish army
in the Netherlands successfully crushed the rebellion by the United Provinces, France
would be surrounded on all sides by a hostile and cohesive Catholic alliance. No country
in Europe could resist the establishment ofHapsburg hegemony. A triumphant
counterreformation and the removal ofProtestant resistance to Spain and Austria would
also eliminate France's crucial allies in the struggle to secure its borders and reclaim its
131 Moote, 48-50.
64
authority on the continent. Richelieu and many ofhis supporters understood this danger
and shifted French foreign policy to disrupt the plans ofthe Hapsburg empires. Sending
Creurves and his army into the Valtelline to drive out the papal garrisons was the first
step in the Cardinal's strategy.132
However, other Catholics in France still believed the existence ofProtestantism
was the greatest menace. The interests ofthe state were secondary to those ofthe
Church, and the removal ofheresy took precedence over political disputes. Catholics
who supported a Franco-Spanish alliance, led primarily by the Queen Mother Marie de
Medici, held considerable influence with the French court. They created major
opposition to Richelieu's designs and distracted the First Minister from his campaign
against the Hapsburgs.133
Berulle and the Catholic Devots
French Catholics were a religious group heavily divided in the seventeenth
century. Matters ofgovernment and matters offaith were usually a single consideration
for the rulers ofEurope. Because the kings ofEurope were seen as the earthly
representatives ofGod's law, their decisions were legitimized by their noble heritage and
the approval ofthe Church. After the outbreak ofthe Protestant Reformation and the
deterioration ofpeace across the continent, concerns ofChurch and state began to
diverge. Princes that converted from Catholicism or tolerated the worship ofother faiths
were denounced by the papacy for aligning with heretics. As tensions between countries
became declarations ofwar, Catholic rulers established alliances with Protestant
132 Maland, Europe at War, 43, 98.
133 Ibid.
65
governments for mutual protection. The monarchs ofEngland, which were primarily
Protestant after the reign ofQueen Elizabeth I, remained key allies for France and Spain,
despite papal mandates against such treaties. Policies that advanced the cause ofa state
. h . fR 134sometimes ran contrary to t e mterests 0 orne.
France was plagued by internal struggle between policies beneficial to the Church
or to the state. Catholics split into two major factions: the bon Franr;ais and the devots.
The bon Franr;ais, or "good Frenchmen", witnessed the growing threat caused by Spain
and the Holy Roman Empire. The ambitions ofthe Hapsburg dynasty reached beyond
their own borders, and the Bourbons ofFrance remained their bitter enemy. The papacy
likewise sought unity among the Catholic states in Europe, supporting the Hapsburgs as
the champions ofChristianity against the Protestants in Germany and the Netherlands.
The bon Franr;ais were good Catholics that followed the Church in purely spiritual
matters. However, they also believed that the king, and not Catholic powers outside the
state, must control the French government. The spread ofGallican thought, which
promoted the development ofFrench nationalism, further influenced the bon Franr;ais.
Represented primarily by France's growing middle class ofmerchants, lawyers and
magistrates, the bon Franr;ais encouraged Richelieu's foreign policy in the Valtelline and
against the Hapsburgs.135
The other Catholic faction in France was the devot party. While the bon Franr;ais
favored a policy ofnational security royal dominance, the devots' first loyalty was to the
papacy and the promotion ofCatholicism. The king and his advisors still ruled their
state, but their primary concern must always be the welfare ofthe Church. The idea of
134 D. H. Pennington, Europe in the Seventeenth-Century Europe. (London: Longman, 1970), 123-128,
210-215.
135 Tapit\ 143-144.
66
Catholic countries declaring war with each other and Catholic kings signing treaties with
Protestant leaders was unthinkable. For the devots, the greatest danger for France in the
seventeenth century was the persistence ofthe Huguenots and their rebellions against the
king. They also embraced an alliance with the Hapsburgs in Spain against the Protestants
elsewhere in Europe. The growth ofthe Catholic Church was more important than the
feuds between the kings ofFrance and Spain.136
The devots had a sizable advantage over the bon Franr;ais in the French court.
Many ofthe advisors and confessors ofthe Catholic nobility and the royal family pursued
these beliefs and influenced their patrons' decisions. The man that guided the devot party
and established a firm pro-Hapsburg position in the court was Father Pierre de Berulle.
Highly educated and deeply entrenched in his faith, Berulle was originally taught by the
Jesuit preachers in France. Their teachings instilled in him the need for serious clerical
reform, which he spent his lifetime achieving. Berulle also developed a strong
fascination with Christian mysticism, including the invocation ofspiritual visions and the
study ofdemonic possession. He eventually separated with the Jesuits, who suggested
that he join their order. Although he exhibited many ofthe beliefs and traditions ofhis
former teachers, Berulle felt their brand ofeducation was too secular and not focused
enough on religious matters. King Henry IV also offered him several positions of
political and religious authority, first as a teacher and confessor to the Dauphin and later
as a bishop. Focused on his passion for spiritual reform, he refused the gracious offers of
the king, showing his initial disdain for entering the realm ofcourt politics.137
136 Ibid.
137 Charles E. Williams, The French Oratorians andAbsolutism, 1611-1641. (New York: Peter Lang,
1989),31-34,71-75.
67
In 1611, Father Berulle founded the Congregation ofthe Oratory ofJesus in Paris.
His project was funded and supported by the most powerful noble women ofthe age,
including the Queen mother Marie de Medici. Along with being devout Catholics and
strong pro-Hapsburg advocates, Berulle's patrons also admired his beliefs in mysticism,
which were gaining popularity among the nobility. The French Oratory was wholly
dedicated to the training and reform ofthe Catholic clergy, becoming one ofthe premier
schools for the seminary seventeenth century Europe.138
Berulle was inevitably dragged into the politics ofthe French court through his
association with Marie de Medici. After the assassination ofConcini and the exile ofthe
Queen regent in 1617, advisors close to the royal family were summoned to negotiate a
peaceful reconciliation between Louis XIII and his mother. The two clerics mainly
responsible for these talks were Father Berulle and Bishop Armand-Jean de LUyon, the
future Cardinal Richelieu. Marie de Medici sponsored both men in their rise through the
ecumenical ranks, and they remained good friends after the crisis was resolved. Berulle
followed Richelieu's career in politics with admiration, supporting his candidacy for
becoming a cardinal and pushed for his appointment to the King's Council. After the
inept administrations ofLuynes and La Vieuville, the devots wanted a firm Catholic
presence guiding the decisions ofLouis XIII. Richelieu, as an early advocate ofa
Franco-Spanish alliance against the Huguenots and a close advisor to the Queen mother,
made him the perfect candidate for the position. Berulle pushed for his acceptance, and
the rest ofthe devot party followed his lead. 139
138 Ibid, 77-83.
139 Levi, 52-55; Moote, 159.
68
The invasion ofthe Valtelline by the marquis de Cceurves in November 1624 and
the immediate anti-Hapsburg foreign policy adopted by Richelieu shocked and angered
Berulle and the devots. The First Minister was aware ofthe support he received in
attaining his office from the pro-Hapsburg Catholics. His use ofFrench and Swiss troops
to cut the Spanish lines ofcommunication in the Alps directly contradicted much ofhis
spoken policies prior to 1624. The devots were further angered that Richelieu had
Creurves recruit Protestants for the assault upon the papal garrisons in the valley. At the
time ofthe invasion, Berulle was in Rome seeking the approval ofPope Urban VIII for a
marriage alliance between England and France. When he returned to Paris with the papal
nuncio Barberini, he pressured Richelieu and Louis XIII to accept a compromise with
Spain. He agreed with the Queen mother that peace was necessary at any cost. His hope,
which matched Richelieu's, was to keep the Spanish from using the Valtelline without
thoroughly rejecting the papacy. Although Berulle remained devoted to the devot cause
and Marie de Medici's service, his willingness to mediate all sides ofthe conflict and
support the foreign policy ofthe crown made him a valuable asset to France.140
The devot clergy was considerably less understanding ofRichelieu's intentions.
They believed the attack on the papal garrisons in the Valtelline was a declaration ofwar
against the pope. Priests publicly denounced Richelieu's actions in their churches,
demanding the immediate removal oftroops from the Valtelline. The devots also began a
large propaganda battle with Richelieu, asserting his temperance with the Huguenots and
violence with Catholic powers was tantamount to heresy. These pamphlets and sermons
140 O'Connell, 94; Williams, 376-378, 383-384.
69
had a profound effect on public opinion, further pressuring the council ofLouis XIII into
peace.141
In his book Cardinal Richelieu and the Development ofAbsolutism, Geoffrey
Treasure argued that:
The central problems of[Richelieu's] life arose from political
decisions which he knew to be necessary, but which ran counter to the
principles ofdevots ofone sort or another, which either complicated or
contradicted the promptings offaith and morality. He was not, as is
sometimes suggested, insensitive to this problem, even though hardened
by experience. He was, and remained in his own way, a devot. 142
There is no doubt that Richelieu agonized over his choice to abandon a pro-Hapsburg
policy and reject the opinions ofthe people that sponsored his rise to power. However,
the major principle that bound the devot party together was the creation ofa treaty with
Spain to remove the Huguenots from France and stop the spread ofProtestants across
Europe. This problem was the greatest threat to the Catholic Church and demanded
precedence over any other concern ofstate. Richelieu's occupation ofthe Valtelline
proved his resolve to subvert the plans ofthe Hapsburgs and his clear break from the
devots.
Marie de Medici
Before his assassination on May 14, 1610, Henry IV prepared for his own assault
against the Hapsburg aggression in the duchies ofJiilich-Cleves. John William, duke of
the two provinces and ardent Catholic, died in 1609 without a direct male heir. His only
successors were the Protestant elector ofBrandenburg and the count Palatine ofNeuburg,
141 Moote, 181-182; Tapie, 144-152.
142 Treasure, 16.
70
who quickly sent their own representatives to present their claims. Just as they arrived,
Emperor Rudolph II declared the duchies under the control ofthe Empire since no direct
heir existed. He sent his younger brother Leopold, bishop ofPassau and Strassburg, to
secure Jillich-Cleves until a new Catholic duke was assigned. When the Protestant
representatives refused to relinquish control oftheir claims, Leopold invaded Jiilich,
drawing the attention ofboth the Evangelical Union and the Catholic League.143
Henry IV prepared to take immediate action against the Holy Roman Empire and
Spain, raising 31,000 troops to enter Jillich-Cleves and expel the emperor's brother. With
the assistance ofSavoy and Venice, another 41,000 were to attack the Spanish across the
Pyrenees and in Northern Italy. Unfortunately, the fanatical end ofthe devot party
delayed the war against the Hapsburgs. While Henry IV traveled to meet with his advisor
Sully, the French cleric Frans;ois Ravaillac jumped into the king's carriage and stabbed
him three times in the chest. Because Louis XIII had not reached the age ofmajority,
Marie de Medici, the Italian wife ofHenry IV, became the Queen regent ofFrance.144
The regency ofLouis XIII from 1610 to 1617 marked a period ofsharp decline in
the politics ofthe French court. The Queen regent possessed few qualities needed to
effectively rule on her son's behalf. She was not particularly intelligent and had little
interest in the machinations ofgovernment. Her staunch Catholic beliefs made
conciliation with the Huguenots even more difficult than during the reign ofHenry IV.
Instead ofkeeping the king's capable advisors, Marie de Medici replaced them with her
foster sister, Leonora Galigai, and her husband Concini. She lavished them with pensions
and titles, nearly bankrupting the royal coffers by the time the Estates General met in
143 Maland, Europe at War, 40-42; Moote, 39-40.
144 Ibid.
71
1614. The Queen regent saw her position mainly as one ofluxury and comfort, not duty
d 'b'l' 145
Marie de Medici was a strong supporter ofthe Catholic cause, making her
regency praised by the devot party. Berulle profited from her patronage ofthe French
Oratory, giving the Queen mother a valuable and influential ally with the clergy. She
also pushed for the promotion ofkey politicians and court advisors, including Richelieu.
After his efforts at the Estates General in 1614, Marie de Medici took an increasing
interest in the Cardinal. Her backing brought him into the direct service ofthe king twice
and assisted in his candidacy for a red cap. Richelieu's support for the Concinis and the
Queen regent's pro-Hapsburg policy kept him in her favor. Their relationship changed
during the fall of 1624.146
Marie de Medici' anger over the Valtelline rivaled that ofthe devot party. Even
more than the other Catholic supporters ofRichelieu, the Queen mother regarded the
change in foreign policy as a personal affront. Since the beginning ofher regency in
1610, Marie de Medici actively sought an alliance between France and Spain. Simone
Bertiere, author ofthe four volume series Les Reines de France, suggested that she hoped
to assist the Spanish in creating Hapsburg hegemony across Europe. Her family
connections in Italy and Austria gave credence to this theory. However, similar to the
devot party, the Queen mother's devotion to the Catholic Church was a strong motivating
factor in her decisions. Taking a pro-Hapsburg position in foreign relations coincided
with the promotion ofher faith. 147
145 Philippe Delonne, Marie de Medicis, (Paris: Pygmalion, 1998), 137-138; O'Connell, 25-26,
146 Levi, 39-44, 56-58.
147 Simone Bertiere, Les Reines de France au Temps des Bourbons: Les Deux Regentes, (Paris: Editions de
Fallois, 1996), 189.
72
Before his appointment to the King's Council in 1624, Richelieu's beliefs aligned
with those ofMarie de Medici. Once he gained the confidence ofLouis XIII, the
Cardinal changed direction and promoted initiatives against the Spanish Hapsburgs.
Because ofher patronage for his political and religious career, the Queen mother saw the
First Minister's conversion as a betrayal. Only recently back from exile, her influence in
the French court was limited by the suspicions ofher son. She encouraged the peace
talks arranged by Berulle and used his influence to undermine Richelieu's plans to
remain resolute against Spain. The comte du Fargis, the French ambassador to Madrid
and a member ofthe devols, was manipulated by Marie de Medici into signing a hasty
treaty with Philip IV's First Minister, the Count-Duke ofOlivares. Because a peace
accord existed on paper, the king and his council were forced to honor the agreement and
consider a truce long before they desired. Although the Cardinal attempted to minimize
her authority over Louis XIII and the French court, the Queen mother held enough power
with the devol party to help disrupt the new foreign policy ofher former advisor.148
Urban VIII
When a government goes through a regime change, the new ruler is often forced
to cope with the situations left by the old one. Because numerous states had multiple
political factions during the seventeenth century, The Thirty Years' War left many
European leaders with these problems. With a religious connection to almost every
country on the continent, the popes ofthe Catholic Church that presided over the
decades-long conflict dealt with more than most rulers. This became the early fate of
Pope Urban VIII.
148 Tapie, 153.
73
Cardinal Maffeo Barberini was elected Pope Urban VIII on August 5, 1623. His
predecessor, Gregory XV, was only in office two years and left a large wake in his
passing. A fanatical defender ofthe Catholic cause in Europe, his decision in 1622 to
intervene in the Valtelline and station papal troops for the protection ofCatholics placed
the papacy in the middle ofan escalating battle between France and Spain. Although the
valley remained open to both countries, the agreement was more advantageous for
Olivares and Spanish efforts to permanently extinguish Protestant resistance in the
Netherlands. The papal garrisons were only to remain in the Valtelline for four months,
though Gregory XV kept them in place through his death in July 1623. He left his
successor sitting on a diplomatic volcano ready to erupt.149
Urban VIII's career followed the pattern ofmany popes during the Renaissance
period. Born and raised in a wealthy merchant family in Florence, he was educated and
trained for the seminary by the Jesuits. Showing early success as a diplomat, he became
a papal nuncio to France, adopting much ofthe culture and people. As pope, Urban VIII
was a great patron ofthe arts and Christian education, continuing a papacy tradition.
However, he also took advantage ofthe wealth and status ofthe Holy See, offering large
monetary donations to his family members. His nephews involved the Vatican in a
devastating personal feud with the Farnese family, draining the Church coffers and
aligning Venice, Tuscany and Modena against the Papal States. Although his pontificate
exhibited the same behavior as other popes, the pivotal timing ofUrban VIII's reign
made his judgments critical in the events ofthe Thirty Years' War.150
149 Elliott, The Count-Duke ofOlivares, 222; Ludwig Pastor, The History ofthe Popesfrom the Close ofthe
Middle Ages. vol. 28. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955),22-23.
150 Eamon Duffy, Saints & Sinners: A History ofthe Popes. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001),
232-234.
74
The Valtelline Episode was the new pope's first diplomatic crisis, precipitated by
the growing tension between two Catholic powers. Riche1ieu's attack on Urban VIII's
garrisons placed the pontiffin a difficult position. Aggression shown against Rome from
another Catholic state, especially one partly ruled by a cardinal, was an intolerable
offense. A pope that allowed such actions displayed the waning authority ofthe Church
to the Protestant rulers in Europe. He was also unwilling to deliver the Catholics in the
Valtelline back under the control ofthe Protestant Grisons. However, Urban VIII was
extremely sympathetic to the position ofthe Bourbons and France, having received
significant exposure to the people as the papal nuncio. Similar to France, he feared the
encroachment ofa growing Hapsburg hegemony on the Italian states and the Vatican.
Urban VIII had to handle the situation between France and Spain with cautious
dip10macy.151
During the summer of 1625, the pope sent his nephew, Cardinal Francesco
Barberini, as a papa11egate to Paris to negotiate for a peace treaty. Richelieu and the
French court detested the appearance ofUrban VIII's representative, who continuously
rejected any offer ofsettlement that involved restoring the Grisons. Barberini left Paris
several months later without any form ofagreement. Sending his nephew to France may
have been a rouse from the pope, as Urban VIII simultaneously levied the recruitment of
Roman troops for the defense ofCatholics in Northern Italy. Unable to take direct action
against Riche1ieu and Louis XIII, the pope was reduced to intimidation and threats of
religious impropriety. Urban VIII was forced to endure the conflict in the Valtelline
lSI Pastor, 55-56, 73-75.
75
between the Hapsburgs and Bourbons until diplomatic and domestic problems in the
French Court made peace necessary.152
The Jesuits
Few organizations in France remained divided over the crown's foreign policy
against Spain during the Thirty Years' War. Most groups fell into the unofficial
associations ofthe divots and the bon Fram;ais. As a religious organization in the
Catholic Church, the Society ofJesus, or Jesuits, was undecided on France's involvement
in the Valtelline and against the Hapsburgs. Over the course ofthe Reformation and the
years ofreligious wars, these priest scholars were persecuted and banished from the
Protestant countries in Europe. Governments despised and feared the influence they had
upon the nobility, particularly in their roles as confessors to princes. Promoting loyalty to
the papacy and the Church before kings made the Jesuits a perfect target for Protestant
. 153aggressIOn.
The situation in France was even more complex than other kingdoms on the
continent. The birth ofGallican ideals in the universities during the sixteenth century
fostered a developing connection between the French people and their country. These
sentiments affected both Catholic and Protestant subject ofthe crown, increasing
suspicions ofgovernment interference from Rome. Concerns about the Jesuits exploded
in 1594 when King Henry IV, a former Huguenot prince and recent convert to
Catholicism, was the victim ofa failed assassination attempt by Jean Chastel, a student of
the superior general ofthe Order. In response to this attack, the Parlement in Paris
152 Levi, 88; Pastor, 74-75.
153 Robert Bireley, The Jesuits and the Thirty Years War. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
2-3.
76
banished the Society ofJesus from France for eight years, forcing several colleges to
close. Only through the skills ofHenry IV's friend and confessor, Father Pierre Coton,
were the Jesuits allowed to reenter France on September 1, 1603. Most provinces
welcomed their reinstatement in the kingdom, as thirty-two applications for colleges were
received within five months.154
After Henry IV's assassination in 1610, the Jesuits' fight for acceptance grew
even more difficult. Father Coton became the confessor for the young Louis XIII and the
Queen regent actively support their universities and positions among the nobility.
However, the bon Fram;ais ofthe Third Estate relentlessly pressured the French court to
reinstate the ban on the Order, especially after the publication ofseveral articles on
justified tyrranicide and papal authority. Richelieu, before and after his appointment in
1624, was a strong supporter ofthe Society ofJesus and protected their interests during
the outbreak ofwar and rebellion. Muzio Vitelleschi, the new superior general since
1615, continually wrote the Cardinal, praising his efforts on behalfofhis priests. This
gave him an important ally in the upcoming conflict.155
French foreign policy in Northern Italy created a serious problem for the Jesuit
leadership. Richelieu's invasion ofthe Valtelline and the condemnation by Urban VIII
left the Society divided on what position to stand behind. An attack against the papal
troops by another Catholic state was difficult to ignore. Father Jean Arnoux, who
replaced Coton as Louis XIII's confessor in 1617, sided with Marie de Medici and the
devot party in denouncing Riche1ieu's course ofaction against Spain. However, the
Jesuits were very dependent on the goodwill ofthe French king and his First Minister.
154 Ibid, 11-13.
155 Ibid, 13-15,65-66.
77
Their secular teachings also brought them closer to the Gallican ideology than most other
clergy. The period from 1624-26 brought a renewed pamphlet war by the devots,
including more ultramontane literature on tyrranicide. While the public immediately
blamed the Jesuits, Richelieu and Louis XIII openly defended them and forbade any form
ofretaliation. As a result, Vitelleschi remained neutral during the Valtelline Episode,
despite the reprimands issued by Urban VIII. Although they refused to directly support
French policy in 1624, the Jesuits became an unspoken ally for the king and his court.156
Multiple events and conditions forced Richelieu to abandon his foreign policy
long before he desired. Marie de Medici and the devot party used their influence to
pressure the French court toward reestablishing a pro-Hapsburg foreign policy. The loyal
clergy that followed the pope, including Father Berulle, abhorred the violence among
Catholic states. While this motive also moved the Queen mother to action, her apparent
support ofthe House ofHapsburg further encouraged the challenge against the First
Minister's power. Despite his affections for the French people, Urban VIII refused to
accept the Cardinal's hostility against the papal soldiers. Weakened by internal
dissention and bankruptcy, his resistance took the form ofthreats ofexcommunication
and constant peace talks. While Richelieu was in a position ofpower to transform French
foreign policy against the Hapsburgs, key groups and individuals questioned his authority
and prevented his influence from becoming absolute.
156 Ibid, 15,66-75.
78
Chapter Five
A War on Paper: Political Pamphleteers
In his Testament Politique, Richelieu addressed the necessity ofa clean public
image for a ruler. He stated that a prince must always look to the public interest when
making decision on domestic and foreign policy. While this might temporarily hinder his
personal objectives, a king in good standing with his people will achieve more during his
reign than one less popular. Ofall the types ofpower a prince possessed, power
established through his good reputation was the most valuable. The Cardinal learned this
lesson early in his career, using public opinion to eliminate his opponents and promote
his strategy for France. The Valtelline Episode presented the first test ofhis ability to
defend his actions and manipulate the perceptions ofthe subjects ofthe French crown.
His major tools ofmanipulation were the printing presses.157
Printed pamphlets in seventeenth century France were far from the development
ofmodem newspapers and magazines. Disguised as collections ofarticles meant to keep
the public informed, they were primarily used for disseminating political propaganda into
the Third Estate and the local governors. The use ofleaflets, pamphlets, and small
booklets to generate rhetorical discourse was not new to France. Aside from being very
expensive to produce, they usually ran around ten pages in length. As a result, the French
nobility and the crown sponsored or controlled the majority ofthe printing presses. Two
massive pamphlet campaigns were waged prior to Richelieu's rise to power in 1624. The
prince de Conde launched one during the Estates General of 1614, attacking the regency
ofMarie de Medicis and the Concinis; a second came around 1620 from Louis XIII and
157 Testament Politique, 285-286.
79
Luynes, attempting to discredit the Queen mother in exile. Both campaigns meant to
influence public opinion, revealing the importance ofa good reputation in government.158
Richelieu's tenure as First Minister under Louis XIII began the gradual
development ofroyal control ofprinting presses and censorship ofpolitical propaganda.
In 1626, an edict was issued that required printed materials designed for public
distribution to gain royal permission. This involved proofreading by the King's Council
and acquiring a notary stamp ofthe Great Seal from the Secretary ofState before
publication. Father Joseph further aided the French propaganda ofthe First Minister by
assuming control the Mercurefram:;ais, France's largest and most distributed annual
newsletter. By recruiting pamphleteers loyal to his policies and censoring materials
attacking the his administration, Richelieu filtered the flow ofinformation to the nobility
and middle class elite.159
One ofRichelieu's earliest pamphleteers and supporters was the bon Fram;ais
Franyois Langlois de Fancan, a canon ofSaint-Germain-l'Auxerrois. Although a staunch
Catholic, Fancan detested the influence ofthe Jesuits and the attempts to forcefully
convert the Huguenots. He also held a strong hatred ofSpanish dominance in Italy and
the Netherlands, writing against the pro-Hapsburg initiatives ofMarie de Medicis.
Fancan began his service for the First Minister around 1618, just after the bishop of
LUyon was sent into exile. He assisted in denouncing Luynes in 1622 with the Chronique
des favoris. His vehement attack on the former advisor ensured that the King's Council
changed their policy concerning domestic issues. Fancan's other major pamphlets
assaulted the Luynes' successor, La Vieuville. The first, Le mot al'oreille de M le
158 Jeffrey K. Sawyer, Printed Poison: Pamphlet Propaganda, Faction Politics, and the Public Sphere in
Early Seventeenth-Century France. (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1990), 18-32, 38-45.
159 Ibid, 135-140.
80
marquis de La Vieuville, questioned his fiscal practices and excessive draining ofthe
royal treasury with unnecessary expenditures. The second, La voix publique au roy,
directly accused La Vieuville ofdisloyalty and betrayal ofthe king, demanding his
replacement. Along with fully describing Richelieu's anti-Hapsburg policy, Fancan all
but named the Cardinal as the best candidate for First Minister. After becoming head of
the King's Council, Richelieu continued to use the brilliant pamphleteer to promote his
ideology with the people.160
The first pamphlet campaign ofCardinal Richelieu's reign occurred during the
Valtelline Episode. After Creurves invaded the valley and expelled the papal troops, the
First Minister knew Catholic devots would denounce his policy and tum the public
against him. The Queen mother, supported by members ofthe clergy, also condemned
his actions at court and before her son, Louis XIII. In an effort to diminish the arguments
ofthe devots, Fancan published La Cabale Espagnolle in 1625.161 The pamphlet
discredited the pro-Hapsburg policies put forth by Marie de Medicis and warned against
the dangers ofa treaty with Spain. It stated that peace with Spain only benefited the
Spanish, citing several instances when Catholic rulers, like "the Duke ofNeubourg, the
prince himselfa friend, ally and very diligent to the Catholic religion," were betrayed by
the "many religious abuses ofSpain.,,162 Fancan concluded the pamphlet by recounting
the attempts ofSpain to take advantage ofalliances with France, beginning with King
Henry IV and continuing with the current affairs ofthe Grisons in the Valtelline.
160 Discussion ofthe Chronique desfavoris found in Levi, 66; Fancan's pamphlet attack on La Vieuville in
Lublinskaya, 265-267; background information on Fancan in Tapie, 145.
161 La Cabale Espagnolle, Entierement Descovuerte, al'aduancement de la France, et contentement des
bons Franr;ois. Paris, 1625; the certainty ofFancan's authorship ofthe pamphlet is discussed in William F.
Church, Richelieu and Reason ofState. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 118.
162 La Cabale Espagnolle, 4-6.
81
Ultimately, the Spanish were untrustworthy and any alliance made between the two
countries should contain serious benefits and protection for France.163
Pamphlets from the other end ofthe pew were expected over the Cardinal's new
foreign policy. Richelieu's authority in the French court was not yet strong enough to
suppress publications written by his opponents, and the devots wasted no time in
challenging his power. The first distributed was the Mysteria politica, published in
Antwerp in early 1625 and quickly translated into French. Written by Jacob Keller, the
rector ofthe Munich Jesuit College and confessor ofMaximilian ofBavaria, the treatise
mocked the validity ofFrench foreign policy and elevated the House ofHapsburg as the
saviors ofCatholicism in Europe. The pamphlet consisted ofeight fictitious letters,
comically portraying the Protestant allies ofFrance plotting against Spain and the Holy
Roman Emperor. Although somewhat embarrassing, the Mysteria politica did little
damage to Richelieu's administration and was quickly refuted by the spinning leaflets of
Fancan. l64
The more potent document was the Admonitio ad regem, circulated in Paris
around September 1625. The Jesuit Andre Eudaemon-Johannes, a member ofCardinal
Barberini's retinue from Rome, most likely wrote and distributed the pamphlet during the
legate's visit to Paris. The Admonitio severely damaged the foreign policies ofLouis
XIII and Richelieu, systematically destroying any previous attempts to justify their
actions.165
163 Ibid, 20-21.
164 Church, 121-122.
165 Ibid, 123, 126-127; Church gives an excel1ent summary ofthe Admonitio ad regem in his book, which
was formed from the actual document.
82
While the Mysteria politica attacked French foreign policy mainly through
political methods, the Admonitio ad regem made the Valtelline Episode and the
Protestant alliances ofRichelieu's administration a purely religious matter. Supporting
the causes ofheretics was forbidden by God and prohibited by the Scriptures, since it
directly opposed the authority ofHis Church. Therefore, Louis XlII's taxation ofhis
people, the Catholic nobility, and loyal clergy for the sake ofmaintaining these alliances
was the greatest mortal sin that the Most Christian King committed.166
The Admonitio next attacked Richelieu and the rest ofthe king's advisors for their
Machiavellian ideology. It stated that Louis XlII's council believed the European
conflict a purely political matter, outside the purview and authority ofthe Church.
According to the pamphlet, the Cardinal's foreign policy assumed that French power
should be acquired at all costs, since religion is not affected by the troubles and disputes
ofrulers. They claimed that their actions intended no harm to the Catholic Church, but
"He who lets in the wolves must answer for their deeds." The Admonitio argued that by
choosing to make peace with the Huguenots and supporting the spread ofheresy outside
France's borders, Louis XIII betrayed his oath to God when he accepted the crown. It
further accused the French ministers and their allies ofatheism, mocking God behind the
mask ofthe public goOd. 167
This treatise concluded by addressing the French Catholics among the lower
nobility and Third Estate. The Admonitio contended that the wars fought by the House of
Hapsburg were justified, since their purpose was to stamp out heresy in Europe.
Conversely, any Catholic prince who interfered on the side ofthe Protestants also
166 Ibid, 124.
167 Ibid, 125.
83
opposed the will ofGod and the defenders ofthe true faith. Louis XIII and his ministers,
it claimed, waged war with Spain because ofjealousy over their power and success,
ignoring the virtue ofthe Hapsburg cause. Ifthe king ofFrance was unwilling to follow
the righteous path, his subjects were empowered to reject his authority and rise up against
him. The Admonition ad regem maintained the purpose ofthe Thirty Years' War and the
conflict between France and Spain was a purely religious affair. It asserted that
Richelieu's foreign policy was heretical and considered sin against the Catholic
Church.168
Shortly after the publication and distribution ofthe Admonitio ad regem,
Richelieu quickly responded with his own pamphlet campaign. Fancan was the first to
meet the accusations, publishing a defense in his pamphlet series Miroir du temps passe.
The tracts used past events to draw similarities with the seventeenth century, particularly
concerning the devots and the pro-Spanish advocates. He argued that the rhetoric ofthe
ultramontane Catholics was the same as the Ligueurs, a former Christian faction that
sought to make affairs ofstate subservient to the power ofthe Church. Despite Fancan's
skill, Richelieu required a true defense ofthe religious piety ofthe king and his council,
which the Admonitio directly questioned. 169
Published and distributed in late 1625, a pamphlet appeared under the name
Jeremie Ferrier, a converted Protestant minister, entitled Le Catholique d 'estat ou
Discours politique des alliances du roy tn?s-Chrestien contre les calumnies des ennemis
de son estat, known simply as "The Catholic Man ofthe State." Although accredited to
Ferrier, Church argued that Father Joseph and Berulle collaborated on the project, and
168]bid,126.
169 Ibid, 127.
84
Richelieu himselfoversaw the composition ofthe publication. Because it also appeared
in other collections ofhis state documents, the work clearly represented the Cardinal's
official position in matters ofgovernment.170
The Catholique d'estat opened with an address to King Louis XIII, proclaiming
his glory and reminding all that he was a direct servant ofGod. God not only graced the
king with power and authority, He was the true impetus that caused rulers to act and
motivated their decisions:
And because [God] names you this, he wishes that you be gods and
abhors all that seek to bind your hands, diminish your rights, decry your
acts that should be venerated, and attempt to be judges and censors of
Your Majesty in matters where only God is your judge.171
The Catholique d'estat claimed that the actions ofkings were the inspiration ofGod,
which were beyond the normal understanding ofmen and their criticisms. Because many
ofthe decisions ofthe state were kept secret from the public, it was impossible for others
to judge the king's purpose as immoral and unjust. The king's authority was the
instrument ofGod's justice on earth. Because God anointed him, the king was beyond
h .. f 172
The pamphlet continued by explaining the definition ofa "Catholic ofstate." If
God made kings and kings made a state, it was logical that the state was also a religious
entity. As true Catholics, subjects ofthe crown should love both the ruler and country
granted to them by God. A person that rejected this understand was "impious and an
atheist who does not believe in the word ofGod or the practices ofthe Catholic
170 For information on the Catholique d'estat, see Church, 127-128; the pamphlet was reprinted in Paul Hay
du Chastelet, Recueil de diverses pieces pour servir aI'histoire. Paris, 1935.
\71 Chastelet, 85.
m Ibid, 85-86.
85
Church.,,173 A "Catholic ofstate" was the natural role ofa citizen, to love and support
God, the king, and the country created by them. This overarching rhetoric touched the
souls ofboth the religious and Gallican ideologies: love for God and the state. Therefore,
anyone that attacked the king and his policies was an enemy ofGod, and all true
Christians ofFrance were called to protect the king against such enemies,174
The Catholique d'estat justified the need to keep state secrets away from the
public eye, The king had the authority to make war against the enemies ofthe state,
without requiring the permission ofthe Church. Subjects ofthe crown were not qualified
to analyze the actions ofthe king:
Governments would be very distraught iftheir secrets, the force
that moves them, were handed over to the people for judgment and ifthey
required approval by empty minds and perverse self-seekers who would
judge states in the classroom and the guidance ofmonarchies and the rules
ofgovernment like those ofgrammar.175
The pamphlet argued that men ofone profession could not correctly judge the accuracy
ofsomeone in another profession. It was ludicrous to have a lawyer perform the duties of
a surgeon. Similarly, the Catholic clergy were improper judges ofthe decisions ofrulers.
The passage contended that those self-proclaimed Frenchman who wrote the Admonitio
ad regem were not true Frenchman, because no citizen who loved his country could hate
h' k' 176
After further defining the justification ofthe king's authority, the writers turned
toward comparing the alliances ofFrance with those ofthe Hapsburgs. France was
173 Ibid, 92.
174 Ibid, 92-94.
175 Ibid, 96-97.
176 Ibid, 96-99.
86
aligned with the Turks when Spain was aligned with the Persians. France supported the
Palatinate and Hesse as Spain did Saxony. France made an alliance with England only
after the latter broke their treaty with Spain. The former Emperor Charles V legalized
Protestantism in the Holy Roman Empire long before King Henry IV ofFrance passed
the Edict ofNantes. This section, written by Father Berulle, challenged the author ofthe
Admonitio in his claim that France made alliances with heretics. These were the political
actions engaged in by all countries in Europe. To condemn one king for these relations
was to declare the injustice and immorality ofall the rulers on the continent. Berulle
solidified the argument by stating, "Without involving their religion or consciences, they
entered into these relationships to maintain what they acquired and to conquer what they
judged necessary.,,177
The Catholique d'estat finally addressed the situation in the Valtelline, using prior
arguments to justify the support ofthe Grisons against Spain. The writers stated that the
Grisons were the subjects and allies ofFrance, even before they converted to
Protestantism. This alone did not invalidate their sovereignty over the Valtelline. The
threat posed by the Hapsburgs was a threat to all the Catholic states in Northern Italy.
Thus, the defense ofthe Grisons and the Alpine valleys was not done for the protection of
Protestantism, but the "very liberty ofall Christendom ... a much greater consideration
than the liberty ofa single valley.,,178 This explained why France made alliances with
Protestant states while suppressing the Huguenots in their own country. To protect the
177 Chastelet, 113-117; the direct involvement ofFather Berulle in this passage in Church, 135.
178 Chastelet, 126.
87
borders ofFrance from the Hapsburgs, peace was necessary among other provinces that
resisted the unjust plans ofSpain and Austria. 179
In one concise publication, Richelieu and his advisors simultaneously countered
each assertion made in the Admonitio ad regem and defined the basis oftheir political
ideology. Fancan's Miroir du temps passe adequately protected the king and Cardinal on
a purely political level. However, the devot article attacked the administration from a
religious standpoint, a position the fiery pamphleteer was incapable ofproperly
defending. His caustic writing style and overt belligerence toward the clergy also
detracted from the weight ofhis arguments. Richelieu understood that any serious and
effective answer to the Admonitio involved a theological response from men ofdevout
faith.
The Catholique d'estat was his answer to the devots. The First Minister
addressed his critics in the analytical form ofthe Admonitio ad regem, systematically
disproving each contention using both political and religious justifications. God exalted
the king and guided his policies, making Louis XIII an instrument ofHis law. Ordinary
people, including the clergy, could not understand all the decisions ofthe king, making
them incapable ofjudging his actions. This argument not only resolved the accusations
made in the Admonitio, it protected against further attempts to question the throne. The
Catholique d'estat also defended Louis XIII's assistance to the Protestant Grisons in the
Valtelline. The true threat to the Catholic Church was the corrupt rulers ofthe Hapsburg
dynasty. Richelieu contended that the sole motive for their European wars was not the
elimination ofheresy, but the satisfaction oftheir greed and desire to control the whole
continent. Therefore, it was necessary to align France with Protestant rulers for mutual
179 Ibid, 126-127.
88
protection against Spain and Austria. The pamphlet denied that this policy advocated the
spread ofProtestantism. Rather, France was justified in making alliances to challenge the
greater danger to Christendom.
The pamphlet campaign of1624-26 established the basis for Cardinal Richelieu's
raison d'etat, or reason ofstate. France was a Catholic state and Louis XIII was a devout
ruler. In matters ofgovernment, the king and his council was more qualified than the
clergy to form policies for the protection and growth ofthe country and its people.
Because advancing the goals ofFrance directly strengthened Christianity, removing the
menace ofthe Hapsburgs from Europe, even through alliances with Protestants, served
the greater good ofthe Catholic Church. This understanding ofraison d'etat, developed
during the Valtelline Episode, became the guiding principle ofRichelieu's
administration.18o
180 Church, 139.
89
Conclusion
Raison d'Etat and a Modern France
The Treaty ofMon90n was not how Richelieu intended the Valtelline episode to
end. By the beginning of 1626, the armies ofFrance and Spain were at a standstill in
Northern Italy. Although he maintained control ofthe valley, C~urves was unable to
make any serious incursions into Milan. Olivares gathered his army in Spain and Urban
VIII recruited troops from the Papal States; both prepared to launch a counteroffensive to
reclaim the Valtelline from the French. General Spinola, the commander ofthe armies in
the Spanish Netherlands, also arranged to move a small force down the Rhine River and
enter the Alps from the north. Venice and Savoy, both allies ofFrance, were involved in
their own ambitions and incapable ofcoming to C~urves' aid. All sides seemed ready
for war.181
The devots in France escalated their pressure on the king and his council for a
peaceful resolution to the crisis. All French Catholics, including Riche1ieu, understood
the danger ofa military confrontation with the papacy and began searching for alternative
solutions. In January 1626, the comte du Fargis, the French ambassador to Madrid,
signed a preliminary treaty at Mon90n with the Spanish minister Olivares. The
agreement restored the Grisons as the nominal rulers ofthe Valtelline, though worship
was guaranteed for the Catholic settlers living in the valley. The key stipulation in the
settlement gave Spain access to the pass and trade routes through the Alps, a compromise
Richelieu refused to accept with the papal nuncio Cardinal Barberini during the summer
of1625. The original draft ofthe treaty was also extremely vague concerning the
lSI Treasure, 90-91.
90
authority ofthe Grisons in the Valtelline and French access to its trade routes. Louis XIII
and Richelieu were outwardly angered by the hasty actions ofthe ambassador, who
apparently negotiated the terms ofpeace without consulting the king. On February 4, the
Cardinal sent a letter to Fargis, demanding the treaty be rewritten to specify the benefits
for France and the Grisons.182 After the final revisions were agreed upon, the Treaty of
Mon90n was signed on March 5,1626.183
The early consensus among historians was that Fargis, a member ofthe devots,
acted beyond his authority and against the wishes ofLouis XIII and Richelieu. Both men
appeared genuinely shocked by the news ofthe peace agreement reached in January. The
king's letters ofconsolation to his allies in Venice, Savoy, and Denmark, showed his ire
over the resolution ofthe treaty and the benefits given to Spain. Many also believed that
Fargis' wife, who was lady-in-waiting to the Queen mother and a close friend ofFather
Berulle, unduly influenced his decisions. Iftrue, this scheme would display the
overpowering weight the devots possessed in diplomatic matters and the weakness ofthe
Cardinal's government.184
A. D. Lublinskaya presented a more recent analysis ofthe Treaty ofMon90n in
his work French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-1629. The author asserted that
Riche1ieu instructed Fargis to secretly open a dialogue with Olivares at the end of 1625.
The First Minister knew the French army was currently incapable ofsimultaneously
resisting the external threat ofSpain in Northern Italy and the internal rebellion ofthe
Huguenots at La Rochelle. He also sought to avoid a military clash with Urban VIII.
Therefore, the French ambassador discreetly negotiated the terms ofthe treaty as the
182 Avenel, vol. 2,187-193.
183 Elliott, The Count-Duke ofOlivares, 256-258.
184 Moote, 182-183; Tapie, 152-153; Treasure, 91.
91
Cardinal informed him. When word reached the French court about the settlement on
March 5, Louis XIII and Richelieu acted livid to save face with their allies. Richelieu set
Fargis up as a political scapegoat to minimize the damage the peace accord caused among
Venice, Savoy, and Denmark. Through this interpretation, the Treaty ofMonyon was a
resounding diplomatic success for Louis XIII and his council.185
Ultimately, the Valtelline Episode was resolved far earlier and more peacefully
than Richelieu wanted it resolved. His desire to immediately disrupt the plans ofthe
Hapsburgs in Spain and Austria was clear in the opening months ofhis appointment in
1624. Many problems still plagued France when the Cardinal came to power. The Edict
ofNantes, ratified under Henry IV in 1598, suffered repeated abuse by the Huguenot
nobility, who continued to threaten the French crown with rebellion. The economy
remained in shambles, nearly bankrupted under the regency ofMarie de Medici. Ofall
these problems facing the kingdom, Richelieu determined the greatest danger to Louis
XIII's reign was the growing dominance ofthe House ofHapsburg in Europe. Ifhe was
unable to immediately upset the plans ofSpain and Austria, France's ancient enemy
would soon surround the kingdom on all sides.
The decision ofthe First Minister stirred up a hornet's nest inside the country,
particularly with his greatest supporters, the devots. By championing the Protestant
Grisons in the Valtelline, many French Catholics felt betrayed by the cleric they helped
acquire his office. Some used their influence inside the French court to speak out against
the Cardinal's strategy. Others took the argument to the middle class elite, launching a
propaganda campaign that questioned his political and religious motivations. Using his
own pamphleteers, Richelieu responded to their accusations by defining his reason of
185 Lublinskaya, 279-281.
92
state and the nature ofhis foreign policy in the Catholique d'Estat. The protection of
France, the true defenders ofChristianity, offered the greatest benefit for the Catholic
Church. His application ofraison d'etat throughout his service to King Louis XIII
brought the French throne into a golden age that lasted a century after his death.
Cardinal Richelieu survived numerous other events that defined his career. His
success during the Mantuan Succession became the first true victory for France over the
aggression ofthe Hapsburgs. The Day ofDupes secured the absolute authority ofhis
position and confirmed Louis XIII's confidence in him. French subsidizing ofGustavus
Adolphus, the King ofSweden, and his campaign in Germany shattered any cohesion left
inside the Holy Roman Empire. However, the Valtelline Episode, more than any other
event, established the direction ofhis leadership that guided France to the height of
power in Europe.186
186 Levi, 113-136.
93
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